Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Andy Desty, Petitioner v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

FILED

APR 0 8 2025

Wefct»

ANDY DESTY,

Petitioner,

v.

SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.,

Respondent.

From Appeal No. 24-13606-D

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Andy Desty

Sui Juris of Record

227 Spring Creek Way,

Douglasville, GA [30134]

(404) 957-2969

godkevboard@gmail.com

Representing Self as Petitioner

April 24, 2025

24027609-1 Document

No. of the United States of

America Department of

State Office of

Authentication

RECEIVED

MAY 2 1 2025

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including Fuentes v. Shevin, 407

U.S. 67, 80, 96-97, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Sniadach v. Family

Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed2d 349 (1969); Lugar v.

Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982),

permit Santander Consumer USA Inc.’s use of deprivation of rights and properties

without due process of law decisions.

Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Takings Clause ofthe Fifth

Amendment, including Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, 143 S. Ct. 1369

(May 25, 2023); Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885), permit Santander

Consumer USA Inc.’s use oftaking and depriving private properties for public use

without just compensation and without due process of law decisions.

Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Truth in Lending Act

(TILA) in Advertising of Downpayments and Installments of the United States

Code Title 15 Section 1662, and in Determination of Finance Charge of the United

States Code Title 15 Section 1605(a)(b)(c)(d), including Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L., permit Santander Consumer USAInc.’suseof

deceiving the American people to enter and to draft consumer credit contracts and

transactions by forcing to deposit large amounts of downpayments money in

Consumer Credit Transactions without full disclosure of required law decisions.

it

Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the United States Supreme

Court’s ruling “Where a Promissory Note Goes, a Deed of Trust Must Follow, in

other word, the Deed and the Note Cannot be Separated,” including Carpenter v.

Longan, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 271 (1872), permits Santander Consumer USA Inc.’s use

of separating original promissory notes from the deed of trust law decisions.

Where is the Note?

Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the United States Code Title 28

Section 636(b)(1)(A) Jurisdiction Power and Temporary Assignment-

Notwithstanding Any Provision of Law to the Contrary, including Labor and

Industry Review Commission of the State of Wisconsin v. Tracey Coleman, 860

F.3d 461 (2017), permit the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Georgia Atlanta Division’s use of dismissing with prejudice a case with No.

l:23’Cw00289 between Desty v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. by a Magistrate

judge without due process of law decisions.

Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Corporate Powers of

Associations'Bank Power to Lend Money Not Credit, codified in the United States

Code Title 12 Section 24 Paragraph 7, including First National Bank of Tallapoosa

v. Monroe, 135 Ga 614,’ 69 S.E. 1123 (1911); C.E. Healey & Son v. Stewardson

National Bank, 1 N.E.2d 858 III. App. 290, permits Santander Consumer USA,

Inc.’s use of power decisions to lend its credit to this Petitioner, not even its

money, and became surety, indorser, or guarantor for him.

Hi

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND RULE 29 STATEMENT

Petitioner in this case is Andy Desty.

Respondent is Santander Consumer USA, Inc. with admin:

Bruce Jackson, Head of the Santander U.S. Auto busi- ness and CEO of

Santander Consumer USA Inc., reporting to Santander U.S. CEO, Tim Wennes, in His

Official Capacity; Juan Carlos Alvarez de Santo, Chief Financial Officer for Santander

U.S. and Santander Bank N.A. in His Official Capacity; Brian Yoshida, Chief Legal

Officer for Santander U.S. in His Official Capacity; MatthewT Covell, Attorney for

Santander Consumer USA Inc. in this case in His Official Capacity.

Defendant, Santander Consumer USA, Inc., is being served as a respondent

herein.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED......................................................................................... i, ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE 29 STATEMENT.......................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................. . iv, v

GLOSSARY........................................................................................................................

vi

TABLE OF APPENDICES........................................................................................... vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES.............................................................................. viii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.................................................................. 10

OPINIONS BELOW........................................................................................................... 10

JURISDICTION................................................................................................................. 10

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED......................

11

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................12

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ADDRESSED........................................................................ 15

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........................................................................................17

A.

History of Santander Consumer USA Inc............................................................ 17

B.

Proceedings Below................................................................................................... 20

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION................................................................21

I.

The Constitutional Issues in this Case Are

Critically Important................................................................................................. 24

II.

Review Is Required Because The U.S. Court of Appeals and

The District Court’s Analysis Conflicts With This Court’s

Equal Protection Decisions......................................................................................25

A.

The Supreme Court Should Correct The U.S.

V

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

Court of Appeals and the District Court’s Unwarranted

Deference To Santander Consumer USA, Inc........................................(25)

B.

The U.S. Supreme Court Should Correct the U.S. Court

of Appeals’ decision and the District Court’s Abandonment

Of Strict Scrutiny........................................................................................... 26

III. The Court Should Grant Review to Clarify or Reconsider

Fuentes to the Extent It Can Be Read to Justify Santander

Consumer USA, Inc.’s Use of Deprivation

properties decisions............................................................................................. 27

CONCLUSION.............................................................

APPENDICES

28

..................................

vi

GLOSSARY

“Petitioner”

Appellant, proceeding in propria persona as Andy Desty, natural

man alive.

“Respondent”

Santander Consumer USA, Inc., corporation, national bank.

“Highest Court” United States Supreme Court.

“Court”

United States Court of Appeals for The Eleventh Circuit Elbert

Parr Tuttle, 56 Forsyth St. N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303

“Case”

Appeal Case Number: 24'13606'D

“Authority”

28 U.S.C. § 2101, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 Cohens v. Virginia, Article III

S.2 C.2.

“Rule”

The United States Constitution

“E. McBath”

J. Elisabeth McBath, federal magistrate judge for the U.S. District

Court

“Grimberg”

Steven D. Grimberg, U.S. District judge assigned on the case at the

U.S. District Court

“Matthew C.”

Matthew T. Covell, Esq., with Georgia Bar No. 190735,

Representative for the Respondent on the case. 1180 W Peachtree

St NW, Suite 1800, Atlanta, GA 30309. Tel: 404-817'8500

“Jordan, Branch, and Lagoa”

U.S. Circuit judges who gave their OPINION at the U.S. Court of

Appeals with no judges’ signature for the case petitioned herein

that later became JUDGMENT to Dismiss without due process

vii

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION AND ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION,

DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 2024,............................................................................... 3a

APPENDIX B — JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION,

DATED SEPTEMBER 26,2024,..................................................................................... 9a

APPENDIX C — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, DATED DECEMBER 9,2024,...................................... Ila

APPENDIX D — JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION,

DATED MARCH 6,2025,............................................................................................ 13a

\7ii i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES

Fuentes v. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67, 80, 96-97, 92 S.Ct. 1983,

32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972);

Page

passim

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,

395 U.S. 337, 340'42, 89

S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed2d 349 (1969)

............................ passim

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 924, 102 S.Ct. 2744,

73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)

passim

Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota,

143 S. Ct. 1369 (May 25, 2023)

passim

Boyd v. U.S.,

116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885)

passim

Stone v. Powell,

428 U.S. 465, 483 n. 35,

96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L

passim

Carpenter v. Longan,

83 U.S. 16 Wall. 271 (1872)

passim

Labor and Industry Review Commission of the State of Wisconsin v. Tracey

Coleman,

860 F.3d 461 (2017)

passim

First National Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe,

135 Ga 614; 69 S.E. 1123 (1911)

C.E. Healey & Son v. Stewardson National Bank,

1 N.E.2d 858 III. App. 290

passim

passim

IX

TABLES OF CITED AUTHORITIES - Continued

Constitutional, Statutory, and Regulatory Provisions

U.S. Const., amend. IV

passim

U.S. Const., amend. V

passim

U.S. Const., amend. XTV

passim

15 U.S.C. § 1662

passim

15 U.S.C. § 1692g

passim

15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1)(A)

.................................... passim

15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A)(B)

................................. passim

28 U.S.C. § 241, 242

10 U.S.C. § 921 Art 121

15 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(b)(c)(d)

28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1)

42 U.S.C. § 1983

12 C.F.R.§ 1026.23 Section D (1)(2)(3)

15 U.S.C. § 1635 (a)(b)

...........................

passim

..................................... passim

................................. passim

...................................... passim

......................................... passim

........................... passim

..................................... passim

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A)

Passim

12 U.S.C. § 24 Paragraph 7

passim

5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(g)

15 U.S.C. § 1640

..................................... passim

.......................................... passim

28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a)(c)

........................................passim

28 U.S.C. § 1651

......................................... passim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41

passim

10

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Andy Desty respectfully submits his petitionfor a writ ofcertiorari to review

the judgments (Appendices A, B, C, D) of the U.S. Court of Appeals and the U.S.

District Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the U.S. District Court is available at (APPENDIX A) at 3a and is

reprinted in the Appendix (“App.”) at 3a. The opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals is

available at App. C at Ila.

The JUDGMENT (App. B) oftheU.S. District Court denied and dismissed

Petitioner’s Complaint with prejudice without due process of law decisions and is

reprinted at App.B-9a. The U.S. Court of Appeals’ JUDGMENT, which overruled

Chief Justice’s ruling and decision in Cohens v. Virginia, is available at App. D-13a.

JURISDICTION

The U.S.D.C and the U.S. Court of Appeals rendered their decisions on

09/26/2024. App. 3a, 9a, and 03/06/2025. The United States Supreme Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1253, and 28

U.S.C. § 1651.

The United States Supreme Court has supreme power and jurisdiction to

attend to this case and to review it pursuant to the Article III S.2 C.2. See Cohens v.

Virginia from the Chief Justice:

The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the

confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever

doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it ifit be

brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction, which

is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to

the constitution.

11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in

relevant part:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.

U.S. Const, amend. IV.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant

part:

No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw,'

nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. Const, amend. V.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in

relevant part:

No State shall... deny to anyperson withinits jurisdiction the equalprotection ofthe

laws, nor either life, liberty, or property.

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

12

INTRODUCTION

On January 9, 2021, Petitioner Andy Desty, applied to access a Consumer

Credit transaction at Avis Car Sales, Morrow, Georgia for a 2019 Volkswagens

Atlas with VIN: 1V2LR2CA2KC549296. Upon arrival. Petitioner was introduced by

an automobile salesperson. Minutes later, the buying process started by asking

Petitioner to provide some personal and identification documents. Further,

Petitioner was asked to disclose his social security number and was advertised with

a Downpayment and Installment amount outside of the finance charge, which

clearly violated The Truth in Lending Act codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1605 and 15 U.S.C.

§ 1662. Petitioner was told that the downpayment, which was paid in the amount of

$3,000.00, was needed and mandatory for an approval from a certain bank under

the name of “Santander Consumer USA, Inc.” which Petitioner did not see present

that day at the time of the transaction. The petitioner was forced to pay and

actually paid $3,000.00 cash to leave the premises with the automobile.

The Petitioner entered an alleged automobile transaction with this

Respondent or with whoever was there that day without full disclosure of his right

to rescind. The Respondent did not exist on the alleged transaction because no

signature from this Respondent was provided on the alleged transaction, and that

false and deceptive information was given to Petitioner despite unlawful and lack of

transparency in the consumer credit application. Despite all the Respondent’s fraud

implemented in the transaction, matters were not being handled equitably and with

efficiency with the Respondent, Santander Consumer USA, Inc. So, having

‘“suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the

Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,”’ Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80,

96'97, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,

395 U.S. 337, 340'42, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed2d 349 (1969); and Lugar v. Edmondson

13

Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), STATED: an

individual deprived of property or properties only temporarily, due

process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mr. Desty

brought this challenge to the use of deprivation of rights and properties in the

Respondent’s business lending process seeking monetary and injunctive relief.

The U.S. District Court granted judgment in favor of the Respondent (App. B)

in a decision that sharply divided the District bench, and the U.S. Court of Appeals

DISMISSED with no judges’ signature, sua sponte, allegedly stated that Petitioner

filed his appeal too late on October 30, 2024, although Petitioner filed a timely

motion for rehearing/Appellant’s Motion to Object for Good Cause to explain to the

U.S. Court of Appeals that Petitioner filed his Appeal on time, but to the United

States Supreme Court (U.S.C.A. EXHIBIT 35) and that the U.S. Supreme Court’s

Clerk replied to Petitioner with a letter on October 24, 2024, stated that Petitioner’s

Writ of Certiorari was postmarked October 17, 2024, and received October 22, 2024,

and that the papers are returned because Petitioner’s case must first be reviewed by

a U.S. Court of Appeals or by the highest state court in which a decision could be

had (See U.S.CA. EXHIBIT 36). District Judge Steven D. Grimberg, and Circuit

Judges Jordan, Branch, and Lagoa’s writing for the panel, acknowledged that

Santander Consumer USA Inc.’s use of deprivation of rights and properties were

subjects to strict scrutiny. They nevertheless concluded that “Lugar’s and Fuentes’

and Sniadach’s serious, good faith consideration’ standard” applied refused to

“second-guess the merits of the Santander Consumer USA Inc.’s decision” and

“instead scrutinize [d] Santander’s decision-makingprocess” to ensure that Santander

Consumer USA Inc. “acted in good faith and even overruled a United States

Supreme Court’s Chief Justice’s ruling and decision.”

14

The United States Court of Appeals dismissed all Petitioner’s motions

including his Appeal without due process of law, without the Petitioner’s consent,

which even overruled a United States Chief Justice ruling and decision in Cohens v.

Virginia although the United States Supreme Court’s Clerk explained in a letter

(U.S.C A. EXHIBIT 36) that Petitioner filed his appeal on time, but must be first

reviewed by a U.S. Court of Appeals, and in spite of that, the Court still dismiss

Petitioner’s appeal. Writing for three of the dissenting judges, Circuit Judges

JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA faulted the panel’s finding that Santander

Consumer USA Inc.’s unconstitutional business conduct of deprivation of rights

and properties was justified by Fuentes and Sniadach and Lugar. In their views,

the panel decision “essentially abdicates judicial review of a deprivation of rightsconscious of takings activity for customers [Santander] customers that favor the

most in one of the most popular states in the United States.

This Petition presents important constitutional question^ (1) The panel’s

interpretation of Fuentes, Sniadach, and Lugar as a blanket endorsement of

deprivation of rights and properties preference in Santander Consumer USA, Inc.’s socalled “holistic” business activities without any regard to Santander Consumer USA,

Inc. having been one ofthe most deprivation of rights and properties businesses in the

nation before deprivation was considered.

This Court should grantthepetitionandreviewthe United States Court of

Appeals’decision, which authorizes public, private or national banks to increase the

use of deprivation of rights and properties and lending their credits to others

without any of their signatures on file decisionspreferencespreciselywhenthatuse

should be abating or completely stopped.

1. The United States Supreme Court shall attend to Writ of Certiorari and handle at its supreme court level only at its own

supervision and authorization,see28C.F.R.§0.20(c),andonlyincasesofgreatnational importance.

15

The U.S. District Court’s and the U.S. Court of Appeals’ decision in

agreement with the Respondent’s unlawful action of taking cash money outside of a

Finance Charge during a consumer credit application clearly rejects the Truth in

Lending Act (TILA) in the Advertising of Downpayments and Installments, which

violated 15 U.S.C. § 1662, and opposed the U.S. Supreme Court decision and ruling

in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Petitioner asked

Respondent about the taking of downpayment money in a notice sent via USPS. The

Respondent NEVER provided an answer.

Besides, it didn’t even bother the District Court to question the Respondent about

the downpayment received in cash money taken from Petitioner outside of the

Petitioner’s Finance Charge knowing that this conflicts with the TILA and ruling

and decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L., and

knowing that national banks are not allowed to loan their credits to others.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ADDRESSED

1. Whether this Court should grant Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari.

2. Whether Respondent violated U.S. Const., Amend IV.

3. Whether Respondent violated U.S. Const., Amend V.

4. Whether Respondent violated U.S. Const., Amend XIV.

5. Whether Respondent violated 15 U.S.C. § 1662.

6. Whether Respondent violated 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(b)(c)(d).

7. Whether Respondent violated 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23 Section D (1)(2)(3); 15 U.S.C. §

1635 (a)(b).

8. Whether the District Court violated 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

9. Whether the Court of Appeals violated Chief Justice decision and ruling in

16

Cohens v. Virginia

10. Whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals violated due process.

11. Whether the Respondent violated 12 U.S.C. § 24 Paragraph 7.

12. Whether the Petitioner has been damaged.

13. Whether Petitioner has satisfied all conditions precedent to assert a claim under

the Fourth, the Fifth, and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

14. Whether Petitioner has satisfied all conditions precedent to assert a claim under

Georgia’s Fair Business Practices Act.

15. Whether Respondent violated the United States Supreme Court ruling and

decision in Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872).

16. Whether the Respondent violated the Uniform Commercial Code § 9’102(65).

17. Whether Respondent violated the Privacy Act, which is codified in 15 U.S.C. §

552a(b).

18. Whether Respondent violated the Republic Act No. 10173 also known as Data

Privacy Act of 2012 (DPA).

19. Whether the amount of any punitive damages to be awarded to Petitioner.

20. Whether the Respondent returns all Petitioner’s properties including a 9’

milimeter belonged to Petitioner, Petitioner’s children’s properties, a 2019

Volkswagen Atlas, and the Petitioner’s legal papers/documents.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Andy Desty, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), 42 U.S.C. §

1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1253, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the Article III S.2 C.2., and Cohens v.

Virginia, prays this Honorable Court to attend to this Writ of Certiorari and

respectfully requests to investigate and settle this matter in good faith. Further, the

Petitioner prays to assume jurisdiction over this matter, to award Petitioner all fees

17

and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and all applicable damages

for the violations committed by the Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. History of Santander Consumer USA, Inc. in support of Petitioner’s Writ of

Certiorari

Because of so many unfair practices conducted by Santander Consumer USA, Inc in

the U.S. and as crazy as it sounds, Petitioner shows below three similar cases to

this Court as to why Petitioner respectfully requests the United States Supreme

Court to step in to attend to this Writ of Certiorari for complete review for the sake

of justice^

(1) On Wednesday, February 25, 2015, an article came out on the website of

Office of Public Affairs U.S. Department of Justice, where Justice

Department Reaches Settlement with Santander Consumer USA, Inc to

resolve allegations concerning over 1,100 illegal car repossessions against

service members. Santander Consumer USA Inc. has agreed to pay at least

$9.35 million to resolve a lawsuit by the Department of Justice alleging that

the motor vehicle lender violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act

(SCRA). The complaint and the settlement, which was subject to court

approval, were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of

Texas. The settlement covers the improper repossessions of 1,112 motor

vehicles between January 2008 and February 2013. The proposed consent

order represents the largest settlement for illegal automobile repossessions

ever obtained by the United States under the SCRA. The lawsuit alleges that

18

Santander initiated and completed 760 repossessions without court orders, of

motor vehicles owned by SCRA-protected service members. The lawsuit also

alleges that Santander sought to collect fees arising from an additional 352

repossessions that unrelated motor vehicle lenders had conducted in violation

of the SCRA before Santander acquired the loans. (SEE:

fileVZZBZsantander consent order.pdf)

(2) On December 22, 2020, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau settles

with Santander Consumer USA Inc. for Credit Reporting Violations in

connection with its auto loans. The CFPB issued a consent order against

Santander Consumer USA Inc. to address the Bureau’s finding that it

violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The consent order was issued

in connection with Santander providing erroneous consumer loan data to

customer reporting agencies (CRAs). The Bureau found that the consumer

loan data Santander furnished to CRAs between January 2016 and August

2019 contained many systemic errors that in many instances, could have

negatively impacted consumers’ credit scores and access to credit. All this is

in violation of the Privacy Act, which is also codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(g).

The consent order requires Santander to take certain steps to prevent future

violations and imposes a $4,750,000 civil money penalty. (SEE:

fileVZZIVcfpb santander-consumer-usa-inc consent-order 202Q-12.pdf)

(3) On July 31, 2023, an article came out on topclassactions.com in a class action

lawsuit between Hugh Kelly and Christine Kelly v. Santander Consumer

USA, Inc. indicated that Santander Consumer USA Inc. agreed to a $14

million class action lawsuit settlement to resolve claims it sent insufficient

repossession notices to Pennsylvania borrowers. The settlement benefits

19

borrowers who entered into a retail installment sales contract with

Santander Consumer USA Inc. for financing the purchase of a motor vehicle,

and whole vehicles were repossessed by Santander after the lender sent a

notice of repossession to a Pennsylvania address between June 30, 2014, and

July 9, 2020. According to the class action lawsuit, Santander failed to send

the proper repossession notices to Pennsylvania borrowers before

repossessing their vehicles. Plaintiffs in the case claim the insufficient notices

violated the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code and the Pennsylvania

Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act. The article says that Santander is a lender

for consumers, small businesses and communities. Santander hasn’t

admitted any wrongdoing but agreed to a $14 million settlement to resolve

the repossession class action lawsuit. The Final approval hearing for the

settlement was scheduled on October 17, 2023. (SEE:

file'-///I :/Kelly%20v.%20Santander%20Consumer%20U.S.%20Inc.pdf for

evidence)

WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Andy Desty, respectfully submit this Writ of Certiorari

to this honorable, supreme Court of the United States for the foregoing stated

above in favor for an admission. This Writ of Certiorari shall be GRANTED

without prejudice against the Respondent to set this matter for a de novo review of

the issue of violations of the laws of the United States and its Constitution, and

stated as follows:

A) Expedite consideration of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1657 because it’s

an action that requires expedition to avoid court orders causing additional harm

and damages.

B) Issue an emergency stay of the enforcement of all orders associated with the

District Court and the Court of Appeals’ rulings.

Grant any other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

20

B. Proceedings Below

1. Petitioner commenced this action in the United States District Court,

challenging Santander Consumer USA Inc.’s use of deprivation of rights and

properties, the Takings Clause, Fraud in credit transactions as a denial of equal

protection under the Fourth, Fifth, and theFourteenthAmendment to the

United States Constitution and violation of the United States Code Title 42

Section 1983. Santander Consumer USA Inc. defended its use of malicious and

deprivation of rights and properties as a narrowly tailored means of pursuing

greater amount in business, which it deemed essential to its mission as Georgia’s

flagship business of loaning. Santander argued that it is not considered as a debt

collector under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act but stated that it is an

automobile lender... so what a dumb statement, and a bloody lie! Santander

Consumer USA Inc lied under oath to the U.S. District Court so it can get its motion

to dismiss GRANTED. Fortunately, and unlawfully, Santander succeeded with its

lies in making the USDC and USCA granted its motions to dismiss Petitioner’s

complaint when it’s been viral on the internet that Santander has this scheme going

as a habit to unlawfully collect monies including made-up fees from its customers

collecting as a debt collector under FDCPA especially when the articles stated above

proved so. Furthermore, Santander Consumer USA Inc. argued that its use of

deprivation of rights and properties was lawful for being modeled after giving its

credit approval to Petitioner in a consumer credit transaction, which was

upheld as constitutional in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337,

340-42, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed2d 349 (1969).

The U.S. District Judge Steven D. Grimberg and the Circuit Judges Jordan,

Branch, and Lagoa have kicked to the curve the United States Supreme Court

decisions and rulings in the cases between Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 16

21

Wall. 271 (1872), and First National Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, 135 Ga 614;

69 S.E. 1123 (1911), where they rejected the decisions and rulings that have

stated the followings: “ Where a promissory note goes, a deed of trust m ust

follow,” and 11A national bank cannot lend its credit to others, but only its

money.” The guess is that Judges Steven D. Grimberg, and Circuit Judges

Jordan, Branch, and Lagoa never thought of why Petitioner has been asking

Santander in Petitioner’s Complaint under what probable cause and due

process of law the Respondent repossessed Petitioner’s automobile including his

firearm, his documents, his children’s school belongings, books, bookbags,

jackets. Further, the judges didn’t even bother to even check to see if Petitioner

had a debt or a promissory note from Santander. Petitioner asked the

Respondent many times, was there a debt associated with this transaction and

complaint. Upon demand, Santander refused to provide an answer even

pertaining to his own alleged debt and the complaint brought against him.

Santander never produced or presented to the District Court and the Court of

Appeals the original promissory note of the transaction bearing the original

signatures between Respondent and Petitioner. That alone created a recipe for

the district judge’s constant angriness where that made him unpleasant to work

in the case just because he decided he will not have time to lawfully investigate

the Petitioner’s complaint. At the end, that made the Petitioner a victim of his

own constitutional rights and his due process from discrimination and biased

judges.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Certiorari should be granted because the U.S. District Court and the Court of

Appeals “decided important federal questions in a way that conflicts with

relevant decisions of this Court.” Rule 10(c).

22

This Writ of Certiorari should be granted because it is in compliance with the

United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court rulings and decisions,

and federal and state laws pursuant to;

Case Laws:

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 96-97, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972)

stated: Even if the government deprives an individual of property only

temporary, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23

L.Ed2d 349 (1969), held: Wisconsin’s prejudgment garnishment of wages

procedure, with its obvious taking of property without notice and prior hearing,

violates the fundamental principles of procedural due process.

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482

(1982), held that: Due process requirements must be satisfied in prejudgment

attachment procedures if state officers collaborate with private creditors in

securing the property at issue. AND, In a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,

Lugar argued that he had been deprived of due process when Edmondson acted

jointly within the state in removing his property by attaching it to the lawsuit.

The lower courts ruled that no state action had occurred.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L„ “The United

States Supreme Court ruled that “State Courts, like Federal Courts, have a

constitutional obligation to safeguard PERSONAL liberties, and to uphold

federal law.”

Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885), the United States Supreme Court held

that “A search and seizure [was] equivalent [to] a compulsory production of a

23

man’s private papers” and that the search was “an ‘unreasonable search and

seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”

Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 271 (1872), the United States Supreme

Court ruled that: “The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as

essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the

mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.” “The

assignment of a negotiable note before its maturity raises the presumption of a

want of notice of any defense to it, and this presumption stands till it is

overcome by sufficient proof.” So, when a mortgagor and a mortgagee make a

separate agreement, that agreement does not follow the note if the note is

transferred. So, where a promissory note goes, a deed of trust must follow. In

other words, THE DEED AND THE NOTE CANNOT BE SEPERATED.

Coleman v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n of Wisconsin, 860 F.3d 461, 475 (7th

Cir. 2017), where the Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal because the Court

of Appeals held that magistrate judges may not dispose of claims in cases like

this one, where only one side has consented to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. The

Petitioner/Plaintiff did not consent to magistrate’s order and final Report and

Recommendation.

First National Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, 135 Ga 614; 69 S.E. 1123 (1911),

the Court ruling that “a bank (national bank) can lend its money (cash), not its

credit.” The provision referred to do not give power to a national bank to

guarantee the payment of the obligations of others solely for their benefit, nor is

there any authority to issue them through such power incidental of the business

of banking.

C.E. Healey & Son v. Stewardson National Bank, 1 N.E.2d 858 HI. App. 290, it

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is stated that: In the federal courts, it is well settled that a national bank has no

power to lend its credit to another by becoming surety, indorser, or guarantor for

him.

-

U.S. Constitution:

U.S. Const., amend. TVThe right of the people to be secure in their, persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall

not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.

U.S. Const., amend. V, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.”

U.S. Const., amend. XIV, “No State shall... deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, nor either life, liberty, or property.”

-

Statutes:

■

28 U.S.C. § 1651, 15 U.S.C. § 1662, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1)(A),

15 U.S.C. § 1692f (6)(A)(B), 10 U.S.C. § 921 Art 121, 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(b)(c)(d),

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23 Section D (1)(2)(3), 15

U.S.C. § 1635 (a)(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 24 Paragraph 7, 15

U.S.C. § 1640, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(g), 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (a)(c), Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure: Rule 41

I.

The Constitutional Issues in This Case Are Critically Important.

The U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals’ wholesale deference to

Santander Consumer USA Inc.’s “good faith” diversity judgments shiftresponsibility

for ensuring equal protection from the courts to vehicle financing companies. But

vehicle financing companies should have no claim to an exemption from judicial

oversight when individual rights are at stake. “Because even National Banks for motor

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vehicles or vehicle financing companies can lose sight ofthe constitution. It is the duty of

the courts to scrutinize closely their ‘benign’ use of deprivation in properties and rights.”

Thus, “when governmental decisions ‘touch upon an individual’s deprivation of

right and property, [h]e is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden[s] he is

askedtobearonthatbasisispreciselytailoredtoserve a compelling governmental

interest.’”

Whether deprivation of properties and rights and dismissing with prejudice

have arisen in the context of vehicle financing in certain federal courts, the United

States Supreme Court has not retreated from its duty to ensure that government

officials honor constitutional guarantees. See Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 635; Labor and

Industry Review Commission ofthe State of Wisconsin v. Tracey Coleman, 860 F.3d

461 (2017); That noble tradition underlines the importance ofthe issues that so

deeply divided the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals in this case.

Petitioner did not consent to the magistrate judge’s order and final Report and

Recommendation that brought his complaint to such dismissal order.

The Fourth, Fifth, and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution guarantees individuals the right to due process when federal, state or

local government deprive them of life, liberty or property.

II.

Review Is Required Because the U.S. Court of Appeals and District Court’s

Analysis Conflicts with This Court’s Equal Protection Decisions.

A. This Court Should Correct the U.S. Court of Appeals and the District Court’s

Unwarranted Deference to Santander Consumer USA

As the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals’ decisions demonstrates,

claiming to apply strict scrutiny may be very different from applying it. The U.S.

26

District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals effectively abandoned strict scrutiny

by holding that “due deference” validated Santander’s conclusion that deprivation of

right and property is “‘essential to its business financing mission.’”

The panel entirely departed constitutional bounds when it required Petitioner to

rebut Santander’s claim that its use of deprivation of rights or properties was in “good

faith.” If anything is clear, an individual suffering discrimination should not shoulder

the heavyburdenofprovingthatthegovernment’suseof deprivation is not narrowly

tailored^ “[T]he government has the burden of proving that deprivation classifications

are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling government interests.”

There is no authority supporting deference to Santander’s subjective judgment

that its deprivation-based creditprogramis narrowly tailored.

B. This Court Should Correct the Court of Appeals and the District Court’s

Abandonment of Strict Scrutiny.

Santander Consumer USA’s use of takings and deprivation in or after credit

approval cannot survive strict scrutiny under this Court’s decisions. First, Santander

Consumer USA, Inc.’s reliance on Georgia’s deprivation demographics to establish a

population goal that justified the reintroduction of deprivation preferences is blatant

deprivation balancing.

The fact is that total confusion and lack of transparency presented and occurred

in a consumer credit transaction between Petitioner and this Respondent where

Respondent raised an amount of commercial frauds, demanded for unreasonable

payments, payments that don’t even exist. To clarify the situation, the Petitioner

mailed to Respondent a notice demanding Respondent to validate its demand

under penalty of perjury as to where the demand for those high fees and payments

came from. Respondent, Santander Consumer USA Inc. failed to provide the

27

validation of his debt.

Petitioner, who is a natural man alive with blood and flesh, paid his money and

filed his Complaint at the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

on January 19, 2023, in which a copy of the foregoing was provided and made upon

the Court clerk in person and a true copy of the complaint has been provided and

served to the Respondent. Petitioner has explained to the U.S. District Court

everything that had happened, and funny enough, the U.S. District Court ignored

everything and pretended they didn’t understand the nature of Petitioner’s

Complaint. The U.S. District and the Respondent fabricated lies on all Petitioner’s

motions filed with them.

The District Court’s ruling against Desty’s objections after their careful

«

consideration of the record is WITHOUT PROOF, FACTS, AND LAWFUL

REASON to support their order. Appendix A, 3a.

The District Court lied about the whole OPINION AND ORDER (U.S.D.C. Doc.

28). The Petitioner objected to the magistrate judge’s Order and Final Report and

Recommendation. See U.S.D.C. Doc. 23

Another clear observation about the District judge Steven D. Grimberg’s

OPINION AND ORDER document, he stated that Petitioner did not object to the

R&R’s summary of his allegations and later in his next two sentences, he

mentioned that Petitioner objects to the R&R. See Appendix A, 5a. In the District

Court’s decision, it is crystal clear that the District Court was confused because

their panel made a decision that was not based on truth, facts, and the law.

Petitioner always approached the courts with his hands clean, with the truth to

NOT deceive anyone.

III.

The Court Should Grant Review to Clarify or Reconsider Fuentes, Sniadach,

Lugar, Stone v. Powell, LIRCSW v. Tracey, First National Bank of

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Tallapoosa v. Monroe, CE Healey & Son v. Stewardson National bank, Boyd

v. U.S., Carpenter v. Longan, to the Extent It Can Be Read to Justify

Santander Consumer USA Inc.’s Use Of Deprivation of Rights and

Properties, Lending its credit to another, and not its money.

For all the foregoing, the U.S. Supreme Court rulings and decisions identified

and stated above, the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals’ decisions

conflict with a long line of this Court’s precedent and rulings, including Lugar,

Fuentes, Sniadach, First National Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, Stone v. Powell,

C.E. Healey, Carpenter v. Longan. If the panel’s reading of Fuentes, or Lugar, First

National Bank of Tallapoosa v. Monroe, or Stone v. Powell, C.E. Healey, or

Carpenter v. Longan are correct, however, Desty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.

should be clarified or reconsidered to restore the integrity of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection, the Takings Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 231’35.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s prayer is that this Honorable United States Supreme Court

should grant this petition for writ of certiorari without prejudice. Further, Petitioner

hereby requests this honorable Court to conduct a de novo review and order the

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion and order in (U.S.D.C. Docs. 28, 29),

Opinion of the Court (U.S.C.A. Doc. 17’1), JUDGMENT (filed on 03/06/2025) to be

Reversed or DENIED without prejudice pursuant to FRCP Rule 41a (2), 28 U.S.C. §

1657, Equal Access to Justice Act.

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Respectfully submitted and signed on April 24th, 2025, in the State of Georgia by:

Andy: Desty, sui juris en lex I Petitioner.

All Unalienable Rights Reserved Without Prejudice UCC 1'308, Without Recourse.

Andy: Desty

c/o 227 Spring Creek Way

Douglasville, Georgia [30134]

godkeyboard@gmail.com

UNDER PENALTY OF PURJURY, I, ANDY DESTY, Petitioner swear, declare and

certify on this 24th day of April 2025, that this foregoing or all information provided

herein is true and correct to the best my knowledge and ability, with evidence of the

facts presented herein, and to the applicable laws stated above.