Amicus Curiae Brief — Leachco, Inc., Petitioner v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, et al.

No. 24-156

In the Supreme Court of the United States

LEACHCO, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,

Respondent.

——————

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATE OF

WEST VIRGINIA AND 17 OTHER STATES

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

WEST VIRGINIA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State Capitol Complex

Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

mwilliams@wvago.gov

(304) 558-2021

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia

[additional counsel listed after signature page]

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does the for-cause restriction on the President’s

authority to remove the CPSC’s Commissioners violate

the separation of powers?

2. Should Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295

U.S. 602 (1935), be overruled?

3. For purposes of preliminary-injunctive relief, can a

separation-of-powers violation cause irreparable harm—

as this Court and several circuits hold—or can separationof-powers violations never cause irreparable harm—as

the Tenth Circuit alone holds?

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented ............................................................ I

Introduction and Interests of Amici Curiae ..................... 1

Summary of Argument ........................................................ 4

Reasons for Granting the Petition...................................... 5

I.

The CPSC’s Structure Is Inconsistent With

Basic Separation-Of-Powers Principles...................... 5

II. Agency Independence Does More Harm

Than Good .................................................................... 14

III. Separation-of-Powers Violations Create

Immediate, Irreparable Harms ................................. 19

Conclusion ........................................................................... 23

III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC,

598 U.S. 175 (2023) ................................................. 21, 22

Bond v. United States,

564 U.S. 211 (2011) ................................................... 2, 20

Bowsher v. Synar,

478 U.S. 714 (1986) ................................................. 11, 20

United States ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co.

v. Stewart,

234 F. Supp. 94 (D.D.C. 1964) ....................................... 9

Citizens United v. FEC,

558 U.S. 310 (2010) ....................................................... 20

Consumers’ Rsch. v. FCC,

109 F.4th 743 (5th Cir. 2024) ....................................... 20

Cooper v. Dillon,

403 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005) ..................................... 20

Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347 (1976) ................................................. 19, 20

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct.

Oversight Bd.,

561 U.S. 477 (2010) ........................................... 11, 16, 20

FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,

343 U.S. 470 (1952) ....................................................... 22

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit

Auth.,

469 U.S. 528 (1985) ......................................................... 2

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams,

897 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1990) .............................................. 3

Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States,

295 U.S. 602 (1935) ................................................. 12, 18

John Doe Co. v. CFPB,

849 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .................................... 23

Morrison v. Olson,

487 U.S. 654 (1988) ................................................. 12, 13

Myers v. United States,

272 U.S. 52 (1926) ........................................................... 6

Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs.,

433 U.S. 425 (1977) ....................................................... 14

PHH Corp. v. CFPB,

881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) .......................................... 2

SEC v. Jarkesy,

144 S. Ct. 2117 (2024) ................................................... 18

Seila Law LLC v. CFPB,

591 U.S. 197 (2020) ....................................... 2, 12, 13, 20

Synar v. United States,

626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) ................................... 9

Tilton v. SEC,

824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) .......................................... 22

United States v. Arthrex, Inc.,

594 U.S. 1 (2021) ........................................................... 13

United States v. Munoz-Flores,

495 U.S. 385 (1990) ....................................................... 20

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.

United for Separation of Church &

State, Inc.,

454 U.S. 464 (1982) ....................................................... 20

Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,

575 U.S. 665 (2015) ......................................................... 7

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,

576 U.S. 1 (2015) ............................................................. 6

Constitutitonal Provision

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ................................................ 5

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 2053 .................................................................. 13

Other Authorities

Adam Benforado,

Don’t Blame Us: How Our

Attributional Proclivities Influence the

Relationship Between Americans,

Business and Government,

5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 509

(2010) ................................................................................ 4

VI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Aditya Bamzai & Saikrishna Bangalore

Prakash,

The Executive Power of Removal,

136 HARV. L. REV. 1756 (2023) .................................... 12

Andrew C. McCarthy,

The Accidental Defender of the

Constitution,

21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 226 (2020) ........................ 9

ANNALS OF CONG. (1789)

(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) ......................................... 10, 12

Ari Natter, US Safety Agency to Consider

Ban on Gas Stoves Amid Health Fears,

BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2023, 1:01 PM) .......................... 17

Bijal Shah,

A Critical Analysis of Separation-ofPowers Functionalism,

84 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007 (2024) ........................................ 15

Bradford R. Clark,

Putting the Safeguards Back into the

Political Safeguards of Federalism,

80 TEX. L. REV. 327 (2001)............................................. 3

Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers

As A Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX.

L. REV. 1321 (2001) ......................................................... 2

CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE

MONTESQUIEU,

THE SPIRIT OF LAW (1751) ............................................ 8

VII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

JOSEPH STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES (1833) ................................... 10

Daniel A. Crane,

Debunking Humphrey’s Executor,

83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1835 (2015) ............................ 16

Daniel Backman,

The Antimonopoly Presidency,

133 YALE L.J. 342 (2023) ............................................... 3

David Casazza,

Liberty Requires Accountability:

Checking Delegations to Independent

Agencies,

38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 729 (2015) ........................ 8

Fatima Hussein,

FDIC Report Outlines ‘Misogynistic,’

‘Patriarchal’ ‘Good Ol’ Boys’

Workplace Culture, AP NEWS

(May 7, 2024, 6:30 PM) ................................................. 17

THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 ................................................... 10

Federalist Society Panel,

Federalism: Deference Meets

Delegation: Which Is the Most

Dangerous Branch?,

43 U. DAYTON L. REV. 31 (2018) ................................. 16

Ilan Wurman,

In Search of Prerogative,

70 DUKE L.J. 93 (2020) ................................................... 5

VIII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Jeremy Waldron,

Separation of Powers in Thought and

Practice?,

54 B.C. L. REV. 433 (2013) ............................................. 7

John C. Yoo,

The Continuation of Politics by Other

Means: The Original Understanding of

War Powers,

84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996) ......................................... 6

JOHN LOCKE,

THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL

GOVERNMENT

(C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980).......................................... 7

Kent Barnett,

To the Victor Goes the Toil-Remedies

for Regulated Parties in Separation-ofPowers Litigation,

92 N.C. L. REV. 481 (2014) ........................................... 21

Kristy Balsanek, et al.,

SEC Stays Climate Rules: An Overview

of Ongoing Legal Challenges,

DLA PIPER (Apr. 9, 2024)............................................ 18

Linda D. Jellum & Moses M. Tincher,

The Shadow of Free Enterprise: The

Unconstitutionality of the Securities &

Exchange Commission’s

Administrative Law Judges,

37 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY

611(2017) ........................................................................ 14

IX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Molly Beutz,

Functional Democracy: Responding to

Failures of Accountability,

44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 387 (2003) .................................... 21

Neal Devins & David E. Lewis,

The Independent Agency Myth,

108 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2023) .............................. 16

Neomi Rao,

A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency

Independence in Free Enterprise Fund

v. PCAOB,

79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541 (2011) ................................. 6

Neomi Rao,

Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for

Presidential Control,

65 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2014) ................................... 13, 16

Peter P. Swire,

Incorporation of Independent Agencies

into the Executive Branch,

94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985) ............................................. 15

GLENN A. PHELPS,

GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM (1993) ........................................ 10

Alison Gocke,

Pipelines and Politics,

47 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 207 (2023) ............................ 15

X

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine

Jean-Pierre,

THE WHITE HOUSE

(Apr. 21, 2023, 1:31 PM) ............................................... 19

Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine

Jean-Pierre,

THE WHITE HOUSE

(Jan. 11, 2023, 2:26 PM) ............................................... 17

Tim Hains,

RCP’s Phil Wegmann: Does WH Have

Any Response To Reports Of Toxic

Work Environment At FDIC?,

REALCLEAR POLITICS (May 13, 2024) ....................... 18

Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy,

The New Separation of Powers

Formalism and Administrative

Adjudication,

90 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1088 (2022) ............................ 15

Saikrishna Prakash,

The Essential Meaning of Executive

Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701 (2003) ........................ 7

Samuel W. Cooper,

Considering “Power” in Separation of

Powers, 46 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1994) .......................... 14

Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo,

The Unitary Executive During the

First Half-Century,

47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997) ......................... 11

XI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

STEVEN G. CALABRESI &

CHRISTOPHER S. YOO,

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:

PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM

WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) ................................. 9, 11

Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.

Prakash,

The President’s Power to Execute the

Laws,

104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) ........................................... 6, 9

Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine

Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for

Strategic Communications John Kirby,

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT

(Dec. 14, 2023, 1:17 PM) ............................................... 19

Victoria Guida,

Embattled FDIC Chair To Step Down

When a Successor Is Confirmed,

POLITICO (May 20, 2024, 5:37 PM) ............................. 17

White House Daily Briefing,

C-SPAN (Nov. 18, 2022) .............................................. 19

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES (1765) .............................................. 7, 8

WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (J. C.

Hamilton ed., 1851)....................................................... 10

INTRODUCTION AND

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE*

Imagine a governmental agency with vast,

unrestrained power over America’s consumer markets.

All on its own, the agency can declare that the items that

line our store shelves are unsuitable and instruct the

public to avoid them. It can strong-arm companies into

recalling products. And when that doesn’t work, it can

force products off the market through internal agency

proceedings. If someone complains, then the agency can

retaliate by going after that individual for recall costs and

more. Worse yet, in doing all this, the agency is

accountable to essentially no one. The president doesn’t

have easy power to steer the agency by firing

subordinates, and he isn’t accountable when the agency

missteps. Meanwhile, the courts can act only once the

damage has been done and it’s too late to do any good.

Unfortunately, one needn’t imagine such an agency—

it’s the Consumer Product Safety Commission. In this

case, one company that drew the Commission’s ire tried to

fight back. Petitioner Leachco, Inc. insisted that the

Commission must at least answer to the President if it’s

going to wield broad executive authority. But the lower

courts rebuffed Leachco, holding that the Commission’s

power and autonomy—including its for-cause removal

protections—are no real issue. Even if they were

unconstitutional, the lower courts didn’t think a

separation-of-powers violation could justify preliminary

injunctive relief.

Under Supreme Court Rule 37, amici timely notified counsel of

record of their intent to file this brief.

*

2

The lower courts were wrong, and the flaws that

permeate their decisions concern more than just the

CPSC. Independent agencies—agencies that dodge the

ordinary constraints under which other executive-branch

agencies work—are now everywhere. They regulate

expansive realms of American life, including financial

markets, communications, elections, employment, energy,

and more. And “[b]ecause of their massive power and the

absence of Presidential supervision and direction,

independent agencies pose a significant threat to

individual liberty and to the constitutional system of

separation of powers and checks and balances.” PHH

Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2018)

(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). They have become “a de facto

fourth branch of Government,” operating in a fuzzy space

that blends legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 240 (2020)

(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Amici States have watched the growth of independent

agencies—and their accompanying attack on the

separation of powers—with increasing concern.

Separating the powers of our federal government

preserves the “integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty

of the States.” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221

(2011); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit

Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (explaining how the

Framers chose the “structure of the Federal

Government” as the “principal means” “to ensure the role

of the States”). Balancing powers among the branches

helps “ensure that States function as political entities in

their own right.” Bond, 564 U.S. at 221. On the flipside,

“[p]ermitting the federal government to avoid these

constraints would allow it to exercise more power than the

Constitution contemplates, at the expense of state

authority.” Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers As

3

A Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324

(2001). So the “success of American federalism” might be

undermined “[i]f the federal government were free to

evade federal lawmaking procedures by shifting

substantial lawmaking authority to unelected officials”

like “independent agencies.” Bradford R. Clark, Putting

the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of

Federalism, 80 TEX. L. REV. 327, 337 (2001).

The CPSC is a special problem for States because the

Commission is operating in a field—“consumer

protection”—that is “traditionally regulated by the

[S]tates,” creating a risk that States will be pushed to the

side. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41 (2d

Cir. 1990); see also Amicus Br. of La. & 15 Other States at

10-18, Consumers’ Research v. CPSC, No. 23-1323 (U.S.

filed July 18, 2024) (describing CPSC’s special threat to

States). Before the Commission can start rewriting

consumer-protection law, States should at least have a

say. But independent agencies like the CPSC have fewer

political access points because they “lack sufficient

accountability to the President,” Daniel Backman, The

Antimonopoly Presidency, 133 YALE L.J. 342, 402 (2023),

so States are often left out in the cold.

Yet independent agencies like the CPSC have no

business operating as they do in our constitutional system.

These agencies aren’t consistent with any original

understanding of the separation of powers. Even though

they’ve sometimes been defended on functionalist

grounds, time has shown that reasoning doesn’t hold up,

either. Promised benefits are illusory, while the harms

have been obvious and repeated. And problems will

continue if courts are unwilling to expeditiously address

them. So courts must be willing to step up and

acknowledge these harms at the preliminary-injunction

4

stage.

When a party is being affected by an

unconstitutionally structured regulator, that creates

irreparable injury that warrants immediate relief.

The Court should grant this Petition to begin to tackle

the serious problems that agencies like the CPSC cause.

Denying the Petition will allow harm to small businesses,

consumers, the States, and others to continue. Milton

Friedman had it right: while “[m]any people want the

government to protect the consumer,” a “much more

urgent problem is to protect the consumer from the

government.” Adam Benforado, Don’t Blame Us: How

Our Attributional Proclivities Influence the Relationship

Between Americans, Business and Government, 5

ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 509, 509 (2010) (quoting

Milton Friedman).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Early political theorists—those that shaped the

Founders’ thinking—would not have imagined the world

of independent agencies we see today. Those thinkers

pushed for a clear separation of powers, which assigned all

executive authority to a responsible executive. The

Framers, too, thought the executive should hold all

executive authority. The executive should thus be

empowered to hire and fire as he wishes. Structures like

those at the CPSC can’t be justified by the sort of “closeenough” constitutionalism embraced by cases like

Humphrey’s Executor.

II. Some have contended independent agencies can be

a little incongruent with the true understanding of

separation of powers so long as they roughly approximate

separation and produce benefits. But this functionalist

understanding hasn’t been borne out with time. The logic

was flawed to begin with, but the evidence now shows that

5

independent agencies aren’t uniquely skilled in their

subject-matter areas or exceptionally sheltered from

political influence. The parade of dubious actions recently

undertaken by several major independent agencies

confirms as much.

III. Separation-of-powers violations justify early

equitable relief. The lower court tried to distinguish

between individual constitutional violations and structural

constitutional violations in holding that the latter don’t

give rise to irreparable injuries. But that’s a false

dichotomy; individual and structural constitutional rights

advance similar interests, protect liberty interests by

working together, and don’t otherwise function as

“greater” and “lesser” sets of rights. The lower court’s

contrary opinion would defeat the Court’s recent aim of

providing litigants fast relief when an unconstitutionally

constituted agency acts against them. And it would create

a system of flawed incentives that would undermine our

constitutional system.

The Court should therefore grant the Petition.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

The CPSC’s Structure Is Inconsistent With

Basic Separation-Of-Powers Principles.

The Constitution’s text decides this case. It provides

that “[t]he executive power”—not some executive

power—“shall be vested in a President.” U.S. CONST. art.

II, § 1, cl. 1; see also Ilan Wurman, In Search of

Prerogative, 70 DUKE L.J. 93, 134 (2020). This power to

execute the laws brings a necessary implication: “as [the

President’s] selection of administrative officers is

essential to the execution of the laws by him, so must be

his power of removing those for whom he cannot continue

6

to be responsible.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,

117 (1926). And “the fact that no express limit was placed

on the power of removal by the executive [is] convincing

indication that none was intended.” Id. In other words,

“formal constitutional principles” drive a “logical proof”:

“the President must oversee executive branch officers;

such oversight requires the removal power; and Congress

cannot diminish or modify the removal power.” Neomi

Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency

Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79

FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2575 (2011).

Yet with

independent agencies like the CPSC, Congress has done

exactly that.

Aside from text, though, “this Court has often put

significant weight upon historical practice” “[i]n

separation-of-powers cases.”

Zivotofsky ex rel.

Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 23 (2015) (cleaned up).

That history confirms that insulating agency

commissioners from removal is constitutionally untenable.

A. “On questions concerning government and law,

eighteenth-century Americans turned to three writers in

particular—John Locke, William Blackstone, and

Montesquieu.” John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics

by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War

Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 199 (1996); see also, e.g.,

Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The

President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J.

541, 607 (1994) (describing how the “orthodox

understanding of executive power held by Locke,

Blackstone, and Montesquieu remained supreme” at the

time of the Founding). Indeed, this Court has looked to

these same writers in sizing up the removal power.

Myers, 272 U.S. at 234. And the writings of all three

7

highlight how

problematic.

independent

agencies

are

deeply

Locke, for instance, stressed that laws “have a constant

and lasting force, and need a perpetual Execution.” JOHN

LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT

§ 144 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690). Given that

continuing need, an executive must be established to see

to it—“[a]nd thus the legislative and executive power

come often to be separated.” Id. Partly this separation

arose because legislatures weren’t always in session. Id.

But the separation also acknowledged human nature; “it

may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to

grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power

of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to

executive them.” Id. § 143.

Throughout his Second Treatise, Locke “repeatedly

illustrated the core meaning of executive power”—and

contemplated that a “supreme executor” would be the only

one to wield it. Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential

Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701,

745 (2003). And even though Locke saw more importance

in the legislative role than the executive’s authority,

“Locke [wa]s emphatically not suggesting that legislative

supremacy entitles legislators to perform adjudicative and

executive functions.” Jeremy Waldron, Separation of

Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433,

441 (2013); see, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,

575 U.S. 665, 710 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

On this score, Blackstone echoed Locke. “[T]he

making of laws is entirely the work of ... the legislative

branch, of the sovereign power,” he explained, “yet the

manner, time, and circumstances of putting those laws in

execution must frequently be left to the discretion of the

executive magistrate.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

8

COMMENTARIES *261 (1765). In contrast, “tyrannical

governments” tended to “vest[]” “the right both of making

and of enforcing the laws” in “the same body of men.” Id.

at 142. And because the British government had “wisely

placed in a single hand” the executive power, others must

act in “due subordination” of that single individual. Id. at

*242-43.

Blackstone’s model promoted “unanimity, strength,

and dispatch.” BLACKSTONE, supra, at *242. It also

ensured that the legislative branch would “take care not

to entrust the [executive] with so large a power, as may

tend to the subversion of its own independence.” Id. at

*142. So both “Blackstone and Locke accept the value of

delegation,” but “the delegations they accept are to a

unitary executive.” David Casazza, Liberty Requires

Accountability: Checking Delegations to Independent

Agencies, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 729, 742 n.65 (2015)

(cleaned up).

Montesquieu was a third voice in the chorus. He

emphasized that “[w]hen the legislative and executive

powers are united in the same person … there can be then

no liberty.”

CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE

MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAW 185 (1751).

“Miserable indeed would be the case” if one authority

were able “to exercise those three powers, that of enacting

laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of

judging the crimes … of individuals.” Id. at 186.

Montesquieu also thought that keeping executive power

under one central figure would advance “expedition”—a

noble goal for anyone who has watched the creaking

wheels of the modern administrative state try to push

forward. Id. at 68.

“[O]ne can only make sense of Montesquieu’s famous

separation maxim if one regards him as subscribing to a

9

modern conception of executive power—as all powers to

execute the law except for the judicial power.” Prakash,

supra, at 747. So as then-Judge Scalia (and two others)

recognized, limiting or reassigning the presidential

removal powers “violates the[se] fundamental principle[s]

expressed by Montesquieu upon which the theory of

separated powers rests.” Synar v. United States, 626 F.

Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986).

In sum, all three thinkers assumed that a strong

executive would wield the complete executive power.

Meanwhile, “a separate administrative power has no basis

in the political philosophers that so influenced the

founding generation.” Calabresi & Prakash, supra, at 606.

So “students of … Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone”

would see that “permit[ting] Congress to strip away a

president’s control of the executive branch by limiting his

capacity to fire subordinates … would indulge” one of the

“gravest threat[s] to the separation of powers.” Andrew

C. McCarthy, The Accidental Defender of the

Constitution, 21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 226, 228 (2020).

B. “The leading members of the Constitutional

Convention of 1787 combined [this] profound scholarship

and learning with practical experience.” United States ex

rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 97

(D.D.C. 1964). Some of that practical experience came

from their own States, where no “pre-1787 state

constitution” referred “to the existence of administrative

power not already vested with the executive authority.”

Calabresi & Prakash, supra, at 607. More experience

came from the weakened, plural system employed in the

Articles of Confederation, a “failed” approach that at one

point entailed “a series of executive departments”

responsible to Congress.

STEVEN G. CALABRESI &

CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:

10

PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 33

(2008); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1407 (1833)

(describing how the grant of executive power to Congress

was thought to be a “fatal defect” in the Articles of

Confederation).

Driven by their education and experience, many

Framers spoke out against weakened executive power

that omitted a muscular removal power. Although

sometimes cited as an opponent of a broad removal power,

James Madison came to believe that “if any power

whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of

appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute

the laws.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 481 (1789) (Joseph Gales

ed., 1834). Because the power of “removing persons” was

“as much of an Executive nature as” the right to appoint

persons, that power couldn’t be interfered with by others,

Congress included. Id. Alexander Hamilton, too, thought

that the executive power was “subject only to the

exceptions and qualifications which are expressed in the

[Constitution].” 7 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76,

80–81 (J. C. Hamilton ed., 1851). “Decision, activity,

secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the

proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree

than the proceedings of any greater number,” he

concluded.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander

Hamilton). Hamilton urged that “the executive power is

more easily confined when it is ONE,” as “all

multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than

friendly to liberty.” Id. George Washington sought a

“strong, independent, and energetic executive” at the

Philadelphia Convention. GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE

WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 103

(1993). And later, as President, John Adams wrote that

“[t]he worst evil that can happen in any government is a

11

divided executive; and, as a plural executive must, from

the nature of men, be forever divided, this is a

demonstration that a plural executive is a great evil, and

incompatible with liberty.” CALABRESI & YOO, supra at

59 (quoting John Adams, Letter to Timothy Pickering

(Oct. 31, 1797)).

Other early American political figures thought much

the same. James Monroe, for example, believed “[t]he

establishment of inferior independent departments, the

heads of which are not, and ought not to be members of

the Administration,” was an idea “liable to many serious

objections.” Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo,

The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century,

47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1512 (1997) (quoting James

Monroe, Letter to Congressman Adam Seybert (June 10,

1812)). Likewise, John Quincy Adams perceived “an

obvious incongruity and indecency that a head of

Department should make a report to either House of

Congress which the President should disapprove.” Id. at

1522 (quoting Entry for January 12, 1819 in THE

MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 217 (Charles Francis

Adams, ed., 1874-77)).

Views like these led to what the Court has since called

the “Decision of 1789,” a choice by the early Congress to

make the heads of the first executive departments

answerable to and removable by the President alone. Free

Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,

492 (2010). The decision “provides contemporaneous and

weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning since

many of the Members of the First Congress had taken

part in framing that instrument.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478

U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (cleaned up).

The early

congressional debates were again colored with the

separation-of-powers absolutism of the early “judicious

12

writers” like Montesquieu. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 545

(1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.

Richard Henry Lee). And in the years that followed,

America’s first Presidents likewise acted with a firm belief

that they—and they alone—could act to remove those

executing and administering the laws. See Aditya Bamzai

& Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive Power of

Removal, 136 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1764-82 (2023). Indeed,

“executive power to remove executive officers coupled

with a congressional inability to curb that power … was

the practice until the Civil War.” Id. at 1789.

C. Now measure this indefeasible conception of the

executive power with the way things work today.

Humphrey’s Executor is the root of the problem. See

Pet.App.26a-27a. There, the Court held that Congress

could constrain the President’s power of removal so long

as the officer wasn’t performing “purely executive” duties.

Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628

(1935). A special “administrative body” that also exercised

some “quasi legislative or quasi judicial powers” was

thought to receive special protection. Id. Oddly, the

Court rested its decision in part on separation of powers,

reasoning that the President would exercise “control or

coercive influence” and “threaten[] the independence of a

commission” if he could exercise his power of removal. Id.

at 629-30. And it thought the Federal Trade Commission

was not truly an executive agency. But see Seila Law, 591

U.S. at 216 n.2 (“The Court’s conclusion that the FTC did

not exercise executive power has not withstood the test of

time.”).

Later, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988),

the Court purported to narrow the categories described in

Humphrey’s Executor to some degree—but with limited

success. Morrison still upheld a removal restriction in

13

part because the need to control a special counsel’s

discretion was not thought to be “central to the

functioning of the executive branch,” id. at 691—sounding

eerily like Humphrey’s Executor’s “purely executive

officer” test by another name. And the misguided idea

that “administrative bodies” sometimes get special

immunities from ordinary presidential power remains

entrenched, at least in the lower courts.

And that’s how we end up with an agency like the

CPSC. The Commission can shape markets, launch largescale investigations, and bring substantial enforcement

authority to bear. Pet.6-7. The Commission can drag

companies into an in-house enforcement mechanism

where it can push a target off the retail market and levy

substantial monetary penalties. Pet.7-9. And it does so

free from any worries about presidential oversight, as

Commissioners can’t be removed except for “neglect of

duty or malfeasance in office.” 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a). And

all because, in some ambiguous way, its work doesn’t

strike some as sufficiently at the heart of the executive

power—whatever the Framers might’ve expected.

This setup can’t continue. The Constitution “[d]ivide[s]

power everywhere except for the Presidency.” Seila Law,

591 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added). The executive power

“acquires its legitimacy and accountability to the public

through a clear and effective chain of command down from

the President, on whom all the people vote.” United

States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1, 11 (2021) (cleaned up).

So “[t]he President’s control over subordinates”—socalled independent agencies included—“constitutes an

essential aspect of the independence of the executive

branch in the scheme of separation of powers.” Neomi

Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential

Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1228 (2014). The Court

14

should grant the Petition to reaffirm that key element of

executive power.

II.

Agency Independence Does More Harm Than

Good.

A. For too long, those who support independent

agencies with removal limits have pushed for a

“functional” or “pragmatic” approach to independent

agencies. Functionalists suggest independent agencies,

despite questionable legal justifications, are necessary

because of their purported decision-producing benefits.

Specifically, they are thought to attract uniquely qualified

experts, render politically independent decisions, and

embrace cooperatively driven outcomes (particularly with

politically diverse, multi-member boards).

Considering these supposed benefits, “[f]unctionalists

were prepared to accept independent agencies not

established under the original constitutional structure

because those agencies performed only ‘quasi’ legislative,

executive, or judicial functions.” Samuel W. Cooper,

Considering “Power” in Separation of Powers, 46 STAN.

L. REV. 361, 370 (1994). Courts then step in only when an

agency’s independence “prevents the Executive Branch

from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned

functions.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,

443 (1977).

Some continue to push a “classically

functionalist” argument today in defending the continued

use of independent agencies: “if the system is not broken

and has worked thus far, why fix it?” Linda D. Jellum &

Moses M. Tincher, The Shadow of Free Enterprise: The

Unconstitutionality of the Securities & Exchange

Commission’s Administrative Law Judges, 37 J. NAT’L

ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 611, 686 (2017).

15

This functionalist approach was problematic from the

beginning. Most obviously, “[f]unctionalism invites judges

to make subjective judgments based on their personal

values and ideological preferences.” Robert L. Glicksman

& Richard E. Levy, The New Separation of Powers

Formalism and Administrative Adjudication, 90 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 1088, 1104 (2022). Rather than measuring

an agency’s actions and authority against our

Constitution, surmise whether a given structure involves

inputs and outputs to the judges’ liking. Functionalism

also unduly minimizes the real harms that flow from

independence—including in a lack of accountability. See,

e.g., Alison Gocke, Pipelines and Politics, 47 HARV. ENV’T

L. REV. 207, 269 (2023) (describing how the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission, as “an independent

agency, … [is] generally less responsive to the standard

actors we might think of as being able to check agency

malfeasance”).

And little evidence suggested the

supposed benefits from endorsing independent agencies

in this way were real. It bordered on the absurd to say

that independent agencies like the Federal Trade

Commission (or here, the CPSC) don’t exercise executive

functions. Of course they do. See, e.g., Pet.18-21.

But “[f]rom the functionalist perspective, the

distinctive expertise and impartiality of independent

agencies appear much less compelling in the light of a halfcentury of experience.” Peter P. Swire, Incorporation of

Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94

YALE L.J. 1766, 1766 (1985). We now know that even

independent agencies sometimes exercise their authority

in a biased way, sometimes engage in discriminatory acts,

and sometimes push out others to expand their own

power. Bijal Shah, A Critical Analysis of Separation-ofPowers Functionalism, 84 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1039

(2024). Even with the FTC—the very agency addressed

16

in Humphrey’s Executor—the evidence says Humphrey’s

Executor’s premises were mistaken. “A century of

experience has shown that” the FTC “is independent from

the President but inclined to the will of Congress, not

uniquely expert, and not predominantly legislative or

adjudicatory.” Daniel A. Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s

Executor, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1835, 1871 (2015). The

“benefits of administrative independence, such as freedom

from ‘politics’ or the promotion of scientific or other

expertise,” have simply “eroded over time.”

Rao,

Removal, supra, at 1232.

A recent empirical analysis confirmed it. Professors

Neal Devins and David E. Lewis surveyed hundreds of

executive-branch and independent-agency officials from

both the Obama and Trump administrations. Neal Devins

& David E. Lewis, The Independent Agency Myth, 108

CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1311 (2023). Their conclusion?

“[T]he independent agency model no longer works.” Id.

at 1309. “[E]xpertise, political insulation, and policy

stability goals have not been realized,” they conclude, and

independent agencies often fail to coordinate with other

agencies while suffering from political neglect. Id. at 1340.

And an ugly paradox results from these realities: even if

presidential control lurks around independent agencies,

ultimate accountability for those agencies is still lessened.

Presidents can disclaim responsibility for their actions.

See Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 498 (noting how laws that

“grant[] … executive power without the Executive’s

oversight … subvert[] the President’s ability to ensure

that the laws are faithfully executed—as well as the

public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts”); see also,

e.g., Federalist Society Panel, Federalism: Deference

Meets Delegation: Which Is the Most Dangerous

Branch?, 43 U. DAYTON L. REV. 31, 51 (2018) (quoting

Neal Katyal: “[B]ecause of the[ir] lack of accountability,”

17

“independent agencies are a unique problem” and “are

dangerous in ways not anticipated by our founders.”).

B. It might be tempting to dub these theoretical

concerns.

But recent real-world examples confirm

independent agencies have run amuck.

Take the CPSC itself. This case is just one example of

the agency going too far. A while back, for instance, the

Commission announced it was considering banning gas

stoves, which 40% of Americans use. See Ari Natter, US

Safety Agency to Consider Ban on Gas Stoves Amid

Health Fears, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2023, 1:01 PM),

https://tinyurl.com/3k8vv5t4. Americans were justifiably

outraged. But when pressed, the White House leaned on

the agency’s structure to dodge responsibility: CPSC

Commissioners “are independent,” so explanations for the

agency’s actions were “not something that the White

House can … provide.” Press Briefing by Press Secretary

Karine Jean-Pierre, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 11, 2023,

2:26 PM), https://tinyurl.com/pm2zea38. CPSC was thus

able to do its problematic work without fearing actual

accountability, and the President was able to insulate

himself from blame for a controversial initiative.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provides

another example. There, Chair Martin Gruenberg came

under fire when an extensive investigation revealed he

had fostered “a workplace culture that is ‘misogynistic,’

‘patriarchal,’ ‘insular,’ and ‘outdated.’” Fatima Hussein,

FDIC Report Outlines ‘Misogynistic,’ ‘Patriarchal’ ‘Good

Ol’ Boys’ Workplace Culture, AP NEWS (May 7, 2024, 6:30

PM), https://tinyurl.com/2m37jcw6. Here again, outrage

ensued. And again, the White House quickly retreated

behind the notion that the FDIC is “an independent

agency.” Victoria Guida, Embattled FDIC Chair To Step

Down When a Successor Is Confirmed, POLITICO (May 20,

18

2024, 5:37 PM), https://tinyurl.com/3erk8z73. All the

White House would do is “refer [the press] to them as to

anything else coming out from the FDIC.” Tim Hains,

RCP’s Phil Wegmann: Does WH Have Any Response To

Reports Of Toxic Work Environment At FDIC?,

REALCLEAR POLITICS (May 13, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/

ymk99e86. Though the Chair says he will resign, he is still

running the FDIC. Meanwhile, the White House has

evaded substantial criticism for the agency’s dysfunction.

Just last term, the Court examined the Securities and

Exchange Commission’s administrative process for

levying civil penalties for securities fraud. SEC v.

Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct. 2117 (2024). The Court found that the

Commission had unconstitutionally purported to assume

“the roles of prosecutor, judge, and jury.” Id. at 2139.

Asserting self-aggrandizing power like that is bad enough.

But in fighting to defend its work, the Commission touted

how it was employing “classic executive power”—

apparently free from Presidential oversight. Pet.’s Br. at

34, SEC v. Jarkesy, No. 22-859 (U.S. filed Aug. 28, 2023).

The Commission has thus dispensed with any pretense

that it’s exercising something other than “executive power

in the constitutional sense”—one of Humphrey’s

Executor’s key findings. 295 U.S. at 628. And this inflated

sense of power might explain why the Commission has

acted so aggressively in other contexts where it has no

legitimate claim of expertise. See, e.g., Kristy Balsanek,

et al., SEC Stays Climate Rules: An Overview of Ongoing

Legal Challenges, DLA PIPER (Apr. 9, 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/ywbh93sh (describing the SEC’s new

unlawful climate-related-risk disclosure regime).

All in all, independent agencies have felt free to take

adventuresome approaches in rulemakings, apply

constitutionally dubious methods in adjudications, and

19

even play fast and loose in their own day-to-day

management. Meanwhile, the President can take a seeno-evil, hear-no-evil, speak-no-evil approach to all the

above. See also, e.g., White House Daily Briefing, CSPAN (Nov. 18, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/2p8x7879

(declining to address potential FTC action against Twitter

because “the FTC is an independent agency”); Press

Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre, THE

WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 21, 2023, 1:31 PM), https://

tinyurl.com/3uffh32k (limiting comments on approval of

mifepristone because “[a]gain, [the FDA is] an

independent agency”); Press Briefing by Press Secretary

Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic

Communications John Kirby, THE AMERICAN

PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Dec. 14, 2023, 1:17 PM), https://

tinyurl.com/3znyzwc5 (“[T]he Fed ... is, as you know, an

independent agency. Going to be super mindful on that …

So, I’m just not going to speak to that.”).

The Constitution calls for more.

III.

Separation-of-Powers

Violations

Immediate, Irreparable Harms.

Create

In a last stumble, the Tenth Circuit held that Leachco

had alleged “a mere generalized separation of powers

violation” that “does not establish irreparable harm.”

Pet.App.14a. The lower court tried to distinguish between

“individual” harms and the structural ones that flow from

separation-of-powers violations. Id. That reasoning

warrants a second look from this Court.

As even the lower court recognized, “the loss” of at

least some constitutional freedoms, “for even minimal

periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable

injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality

op.). But the lower court tried to do some hair-splitting,

20

suggesting a deprivation of a constitutional right can be

irreparable but only when it’s stacked on some other type

of harm. Pet.App.14a. It’s hard to find a principle like that

in Elrod or any cases that follow it. Quite the opposite: the

Court has said that constitutionally deficient removal

provisions that “violate[] the separation of powers …

inflict[] a ‘here-and-now’ injury on affected third parties

that can be remedied by a court.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at

212 (quoting Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727 n.5.

Elrod addressed the First Amendment, but there’s no

good reason to place speech rights on a higher pedestal

than the Constitution’s institutional and structural

protections. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.

United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.

464, 484 (1982) (“[W]e know of no principled basis on which

to create a hierarchy of constitutional values.”). For one

thing, they often serve similar purposes tied to

accountability. The First Amendment was “inspired” by

“a desire for government accountability in the face of

perceived abuses.” Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1214

(11th Cir. 2005); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.

310, 339 (2010) (“Speech … is the means to hold officials

accountable to the people.”). Likewise, appropriate

respect for separation of powers avoids a “diffusion of

power [that] carries with it a diffusion of accountability.”

Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 497.

And separation-of-powers protections are individual

protections in many ways. After all, “[t]he structural

principles secured by the separation of powers protect the

individual as well.” Bond, 564 U.S. at 222; accord

Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730. Ultimately, all these provisions

serve to “safeguard liberty.” United States v. MunozFlores, 495 U.S. 385, 395 (1990); see also Consumers’

Rsch. v. FCC, 109 F.4th 743, 788 (5th Cir. 2024) (Ho, J.,

21

concurring) (“If you believe in democracy, then you should

oppose an administrative state that shields government

action from accountability to the people.”).

A preliminary injunction is also an important tool

against structural violations like the CPSC’s. For leaders

to be held accountable, they must face sanctions for bad

decisions.

Molly Beutz, Functional Democracy:

Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 HARV. INT’L

L.J. 387, 402 (2003). And the stronger the sanction, the

more “powerful [the] incentive for responsible and, more

importantly, responsive decision-making.” Id. A full-stop

order at the start of the case is the right tool for the job.

Anything weaker invites the agency to press ahead in the

hopes the target will acquiesce or bankrupt before getting

to the end of the road. In contrast, an injunction

encourages both the agency to conform and litigants to act

to hold it accountable. See Kent Barnett, To the Victor

Goes the Toil-Remedies for Regulated Parties in

Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481,

497 (2014) (“[T]he mere pronouncement of a norm through

a declaratory judgment may be less valuable than a

prohibitory injunction that limits administrative action,

leaving litigants less incentive to vindicate that norm. If

affected parties have no incentive to enforce a norm, that

norm may cease to operate.”).

In refusing to recognize these ideas, the lower court

effectively rendered a recent decision from this Court

dead letter. In Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175

(2023), the Court held that a respondent to an

administrative proceeding who sought to challenge the

agency’s constitutional authority could sue to “stop the

administrative proceedings.” Id. at 180. The Court

recognized the claimed separation-of-powers violation

would be “impossible to remedy once the proceeding is

22

over,” as “[j]udicial review of [the] structural

constitutional claims would come too late to be

meaningful.” Id. at 191. So faster, immediate relief was

necessary. But if the Tenth Circuit were right, then

Petitioners in Axon would be out of luck. Yes, they could

file their complaint in federal court, but they’d receive no

preliminary relief—and their relief at the end of the

federal case would almost “come too late to be

meaningful.” “[B]y the time that they access[ed] any

judicial review” and relief, “the proceedings w[ould] be

complete, rendering the possibility of obtaining an

injunction moot even if the final Commission order is

vacated.” Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 298 (2d Cir. 2016)

(Droney, J., dissenting). The Court could not have

intended that backwards result.

And the States are collateral damage in this upsidedown world. If the CPSC is allowed to ban another

product under its unconstitutional structure, then States’

markets are lessened in a way that might not have

happened if the Commission were accountable. If the

CPSC may issue another broad rule setting onerous

standards, then States’ product-liability law is effectively

mooted (or worse, preempted) without a democratically

accountable actor having ever given the thumbs-up for

that aggressive tack. And if all the real decisions continue

to be made by the “fourth branch of the Government”

ensconced safely in Washington, FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343

U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting), then no one

will feel a need to make those decisions back in the States.

The Court should not embrace those outcomes. It

should instead grant the Petition and recognize that

“[i]rreparable harm occurs almost by definition when a

person or entity demonstrates a likelihood that it is being

regulated on an ongoing basis by an unconstitutionally

23

structured agency that has issued binding rules governing

the plaintiff’s conduct and that has authority to bring

enforcement actions against the plaintiff.” John Doe Co.

v. CFPB, 849 F.3d 1129, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh,

J., dissenting).

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the Petition.

Respectfully submitted.

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

WEST VIRGINIA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State Capitol Complex

Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

mwilliams@wvago.gov

(304) 558-2021

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia

24

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General

State of Alabama

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

DREW WRIGLEY

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

CHRIS CARR

Attorney General

State of Georgia

DAVE YOST

Attorney General

State of Ohio

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General

State of Indiana

GENTNER DRUMMOND

Attorney General

State of Oklahoma

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

LIZ MURRILL

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General and

Reporter

State of Tennessee

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

ANDREW BAILEY

Attorney General

State of Missouri

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General

State of Texas

SEAN REYES

Attorney General

State of Utah

25

JASON MIYARES

Attorney General

State of Virginia