Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jo-Ann Connelly, Petitioner v. Connecticut, ex rel. Jeremiah Dunn, Chief State Animal Control Officer

No. ______

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

JO-ANN CONNELLY,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL. JEREMIAH DUNN,

CHIEF STATE ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

APPELLATE COURT OF CONNECTICUT

_____________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_______________________________

Earl N. “Trey” Mayfield, III

Counsel of Record

CHALMERS ADAMS BACKER & KAUFMAN, LLC

10521 Judicial Drive, Suite 200

Fairfax, Virginia 22030

(703) 268-5600

tmayfield@chalmersadams.com

Counsel for Petitioner

GibsonMoore Appellate Services, LLC

206 East Cary Street♦ Richmond, VA 23219

804-249-7770 ♦

www.gibsonmoore.net

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the exclusionary rule applies to

warrantless searches of the home conducted for

community caretaking?

2. Whether the exclusionary rule applies to

warrantless searches of the home in forfeiture

proceedings where the government claims it is

motivated by welfare concerns rather than

punishing the property owner?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

& RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner is Jo-ann Connelly who was the

owner of the listed animals subjected to the

forfeiture proceeding below. Respondent is the

State of Connecticut, by its Chief State Animal

Control Officer, Jeremiah Dunn.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

& RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................... vi

INTRODUCTION....................................................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 3

JURISDICTION ......................................................... 3

CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................................... 4

STATEMENT ............................................................. 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............... 12

I. COURTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY ARE

DEEPLY DIVIDED ON WHETHER THE

EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES TO

UNLAWFUL SEARCHES OF THE HOME

WHERE THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS IT

WAS

MOTIVATED

BY

PUBLIC

WELFARE CONCERNS RATHER THAN

CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT ......................... 12

A. The Fourth Amendment Does Not

Permit Warrantless Searches of the

Home Based on the Government’s Public

Welfare Concerns ..................................... 13

iv

B. Absent Exigent Circumstances, Federal

& State Courts Typically Apply the

Exclusionary Rule to Warrantless

Searches of the Home Even When

Government Officials Claim to be Acting

to Protect Public Health & Safety ........... 14

C. Some

States

Have

Created

a

“Vulnerable Populations” Exception to

the Exclusionary Rule for Warrantless

Search Evidence Used in Non-Criminal

Judicial Proceedings ................................ 19

II. CONNECTICUT HAS CREATED A

CLEAR SPLIT OF AUTHORITY ON

WHETHER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

APPLIES

IN

FORFEITURE

PROCEEDINGS

BASED

ON

UNDERLYING CONDUCT THAT IS

ALLEGEDLY CRIMINAL WHEN THE

GOVERNMENT

ASSERTS

ITS

OBJECTIVE IS NOT PUNITIVE ................. 23

III. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG ........ 27

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 32

APPENDIX

Opinion

Connecticut Appellate Court

filed October 8, 2024 ........................................... 1a

Order on Petition for

Certification to Appeal

Supreme Court State of Connecticut

filed December 17, 2024.................................... 63a

v

Memorandum of Decision

Superior Court

Judicial District of

Hartford at Hartford

filed December 13, 2022.................................... 64a

Order

Superior Court

Judicial District of

Hartford at Hartford

filed October 18, 2022 ....................................... 71a

Order

Superior Court

Judicial District of

Hartford at Hartford

filed October 6, 2022 ......................................... 72a

U.S. Const. amend. IV............................................ 73a

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-329a .................................... 74a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s):

Cases:

Boyd v. United States,

116 U.S. 616 (1886) ....................................... 23, 24

Brigham City v. Stuart,

547 U.S. 398 (2006) ....................................... 13, 14

Broden v. Marin Humane Soc’y,

70 Cal.App.4th 1212

(Cal.Ct.App.-1st Dist. 1999) ............................... 30

Camara v. Municipal Court,

387 U.S. 523 (1967) ....................................... 16, 30

Campbell v. City of Spencer,

2013 WL 6835271 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2013),

aff’d, 777 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2014) ................. 30

Caniglia v. Strom,

593 U.S. 194 (2021) ..............................2, 13, 14, 18

Carpenter v. State,

18 N.E.3d 998 (Ind. 2014) ................................... 29

Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co.,

693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982) ........................... 17

Dyas v. Superior Court,

11 Cal.3d 628 (1974) ........................................... 18

Goodwin v. Toucy,

71 Conn. 262 (1898) ............................................ 31

Graham v. Barnette,

5 F.4th 872 (8th Cir. 2021) ................................. 13

Griffin v. Fancher,

127 Conn. 686 (1941) .......................................... 23

vii

In re Corey P.,

269 Neb. 925 (2005) ............................................ 22

In re Mary S.,

186 Cal.App.3d 414

(Cal.Ct.App.-4th Dist. 1986) ......................... 21, 22

In re Nicholas R.,

92 Conn.App. 316 (2005)..................................... 20

In re Robert P.,

61 Cal.App.3d 310

(Cal.Ct.App.-1st Dist. 1976) ......................... 12, 20

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,

468 U.S. 1032 (1984) ............................................. 9

King v. Montgomery Cnty., Tenn.,

797 Fed.Appx. 955 (6th Cir. 2020) ..................... 30

Luna-Diaz v. City of Hackensack Police Dept.,

2022 WL 18024213 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022) ........ 13

Matter of Diane P.,

110 A.D.2d 354 (N.Y. App. Div.-2d 1985) .... 20, 21

Matter of Fourteen Exotic Parrot-like Birds,

512 P.3d 392 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 2022) ...... 30, 31

Michigan v. Tyler,

436 U.S. 499 (1978) ............................................. 16

Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v.

R.W. Commerford and Sons, Inc.,

192 Conn.App. 36 (2019)..................................... 23

Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Freeman,

171 U.S. 620 (1898) ............................................. 23

One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,

380 U.S. 693 (1965) ............. 1-3, 8-10, 23-27, 30-31

viii

One 1995 Corvette VIN No.

1G1YY22P585103433 v. Mayor and

City Council of Baltimore,

353 Md. 114 (1999).................................. 25, 26, 27

People ex rel. A.E.L,

181 P.3d 1186 (Col.Ct.App.-Div. II 2008)........... 22

Pine v. State,

921 S.W.2d 856

(Tex. Ct. App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1996) ......... 30

Savina Homes Indus., Inc. v. Sec. of Labor,

594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979) ........................... 17

State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R.,

982 P.2d 73 (Utah 1999) ..................................... 21

State ex rel. Children, Youth

& Families Dept. v. Michael T,

143 N.M. 45 (N.M.Ct.App. 2007) ........................ 22

State v. Berry,

92 S.W.3d 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) .................... 29

State v. Correa,

340 Conn. 619 (2021) ............................................ 5

State v. Fessenden,

355 Or. 759 (2014)......................................... 28, 29

State v. Onofrio,

179 Conn. 23 (1979) .............................................. 5

State v. Vargas,

213 N.J. 301 (2013) ....................................... 18, 19

United States v. Collins,

110 Fed.Appx. 701 (7th Cir. 2004) ..................... 17

United States v. James Daniel,

510 U.S. 43 (1993) ............................................... 23

ix

United States v. Janis,

428 U.S. 443 (1976) ......................................... 9, 10

United States v. Jones,

798 Fed.Appx. 434 (11th Cir. 2020) ................... 17

United States v. McGough,

412 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2005) ..................... 15, 16

United States v. Parr,

716 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983) ....................... 16, 17

United States v. Washington,

573 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2009) ............................... 15

Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ..................................................... 3

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-329a ...................................... 24

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-329a(b) .................................... 7

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-329a(c) .................................... 7

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-329a(f)..................................... 7

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-329a(g) .................................... 7

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-247 .......................................... 7

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-247(a) ...................................... 7

Constitutional Provisions:

U.S. Const. amend. IV........ 1-3, 8-18, 21, 23-26, 28-32

Rules:

U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 14(1)(i).............................................. 4

U.S. Sup. Ct. R. (14)(1)(i)(vi) ...................................... 4

Other Authorities:

1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.7(a)

(6th ed. Oct. 2022 Update) ................................. 31

1

INTRODUCTION

This Court has long held that the privacy of the

home is at the core of the Fourth Amendment’s

protections. In criminal cases, the Court has held for

over a century that evidence obtained from

government actors searching a home in violation of

the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement must

be suppressed. The failure to obtain a warrant can be

excused, and the search rendered reasonable, if the

search is conducted pursuant to consent, or if exigent

circumstances make obtaining a warrant impractical

under the particular facts of the case. Exigent

circumstances are determined objectively, based on

what a reasonable government official would have

done under the circumstances. In a criminal

prosecution, the defendant moves to suppress the

evidence from the search that she claims was

obtained in violation of the warrant requirement, and

a judge impartially determines if there are exigent

circumstances that make the search reasonable in

spite of a warrant’s absence. If the circumstances

upon which the government relies are not exigent, the

government may not be rewarded for its illegal

conduct, and the evidence from the unreasonable (and

thus unlawful) search must be suppressed.

In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380

U.S. 693 (1965), this Court held that when the

government seeks to impose penalties or forfeitures of

non-contraband property on someone based on

underlying conduct that is criminal in nature, the

exclusionary rule applies, no matter what label the

government gives to the proceeding.

2

This case presents two related questions on

whether the exclusionary rule applies in civil

forfeiture proceedings where the government seeks to

use evidence obtained from the warrantless search of

a home, and neither consent nor exigent

circumstances were present.

First, this Court held in Caniglia v. Strom, 593

U.S. 194, 196 (2021) that the government’s

proclaimed motive of protecting public welfare under

the community caretake label did not create an

exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement for government searches of the home.

Caniglia did not address, however, whether the

exclusionary rule applies where the government

unlawfully invades a home, conducts a warrantless

search, and then uses the evidence from that search

to forfeit the owner’s property. Most courts to have

addressed the issue have held that the government’s

motive to protect public welfare is not itself an

exception to the warrant requirement, and that the

exigent circumstances test must be applied on a caseby-case basis. In the case below, the Appellate Court

adopted a different test, holding—like many other

states—that where the government’s claimed motive

is to protect vulnerable populations like animals and

children, the exclusionary rule can be dispensed with

in proceedings that are not criminal prosecutions, like

the civil forfeiture action here to seize Petitioner’s

animals.

Second, although Plymouth Sedan purported to

broadly apply the exclusionary rule to both penalties

and forfeitures where the underlying conduct is

criminal in nature, the Appellate Court below held

that when the government claims to bring a forfeiture

action for a non-punitive purpose—like protecting

3

animal welfare—Plymouth Sedan’s mandate of

exclusion is inapplicable, and the government’s

interest in protecting animals outweighs any Fourth

Amendment privacy interest or deterrent effect that

might be accomplished by the exclusionary rule. The

Appellate Court’s holding is at odds with the vast

majority of jurisdictions that apply the exclusionary

rule whenever the government seeks to forfeit noncontraband property.

The Court should grant certiorari, and hold that

(1) the exclusionary rule applies to home searches

conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment even

when the government asserts it was motivated by

community caretaking/public welfare; and (2) the

exclusionary rule applies to all forfeiture proceedings

for non-contraband property based on underlying

conduct that is criminal in nature, regardless of the

government’s claimed motive in bringing the

forfeiture action.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Appellate Court of Connecticut’s opinion

affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s

Motion to Suppress is published at 228 Conn.App. 458

(2024), and is reproduced in the Appendix at Pet.App.

1a. The Connecticut Supreme Court’s denial of

Petitioner’s certification to appeal is reproduced in

the Appendix at Pet.App.63a.

JURISDICTION

Petitioner invokes this Court’s jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). The opinion of the

Appellate Court of Connecticut was entered on

October 8, 2023. The Connecticut Supreme Court

denied the petition for certification on December 17,

4

2024. This petition is timely filed consistent with

Justice Sotomayor’s March 14, 2025 order extending

the time to file this petition until May 16, 2025.

CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant constitutional and statutory

provisions are reproduced in the Appendix at

Pet.App. 73a.

STATEMENT 1

1. Petitioner Jo-ann Connelly started an animal

rescue in January 2019 and was fostering animals in

her home on Porter Road in Hebron, Connecticut,

eventually providing care to several dozen animals.

Pet.App.3a-5a. The house was large, comprised of

approximately 3200 square feet on approximately

five-and-a-half acres. Id. 3a-4a. As of March 2022,

Connelly was preparing to transfer the animals to a

formal animal shelter she had outfitted and was

awaiting state approval of the facility to move the

animals.

Connelly and her then-husband filed for divorce in

December of 2020. Apparently as a result of

allegations emanating from that litigation, the State’s

Department of Children and Families (“DCF”)

initiated a neglect investigation concerning the

Connelly’s minor child. On February 22, 2022, DCF

moved for an order requiring Connelly to give DCF

1 Pursuant to Rule 14(1)(i), Petitioner’s Appendix contains only

the pertinent orders issued below, as other evidence and

pleadings in the case below, while relevant, is not “essential to

understand the petition.” Rule(14)(1)(i)(vi). Consistent with Rule

26(1), Petitioner will provide other record evidence necessary for

a merits consideration if certiorari is granted.

5

access to her home and the minor child. The Superior

Court granted the motion, authorizing a DCF official

and the child’s attorney to enter Connelly’s home for

observation, provided that the access occur before

March 22, 2022.

At the time the DCF visit occurred on March 21,

2022, Connelly and her minor child were staying in

an AirBnB because the Porter Road house was being

cleaned out in advance of its planned sale. 2 Over DCF

Investigator Rooke’s objection, Connelly insisted on

videotaping the visit. 3 The March 21, 2022 DCF visit

was the only entry of Connelly’s home authorized by

court order, and no court order in the DCF case

permitted entry into Connelly’s home after March 22,

2022. The Appellate Court below’s entire discussion of

Connelly’s interactions with DCF consisted of the

statement, “An employee of [DCF] had contact with

2 While staying at the AirBnB, Connelly returned daily to the

Porter Road house to care for the rescued animals.

Because the Superior Court below held that this is a civil

matter to which a suppression hearing is inapplicable (the

subject of this Petition), no hearing was held. Consequently,

evidence concerning the initial court-authorized DCF child

welfare visit, and the warrantless first search at the Porter Road

house, were not entered into the trial court record. The evidence

is proffered here, as in the Appellate Court, to demonstrate what

Petitioner would have presented to the trial court had a

suppression hearing been permitted. Given the opportunity of a

suppression hearing, she would submit the evidence that the

March 23, 2022, search of her home was warrantless and

unconsented, thereby rendering the subsequent warrant

unlawful. See, e.g., State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23, 35-36 (1979)

(holding trial court’s failure to enter proffered evidence into the

record to permit appellate review was error, and remanding for

new trial); State v. Correa, 340 Conn. 619, 682 n.35 (2021)

(observing proper procedure when a trial court has failed to

apply the correct Fourth Amendment standard is a remand to

the trial court for a suppression hearing).

3

6

the defendant on March 21, 2022, concerning an

unrelated matter.” Pet.App.4a n.3.

2. Despite DCF having conducted the one entry

authorized by the court, and despite the deadline for

the entry having expired, on March 23, 2022, the

State, including DCF, searched Connelly’s Porter

Road home without a warrant and without her

permission. Officers arriving at the home claimed

DCF had an order to search the house and property.

Connelly asked for a copy of the asserted “order,” but

was instead immediately handcuffed, dragged down

the stairs outside her home and kept detained. She

demanded to be permitted to call her attorney but was

refused. The group of officers included DCF

Investigator Rooke from the court-authorized search

two days earlier at the AirBnB, a local and a state

animal control officer, and a State Police Officer.

Upon being detained, Connelly told DCF

Investigator Rooke that the officials did not have

permission to enter or search the house or property.

The officials ignored her, and an animal control officer

then opened the door and entered the house. Connelly

repeatedly told the officials they were not allowed on

her property and ordered them to leave.

After officers entered the home, Connelly again

demanded to speak with her attorney and was

eventually allowed to do so. He told the officers they

had no order or warrant permitting them to be on the

property. Nonetheless, the officers continued to

search and take pictures inside her home and the

property’s external areas.

3. Based on the fruits of that warrantless search,

an officer sought a criminal search and seizure

warrant for Connelly’s property on March 24, 2022,

7

asserting that evidence of the criminal offense of

Cruelty to Animals in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §

53-247 would be found. Pet.App. 4a. 4 The Superior

Court issued a search and seizure warrant that same

day. Id. The State executed the warrant on March 25,

2022, seizing from Connelly’s property 33 dogs, 28

cats, 5 ducks, 3 goats, 1 parakeet, and 1 pony. Id. at

4a-5a.

Following the seizure, the State charged Connelly

with three misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty in

violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-247(a). The State

then instituted what it characterized as an in rem

forfeiture action to ostensibly protect the seized

animals from abuse and neglect pursuant to Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 22-329a(b), (c), (f), and (g) based on

claimed criminal violations under Conn. Gen. Stat. §

53-247(a). Pet.App. 5a-6a.

The Superior Court held a virtual hearing on May

26, 2022 to consider the State’s application for

temporary custody of the animals seized from

Connelly. Id. at 6a. On June 15, 2022, the Court

determined under a preponderance of the evidence

standard the animals had been subject to abuse and

neglect as defined under the criminal statute, Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 53-247, and granted the State temporary

custody of the animals. Pet.App.11a-12a.

4. On September 27, 2022, Connelly, pro se,

moved to suppress all of the evidence collected by the

State in the warrantless March 23, 2022 search, and

The warrant application did not aver that officers had

Connelly’s permission to enter her home, that there was any

lawful warrant or order authorizing the search, or that any

exigent circumstance existed that could excuse a warrantless

entry.

4

8

all of the evidence from the subsequent March 25,

2022 search and seizure, which was obtained by the

State relying on evidence from the initial warrantless

search. Id. at 13a. The motion argued that the State’s

warrantless search, made without consent or exigent

circumstances, violated the Fourth Amendment. The

Superior Court denied the Motion finding, “The

exclusionary rule does not apply to civil cases.” Id. at

14a, 72a.

Responding to the court’s order denying

suppression, Connelly, then represented by counsel,

filed a motion for reconsideration denoted as a

“Motion to Reargue” on October 12, 2022, renewing

her Fourth Amendment exclusion argument, and

pointing out that that the exclusionary rule applies to

civil forfeiture proceedings under One 1958 Plymouth

Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). Id. at

14a. The Superior Court ruled that “No Action [was]

Necessary” because “the foregoing [Motion] having

been considered by the Court.” Pet.App. 71a.

On October 18, 2022 the Superior Court held a

trial on the State’s application for permanent custody

of the animals and admitted all of the evidence

entered in the earlier May 26, 2022 temporary

custody hearing. Id. at 14a, 16a. The Court reached

the same determination with respect to cruelty and

neglect as it had in the earlier hearing, granted the

State permanent custody of Connelly’s animals, and

imposed on her the costs the State purported to have

incurred in caring for the animals since it seized

them. Id. at 16a, 18a-19a, 64a-70a.

5. Connelly timely appealed the judgment,

arguing the March 25, 2022 search of her home

violated the Fourth Amendment and its evidentiary

9

fruits should have been excluded from the civil

forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 2a-3a, 20a-21a. The

Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment

that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to forfeiture

proceedings when the state claims the forfeiture is

motivated by welfare concerns rather than to punish

the property’s owner. Id. at 21a, 33a-56a. For

purposes of the appeal, the court assumed “the

warrantless search of [Connelly’s] property was

conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

at 21a n.21. The court’s starting premise was that the

exclusionary rule is a judicially-created prudential

doctrine “formulated in the criminal context to deter

law enforcement officers who fail to obtain a warrant

as required under the Fourth Amendment,” and that

such deterrence is the doctrine’s sole purpose. Id. at

21a n.21, 23a-27a. The court further opined that the

United States Supreme Court has never applied the

exclusionary rule in civil cases, except in civil

forfeiture proceedings where the forfeiture was quasicriminal in nature, as established in One 1958

Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693

(1965). Pet.App. 23a-29a.

In determining whether the exclusionary rule

should apply to particular kinds of civil proceedings,

the Appellate Court held courts must “weigh the

likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized

evidence against the likely costs” on a case-by-case

basis under the Janis balancing test. Id. at 28a-29a

(citing, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 443, 446

(1976); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,

1041(1984)). The Appellate Court opined that the only

civil cases in which the exclusionary rule may apply

without resorting to the Janis balancing test is when

the proceeding is quasi-criminal. Pet.App.29a-32a

10

The Appellate Court engaged in a three-step

analysis to conclude that the exclusionary rule is

inapplicable to animal forfeiture proceedings where

the government’s claimed motivation is protecting

animal welfare. Under the first step, if the animal

welfare proceeding is “a forfeiture proceeding

intended to penalize the defendant for a criminal

offense,” the Plymouth Sedan exclusionary rule

applies. Pet.App.32a. Construing the legislative

language of Connecticut animal-seizure statutes, the

Appellate Court held that (1) the statutory labeling of

the procedures as “seizure and custody” of animals is

distinct from their being labeled “forfeitures,” and (2)

that because the Legislature’s purpose in authorizing

in rem animal welfare seizure proceedings was to

protect animals rather than to punish owners, such

proceedings are not subject to the exclusionary rule

under Plymouth Sedan. Pet.App.33a-43a.

Second, the exclusionary rule would also apply if

the animal welfare proceeding is quasi-criminal. Id.

at 32a. The Appellate Court held that because the

animal seizure proceeding’s primary purpose is

remedial—to protect the health and safety of

animals—and not to punish their owners, the

exclusionary rule was inapplicable. Id. at 43a-47a.

Third, even if the proceeding at issue is neither a

forfeiture nor quasi-criminal, the Janis balancing test

must be applied to determine whether the

exclusionary rule should be applied to such

proceedings. Id. at 32a. Analogizing the state interest

in protecting animal welfare to its interest in

protecting child welfare, the Appellate Court

observed that both are “part of a vulnerable class,”

and opined “there is little incentive to violate the

Fourth Amendment because officers [charged with

11

protecting child welfare] do not usually act with the

object of obtaining evidence for a criminal

prosecution.” Id. at 47a-54a (cleaned up). The

Appellate Court asserted that any deterrent effect

from an exclusionary rule would be minimal because

government officials are already dissuaded from

committing illegal searches by the rule’s applicability

to criminal proceedings. Id. at 53a-56a. It further

observed that the animal seizure statute in question

already required search warrants, making such

illegal searches unlikely. Id. at 54a-56a and n.33.

Moreover, the Appellate Court was concerned that

applying the exclusionary rule to animal welfare

cases would “prevent the state from being able to offer

crucial evidence.” Id. at 52a-53a. In view of the

impediment imposed on the state’s goal of protecting

animal welfare and the perceived minimal deterrence

value, the Appellate Court held that the

circumstances did not justify excluding illegallyseized evidence from animal forfeiture proceedings.

Id. at 56a.

6. At issue here is the question of whether

evidence obtained by violating Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment rights can used by the State when it is

purportedly motivated by animal welfare and the

State’s “community caretaking” role.

12

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. COURTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY ARE

DEEPLY DIVIDED ON WHETHER THE

EXCLUSIONARY

RULE

APPLIES

TO

UNLAWFUL SEARCHES OF THE HOME

WHERE THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS IT

WAS MOTIVATED BY PUBLIC WELFARE

CONCERNS RATHER THAN CRIMINAL

PUNISHMENT.

Absent consent or exigent circumstances, the

typical consequence for the government’s warrantless

search of a home in pursuit of protecting the public

has been the exclusion of the evidence obtained from

the search in a subsequent judicial proceeding. This

is the usual rule in both the federal and state courts.

Another line of cases, however, purports to create a

categorical exception to the exclusionary rule when

the government’s warrantless search is claimed to be

in furtherance of protecting children or animals.

Since at least 1976, when In re Robert P., 61

Cal.App.3d 310, 321 (Cal.Ct.App.-1st Dist. 1976) was

decided, some states have asserted that their motive

in protecting vulnerable populations allows the

exclusionary rule to be dispensed with entirely,

without regard to the circumstances under which

government officials conducted their search. When

the government conducts judicial proceedings not

involving criminal prosecution for the ostensible

protection of animal and child welfare, those states

permit evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment to be admitted. That doctrinal conflict is

entrenched, and will persist unless the Court

intervenes.

13

A. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Permit

Warrantless Searches of the Home Based

on the Government’s Public Welfare

Concerns.

In Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 196 (2021), this

Court held that the community caretaking function 5

does not justify warrantless searches and seizures in

the home. The very core of the Fourth Amendment’s

guarantee of “the right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures” is “the right of a

man to retreat into his home and there be free from

unreasonable governmental intrusions.” Id. at 19798 (cleaned up). The Court “has repeatedly declined

to expand the scope of exceptions to the warrant

requirement to permit warrantless searches of the

home.” Id. at 199 (cleaned up).

The Fourth Amendment, however, “does not

prohibit all unwelcome intrusions on private

property—only unreasonable ones.” Id. at 198

(cleaned up). When exigent circumstances are

present, law enforcement officers may enter private

property without a warrant. Id. at 198. The doctrine

“allows an officer to enter a home without a warrant

if the exigencies of the situation make the needs of

law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless

search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. at 205-06 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S.

398, 403 (2006)). Such exigencies include fighting

5 “Community caretaking” commonly takes place in the context

of what are referred to as “welfare checks.” See, e.g., Caniglia,

593 U.S. at 196; Graham v. Barnette, 5 F.4th 872, 879-81 (8th

Cir. 2021); Luna-Diaz v. City of Hackensack Police Dept., 2022

WL 18024213 at *18 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022).

14

fires and investigating their causes; preventing the

imminent destruction of evidence; engaging in hot

pursuit of a fleeing felon or to prevent a suspects

escape; addressing a threat to the safety of law

enforcement officers or the general public; rendering

emergency assistance to an injured occupant; or

protecting an occupant who is threatened with serious

injury. Id. at 198 and 205 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)

(collecting cases). “[C]ircumstances are exigent only

when there is not enough time to get a warrant[.]” Id.

at 203 (Alito, J., concurring) (collecting cases).

The “recognition that police officers perform many

civic tasks in modern society” is “not an open-ended

license to perform them anywhere.” Id. at 199.

Caniglia left unaddressed, however, whether the

exclusionary rule applies when government officials

engage in warrantless community caretaking

searches in the absence of exigent circumstances.

B. Absent Exigent Circumstances, Federal &

State Courts Typically Apply the

Exclusionary

Rule

to

Warrantless

Searches of the Home Even When

Government Officials Claim to be Acting

to Protect Public Health & Safety.

The traditional rule applied by most courts, both

federal and state, has been that compliance with the

Fourth Amendment requires a warrant. A

warrantless search can be rendered reasonable,

however, when consent is provided, or when exigent

circumstances make obtaining a warrant impractical

under the fact-specific circumstances of a given case.

As the examples infra demonstrate, this holds just as

true when government officials are conducting a

search pursuant to protecting the public’s health and

15

welfare as it is when they are investigating crime. It

is not the government’s motive in conducting the

warrantless search that renders it reasonable; it is

the facts peculiar to the search at issue that

determine if the failure to obtain a warrant should be

excused. Courts routinely perform this function, and

apply the exclusionary rule on a case-by-case basis,

without granting categorical exceptions to the Fourth

Amendment based on the government’s claimed goal

of protecting particular subjects.

1. In United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279,

288-89 (6th Cir. 2009), the Sixth Circuit held, “[T]he

community caretaker exception does not provide the

government with refuge from the warrant

requirement except when delay is reasonably likely to

result in injury or ongoing harm to the community at

large.” Id. at 289. Washington involved officers

entering an apartment without a warrant on

suspicion that the individual present was engaged in

criminal trespass, a fourth-degree misdemeanor. Id.

at 281-82, 289. The court held, “the critical issue is

whether there is a “true immediacy” that absolves an

officer from the need to apply for a warrant and

receive approval from an impartial magistrate.”

Finding no such threat of imminent harm, the Sixth

Circuit’s remedy for the warrantless search of a home

was to suppress the evidence obtained from that

illegal search. Id. at 280, 289.

2. The Eleventh Circuit came to the same

conclusion in United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d

1232 (11th Cir. 2005). The caretaking function in

McGough involved officers entering an apartment

without a warrant and without the owner’s consent

for the ostensible purpose of retrieving the shoes of a

child who was outside the apartment after her father

16

had been arrested. Id. at 1233-35. In the absence of

an imminent threat or other exigent circumstance

justifying the warrantless search of the apartment to

exercise that community caretaking function, the

court held the evidence obtained from that

warrantless entry had to be suppressed. Id. at 123940.

In a similar vein, in United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d

796, 811 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit

suppressed evidence obtained in a warrantless home

search after a residential fire had been suppressed.

Conducted by firemen and police, the search executed

“a policy of seeking out and salvaging valuables

without an administrative warrant.” Id. at 811.

Observing that “the ‘basic purpose of the Fourth

Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security

of individuals against arbitrary invasions by

government officials,” the court held it was of no

moment whether the officials were police officers

engaged in crime detection. Id. at 811 (cleaned up).

Regardless of whether the officials were health, fire,

or building inspectors, or whether a search’s “purpose

may be to locate and abate suspected public nuisance,

or simply to perform a routine periodic inspection,”

Fourth Amendment protections still apply. Id. at 811

(citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 505 (1978);

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528

(1967)). Important though the government’s interest

might be in securing valuables and preventing

vandalism and looters, government officials must

obtain a “warrant to safeguard the substantial

privacy interests implicated by any entry into a

person’s home.” Parr, 716 F.2d at 812. The interest of

fire officials in identifying valuable property after a

fire is not an exigent circumstance outweighing a

17

homeowner’s privacy interest.

Id. at 813.

Accordingly, the evidence obtained from the

warrantless post-fire valuables search had to be

suppressed. Id. at 810, 817.

In yet a third case, applying the same exigent

circumstances rationale, the court held that officers

responding to a domestic violence report involving

gunshots were providing emergency aid, obviating the

need for a warrant, and thus the court denied the

motion to suppress the evidence of criminality

discovered in the residence. United States v. Jones,

798 Fed.Appx. 434, 437-40 (11th Cir. 2020).

3. Applying the exigent circumstances test to find

a warrantless home search reasonable, the Seventh

Circuit held in United States v. Collins, 110 Fed.Appx.

701, 703-05 (7th Cir. 2004), that officers responding

within a minute to reports of gunshots in the vicinity

of the home could enter the home to ascertain if

anyone inside had been shot. Because the facts

reasonably supported the officers’ warrantless entry

into the home to ascertain if there were any victims

in need of aid, the fruits of the search were admissible

in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

4. Federal appellate courts have also held the

exclusionary rule is properly applied to civil sanctions

in administrative OSHA proceedings, where the

government searches were warrantless, as an

appropriate means of deterring such unlawful

government conduct. See Donovan v. Sarasota

Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061, 1070-71 (11th Cir. 1982);

Savina Homes Indus., Inc. v. Sec. of Labor, 594 F.2d

1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that the

exclusionary rule applies to administrative OSHA

searches that violate the Fourth Amendment, and

18

collecting cases applying the exclusionary rule to

administrative and civil cases). Hence, even where

the welfare of humans (as opposed to animals) is

concerned in non-criminal proceedings, the

exclusionary rule is applied.

5. The

California

Supreme

Court

has

emphatically

rejected

the

argument

that

governmental interests distinct from traditional

policing can justify warrantless searches. In Dyas v.

Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 628 (1974), the court held

that what “matter[s] [under the Fourth Amendment]

is whether [the person conducting the search] is

employed by an agency of government, federal, state

or local, whose primary mission is to enforce the law.”

Id. at 635. “Merely because the ‘primary’ mission of a

governmental agency is not law enforcement does not

provide its employees with authority to violate with

impunity the privacy of citizens with whom they come

in contact. Id. Hence, the court held the exclusionary

rule applies regardless of a particular governmental

official’s duties or agency mission, including, for

example, to social workers searching homes of welfare

recipients seeking evidence of ineligibility, and

agricultural inspectors looking for insect pests. Id.

(collecting cases). The court concluded, “The

controlling question, therefore, is not the ‘mission’ of

the governmental agency. Whether the exclusionary

rule should be invoked depends instead on whether to

do so would deter the particular governmental

employee, and others similarly situated, from

engaging in illegal searches of private citizens.” Id.

6. Applying an analysis similar to that later

adopted in Caniglia, the New Jersey Supreme Court

held in State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301 (2013), when

faced with officers who conducted a warrantless

19

welfare check on a tenant’s residence, that “the

community-caretaking doctrine is not a justification

for the warrantless entry and search of a home.” Id.

at 305. Such searches can be conducted only with

consent or “some species of exigent circumstances.”

Id. at 321. The court observed that “merely because

police activities [like community caretaking roles] are

divorced from the detection, investigation, or

acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a

criminal statute does not mean that persons have a

lesser expectation of privacy in their homes.” Id. at

325 (cleaned up). In the absence of an exigency

justifying the warrantless search of a home, the

evidence from the search must be suppressed. Id. at

305, 329.

C. Some States Have Created a “Vulnerable

Populations”

Exception

to

the

Exclusionary Rule for Warrantless Search

Evidence Used in Non-Criminal Judicial

Proceedings.

The Appellate Court below held that the

exclusionary should not apply to animal welfare

seizure proceedings, because the rule “would yield a

minimal deterrence benefit while at the same time it

would frustrate and hinder the purpose of

[Connecticut’s] animal welfare statute and the

protection of animals.” Pet.App.56a. The court

reached that conclusion by looking to “child protection

proceedings for guidance, as they share important

similarities with animal welfare proceedings in that

both seek to protect a vulnerable class or group and

both are civil, and not quasi-criminal, in nature.” Id.

at 47a.

20

The Appellate Court asserted that the

exclusionary rule does not apply to civil child neglect

proceedings. Id. at 48a-49a (citing In re Nicholas R.,

92 Conn.App. 316, 321(2005)). To bolster that

conclusion, the Appellate Court relied in significant

part (see Pet.App. 49a-51a) on the decision of the

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

in Matter of Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354, 356, 358 (N.Y.

App. Div.-2d 1985) (citing In re Robert P., 61

Cal.App.3d 310, 321 (Cal.Ct.App.-1st Dist. 1976)),

which held, “State’s overwhelming interest in

protecting and promoting the best interests and

safety of minors in a child protective proceeding far

outweighs the rule’s deterrent value,” because “the

State’s interest in protecting abused children and the

unthinkable consequences to the children if they are

left in the hands of abusive parents far outweigh the

potential consequences to the parents.”

The court further explained, “Principles of law

designed to protect the citizenry from improper police

activities should not be applied without regard to the

grim realities that permeate certain types of

situations. A child abused by a parent is bereft of any

refuge and is perhaps the most helpless and powerless

of all victims, betrayed by the very person to whom he

or she would most naturally turn for succor. We deal

here not with theoretical quibbles over abstract social

concepts, but with the urgent plight of those who most

need the protective hand of the [s]tate. We also

emphasize that the effects of applying the

exclusionary rule in a child protective proceeding

would potentially be immeasurably more devastating

than is true of the typical criminal prosecution.” Id. at

357.

21

Accordingly, the court concluded “because a child

protective proceeding itself is not punitive in nature

and the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule will

be adequately served by precluding use of the

evidence in any related criminal proceeding, the

[s]tate’s interest in protecting its children mandates

the admissibility of relevant evidence seized during

an illegal search.” Id. at 358.

The Appellate Court further relied (see

Pet.App.51a-52a) on the same conclusion reached by

the Utah Supreme Court in State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R.,

982 P.2d 73 (Utah 1999), holding “that the Fourth

Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable to child

protection proceedings.” Id. at 78. The exclusionary

rule’s deterrent effect on government officials is

inapplicable in the child welfare context, the court

reasoned, because “State officials confronting the

possibility of child abuse or neglect—emergencies

that occasionally lead to child protection

proceedings—do not ordinarily seek to uncover

incriminating evidence during the warrantless

searches incidental to these investigations. There is

little incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment

because these officers do not usually act with the

object of obtaining evidence for criminal prosecution.

There appears to be little likelihood that any

substantial deterrent effect on unlawful police

intrusion would be achieved by applying the

exclusionary

rule

to

child

protection

proceedings. Whatever deterrent effect there might

be is far outweighed by the need to provide for the

safety and health of children in peril.” Id. at 79.

The California Court of Appeal likewise held in In

re Mary S., 186 Cal.App.3d 414 (Cal.Ct.App.-4th Dist.

1986), that because “Dependency proceedings are civil

22

in nature, designed not to prosecute a parent, but to

protect the child,” the exclusionary rule is

inapplicable “since the potential harm to children in

allowing them to remain in an unhealthy

environment outweighs any deterrent effect which

would result from suppressing evidence unlawfully

seized.” Id. at 418 (cleaned up).

Other state courts have come to the same

conclusion that the government’s motive in protecting

child welfare obviates the need to apply the

exclusionary rule to warrantless searches, without

regard to whether exigent circumstances are present.

See, e.g., People ex rel. A.E.L, 181 P.3d 1186, 1191-92

(Col.Ct.App.-Div. II 2008) (“a dependency and neglect

case is not a quasi-criminal proceeding, and that the

societal costs of applying the rule would exceed any

deterrent effect that exclusion would have on the

department or the police in investigating a child

welfare issue); In re Corey P., 269 Neb. 925, 933-35

(2005); (any possible benefits of the exclusionary rule

do not justify the costly result in a juvenile proceeding

of a possible erroneous conclusion that there has been

no abuse or neglect, leaving innocent children in

unhealthy or compromising circumstances); State ex

rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Michael T,

143 N.M. 45, 77-78 (N.M.Ct.App. 2007) (because the

nature of an abuse and neglect proceeding is to

protect the interests and well-being of the children,

the purposes of the exclusionary rule would not be

advanced if the evidence is suppressed).

23

II. CONNECTICUT HAS CREATED A CLEAR

SPLIT OF AUTHORITY ON WHETHER THE

EXCLUSIONARY

RULE

APPLIES

IN

FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS BASED ON

UNDERLYING

CONDUCT

THAT

IS

ALLEGEDLY

CRIMINAL

WHEN

THE

GOVERNMENT ASSERTS ITS OBJECTIVE

IS NOT PUNITIVE.

In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380

U.S. 693 (1965), this Court held that even though

Pennsylvania characterized its forfeiture action

seizing the car at issue as “civil,” the Fourth

Amendment’s exclusionary rule still applied in

governmental proceedings to seize non-contraband

property (i.e., property that is not inherently illegal) 6

for alleged behavior that is criminal in nature. Id. at

695, 698-702. 7

Plymouth Sedan held that because “suits for

penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission

of offenses against the law, are of this quasi criminal

nature, we think that they are within the reason of

criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the fourth

amendment of the constitution.” 380 U.S. at 697-98

(cleaned up) (emphasis added) (citing Boyd v. United

States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886)). By its plain

6 No issue of contraband is presented by this case. “[A]nimals

under Connecticut law, as in all other states, have generally

been regarded as personal property.” Nonhuman Rights Project,

Inc. v. R.W. Commerford and Sons, Inc., 192 Conn.App. 36, 45

(2019) (citing Griffin v. Fancher, 127 Conn. 686, 688-89 (1941)

(recognizing dogs as property)). Accord, e.g., Northwestern Nat.

Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620, 621-630 (1898) (describing

domesticated animals as chattel).

7Plymouth Sedan has never been overruled, and is still good law.

See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel, 510 U.S. 43, 49 (1993)

(citing Plymouth Sedan).

24

terms. Plymouth Sedan distinguished between

penalties and forfeitures, holding that if either was to

be imposed “within the reason” of a criminal

proceeding, then the exclusionary rule applied: “[T]he

essential question is whether evidence—in Boyd the

books and records, here the results of the search of the

car—the obtaining of which violates the Fourth

Amendment may be relied upon to sustain a

forfeiture. Boyd holds that it may not.” 380 U.S. at

698.

The Appellate Court below dismissed the notion

that Fourth Amendment constraints on forfeiture

proceedings are applicable to animal welfare seizures,

reasoning that “the animals subject to the custody

order have not perpetrated some wrong, nor were they

used for criminal purposes,” and the seizure statute

“lacked any language indicating that it is designed to

punish property owners who abuse or neglect

animals.” Pet.App.40a. Because the statute’s

“overarching purpose” “is to protect the welfare of

animals,” it cannot be deemed punitive in nature, and

is thus not considered a forfeiture for constitutional

purposes. Id. at 40a-41a. See also id. at 46a (“it is clear

from the legislative history that the primary purpose

of § 22-329a (a) is not the protection of the owner, but

rather the protection of animals from imminent

harm. 8 In light of the clear purpose of animal welfare

actions to protect the health and safety of animals, a

vulnerable class, such actions are remedial and not

punitive, and, thus, not quasi-criminal in nature. The

The Appellate Court did not explain why the exigent

circumstances doctrine would be insufficient to address

“imminent harm,” or why there was no evidence in the record of

imminent harm known to the officers that would justify the

warrantless search of Connelly’s home.

8

25

exclusionary rule, therefore, does not apply to animal

welfare actions on the basis of quasi-criminality.”)

(cleaned up).

The Maryland Court of Appeals has come to the

opposite conclusion as the Appellate Court below,

holding that Plymouth Sedan must be applied to all

forfeitures based on underlying criminal conduct.

Plymouth Sedan “speaks in general terms, labeling as

‘quasi-criminal’ any forfeiture action based upon

inherently criminal activity, whether actually

indictable or not, and no matter what the

punishment.” One

1995

Corvette

VIN

No.

1G1YY22P585103433 v. Mayor and City Council of

Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 133 (1999). The Plymouth

Sedan “Court was referring . . . to all forfeiture actions

requiring evidence of a criminal nature, i.e., evidence

of criminality.” Id. at 134. Hence, the Maryland Court

of Appeals held, “we decline to allow the government

to avoid compliance with the requirements of the

Fourth Amendment as traditionally applicable in

criminal cases by proceeding under the auspices of a

civil action that authorizes the taking of private

property, but only if that property is used, or intended

to be used, for criminally-related purposes. To do

otherwise might facilitate a practice in which . . .

property, and the financial benefits resulting from

forfeiture, might become the primary purpose of the

actions rather than the apprehension and conviction

of the criminals and their removal from society.” Id.

at 137.

The Maryland Court of Appeals dealt head-on with

the Appellate Court below’s effort to assume away

Plymouth Sedan when the government asserts a nonpunitive motive for the forfeiture:

26

The determination of whether the prophylactic,

judicially-created exclusionary rule applies to a

civil in rem forfeiture action is not based on

whether the forfeiture statute was intended to

be “punitive.” Rather, because the federal

exclusionary rule remedies certain violations of

the Fourth Amendment, but is not coextensive

with it, we must determine whether the Fourth

Amendment was intended to apply to

proceedings outside the scope of a criminal

trial. Although the purpose of the exclusionary

rule may be to curb improper police conduct,

the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to

insure “the right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures....”

It protects everybody, not just those of the

criminal milieu, and, thus, is not limited to

criminal proceedings.

353 Md. at 127-28. The court construed Plymouth

Sedan as “speak[ing] in general terms, labeling as

‘quasi-criminal’ any forfeiture action based upon

inherently criminal activity, whether actually

indictable or not, and no matter what the

punishment.” Id. at 133.

Unlike the Appellate Court below’s rationale in

Connelly that no punitive forfeiture had occurred

because the animals themselves were not

perpetrators or the instrumentality of a crime, the

Maryland Court of Appeals explained that Plymouth

Sedan belies that reasoning: “Just as there was

nothing even remotely criminal in possessing a 1958

Plymouth, it was not criminal for petitioner to own a

1995 Corvette” Id. at 134-35 (cleaned up). A

“forfeiture action is . . . ‘quasi-criminal’ litigation

27

because criminality is at the basic foundation of the

conduct from which a forfeiture suit may arise.” Id. at

135 (cleaned up). That equally describes

Connecticut’s animal forfeiture regime at issue here,

where criminal conduct—animal abuse and neglect—

underpins the State’s rationale for seizing an owner’s

property.

When it decided 1995 Corvette in 1999, the

Maryland Court of Appeals observed, “Eleven of the

thirteen United States Courts of Appeals have

interpreted Plymouth Sedan to stand for the

proposition that the exclusionary rule applies to

civil in rem forfeitures. Additionally, courts in thirtyfour states have interpreted Plymouth Sedan to stand

for the same proposition . . . the cases consistently

accept the interpretation of Plymouth Sedan as

applying the exclusionary rule to civil in

rem forfeiture proceedings. Our examination of the

cases has revealed no court that completely rejects

that interpretation[.]” 353 Md. at 123-24 (collecting

cases).

III. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG.

This case exemplifies why the warrant

requirement exists, and why evidence from illegal

searches of the home should be suppressed. The

entirety of the Appellate Court’s recitation of the

circumstances supporting the warrant for the second

search of Connelly’s home is as follows:

On March 23, 2022, Tanya Wescovich, an

animal control officer with the plaintiff, the

state of Connecticut, visited the property with

an employee of the Department of Children and

Families, which had received a report that the

defendant was abandoning the property and

28

the animals being kept there. On the basis of

Wescovich’s observations during that visit, the

next day, March 24, 2022, Wescovich, along

with William A. Bell, the animal control officer

for the town of Hebron, applied for a search and

seizure warrant for the defendant's property in

Hebron.

Pet.App.4a.

Had a suppression hearing been held, the trial

court would have learned that the “report” Officer

Wescovich claimed to have received consisted of her

and four other Connecticut officers handcuffing

Connelly and conducting an illegal home invasion.

The underlying premise of the Appellate Court’s

decision is the assumed lawful motives and good faith

by the government employees at Connelly’s home. But

there is no evidence to support that assumption.

When Connelly challenged the lawfulness of the

government’s conduct, the Connecticut courts held

that because this was not a criminal prosecution, the

Fourth Amendment provides her with no right to a

hearing in which that conduct might be challenged.

Despite the Appellate Court’s opinion below that

the exclusionary rule should be inapplicable where

the government acts to protect “vulnerable

populations” like animals, courts are entirely capable

of determining if exigent circumstances exist to

justify warrantless searches and seizures in animal

welfare cases. For instance, in State v. Fessenden, 355

Or. 759 (2014), an officer was dispatched to perform a

welfare check on a horse reported as showing signs of

starvation. Id. at 761-62. Given the officer’s factbased opinion that the horse’s malnourishment

constituted a medical emergency, the court held his

29

warrantless entry onto the property to seize the horse

and take it to a veterinarian was an exigent

circumstance excusing the warrantless entry onto the

property, and that the evidence obtained thereby

could be used in his criminal trial. Id. at 773-76.

By contrast, in the absence of exigent

circumstances, an officer’s warrantless entry onto

residential property based on a complaint that dogs

were not being cared for property presented no

exigency, and the evidence from the search had to be

suppressed. State v. Berry, 92 S.W.3d 823, 826-30

(Mo. Ct. App. 2003). Likewise, when officers

responded to a report of bloodied dogs fighting in a

yard in order to render any needed assistance to

either the dogs or humans, there was no exigency

justifying their warrantless entry onto the property,

and the fruits of the search were properly suppressed.

Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1000, 1003 (Ind.

2014) (decided under Indiana’s state analogue to the

Fourth Amendment). in the animal welfare context,

the answer to that question—as with any other

claimed exigency—is fact-dependent.

The Appellate Court’s decision below provides no

explanation for why enforcing the exclusionary rule in

animal welfare cases would be any more burdensome

than it is when government agents perform other

public welfare functions, or why there would be any

less of a need to deter home invasions by such

officials. While there may be exigent circumstances

permitting warrantless searches to protect animal

welfare, the Court should provide clarity on whether

the exclusionary rule applies where the Government

cannot show such circumstances.

30

The Appellate Court’s decision below identifies no

other case in which Pennsylvania Sedan’s

exclusionary rule has been held inapplicable to

animal forfeiture or seizure hearings because the

government’s claimed motivation was protecting

animal welfare instead of punishing the owner. The

cases that have addressed this scenario have held, or

otherwise suggested, that the contrary rule applies:

Absent exigent circumstances, the exclusionary rule

applies in animal forfeiture proceedings to

warrantless searches conducted to protect animal

welfare.

The Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule

applies to civil forfeiture proceedings brought to

protect animal welfare, regardless of whether a crime

is alleged. Matter of Fourteen Exotic Parrot-like

Birds, 512 P.3d 392, 395-96, 398-99, 402 (Okla. Ct.

Civ. App. 2022) (citing Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at

398; Camara, 387 U.S. at 533). Accord, Campbell v.

City of Spencer, 2013 WL 6835271 at *2, 4 (W.D. Okla.

Dec. 26, 2013) (citing Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at

700) (civil animal welfare forfeiture actions are

covered by Plymouth Sedan’s holding), aff’d, 777 F.3d

1073, 1078-79 (10th Cir. 2014) (exclusionary rule

applies to animal welfare civil forfeiture proceedings).

While the Fourth Amendment’s default warrant

requirement applies to animal welfare searches and

seizures, exigent circumstances can excuse the failure

to obtain a warrant. See e.g., Broden v. Marin

Humane Soc’y, 70 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1221-22

(Cal.Ct.App.-1st Dist. 1999); King v. Montgomery

Cnty., Tenn., 797 Fed.Appx. 955-56 (6th Cir. 2020).

See also, Pine v. State, 921 S.W.2d 856, 870-71, 872

(Tex. Ct. App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1996) (citing

Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. 700-02) (assuming,

31

without deciding, that civil animal forfeiture

proceedings to protect animals from neglect and

abuse that are entirely separate from the criminal

proceeding against the owner require government

agents to obtain a warrant, and that evidence

obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must

be excluded).

Neither the relabeling, nor the State’s claimed

munificent motive, changes what Connecticut is

doing: Seizing private, non-contraband property by

conducting warrantless searches in violation of the

Fourth Amendment.

Connecticut’s animal welfare laws are simply a

category of nuisance abatement. Goodwin v. Toucy,

71 Conn. 262 (1898). “[T]here does not appear to be

any doubt but that the Plymouth Sedan approach is

called for when the government instead brings an

action to abate a nuisance and would prove the illegal

activity constituting the nuisance by the means of

evidence come by through an unconstitutional

search.” 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.7(a), (6th

ed. Oct. 2022 Update). Where the State seeks to prove

conduct that would be criminal as the rationale for

seeking someone’s property, as it does by alleging

abuse or neglect against animals (and regardless of

whether the State brings any criminal prosecution),

the State must adhere to Fourth Amendment

standards. See Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700-02;

Matter of Fourteen Exotic Parrot-like Birds, 512 P.3d

at 395-96, 398-99, 402.

The State obtained no warrant for its initial search

of Connelly’s home. Permitting government actors to

engage in warrantless searches based on nothing

more than the government’s claim to be protecting

32

public welfare is an open invitation for government

officials to run riot. It will, as it has here, eviscerate

the Fourth Amendment’s sanctified protection of the

home. The Court should clarify the law, and hold that

all of its fruits of Connecticut’s warrantless search of

Connelly’s home were required to be excluded from its

civil forfeiture proceedings to seize her animals.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

/s/ Earl N. “Trey” Mayfield, III

Earl N. “Trey” Mayfield, III

Counsel of Record

CHALMERS ADAMS BACKER & KAUFMAN, LLC

10521 Judicial Drive, Suite 200

Fairfax, Virginia 22030

(703) 268-5600

tmayfield@chalmersadams.com

Counsel for Petitioner