Amicus Curiae Brief — Tamer Mahmoud, et al., Petitioners v. Thomas W. Taylor, et al.

No. 24-297

444444444444444444444444444444444444444444

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

____________________

TAMER MAHMOUD, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

THOMAS W. TAYLOR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SUPERINTENDENT OF THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY

BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,

Respondents.

____________________

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

____________________

Brief Amici Curiae of America’s Future,

Citizens United Foundation,

Public Advocate of the United States,

U.S. Constitutional Rights Legal Def. Fund,

Fitzgerald Griffin Foundation, and

Conservative Legal Def. and Education Fund

in Support of Petitioners

____________________

RICK BOYER

Lynchburg, VA

J. MARK BREWER

Johnson City, TX

JAMES N. CLYMER

Lancaster, PA

MICHAEL BOOS

Washington, DC

WILLIAM J. OLSON*

JEREMIAH L. MORGAN

WILLIAM J. OLSON, P.C.

370 Maple Ave. W., Ste. 4

Vienna, VA 22180

(703) 356-5070

wjo@mindspring.com

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

*Counsel of Record

March 10, 2025

444444444444444444444444444444444444444444

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ARGUMENT

I.

THE MCPS POLICY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

UNDER YODER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A. Petitioners Have Demonstrated a

Violation of the Free Exercise Clause . . . . 5

B. Principles Drawn from Yoder . . . . . . . . . . . 8

II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE PROVIDES MUCH

BROADER PROTECTIONS THAN THE FOURTH

CIRCUIT BELIEVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

A. The Free Exercise Clause Draws Its

Genesis from Madison’s Virginia

Declaration of Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

B. This Court Has Defined “Religion” by

Madison’s Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

C. Compulsory Government Education

Violates the Free Exercise of Religion . . . 17

ii

III. THE MCPS’ COMPULSORY LGBTQ+

INDOCTRINATION POLICY VIOLATES THIS

COURT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

JURISPRUDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

A. LGBTQ+ Doctrine Is at Its Core

Religious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

B. This Court Has Long Banned

Proselytizing in Government Schools . . . 22

C. Public Schools Were Designed for the

Propagation of the Religion of “Secular”

Humanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

D. MCPS’ LGBTQ+ Agenda Is Not Neutral

toward Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

HOLY BIBLE

1 Corinthians 6:9-10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

1 Corinthians 7:2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Deuteronomy 6:6-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Deuteronomy 30:2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Deuteronomy 31:12-13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Genesis 2:24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Genesis 5:2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Genesis 18:19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Isaiah 54:13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Jeremiah 10:2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Jude 1:7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Leviticus 18:22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Leviticus 20:13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Mark 10:6-9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Matthew 19:4-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 21

Proverbs 13:20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Psalm 1:1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Romans 1:26-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-20

1 Timothy 1:8-11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

CONSTITUTION

Amendment I . . . . . . . . . . 4-5, 7-8, 10, 12, 14, 16-18,

22, 24-26, 32

Amendment II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CASES

Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.

203 (1963). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 32

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) . . . . . 24

iv

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) . . . . . . . . 22, 23

Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1

(1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25-26, 30

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.

726 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . 24

McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.

203 (1948). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) . . . 6

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) . 14-17

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.

290 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 32

Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) . . . . . . . 23, 31

Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) . . . . . . 29-30

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) . . . . . . . 24, 31

West Virginia State Board of Education v.

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) . . . . . . . 2-11

MISCELLANEOUS

59 Ohio Education Monthly 650

(O.T. Corson: 1910) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

J. Cahn, The Return of the Gods (Frontline:

2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

J. Dunphy, “A Religion For A New Age,” The

Humanist 43:1 (Jan.-Feb. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . 29

H. Edmondson, John Dewey and the Decline of

American Education (ISI: 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . 28

The Founders’ Constitution (P. Kurland & R.

Lerner, eds., U. of Chi.: 1987) . . . . . 15-16, 18, 31

C. Haynes, Ph.D., “James Madison: Champion

of the ‘cause of conscience,’” Washington

Times (Dec. 12, 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14

“Ishtar,” Britannica. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

v

H. Mann, II, Life and Works of Horace Mann

(Lee and Shepherd Publishers: 1891) . . . . . . . 27

D. Noebel, J. Baldwin and K. Bywater, Clergy

in the Classroom: The Religion of Secular

Humanism (Summit Press: 2007) . . . . . . . . 28-29

R. Perry and J. Cooper, eds., Sources of Our

Liberties, Revised ed. (American Bar

Foundation: 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14

H. Titus, “The Free Exercise Clause: Past,

Present and Future,” 6 REGENT U. L. REV.

7 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1

America’s Future, Citizens United Foundation,

Public Advocate of the United States, U.S.

Constitutional Rights Legal Defense Fund, Fitzgerald

Griffin Foundation, and Conservative Legal Defense

and Education Fund are nonprofit organizations,

exempt from federal income tax under either section

501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.

These entities, inter alia, participate in the public

policy process, including conducting research, and

informing and educating the public on the proper

construction of state and federal constitutions, as well

as statutes related to the rights of citizens, and

questions related to human and civil rights secured by

law. Most of these amici filed an amicus brief in

support of Petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari. See

Brief Amici Curiae of America’s Future, et al.,

Mahmoud v. Taylor, U.S. Supreme Court No. 24-297

(Oct. 16, 2024).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In October 2022, Montgomery County, Maryland

public schools (“MCPS”) announced its adoption of

“over 22 LGBTQ+-inclusive texts.” Mahmoud v.

McKnight, 688 F. Supp. 3d 265, 272 (D. Md. 2023)

(“Mahmoud I”). Some of these books promoted samesex marriage and changing “gender identity,” and were

intended for students from pre-K through fifth grade.

1

It is hereby certified that that no counsel for a party authored

this brief in whole or in part; and that no person other than these

amici curiae, their members, or their counsel made a monetary

contribution to its preparation or submission.

2

Id. at 273. In March 2023, MCPS announced that it

would stop informing parents when teaching such

controversial sexual material and would no longer

permit parents and students to opt out as it had

previously done. Id. at 271, 273-74.

Three sets of parents filed suit to challenge the

policy: Tamer Mahmoud and Enas Barakat, a Muslim

couple; Jeff and Svitlana Roman, members of the

Roman Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox faiths,

respectively; and Catholic parents Chris and Melissa

Persak. Id. at 274. They maintained that under

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), strict scrutiny

should apply to the MCPS decision to deny the right to

opt out. Mahmoud I at 288.

The district court ruled that Yoder was “inexorably

linked to the Amish community’s unique religious

beliefs and practices” and has no application to other

religions. Id. at 294. The court ruled that the

plaintiffs had not proven that the schools would coerce

the children to change their beliefs, so there was no

substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. Id.

at 301. The district court also found that, for

substantive due process purposes, Yoder does not

explicitly hold a parent’s interest in the religious

upbringing of their children to be a fundamental right.

Id. at 304. Thus, the elimination of the opt-out

provision need pass only rational basis review and the

court ruled that it did so. Id. at 306. Accordingly, the

court denied injunctive relief. Id. at 307.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed over a strong dissent.

The Court of Appeals ruled that “to show a cognizable

3

burden, the Parents must show that the absence of an

opt-out opportunity coerces them or their children to

believe or act contrary to their religious views.”

Mahmoud v. McKnight, 102 F.4th 191, 208 (4th Cir.

2024) (“Mahmoud II”). As the district court had, the

Fourth Circuit decided there was no coercion (id. at

209), and it ratified the district court’s limited reading

of Yoder (id. at 211). The court ruled that the

plaintiffs could not show likelihood of success on either

their free exercise challenge or substantive due process

claim. Id. at 216-217.

Judge Quattlebaum concluded in dissent that the

schools’ decision “burdened these parents’ right to

exercise their religion and direct the religious

upbringing of their children by putting them to the

choice of either compromising their religious beliefs or

foregoing a public education for their children.” Id. at

218 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

There was a time not so very long ago when the

proponents of homosexual rights represented that all

that they wanted was to be left alone to do what they

wanted to do in the privacy of their own bedrooms. In

adopting a curriculum to proselytize young grade

school children with the school’s LGBTQ+ views,

MCPS has moved well beyond that initial demand.

Moreover, by eliminating the ability of parents and

students to “opt out” of LGBTQ+ indoctrination, MCPS

is acting in a truly coercive and abusive manner to

indoctrinate students with its secular humanist,

religious agenda.

4

One would have thought that the 1972 Wisconsin

v. Yoder decision a half-century ago had established

the rule that compulsory education could not be used

to override the religious liberties of parents and

students — but MCPS and the courts below make the

untenable argument that only the Amish may enjoy

that decision’s protection under Yoder. That decision

articulates many legal propositions which support the

position of Petitioners here.

However, this Court should address the true

purpose of the Free Exercise Clause — the recognition

of a jurisdictional divide between the authority of the

state and areas of individual autonomy where no

government may intrude — in matters of “conscience.”

As Madison put it in his Memorial and Remonstrance:

“Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and

the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by

reason and conviction, not by force or violence.” In

areas of religion, we are guaranteed Free Exercise of

our own conscience. Applied here, parents’ views of

the LGBTQ+ agenda are matters of faith and

“conscience,” where our duty is owed only to God,

making it an “unalienable right” not within the reach

of government. Thus, Petitioners should prevail, not

based on judicial “interest balancing,” but because the

state has no authority whatsoever over matters of

conscience.

The MCPS removal of the “opt-out” provision also

violates this Court’s Establishment Clause

jurisprudence. Under a long and unbroken line of this

Court’s decisions, government schools may not teach

the Bible, or have organized prayer, or even post the

5

Ten Commandments. If public schools may not teach

traditional morality, surely the MCPS cannot teach a

pagan morality — especially when MCPS rules

prevent parents and students from opting out to avoid

being subjected to a LGBTQ+ catechism.

ARGUMENT

I.

T H E

M C P S

P O L I C Y

I S

UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER YODER.

A. Petitioners Have Demonstrated a

Violation of the Free Exercise Clause.

Petitioners place heavy emphasis on Wisconsin v.

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). These amici believe that

Petitioners ably have demonstrated that the

challenged policy violates the Free Exercise Clause,

based on the application here of the following

principles drawn from Yoder:

•

•

•

Parents have special authority to control the

education of their children, even when

attending government schools, on matters

which violate religious beliefs and morals, and

particularly with respect to impressionable

and vulnerable young children (Yoder at 21114);

compulsory education laws combined with

compulsory LGBTQ+ training, and no opt-out,

subject young children to education at odds

with the family’s religious views (id. at 211);

the actions of Montgomery County Schools

substantially interfere with the rights of

6

•

parents to their free exercise of religion (id. at

218-19); and

the fact that the curriculum was designed to

disrupt children’s moral presuppositions

shows the intentionality and substantiality of

the Schools’ actions (id. at 217-18).

Petitioners also contend that strict scrutiny should

apply, that the MCPS has demonstrated no compelling

state interest, and that there is no evidence that they

considered less restrictive means before infringing on

the fundamental interests of parents. Brief for

Petitioners at 47-52. However, the Yoder case was

decided without any reference to strict scrutiny,

intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis tests. The

Yoder Court viewed the issue before it in the same way

the Court did in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.

510 (1925) — a choice between the state’s power to

“impose reasonable regulations for the control and

duration of basic education” versus the “right of

parents” to chose the method of education. Yoder at

213. Thus, the Yoder Court balanced interests,

seeking to achieve a “reasonable” result. Justice White

believed the case required what he called “a delicate

balancing of important but conflicting interests.” Id.

at 237 (White, J., concurring).

The problem with interest “balancing” to achieve

a “reasonable” result in Yoder, as well as here, is that

it becomes a replacement for the judiciary’s obligation

to search for the original meaning of the Free Exercise

Clause. As a result, litigants must argue more from

policy than from law in order to persuade judges to

7

find their position more “reasonable” — an inherently

standardless, indeed arbitrary, objective.

The notion of “reasonableness” is widely used in

tort law, primarily used by juries, to determine what

a reasonable person might be expected to do. Its use

to determine the constitutionality of a challenged rule

transforms the U.S. Constitution into an empty vessel

into which each judge can read his own truth. While

disputes can and do occur in a search for the true,

objective original meaning of constitutional text,

arguments about reasonableness are subjective,

entirely dependent on the background and personality

of the judge. When the method is balancing and the

goal is reasonableness, the case is determined by “the

eye of the beholder.”

In the context of the Second Amendment, Justice

Scalia revealed the appeal of “interest balancing” to

judges — it empowers judges to decide cases based on

their own personal preferences. That is why Justice

Scalia coined the phrase “judge-empowering ‘interestbalancing inquiries.’” District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). These amici suggest that the

proper way to analyze a constitutional challenge is

textual, as discussed in Section II, infra. Nevertheless,

since legal reasoning is conducted by analogy from

precedent, there is much to be found in the Yoder

decision, which supports Petitioners here.

8

B. Principles Drawn from Yoder.

The circuit court made several errors in its reading

of Yoder. It erroneously believed this Court’s ruling

applied only to the facts of that case, that “requiring

[Amish] children to attend formal secondary education

compelled both the parents and their children ‘to

perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental

tenets of their religious beliefs.’” Mahmoud II at 210.

To be sure, the Court extensively addressed Amish

religious beliefs and culture, but Yoder also articulated

Free Exercise Clause principles that are in no way

limited to protecting one religious sect.

Second, the circuit court erred in divining from

Yoder that there could be no Free Exercise violation

unless the government was actually compelling

persons to change their religious views. It stated:

“there’s no evidence at present that the Board’s

decision not to permit opt-outs compels the Parents or

their children to change their religious beliefs or

conduct.” Id. at 209 (bold added, italics original).

Nowhere in Yoder is there support for this proposition.

However, it is astonishing that the circuit court could

find no coercion here. Coercing children to attend

school, and then subjecting them to systematic and

intentional indoctrination geared toward undercutting

the parents’ religion and inoculating their children

does constitute coercion to abandon the family’s

religious views. See generally Brief for Petitioners at

16-19.

The circuit court erred in trying to distinguish

Yoder because of the duration of the religious

9

tradition. The court believed Yoder was predicated on

“a record that the Supreme Court recognized ‘probably

few other religious groups or sects could’ develop,”

demonstrating hundreds of years of religious tenets

proving that the Amish were religiously opposed to

attendance at public high schools. Mahmoud II at 210.

Petitioners here follow teachings that oppose LGBTQ+

beliefs which are thousands of years old. The

Christian Petitioners believe that God created human

beings in His own image, distinctly and unchangeably

as male and female, and forbade the treating of the

sexes as malleable. In Jesus’ own words in Matthew

19:4-5: “[H]e which made them at the beginning made

them male and female, And said, For this cause shall

a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his

wife: and they twain shall be one flesh.” The Muslim

Petitioners herein share similar, ancient, fundamental

beliefs about sexuality. Moreover, exactly the same as

the Amish, all Petitioners here are concerned about

“values they reject as influences that alienate man

from God.” Yoder at 212. They believe that LGBTQ

behavior is a sin, and that allowing their children to be

indoctrinated into the ways of sin is also sin.2

2

See, e.g., Jeremiah 10:2 (“Thus saith the Lord, Learn not the

way of the heathen”); Psalm 1:1 (“Blessed is the man that walketh

not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of

sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful”); Deuteronomy 6:67 (“And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be in

thine heart: And thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy

children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house,

and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down,

and when thou risest up”). See also Isaiah 54:13; Deuteronomy

31:12-13; Genesis 18:19; Proverbs 13:20; and Deuteronomy 30:2.

10

Yoder clearly established that the religious

upbringing of children is at the core of the freedoms

protected by the Free Exercise Clause. The Yoder

parents shared the concerns of Petitioners here:

object[ing] to the high school, and higher

education generally, because the values they

teach are in marked variance with Amish

values and the Amish way of life; they view

secondary school education as an

impermissible exposure of their children to a

‘worldly’ influence in conflict with their

beliefs. [Yoder at 210-11 (emphasis added).]

It was not a coercive requirement to change beliefs

that offended the Free Exercise Clause, but a

requirement to expose children to “worldly” religious

values “at marked variance” with those of the parents.

And, again as here, the Yoder Court understood that

forced high school attendance “places Amish children

in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with ...

pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and

ways of the peer group.” Id. at 211 (emphasis added).

One of the Montgomery school children speaking

in support of an opt-out was attacked by a school board

member who “accused [the] student ... of ‘parroting’

his parents’ ‘dogma.’” Brief for Petitioners at 42

(emphasis added). One of the challenged books claims

that by “‘standing together,’ ... we will ‘rewrite the

norms.’” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). The guidance

documents for the LGBTQ curriculum “also instruct

teachers — twice — to ‘[d]isrupt the either/or

thinking’ of elementary students about biological sex.”

11

Id. at 12 (emphasis added). Even some elementary

school principals in Montgomery County objected that

the teaching “invite[s] ‘shaming comment[s]’ toward

students who disagree” and is “‘dismissive of religious

beliefs.’”

Id. at 13 (emphasis added).

After

proclaiming that “‘Everyone Needs These Books’ to

combat the ‘dominance, superiority and entitlement’ of

the ‘dominant culture,’” the MCPS “acknowledges that

‘[a]ny child ... may come away from [the storybook]

instruction’ with ‘a new perspective not easily

contravened by their parents.’”

Id. at 13

(emphasis added).

As with Yoder, Petitioners here have demonstrated

that the hostility of Maryland schools to their beliefs

“interposes a serious barrier to the integration of the

[children] into [their] religious communit[ies.]” Yoder

at 211-12. Just as with the Amish in 1972, so too with

the Petitioner parents here, “contemporary society [is]

exerting a hydraulic insistence on conformity to

majoritarian standards.” Id. at 217.

The Yoder Court noted in particular “the child’s

crucial adolescent period of religious development.” Id.

at 223. Yet if the “adolescent period” is crucial, surely

pre-K through fifth grade, where Maryland’s programs

are targeted, can hardly be less so. In FCC v. Pacifica

Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), this Court recognized

that young children are especially impressionable

about sexual subjects, and that, as such, “the

government’s interest in the well-being of its youth

and in supporting parents’ claim to authority in their

own household justified the regulation of otherwise

protected expression.” Id. at 749 (internal quotation

12

marks omitted). Concurring, Justice Powell noted that

“representations of ... erotic acts” may be “potentially

degrading and harmful to children.” Id. at 758

(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell correctly found

parental authority to be the fount of the right of

government to regulate sexual material disseminated

to children.

He noted that “[Constitutional]

interpretation has consistently recognized that the

parents’ claim to authority in their own household to

direct the rearing of their children is basic in the

structure of our society,” and therefore it is proper to

“leav[e] to parents the decision as to what speech of

this kind their children shall hear and repeat.” Id.

II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE PROVIDES

MUCH BROADER PROTECTIONS THAN

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT BELIEVES.

A. The Free Exercise Clause Draws Its

Genesis from Madison’s Virginia

Declaration of Rights.

The First Amendment provides that “Congress

shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of

religion].” The Fourth Circuit reads this language to

mean that “laws incidentally burdening religion are

ordinarily not subject to strict scrutiny under the Free

Exercise Clause so long as they are neutral and

generally applicable.” Mahmoud II at 206 (quoting

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 533

(2021)). To the Fourth Circuit, the Clause “requires

merely that the law at issue be rationally related to a

legitimate governmental interest.” Id. at 206. But the

historical reality is that the Free Exercise Clause

13

embodies James Madison’s revolutionary ideal that

government has no jurisdiction or authority

whatsoever to indoctrinate Americans with respect to

matters of conscience, as they are duties owed

only to God, such as their view of LGBTQ+ issues.

Unlike some early state constitutions which

provided only for government “tolerance” of religion,3

Virginia charted a different path that led directly to

the First Amendment. Dr. Charles C. Haynes,

founding director of the Religious Freedom Center of

the Newseum Institute, describes how Virginia

embarked on the “world’s boldest ... experiment in

religious freedom,” based on Madison’s and Jefferson’s

ideal of “liberty of conscience, for all:”4

[I]n 1776 ... at the convention called to declare

Virginia’s independence ... Madison

successfully called for an amendment to the

venerable George Mason’s draft of the Virginia

Declaration of Rights, changing “toleration

in the exercise of religion” to “free

exercise of religion.”

With that small change in language,

Virginia moved from toleration to full religious

freedom — a precedent that would greatly

3

See, e.g., Massachusetts Constitution, section XXVIII, R. Perry

and J. Cooper, eds., Sources of Our Liberties, Revised ed.

(American Bar Foundation: 1978) (hereinafter Sources of Our

Liberties).

4

C. Haynes, Ph.D., “James Madison: Champion of the ‘cause of

conscience,’” Washington Times (Dec. 12, 2016) (emphasis added).

14

influence the new nation’s commitment to free

exercise of religion under the First

Amendment. No longer would government

have the power to decide which groups to

“tolerate” and what conditions to place on

the practice of their religion.

[Id.

(emphasis added).]

B. This Court Has Defined “Religion” by

Madison’s Definition.

In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879),

this Court also viewed the Virginia Declaration of

Rights as the ideological precursor to the Free Exercise

Clause. Id. at 162-63. Noting that “‘religion’ is not

defined in the Constitution,” this Court looked to the

definition in the Declaration of Rights. See id. at 16263. Section 16 of the Declaration of Rights declared

that religion is:

the duty which we owe to our Creator,

and the manner of discharging it, can be

directed only by reason and conviction,

not by force or violence. [Constitution of

Virginia, Section 16, reprinted in Sources of

Our Liberties at 312 (emphasis added).]

The Reynolds Court recognized that “religion” was

exactly as Madison defined it, a subject area that “was

not within the cognizance of civil government.”

Reynolds at 163. The Court explained that this

jurisdictional principle was detailed in James

Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, submitted to

the Virginia Assembly in 1785, some nine years after

15

the Declaration of Rights, in support of Thomas

Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.

Quoting from the Declaration, Madison wrote these

words:

[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable

truth, “that Religion or the duty which we

owe to our Creator and the manner of

discharging it, can be directed only by

reason and conviction, not by force or

violence.” [citing the Virginia Declaration of

Rights]. The Religion then of every man must

be left to the conviction and conscience of

every man; and it is the right of every man to

exercise it as these may dictate....

We

maintain therefore that in matters of Religion,

no man’s right is abridged by the

institution of Civil Society and that

Religion is wholly exempt from its

cognizance.5

Four months later, the General Assembly passed

Jefferson’s “Act for Establishing Religious Freedom.”

In the preamble, as the Reynolds Court noted, this

same jurisdictional principle was reaffirmed. See

Reynolds at 163. The preamble read:

5

J. Madison, “Memorial and Remonstrance” to the Honorable

General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 20,

1785), reprinted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution at 82 (item # 43)

(P. Kurland & R. Lerner, eds., U. of Chi.: 1987) (emphasis added)

(hereinafter The Founders’ Constitution).

16

Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind

free; that all attempts to influence it by

temporal punishments or burthens, or by

civil incapacitations ... are a departure from

the plan of the Holy author of our religion, who

being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose

not to propagate it by coercions on either, as

was in his Almighty power to do....6

Accordingly, the Reynolds Court incorporated

Madison’s definition of “religion” as the best expression

of the intent of the Framers of the Free Exercise

Clause.

The LGBTQ+ agenda being forced on students is a

set of teachings on moral topics falling squarely in the

area of conscience. It is being forced not only on

parents and children who follow Christianity and

Islam, but also on those who follow no organized

religion and could be agnostics or atheists. The Free

Exercise of Religion does not protect religious

people; rather it protects a sphere of our lives —

termed “religion” — from any governmental

intrusion. That area of “religion” describes all matters

that are matters of conscience — such as our view of

moral issues — which are areas where no government

may proselytize or coerce.

6

Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (Oct. 31, 1785),

reprinted in 5 The Founders’ Constitution at 84 (item #44)

(emphasis added).

17

C. Compulsory Government Education

Violates the Free Exercise of Religion.

As Jefferson and Madison saw it, and as the

Reynolds Court later agreed, the Free Exercise Clause

cannot be understood in terms of judicial “levels of

scrutiny” that have given judges the power to

manipulate the text of the Constitution since they

were introduced in the mid-1900s. Under the Free

Exercise Clause, government has no jurisdiction

whatsoever over the area of “religion.” No jurisdiction

means no jurisdiction. Under balancing, government

can intrude on the rights of Americans if judges

believe such intrusion meets the terms of some judgemade, atextual test. A few restrictions on free exercise

cannot be glossed over in service to some other

interests, such as tolerance, or the recently popular

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.

There is “no

compelling government interest” which can authorize

government to intrude on matters of religion. Where

there is no jurisdiction, there is nothing to balance.

The domain of religion is “wholly exempt from [the]

cognizance” of the civil magistrate.

In truth, compulsory education in government

schools by itself offends the Free Exercise Clause, as

all education has a spiritual underpinning. This

principle once was understood broadly, as “both

Jefferson and Madison denied to the state any

authority to educate or tax the people to support an

educational program.”7 In his Act for Establishing

7

H. Titus, “The Free Exercise Clause: Past, Present and Future,”

6 REGENT U. L. REV. 7, 60 (1995).

18

Religious Freedom, Jefferson wrote that “to suffer the

civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of

opinion ... is a dangerous fallacy, which at once

destroys all religious liberty, because he being of

course the judge ... will make his opinions the rule of

judgment, and approve or condemn the sentiments of

others only as they shall square with his own.”8

The Act asserted that, “to compel a man to furnish

contributions of money for the propagation of opinions

which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.”9 That

principle shared by Madison and Jefferson, applied

here, has been disrespected in the extreme by MCPS

and the courts below — which have no problem with

compelling the Petitioner parents not just to pay for

government propagation of religious beliefs which are

anathema to them, but to also then compound the

offense by seeking to co-opt Petitioners’ children and

indoctrinate them with those beliefs.

III. THE MCPS’ COMPULSORY LGBTQ+

INDOCTRINATION POLICY VIOLATES

THIS COURT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

JURISPRUDENCE.

Although in the courts below focus was placed on

the Free Exercise Clause, it deserves mention that the

MCPS policy also violates 80 years of this Court’s

Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

LGBTQ+

indoctrination is every bit as much a matter of

8

Act for Establishing Religious Freedom at 85.

9

Id. at 84.

19

conscience and religion as are the Christian disciplines

long banned by this Court. In other words, if this

Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence prevents

teaching against LGBTQ+ doctrine, then it most

certainly also prevents the teaching in favor of

LGBTQ+ doctrine.

A. LGBTQ+ Doctrine

Religious.

Is

at

Its

Core

Holy Writ addresses and condemns lesbian, gay,

and bisexual practices in the ancient world numerous

times in both Old and New Testaments:

•

•

•

•

Leviticus 18:22: “You shall not lie with a male

as with a woman; it is an abomination.”

Leviticus 20:13: “If a man lies with a male as

with a woman, both of them have committed

an abomination; they shall surely be put to

death; their blood is upon them.”

Jude 1:7: “Just as Sodom and Gomorrah and

the surrounding cities, which likewise

indulged in sexual immorality and pursued

unnatural desire, serve as an example by

undergoing a punishment of eternal fire.”

Romans 1:26-28: “For this reason God gave

them up to dishonorable passions. For their

women exchanged natural relations for those

that are contrary to nature; and the men

likewise gave up natural relations with

women and were consumed with passion for

one another, men committing shameless acts

with men and receiving in themselves the due

penalty for their error. And since they did not

20

•

•

•

•

see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up

to a debased mind to do what ought not to be

done.”

Genesis 2:24: “Therefore a man shall leave his

father and his mother and hold fast to his

wife, and they shall become one flesh.”

Mark 10:6-9: “But from the beginning of

creation, ‘God made them male and female.’

‘Therefore a man shall leave his father and

mother and hold fast to his wife, and the two

shall become one flesh.’ So they are no longer

two but one flesh. What therefore God has

joined together, let not man separate.”

1 Corinthians 6:9-10: “Or do you not know that

the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom

of God? Do not be deceived: neither the

sexually immoral, nor idolaters, nor

adulterers, nor men who practice

homosexuality, nor thieves, nor the greedy,

nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor swindlers will

inherit the kingdom of God.”

1 Timothy 1:8-11 ESV: “Now we know that the

law is good, if one uses it lawfully,

understanding this, that the law is not laid

down for the just but for the lawless and

disobedient, for the ungodly and sinners, for

the unholy and profane, for those who strike

their fathers and mothers, for murderers, the

sexually immoral, men who practice

homosexuality, enslavers, liars, perjurers, and

whatever else is contrary to sound doctrine, in

accordance with the gospel of the glory of the

blessed God with which I have been

entrusted.”

21

•

1 Corinthians 7:2: “But because of the

temptation to sexual immorality, each man

should have his own wife and each woman her

own husband.”

Transgenderism also has ancient spiritual roots.

Without even knowing it, many of its proponents have

embraced what was a foundational principle of early

pagan religions. One of the “gods” of the pagan world

was Ishtar, the “goddess of war and sexual love.” See

“Ishtar,” Britannica. “An ancient Mesopotamian tablet

records ... [Ishtar saying] ‘When I sit in the alehouse,

I am a woman, and I am an exuberant young man.’”

J. Cahn, The Return of the Gods (Frontline: 2022) at

118. The goddess Ishtar had summertime festivals

and parades. “The parades of the goddess featured

men dressed as women, women dressed as men, each

dressed as both, male priests parading as women, and

cultic women acting as men. They were public

pageants and spectacles of the transgendered, the

cross-dressed, the homosexual, the intersexual, the

cross-gendered.” Id. at 181. Transgenderism likewise

is at odds with Scripture:

•

•

Genesis 5:2: “Male and female he created

them, and he blessed them and named them

Man when they were created.”

Matthew 19:4: “And he answered and said

unto them, Have ye not read, that he which

made them at the beginning made them male

and female.”

22

B. This

Court

Has

Long

Banned

Proselytizing in Government Schools.

Under this Court’s jurisprudence, when

compulsory public schools affirm some religious beliefs

while disparaging others, an Establishment Clause

violation occurs. This Court has been clear in its view

that coercion to change religious practices is not

necessary to trigger an Establishment Clause

violation. Merely putting the imprimatur of the state

in favor of one religious belief over another is

sufficient. Consider this line of cases:

•

•

•

In West Virginia State Board of Education v.

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), this Court

banned government schools compelling

children to salute the flag and pledge

allegiance regardless of the particular

religious views of the child or the sincerity

with which they are held.

In McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.

203 (1948), the Court stated that compulsory,

tax-supported public schools could not enable

sectarian groups to give religious instruction

to public school students in public school

buildings.

In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the

Court ruled that students in government

school could not be required to recite an

official state prayer, even if students may

23

•

•

remain silent or be excused, and the prayer

was denominationally neutral.10

In Abington School District v. Schempp, 374

U.S. 203 (1963), the Court ruled that school

boards many not require passages from the

Bible be read or the Lord’s Prayer be recited,

even if students may be excused from

attending or participating.11

In Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), the

Court prohibited posting a copy of the Ten

Commandments purchased with private

contributions on the wall of school

classrooms.12

10

“Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally

neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the

students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations

of the Establishment Clause,” this Court ruled. Engel at 430

(emphasis added). “[I]t is no ... business of government to

compose official prayers for any group of the American people to

recite.” Id. at 425.

11

“Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading ... upon the

written request of his parent or guardian.” Abington at 205. “The

fact that some pupils ... might be excused ... does not mitigate the

obligatory nature of the ceremony for [the state law]

unequivocally requires the exercises to be held every school day.”

Id. at 210-211.

12

“If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have

any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read,

meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the

Commandments.... [T]his ... is not a permissible state objective

under the Establishment Clause.” Stone v. Graham at 42. “It

does not matter that ... the Ten Commandments are financed by

voluntary private contributions, for the mere posting of the copies

... provides the ‘official support of the State ... Government’ that

24

•

•

•

•

In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the

Court struck down a state law authorizing a

one-minute period of silence in public schools

for meditation and voluntary prayer.

In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987),

this Court struck down a Louisiana law

requiring public schools that taught the theory

of evolution to also teach the theory of

creation.13

In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992),

including clergy to offer prayers at a public

school graduation ceremony was found to

violate the Establishment Clause.

In Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.

290 (2000), this Court struck down a policy

permitting student-initiated, student-led

prayer at graduations and football games,

although the prayers were required to be

“nonsectarian” and “non-proselytizing.”

Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit’s

Free Exercise analyses turned on the (claimed)

absence of “coercion” in the elimination of the opt-out

policy. As the district court put it, “The sine qua non

of a free exercise claim is coercion, and the plaintiffs

have not shown the no-opt-out policy likely will ...

the Establishment Clause prohibits....” Id. at 42.

13

The Court ruled that “the Act ... has the ... purpose of

discrediting evolution by counterbalancing its teaching ... with the

teaching of creationism.” Id. at 589. The Court declared that the

purpose of the Establishment Clause is to ensure that

“Government not intentionally endorse religion or a religious

practice.” Id. at 587.

25

otherwise coerce their children to violate or change

their religious beliefs....” Mahmoud I at 298. But in

the Establishment Clause context, this Court has been

crystal clear that no coercion need be shown

whatsoever. Even when children could be excused,

proselytization of all sorts was banned by this line of

cases. Students who sought protection from prayer,

Bible reading, the Ten Commandments, and even a

moment of silence, or even hearing a prayer were

protected.

How could the Fourth Circuit remain faithful to

this Court’s many rulings on the Establishment Clause

while allowing MCPS to use its compulsory attendance

laws to hold students hostage to be indoctrinated in

LGBTQ+ doctrine against their and their parents’

wishes and beliefs?

Indeed, in Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1

(1947), this Court made clear that the First

Amendment “requires the state to be a neutral in

its relations with groups of religious believers and

non-believers.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). This Court

nonetheless famously declared that:

The “establishment of religion” clause of the

First Amendment means at least this....

Government can[not] ... pass laws which aid

one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one

religion over another.... No tax in any

amount, large or small, can be levied to

support any religious activities ... whatever

form they may adopt to teach or practice

religion.... [Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).]

26

In dissent, Justice Robert Jackson provided

important background relevant to the MCPS policy,

that “[o]ur [modern] public school ... is a relatively

recent development dating from about 1840. It is

organized on the premise that secular education

can be isolated from all religious teaching so

that the school can ... maintain a strict and lofty

neutrality as to religion.” Everson at 23-24

(Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It could be

argued that the Everson Court and Justice Jackson’s

dissent erred in believing that “secular education

[could be] isolated from all religious teaching,” or be

strictly “neutral.”

Most seem willing to believe that at least some

subjects, such as arithmetic, can be taught in a secular

manner, and not offend the secular/religious divide.

Some may contend that teaching about diversity,

equity, and inclusion is purely secular, but by the

Madison/Jefferson definition, it is not. Meanwhile, few

would argue that teaching children about sexual

practices deemed sinful in multiple religious traditions

is purely secular. Since the teaching of a LGBTQ+

curriculum constitutes religious teaching, it is barred

by this Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence.

The matter at issue in this case — the MCPS’

elimination of the opt-out — is just the most egregious

aspect of MCPS teaching a LGBTQ+ curriculum.

27

C. Public Schools Were Designed for the

Propagation of the Religion of “Secular”

Humanism.

It should come as no surprise that MCPS is

pushing on students a distinctively irreligious

LGBTQ+ agenda. Indeed, those most prominent in

developing the public school model did so to shift the

nation away from Christianity, beginning around 1840

with Massachusetts educator Horace Mann, who has

been described as “the first great American advocate of

public education.” To Mann, the salvation of the

human race was achieved not through doctrinal

religious means, but academic ones. “Our public

schools are the Ark of the American Covenant,” Mann

stated. “Education is our only political safety. Outside

of this ark, all is deluge.”14

In an 1840 lecture, Mann — wittingly or not —

explained the inherently coercive nature of his

compulsory education model. “We, then, who are

engaged in the sacred cause of education, are entitled

to look upon all parents as having given

hostages to our cause,” he said (emphasis added).15

The Fourth Circuit, apparently, shares Mann’s view.

Mann’s still-moralistic secularism was quickly

succeeded by the militantly secular humanism of John

Dewey, perhaps the seminal figure in American public

14

15

59 Ohio Education Monthly 650 (O.T. Corson: 1910).

H. Mann, II, Life and Works of Horace Mann, 210, M. Mann,

ed. (Lee and Shepherd Publishers: 1891).

28

education to this day. According to Dewey biographer

Henry Edmondson, “Dewey’s unrelenting attack on

religion and traditional education is a conspicuous

feature of his educational philosophy.” H. Edmondson,

John Dewey and the Decline of American Education at

19 (ISI: 2014).

[W]ith reference to the notorious statement

generally attributed to Marx, Dewey asserts

that “religion is the opium of the people.”

Dewey makes little attempt to veil his

hostility to Christianity in particular.... [Id.

at 19 (emphasis added).]

Edmondson notes that “Dewey not only rejects

conventional religion, he seeks to create a kind of

alternative faith ... nothing more than a kind of

shared democratic faith guided by science.” Id. at 21

(emphasis added). Dewey conceived of the educator in

surprisingly religious terms as something of a

missionary, using the classroom as a pulpit, to replace

the Christian religion with materialistic humanism.

As Edmondson writes, “[g]iven these views, it is no

surprise that Dewey signed the famous ‘Humanist

Manifesto’ in 1933, a secularist call to arms that

emphatically rejects religious faith.” Id. at 20.

Dewey’s good friend Charles Francis Potter, author

of Humanism: A New Religion and co-signer with

Dewey of the Humanist Manifesto, was still clearer in

stating his intent that the public schools should

actively proselytize his “new religion.” Potter wrote,

“[e]ducation is thus a most powerful ally of Humanism,

and every American public school is a school of

29

Humanism. What can the theistic Sunday school,

meeting for an hour once a week, and teaching only a

fraction of the children, do to stem the tide of a

five-day program of humanistic teachings?”16

Modern humanists echo this theme. In a 1983

article in The Humanist magazine, John J. Dunphy

wrote:

[T]he battle for humankind’s future must be

waged and won in the public school

classroom by teachers who correctly perceive

their role as the proselytizers of a new

faith: a religion of humanity.... These

teachers must embody the same selfless

dedication as the most rabid fundamentalist

preachers, ... utilizing a classroom instead of a

pulpit to convey humanists values in whatever

subject they teach.... The classroom must

and will become an arena of conflict

between ... the rotting corpse of

Christianity ... and the new faith of

humanism....17

The development of secular humanism as a

distinctly anti-Christian religion has not escaped the

attention of this Court, as 63 years ago it recognized:

16

D. Noebel, J. Baldwin, and K. Bywater, Clergy in the

Classroom: The Religion of Secular Humanism at 40 (Summit

Press: 2007) (emphasis added).

17

J. Dunphy, “A Religion For A New Age,” The Humanist 43:1

(Jan.-Feb. 1983) (emphasis added).

30

“Among religions in this country which do not teach

what would generally be considered a belief in the

existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical

Culture, Secular Humanism and others.” Torcaso v.

Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (emphasis

added).

This Court’s hope in Everson that a comprehensive

education could somehow be divorced from religion has

never been justified in America’s history. Throughout

that history, the only real question has been, which

religion will be taught in schools?

D. MCPS’ LGBTQ+ Agenda Is Not Neutral

toward Religion.

MCPS specifically instructs teachers how to

proselytize, to counter the beliefs of students who may

have religious objections to the storybooks. They are

instructed:

If a student says being “gay, lesbian, queer,

etc.” is “wrong and not allowed” by his or her

religion, teachers might respond, “I

understand that is what you believe, but not

everyone believes that. We don’t have to

understand or support a person’s identity to

treat them with respect and kindness.”

[Mahmoud I at 279.]

MCPS is telling students that the state

disapproves of their religious belief and that their

belief lacks “respect and kindness.” And MCPS goes

far beyond merely posting privately funded religious

31

material on the wall. It actively uses the storybooks as

part of its pedagogy, actively teaching children to

“venerate and obey” the idea “that there is no single

way to be a boy, girl, or any other gender” — a purely

religious postulate, and one directly at odds with the

religions of Petitioners. Id. at 278. And unlike the

Ten Commandments in Stone, the storybooks are

funded by tax dollars taken directly from the pockets

of Petitioners, “for the propagation of opinions which

[they] disbelieve[] and abhor[].”18

Contrast MCPS’ approach with this Court’s earlier

statement in 1985 when it struck down an Alabama

statute authorizing public school teachers to hold a

moment of silence for “meditation or voluntary

prayer.” This Court ruled that “whenever the State

itself speaks on a religious subject, one of the questions

that we must ask is whether the government

intends to convey a message of endorsement or

disapproval of religion.”

Wallace at 60-61

(emphasis added). Here, teachers are affirmatively

instructed to “convey a message of disapproval,” that

Petitioners’ beliefs lack “respect and kindness.” They

are to actively serve as Dunphy’s “ardent

fundamentalists,” as MCPS instructs “teachers [to] ...

try to ‘disrupt the either/or thinking’ and provide

examples like ‘Harry Styles wears dresses’ or ‘my best

friend is a woman ... married to another woman.’”

Mahmoud I at 279. MCPS’ promotion of one religious

belief over another is blatant.

18

Act for Establishing Religious Freedom at 85.

32

Here, not only do Petitioners’ religious beliefs not

get equal time, but teachers are also instructed to

actively disparage Petitioners’ religious beliefs to their

own children — in front of their peers. Moreover,

unlike the student-initiated prayers in Santa Fe, here

we have the teachers, the ultimate expression of

government authority and sanction, conveying to

young “members of the audience who are

nonadherents” that “they are outsiders, not full

members of the political community.” Id. at 309.

MCPS defies Santa Fe’s command that the

Establishment Clause exists to “remove debate over

this kind of issue from governmental supervision or

control.” Id. at 310. Rather, as even some MCPS

noted (see Petition at 13), MCPS teachers’ job is to end

the debate, in favor of one religious perspective and

against another.

In the light of these precedents, the MCPS

compulsory reading policy, with no opt-out, is a

painfully clear Establishment Clause violation.

Although the policies this Court has struck down may

have promoted Christian beliefs, the MCPS policy is

the reverse, promoting beliefs at sharp odds with

Christianity (as well as Islam, particularly affecting

some Petitioners).

Abington promised that “[t]he government is

neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and

it disparages none.” Abington at 215. MCPS’s policy

utterly destroys Abington’s promise and effects an

unconstitutional establishment of religion under this

Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

33

CONCLUSION

The circuit court decision should be vacated and

the case remanded to provide full relief to Petitioners.

Respectfully submitted,

RICK BOYER

WILLIAM J. OLSON*

INTEGRITY LAW FIRM JEREMIAH L. MORGAN

P.O. Box 10953

WILLIAM J. OLSON, P.C.

Lynchburg, VA 24506 370 Maple Ave. W., Ste. 4

Vienna, VA 22180

J. MARK BREWER

(703) 356-5070

209 N. Nugent Ave.

wjo@mindspring.com

Johnson City, TX 78636 *Counsel of Record

JAMES N. CLYMER

CLYMER MUSSER &

SARNO, P.C.

408 W. Chestnut St.

Lancaster, PA 17603

MICHAEL BOOS

CITIZENS UNITED

1006 Pennsylvania Ave. SE

Washington, DC 20003

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

March 10, 2025