Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Sean Duffy, Secretary of Transportation, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 9, 2024

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No. 24IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

PROTECT OUR PARKS, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

PETE BUTTIEGIEG, SECRETARY OF THE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

16 Thomas Place

Norwalk, CT 06853

MICHAEL RACHLIS

Counsel of Record

RACHLIS DUFF & PEEL LLC

542 South Dearborn Street,

Suite 900

Chicago, IL 60605

mrachlis@rdaplaw.net

Counsel for Petitioners

332432

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Obama Presidential Center project

(the “OPC”), which includes four structures

constructed over 19.3 acres of Frederick Law

Olmsted’s Jackson Park, located next to Lake

Michigan, is a major federal action under the

federal environmental laws when the roadwork

required because of the destruction and alteration

of its internal roadwork, necessitated by that

construction, is federally funded?

2. Whether a federal court can properly defer to

a federal agency’s narrow, unsupported and

KLJKO\ GHIHUHQWLDO GHÀQLWLRQ RI D PDMRU SURMHFW

escapes review under this Court’s recent decision

in Loper Bright v. Riamondo (2024) and its

well-established decision in Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (1971)?

3. Whether the federal reviews of the OPC relied

upon below employed illegal segmentation

to allow large portions of the undertaking to

escape federal review under the NEPA, the

Transportation Act and other federal statutes,

ZKLFKFRQÁLFWVZLWKWKHHVWDEOLVKHGLQWHUSUHWLYH

principles used in the D.C. Circuit?

4. Whether the Seventh Circuit erred in deferring

to the federal agencies who either ignored

or belittled the destruction of hundreds of

trees, migratory bird habitats, and other

key environmental in declining to require an

environmental impact statement?

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the trial court’s denial of the Plaintiffs’ only

motion for leave to amend pursuant to Fed. R.

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began, before any schedule was set, and before

any trial date was set?

6. Whether the Seventh Circuit’s refusal to reverse

the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of state law claims

for violation of the public trust doctrine and

improper delegation violated both Illinois law and

this Court’s precedents dealing with the duty of

loyalty, the duty of care, and the nondelegation

doctrine under the public trust doctrine?

iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

Petitioners are Protect Our Parks, Inc., Jamie

Kalven, W.J.T. Mitchell, Bren Sherriff, Sid Williams, and

Stephanie Franklin.

Respondents referred to as the Federal Defendants

are PETE BUTTIGIEG, Secretary of the U.S. Department

of T ra nspor t at ion, S T E P H A N I E P O L L A C K , Act i ng

Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration,

A RLENE KOCHER, Division Administrator of the Federal

Highway Administration, Illinois Division, M ATT FULLER,

Environmental Programs Engineer, Federal Highway

Administration, Illinois Division, DEB HAALAND, Secretary

of the U.S. Department of the Interior, SHAWN BENGE,

Deputy Director, Operations, Exercising the Delegated

Authority of the Director of the National Park Service,

JOHN E. WHITLEY, Acting Secretary of the Army, PAUL B.

CULBERSON&RPPDQGLQJ2IÀFHURIWKH$UP\&RUSVRI

Engineers (hereinafter the Federal Defendants).

The other respondents are the City of Chicago, the

Chicago Park District, and the Barack Obama Foundation.

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corporation with no parent entities that does not issue

stock.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al., v. Pete Buttigieg, et al., No.

21-cv-2006, U.S. District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois. Judgment entered on August 12, 2021 (Motion

for Preliminary Injunction) and March 29, 2022 (Motion

to Dismiss); Final Judgment entered November 3, 2022.

Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al., v. Pete Buttigieg, et al.,

Appeal No. 21-2449, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh

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Final Judgment entered on July 1, 2022.

Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al., v. Pete Buttigieg, et

al., Appeal No. 22-3190, U.S. Court of Appeals for the

6HYHQWK&LUFXLW$IÀUPLQJ'HQLDORI5HTXHVWIRU/HDYHWR

Amend and Dismissal of Federal Law Counts, and Final

Judgment entered on April 8, 2024; Denying Petition for

Rehearing, June 10, 2024.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PA RTIES TO THE PROCEEDING A ND

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .x

OPINION BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . .1

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT . . . . . . . . .21

Table of Contents

Page

REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

ON THE PETITIONERS’ FEDERAL

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW CLAIMS

CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S

DECISIONS IN LOPER BRIGHT AND

OV ERTON PA RK BY A D OP T I NG

A N I M PROPERLY HIGH LEV EL

OF DEFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

A. Unconstitutional Deference Regarding

'HÀQLWLRQRID0DMRU)HGHUDO$FWLRQ . . . . .23

B. Unconstitutional Deference Allowing

for Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

C. Improper Deference In Regards

to A nalysis of Issues Under the

T ranspor tation Act /Section 4(f )

Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

II. THE CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED ON THE

APPLICATION OF PUBLIC CITIZEN

IN REGA R D S T O LI M I TAT IONS

ON NEPA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

vii

Table of Contents

Page

III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

REGARDING THE NECESSITY OF

A N EN V I RON M EN TA L I M PAC T

STATEMENT IS CONTRARY TO THIS

COURT ’S PRECEDENT CURBING

U N BR I DL E D D E F E R E NC E T O

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES . . . . . . . . . .30

IV. REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

UPENDS FED. R. CIV. P. 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

RE V I EW OF T H E DECISION IS

NECESSARY AS THE DISMISSAL

OF THE PUBLIC TRUST AND OTHER

STATE LAW CLAIMS IS CONTRARY

T O T HIS COU RT ’ S A N D O T H ER

PRECEDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

viii

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 8, 2024 . . .1a

APPENDIX B — JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

EASTERN DIVISION, FILED NOVEMBER 3,

2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40a

APPENDIX C — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 1, 2022. . . .43a

APPENDIX D — MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS , EA ST ERN

DIVISION, FILED MARCH 29, 2022 . . . . . . . . . .66a

APPENDIX E — NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET

EN T RY I N T H E U N I T ED S TA T E S

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DI S T R IC T OF I L LI NOI S , F I L ED

JANUARY 6, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110a

APPENDIX F — MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS , EA ST ERN

DIVISION, FILED AUGUST 12, 2021 . . . . . . . . .113a

Table of Appendices

Page

APPENDIX G — DENIAL OF REHEARING

OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,

FILED JUNE 10, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165a

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.

1DW·O+LJKZD\7UDIÀF6DIHW\$GPLQ

538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Chevron v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 21-23, 33

Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. F.E.R.C.,

753 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26, 27

Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,

541 U.S. 752 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10, 29

Eagle County, Colorado v.

6XUIDFH7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ%RDUG

82 F. 4th 1152 (D. C. Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29, 30

Forman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Friends of the Parks v. Chicago Park District,

160 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (N.D. Ill. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Grand Canyon Trust v. F.A.A.,

290 F.3d 339 (D.D.C. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Cited Authorities

Page

Highway J Citizens Grp. v. Mineta,

349 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 25

Illinois Central v. Illinois,

146 U.S. 387 (1892) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

/DNH0LFK)HG·QY86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJ·UV

742 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) . . . . .10, 21, 22, 24-26, 28, 30, 33

Malec v. City of Belleville,

891 N.E.2d 1039 (Ill. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 37, 39

0LOKDXY6KDUS

15 Barb. 193 (N.Y. Gen Term 1853) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

0RQRQJDKHODY8QLWHG6WDWHV

148 U.S. 312 (1893) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Paepcke v. Public Building Commission of

Chicago,

263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37, 40, 42

People ex rel. Chicago Dryer Co. v.

City of Chicago,

413 Ill. 315 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al. v. Buttigieg, et al.,

10 F.4th 758 (7th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19, 22

xii

Cited Authorities

Page

Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al. v. Buttigieg, et al.,

39 F. 4th 389 (7th Cir. 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al. v. Buttigieg, et al.,

97 F.4th 1077 (7th Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al. v.

Chicago Park District,

971 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

6HYHQ&RXQW\,QIUDVWUXFWXUH&RDOLWLRQY

Eagle County,

2024 WL 3089539,

cert granted (June 24, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10, 30

6RXWKZHVW:LOOLDPVRQ&RXQW\

&RPPXQLW\$VVRFLDWLRQ,QFY6ODWHU

243 F.3d 270 (6th Dist. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 25

Federal Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq.

(Administrative Procedure Act). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 22

16 U.S.C. § 470(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

28 U.S.C. § 1254. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

31 U.S.C. 1221, et seq.

(Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

xiii

Cited Authorities

Page

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 31

44 U.S.C. § 2101, et seq.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

49 U.S.C. §§ 303 (a)—(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

40 C.F.R. § 1500, et seq.

(NEPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4, 6, 18, 20-22, 25, 27, 29, 33

40 C.F.R. § 1501.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 24

40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 24

40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 24

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 6, 31

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(8). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

86 Fed. Reg. 8677-01 (Feb. 8, 2021). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

xiv

Cited Authorities

Page

Federal Rules

Fed. R. Civ P. 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

Fed. R. Civ P. 12(b)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20, 41

Fed. R. Civ P. 15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19, 35, 37

Fed. R. Civ P. 15(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Fed. R. Civ P. 60(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Fed. R. Civ P. 60(b)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Fed. R. Civ P. 60(b)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Fed. R. Civ P. 62.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

State Statutes

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

Illinois Park District Aquarium and Museum Act,

70 ILCS 1290/1, et seq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15, 40

Cited Authorities

Page

Other Authority

Miran Levy, Panel Assignment in the Federal

Courts of Appeals, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 65

(2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government:

§ 136 (1690) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Robert G. Natelson, Legal Or igins of the

Necessar y and Proper Clause in Gar y

Lawson et al., The Origins of the Necessary

and Proper Clause (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Schanzenbach & Shoked, Reclaiming Fiduciary

Law for the City, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 565

(2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Patty Wetli, South Side Voters Speak Up for Trees

in Jackson Park and South Shore, Is Anybody

Listening? WTTW News, Nov. 9, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . .34

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit is reported at Protect Our Parks,

Inc., et al, v. Buttigieg, et al., 97 F.4th 1077 (7th Cir. 2024).

[Appendix A, pp. 1a-39a] The Seventh Circuit opinion

affirmed the decisions of the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois [Appendices B

(pp. 40a-42a, unreported), D (pp. 66a-109a, reported at

Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al. v. Buttigieg, et al., 2022 WL

910641 (N.D. Ill., March 29, 2022)), & E (pp. 110a-112a,

unreported)]

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254.

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion was issued on April

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rehearing en banc on May 23, 2024, which was denied

on June 10, 2024. This petition is timely based on the 90

days provided for by Rule from the denial of the petition

for leave to appeal.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

49 U.S.C. Section 303 (a)—(c) (the “Transportation

Act”)—Policy on lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges,

and historic sites—

(a) It is the policy of the United States

Government that special effort should be made

to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside

and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and

waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.

(b) The Secretary of Transportation shall

cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the

Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and

Agriculture, and with the States, in developing

transportation plans and programs that include

measures to maintain or enhance the natural

beauty of lands crossed by transportation

activities or facilities.

Subject to subsections (d) and (h), the Secretary

may approve a transportation program or project

(other than any project for a park road or parkway

under section 204 of title 23) requiring the use of

publicly owned land of a public park, recreation

area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national,

6WDWHRUORFDOVLJQLÀFDQFHRUODQGRIDQKLVWRULF

VLWH RI QDWLRQDO 6WDWH RU ORFDO VLJQLÀFDQFH DV

GHWHUPLQHGE\WKH)HGHUDO6WDWHRUORFDORIÀFLDOV

having jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge, or

site) only if—

(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative

to using that land; and

(2) the program or project includes all possible

planning to minimize harm to the park, recreation

area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic

site resulting from the use.

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)—Cooperation of agencies;

reports; availability of information; recommendations;

international and national coordination of efforts—

on proposals for legislation and other major

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of the human environment, a detailed statement

E\WKHUHVSRQVLEOHRIÀFLDORQ³

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed

action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which

cannot be avoided should the proposal be

implemented,

(iii)

alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term

uses of man’s environment and the maintenance

and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

(v) a ny i r r e ve r s i ble a nd i r r et r i e v a ble

commitments of resources which would be involved

in the proposed action should it be implemented.

Prior to making any detailed statement, the

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obtain the comments of any Federal agency which

has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with

respect to any environmental impact involved.

Copies of such statement and the comments and

views of the appropriate Federal, State, and

local agencies, which are authorized to develop

and enforce environmental standards, shall be

made available to the President, the Council

on Environmental Quality and to the public

as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall

accompany the proposal through the existing

agency review processes;

40 C.F.R. § 1501.1(a)—NEPA thresholds—

(a) In assessing whether NEPA applies or is

otherwise fulfilled, Federal agencies should

determine:

(1) Whether the proposed activity or decision

is expressly exempt from NEPA under another

statute;

(2) Whether compliance with NEPA would

clearly and fundamentally conf lict with the

requirements of another statute;

(3) Whether compliance with NEPA would be

inconsistent with Congressional intent expressed

in another statute;

(4) Whether the proposed activity or decision is

a major Federal action;

(5) Whether the proposed activity or decision,

in whole or in part, is a non-discretionary action

for which the agency lacks authority to consider

environmental effects as part of its decisionmaking process; and

(6) Whether the proposed action is an action

for which another statute’s requirements serve

the function of agency compliance with the Act.

40 CFR § 1508.18(a)—Major Federal action

Major Federal action includes actions with effects

that may be major and which are potentially

subject to Federal control and responsibility.

Major reinforces but does not have a meaning

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include the circumstance where the responsible

officials fail to act and that failure to act is

reviewable by courts or administrative tribunals

under the Administrative Procedure Act or other

applicable law as agency action.

(a) Actions include new and continuing activities,

including projects and programs entirely or

SDUWO\ ÀQDQFHG DVVLVWHG FRQGXFWHG UHJXODWHG

or approved by federal agencies; new or revised

agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or

procedures; and legislative proposals (§§1506.8,

1508.17). Actions do not include funding assistance

solely in the form of general revenue sharing

funds, distributed under the State and Local

Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. 1221

et seq., with no Federal agency control over the

subsequent use of such funds. Actions do not

include bringing judicial or administrative civil

or criminal enforcement actions.

&)5³6LJQLÀFDQWO\

6LJQLI LFDQWO\ as used i n NEPA requ i res

considerations of both context and intensity:

(a) Context.7KLVPHDQVWKDWWKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRI

an action must be analyzed in several contexts

such as society as a whole (human, national), the

affected region, the affected interests, and the

ORFDOLW\ 6LJQLÀFDQFH YDULHV ZLWK WKH VHWWLQJ RI

the proposed action. For instance, in the case of

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depend upon the effects in the locale rather than

in the world as a whole. Both short- and long-term

effects are relevant. (b) Intensity. This refers

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must bear in mind that more than one agency

may make decisions about partial aspects of a

major action. The following should be considered

in evaluating intensity: (1) Impacts that may be

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may exist even if the Federal agency believes that

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degree to which the proposed action affects public

health or safety. (3) Unique characteristics of the

geographic area such as proximity to historic or

cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands,

wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically

critical areas. (4) The degree to which the effects

on the quality of the human environment are

likely to be highly controversial. (5) The degree

to which the possible effects on the human

environment are highly uncertain or involve

unique or unknown risks. (6) The degree to which

the action may establish a precedent for future

DFWLRQV ZLWK VLJQLÀFDQW HIIHFWV RU UHSUHVHQWV D

decision in principle about a future consideration.

(7) Whether the action is related to other actions

ZLWK LQGLYLGXDOO\ LQVLJQLÀFDQW EXW FXPXODWLYHO\

VLJQLÀFDQW LPSDFWV 6LJQLÀFDQFH H[LVWV LI LW LV

UHDVRQDEOHWRDQWLFLSDWHDFXPXODWLYHO\VLJQLÀFDQW

LPSDFWRQWKHHQYLURQPHQW6LJQLÀFDQFHFDQQRW

be avoided by terming an action temporary or by

breaking it down into small component parts. (8)

The degree to which the action may adversely

affect districts, sites, highways, structures,

or objects listed in or eligible for listing in the

National Register of Historic Places or may

FDXVHORVVRUGHVWUXFWLRQRIVLJQLÀFDQWVFLHQWLÀF

cultural, or historical resources. (9) The degree

to which the action may adversely affect an

endangered or threatened species or its habitat

that has been determined to be critical under the

Endangered Species Act of 1973. (10) Whether

the action threatens a violation of Federal, State,

or local law or requirements imposed for the

protection of the environment.

16 U.S.C. § 470(f)—Section 106 of the National

Historic Preservation Act of the United States (“NHPA”)

The head of any Federal agency having direct

or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal

or federally assisted undertaking in any State

and the head of any Federal department or

independent agency having authority to license

any undertaking shall, prior to the approval of

the expenditure of any Federal funds on the

undertaking or prior to the issuance of any

license, as the case may be, take into account the

effect of the undertaking on any district, site,

building, structure, or object that is included in

or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.

The head of any such Federal agency shall afford

the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation

established under part B of this subchapter a

reasonable opportunity to comment with regard

to such undertaking.

INTRODUCTION

On January 21, 2009, then-President Barack Obama

issued a Memorandum on Transparency and Open

Government which proclaimed:

My Administration is committed to creating an

unprecedented level of openness in Government.

We will work together to ensure the public trust

and establish a system of transparency, public

participation, and collaboration. Openness will

VWUHQJWKHQRXUGHPRFUDF\DQGSURPRWHHIÀFLHQF\

and effectiveness in Government.

Government should be transparent.

These stirring words have not carried over to his

efforts through the Barack Obama Foundation (the

“Foundation”), working hand in hand with the City of

Chicago, to construct and operate the Obama Presidential

Center (“OPC”)—which is not a library1—at the heart of

1. On August 2, 2024 the National Archives and Records

Administration announced that it was closing its Hoffman

historic Jackson Park, an urban masterpiece designed

by Frederick Law Olmsted. While construction (far from

complete) has been underway for over three years, there

remains ingrained mystery and uncertainty about the

OPC. Putting aside unknowns about how much space is

SUHFLVHO\UHVHUYHGIRUH[KLELWVSULYDWH)RXQGDWLRQRIÀFH

space, the private residence and other items, mum is the

ZRUGUHJDUGLQJWKHÀQDQFHVIRUWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKLV

private project located on public trust property where the

public is contributing nearly a quarter of a billion dollars.

Today no one knows the real costs for the OPC,

whose completion date has been pushed forward again to

early 2026. No one knows the actual current budget for

the project. No one has reliable information regarding

what the funding of the Foundation is dedicated to, or

available for. The Foundation has not issued its Form 990

FRYHULQJWKHÀVFDO\HDURULWVDQQXDOUHSRUWIRUWKH

same. The mandatory endowment (which the Foundation

estimated as $470 million as of 2021, but not updated) that

the Foundation was required to set up under its Master

Agreement with the City of Chicago, as of the last public

reckoning, contained only $1 million contributed in June

1RRQHNQRZVZKHWKHUWKH)RXQGDWLRQKDVVXIÀFLHQW

funds dedicated to, or even available for, the actual costs

of construction of the OPC, which long ago exceeded the

numbers advanced by the Foundation and upon which

the City relied to transfer this public trust land, without

conducting proper due diligence. The Foundation and

Estates facility that actually housed the records and artifacts of

the Barack Obama Presidential Library. The contents are being

permanently moved not to the OPC, but rather to College Park,

Maryland next year.

the City, aided by unbalanced judicial rulings from the

Northern District of Illinois and the Seventh Circuit,

have effectively stonewalled Petitioners’ every effort to

obtain essential statutory review and public information

in regards to this project.

Against this backdrop, the Seventh Circuit’s

DIÀUPDQFHRIWKH'LVWULFW&RXUWLQIDYRURI5HVSRQGHQWV

is erroneous in light of both Loper Bright Enterprises v.

Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024) and Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) because

that decision is tainted with unconstitutional deference to

the federal agencies, as it found that the construction of the

OPC (i) was not a major federal action; (ii) the destruction

and alteration of roadwork to and around Jackson Park

was separate and distinct from the OPC construction, and

(iii) an environmental impact statement (an “EIS”) was

unnecessary for a multibillion project in historic Jackson

Park based expressly on no-look, abject deference.

The Seventh Circuit’s extreme deference allowed the

Foundation complete control over the location of the

OPC, notwithstanding its profound impact of an admitted

federal action, with severe adverse environmental

consequences, without meeting its statutory obligation

to examine alternative sites for the OPC. Such decision

is not only inapposite to Loper Bright and Overton Park,

EXWDOVRFRQÁLFWVZLWKWKH'&&LUFXLWRSLQLRQDSSO\LQJ

Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S.

D FRQÁLFW DOUHDG\ UHFRJQL]HG E\ WKLV &RXUW

by accepting certiorari in 6HYHQ&RXQW\,QIUDVWUXFWXUH

Coalition v. Eagle County, 2024 WL 3089539, cert granted

(June 24, 2024). This case offers a test as to whether lower

courts will be bound to follow Supreme Court precedent

at the crossroads of environmental, administrative and

constitutional law. For these and other reasons set forth

below, Petitioners request that certiorari be granted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Defendant Barack Obama Foundation (the

“Foundation”) is a private, non-governmental entity which,

in approximately 2014, began its search for a home for a

presidential library for the 44th President of the United

States.

2. In 2015, when Barack Obama was still president,

a Chicago ordinance announced that “the City and the

Foundation . . . [were] enter[ing] into a long-term ground

lease” for the site.” (emphasis added). [6HHDkt. 1, p. 16] 2

The City Council explicitly delegated the entire selection

process and choiceRIÀQDOORFDWLRQWRWKH)RXQGDWLRQDQG

its namesake:

WHEREAS, W hile the City Council is

FRQÀGHQW in the quality and thoroughness of both

UIC’s and UChicago’s proposals, the City defers

to the sound judgment of the President and his

Foundation as to the ultimate location of the

Presidential Library. [Id.] (Emphasis supplied)

It then continued:

It is anticipated that the City and the Foundation

will enter into a long-term ground lease that

will allow the Foundation to develop, construct

2. Unless otherwise noted, “Dkt.” refers to pleadings from

Case No. 21-cv-2006.

and operate the Presidential Center, and that

the Foundation will enter into a use agreement,

sublease or other agreement with NARA [National

Archives and Records Administration] to operate

the Library and Museum. [Id.]

3. Using that uncabined discretion, on July 29, 2016,

and without further input or analysis from the City, the

former President and the Foundation selected Jackson

Park as that site, created by Frederick Law Olmsted,

the greatest American landscape architect, which is

included on the National Register of Historic Places.

The OPC project has already dismantled some portions

of Jackson Park’s historic landscape by obliterating trees

and wildlife. It is in the process of wrecking the Park’s

historic transportation system by closing roadways that

remain integral to Olmsted’s initial conception of Jackson

Park and its surrounding area, and losing parkland to

expansions of parts of Lake Shore Drive and Stony Island

Avenue.

4. On May 17, 2018, the Foundation and the City

submitted their revised plans for the OPC to the City

Council, which in predetermined fashion, approved it

unanimously on the same day after a brief public hearing.

Five days later the City Council’s Zoning Board approved

the necessary amendments to the zoning laws, which were

UDWLÀHGE\DWRYRWHWKHQH[WGD\

5. Similarly, on October 31, 2018, the City also in

predetermined fashion, passed a new ordinance that

dropped the term “lease” from the proposal’s description,

because that word had become toxic after Friends of the

Parks v. Chicago Park District, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1060,

1062 (N.D. Ill. 2016) held that a 99-year lease to the Lucas

Foundation was tantamount to transferring a fee simple

interest, subject to review for essential fairness under the

public trust doctrine, after which the Lucas Foundation

moved its project to Los Angeles, California. Without

making a single substantive change, the City rechristened

its one-time lease for the OPC as a “use agreement,” which

left the Foundation with all its former control of 19.3 acres

of park land for 99 years for $10, and obligated the City

RI&KLFDJRWRHQJDJHLQVXEVWDQWLDOPRGLÀFDWLRQWRDVLWH

close to the Jackson Park Lagoon, plus extensive road

work for, as of 2018, an estimated $200 million, paid for

in full by federal funds.

6. With no barriers or opposition from the City, the

Foundation abandoned its plan to build a presidential

library, which it now rebranded a presidential center, done

in large part to avoid statutory restrictions that limited

the height of presidential libraries to 70 feet under the

National Archives and Record Act. 6HH44 U.S.C. § 2101, et.

seq. By rechristening the proposed campus a “presidential

center,” all those limitations, and others, no longer applied,

permitting the monument to stretch to 235 feet high, solely

for itsRZQEHQHÀW

7. The OPC project is monumental in terms of both

size and investment, for which total construction and

operating costs are unknown, but surely exceed $1.5

billion.

8. The massive undertakings to complete the

OPC are backed by millions of federal dollars; and they

mandate the destruction of four (4) roads in Jackson

Park, the needed expansion of both Lake Shore Drive

and Stony Island Avenue. The project description in the

NOTICE OF FINAL FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION ON PROPOSED

TRANSPORTATION PROJECT IN ILLINOIS, 86 Fed. Reg. 867701 (Feb. 8, 2021), speaks of this as one connected project:

The proposed construction along Lake Shore

Drive, Stony Island Avenue, Hayes Drive,

and other roadways in Jackson Park and the

construction of proposed trails and underpasses

in Jackson Park, Cook County, Illinois. (Emphasis

added).

Lake Shore Drive (U.S. Route 41) will be widened

to the west to provide an additional southbound

travel lane between 57th Street and Hayes Drive.

To accommodate the additional travel lane, the

59th Street Inlet Bridge will be widened and

PRGLÀFDWLRQVDWWKHLQWHUVHFWLRQVRIWK6WUHHW

Science Drive, and Hayes Drive are proposed.

Hayes Drive will be reconfigured to remove

existing on-street parking to provide two travel

lanes in each direction with minimal widening.

Stony Island Avenue will be widened to the east

to accommodate additional through lanes and

turn lanes at cross-street intersections. Proposed

bicycle and pedestrian accommodations include

the construction of four underpasses within

Jackson Park. Proposed trails and connections

along Cornell Drive, Hayes Drive, and Marquette

Drive will also be constructed.

The “other roadways” referred to in the first

paragraph above include Cornell Drive and the Midway

3ODLVDQFHJRLQJHDVW7KDWFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQLVFRQÀUPHGLQ

the second paragraph above, for constructing these trails

and connections requires closing Cornell Drive, including

the east bound lanes from the Midway Plaisance that now

lead into Lake Shore Drive. Additionally, other historic

transportation roads and vistas comprising Jackson Park,

such as Science Drive (which is referenced above), run off

of Cornell Drive to provide access to the parking under

WKH*ULIÀQ0XVHXPRI6FLHQFHDQG,QGXVWU\0RUHRYHUQR

work inside Jackson Park falls outside of this description.

9. Previously, in 2018, in a different and separate

suit from the matter at bar, Protect Our Parks and others

brought suit against the City and its park district for

violations of the public trust and related doctrines. In

June, 2019, the District Court (Judge John Robert Blakey)

found that POP had standing to bring the challenges in

that suit. On June 11, 2019, the District Court granted the

defendants City of Chicago and Chicago Park District’s

motion for summary judgment on the merits, using a

deferential standard that required the Court to ask

only´ZKHWKHUVXIÀFLHQWOHJLVODWLYHLQWHQWH[LVWVµIRUWKH

project, thereby denying that there was any independent

constitutional public trust standard, claiming the Illinois

Park District Aquarium and Museum Act, 70 ILCS 1290/1,

et seq. ´0XVHXP $FWµ SURYLGHV ´VXIÀFLHQW OHJLVODWLYH

intent . . . to permit diverting a portion of Jackson Park

for the OPC.” The District Court then recited unsupported

FODLPVRI´DPXOWLWXGHRIEHQHÀWVWRWKHSXEOLFDV

well as provide increased access to other areas of Jackson

Park and the Museum of Science and Industry,” [see Case

No. 18-cv-3424, Dkt. 145, pp. 25, 32] without mentioning

the road closures, the destruction of trees, or the huge

public subsidies.

10. Approximately six weeks after the Court’s

June 11, 2019 Opinion, those agencies issued a combined

report, titled “Assessment of Effects” (available at https://

www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dcd/supp_info/

jackson/aoe_for_public_review.pdf ) (the “AOE Report”)

which found that the “undertaking”—building the OPC

in Jackson Park—would create adverse effects including

the height and location of the OPC, the closure of various

roads, the clear cutting of old age trees, the destruction of

the Women’s Garden, and the destruction of the viewshed

and distinctive ambience of the original Olmsted design

for Jackson Park. [Id.]

11. Thereafter on August 7, 2019, plaintiffs in

that matter moved to vacate the Court’s June 11, 2019

Judgment under Rule 60(b)(2), 60(b)(5), 60(b)(6) and

Rule 62.1. [Case No. 18-cv-3424, Dkt. 156] The District

Court sat on that ruling for three months, until after

SODLQWLIIV KDG ÀOHG WKHLU DSSHDO LQ WKH 6HYHQWK &LUFXLW

on the initial judgment. Its opinion of November 6, 2019

ignored the AOE Report on adverse effects, holding that

these shortfalls did not matter under a novel standard

never applied previously anywhere, that the OPC passes

constitutional muster so long as it supplies any “public

EHQHÀWZKDWVRHYHUµ,WIXUWKHUFKDVWLVHGWKHSODLQWLIIVIRU

not anticipating the content on the AOE Report before

they were published. [Id., Dkt. 165, p. 4]. That ruling was

also appealed.

12. In August 2020, the Seventh Circuit held that

WKHSODLQWLIIVODFNHGWKHQHFHVVDU\VSHFLÀFDQGFRQFUHWH

interest to mount their state law public trust claims. It

therefore reversed the entry of judgment against the

plaintiffs, dismissing those claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. It did hold, however, that the plaintiffs

did have Article III standing to bring limited federal

claims for violations of the takings and due process

clauses, and held the defendants prevailed on those claims

on the merits. Protect Our Parks v. Chicago Park District,

971 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2020).

13. After the AOE Report was issued, the federal

reviews for the OPC project continued. The NHPA Section

UHYLHZ GHÀQHG WKH ´XQGHUWDNLQJµ DW LVVXH DV WKH

entire OPC project. The Section 4(f) report admitted and

recognized that the expansion of Lake Shore Drive and

Stony Island Avenue were properly “related”—indeed

proximately caused by—the OPC. “The need for the

[Federal Highway Administration] action [which is the

expansion of Lakeshore Drive and Stony Island] arises

as a result of changes in travel patterns caused by the

closed roadways” demanded by the OPC. [6HH Dkt. 1-2,

Complaint, Ex. 10 at 12] Relatedly, there is no dispute

WKDWWKHIHGHUDOPRQLHVDUHÁRZLQJWRVXSSRUWWKH23&

project. However, Respondents argued that the huge

federal monies for altering the roadwork in Jackson Park

were dedicated only for use on Stony Island Avenue and

Lake Shore Drive, even though expansion of the roads

was required by and intertwined with shutting down

half of the Midway Plaisance going east, and done solely

to accommodate the Foundation’s demand to place the

OPC further north where the pubic would get a clearer, if

somewhat cockeyed, view of the massive OPC tower from

the west end of the Midway Plaisance.

14. The current project is far from complete, and

5HVSRQGHQWV FRQWLQXH WR GHPROLVK VLJQLÀFDQW SDUWV RI

Jackson Park, its historical resources, parkland, and

trees, with its adverse effects on the human environment,

the historic landscape, wildlife, and migratory birds.

Respondents admitted that the OPC project is a “major

Federal action” requiring compliance with NEPA, but

notwithstanding the intertwined nature of the OPC

project, it was only the road expansions—not the

destruction of the park itself—that were characterized as

the major federal action subject to federal review; as such,

the agencies interpreted the various statutes to not require

review of alternative locations. The sheer magnitude of the

project and gravity of the proposed changes cried out for

an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). Nonetheless

the federal Respondents instead issued a Finding of No

6LJQLÀFDQW,PSDFW ´)216,µ EDVHGRQDQ(QYLURQPHQWDO

Assessment (“EA”) notwithstanding the major adverse

HIIHFWVÀUVWLGHQWLÀHGLQWKH$2(UHSRUWRI

15. These manifest failures led Petitioners in April

WR ÀOH D FRPSODLQW DJDLQVW 5HVSRQGHQWV FODLPLQJ

inter alia, that this truncated review violated both federal

and state statutes and case law doctrines. [Case No. 21cv-2006] The new case was assigned to Judge Jorge L.

Alonso by rotation. The City of Chicago immediately

applied to Judge Blakey to take control over that case

because it was allegedly closely related to another suit

ÀOHGE\3URWHFW2XU3DUNVWKDWKDGFRQFOXGHG GHVFULEHG

supra). On April 30, 2021 Judge Blakey, without hearing

or argument, recommended that the Executive Committee

for the Northern District of Illinois approve that motion,

even though Petitioners’ new action had new claims and

new parties which routinely bar such arguments. 6HH

Miran Levy, Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts

of Appeals, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 65 (2017). Judge Blakey

issued a further order that purported to combine this

new case with the earlier litigation because of their core

of common facts, without noting that the earlier case

already had been concluded. Subsequently, the Executive

Committee for the Northern District, after receiving a

written request from the City and Foundation (and without

response from Petitioners) issued a non-appealable order

assigning the case to Judge Blakey. 3

16. Judge Blakey proceeded to deny Petitioners’

motion for a preliminary injunction for the federal

environmental claims on August 10, 2021, but only

published his opinion on August 19, 2021, one day before

the 10-day appeal period to the Seventh Circuit ended.

+LVVKRWJXQGHFLVLRQZDVODWHUDIÀUPHGE\WKH6HYHQWK

Circuit. 6HH Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al. v. Buttigieg,

et al., 39 F. 4th 389 (7th Cir. 2022) [Appendix C]; see

also Protect Our Parks, Inc., et al. v. Buttigieg, et al., 10

F.4th 758 (7th Cir. 2021) (denial of motion to stay pending

appeal).

17. In November 2021, Petitioners sought leave

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 to bring an additional public

trust claim both individually and derivatively to prevent

the transfer of possession of large swathes of Jackson

Park to the Foundation on the ground that the transfer

was illegal because the City and the Foundation made

no attempt to satisfy contractual preconditions for that

WUDQVIHU7KLVPRWLRQZDVÀOHGZLWKLQDSSUR[LPDWHO\WHQ

weeks after information supporting it became publicly

available for evaluation: no discovery in the matter had

3. Such actions are all too common but rarely survive

in appellate litigation and this case offers an opportunity to

reexamine the practice.

begun; no discovery schedule was set; and no trial date

was set. Petitioners explicitly disclaimed any third-party

EHQHÀFLDU\FDXVHVRIDFWLRQZHOONQRZLQJWKDWWKRVHZHUH

purportedly barred under Paragraph 34 of the Master

Agreement between the City and the Foundation. On

-DQXDU\RQHGD\DIWHUEULHÀQJRQWKHPRWLRQIRU

leave was completed, Judge Blakey denied the motion

on the grounds that Petitioners had pled third-party

EHQHÀFLDU\ FODLPV ZKLFK GHFLVLRQ HIIHFWLYHO\ EORFNHG

all substantive examination of the financial terms of

the agreement between the City and Foundation, which

remain largely hidden to this day.

18. Judge Blakey then granted the Foundation and

City Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

all of Petitioners’ state law claims. [Appendix D]

19. Subsequently, after the administrative record

was completed and filed, the District Court entered

summary judgment on Petitioners’ federal claims for

the reasons in its denial of the preliminary injunction.

[Appendix B] Petitioners appealed all of these rulings

again to the Seventh Circuit.

2Q$SULOWKH6HYHQWK&LUFXLWDIÀUPHG

the District Court’s decisions rejecting all of Petitioners’

challenges under NEPA, the Transportation Act, and

NHPA, whose common foundation was extreme deference

to the federal agencies’ decisions on interpretations of

statutes and regulations, including those dealing with

what elements comprise a major federal action and what

alternatives were to be reviewed. [Appendix A] The

6HYHQWK&LUFXLWDIÀUPHGGLVPLVVDORIWKHVWDWHODZFODLPV

applying a heretofore novel standard of total deference in

dealing with both public trust and nondelegation claims.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the Rule

15 motion to amend by parroting the District Court’s

conclusion that Petitioners were bringing a third-party

beneficiary claim barred by the agreement, despite

Petitioners’ explicit statement that they were not suing on

the contract, but as taxpayers. Malec v. City of Belleville,

891 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ill. 2008).

21. On May 22, 2024, Petitioners filed a timely

petition for rehearing en banc. On June 10, 2024, the

petition for rehearing was denied. [Appendix G]

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION ON THE

PETITIONERS’ FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL

REVIEW CLAIMS CONFLICTS WITH THIS

COURT’S DECISIONS IN LOPER BRIGHT

A ND OVERTON PA RK BY A DOPTING A N

IMPROPERLY HIGH LEVEL OF DEFERENCE.

The Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of the agency

ÀQGLQJVXQGHU1(3$WKH7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ$FWDQG1+3$

XQDEDVKHGO\GHIHUUHGWRWKRVHDJHQF\GHFLVLRQVGHÀQLQJ

the project and segmenting the OPC out of their review,

as the Court repeatedly stated that, i.e., the “agency was

entitled to take the Jackson Park site as a given where

carrying out his duties.” [Appendix A at 28a] Indeed, in

an earlier opinion on Petitioners’ motion to stay pending

appeal, the Seventh Circuit admonished Petitioners for

not recognizing that the Seventh Circuit need only defer

to the agency actions: “7KH ÀUVW SUREOHP ZLWK 3URWHFW

Our Park’s position is that it fails to take into account the

deference courts owe to agencies with respect to relevant

scope of a project.” Protect Our Parks v. Buttigieg et al.,

10 F.4th at 764.

The Seventh Circuit dodged its obligations under

NEPA, the Transportation Act, NHPA, and the other

statutes for which reviews were triggered by adopting

a form of abject deference prohibited by Loper Bright

and manifestly inconsistent with Overton Park and its

progeny in three critical dimensions. First, it deferred to

5HVSRQGHQWV·XVHRIDQLPSRVVLEO\QDUURZGHÀQLWLRQRID

major federal action under NEPA and interpretation of

the Transportation Act which necessarily dismembered

Jackson Park solely to escape examining any alternatives

for the OPC outside of Jackson Park. Second, and related,

the Seventh Circuit’s complete deference approach allowed

Respondents to segment the project. Third, the Seventh

Circuit shunned any substantial inquiry into Respondents’

choices, at the same time ignoring the intentionally

interconnected nature of the OPC project. Both Loper

Bright and Overton Park establish that such deference,

which impacts all of Respondent’s federal reviews, is

unconstitutional.

Loper Br ight overturned Chevron v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),

holding that the Administrative Procedure Act requires

courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding

whether an agency acted within its statutory authority. 144

S.Ct. at 2265. Loper Bright highlights and complements

the Court’s earlier decision in Overton Park, which states

that:

[T]he generally applicable standards of § 706

require the reviewing court to engage in a

substantial inquiry. Certainly, the Secretary’s

decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity.

But that presumption is not to shield his action

from a thorough, probing, in-depth review.

401 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit’s

decision is clear error under these authorities and

certiorari properly granted.

Unconstitutional Deference Rega rding

'HÀQLWLRQRID0DMRU)HGHUDO$FWLRQ

The Seventh Circuit’s decision here wrongly deferred

to the interpretations of the various agencies of the

relevant statutes and regulations when it found that the

OPC project was a “local” project and not a unitary “major

federal action.” [Appendix A at 26a] Indeed, the case on

which the Seventh Circuit relies as to what constitutes a

major federal action, Highway J Citizens Grp. v. Mineta,

349 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2003) [see Appendix A at 26a],

demonstrates the vast gulf between proper review and

the threadbare, deferential review undertaken here. The

Mineta court stated in part that “[i]f an agency considers

the proper factors and makes a factual determination on

ZKHWKHUWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVDUHVLJQLÀFDQWRUQRW

that decision implicates substantial agency expertise and

is entitled to deference.” Id. at 953. Most critically, that

statement followed an explicit factual determination that

none of the construction activities on the road would in

any way affect proposed tunnel repairs. But, the Seventh

Circuit ignored that key condition precedent by showering

uber-deference on the agency’s unmoored discretion on

DOOPDWWHUVRIVWDWXWRU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDERXWWKHGHÀQLWLRQ

of a major federal action that was applied here. This

case affords the opportunity to determine whether such

excessive deference survives under Loper Bright.

Certiorari is critical to decide whether an independent

and non-deferential standard of the applicable statutes and

regulations establishes whether the OPC project as a whole

is a “major federal action.” It is also necessary to decide

whether the deference shown in the Seventh Circuit’s

decision is contrary to 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2003), which

GHÀQHVDPDMRUIHGHUDODFWLRQDVRQHZKLFK´LQFOXGHV

actions with effects that may be major, and which are

potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility”

(emphasis added), especially when “[a]ctions include new

and continuing activities, including projects and programs

entirely or partlyÀQDQFHGDVVLVWHGFRQGXFWHGUHJXODWHG

or approved by federal agencies; new or revised agency

rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and

legislative proposals (§§ 1506.8, 1508.17).” 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.18(a) (emphasis added).

Moreover, it is critical to ask whether the Seventh

&LUFXLW·V GHIHUHQFH FDQ EH MXVWLÀHG RU H[SODLQHG VROHO\

because a private actor serves as the site’s developer.

Lower courts have made it clear that even non-federal

projects can constitute a “major federal action” for

example: “(1) when the non-federal project restricts

or limits the statutorily prescribed decision-makers’

choice of reasonable alternatives; or (2) when the federal

decision-makers have authority to exercise sufficient

control or responsibility over the non-federal project so

DV WR LQÁXHQFH WKH RXWFRPH RI WKH SURMHFWµ 6RXWKZHVW

:LOOLDPVRQ &RXQW\ &RPPXQLW\ $VVRFLDWLRQ ,QF Y

6ODWHU, 243 F.3d 270, 281 (6th Dist. 2001). Consistent with

that decision, the non-federal action to which the Seventh

Circuit deferred improperly restricted the statutory duty

to examine alternative sites outside of Jackson Park, given

the federal control over the funding for new roadwork.

Certiorari is necessary to resolve the Seventh Circuit’s

FRQÁLFWZLWKLoper Bright and decisions like 6RXWKZHVW

:LOOLDPVRQ

B. Unconstitutional Deference Allowing for

Segmentation

It needs to be determined whether Seventh Circuit

exercised independent judgment over the segmentation

LVVXHZKHQLWGHIHUUHGWRWKHDJHQFLHV·GHÀQLWLRQRIWKH

project, which precluded any review of the critical issue

under these various federal statutes, thereby allowing it

to sidestep looking at any alternative sites for the OPC

outside Jackson Park. At every turn in its opinion the

Seventh Circuit found the agency properly removed the

OPC from consideration in its duties to perform federal

reviews, citing again to deferring to local decision makers

under its misreading of Mineta. 6HH, e.g., Appendix A at

24a-27a (narrowing scope of NEPA review), Appendix A

at 28a (narrowing scope of NHPA review (“Section 106

applies only to federal projects, not local work such as the

Foundation’s plan”)); Appendix A at 27a (narrowing review

under Section 4(f ) of Transportation Act (“the FHWA had

no authority to tell the Foundation to build the Center

somewhere else or to forbid the City from authorizing

that location.”)).

This Court’s opinion in Loper Bright raises the

question of whether the Seventh Circuit unconstitutionally

deferred to the interpretation of the agencies (and private

developers) of Congressional mandates, by segmenting

the project to avoid a substantial review of any viable

alternative that protected the environment and historic

resources by refusing to look to alternative sites for

the unitary OPC project in Jackson Park. The point is

critical given the previous acknowledgement from these

same federal agencies that the proposed undertaking

collectively involved “the potential effects to historic

properties from the Obama Presidential Center (OPC)

project and certain related Federal actions in and near

Jackson Park.” [6HH Dkt. 1-1, Complaint, Ex. 3, January

16, 2020 Assessment of Effect Report at 1] Indeed, the

roadwork involving the expansion of Lake Shore Drive and

Stony Island is “related” to—indeed necessitated by—the

OPC, so that a proper account of the undertaking includes

“the construction of the OPC in Jackson Park by the

Obama Foundation, the closure of roads to accommodate

the OPC and to reconnect fragmented parkland, the

UHORFDWLRQRIDQH[LVWLQJWUDFNDQGÀHOGRQWKH23&VLWHWR

adjacent parkland in Jackson Park, and the construction of

a variety of roadway, bicycle and pedestrian improvements

in and adjacent to the park.” Id.

In addition, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of

segmentation has created a circuit split with the D.C.

Circuit as seen in Delaware Riverkeeper Network v.

F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2014), itself a ground

for certiorari review. There the question was whether the

federal government engaged in improper segmentation

when it sought permits to repair one segment of a

continuous pipeline that was connected to, and operated in

unison with, other segments. That court’s careful opinion

started its segmentation analysis by referring to the

regulation’s requirements of interdependence of activities

on a single site set forth above. The Delaware Riverkeeper

Network court held that there was no evidence that any

of the segments of the single pipeline had some “logical

termini,” id. at 1315, or “substantial independent utility,”

id. at 1316. Accordingly, the operational connections

among the separate repairs were too strong to allow

for segmentation, as it was essential to deal with the

cumulative impacts of the overall upgrade project. The

court’s conclusion followed swiftly:

[W]e hold that in conducting its environmental

rev iew of the Nor theast P roject w ithout

considering the other connected, closely related,

and interdependent projects on the Eastern

Leg, FERC impermissibly seg mented the

environmental review in violation of NEPA.

:H DOVR ÀQG WKDW )(5&·V ($ LV GHÀFLHQW LQ LWV

failure to include any meaningful analysis of the

cumulative impacts of the upgrade projects.

Id. at 1309.

The level of interconnection between roads in Jackson

Park is marked by innumerable daily interactions between

SHGHVWULDQVDQGYHKLFXODUWUDIÀFQLJKWDQGGD\ZKLFKDUH

far tighter than the occasional pipeline repairs in Delaware

Riverkeeper Network. All the activities in Jackson Park

occur in close physical proximity with each other. Indeed,

the four (4) so-called “local” roads destroyed by the OPC

are key arteries: the Midway Plaisance going east, Cornell

Drive going north and south, Hayes Drive and Marquette

Drive going east and west. Having consistency among the

circuits on these frequent segmentation cases is critical to

the enforcement of the environmental laws, so resolving

the circuit split regarding the segmentation analysis is

vital.

Improper Deference In Regards to Analysis of

Issues Under the Transportation Act/Section

4(f) Review

With respect to Section 4(f ) review under the

Transportation Act, the Seventh Circuit again improperly

deferred to an agency’s narrow interpretation of the

SURMHFW·V GHÀQLWLRQ DV GLVFXVVHG DERYH LQ FRQMXQFWLRQ

with its clearly erroneous mantra that the agency was

entitled to take the construction of the OPC at the Jackson

Park site as a given. Such deference is contrary to Loper

BrightE\DUWLÀFLDOO\WUXQFDWLQJWKHVXEVWDQWLYHUHYLHZRI

statutorily required alternatives under the Transportation

Act. While the Department of Transportation cannot force

any developer to use one of the alternatives examined

in the review, nonetheless, it still has the absolute

authority to not approve funding for projects that do

not meet federal environmental standards when there

are feasible and prudent alternatives. 6HH 49 U.S.C.

§ 303(c). Put differently, the federal government cannot

propose but it can, and is duty bound to, veto in a proper

case a request for funds after performance of a proper

review, never undertaken here. The Seventh Circuit’s

decision impermissibly converts a mandatory statutory

requirement under Section 4(f) into a discretionary

one. Certiorari is needed to prevent the spread of this

dangerous practice.

II. T H E CIRCU I T S A RE DI V I DED ON T H E

A PPLICAT ION OF PUBL IC CITIZEN I N

REGARDS TO LIMITATIONS ON NEPA.

As the federal register makes clear, and as the

FHWA admits, “[t]he need for the FHWA action arises

as a result of changes in travel patterns caused by the

closed roadways” necessitated by the OPC. [Dkt. 1-2,

Complaint Ex. 10 at 12 (emphasis added)] Without that

roadwork, the OPC could not proceed forward. Despite

this evidence of proximate cause, the Seventh Circuit

relied on Public Citizen to support its limited application

of NEPA by adopting the mantra that federal law does not

require agencies to waste time and resources evaluating

the environmental effect that those agencies neither cause

nor have the authority to change. On this issue, which

directly impacts the scope of review under NEPA (and

impacts other related federal reviews), there is a circuit

split between the Seventh Circuit (and other circuits) with

the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Eagle County, Colorado v.

6XUIDFH7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ%RDUG, 82 F. 4th 1152 (D. C. Cir.

2023).

In Eagle County, the issue involved the approval for

the construction and operation of a new rail line serving

areas in Colorado and Utah. A local board performed a

limited environmental review, expressly not considering

issues such as the Endangered Species Act, effects of oil

and development, or other rail carriers because the board

interpreted that they had no jurisdiction over them.

The D.C. Circuit reversed, stating that the Board

“cannot avoid its responsibility under NEPA to identify

and describe environmental effects” of other matters “on

the ground that it lacks authority to prevent, control, or

mitigate those developments.” 82 F.4th 1180. That decision,

moreover, goes much further than here for there the D.C.

Circuit required the parties that constructed an 80-mile

spur line in Utah to examine the effects of that construction

as far away as Louisiana, Texas and Colorado, which were

all subject to review by other government authorities. The

railroad had already conducted an exhaustive study of the

impacts of the new line on its immediate environs. Thus,

even adopting the narrowest reading of the government’s

duty in Eagle County, it is imperative to include in the

review alternative sites that were about one mile away

from Jackson Park. The Court has recently accepted

certiorari on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion 6HYHQ &RXQW\

Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, 2024 WL

3089539, cert granted (June 24, 2024), and should do so

here, for no matter which way Eagle County comes out,

the decision of the Seventh Circuit is wrong.

III. T H E S E V E N T H C I R C U I T ’ S DE C I S I O N

R E G A R DI NG T H E N E C E S S I T Y OF A N

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT IS

CONTRARY TO THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT

CURBING U NBRIDLED DEFERENCE TO

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

In this case, it is imperative to ask whether the

Seventh Circuit engaged in improper uber-deference to

WKHIHGHUDODJHQFLHV·GHFLVLRQVLQÁDWO\GHQ\LQJDQ(,6LQ

direct contravention of this Court’s Loper Bright decision:

As we explained in POP III, the administrative

record shows the ‘agencies were very thorough.’

The environmental assessment includes, among

other things a Natural Resources Technical

Memorandum that discusses the habits of

migratory birds and how the project will the

effect the nests as well as a Tree Technical

Memorandum that considers each species of tree

that will be cut down to build the Center. After

reviewing each of these effects, the agencies

concluded that none would have a significant

impact. The environmental assessment thus

FRQÀUPV WKDW WKH DJHQFLHV WRRN WKH QHFHVVDU\

hard look at the environmental impact at likely

environmental impact before reaching a decision.

Appendix A at 25a.

The federal agencies thus gave a hard look to the

wrong question. The issue is not what replacements

work best once Jackson Park is wrecked. It is the prior

question of whether the project should be taken at all, to

which no look, hard or otherwise, was given in making

D ÀQGLQJ RI QR VLJQLÀFDQW LPSDFW ZKLFK WR 3HWLWLRQHUV·

knowledge has never been granted on a project of this

size. The law requires a federal agency to prepare an

(,6IRUDPDMRUIHGHUDODFWLRQ´VLJQLÀFDQWO\DIIHFWLQJWKH

quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).

Furthermore, an EIS must be prepared when an EA

reveals that a proposed action may VLJQLÀFDQWO\LPSDFW

the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). The applicable

regulations make clear that both context and intensity

PXVW EH FRQVLGHUHG ZKHQ ORRNLQJ DW ´VLJQLÀFDQFHµ 6HH

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. Here, both the context and intensity

of the actions show beyond doubt that the environmental

LPSDFWLVVLJQLÀFDQW7KHDJHQFLHV·HUURUVDQGRPLVVLRQV

are particularly glaring when discussing the massive

destruction of trees.

Here, the Seventh Circuit deferred to an agency

decision based on a purportedly “meticulous tree survey”

describing what new trees should be planted and green

lighting without a second thought the destruction of more

than 800 trees, the vast majority of which are mature or

near maturity and in good to fair condition. In so doing,

the Seventh Circuit let the agencies ask and answer the

wrong question: how do we best replace the 800 trees cut

down. Again, the right question is: why cut down those

trees at all? Build this project elsewhere, and it becomes

easy to save all those 800 trees. Such deference gave way

to rubberstamping the agencies nonsensical solution which

could take up to one hundred (100) years or more to plant

new saplings of 2 to 4 inches in diameter to reach full size.

[6HHDkt. 61-22, Fed. Defs. Ex. 17, Part 1, Appendix D-1]

Certiorari could determine whether this omission is

inexcusable. These existing large trees have for decades

provided safe nests to local and migratory birds. [Dkt.

1-2, Compl. Ex. 10 at 29-34] They absorb large amounts

of water that helps stabilize the local environment, and

they remove large amounts of carbon dioxide from the

air. Countless recent studies speak to their critical role

in maintaining the fragile ecological balance. 6HH, e.g.,

7KH 0RUWRQ $UERUHWXP %HQHÀWV RI 7UHHV DYDLODEOH DW

https://mortonarb.org/plant-and-protect/benefits-ofWUHHV ´1XPHURXV VFLHQWLÀF VWXGLHV KDYH VKRZQ WKDW

trees promote health and well-being by reducing air

pollution, encouraging physical activity, enhancing mental

health, promoting social ties, and even strengthening the

economy.”).

In the face of this evidence, how could both the EA

(and its referenced Tree Memorandum [Dkt. 31-1, Ex.

6, AE Appendix D, Trees Technical Memorandum])

conclude that clear-cutting about 800 mature trees was

´LQVLJQLÀFDQWµ UHO\LQJ XSRQ inter alia, some possible

future planting of saplings, without pointing to a single

similar determination made anywhere else in the United

States. This Court should ask whether that ruling is

especially inappropriate in a city, like Chicago, that is in

fact tree poor. [Dkt. 80, Ex. 10, Mark Rivera, “Chicago

tree canopy dwindling; calls for equity, tree planting in

underserved communities,” June 30, 2021]

Nor should it matter, as the District Court claimed,

that there were some “unaffected 500-plus acres of

Jackson Park,” or, indeed several thousand acres along the

Chicago Lakefront, or the millions of acres nationwide.

Any purported ratio would gut both NEPA and the

Transportation Act by allowing government agencies

to use the largest possible denominator to trivialize

any government action. There is not a single regulation,

case, or practice anywhere that defers to any agency

judgment that equates mature trees from a historic park

with saplings. Deference in such circumstances is wholly

indefensible and is thus prohibited by both Loper Bright

and Overton Park.

Furthermore, and also contrary to Loper Bright, the

Seventh Circuit’s improper deference infects the agencies’

interpretations of federal regulations with regards to an

EIS. For example, any well-designed EA or EIS must

examine the intensity of any factor that affects “[u]nique

characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity

to historic or cultural resources [and] park lands [and]

[t]he degree to which the action may adversely affect

districts, sites, highways, structures, or objects listed in

or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic

3ODFHV RU PD\ FDXVH ORVV RU GHVWUXFWLRQ RI VLJQLÀFDQW

VFLHQWLÀF FXOWXUDO RU KLVWRULFDO UHVRXUFHVµ &)5

§§ 1508.27(b)(3), (8). Those vulnerable areas are found

everywhere in Jackson Park, which is listed on the

National Register of Historic Places (as is the Midway

Plaisance, and the Chicago Boulevard Historic District),

and is an acknowledged Olmsted masterpiece.

The court’s improper deference also stretches to

the agencies’ interpretation of how “the effects on the

quality of the human environment are likely to be highly

controversial,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4). Here, the

agencies and courts all ignore for example, a nonbinding

advisory referendum in the November 2022 election,

where citizens voted overwhelmingly (by 82 percent) to

halt the destruction of trees in Jackson Park, in connection

with the OPC and any related activities. 6HH, Patty Wetli,

South Side Voters Speak Up for Trees in Jackson Park

and South Shore, Is Anybody Listening? WTTW News,

Nov. 9, 2022 https://news.wttw.com/2022/11/09/southside-voters-speak-trees-jackson-park-and-south-shoreanyone-listening.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision and its deference on

such issues is contrary to other circumstances where

such a development of this size and its environmental

destruction has not avoided an EIS, creating not only

DFRQÁLFWZLWKWKLV&RXUW·VDXWKRULW\EXWRWKHUFLUFXLWV·

analyses. 6HH, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l

+LJKZD\7UDIÀF6DIHW\$GPLQ., 538 F.3d 1172, 1220 (9th

&LU LQYDOLGDWLQJ($WKDW´VKXQWHGDVLGHVLJQLÀFDQW

questions with merely conclusory statements”); Grand

Canyon Trust v. F.A.A., 290 F.3d 339, 340-41 (D.D.C.

2002) (EA must provide a “hard look” at potential

impacts). The Seventh Circuit decision runs contrary to

all such decisions. Certiorari is needed to protect against

the unprecedented lapse in environmental standard,

ZKHQ WKHUH LV QR LGHQWLÀDEOH UHDVRQ ZK\ WKLV SULYDWH

development had to be built on the most environmentally

sensitive site on Chicago’s south side.

IV. REVIEW IS WARRANTED BECAUSE THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION UPENDS FED.

R. CIV. P. 15.

In late August 2021, Petitioners became aware

RI SRVVLEOH ÀQDQFLDO LQFRQVLVWHQFLHV LQ UHVSHFW WR WKH

Foundation and the OPC construction that arose months

after the original complaint was filed in April 2021.

Such matters involved, inter alia, that the City and the

Foundation had not met all the strict conditions precedent

that were necessary before the transfer of possession of

the 19.3 acres in Jackson Park to the Foundation. Those

conditions required generally that the Foundation establish

that it had funds to pay for the cost of construction and to

establish an endowment that would cover the operation

and maintenance.

As to costs of construction, the Foundation claimed

at the time the construction cost was $482 million, and,

based on an unaudited report, it claimed it had already

received $485 million, just above the stated cost of

construction as of March 2021. Those numbers did not

determine the accuracy of the claim, nor did it explain

whether those dollars were committed to construction

of the OPC or allocated somewhere else. Three months

later, in June 2021, the head of the Foundation, Valerie

Jarret, acknowledged that the costs for construction for

the OPC had climbed to about $700 million. As to the

required endowment, the Foundation placed only $1

million dollars, when its own calculations demonstrated

that this fund had to be $470 million in order to maintain,

operate and improve the OPC. The Foundation shrugged

off the difference of $469 million by saying that it had

time to raise those monies, as if a bare promise was

tantamount to an endowment. Thus, by late August,

the Foundation had failed to meet the strict condition

precedent for closing on the transfer of possession, for

there is no indeterminate good faith exception to the strict

conditions precedent for the transfer of possession. At

that point, the sole remedy for the City was to postpone,

without penalty, breaking ground until the money was

UDLVHGWRVDWLVÀHGERWKFRQGLWLRQVSUHFHGHQW'HVSLWHWKHVH

ÀQDQFLDOVKRUWIDOOVWKH&LW\GLGQRWSUHVVWKH)RXQGDWLRQ

to update their representations that such conditions were

met (as required under the Master Agreement (see Section

13(iv)) consistent with standard commercial practices); nor

did the Foundation and the City waive these conditions

precedent, even though Foundation assets were by now

hundreds of millions of dollars short of its target amounts.

With these new issues arising, Petitioners made an

effort to obtain better information including through

correspondence in August and September 2021 to the

City and Foundation. [6HH Dkt. 115, Exs. A & B] With

no meaningful answer, Petitioners investigated further

DQGÀOHGWKHLURQO\5XOHPRWLRQLQ1RYHPEHU³

approximately six months after the original complaint was

ÀOHGDQGbefore (i) the trial court ruled on a Rule 12 motion

against Petitioners’ state law claims, (ii) any discovery

had been begun or cut-off established, and any trial date

set. Despite these manifest shortfalls, the Seventh Circuit

DIÀUPHGWKH'LVWULFW&RXUW·VGHQLDORI3HWLWLRQHUV·PRWLRQ

That decision cannot stand under Rule 15 nor this Court’s

precedent.

Rule 15(a)(2) mandates that courts “should freely

give leave when justice so requires.” And this Court has

enforced that mandate. 6HH, e.g. Forman v. Davis, 371

86 7KH6HYHQWK&LUFXLW·VDIÀUPDQFHLJQRUHV

that mandate, and compounds that initial blunder by

incorrectly insisting that Illinois “does not recognize a

cause of action that would allow a plaintiff to challenge

a land use made in violation of a contract to which it is

not a party.” [Appendix A at 18a] The reference to “it is

not a party” makes it appear that what was an explicit

taxpayer claim could be mysteriously transformed into a

WKLUGSDUW\EHQHÀFLDU\FODLP

The proposed amended complaint relied explicitly on

a public trust theory consistent with Paepcke v. Public

Building Commission of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill.

1970) and Malec, allowing Plaintiffs standing either in

their own right, or as public representatives.

It is established that a taxpayer can enjoin the

misuse of public funds, based upon taxpayers’

ownership of such funds and their liability to

UHSOHQLVK WKH SXEOLF WUHDVXU\ IRU WKH GHÀFLHQF\

caused by misappropriation thereof. Consequently,

a taxpayer has standing to bring suit, even in the

absence of a statute, to enforce the equitable

interest in public property which he claims is

being illegally disposed of.

Malec, 891 N.E.2d at 1042 (emphasis added).

Indeed, if the Seventh Circuit’s theory was correct,

any local government could routinely insulate itself from

all taxpayer review by inserting into all its agreements

DFODXVHGLVDOORZLQJWKLUGSDUW\EHQHÀFLDU\DFWLRQVDQG

thereby routinely block all taxpayer standing cases. No

legal authority allows a private contract clause to undercut

an independent public trust cause of action.

To be sure, many standard commercial contracts

include provisions like clause 34 that preclude thirdSDUW\ EHQHÀFLDU\ FRQWUDFWV IRU WZR UHDVRQV )LUVW WKH

possibility that vested third-party rights would prevent

DQ\FRQWUDFWPRGLÀFDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHFRQWUDFWLQJSDUWLHV

which is commercially unworkable. And second, no one

wants any third party to weigh in on disputes that arise

in the interpretation or application of the contract. But

in this context those observations are irrelevant because

the clause cannot defeat a taxpayer argument that the

agreement fails ab initio because it does not satisfy

its conditions precedent. To prevent all oversight is an

open invitation for local governments to run haywire.

Chicago and Illinois taxpayers have the right to know the

ÀQDQFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHDJUHHPHQWVPDGHEHWZHHQ

their local governmental entity and the Foundation,

particularly where publicly available information already

UDLVHGFRQFHUQVDERXWWKH)RXQGDWLRQ·VÀQDQFLDOPHDQVWR

meet its obligations. The Foundation’s 2021 990 form tax

return and its 2021 Annual Report, covering the year of

the transfer, reveal assets far below those needed to fund

the construction of the OPC and to fund its endowment.

The last publicly available piece of information—the

2022 Form 990 (while not directly relevant)—did not

DOWHUWKHÀQDQFLDOFRQFHUQVDVPXFKRIWKHQHZPRQLHV

it mentions were not earmarked for the construction or

the endowment. It is there that the money trail ends.

To make sure that this frightening state of affairs does

not spread elsewhere, and to uphold the integrity of the

federal rules, and this Court’s authority regarding liberal

amendments, as well as in regards to transparency and

good government, certiorari should be granted on this

issue.

V. REVIEW OF THE DECISION IS NECESSARY AS

THE DISMISSAL OF THE PUBLIC TRUST AND

OTHER STATE LAW CLAIMS IS CONTRARY TO

THIS COURT’S AND OTHER PRECEDENT.

Petitioners’ complaint sets forth facts regarding

SXEOLFDQGSULYDWHEHQHÀWDORQJZLWKDGGLWLRQDOIDFWVDV

to how the City of Chicago delegated its authority over

the project to the Foundation, and how the Foundation’s

actions were rubber stamped by the City of Chicago.

Petitioners alleged that as citizens of Chicago they have,

as acknowledged in Malec, an undivided equitable interest

in Jackson Park, fully protected under Illinois law. The

precise value of these interests is hard to determine,

but they are worth hundreds of times more than the $10

received in this exchange, a transaction which blatantly

violated 0RQRQJDKHOD Y 8QLWHG 6WDWHV, 148 U.S. 312

(1893), which has long held that that these citizens are

entitled to “full and perfect equivalent for the property

taken.” Id. at 326. That view is hard-wired into the Illinois

and U.S. Constitution for duties of loyalty, care and candor

have been well-recognized for both public and private

trustees from the Founding period, including within this

Court’s seminal opinion in Illinois Central v. Illinois,

146 U.S. 387 (1892) which establishes key public trust

principles. Certiorari should be granted to restore the

traditional balance.

According to John Locke, the social contract required

“that the government had a fiduciary obligation to

manage properly what had been entrusted to it.” Robert

G. Natelson, Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper

Clause, 52, 53, in Gary Lawson et al., The Origins of

the Necessary and Proper Clause (2010) (citing John

Locke, The Second Treatise of Government: § 136 (1690)

(emphasis added)). Those principles were recognized and

applied in 0LOKDXY6KDUS, 15 Barb. 193, 206-207 (N.Y.

Gen Term 1853), to set aside a sweetheart deal for the

construction of an overhead rail line along Broadway in

New York City. 6HH, Schanzenbach & Shoked, Reclaiming

Fiduciary Law for the City, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 565, 586-87

(2018). For Respondents and the Seventh Circuit, these

authoritative sources disappeared down a memory hole.

Contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s decision [Appendix

A at 29a-37a], it has never been the law that a legislative

declaration that a transfer blessed by the legislature, in

this instance purportedly by the Illinois Museum Act

(70 ILCS 1290), is free from independent constitutional

scrutiny when the decision in Paepcke recognizes that

the discretion exercised by the legislature must meet

constitutional norms “by [examining] existing legislation

measured by constitutional limitations.” Paepcke at 21

(emphasis added). On this score, the contrast between

Paepcke and the current case is eyepopping. Paepcke

involved a transfer for four acres of land out of 100+ acres

located Washington Park, west of Hyde Park, from one

public use to another, from parkland to a school, which

had only a modest effect on the recreational uses in the

park. Paepcke at 19. There were no unbalanced and

XQGLVFORVHGÀQDQFLDOGHDOLQJVQRKXJHSXEOLFVXEVLGLHV

to a private foundation, no massive destruction of trees

and wildlife habitat, no road closings, no delegation of

virtually conclusive authority to a private party whose

interest was averse to that of the state. It is not surprising

that the transaction was fully defensible under applicable

constitutional standards.

Yet at no point did either the District Court or the

Seventh Circuit comment on the jaw-breaking differences

between one case that represents a sensible social

improvement and a second that represents an inexcusable

giveaway of public lands and funds to a well-connected

private party, when it is painfully clear that the primary

SXUSRVH RI 23& LV WR EHQHÀW D SULYDWH SDUW\ ,Q Lake

0LFK)HG·QY86$UP\&RUSVRI(QJ·UV, 742 F. Supp.

441 (N.D. Ill. 1990), the deal between the City and Loyola

was vastly more favorable to the City. It was struck down,

on the ground that “the public trust is violated when

WKH SULPDU\ SXUSRVH RI D OHJLVODWLYH JUDQW LV WR EHQHÀW

a private interest.” Id., 742 F. Supp. at 445. The current

transaction was wholly vulnerable to any court that sought

to examine the relevant differences.

Similarly, the improper delegation of authority

discussed supra, where the Foundation was provided

carte blanche decision-making with the City left to rubber

stamp those decisions, was pled but conveniently ignored

by the Seventh Circuit and District Court, which also

violated the principle of drawing all inferences against

Petitioners. Having done so on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

[Appendix D], certiorari review is particularly necessary

and appropriate.

Alternatively, this Court could certify questions of

law to the Illinois Supreme Court (consistent with Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 20). Such questions include: (1)

whether a transfer of public trust property to a private

party is constitutional under Paepcke when evaluated

solely as to whether a legislative declaration provided for

and approved the transfer; and (2) whether an ordinance

that provides full discretion to a private party to decide

the location for such development on public lands is an

improper delegation of legislative authority in violation

of the Illinois Constitution. People ex rel. Chicago Dryer

Co. v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 315, 323 (1952) (emphasis

supplied).

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully

request that the Supreme Court grant review of this

matter.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

16 Thomas Place

Norwalk, CT 06853

MICHAEL RACHLIS

Counsel of Record

RACHLIS DUFF & PEEL LLC

542 South Dearborn Street,

Suite 900

Chicago, IL 60605

mrachlis@rdaplaw.net

Counsel for Petitioners

APPENDIX

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 8, 2024 . . .1a

APPENDIX B — JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

EASTERN DIVISION, FILED NOVEMBER 3,

2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40a

APPENDIX C — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 1, 2022. . . .43a

APPENDIX D — MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS , EA ST ERN

DIVISION, FILED MARCH 29, 2022 . . . . . . . . . .66a

APPENDIX E — NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET

EN T RY I N T H E U N I T ED S TA T E S

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DI S T R IC T OF I L LI NOI S , F I L ED

JANUARY 6, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110a

APPENDIX F — MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS , EA ST ERN

DIVISION, FILED AUGUST 12, 2021 . . . . . . . . .113a

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX G — DENIAL OF REHEARING

OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,

FILED JUNE 10, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165a

Appendix

APPENDIX A — OPINION

OF THE

UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,

FILED APRIL 8, 2024

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-3190

PROTECT OUR PARKS, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

PETE BUTTIGIEG, SECRETARY OF

TRANSPORTATION, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:21-cv-02006 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.

A RGUED OCTOBER 24, 2023

DECIDED A PRIL 8, 2024

Before ROVNER, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge. This appeal represents, we hope,

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3UHVLGHQWLDO&HQWHULQ&KLFDJR6HHProtect Our Parks,

Appendix A

Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist.)G WK&LU

´POP Iµ cert. denied sub nom. Protect Our Parks, Inc. v.

City of Chicago6&W/(GG

Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Buttigieg )WK WK

&LU per curiam ´POP IIµ Protect Our Parks,

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the courts resolve its federal-law theories. But it failed to

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causes of action. At the request of the parties, the district

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the federal-law theories.

Appendix A

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theories, it presents the identical factual record that we

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I. Background

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and reread our earlier decisions.

A. The Proposed Locations for the Center

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initiated a nationwide search for a future home for the

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Appendix A

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as two of its top three choices for the future location of

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the construction, maintenance, and operation of those

Appendix A

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B. The Selection of Jackson Park as the Site

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with the proposal, the Foundation applied for the

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the Foundation offered to cover all costs associated with

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requires the Foundation to fund the construction of the

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C. The Federal Review Process

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the U.S. Department of Transportation pursuant to the

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for a section 408 permit, see 33 U.S.C. § 408, and a permit

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Appendix A

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in POP III. See 39 F.4th at 393-96. None of the parties

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we drew from the administrative record and set forth

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that there are no pertinent facts other than those in

the administrative record and there are no disputes of

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D. Procedural History

1. POP I

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Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

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POP I, 971 F.3d at 728.

2. POP II

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10a

Appendix A

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POP relied on the Administrative Procedure Act,

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us that there are ample proper defendants.

11a

Appendix A

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'HSDUWPHQWRI,QWHULRUYLRODWHGWKH83$55$FW &RXQW

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&RXQW ,9 WKH &LW\ DQG WKH $UP\ &RUSV YLRODWHG

VHFWLRQ RI WKH 5LYHUV DQG +DUERUV $FW 86&

DQGVHFWLRQRIWKH&OHDQ:DWHU$FWid. § 1344

&RXQW9 DOOGHIHQGDQWVYLRODWHG$UWLFOH,6HFWLRQ

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SURKLELWLRQ RQ ultra vires DFWLRQV &RXQW 9,, $UWLFOH

9,,,6HFWLRQRIWKH,OOLQRLV&RQVWLWXWLRQ &RXQW9,,,

WKH7DNLQJV&ODXVHRIWKH,OOLQRLV&RQVWLWXWLRQ &RXQW,;

Article II, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution, which

SURKLELWVLPSURSHUGHOHJDWLRQVRIDXWKRULW\ &RXQW;,

$UWLFOH,6HFWLRQRIWKH,OOLQRLV&RQVWLWXWLRQ &RXQW;,,

$UWLFOH , 6HFWLRQ RI WKH ,OOLQRLV &RQVWLWXWLRQ &RXQW

;,,, DQGWKH,OOLQRLV6WDWH$JHQF\+LVWRULF3UHVHUYDWLRQ

5HVRXUFHV$FW,/&6 &RXQW;9 7KRVHFRXQWV

IDOOZLWKLQWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VVXSSOHPHQWDOMXULVGLFWLRQ

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

6RRQDIWHUÀOLQJLWVFRPSODLQWDQGMXVWGD\VEHIRUH

WKH )RXQGDWLRQ ZDV VFKHGXOHG WR EUHDN JURXQG RQ WKH

&HQWHU 323 PRYHG IRU D SUHOLPLQDU\ LQMXQFWLRQ EDVHG

on the federal-law theories. It insisted that construction

RIWKH&HQWHULQ-DFNVRQ3DUNKDGWREHHQMRLQHGEHFDXVH

12a

Appendix A

WKHIHGHUDOUHYLHZSURFHVVIHOOVKRUW³ZRHIXOO\VRLQLWV

YLHZ³RIWKHVWDWXWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWV7KHGLVWULFWFRXUW

FRQFOXGHGWKDW323ZDVXQOLNHO\WRSUHYDLORQWKHPHULWVRI

LWVFRQWHQWLRQVDQGSURPSWO\GHQLHGLWVPRWLRQ323WKHQ

WXUQHGWRXVVHHNLQJDSUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQSHQGLQJ

DSSHDOEXWÀQGLQJWKDW323KDGQRWVKRZQWKHQHFHVVDU\

OLNHOLKRRGRIVXFFHVVRQWKHPHULWVZHGHQLHGWKLVLQWHULP

relief. See POP II, 10 F.4th at 763.

3. POP III

POP then moved ahead with its appeal of the district

FRXUW·V RUGHU GHQ\LQJ LWV PRWLRQ IRU D SUHOLPLQDU\

LQMXQFWLRQ6HH86& D $IWHUIXOOEULHÀQJ

DQGRUDODUJXPHQWVZHKHOGWKDW323IDLOHGWRPDNH´DW

OHDVWD¶VWURQJ·VKRZLQJRIOLNHOLKRRGRIVXFFHVVXQGHU

DQ\RIWKHWKHRULHVLWLQYRNHGµPOP III, 39 F.4th at 397.

323·V SULQFLSDO WKHRU\ ZDV WKDW WKH IHGHUDO DJHQFLHV·

GHFLVLRQQRWWRSUHSDUHDIXOOEORZQHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFW

VWDWHPHQWIRUSXUSRVHVRI1(3$ DVRSSRVHGWRDPRUH

DEEUHYLDWHGHQYLURQPHQWDODVVHVVPHQWZKLFKZDVGRQH

ZDVDUELWUDU\DQGFDSULFLRXV,WZDVXQOLNHO\WRVXFFHHG

RQWKLVWKHRU\ZHVDLGEHFDXVH´WKHUHFRUGVKRZVWKDW

WKH 3DUN 6HUYLFH DQG 'HSDUWPHQW RI 7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ

WRRNWKHQHFHVVDU\KDUGORRNDWWKHOLNHO\HQYLURQPHQWDO

FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH SURMHFW EHIRUH UHDFKLQJ WKHLU

GHFLVLRQVµ Id. DW 7KH DJHQFLHV KDG ´WKRURXJKO\

VWXGLHG WKH SURMHFW WKURXJK WKH OHQV RI WKH UHTXLUHG

UHJXODWRU\ IDFWRUV EHIRUH UHDFKLQJ WKHLU GHFLVLRQ WKDW

QRHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWVWDWHPHQWZDVUHTXLUHGµDQG

VR ZH FRQFOXGHG WKHLU GHFLVLRQ ´LPSOLFDWHV VXEVWDQWLDO

DJHQF\H[SHUWLVHDQGLVHQWLWOHGWRGHIHUHQFHµId. at 399

TXRWDWLRQRPLWWHG

13a

Appendix A

323·VVHFRQGWKHRU\ZDVWKDWWKH3DUN6HUYLFHDQGWKH

'HSDUWPHQWRI7UDQVSRUWDWLRQZHUHXQGHUDQREOLJDWLRQ

LPSRVHG E\ 1(3$ WR HYDOXDWH DOWHUQDWLYH ORFDWLRQV IRU

WKH&HQWHUWKURXJKRXW&KLFDJR7KHDJHQFLHVKDGDYRLGHG

WKLV DOOHJHG UHTXLUHPHQW 323 FRQWHQGHG E\ WUHDWLQJ

WKH&LW\·VVHOHFWLRQRI-DFNVRQ3DUNDVDJLYHQ,WVDZWKH

'HSDUWPHQW·VGHFLVLRQQRWWRTXHVWLRQWKHVHOHFWLRQRIWKH

-DFNVRQ3DUNVLWHDVDQXQODZIXO´VHJPHQWDWLRQµRIWKH

SURMHFWWRPDNHWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFWDSSHDUVPDOOHU

:HFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKLVDUJXPHQWZDV´IDWDOO\ÁDZHG

IRUWKUHHUHDVRQVµId.´)LUVW1(3$UHDFKHVRQO\PDMRU

IHGHUDO DFWLRQV QRW DFWLRQV RI QRQIHGHUDO DFWRUVµ DQG

EHFDXVH´>W@KH&HQWHUZDVQRWDIHGHUDOSURMHFWQRIHGHUDO

DJHQF\KDGWKHDXWKRULW\WRGLFWDWHWRWKH>)RXQGDWLRQRU

WKH&LW\@ZKHUHWKH&HQWHUZRXOGEHORFDWHGµId. Second,

323 IDLOHG WR HVWDEOLVK FDXVDWLRQ :H H[SODLQHG WKDW

´1(3$UHTXLUHVDJHQFLHVWRFRQVLGHURQO\HQYLURQPHQWDO

KDUPV WKDW DUH ERWK IDFWXDOO\ DQG SUR[LPDWHO\ FDXVHG

E\ D UHOHYDQW IHGHUDO DFWLRQµ Id. 1RWDEO\ ´WKH IHGHUDO

JRYHUQPHQWKDVQRDXWKRULW\WRFKRRVHDQRWKHUVLWHIRUWKH

&HQWHURUWRIRUFHWKH&LW\WRPRYHWKH&HQWHUDQGVRQR

IHGHUDODFWLRQZDVDSUR[LPDWHFDXVHRIDQ\HQYLURQPHQWDO

KDUPVUHVXOWLQJIURPWKHFKRLFHRI-DFNVRQ3DUNµId. at

)LQDOO\ZHVDLGWKDW323´LJQRUH>G@WKH¶UHDVRQDEOH·

KDOIRIWKHUHDVRQDEOHDOWHUQDWLYHVUHTXLUHPHQWµEHFDXVH

´>L@WZRXOGEHXQUHDVRQDEOHWRUHTXLUHDJHQFLHVWRVSHQG

WLPH DQG WD[SD\HU GROODUV H[SORULQJ DOWHUQDWLYHV WKDW

ZRXOGEHLPSRVVLEOHIRUWKHDJHQF\WRLPSOHPHQWµId.

7KH VDPH SUREOHPV XQGHUPLQHG PDQ\ RI 323·V

RWKHUWKHRULHV)RUH[DPSOHLWDUJXHGWKDWWKH+LJKZD\

Administration should have evaluated alternative locations

14a

Appendix A

IRUWKH&HQWHUZKHQFRQGXFWLQJLWVVHFWLRQ I UHYLHZ%XW

WKH+LJKZD\$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ·VGHFLVLRQWRWDNHWKHORFDWLRQ

RIWKH&HQWHUDVDJLYHQZDVQRWDUELWUDU\DQGFDSULFLRXV

EHFDXVH WKH DJHQF\ ´FRXOG QRW KDYH FRPSHOOHG WKH &LW\

WRORFDWHWKH&HQWHUDWDGLIIHUHQWVLWHµId.DW323·V

RWKHU DUJXPHQWV VXIIHUHG IURP WKH VDPH IODZ 7KXV

DIWHUWKRURXJKO\UHYLHZLQJWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHUHFRUGDQG

DGGUHVVLQJHDFKRI323·VDUJXPHQWVZHFRQFOXGHGWKDW

WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW KDG SURSHUO\ GHQLHG LWV UHTXHVW IRU D

SUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQ

4. Events Following POP II

$IHZWKLQJVKDSSHQHGEHWZHHQWKHWLPH323ÀOHGLWV

LQWHUORFXWRU\DSSHDODQGWKHGDWHRIRXUGHFLVLRQLQPOP

III,Q$XJXVWWKH)RXQGDWLRQEURNHJURXQGRQWKH

SURMHFW7KHFRQVWUXFWLRQLQ-DFNVRQ3DUNFRQWLQXHVWRWKLV

GD\3UHVVUHSRUWVLQGLFDWHWKDWWKH)RXQGDWLRQH[SHFWV

WKH&HQWHUWREHFRPSOHWHGE\ODWH6HHe.g./\QQ

Sweet, Halfway Built, the Obama Presidential Center

Is Already a South Side Landmark, CHICAGO SUN TIMES

2FW

%DFNLQWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWWKHUHZHUHWZRLPSRUWDQW

GHYHORSPHQWV )LUVW WKH &LW\ DQG WKH )RXQGDWLRQ ÀOHG

a motion to dismiss the state-law counts for failure to

state a claim. See FED. R. CIV. P. E 6HFRQGDIWHU

WKHPRWLRQWRGLVPLVVZDVEULHIHGDQGDUJXHGEXWEHIRUH

WKH FRXUW UXOHG RQ LW 323 VRXJKW OHDYH WR DPHQG WKH

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

D ,W ZDQWHG WR DGG EUHDFKRIFRQWUDFW DQG XQMXVW

HQULFKPHQWWKHRULHVDJDLQVWWKH&LW\DQGWKH)RXQGDWLRQ

15a

Appendix A

RQ WKH JURXQG WKDW WZR FRQGLWLRQV SUHFHGHQW RI WKH

0DVWHU $JUHHPHQW KDG QRW EHHQ VDWLVÀHG 7KH GLVWULFW

FRXUW FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH WZR WKHRULHV ZRXOG EH IXWLOH

EHFDXVH323KDGQRHQIRUFHDEOHULJKWVXQGHUWKH0DVWHU

$JUHHPHQW LW DFFRUGLQJO\ GHQLHG OHDYH $ERXW WKUHH

PRQWKVODWHUWKHFRXUWJUDQWHGWKHPRWLRQWRGLVPLVVWKH

state-law counts.

)ROORZLQJWKLVGLVPLVVDODQGRXUPDQGDWHLQPOP III,

WKH SDUWLHV VXEPLWWHG D MRLQW VWLSXODWLRQ WR WKH GLVWULFW

FRXUW$VZHQRWHGHDUOLHUWKH\DJUHHGWKDWDOOSHUWLQHQW

IDFWV FRXOG EH IRXQG LQ WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLYH UHFRUG DQG

WKDW QR DGGLWLRQDO EULHÀQJ ZDV QHFHVVDU\ EH\RQG ZKDW

ZDV VXEPLWWHG DW WKH SUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQ VWDJH

7KH\DOVRUHTXHVWHGDÀQDOMXGJPHQWRQWKHIHGHUDOODZ

counts in favor of the defendants in order to pave the

ZD\IRUDSSHOODWHUHYLHZ7KHGLVWULFWFRXUWDGRSWHGWKH

SDUWLHV· SURSRVHG RUGHU DQG HQWHUHG ÀQDO MXGJPHQW IRU

the defendants.

323QRZDSSHDOVWKHMXGJPHQWVGLVPLVVLQJLWVVWDWH

ODZ WKHRULHV DQG DZDUGLQJ VXPPDU\ MXGJPHQW WR WKH

defendants on the federal-law counts, as well as the district

FRXUW·VRUGHUGHQ\LQJOHDYHWRDPHQG:HDGGUHVVWKHVH

UXOLQJVLQUHYHUVHVHTXHQFH

II. The Motion to Amend

323ÀOHGLWVPRWLRQWRDPHQGLQ1RYHPEHUVHYHQ

months after its initial complaint. The amendment would

KDYHDGGHGWZRDGGLWLRQDOVWDWHODZWKHRULHVDJDLQVWWKH

&LW\DQGWKH)RXQGDWLRQ7KHÀUVWDVVHUWVWKDWWKH&LW\

16a

Appendix A

YLRODWHG WKH 0DVWHU $JUHHPHQW EHFDXVH WKH FRQGLWLRQV

SUHFHGHQWWRWKHWUDQVIHURISDUNODQGWRWKH)RXQGDWLRQVHW

RXWLQVHFWLRQV K DQG M ZHUHQRWVDWLVÀHGWKHVHFRQG

DWWHPSWVWRUDLVHDQXQMXVWHQULFKPHQWFODLPSUHGLFDWHG

on that failure. The district court denied the request,

FRQFOXGLQJWKDWDPHQGPHQWZRXOGEHIXWLOHEHFDXVHWKH

0DVWHU $JUHHPHQW GRHV QRW FRQIHU OHJDOO\ HQIRUFHDEOH

ULJKWV RQ DQ\ RI WKH SODLQWLIIV :H UHYLHZ WKDW GHFLVLRQ

IRUDEXVHRIGLVFUHWLRQ6HHJohnson v. Cypress Hill, 641

)G WK&LU

Once the time for amendments as a matter of course

KDVH[SLUHGDSDUW\PD\DPHQGLWVFRPSODLQWRQO\ZLWK

leave from the district court or written consent of the

adverse parties. See FED. R. CIV. P. D $OWKRXJKD

GLVWULFW ´FRXUW VKRXOG IUHHO\ JLYH OHDYH ZKHQ MXVWLFH VR

UHTXLUHVµid.´OHDYHWRDPHQGLVQRWWREHDXWRPDWLFDOO\

JUDQWHGµJohnson v. Methodist Medical Center of Illinois,

)G WK&LU DQG´>D@GLVWULFWFRXUW

GRHVQRWDEXVHLWVGLVFUHWLRQLQGHQ\LQJDPRWLRQWRDPHQG

ZKHQDPHQGLQJWKHSOHDGLQJZRXOGEHDIXWLOHDFWµWilson

v. Am. Trans Air, Inc.)G WK&LU

$QDPHQGPHQWZRXOGEHIXWLOH´LIWKHDPHQGHGSOHDGLQJ

FRXOG QRW VXUYLYH D PRWLRQ IRU VXPPDU\ MXGJPHQWµ

Wilson, 874 F.2d at 392.

323·VÀUVWQHZWKHRU\DVZHVDLGIRFXVHVRQVHFWLRQV

K DQG M RIWKH0DVWHU$JUHHPHQW6HFWLRQ K

SURYLGHVWKDWWKH)RXQGDWLRQPXVWFHUWLI\LQZULWLQJWKDW

LW KDV VXIÀFLHQW IXQGV WR FRYHU WKH FRVW RI FRQVWUXFWLQJ

WKH&HQWHU M UHTXLUHVWKH)RXQGDWLRQWRHVWDEOLVKDQ

endowment to operate, enhance, and maintain the Center

17a

Appendix A

for the duration of the lease term set forth in the Use

$JUHHPHQW$FFRUGLQJWR323QHLWKHURIWKHVHFRQGLWLRQV

ZDVVDWLVÀHGE\WKHWLPHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH&HQWHUEHJDQ

$VZHQRWHGHDUOLHUWKH0DVWHU$JUHHPHQWDXWKRUL]HVWKH

&LW\WRZDLYHDQ\FRQGLWLRQVSUHFHGHQWWRWKHFRQWUDFWEXW

QRRQHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH&LW\SXUVXHGWKLVRSWLRQ

(YHQ DVVXPLQJ DV ZH PXVW WKDW WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV

RI VHFWLRQV K DQG M KDYH QRW EHHQ VDWLVÀHG 323·V

EUHDFKRIFRQWUDFW WKHRU\ LV VWLOO IXWLOH ,W LV D ´UDWKHU

YDQLOODVWDWHPHQWRIFRQWUDFWODZµWKDW´DFDXVHRIDFWLRQ

EDVHG RQ D FRQWUDFW PD\ EH EURXJKW RQO\ E\ D SDUW\ WR

WKDWFRQWUDFWE\VRPHRQHLQSULYLW\ZLWKVXFKDSDUW\RU

E\DQLQWHQGHGWKLUGSDUW\EHQHÀFLDU\RIWKHFRQWUDFWµ

Northbound Group, Inc. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d 647, 651

WK&LU TXRWDWLRQRPLWWHG 7KH0DVWHU$JUHHPHQW

LVDFRQWUDFWEHWZHHQRQO\WKH&LW\DQGWKH)RXQGDWLRQ

WKHSODLQWLIIVSOD\QRSDUWLQLW

1HLWKHUFDQ323SRLQWWRDQ\ULJKWVDVDWKLUGSDUW\

EHQHÀFLDU\RIWKH0DVWHU$JUHHPHQW´,OOLQRLVODZKROGVD

VWURQJSUHVXPSWLRQDJDLQVWFUHDWLQJFRQWUDFWXDOULJKWVLQ

WKLUGSDUWLHVDQGWKLVSUHVXPSWLRQFDQRQO\EHRYHUFRPH

E\DVKRZLQJWKDWWKHODQJXDJHDQGFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKH

FRQWUDFWPDQLIHVWDQDIÀUPDWLYHLQWHQWE\WKHSDUWLHVWR

EHQHÀW WKH WKLUG SDUW\µ Estate of Willis v. Kiferbaum

Const. Corp., 357 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 830 N.E.2d 636, 642,OO'HF ,OO$SS&W FLWLQJBates &

Rogers Constr. Corp. v. Greeley & Hansen, 109 Ill. 2d 225,

1(G,OO'HF ,OO 6HFWLRQRI

WKH0DVWHU$JUHHPHQWVWDWHVWKDWWKHFRQWUDFWFRQIHUVQR

EHQHÀWVXSRQQRQSDUWLHVWKHUHE\H[SUHVVO\GLVDYRZLQJ

18a

Appendix A

DQ\LQWHQWLRQWRFRQIHUFRQWUDFWXDOULJKWVRQ323DQGLWV

co-plaintiffs.

323 GRHV QRW DUJXH WKDW JHQHUDO SULQFLSOHV RI

FRQWUDFW ODZ SURYLGH WKH QHFHVVDU\ HQIRUFHDEOH ULJKWV

5DWKHU LW DUJXHV WKDW LW FDQ HQIRUFH WKH WHUPV RI WKH

0DVWHU$JUHHPHQWEHFDXVHWKHSODLQWLIIVDUHPXQLFLSDO

WD[SD\HUVDQGUHVLGHQWV323FRQWHQGVWKDWMalec v. City

of Belleville, 384 Ill. App. 3d 465, 891 N.E.2d 1039, 322

,OO'HF ,OO$SS&W VXSSRUWVWKLVWKHRU\:H

UHDGWKDWFDVHGLIIHUHQWO\Malec is one of several cases

KROGLQJWKDWXQGHU,OOLQRLVODZ´¶DWD[SD\HUKDVVWDQGLQJ

WREULQJVXLWHYHQLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDVWDWXWHWRHQIRUFH

WKHHTXLWDEOHLQWHUHVWLQSXEOLFSURSHUW\ZKLFKKHFODLPVLV

EHLQJLOOHJDOO\GLVSRVHGRI·µId.DW TXRWLQJMartini

v. Netsch, 272 Ill. App. 3d 693, 650 N.E.2d 668, 670, 208

,OO'HF ,OO$SS&W 7KRVHFDVHVPLJKWDOORZ

DWD[SD\HUWRFKDOOHQJHDODQGXVHWKDWYLRODWHVVWDWHRU

municipal law, see id.DWEXWWKH\GRQRWHVWDEOLVK

WKDWDQDOOHJHGYLRODWLRQRIDPXQLFLSDOFRQWUDFWLVJURXQGV

IRUDWD[SD\HUVXLWMalecGRHVQRWUHFRJQL]HDFDXVHRI

DFWLRQWKDWZRXOGDOORZDSODLQWLIIWRFKDOOHQJHDODQGXVH

PDGHLQYLRODWLRQRIDFRQWUDFWWRZKLFKLWLVQRWDSDUW\

323KDVQRWGLUHFWHGXVWRDQ\DXWKRULW\WKDWVXSSRUWVLWV

SRVLWLRQDQGVRLWZRXOGEHIXWLOHIRULWWRDGGWKHSURSRVHG

EUHDFKRIFRQWUDFWFODLP

3HUKDSVUHFRJQL]LQJWKDWLWVÀUVWWKHRU\IDOOVVKRUW

323 VXJJHVWV DQ DOWHUQDWLYH WKHRU\ WKDW ZH FKDULWDEO\

ZLOO FDOO XQXVXDO ,W WHOOV XV WKDW LWV VHOIVW\OHG EUHDFK

RIFRQWUDFW FODLP LV DFWXDOO\ D ´WD[SD\HU GHULYDWLYH

DFWLRQµDQGWKDWLWLVPHUHO\WU\LQJWRHQIRUFHFRQWUDFWXDO

19a

Appendix A

ULJKWVEHORQJLQJWRWKH&LW\:KLOHZHDSSUHFLDWH323·V

FUHDWLYLW\LQWKLVUHVSHFWZHDUHXQDEOHWRFRQQHFWWKLV

QHZOLQHRIDUJXPHQWZLWKWKHFODLP323GHVFULEHGLQWKH

proposed amended complaint. Illinois courts do allow a

WD[SD\HUWREULQJVXLW´RQEHKDOIRIDORFDOJRYHUQPHQWDO

XQLW WR HQIRUFH D FDXVH RI DFWLRQ EHORQJLQJ WR WKH ORFDO

JRYHUQPHQWDOXQLWµScachitti v. UBS Fin. Servs., 215 Ill.

G1(G,OO'HF ,OO

%XWUHFRYHU\PXVWUXQLQIDYRURIWKHORFDOJRYHUQPHQW

See Feen v. Ray, 109 Ill. 2d 339, 487 N.E.2d 619, 621, 93

,OO'HF ,OO +HUH323VHHNVUHOLHIagainst

WKH&LW\ ZKLFKLVDGHIHQGDQWDSSHOOHHLQWKLVFDVHDQG

ZKLFKLVKDYLQJQRWURXEOHVSHDNLQJIRULWVHOI 7KHODFN

RIDUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHUHOLHIUHTXHVWHGLQWKHDPHQGHG

SOHDGLQJRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGWKHQDWXUHRIDWD[SD\HU

GHULYDWLYH VXLW RQ WKH RWKHU VKRZV WKDW WKLV WKHRU\

ZRXOGQRWVRPXFKUHFKDUDFWHUL]HWKHFODLPDVLWZRXOG

WUDQVPRJULI\ LW %HFDXVH 323·V SURSRVHG FRPSODLQW LV

LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKLV QHZ WKHRU\ LW GRHV QRW EHORQJ LQ

the case. See Vidimos, Inc. v. Laser Lab Ltd., 99 F.3d

WK&LU

323·V VHFRQG SURSRVHG QHZ WKHRU\ LV DOVR GRRPHG

8QGHU,OOLQRLVODZXQMXVWHQULFKPHQW´LVDFRQGLWLRQWKDW

PD\EHEURXJKWDERXWE\XQODZIXORULPSURSHUFRQGXFW

DVGHÀQHGE\ODZµAlliance Acceptance Co. v. Yale Ins.

Agency, Inc., 271 Ill. App. 3d 483, 648 N.E.2d 971, 977, 208

,OO'HF ,OO$SS&W TXRWDWLRQRPLWWHG $SDUW\

PD\QRWGUHVVXSDQXQVXFFHVVIXOFRQWUDFWFODLPLQWKH

JDUERIXQMXVWHQULFKPHQWEXWWKDWLVZKDW323LVGRLQJ

KHUH,WVXQMXVWHQULFKPHQWFODLPFDQQRWVWDQGRQLWVRZQ

´WKHUHTXHVWIRUUHOLHIEDVHGRQXQMXVWHQULFKPHQWLVWLHG

20a

Appendix A

WRWKHIDWHRIWKH>EUHDFKRIFRQWUDFW@FODLPµVanzant v.

Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc.)G WK&LU

The district court acted well within its discretion when it

denied leave to amend.

III. The Federal-Law Theories

:H QRZ WXUQ WR IDPLOLDU JURXQG 323·V IHGHUDO

ODZ DUJXPHQWV 7KH GLVWULFW FRXUW DZDUGHG VXPPDU\

MXGJPHQWWRWKHGHIHQGDQWVRQDOOVHYHQRIWKRVHFRXQWV

2Q DSSHDO 323 KDV SUHVHQWHG DGHTXDWH DUJXPHQWV

FKDOOHQJLQJWKHUXOLQJVRQRQO\WKUHHRIWKHP :HEULHÁ\

DGGUHVVLWVIRXURWKHUSRLQWVLQ3DUW9RIWKLVRSLQLRQ :H

HYDOXDWHWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VUXOLQJde novoFRQVWUXLQJWKH

UHFRUGLQWKHOLJKWPRVWIDYRUDEOHWR323DQGGUDZLQJDOO

UHDVRQDEOHLQIHUHQFHVLQLWVIDYRU6HHBurton v. Downey,

)G WK&LU

A. Application of Law of the Case

As we noted at the outset, we covered much of this

WHUULWRU\LQPOP III, where we concluded that POP had

IDLOHG WR HVWDEOLVK D VWURQJ OLNHOLKRRG RI VXFFHVV RQ WKH

PHULWV6HH)WKDW:LWKWKDWGHFLVLRQLQKDQGWKH

GHIHQGDQWVXUJHXVWRFRQFOXGHWKDWPOP IIIHVWDEOLVKHV

the law of the case.

´7KH ODZ RI WKH FDVH GRFWULQH LV D UXOH RI SUDFWLFH

EDVHG RQ WKH VRXQG SROLF\ WKDW ZKHQ DQ LVVXH LV RQFH

OLWLJDWHGDQGGHFLGHGWKDWVKRXOGEHWKHHQGRIWKHPDWWHUµ

Tully v. Okeson)WK WK&LU FOHDQHG

XS ,W´HVWDEOLVKHVDSUHVXPSWLRQWKDWDUXOLQJPDGHDW

21a

Appendix A

RQHVWDJHRIDODZVXLWZLOOEHDGKHUHGWRWKURXJKRXWWKH

VXLWµAvitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219,

WK&LU 1RQHWKHOHVVWKHUXOHLVQHLWKHU´D

VWUDLWMDFNHWµid.QRU´KDUGDQGIDVWµTice v. Am. Airlines,

Inc.)G WK&LU 7KHVWUHQJWKRIWKH

SUHVXPSWLRQ´YDULHVZLWKWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVµAvitia, 49

F.3d at 1227.

323DUJXHVWKDWWKHODZRIWKHFDVHUXOHKDVQRIRUFH

KHUHEHFDXVHPOP IIIZDVDSUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQUXOLQJ

$VLWVHHVWKLQJVDFRXUWPD\DSSO\WKHGRFWULQHRQO\LI

LWVSULRUUXOLQJZDVDÀQDOMXGJPHQWRQWKHPHULWV7KLV

DUJXPHQWPLVXQGHUVWDQGVWKHGRFWULQH

,WLVWUXHWKDWLQPDQ\FLUFXPVWDQFHVLWLVLQDSSURSULDWH

WR DOORZ D GHFLVLRQ JUDQWLQJ RU GHQ\LQJ D SUHOLPLQDU\

LQMXQFWLRQWRVXSSO\WKHODZRIWKHFDVHLQDODWHUDSSHDO

See, e.g., Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 188 F.2d

WK &LU Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit

Corp.)G WK&LU :HQRWHGLQThomas

WZRUHDVRQVZK\´>D@FRXUWPXVWEHFDXWLRXVLQDGRSWLQJ

ÀQGLQJVDQGFRQFOXVLRQVIURPWKHSUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQ

VWDJHLQUXOLQJRQDPRWLRQIRUVXPPDU\MXGJPHQWµ

)G DW TXRWDWLRQ RPLWWHG )LUVW ´ÀQGLQJV RI IDFW

DQGFRQFOXVLRQVRIODZPDGHDWWKHSUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQ

VWDJH DUH RIWHQ EDVHG RQ LQFRPSOHWH HYLGHQFH DQG D

KXUULHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHLVVXHVµId.6HFRQG´GLIIHUHQW

VWDQGDUGVDSSO\LQWKHWZRFRQWH[WV UHDVRQDEOHOLNHOLKRRG

RI VXFFHVV RQ DQ LQMXQFWLRQ DQG WKH H[LVWHQFH RI DQ\

JHQXLQHLVVXHVRIPDWHULDOIDFWRQVXPPDU\MXGJPHQW µ

Id.$VZHKDYHQRWHGHOVHZKHUH´DOHVVWKDQGHYHORSHG

UHFRUGDVKRUWWLPHOLQHDQGDFRQFRPLWDQWWUXQFDWHGOHJDO

22a

Appendix A

DQDO\VLVXVXDOO\FRXQVHODJDLQVWLQYRNLQJWKHODZRIWKH

FDVHGRFWULQHLQDZD\WKDWZRXOGSUHFOXGHDIXOOPHULWV

GHWHUPLQDWLRQµTully, 78 F.4th at 381.

%XW ´UDUHO\µ GRHV QRW PHDQ ´QHYHUµ :H OLNH RXU

VLVWHU FLUFXLWV KDYH UHFRJQL]HG WKDW ´WKLV JHQHUDO UXOH

GRHVQRWDSSO\WR¶DIXOO\FRQVLGHUHGDSSHOODWHUXOLQJRQ

DQLVVXHRIODZPDGHRQDSUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQDSSHDO·µ

Id. FOHDQHG XS DQG TXRWLQJ % &KDUOHV $ODQ :ULJKW

Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice

and Procedure GHG VHHDOVRHowe v.

City of Akron)G WK&LU FROOHFWLQJ

FDVHVIURPRWKHUFRXUWVRIDSSHDOV ,QRWKHUZRUGVZKHUH

the concerns we have discussed are not present, an earlier

OHJDO FRQFOXVLRQ XQGHUO\LQJ D UXOLQJ RQ D PRWLRQ IRU D

SUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQPD\HVWDEOLVKWKHODZRIWKHFDVH

7KLVFDVHIDOOVFRPIRUWDEO\LQWRWKDWH[FHSWLRQWRWKH

JHQHUDOUXOH:HKDGDPSOHWLPHLQPOP III to consider

WKHLGHQWLFDOUHFRUGWKDWLVQRZEHIRUHXVDQGVRWKHUHDUH

QRQHZIDFWVZHPXVWLQFRUSRUDWH7KHOHJDOLVVXHVKDYH

DOVRUHPDLQHGWKHVDPH7KHVHZHUHOLWLJDWLRQFKRLFHV323

PDGH$OOLWKDVGRQHGXULQJWKLVURXQGLVWRSUHVHQWWKH

VDPHOHJDODUJXPHQWVWKDWZHUHMHFWHGLQPOP III and to

insist that our earlier conclusions of law were erroneous.

,WV DUJXPHQWV DUH QR PRUH SHUVXDVLYH QRZ WKDQ WKH\

were then.

In the interest of completeness, however, we are

ZLOOLQJWRFRQVLGHUZKHWKHU323KDVRIIHUHGDQ\UHDVRQ

WKDW ZRXOG MXVWLI\ RXU VHWWLQJ DVLGH WKRVH HDUOLHU OHJDO

FRQFOXVLRQV$SDUW\LV´IUHHWRDUJXHWKDWDQLQWHUYHQLQJ

23a

Appendix A

FKDQJHLQODZRURWKHUFKDQJHGRUVSHFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFH

ZDUUDQWVDGHSDUWXUHµIURPODZRIWKHFDVHTice, 373 F.3d

DW:HKDYHLGHQWLÀHGYDULRXVFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQZKLFK

WKHFRXUWRXJKWQRWWRIROORZWKHODZRIWKHFDVHVXFKDV

ZKHQWKHUHLV´DGHFLVLRQRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW>RURIWKLV

FRXUWVLWWLQJen banc, see Kathrein v. City of Evanston,

)G WK&LU @DIWHUWKHÀUVWUHYLHZ

that is inconsistent with the decision on that review ... [or]

DFRQYLFWLRQRQWKHSDUWRIWKHVHFRQGUHYLHZLQJFRXUWWKDW

WKHGHFLVLRQRIWKHÀUVWZDVFOHDUO\HUURQHRXVµChicago

& N.W. Transp. Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 926, 930

WK&LU

:H FDQ ÀQG QR GHFLVLRQ RI HLWKHU WKLV FRXUW RU WKH

6XSUHPH&RXUWWKDWERWKSRVWGDWHVDQGLVLQFRQVLVWHQW

ZLWKRXUUXOLQJLQPOP III. POP draws our attention to

VHYHUDOGHFLVLRQVLQZKLFKWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVLQYRNHG

WKHVRFDOOHG´PDMRUTXHVWLRQVµGRFWULQH6HHAm. Hosp.

Ass’n v. Becerra, 596 U.S. 724, 142 S. Ct. 1896, 213 L. Ed.

G Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation,

866&W/(GG

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 213

/ (G G ,W DUJXHV WKDW MXGLFLDO GHIHUHQFH

WRDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDJHQFLHVLVQRZGLVIDYRUHG7KDWPD\

EHVR ZHKDYHQRQHHGWRH[SUHVVDYLHZRQWKHPDWWHU

EXW323GRHVQRWDUJXHWKDWWKLVFDVHSUHVHQWVDPDMRU

TXHVWLRQQRUKDVLWGUDZQDQ\RWKHUFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ

WKLVVXSSRVHGJHQHUDOOHJDOGHYHORSPHQWDQGWKHLVVXHV

UDLVHGLQWKLVFDVH,WKDVQRWIRUH[DPSOHVXJJHVWHGWKDW

WKRVHFDVHVFKDQJHGWKHZD\FRXUWVUHYLHZFODLPVXQGHU

WKH $GPLQLVWUDWLYH 3URFHGXUH $FW $QG LQ DQ\ HYHQW

HDFKRIWKRVHGHFLVLRQVZDVLVVXHGEHIRUHRXUGHFLVLRQLQ

24a

Appendix A

POP IIIDQGVRWKH\GRQRWSUHVHQWWKHNLQGRIXQXVXDO

FLUFXPVWDQFHVWKDWZDUUDQWGLVSODFLQJWKHSUHVXPSWLRQ

that law of the case applies.

,QDODVWJDVS323DOVRFRQWHQGVWKDWRXUGHFLVLRQLQ

POP IIIZDVFOHDUO\HUURQHRXV6HHAgostini v. Felton,

866&W/(GG

´7KH GRFWULQH GRHV QRW DSSO\ LI WKH FRXUW LV FRQYLQFHG

WKDW LWV SULRU GHFLVLRQ LV FOHDUO\ HUURQHRXV DQG ZRXOG

ZRUNDPDQLIHVWLQMXVWLFHµ FOHDQHGXS 5HKHDUVLQJWKH

VDPHDUJXPHQWVWKDWZHKHDUGDQGUHMHFWHGLQRXUHDUOLHU

UXOLQJ LW XUJHV XV WR UHYHUVH FRXUVH DQG DFFHSW WKHP

WKLV WLPH DURXQG :H GHFOLQH WKH LQYLWDWLRQ )DU IURP

ÀQGLQJ ´PDQLIHVW HUURUµ LQ RXU HDUOLHU DQDO\VLV Tully,

)WKDW TXRWDWLRQRPLWWHG RXUIUHVKORRNDWWKH

matter convinces us that POP IIIZDVFRUUHFWO\GHFLGHG

2XU HDUOLHU UXOLQJ WKHUHIRUH FRQWUROV WKH IHGHUDOODZ

WKHRULHVRQDSSHDO:HFRXOGVWRSWKHUHEXWIRUWKHVDNH

RIFRPSOHWHQHVVZHVXPPDUL]HRXUNH\ÀQGLQJVRQ323·V

principal federal theories.

B. NEPA (Count II)

As in POP III 323 DUJXHV WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQWV

YLRODWHG 1(3$ LQ WKUHH GLVWLQFW ZD\V ,W ILUVW VD\V

WKDW WKH IHGHUDO DJHQFLHV ZHUH UHTXLUHG WR SUHSDUH

an environmental impact statement, rather than an

environmental assessment. Their decision that the

DVVHVVPHQWZDVHQRXJKZDVDUELWUDU\DQGFDSULFLRXVLQ

323·VHVWLPDWLRQEHFDXVHWKHSURMHFWUHTXLUHVWKH&LW\

WRUHPRYHDSSUR[LPDWHO\WUHHVWKDWSURYLGHQHVWLQJ

VSDFHVIRUORFDODQGPLJUDWRU\ELUGVDQGLWZLOODIIHFWDQ

25a

Appendix A

KLVWRULFDOO\DQGFXOWXUDOO\VLJQLÀFDQWDUHD7KLVDUJXPHQW

fails for several reasons.

First, it misunderstands what NEPA is supposed to

GR´¶7KHRQO\UROH·IRUDFRXUWLQDSSO\LQJWKHDUELWUDU\

DQGFDSULFLRXVVWDQGDUGLQWKH1(3$FRQWH[W¶LVWRLQVXUH

WKDWWKHDJHQF\KDVWDNHQD´KDUGORRNµDWHQYLURQPHQWDO

FRQVHTXHQFHV·µHighway J Citizens Group v. Mineta, 349

)G WK &LU TXRWLQJ Kleppe v. Sierra

Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 49 L. Ed. 2d

DOWHUDWLRQ RPLWWHG ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV 1(3$

LV D SURFHVV VWDWXWH QRW RQH WKDW LPSRVHV HQIRUFHDEOH

HQYLURQPHQWDO VWDQGDUGV $V ZH H[SODLQHG LQ POP III,

WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHUHFRUGVKRZVWKDW´WKHDJHQFLHVZHUH

YHU\ WKRURXJKµ )WK DW 7KH HQYLURQPHQWDO

DVVHVVPHQW LQFOXGHV DPRQJ RWKHU WKLQJV D 1DWXUDO

Resources Technical Memorandum that discusses the

KDELWVRIPLJUDWRU\ELUGVDQGKRZWKHSURMHFWZLOODIIHFW

their nests, as well as a Tree Technical Memorandum

WKDWFRQVLGHUVHDFKVSHFLHVRIWUHHWKDWZLOOEHFXWGRZQ

WR EXLOG WKH &HQWHU 3 $IWHU UHYLHZLQJ HDFK RI WKHVH

HIIHFWV WKH DJHQFLHV FRQFOXGHG WKDW QRQH ZRXOG KDYH D

VLJQLÀFDQW LPSDFW 7KH HQYLURQPHQWDO DVVHVVPHQW WKXV

FRQÀUPVWKDWWKHDJHQFLHVWRRNWKHQHFHVVDU\KDUGORRN

DW WKH OLNHO\ HQYLURQPHQWDO LPSDFW EHIRUH UHDFKLQJ D

GHFLVLRQ+DYLQJIRXQGDQGH[SODLQHGWKDW´WKHSURSRVHG

DFWLRQZLOOQRWVLJQLÀFDQWO\DIIHFWWKHHQYLURQPHQWµWKH

DJHQFLHV ZHUH QRW DOVR UHTXLUHG WR SUHSDUH WKH PRUH

HODERUDWH HQYLURQPHQWDO LPSDFW VWDWHPHQW Indiana

3. *LYHQ WKH EURDG VFRSH RI WKH UHOLHI PHDVXUHV 323 VHHNV

WKHIDFWWKDWWKHWUHHVDUHE\QRZORQJJRQHGRHVQRWUHQGHUWKLV

appeal moot.

26a

Appendix A

Forest Alliance, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 325

)G WK&LU

6HFRQG 323 DUJXHV WKDW WKH DJHQFLHV XQODZIXOO\

VHJPHQWHG WKHLU 1(3$ UHYLHZ 6HJPHQWDWLRQ ´¶DOORZV

DQ DJHQF\ WR DYRLG WKH 1(3$ UHTXLUHPHQW WKDW DQ

>HQYLURQPHQWDO LPSDFW VWDWHPHQW@ EH SUHSDUHG IRU DOO

PDMRU IHGHUDO DFWLRQ ZLWK VLJQLILFDQW HQYLURQPHQWDO

LPSDFWVE\VHJPHQWLQJDQRYHUDOOSODQLQWRVPDOOHUSDUWV

LQYROYLQJ DFWLRQV ZLWK OHVV VLJQLILFDQW HQYLURQPHQWDO

HIIHFWV·µMineta)GDW TXRWLQJCity of West

Chicago v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,

)G WK&LU ,QDQHIIRUWWRSURYH

WKDW WKH DJHQFLHV XQODZIXOO\ VHJPHQWHG WKH SURMHFW

ZKHQUHYLHZLQJLW323SRLQWVVROHO\WRWKHIDFWWKDWWKH

)RXQGDWLRQ·VVHOHFWLRQRIWKH-DFNVRQ3DUNVLWHUHTXLUHV

WKH&LW\WRFORVHVRPHURDGZD\VDQGFRQVWUXFWQHZRQHV

XVLQJIHGHUDOKLJKZD\IXQGV

7KH&LW\·VSODQWRXVHIHGHUDOIXQGVWRFRQVWUXFWQHZ

roads near the site does not have the implications POP

EHOLHYHVWKDWLWGRHV1(3$FRYHUVRQO\´PDMRU)HGHUDO

DFWLRQVµ86& & VHHDOVRMineta, 349 F.3d

DW7KHSURMHFWLVDORFDOQRWDIHGHUDOLQLWLDWLYH7KH

IHGHUDODJHQFLHVKDG DQGKDYH QRFRQWURORYHUZKHUHWKH

&HQWHULVEHLQJEXLOWDQG1(3$LPSRVHVQRUHTXLUHPHQW

WKDWWKH\RYHUVHHWKH)RXQGDWLRQ·VRUWKH&LW\·VDFWLRQV

)RU WKDW UHDVRQ WRR WKLV DUJXPHQW IDLOV ZH QHHG QRW

UHVWDWHWKHPDQ\RWKHUSUREOHPVZLWKLW6HHPOP III, 39

F.4th at 399.

323·V WKLUG FRQWHQWLRQ LV WKDW 1(3$ UHTXLUHG WKH

IHGHUDO DJHQFLHV WR FRQVLGHU DOWHUQDWLYH VLWHV IRU WKH

27a

Appendix A

&HQWHU 7KLV DUJXPHQW VXIIHUV IURP WKH VDPH ÁDZV DV

WKHODVWWZR7KHIHGHUDODJHQFLHVODFNHGWKHDXWKRULW\WR

GLFWDWHZKHUHWKH&HQWHUZRXOGEHORFDWHGDQGVRLWZRXOG

EH XQUHDVRQDEOH RI WKHP WR ZDVWH WLPH DQG UHVRXUFHV

H[SORULQJSRWHQWLDODOWHUQDWLYHVLWHV7KHIHGHUDODJHQFLHV

did all that NEPA required of them.

C. Transportation Act (Count I)

323PDNHVPXFKWKHVDPHUHDVRQDEOHDOWHUQDWLYHV

DUJXPHQW LQ VXSSRUW RI LWV DVVHUWLRQ WKDW WKH &LW\ WKH

)RXQGDWLRQDQGWKH+LJKZD\$GPLQLVWUDWLRQGHIHQGDQWV

YLRODWHGVHFWLRQ I RIWKH7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ$FW8QGHUWKDW

VHFWLRQWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI7UDQVSRUWDWLRQPD\DSSURYH

D ´WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ SURJUDP RU SURMHFWµ LQ D SXEOLF SDUN

RQO\LI´ WKHUHLVQRSUXGHQWDQGIHDVLEOHDOWHUQDWLYHWR

XVLQJWKHODQGDQG WKHSURJUDPRUSURMHFWLQFOXGHV

DOO SRVVLEOH SODQQLQJ WR PLQLPL]H KDUP WR WKH SDUN

RUKLVWRULFVLWH>@µ86& F $FFRUGLQJWR323

VHFWLRQ I UHTXLUHGWKHGHIHQGDQWVWRFRQVLGHUUHDVRQDEOH

DOWHUQDWLYHVWRWKH-DFNVRQ3DUNVLWH

,WV YLHZ LV PLVWDNHQ 7KH +LJKZD\ $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ

KDG QR DXWKRULW\ HLWKHU WR WHOO WKH )RXQGDWLRQ WR EXLOG

WKH &HQWHU VRPHZKHUH HOVH RU WR IRUELG WKH &LW\ IURP

DXWKRUL]LQJWKDWORFDWLRQ$VZHH[SODLQHGLQOld Town

Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Kauffman´>H@QWLWLHV

that proceed on their own dime need not meet conditions

IRU IHGHUDO DVVLVWDQFH RU DSSURYDOµ )G

WK &LU 323 SRLQWV RXW WKDW WKH SURMHFW LQ Old

Town did not involve the use of federal funds. But the

IHGHUDODJHQFLHVGLGQRWVRPHKRZDFTXLUHWKHDXWKRULW\

WR DSSURYH RU GHQ\ WKH -DFNVRQ 3DUN VLWH WKURXJK WKH

28a

Appendix A

&LW\·VUHTXHVWIRUURDGEXLOGLQJIXQGV7KHRQO\GLIIHUHQFH

WKDWWKHUHTXHVWPDNHVLVWKDWLWUHTXLUHGWKH+LJKZD\

$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ WR FRQGXFW IHGHUDOO\ PDQGDWHG UHYLHZV

7KHDJHQF\ZDVHQWLWOHGWRWDNHWKH-DFNVRQ3DUNVLWHDV

DJLYHQZKHQFDUU\LQJRXWLWVGXWLHV

D. NHPA (Count IV)

323·V 1+3$ FODLP LV WKH ODVW RI WKH IHGHUDOODZ

WKHRULHV,WDUJXHV\HWDJDLQWKDWDIHGHUDODJHQF\³KHUH

DJDLQ WKH +LJKZD\ $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ³ZDV UHTXLUHG WR

FRQVLGHU DOWHUQDWLYH VLWHV IRU WKH &HQWHU 7KH +LJKZD\

Administration conducted a review pursuant to section

106 of NHPA, which is a procedural statute that requires

DJHQFLHV WR ´WDNH LQWR DFFRXQW WKH HIIHFW RI WKH>LU@

XQGHUWDNLQJ>V@ RQ DQ\ KLVWRULF SURSHUW\µ 86&

/LNH1(3$VHFWLRQDSSOLHVRQO\WRIHGHUDO

SURMHFWVQRWWRORFDOZRUNVXFKDVWKH)RXQGDWLRQ·VSODQ

WREXLOGWKH&HQWHUZLWKWKH&LW\·VDVVLVWDQFH)RUWKDW

UHDVRQDQGEHFDXVHWKH+LJKZD\$GPLQLVWUDWLRQIROORZHG

the procedural requirements of section 106, the defendants

ZHUHHQWLWOHGWRVXPPDU\MXGJPHQWRQWKLVFRXQW

IV. State-Law Theories

:H DUULYH ÀQDOO\ DW 323·V VXSSOHPHQWDO VWDWHODZ

WKHRULHV 8SRQ D PRWLRQ E\ WKH VWDWH GHIHQGDQWV WKH

GLVWULFW FRXUW GLVPLVVHG DOO HLJKW RI WKHP SXUVXDQW WR

)HGHUDO5XOHRI&LYLO3URFHGXUH E 323QRZDSSHDOV

WKDWGHFLVLRQEXWZHGHHPLWQHFHVVDU\WRGLVFXVVRQO\WZR

JURXQGV,QVRGRLQJZHWDNHDIUHVKORRNDWWKHGLVWULFW

FRXUW·VGHFLVLRQWRGLVPLVVWKRVHWZRWKHRULHVDFFHSWLQJ

29a

Appendix A

DOOZHOOSOHDGHGIDFWXDODOOHJDWLRQVLQWKHFRPSODLQWDVWUXH

DQGGUDZLQJDOOUHDVRQDEOHLQIHUHQFHVLQ323·VIDYRU6HH

St. John v. Cach, LLC)G WK&LU 7R

VXUYLYHDPRWLRQWRGLVPLVV´WKHFRPSODLQWPXVWVWDWHD

FODLPWKDWLVSODXVLEOHRQLWVIDFHµid. TXRWDWLRQRPLWWHG

ZKLFKPHDQVWKDWWKH´IDFWXDOFRQWHQW>PXVWDOORZXV@WR

GUDZWKHUHDVRQDEOHLQIHUHQFHWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWLVOLDEOH

IRUWKHPLVFRQGXFWDOOHJHGµAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

6&W/(GG

A. The Public Trust (Count VI)

323·V SULPDU\ VWDWHODZ FRQWHQWLRQ UHVWV RQ WKH

SXEOLFWUXVW GRFWULQH ZKLFK LW DOOHJHV ZDV YLRODWHG E\

WKHDFWLRQVRIWKH&LW\DQGWKH)RXQGDWLRQ,WDUJXHVWKDW

-DFNVRQ3DUNLVSXEOLFWUXVWSURSHUW\XQGHU,OOLQRLVODZ

DQGGUDZLQJDQDQDORJ\WRSULYDWHWUXVWODZWKDWWKH&LW\

LVDNLQWRDWUXVWHHVXEMHFWWRÀGXFLDU\GXWLHV7KH&LW\

EUHDFKHGLWVÀGXFLDU\GXWLHVVD\V323E\WUDQVIHUULQJD

SRUWLRQRILWVSDUNODQGWRWKH)RXQGDWLRQDQGJLYLQJWKH

Foundation control over it.

$OWKRXJKZHKDGQRRFFDVLRQWRUHVROYH323·VSXEOLF

WUXVWWKHRU\LQPOP IZHGLGH[SODLQWKHFRQWRXUVRIWKH

GRFWULQHXSRQZKLFKLWUHVWV,QEULHI´WKHSXEOLFWUXVW

GRFWULQHHVWDEOLVKHGLQ$PHULFDQODZE\Illinois Central

Railroad Co. v. Illinois, [146 U.S. 387, 13 S. Ct. 110, 36

/(G @SURKLELWVDVWDWHIURPDOLHQDWLQJLWV

LQWHUHVW LQ SXEOLF ODQGV VXEPHUJHG EHQHDWK QDYLJDEOH

ZDWHUZD\VWRDSULYDWHSDUW\IRUSULYDWHSXUSRVHVµ

)GDW$VRULJLQDOO\IRUPXODWHGLQIllinois Central,

WKHGRFWULQHSHUPLWWHGDVWDWHWR´DOLHQDWHSXEOLFO\RZQHG

30a

Appendix A

VXEPHUJHGODQGWRDSULYDWHSDUW\>RQO\@LIWKHSURSHUW\

ZLOOEH¶XVHGLQSURPRWLQJWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHSXEOLF·RU

¶FDQEHGLVSRVHGRIZLWKRXWDQ\VXEVWDQWLDOLPSDLUPHQW

RIWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWLQWKHODQGVDQGZDWHUVUHPDLQLQJ·µ

Id. TXRWLQJIllinois Central86DW

7KH SXEOLFWUXVW GRFWULQH KDV HYROYHG LQ ,OOLQRLV VR

WKDWLWQRZDSSOLHVWRDEURDGHUVZDWKRIODQGV7KXVDV

DQ ,OOLQRLV DSSHOODWH FRXUW KDV H[SODLQHG DOWKRXJK WKH

GRFWULQHDSSOLHVWR´PRVWO\VXEPHUJHGODQGXQGHU/DNH

0LFKLJDQRUWKH&KLFDJR5LYHUµLWH[WHQGVDOVRWR´SDUNVµ

DQG´FRQVHUYDWLRQDUHDVµTimothy Christian Schools v.

Village of Western Springs, 285 Ill. App. 3d 949, 675 N.E.

G ,OO 'HF ,OO $SS &W :KDW

PDWWHUVLVWKDWODQGKDVEHHQDFTXLUHGDQGGHGLFDWHGIRU

DSXEOLFSXUSRVH´E\WKHVRYHUHLJQµDWZKLFKSRLQW´WKH

DJHQFLHV FUHDWHG E\ >WKH VRYHUHLJQ@ KROG WKH SURSHUWLHV

LQWUXVWIRUWKHXVHVDQGSXUSRVHVVSHFLÀHGDQGIRUWKH

EHQHÀWRIWKHSXEOLFµPaepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm’n of

Chicago,OOG1(G ,OO

Illinois courts have developed a three-part test for

GHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUDSODLQWLIIPD\SUHYDLORQDQDOOHJHG

SXEOLFWUXVWYLRODWLRQ

>7@RVWDWHDFDXVHRIDFWLRQXQGHUWKHSXEOLFWUXVW

GRFWULQHIDFWVPXVWEHDOOHJHGLQGLFDWLQJWKDW

FHUWDLQSURSHUW\LVKHOGE\DJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\

IRUDJLYHQSXEOLFXVHWKHJRYHUQPHQWDOERG\

KDVWDNHQDFWLRQWKDWZRXOGFDXVHRUSHUPLWWKH

SURSHUW\WREHXVHGIRUDSXUSRVHLQFRQVLVWHQW

ZLWKLWVRULJLQDOO\LQWHQGHGSXEOLFXVHDQGVXFK

DFWLRQLVDUELWUDU\RUXQUHDVRQDEOH

31a

Appendix A

Paschen v. Village of Winnetka, 73 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 392

1(G,OO'HF ,OO$SS&W

see also Timothy Christian Schools, 675 N.E.2d at 174.

7KH SDUWLHV DJUHH WKDW -DFNVRQ 3DUN LV SXEOLFWUXVW

ODQGWKDWKDVQHYHUEHHQVXEPHUJHGDQGWKDWWKH3DUN

'LVWULFWZDVFUHDWHGWRDGPLQLVWHULWIRUWKHEHQHÀWRIWKH

SXEOLF6HHTHE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 1869,

DW ,/&6 7KHLU GLVDJUHHPHQW WXUQV RQ

whether the construction of the Center and the formation

RIDJUHHPHQWVDOORZLQJWKH)RXQGDWLRQWRPDLQWDLQWKH

&HQWHUYLRODWHWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWWKHSDUNODQGEHSXW

WRDSXEOLFXVH

:HREVHUYHGLQPOP IWKDWD´>G@HGLFDWLRQWRDSXEOLF

SXUSRVH LVQ·W DQ ¶LUUHYRFDEOH FRPPLWPHQW· DQG MXGLFLDO

UHYLHZRIDQ\UHDOORFDWLRQLVGHIHUHQWLDOSDUWLFXODUO\LIWKH

ODQGLQTXHVWLRQKDVQHYHUEHHQVXEPHUJHGµ)GDW

FOHDQHGXSDQGTXRWLQJPaepcke1(GDW

:KHQDUHDOORFDWLRQRIWUXVWODQGWRDQHZSXEOLFSXUSRVHLV

FKDOOHQJHG´¶>W@KHFRXUWVFDQVHUYHRQO\DVDQLQVWUXPHQW

RIGHWHUPLQLQJOHJLVODWLYHLQWHQWDVHYLGHQFHGE\H[LVWLQJ

OHJLVODWLRQPHDVXUHGDJDLQVWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOOLPLWDWLRQV·µ

Friends of Parks v. Chicago Park Dist., 203 Ill. 2d 312,

1(G,OO'HF ,OO TXRWLQJ

Paepcke 1(G DW 6R ORQJ DV FRQVWLWXWLRQDO

OLPLWDWLRQV DUH QRW WUDQVJUHVVHG RXU UROH LV OLPLWHG WR

HQVXULQJWKDW´WKHUHKDVEHHQDVXIÀFLHQWPDQLIHVWDWLRQRI

OHJLVODWLYHLQWHQWWRSHUPLWWKHGLYHUVLRQDQGUHDOORFDWLRQ

FRQWHPSODWHGE\WKHSODQµPaepcke, 263 N.E.2d at 18.

7KH,OOLQRLV*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\H[SUHVVO\SHUPLWWHG

the construction and operation of presidential centers

LQSDUNVKHOGLQWKHSXEOLFWUXVWZLWKWKHSDVVDJHRIWKH

32a

Appendix A

0XVHXP$FW6HH,/&67KDWODZDXWKRUL]HV

FLWLHVDQGSDUNGLVWULFWV´WRSXUFKDVHHUHFWDQGPDLQWDLQ

ZLWKLQDQ\VXFKSXEOLFSDUNRUSDUNVHGLÀFHVWREHXVHGDV

PXVHXPVLQFOXGLQJSUHVLGHQWLDOOLEUDULHVFHQWHUV

DQG PXVHXPV>@µ Id. The Museum Act also permits

municipalities to contract with certain private entities to

erect, maintain, and operate presidential centers. Id. In

HQDFWLQJWKLVOHJLVODWLRQWKH*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\´UHDIÀUPHG

DQGIRXQGWKDWWKHPXVHXPV>@GHVFULEHGLQWKLV6HFWLRQ

DQG WKHLU FROOHFWLRQV H[KLELWLRQV SURJUDPPLQJ DQG

DVVRFLDWHGLQLWLDWLYHVVHUYHYDOXDEOHSXEOLFSXUSRVHV>@µ

Id. $PRQJ WKRVH SXUSRVHV DUH ´IXUWKHULQJ KXPDQ

NQRZOHGJHDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJHGXFDWLQJDQGLQVSLULQJWKH

SXEOLFDQGH[SDQGLQJUHFUHDWLRQDODQGFXOWXUDOUHVRXUFHV

DQGRSSRUWXQLWLHVµId.

:H KDYH QR GRXEW WKDW WKH &HQWHU IDOOV ZLWKLQ WKLV

OHJLVODWLYHJUDQWRIDXWKRULW\$VSDUWRILWVHIIRUWVWRKRQRU

WKHOHJDF\RIWKHQDWLRQ·VÀUVW%ODFNSUHVLGHQWWKH&HQWHU

ZLOO IHDWXUH UHFRUGV DQG DUWLIDFWV IURP WKDW SUHVLGHQW·V

DGPLQLVWUDWLRQDQGRIIHUHGXFDWLRQDOSURJUDPPLQJDQG

LQLWLDWLYHV WR WKH SXEOLF ,W ZDV DOVR ZLWKLQ WKH &LW\·V

DXWKRULW\ WR FRQWUDFW ZLWK WKH )RXQGDWLRQ ZKLFK ZDV

´RUJDQL]HG IRU WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQ >DQG@ PDLQWHQDQFH DQG

RSHUDWLRQRIµWKH&HQWHUId. The Museum Act, coupled

ZLWKWKHLQWHQGHGXVHRIWKH&HQWHUDQGWKH&LW\·VH[LVWLQJ

DUUDQJHPHQWVZLWKWKH)RXQGDWLRQLVHQRXJKWRVDWLVI\XV

WKDWWKHSRUWLRQRI-DFNVRQ3DUNVHWDVLGHIRUWKH&HQWHU

ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRVHUYHDSXEOLFSXUSRVHDV,OOLQRLV·VSXEOLF

trust doctrine requires.

323GRHVQRWGLVSXWHWKDWWKH&HQWHUZLOOEULQJWKHVH

EHQHÀWV WR WKH SXEOLF ,QVWHDG LW DUJXHV WKDW ZH PXVW

33a

Appendix A

DSSO\VRPHIRUPRIKHLJKWHQHGVFUXWLQ\WRWKHSURSRVHG

ODQG XVH EHFDXVH LQ LWV YLHZ WKH 8VH $JUHHPHQW DQG

WKH 0DVWHU $JUHHPHQW ZHUH IODZHG WUDQVDFWLRQV ,Q

323·VWHOOLQJWKHVHWUDQVDFWLRQVVRPHKRZXQGHUPLQHWKH

&HQWHU·VHOLJLELOLW\IRUSXEOLFWUXVWWUHDWPHQWEHFDXVHWKH

GRFWULQH LQFRUSRUDWHV ZHOOHVWDEOLVKHG ÀGXFLDU\ GXWLHV

IURP SULYDWH WUXVW ODZ %XW 323 VXSSRUWV WKLV WKHRU\

ZLWKMXVWWZRVRXUFHVDODZUHYLHZDUWLFOHWKDWGRHVQRW

GLVFXVVWKHSXEOLFWUXVWGRFWULQHLQ,OOLQRLVDQGDGHFLVLRQ

IURPD1HZ<RUNVWDWHWULDOFRXUW,WKDVQRWGLUHFWHGXV

WR DQ\ GHFLVLRQ IURP DQ ,OOLQRLV FRXUW UHFRJQL]LQJ WKLV

WKHRU\QRUKDYHZHIRXQGVXFKDFDVH7KDWLVWKHHQGRI

LW323EURXJKWWKLVFRQWHQWLRQWRIHGHUDOFRXUWXQGHUWKH

VXSSOHPHQWDOMXULVGLFWLRQ86&DQGVRZHDUH

ERXQGWRDSSO\WKHH[LVWLQJODZRI,OOLQRLVQRWZKDWHYHU

323KRSHV,OOLQRLVODZPD\VRPHGD\EH6HHid.

see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151, 108 S. Ct. 2302,

/(GG

&KDQJLQJ WDFNV 323 DUJXHV WKDW WKH *HQHUDO

$VVHPEO\KDGQRDXWKRULW\WRPRGLI\WKHSXEOLFSXUSRVH

WKDW RULJLQDOO\ VXSSRUWHG WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI -DFNVRQ

3DUN,WSRLQWVWRDSDVVDJHLQPaepckeWKDW´UHIHU>V@WR

WKHDSSURDFKGHYHORSHGE\WKHFRXUWVRI:LVFRQVLQLQ

GHDOLQJ ZLWK GLYHUVLRQ >RI SXEOLFWUXVW ODQG@ SUREOHPVµ

263 N.E.2d at 19. The approach to which Paepcke refers

LQYROYHV WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI ÀYH IDFWRUV RQH RI ZKLFK LV

WR FRQVLGHU ZKHWKHU ´WKH SXEOLF XVHV RI WKH RULJLQDO

DUHD ZRXOG EH GHVWUR\HG RU JUHDWO\ LPSDLUHGµ E\ WKH

proposed reallocation. Id. %XW WKDW ODQJXDJH LV SODLQO\

dicta WKH FRXUW UHIHUUHG WR WKH :LVFRQVLQ DSSURDFK

RQO\´>L@QSDVVLQJµDQGLWVWDWHGWKDWWKHDSSURDFKZDV

´QRW FRQWUROOLQJµ DQG RQO\ ´D XVHIXO JXLGH IRU IXWXUH

34a

Appendix A

DGPLQLVWUDWLYHDFWLRQµId.0RUHUHFHQWFDVHVFRQÀUPWKLV

XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPaepcke. In Friends of Parks v. Chicago

Park DistrictIRUH[DPSOHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI,OOLQRLV

understood PaepckeDVZHKDYHKHUHZLWKRXWPHQWLRQLQJ

WKHSDVVDJH323VHL]HVRQ6HH1(GDW

)LQDOO\ DOWKRXJK 323 KDV QRW DOOHJHG DQ\ VSHFLÀF

profits that the Foundation will receive, we assume

WKDW WKH )RXQGDWLRQ ZLOO EHQHÀW IURP PDLQWDLQLQJ DQG

RSHUDWLQJWKH&HQWHU%XWXQGHU,OOLQRLVODZEHQHÀWWRD

SULYDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQGRHVQRWE\LWVHOIYLRODWHWKHSXEOLF

trust doctrine. See id.7KHGRFWULQHZRXOGRIFRXUVHEH

YLRODWHGLI´WKHGLUHFWDQGGRPLQDWLQJSXUSRVHKHUHZRXOG

EHDSULYDWHRQHµRULI´WKHSXEOLFSXUSRVHWREHVHUYHG

>ZRXOG@EHRQO\LQFLGHQWDODQGUHPRWHµPeople ex rel. Scott

v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773, 781,

,OO'HF ,OO %XWDVZHKDYHH[SODLQHGWKH

*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\GHWHUPLQHGWKDWWKHPDLQSXUSRVHRI

PXVHXPVVXFKDVWKH&HQWHULVWREHQHÀWWKHSXEOLFDQG

WKHUH LV QRWKLQJ LQ WKH UHFRUG WKDW VXJJHVWV RWKHUZLVH

323·V DOOHJDWLRQV VXJJHVW DW PRVW WKDW DQ\ ´EHQHÀW WR

SULYDWHLQWHUHVW>LV@WRIXUWKHU>WKH@SXEOLFSXUSRVHDQG>LV@

LQFLGHQWDOWRWKHSXEOLFSXUSRVHµId. GLVFXVVLQJPeople ex

rel. Moloney v. Kirk,OO1( ,OO

ZKLFK XSKHOG D JUDQW RI VXEPHUJHG ODQG WR D SULYDWH

RUJDQL]DWLRQ EHFDXVH WKH EHQHÀWV WR WKDW RUJDQL]DWLRQ

ZHUHLQFLGHQWDOWRWKHSXEOLFSXUSRVH ,WLVQRWRXUUROH

WRVHFRQGJXHVVWKHUHSXUSRVLQJRIDSRUWLRQRI-DFNVRQ

3DUNIRUWKDWQHZXVHHVSHFLDOO\EHFDXVHWKHSDUNZDV

QHYHUVXEPHUJHGLQQDYLJDEOHZDWHUV&RPSDUHPaepcke,

1(G QHYHU VXEPHUJHG ODQG ZLWK Scott, 360

1(G VXEPHUJHGODQG )RUDOOWKHVHUHDVRQV323

KDVIDLOHGWRVWDWHDSODXVLEOHSXEOLFWUXVWFODLP

35a

Appendix A

B. Improper Delegation (Count XI)

323DOVRDUJXHVWKDWWKH&LW\XQODZIXOO\GHOHJDWHGLWV

DXWKRULW\WRÀ[WKHORFDWLRQRIWKH&HQWHUWRWKH)RXQGDWLRQ

in violation of Article II of the Illinois Constitution, which

SURYLGHV WKDW ´>W@KH OHJLVODWLYH H[HFXWLYH DQG MXGLFLDO

EUDQFKHVDUHVHSDUDWH1REUDQFKVKDOOH[HUFLVHSRZHUV

SURSHUO\EHORQJLQJWRDQRWKHUµILL. CONST., art. II, § 1. Its

´VPRNLQJJXQµHYLGHQFHDSSHDUVLQDUHFLWDOLQWKH

2UGLQDQFH´:KHUHDVZKLOHWKH&LW\&RXQFLOLVFRQÀGHQW

LQWKHTXDOLW\DQGWKRURXJKQHVVRIERWK8,&·VDQG>WKH

8QLYHUVLW\RI@&KLFDJR·VSURSRVDOVWKH&LW\GHIHUVWRWKH

VRXQGMXGJPHQWRIWKH3UHVLGHQWDQGKLV)RXQGDWLRQDVWR

WKHXOWLPDWHORFDWLRQRIWKH3UHVLGHQWLDO/LEUDU\>@µ323

VHHV IXUWKHU SURRI RI XQODZIXO GHOHJDWLRQ LQ WKH &LW\·V

GHFLVLRQ WR GHIHU WR WKH )RXQGDWLRQ·V SUHIHUUHG ORFDWLRQ

for the Center.

8QGHU,OOLQRLVODZ´WKHOHJLVODWXUHFDQQRWGHOHJDWHLWV

OHJLVODWLYHSRZHUWRGHWHUPLQHZKDWWKHODZVKRXOGEHµ

East St. Louis Fed. of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St.

Louis Sch. Dist. No. 189, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 687 N.E.2d 1050,

,OO'HF ,OO$SS&W 1HYHUWKHOHVV

LW ´PD\ GHOHJDWH WKH DXWKRULW\ WR GR WKRVH WKLQJV LW

PLJKW SURSHUO\ GR EXW FDQQRW GR DV XQGHUVWDQGDEO\

RU DGYDQWDJHRXVO\ LI WKH DXWKRULW\ WKDW LV JUDQWHG LV

GHOLQHDWHG E\ LQWHOOLJLEOH VWDQGDUGVµ R.L. Polk & Co.

v. Ryan, 296 Ill. App. 3d 132, 694 N.E.2d 1027, 1033,

,OO'HF ,OO$SS&W FLWDWLRQVRPLWWHG

$OWKRXJKWKLVUXOHXVXDOO\LVLQYRNHGZKHQWKHOHJLVODWXUH

FRQIHUV DXWKRULW\ XSRQ DQ H[HFXWLYH DJHQF\ LW DOVR KDV

EHHQ DSSOLHG ZKHQ DXWKRULW\ LV GHOHJDWHG WR D SULYDWH

RUJDQL]DWLRQ6HHe.g., People v. Pollution Control Bd.,

36a

Appendix A

83 Ill. App. 3d 802, 404 N.E.2d 352, 356, 38 Ill. Dec. 928

,OO$SS&W (YHQWKRXJKWKH,OOLQRLVFRXUWVKDYH

QRW IRUPXODWHG H[WHQVLYH SULQFLSOHV ´RQ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI

GHOHJDWLRQ RI OHJLVODWLYH SRZHU WR SULYDWH SDUWLHVµ id.,

WKH\FRQVLVWHQWO\KDYHKHOGWKDWOHJLVODWLYHERGLHVPD\QRW

FRQIHUXSRQSULYDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQVWKHDXWKRULW\WR´GHFLGH

ZKDWWKHODZVKDOOEHµPeople ex rel. Chicago Dryer Co. v.

City of Chicago,OO1(G ,OO

:HÀQGQRSRVVLEOH OHWDORQHSODXVLEOH SUREOHPZLWK

GHOHJDWLRQLQ323·VFRPSODLQW7KHUHFLWDODWWKHKHDUWRI

LWVDOOHJDWLRQVGRHVQRWGHOHJDWHDQ\WKLQJLWLVPHUHO\D

VWDWHPHQWE\WKH&LW\DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWWKH)RXQGDWLRQ

ZDV FRQGXFWLQJ D QDWLRQZLGH VHDUFK IRU D ORFDWLRQ IRU

WKH&HQWHUDQGH[SUHVVLQJLWVGHVLUHWKDWWKHVLWHEHLQ

&KLFDJR$ORRNDWDQRWKHUUHFLWDOLQWKH2UGLQDQFH

FRQÀUPVWKDWWKH&LW\GLGQRWGHOHJDWHDQ\DXWKRULW\WR

WKH )RXQGDWLRQ ,W VWDWHV WKDW ´WKH &LW\ ZLOO LQWURGXFH

D VHSDUDWH RUGLQDQFH DXWKRUL]LQJ WKH GHYHORSPHQW

construction and operation of the Presidential Center on

WKH6HOHFWHG6LWHLI>WKH8QLYHUVLW\RI@&KLFDJR·VSURSRVDO

LVVHOHFWHG>@µ7KH&LW\GLGH[DFWO\WKDWZKHQLWDSSURYHG

the plan and passed the 2018 Ordinance.

323 DSSDUHQWO\ WDNHV LVVXH ZLWK WKDW SURFHVV DV

ZHOOEXWLWFLWHVQRDXWKRULW\VXSSRUWLQJWKHQRWLRQWKDW

SUHSDULQJDSURMHFWSURSRVDOLVDOHJLVODWLYHIXQFWLRQOHW

DORQHDSRZHUWKDWPD\QRWEHGHOHJDWHG$QGWKHIDFWWKDW

WKH&LW\XOWLPDWHO\DSSURYHGWKHORFDWLRQLVHYLGHQFHWKDW

LWQRWWKH)RXQGDWLRQH[HUFLVHGWKHOHJLVODWLYHIXQFWLRQ

RIDXWKRUL]LQJWKHSURSRVHGGHYHORSPHQW%HFDXVH323·V

FRPSODLQWFRQWDLQVQRDOOHJDWLRQVRIZURQJIXOGHOHJDWLRQ

37a

Appendix A

it fails to state a claim under the separation-of-powers

clause of the Illinois Constitution.

V. Remaining Theories

$VZHKDYHQRZVDLGVHYHUDOWLPHV323·VFRPSODLQW

LVFKRFNIXOORIDOWHUQDWHOHJDOWKHRULHVDOOGLUHFWHGDWWKH

VDPHHQGVWRSWKH&HQWHUDQGUHVWRUH-DFNVRQ3DUNWR

LWVSUHYLRXVFRQGLWLRQ:HKDYHGLVFXVVHGHYHU\DSSURDFK

WKDWZDVDGHTXDWHO\GHYHORSHGLQWKHEULHIVEXWWKHUHDUH

VWLOOPRUH)RXURIWKHUHPDLQLQJWKHRULHV &RXQWV,,,9

;DQG;,9 DUHEDVHGRQIHGHUDOODZWKH83$55$FW

VHFWLRQRIWKH5LYHUVDQG+DUERUV$FWDQGVHFWLRQ

RIWKH&OHDQ:DWHU$FW$UWLFOH6HFWLRQRIWKH8QLWHG

6WDWHV &RQVWLWXWLRQ DQG VHFWLRQ N RI WKH 1+3$

UHVSHFWLYHO\(DFKRIWKHRWKHUVL[WKHRULHV &RXQWV9,,

9,,,,;;,,;,,,DQG;9 DOOHJHVDYLRODWLRQRI,OOLQRLV

ODZ7KHGLVWULFWFRXUWUHMHFWHGDOOWHQ2QDSSHDO323

LQVLVWVWKDWLWLVDFWLYHO\SXUVXLQJDOOÀIWHHQ<HWLWVEULHIV

VD\KDUGO\DZRUGDERXWWKHUHPDLQLQJWHQDQGVRZHZLOO

EHHTXDOO\EULHIZLWKWKHP

´$QDSSHOODQWZKRGRHVQRWDGGUHVVWKHUXOLQJVDQG

UHDVRQLQJRIWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWIRUIHLWVDQ\DUJXPHQWVKH

PLJKWKDYHWKDWWKRVHUXOLQJVZHUHZURQJµHackett v. City

of South Bend)G WK&LU 7KHEULHIV

DUHHQWLUHO\VLOHQWRQ&RXQWV,,,9,;;,,;,9DQG;9

ZKLFK PHDQV WKDW 323 KDV IRUIHLWHG DQ\ FKDOOHQJHV WR

WKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VUXOLQJVRQWKRVHWKHRULHV6HHKlein

v. O’Brien)G WK&LU

323GHYRWHVDOLWWOHVSDFHWR&RXQW9,,ZKLFKDOOHJHV

an ultra viresFODLPDJDLQVWWKH&LW\DQGVRWKHUHIRUH

38a

Appendix A

ZLOO ZH ,W GHVFULEHV WKUHH DOOHJHGO\ XQODZIXO DFWV EXW

LWGRHVQRWLGHQWLI\DODZWKDWZDVYLRODWHGRURWKHUZLVH

H[SODLQ KRZ WKH &LW\ DFWHG XQODZIXOO\ %HFDXVH 323·V

FRQWHQWLRQV LQ WKLV FRQQHFWLRQ DUH ´XQVXSSRUWHG E\

SHUWLQHQWDXWKRULW\µUnited States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d

WK&LU WKH\KDYHEHHQIRUIHLWHG

/DVWZHKDYH&RXQWV9,,,;DQG;,,,7KHVLQJOH

sentence POP offers to support the first and last of

WKHVH LV UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI WKH ZD\ LW WUHDWV DOO WKUHH

´DV 3ODLQWLIIV· FRQVWLWXWLRQDO FODLPV LQ &RXQWV 9,,, DQG

;,,,UHO\XSRQWKHWUDQVIHUDQGWKHVKDPQDWXUHRIWKH

¶XVH·DJUHHPHQWLWZDVHUURQHRXVIRUWKH>GLVWULFWFRXUW@

WRGLVPLVVWKRVHFODLPVIRUVLPLODUUHDVRQVµ:HGRQRW

NQRZZKLFK´VLPLODUUHDVRQVµLWLQWHQGHGWRLQYRNHEXW

WKDWYDJXHQHVVLVQRWWKHRQO\SUREOHPKHUH$VZHKDYH

VDLG ´>D@ VNHOHWDO ¶DUJXPHQW· UHDOO\ QRWKLQJ PRUH WKDQ

DQ DVVHUWLRQ GRHV QRW SUHVHUYH D FODLP (VSHFLDOO\ QRW

ZKHQ WKH EULHI SUHVHQWV D SDVVHO RI RWKHU DUJXPHQWV

DV>323·V@GLGµUnited States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955,

WK&LU per curiam FLWDWLRQRPLWWHG $Q\

DUJXPHQWVDERXWWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VGLVSRVLWLRQRIWKHVH

WKUHHWKHRULHVKDYHEHHQIRUIHLWHG

VI. Conclusion

323 DQG LWV FRSODLQWLIIV KDYH RSSRVHG WKH &LW\·V

SODQWREXLOGWKH&HQWHULQ-DFNVRQ3DUNIURPWKHVWDUW

:KHQZHODVWKDGWKLVFDVHEHIRUHXVWKHSODLQWLIIVZHUH

WU\LQJ WR VHFXUH D SUHOLPLQDU\ LQMXQFWLRQ DJDLQVW WKH

HQWLUH SURMHFW EXW WKH\ IDLOHG WR VKRZ WKDW WKH\ ZHUH

HQWLWOHG WR VXFK H[WUDRUGLQDU\ UHOLHI &RQVWUXFWLRQ RI

39a

Appendix A

WKH&HQWHULVQRZZHOOXQGHUZD\DQG\HWWKHSODLQWLIIV

demand that we put a stop to it and, we assume, order

WKHGHIHQGDQWVWRUHVWRUHWKHVLWH%XWWKH\KDYHIDLOHG

WR VKRZ WKDW WKH\ DUH HQWLWOHG WR DQ\ UHOLHI UHODWLQJ WR

WKHLU RYHUDUFKLQJ FODLP DJDLQVW WKH &HQWHU QR PDWWHU

XQGHU ZKDW WKHRU\ 7KH GLVWULFW FRXUW GLG QRW DEXVH LWV

GLVFUHWLRQE\GHQ\LQJWKHSODLQWLIIV·UHTXHVWIRUOHDYHWR

DPHQG7KHFRXUWDOVRSURSHUO\UXOHGWKDWWKHVWDWHODZ

FRXQWVKDGWREHGLVPLVVHGDQGFRQVLVWHQWZLWKPOP III,

WKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWVZHUHHQWLWOHGWRVXPPDU\MXGJPHQW

on the federal-law counts.

7KHMXGJPHQWRIWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWLV$)),50('

40a

APPENDIX BAppendix

— JUDGMENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN

DIVISION, FILED NOVEMBER 3, 2022

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Case No. 21-cv-02006

Hon. John Robert Blakey

PROTECT OUR PARKS, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

PETE BUTTIGIEG, et al.,

Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS

Before the Court is the Parties’ Stipulations and

Proposed Order of Judgment, [138], which requests that

WKH &RXUW HQWHU ÀQDO MXGJPHQW LQ IDYRU RI 'HIHQGDQWV

on all remaining counts before this Court, Counts I

through V, X, and XIV (the “Seven Federal Counts”), as

well as the Joint Supplemental Submission by All Parties

in Support of Joint Stipulation [146]. The Parties have

DGYLVHGWKH&RXUWWKDWDGGLWLRQDOEULHÀQJEH\RQGZKDW

WKH\VXEPLWWHGLQWKHSUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQSURFHHGLQJV

remains unnecessary; that no pertinent facts exist, other

than what is contained in the Administrative Record,

41a

Appendix B

which stands complete on the docket, [112]; and that no

disputes of fact material exist concerning the disposition

of the Seven Federal Counts.

Based on the Parties’ stipulations and submissions, the

record before the Court, and the Court’s Memorandum

Opinion denying Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary

LQMXQFWLRQ>@ ´0HPRUDQGXP2SLQLRQµ ZKLFKIRXQGWKDW

the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success

on the merits of the Seven Federal Counts, and which was

DIÀUPHGRQDSSHDOProtect Our Parks, Inc. v. Buttigieg,

)WK WK&LU WKH&RXUWGHWHUPLQHVWKDW

no genuine disputes of material fact exist in connection

with the Seven Federal Counts. Accordingly, Defendants

DUHHQWLWOHGWRMXGJPHQWE\WKLV&RXUWDVDPDWWHURIODZ

DQGMXGJPHQWVKRXOGEHHQWHUHGIRU'HIHQGDQWVRQWKHVH

counts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for the reasons set

forth in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion.

In addition, Plaintiffs explicitly waive any arguments,

claims, or theories as to the Seven Federal Counts not

DGYDQFHGLQWKHLUPRWLRQIRUSUHOLPLQDU\LQMXQFWLRQDQG

supporting memorandum. See, e.g., Puffer v. Allstate

Ins. Co.)G WK&LU ´,WLVDZHOO

established rule that arguments not raised to the district

court are waived on appeal. Moreover, even arguments

that have been raised may still be waived on appeal if they

are underdeveloped, conclusory, or unsupported by law.”)

(citations omitted).

The remaining counts having been previously

GLVPLVVHGVHH>@WKH&OHUNVKDOOHQWHUÀQDOMXGJPHQW

42a

Appendix B

for Defendants and against Plaintiffs on all counts. All set

dates and deadlines are stricken. Civil case terminated.

Dated: November 3, 2022

ENTERED:

/s/ John Robert Blakey

John Robert Blakey

United States District Judge

43a

Appendix

APPENDIX C — OPINION

OF THE

UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,

FILED JULY 1, 2022

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-2449

PROTECT OUR PARKS, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

PETE BUTTIGIEG, SECRETARY OF

TRANSPORTATION, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:21-cv-02006 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.

A RGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2021

DECIDED JULY 1, 2022

Before WOOD and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.1

WOOD, Circuit Judge. In 2016, after a nationwide

search, the Barack Obama Foundation decided to build

1. Circuit Judge Kanne died on June 16, 2022, and did not

participate in the decision of this case, which is being resolved under

28 U.S.C. § 46(d) by a quorum of the panel.

44a

Appendix C

the Obama Presidential Center in historic Jackson Park

on Chicago’s South Side. The City of Chicago and the

Chicago Park District embraced the plan. But a group

of residents, under the banner of an organization called

Protect Our Parks, Inc., vehemently opposed it. Two years

DJRZHGLVPLVVHG3URWHFW2XU3DUNV·ÀUVWHIIRUWWRHQMRLQ

WKHSURMHFWProtect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist.,

971 F.3d 722, 738 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Protect Our Parks I”),

cert. denied sub nom. Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. City of

Chicago, 141 S. Ct. 2583, 209 L. Ed. 2d 600, 2021 U.S.

LEXIS 2154, 2021 WL 1602736 (U.S. 2021). Protect Our

Parks, along with several individual plaintiffs, responded

with the present action against the City and the Park

District (to which we refer collectively as the City), as

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environmental reviews performed by federal agencies in

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National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47,

section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 54

U.S.C. § 306108, and other similar statutes.

Protect Our Parks’ central theory is that these

laws required the agencies to consider alternatives to

the Jackson Park site in their evaluation of possible

environmental harms. It correctly notes that the agencies,

taking a different view of the law, did not do this. The

problem with this argument is that none of the federal

defendants had anything to do with the site selection—it

was the City that chose Jackson Park, and the federal

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elsewhere. Federal law does not require agencies to waste

time and resources evaluating environmental effects that

45a

Appendix C

those agencies neither caused nor have the authority to

change. See Dept. of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S.

752, 756, 124 S. Ct. 2204, 159 L. Ed. 2d 60 (2004). We thus

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In 2014, the Foundation began searching for a home for

President Obama’s presidential library. After evaluating

several potential sites, it chose Jackson Park, a public park

in the neighborhood where President Obama lived and

began his career as a community organizer, law professor,

and state senator. The Center will feature a museum, a

public library, spaces for educational and cultural events,

green space, and an archive commemorating the life and

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of the Obama Presidential Center (the Center) is wholly

funded by the Obama Foundation.

After the Chicago City Council unanimously approved

building the Center in Jackson Park, the City acquired the

needed parkland from the Chicago Park District, signed

a use agreement with the Foundation, and prepared to

break ground. When completed, the Center will take up

19.3 acres, which amounts to about 3.5% of Jackson Park.

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and so some of the harms Protect Our Parks wanted to avoid have

already taken place (e.g., the removal of trees), the overall effort is

still in an early enough stage that more limited, but meaningful,

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has not become moot.

46a

Appendix C

Although the federal government had no role in the

Foundation’s or Chicago’s decision to house the Center

in Jackson Park, the City’s approval did trigger several

federally mandated agency reviews. Protect Our Parks

argues that these reviews were inadequate.

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Section

4(f) Review. The plans for the Center require the closure

of portions of three roads within Jackson Park. To

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Department of Transportation has proposed using federal

funding to build or improve other roads, bike paths, and

pedestrian walkways in the park. To be clear, the plan to

close portions of existing roads in the park did not require

federal approval. See Old Town Neighborhood Ass’n v.

Kauffman, 333 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2003). What did

give rise to the approval requirement was the plan to build

replacement infrastructure using federal highway dollars.

That brought the Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA) into the picture; it was required to review

the proposal under section 4(f) of the Department of

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Section 4(f) permits the Secretary of Transportation to

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public parks or historic sites, so long as “(1) there is no

prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and (2)

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minimize harm to the park ... resulting from the use.” Id.

§ 303(c). The Center’s proposal implicates four properties

protected by section 4(f), including Jackson Park itself.

47a

Appendix C

After a comprehensive analysis, the FHWA found

that there was no feasible and prudent alternative to

using section 4(f) properties for new transportation

infrastructure, which was needed to substitute for

the roads that would be eliminated. The agency then

considered nine alternatives to determine how to minimize

any negative impacts on the affected parks and historic

areas. The FHWA’s analysis concluded that only one

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pedestrian and bike access to Jackson Park. The agency

then designed studies of two sub-alternatives (Subalternatives 9A and 9B) before concluding that 9B would

cause the least damage to properties protected by section

4(f).

National Environmental Policy Act Environmental

Assessment. The National Park Ser v ice and the

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environmental assessment pursuant to the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4

(2019) (explaining that agencies may prepare a concise

environmental assessment to determine if a more detailed

environmental impact is required). The assessment

explained that the City had decided to place the Center

in Jackson Park, that the City would close portions of

three local roads to accommodate the Center, and that

the federal government had no say in those matters.

The federal government did have a role, however, in

approving the new use of the parkland and funding for

new transportation infrastructure in the park (more on

this later).

48a

Appendix C

On that basis, the agencies assessed the environmental

impact of three options: Option A, in which neither

the Park Ser vice nor the federal Department of

Transportation approved the City’s plan; Option B, in

which only the Park Service approved it; and Option C,

in which both did. The agencies prepared an exhaustive

review of the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of

each option, including the potential consequences on trees,

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and cultural resources. They found that Alternative C

best met both agencies’ goals. They also concluded that

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environment, which meant that the agencies could move

forward with only an environmental assessment, rather

than a full-blown environmental impact statement. See

Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 757.

Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Act Review.

The National Park Service also conducted a review

under the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Act

(UPARR Act). See 54 U.S.C. §§ 200501-511. The UPARR

Act, a grant program enacted in 1978, provided federal

funds to local governments to improve urban parks and

recreational facilities. Chicago received UPARR grants

to rehabilitate Jackson Park in the 1980s. Any community

that received a UPARR grant must maintain that land

for public recreational use unless the Park Service

approves converting the space for another purpose. The

Park Service “shall approve” a proposed conversion

if: (1) the conversion aligns with a local park-recovery

action program, and (2) steps are taken to ensure that

the community has “adequate recreation properties

49a

Appendix C

and opportunities of reasonably equivalent location and

usefulness.” 54 U.S.C. § 200507.

Because Chicago wanted to dedicate about ten acres

of parkland to non-recreational space to make room

for the Center’s buildings and related transportation

improvements, the City sought the Park Service’s approval

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proposed replacing the lost parkland by turning property

on the Midway Plaisance between Stony Island Avenue

to the east, and the Metra Electric Railway to the west,

into public recreational space. The replacement parkland

borders (and effectively extends) Jackson Park’s western

border. Under the City’s plan, the new space will include

improvements such as pedestrian walkways and a play

area. The plan would yield a net gain of about 6.6 acres

of recreational space in Jackson Park. The Park Service

considered the proposal, decided that the proposed

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approved a partial conversion to make way for the Center.

Army Corps of Engineers Permits. The City also

needed to secure permits from the United States Army

Corps of Engineers, which administers the Rivers and

Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401, and

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251. The Rivers and

Harbors Act regulates alterations to public works built

by the United States to improve navigable waters. See 33

U.S.C. § 408. It bars such changes unless they comply with

a safety-valve provision authorizing the Corps to allow an

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