Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jaffan International, LLC, Petitioner v. Radhe Krishna Properties, LLC

No_____

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JAFFAN INTERNATIONAL, LLC,

v.

Petitioner,

RADHE KRISHNA PROPERTIES, LLC,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

District Court of Appeal

Second District of Florida

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Stephen J. Bagge,

CAREY, O’MALLEY,

WHITAKER, MUELLER,

ROBERTS & SMITH,

P.A.

712 South Oregon Avenue,

Tampa, Florida 33606

(813) 250-0577

sbagge@careyomalley.com

Counsel for Petitioner

Jaffan International, LLC

QUESTION PRESENTED

This Petition presents the question of whether state law

supersedes the federal substantive law of res judicata in

determining whether a federal final judgment is binding as res

judicata in state court. Departing from this Court’s precedent,

and in conflict with both federal circuit courts and other state

appellate courts, the Second District Court of Appeal of

Florida affirmed a state court’s refusal, on state substantive

law grounds, to apply federal substantive law of res judicata

in determining whether a federal final judgment was binding

in state court.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Petitioner is Jaffan International, LLC (“Tenant”), who

was the defendant-appellant below

Respondent is Radhe Krishna Properties,

(“Landlord”), who was the plaintiff-appellee below.

LLC

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Tenant certifies it does not have a parent or publicly

held company owning 10% or more of the corporation’s stock.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from the following proceedings:

Jaffan Int’l LLC v. Radhe Krishna Properties, LLC,

2D2024-0016, (Fla. App. March 25, 2025) (denying rehearing

on appeal).

Jaffan Int’l LLC v. Radhe Krishna Properties, LLC,

2D2024-0016, (Fla. App. Feb. 12, 2025) (affirming trial court

judgment in favor of Landlord).

Radhe Krishna Properties, LLC v. Jaffan Int’l, 21-CC92536 (Fla. Cty. Court Dec. 12, 2023) (entering judgment of

eviction in favor of Landlord)

In re Jaffan Int'l, LLC, No. 8:22-BK-00459-RCT,

(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2023) (dismissing bankruptcy case

but refusing to convert to chapter 7 or liquidate bankruptcy

estate)

(i)

In re Jaffan Int'l, LLC, No. 8:22-BK-00459-RCT, 2022

WL 1295923 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2022) (denying

Landlord’s motion for relief from stay on the basis that Tenant

had leasehold interest in subject property)

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ....................................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS........................................ i

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ......................................................... i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ..................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................... iv

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................................. 1

JURISDICTION ....................................................................... 1

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION..................................................................... 2

STATEMENT ........................................................................... 5

I.

Initial State Court and Bankruptcy

Proceedings............................................................... 4

II.

Renewed State Court Proceedings .......................... 8

III.

State Court Appellate Proceedings ......................... 9

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .................... 10

I.

The Second District Erred in Elevating State Law

Over Federal Law Renewed State Court

Proceedings............................................................. 10

A. The Second District Departed From Centuries of

Long-Standing Precedent in Refusing to Give

Effect to the Stay Order ..................................... 10

B. State Rules or Policy Concerns Do Not Change

The Result. ......................................................... 15

C. The Second District’s Decision Wrongly Impaired

the Stay Order and Cannot Stand .................... 16

II.

This Court Should Grant the Petition to Protect

Our Federalist System and Constitution .............. 17

CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 20

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Anderson v. Phoenix Investment Counsel of Boston, Inc.,

387 Mass. 444 (1982) ..................................................... 18

Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall,

685 F.2d 1306 (11th Cir. 1982) ....................................... 14

Central National Bank v. Stevens,

169 U.S. 432 (1898) .................................................... 12,17

Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

522 U.S. 222 (1998) ....................................................... 15

Beard v. Sheet Metal Workers Union, Local 150,

908 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1990) ......................................... 18

Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. McCabe,

213 U.S. 207 (1909) ......................................................... 12

Deposit Bank of Frankfort v. Bd. of Councilmen

of City of Frankfort,

191 U.S. 499 (1903) ........................................................... 2

Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air

v. Com. of Pa., 755 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1985) ............... 13,18

Dowell v. Applegate,

152 U.S. 327 (1894) ............................................................. 12

Edwards v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Clovis,

696 P.2d 484 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) ............................... 18

Embry v. Palmer,

107 U.S. 3 (1883). ............................................................ 12

Hayburn's Case,

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792) .......................................... 11,18

Mackall v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

356 P.3d 946 (Colo. App. 2014) ...................................... 15

Maricopa-Stanfield Irr. & Drainage Dist. v. Robertson,

211 Ariz. 485 (2005) ..................................................... 18

(iv)

Matter of Cook,

49 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995) .......................................... 18

Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.,

223 U.S. 1 (1912) ......................................................... 15

Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard,

568 U.S. 17 (2012)............................................................. 16

In re Ramirez,

283 B.R. 156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) ............................... 14

Riggs v. Johnson,

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867) ........................................ 2,12

Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,

589 U.S. 35 (2020) ......................................................... 14

Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,

531 U.S. 497 (2001) ............................................... 3,14,19

Stern v. Marshall,

564 U.S. 462 (2011) ................................................... 5,19

Stoll v. Gottlieb,

305 U.S. 165 (1938).................................................. 12, 17

In re Summit II, LLC,

651 B.R. 829 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2023) ............................ 6

United States v. Peters,

9 U.S. 115 (1809) ................................................. 3, 11, 18

Watkins v. Resorts Intern. Hotel & Casino, Inc.,

591 A.2d 592 (N.J. 1991). .......................................... 3, 18

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. Art. IV, Section 1,

Full Faith and Credit Clause ......................................... 4

U.S. Const. Art. VI,

Supremacy Clause ........................................................ 15

(v)

FEDERAL STATUTES

11 U.S.C. § 349(b) ........................................................... 1, 4, 14

11 U.S.C. § 365(a) ................................................................. 1, 6

28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) .................................................................. 1

STATE STATUTES

Fla. Stat. § 83.232 .................................................... 1, 6, 11, 15

(vi)

1

Petitioner submit this Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to review the judgment of the Second District

Court of Appeal of the State of Florida (the “Second

District”) in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Second District Court decision is pending

publication and is reproduced at Pet. App. 1a. The Second

District’s denial of rehearing is reproduced at Pet. App.

2a. The trial court’s decision is unreported and is

reproduced at Pet. App. 4a.

This Petition involves consideration of the res

judicata effect of related proceedings in the United States

Bankruptcy, Middle District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy

Court”. The Bankruptcy Court final order (the “Stay

Order”) in favor of Tenant is unreported and available at

2022 WL 1295923 and is reproduced at Pet. App. 10a. The

Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of the bankruptcy case is

unreported and is reproduced at Pet. App. 33a. Portions

of the transcript of the hearing which resulted in the

entry of the dismissal of the bankruptcy case are

reproduced at Pet. App. 35a.

JURISDICTION

On February 12, 2025, the Second District

affirmed the trial court without an opinion. On March 25,

2025, the Second District denied Tenant’s timely filed

motion for rehearing.

28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) provides this Court with

jurisdiction to review the Second District’s opinion.

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the United States Code,

the United States Constitution, and the Florida Statutes

are set forth in Petitioner's Appendix I. These provisions

are: U.S. Const. art. IV and VI; U.S.C. § 349(b); 11 U.S.C.

§ 365(a); and Fla. Stat. § 83.232.

2

INTRODUCTION

In this case, the Second District’s failure to take

action departed from centuries’ old precedent requiring

state courts to give res judicata effect to federal final

judgments as a mandatory, constitutional matter. In so

doing, the Second District engaged in substantial legal

error by impairing the federal courts’ ability to enter

final, binding judgments. The Second District’s

unprecedented decision to permit state substantive law

to prevail over federal law also created conflict with

federal circuit court opinions and state court of last resort

opinions which have uniformly held federal law controls

on the effectiveness of federal final judgments in state

court.

Simply put, this Court has never permitted state

substantive law to override the binding effect of a federal

final judgment that has not been set aside or reversed on

appeal. Federal final judgments are binding in state

court, “unless reversed in an appellate court, or modified

or set aside in the court of its rendition.” Deposit Bank of

Frankfort v. Bd. of Councilmen of City of Frankfort, 191

U.S. 499, 520 (1903). The rule is inflexible: a federal final

judgment “can never be taken away or impaired by state

decisions.” Id.

Failing to give res judicata effect to a final

judgment entered in federal court “is a virtual

abandonment of the final power of the Federal courts to

protect all who come before them relying upon rights

guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.” Id. “Any other

conclusion” fails “to preserve inviolate the safeguards of

the Federal Constitution….” Id.

This Court has explained the reason for refusing

state courts to disregard federal court proceedings is to

protect the Constitution itself. Riggs v. Johnson, 73 U.S.

(6 Wall.) 166, 194–96, 18 L.Ed. 768 (1867) (“[T]he

3

Constitution itself becomes a mockery ... if ... the nation is

deprived of the means of enforcing its own laws by the

instrumentalities of its own tribunals”).

In fact, the conduct of states attempting to “annul

the judgments of the courts of the United States” has been

described as nothing less than “destructive of the union.”

United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 115, 136 (1809).

This rule remains the law to this day. States must

follow federal law as it relates to the effect of federal final

judgments in state court, without exception, with the

relevant rule of law decided by the federal courts. As this

Court has more recently reiterated, “[s]tates cannot give

[federal] judgments merely whatever effect they would give

their own judgments, but must accord them the effect that

this Court prescribes.” Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed

Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001).

Indeed, not surprisingly, state courts have

concurred that federal final judgments are binding in state

court on constitutional grounds.

As a New Jersey appellate court explained, “once it

is accepted that Article III1 and its implementing

legislation have created courts with the power to issue

judgments that will have preclusive effects in other

litigation, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI mandates

that those preclusive effects are binding on state courts.”

Watkins v. Resorts Intern. Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d

592, 597 (N.J. 1991).

A state court’s obligation to honor federal final

judgments is essential to federalism. That is because

“cohesion between state and federal courts is necessary

for the continuing vitality of the federalist system.”

Watkins, 591 A.2d at 598. These issues are important, “as

Watkins court was discussing Article III, and the

instant case involves bankruptcy courts, which are created in

Article I, the logic still applies, since Article I is in the Constitution.

1 While the

4

nothing less is at stake than the integrity of federal

judicial power and the coherence of the federalist judicial

system.” Id.

In the decision below, the Second District

disregarded centuries of foundational precedent

establishing and repeatedly reinforcing the basic,

fundamental power of federal courts to enter final

judgments which bind the parties. The Second District

compounded its error by failing to give effect to 11 U.S.C.

§ 349(b)(2), which governs the vacatur of certain

bankruptcy orders when a bankruptcy case is dismissed.

The Bankruptcy Code provides that the Stay Order

should not have been treated as vacated, and yet that is

precisely what effectively occurred.

Review by this Court is critical in order to protect

the federal courts’ fundamental ability to issue binding,

final decisions. Any impairment of a federal court’s

ability to enter final judgments cannot stand, no matter

how seemingly minor, given the high stakes

constitutional and federalism issues involved when a

state law overrides controlling federal law.

The personal stakes in this dispute are equally

important as the weighty constitutional and

jurisdictional issues presented here. At issue in the case

below is the eviction of a small business, a Mediterranean

restaurant. The sole basis for the state court lawsuit filed

against Tenant was the claim that Tenant’s lease had

expired, as Landlord asserted Tenant had not effectively

renewed the lease. This precise issue was decided on the

merits in favor of Tenant in the Bankruptcy Court, which

determined that Tenant had a continuing lease. Yet the

state trial court refused to honor that decision on state

law grounds unrelated to the actual merits, which was

then affirmed by the Second District. The end result is

that Tenant’s business will be destroyed unless the

decision below is reversed.

5

This case is an ideal vehicle for the resolution of

the question presented. The relevant issues have been

fully briefed below. Although rooted in centuries of

precedent, the modern reiteration of this rule is limited

modern precedent reiterating the fundamental rule that

a state court cannot disregard the res judicata effect of a

federal final judgment.

It is perhaps that lack of more recent modern

precedent that may have encouraged the Second District

to put state substantive law ahead of federal law.

While this may just be one wrongly decided state

court case, failing to take action may only embolden state

courts to disregard federal final judgments in the future.

This is a line in the sand that simply cannot be crossed.

As this Court has observed, “[a] statute may no more

lawfully chip away at the authority of the Judicial Branch

than it may eliminate it entirely. Slight encroachments

create new boundaries from which legions of power can

seek new territory to capture.” Stern v. Marshall, 564

U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (citations omitted). This Court

simply cannot allow “compromise” regarding “the role of

the Judiciary,” “even with respect to challenges that may

seem innocuous at first blush.” Id.

This Court should grant this Petition and review

and reverse the the Second District’s judgment.

STATEMENT

I. Initial State Court and Bankruptcy Proceedings

This is an appeal of a commercial eviction action.

The underlying action was filed on the sole basis that

Tenant was a holdover tenant whose lease had expired.

Landlord sought to evict Tenant on the basis that

Tenant no longer had a valid lease, as its lease had

expired as of August 31, 2021 and Tenant had either

failed to renew the lease or its efforts to renew the lease

6

were ineffective due to prior alleged defaults. Landlord

filed suit on September 1, 2021 (the day after the alleged

expiration of the lease) claiming that Tenant was a

holdover tenant.

Prior to Tenant being served or filing any papers,

the trial court issued an order requiring payment of rent

into the court registry (the “Rent Order”). Pursuant to

Fla. Stat. § 83.232, a trial court can order a tenant to pay

rent into the court registry in a commercial eviction

action, and a failure to comply waives the tenant’s

defenses.

Thereafter, Landlord moved for default on the

basis that Tenant had failed to deposit rent into the Court

registry after October 2021. Prior to the trial court taking

final action on the motion, Tenant filed for bankruptcy.

On February 17, 2022, in the Bankruptcy Court,

Landlord filed its Amended Motion for Relief from the

Automatic Stay (the “Stay Relief Motion”).

At issue in the Stay Relief Motion was whether

cause existed to lift the automatic stay such that

Landlord could prosecute its state court eviction case.

Landlord contended, as it did in its state court complaint,

that the lease was expired and could not have been

renewed in light of prior alleged defaults and because

Tenant had failed to properly renew the lease.

Tenant filed a motion to assume the subject lease.

(Under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11

debtors “may assume or reject … any unexpired lease...

of the debtor.” The “primary purpose of the statute is to

allow for the assumption of contracts that are beneficial

to the estate, and the rejection of contracts that are

burdensome to the estate.” In re Summit II, LLC, 651

B.R. 829, 838 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2023))

The Bankruptcy Court found in favor of Tenant on

the Stay Relief Motion, based on the application of

7

Florida law, entering the Stay Order. (App. 10a) The

Bankruptcy Court framed the issue as follows: “whether

the term of the lease between the parties had been

properly extended.” (Id.) The Bankruptcy Court noted

that Landlord had argued “that [Tenant] is unable to

assume the Lease.” (App. 21a)

The Bankruptcy Court explained that the validity

of the lease was a threshold determination to be

determined in the context of Stay Relief Motion: It noted

“if the Lease expired such that [Tenant] could not assume

it and remain at the Property, cause would exist to lift

the stay. On that point, the parties agree. However, if the

Lease were renewed pursuant to its terms or if there are

circumstances that militate against the forfeiture of

[Tenant’s] leasehold interest in the Property, relief from

the stay would not be appropriate.” (App. 21a)

The Bankruptcy Court found that such

circumstances existed. The Bankruptcy Court found that

Florida’s anti-forfeiture doctrine operated to preclude

Tenant forfeiting its interest in the lease. (App. 24a-25a.)

The Bankruptcy Court explained that “[i]n the context of

landlord-tenant disputes, Florida law provides the

equitable remedy of anti-forfeiture ‘whenever it is just

and equitable to do so; the only condition precedent . . .

being the tender of the arrears of rent with accrued

interest.’” (Id.)

The Bankruptcy Court found that Tenant had

satisfied the requirements of the anti-forfeiture doctrine,

such that Tenant had a continued interest in the

property. (Id.) The Bankruptcy Court’s ultimate holding

was that Tenant had “satisfied its burden to demonstrate

an equitable exception to the termination of the Lease.”

(Id.). Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court squarely held

that Tenant had a continued leasehold interest in the

subject property.

8

Consequently, Landlord did not receive permission

to prosecute the state court case below. To obtain the

benefit of the Stay Order, the Bankruptcy Court required

that Tenant pay to Landlord as adequate protection

payments any amounts that were due under the lease,

including post-renewal rent payments, late fees/charges,

interest, attorney’s fees, and costs. (App. 26a)

The Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of Tenant

despite its observation that the state court had been on

the verge of entering a judgment in favor of Landlord prebankruptcy.

The

Bankruptcy

Court

deferred

consideration of Tenant’s motion to assume the lease

until it considered a plan of reorganization.

On August 9, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court

involuntarily dismissed the main bankruptcy case. (App.

33a). The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the bankruptcy

case on motion by the bankruptcy trustee due to

“incompetence and gross mismanagement” in Tenant’s

affairs, but it expressly found that Tenant had not

engaged in fraud or dishonesty, and it made no findings

that Tenant was in violation of the lease or had otherwise

forfeited the lease. (App. 43a) While the bankruptcy

trustee sought to have Tenant’s bankruptcy estate

liquidated by converting the case to a Chapter 7, the

Bankruptcy Court refused to do so. (App. 43a-45a)

Instead, the Bankruptcy Court simply dismissed the

Chapter 11 case. (App. 47a).

While simultaneously finding that the bankruptcy

case should be dismissed, the Bankruptcy Court

repeatedly referenced Tenant’s lease. It made a factual

finding that the “Tenant has a valuable lease” and had a

“going-concern value.” (App. 43a-45a). In refusing to

convert the case to a Chapter 7, the Bankruptcy Court

explained that conversion would be improper as it would

“most certainly result in the loss of the lease.” (App. 44a).

9

II. Renewed State Court Proceedings

In the state case, Landlord filed a renewed motion

for entry of final judgment. The basis for the motion was

that Tenant had failed to pay rent money into the court

registry prior to the bankruptcy and that Landlord was

entitled to immediate possession.

In opposition, Tenant argued that the Stay Order

had mandatory res judicata and collateral estoppel effect

under federal constitutional principles, and under the

Bankruptcy Code, the Stay Order could not be treated as

vacated and was deemed a final order even though the

bankruptcy case had been dismissed. (App 60a-67a).

The trial court ruled in favor of Landlord. The trial

court thereafter entered the Final Judgment. (App. 4a).

The trial court wrote that it “considered the impact of the

bankruptcy and the dismissal of the bankruptcy for cause

and the lifting of the automatic stay and finds that the

Court has the authority to apply Florida Statute §

83.232(5) to the facts.” (App. 8a).

The trial court found that the “claims of res

judicata, collateral estoppel, equitable mootness, and

other arguments are all defenses and said defenses are

waived in light of the noncompliance with Florida Statute

§ 83.232(5).”(App. 8a).

III.

State Court Appellate Proceedings

Tenant appealed the Final Judgment, arguing that

the trial court erred by failing to apply federal res

judicata principles. (App. 99a-109a) On February 12,

2025, the Second District affirmed the trial court without

an opinion. (App 1a). On March 25, 2025, the Second

District denied Tenant’s timely filed motion for

rehearing. (App. 2a).

Under Florida law, as a result of the per curiam

affirmance, Tenant had no right of appeal to the Florida

10

Supreme Court, and thus the Second District was the

final court of review. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So.

2d 286, 288 n.3 (Fla. 1988) (“[A] district court decision

rendered without opinion or citation constitutes a

decision from the highest state court empowered to hear

the cause, and appeal may be taken directly to the United

States Supreme Court.”)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

The Second District Erred in Elevating State Law

Over Federal Law.

A.

The Second District Departed From

Centuries of Long-Standing Precedent in Refusing

to Give Effect to the Stay Order.

The Second District erred in affirming the trial

court, which refused to apply federal res judicata

principles due to state substantive law, and which

otherwise disregarded the Bankruptcy Code, which

provides that the Stay Order is not a kind of order

vacated by the dismissal of a bankruptcy case.

Fla. Stat. § 83.232, which provided the basis for the

ruling below, is a statute which reflects a policy decision

by the Florida Legislature to help ensure that landlords

are timely paid rent during eviction proceedings. Premici

v. United Growth Properties, L.P., 648 So. 2d 1241, 1243

(Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

The statute, aptly described by Florida courts as

“poorly structured,” id. at 1243, provides that a failure to

pay rent pursuant to court order constitutes “an absolute

waiver of the tenant’s defenses” and, as a result, a

landlord “is entitled to an immediate default for

possession without further notice or hearing thereon.”

Fla. Stat. § 83.232(5).

Applying Fla. Stat. § 83.232(5) is problematic

under these facts because Tenant had obtained a final

11

judgment in its favor, and this Court has long held that a

federal final judgment must be honored in state court,

without exception, unless the judgment is reversed or

vacated. As a result of the application of Fla. Stat. §

83.232, the trial court ordered Tenant evicted, when the

sole basis for the underlying lawsuit was the claim that

Tenant had failed to renew its lease, and this issue was

squarely decided on the merits in favor of Tenant. The

trial court also directly undermined the Bankruptcy

Court’s decision to dismiss the bankruptcy case instead

of converting it to a Chapter 7, as the Bankruptcy Court

expressed the intent that the lease be preserved and not

destroyed.

Since 1792, finality of judgments has been

recognized as an essential attribute of this federal

judicial power to render decisions. See Hayburn's Case, 2

U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410, 413, 1 L.Ed. 436 (1792).

As early as 1809, this Court held that state

legislation which defied a federal court decree was

unconstitutional, as a contrary result would be that states

could otherwise “annul the judgments of the Courts of the

United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those

judgments.” Peters, 9 U.S. at 136.

The same principle extends both to laws which are

“general,” along with those “enacted for the particular

case,” as “state laws cannot in any manner limit or affect

the operation of the process or proceedings in the Federal

courts.” Riggs v. Johnson Cnty., 73 U.S. 166, 195 (1867).

State courts are “destitute of all power” to interfere

with the proceedings or decisions of the Federal Courts.

Central National Bank v. Stevens, 169 U.S. 432, 460–61

(1898) (exemption from interference by state judicial

action is “essential” to the “independence and efficiency

of United States courts). Thus, states cannot take action

that causes a successful litigant to lose “the fruits of his

12

judgment.” Id. at 465. In Stevens, the Court held that

renewed state court litigation was improper since it

“impaired [the federal court’s] jurisdiction….” Id.

The federal courts’ authority to determine effect

given to federal proceedings is “conferred…by the

constitution.” Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9–10 (1883).

Provisions of the Constitution which create this power

include those “which authorize all legislation necessary

and proper for executing the powers vested by the

constitution in the government of the United States, or in

any department or officer thereof, and which declare the

supremacy of the authority of the national government

within the limits of the constitution.” Id.

A “federal judgment cannot be ignored in the state

court … [and] such judgment, until reversed by a proper

proceeding … is binding upon the parties, and must be

given force….” Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213

U.S. 207, 220 (1909). A federal final judgment cannot “be

collaterally attacked, or treated as a nullity.” Dowell v.

Applegate, 152 U.S. 327, 340 (1894).

The rule equally applies to final judgments entered

in bankruptcy court. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170–

71 (1938). A state court errs if it fails to give res judicata

effect to a final order made pursuant to the Bankruptcy

Code, and a state court must treat a final bankruptcy order

“as an effective judgment.” Id.

Refusing to give res judicata effect to a bankruptcy

final judgment impairs “the power of the Federal courts to

protect those who come before them relying upon

constitutional rights or rights given, as in [bankruptcy

proceedings] through a statute enacted pursuant to

constitutional grants of power.” Id.

The rule requiring mandatory application of res

judicata in state court has been described “beyond doubt,”

as “[i]t would be unthinkable to suggest that state courts

13

should be free to disregard the judgments of Federal

Courts.” Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air

v. Com. of Pa., 755 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations

and quotations omitted).

The importance of affording res judicata effect to a

final federal court judgment outweighs “the substantive

merits of the controversy,” since res judicata goes

“directly to basic jurisdictional powers of courts of

separate sovereignties.” Id.

In Delaware Valley, Pennsylvania sought to vacate

a federal consent judgment because the state officer who

consented to the judgment lacked statutory authority.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the

judgment was a nullity due to lack of statutory authority.

Nonetheless, the Third Circuit found that vacatur was

improper under constitutional, res judicata principles.

The Third Circuit noted “although the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court's discussion of state statutes and

especially its motor vehicle code is impressive and

erudite, jurisprudentially speaking, it is irrelevant to the

overarching question of the competency of a state court to

interfere with a final, federal court judgment.” Id.

(emphasis added).

The rule that the federal courts and not state

courts control the federal substantive law of the res

judicata effect of federal court decisions was reiterated in

Semtek Intern. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.

497, 507 (2001). There, the Court explained, “[s]tates

cannot give [federal] judgments merely whatever effect

they would give their own judgments, but must accord

them the effect that this Court prescribes.” Id. at 507.

Further, although the Stay Order did not conclude

the entire bankruptcy proceeding, in the context of

bankruptcy, it was a final order, which constituted res

judicata. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d

1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 1982) (denial of stay relief was final

14

judgment and constituted res judicata on creditor claim);

see also Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589

U.S. 35, 47 (2020) (holding that denial of motion from relief

from automatic stay was final order subject to right of

immediate appeal).

Finally, although the main bankruptcy case was

later dismissed, the Stay Order survived dismissal under

the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(2); In re Ramirez,

283 B.R. 156, 161 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). Under 11 U.S.C.

§ 349(b)(2), as explained in Ramirez, only certain orders

are vacated upon the dismissal of a bankruptcy. An order

on stay relief is not among the orders listed in 11 U.S.C. §

349(b)(2).

The Ramirez court noted that by only providing that

certain orders are vacated, Congress was intentionally not

“attempting to undo the bankruptcy case in its entirety

thereby eliminating the application of the doctrine of res

judicata to all claims and all matters decided prior to

dismissal.” Id.; see also In re Pavelich, 229 B.R. 777, 780

(B.A.P. 9th Cir.1999) (“[T]he omission of an order from the

list in § 349(b) ordinarily means that dismissal does not

affect the omitted order.”).

Accordingly, under 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(2), final

orders in bankruptcy proceedings, which have not been

vacated, have res judicata/collateral estoppel effect even

when a main bankruptcy case has later been dismissed.

E.g. In re Ramirez, 283 B.R. at 161; Mackall v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A., 356 P.3d 946, 952 (Colo. App. 2014).

In short, the statutory scheme provided that the

underlying decision regarding the existence of the lease in

the Stay Order should have survived the dismissal of the

bankruptcy and not treated as vacated. Nonetheless, the

Second District disregarded the statutory scheme without

justification by essentially treating the Stay Order as

vacated since the main bankruptcy case was dismissed.

15

B.

State Rules or Policy Concerns Do Not

Change the Result

While Fla. Stat. § 83.232 embodies reasonable

public policy concerns, this Court has never allowed state

public policy concerns to override the fundamental

principle that federal substantive law prevails over state

law. Indeed, this Court rejected public policy rationales

for disregarding federal law in state court in Mondou v.

New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912): “The

suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony

with the policy of the state, and therefore that the courts

of the state are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite

inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal

contemplation does not exist.”

In the analogous context of the Full Faith and

Credit Clause of the Constitution, which requires that

states honor judgments entered in other states, this

Court has likewise explained that state laws and public

policies cannot be considered when determining if an out

of state judgment should be enforced. Baker by Thomas

v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234 (1998) (rejecting

notion of a ubiquitous “public policy exception”

permitting one state to resist recognition of another

state's judgment).

In fact, in that same context, this Court has

observed “[w]e are aware of no considerations of local

policy or law which could rightly be deemed to impair the

force and effect which the full faith and credit clause and

the Act of Congress require…” Id. at 234 (cleaned up)

(citations omitted). Thus, states are ordered to submit

“even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of

another State, because the practical operation of the

federal system, which the Constitution designed,

demanded it.” Id. at 222.

Indeed, this Court has held that strictly enforcing

16

principles of res judicata is itself required as a matter of

public policy: “[P]ublic policy dictates that there be an end

of litigation….The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of

fundamental and substantial justice.” Federated Dept.

Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (citations

omitted). As such, there is “no principle of law or equity

which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the

salutary principle of res judicata.” Id. (citations omitted)

Finally, the fact that the waiver of defenses set

forth in Fla. Stat. 83.232 may be more a “specific” rule

than the general constitutional res judicata principles

discussed here does not change the result. Under

constitutional principles, “[w]here a specific statute, for

example, conflicts with a general constitutional

provision, the latter governs.” Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v.

Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012). This also applies “where

a specific state statute conflicts with a general federal

statute” since “there is no general-specific exception to

the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 21-22.

C.

The Second District’s Decision Wrongly

Impaired the Stay Order and Cannot Stand

The bottom line is that the application of state law

should not have precluded the Second District from

considering the res judicata effect of the Stay Order.

Longstanding precedent simply does not allow state law

to stand in the way of a federal final judgment, when as

here, refusing to honor the federal final judgment would

deprive the federal court winner of its victory.

The sole basis of the underlying eviction action was

Landlord’s claim that Tenant had not renewed its lease.

Tenant prevailed on this precise issue in Bankruptcy

Court.

Entry of the final judgment on state law grounds

therefore had the completely unacceptable result of

depriving Tenant of the “fruit” its prior federal court

17

victory, an unthinkable result since this result “impaired

[the federal court’s] jurisdiction….” Stevens, 169 U.S. at

460–61. It also clearly undermined the Bankruptcy

Court’s express intent to preserve Tenant’s lease when

the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the bankruptcy case

instead of converting it into a liquidation.

Depriving Tenant of its victory in the Stay Order2

is a fundamental violation of the Constitution, since a

state court’s failure to apply res judicata to bankruptcy

decisions in state court disregards “the power of the

Federal courts to protect those who come before them

relying upon constitutional rights or rights given, as in

[bankruptcy proceedings] through a statute enacted

pursuant to constitutional grants of power.” Stoll, 305 U.S.

at 170–71.

II.

This Court Should Grant the Petition to Protect

Our Federalist System and Constitution

The Petition should be granted in order to preserve

our federalist system and prevent any degradation of the

ability of federal courts to enter final judgments.

The ability to enter final judgments has been

recognized as an essential element of our federal courts

since the early days of the Republic. E.g. Hayburn's Case,

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410, 413.

Courts have repeatedly emphasized the rule that

final federal court judgments cannot be undermined by

state law, without fail. Any other result is “destructive of

the union,” Peters, 9 U.S. at 136, and “nothing less is at

stake than the integrity of federal judicial power and the

coherence of the federalist judicial system.” Watkins, 591

That the Stay Order might seem moot in light of the fact that

bankruptcy case was dismissed does not change the result, since even

a mooted final judgment has res judicata effect, if the underlying

final judgment is not vacated. U.S. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S.

36, 41 (1950).

2

18

A.2d at 598.

Tellingly, state appellate courts and the federal

circuit courts have uniformly held that state courts have

a fundamental, exceptionless obligation to apply federal

law on the issue of whether a federal final judgment is

binding in state court. E.g. Delaware Valley, 755 F.2d 3

at 43; Matter of Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir. 1995)

(“[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has long

assumed that state tribunals must give federal

judgments the same force that Federal Courts give

them.”); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 42 n.3

(2d Cir. 1986) (“federal law should determine the

preclusive effect of a federal judgment, without regard to

the basis of jurisdiction.”); Beard v. Sheet Metal Workers

Union, Local 150, 908 F.2d 474, 477 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990)

(“[T]he state court must give the prior federal judgment

the same res judicata effect that it would have in Federal

Court.”); Edwards v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of

Clovis, 696 P.2d 484, 492 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (“When a

State court is faced with the issue of determining the

preclusive effect of a Federal court's judgment, it is the

Federal law of res judicata which must be examined.”);

Anderson v. Phoenix Investment Counsel of Boston, Inc.,

387 Mass. 444, 440 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (1982) (same);

Maricopa-Stanfield Irr. & Drainage Dist. v. Robertson,

211 Ariz. 485, 491, 123 P.3d 1122, 1128 (2005) (same).

The state appellate courts and federal circuit

courts holding that federal law governs the application of

res judicata in state court are in accord with this Court’s

most recent discussion on this issue in Semtek, where the

Court reiterated the primacy of federal law on this issue.

531 U.S. at 507.

As such, the Second District’s failure to apply

federal rules of res judicata and reverse the error of the

trial court has resulted in a decision on an important

federal question in a way that conflicts with numerous

19

state courts of last resort and with numerous United States

circuit courts. The Second District has also now decided an

important federal question in a way that conflicts with

relevant decisions of this Court. The Second District’s

decision to refuse to apply federal res judicata because of

state law constraints is simply without precedent.

Any diminution of the rule that a final federal court

judgment must be given res judicata effect in state court

fundamentally undermines the ability of the federal courts

to enter final judgments. This Court cannot “overlook the

intrusion,” as “illegitimate and unconstitutional practices

get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent

approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of

procedure.” Stern, 564 U.S. at 503 (citations omitted).

This case cleanly presents the issue of the

requirement of applying federal res judicata in state court,

and is an ideal vehicle for this Court to protect the federal

courts from further encroachment.

Just as importantly, granting certiorari will

preserve Tenant’s business from being destroyed on

grounds that are simply unjust. Landlord has received all

rent due, and Tenant’s continued presence at the subject

premises required continued, ongoing payment of the rent.

If Tenant defaults on its lease obligations at any time,

Tenant can be removed in accordance with the terms of the

lease and under Florida law. Tenant prevailed on the

merits on the only substantive issue before the state court,

whether Tenant has an actual lease, and refusing to give

effect to the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in that regard is

simply unjust.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ

of Certiorari should be granted, and the decision below

should be reversed.

20

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN J. BAGGE

Counsel of Record

CAREY, O’MALLEY, WHITAKER,

MUELLER,

ROBERTS & SMITH, P.A.

712 South Oregon Avenue

Tampa, Florida 33606

813) 250-0577

Fax: (813) 250-9898

Counsel for Petitioner

Jaffan International, LLC