Amicus Curiae Brief — Shawn Montgomery, Petitioner v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al.

No. 24-1238

In the Supreme Court of the United States

SHAWN MONTGOMERY, PETITIONER

v.

CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS

GREGORY ZERZAN

General Counsel

CHARLES E. ENLOE

Assistant General Counsel

ERIN D. HENDRIXSON

Senior Trial Attorney

Department of Transportation

Washington, DC 20590

REBECCA PETTIT

Chief Counsel

Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration

Washington, DC 20590

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorney General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

SOPAN JOSHI

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. RAAB

JENNIFER L. UTRECHT

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether 49 U.S.C. 14501(c) preempts a state

common-law claim against a broker for negligently

selecting a motor carrier or driver.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Interest of the United States ........................................................ 1

Introduction ..................................................................................... 2

Statement ......................................................................................... 4

Summary of argument ................................................................... 7

Argument:

A. Section 14501(c)(1)’s general preemption rule

encompasses state common-law rules governing a

broker’s selection of a motor carrier ................................ 9

1. A common-law rule is a “law, regulation, or

provision having the force and effect of law”

within the meaning of Section 14501(c)(1) .............. 10

2. A common-law rule governing a broker’s

selection of a motor carrier is “related to a

price, route, or service” of a “broker” ..................... 12

3. A common-law rule imposing liability on a

broker who negligently selects a motor carrier

involves broker services “with respect to the

transportation of property” ...................................... 17

B. Section 14501(c)(2)(a) does not exempt from Section

14501(c)(1)’s general preemptive scope state

common-law rules governing brokers’ selection of

appropriate motor carriers .............................................. 20

1. A State’s “safety regulatory authority” under

Section 14501(c)(2)(A) includes the authority to

adopt and enforce rules of common-law liability

that are intended to enhance safety ......................... 20

2. The Illinois common-law rule that petitioner

invokes does not regulate “with respect to

motor vehicles” ........................................................... 22

3. This Court need not address respondents’

additional arguments ................................................. 29

(III)

IV

Table of Contents—Continued:

Page

C. Preemption of state common-law rules governing a

broker’s selection of a carrier does not create an

unwarranted safety regulatory gap ................................ 30

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 32

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,

513 U.S. 219 (1995) ......................................................... 17, 19

Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger,

Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023) .............................. 10, 24

Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248

(11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1182 (2004) ......... 16

C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Miller,

142 S. Ct. 2866 (2022) ......................................................... 2, 4

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood,

507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) ....................................................... 11

Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954) ............. 29

Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) .............................................. 16

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) ........ 11

City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service,

Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002) ........................................................ 6

Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc.,

142 F.4th 847 (6th Cir. 2025), petition for cert.

pending, No. 25-145 (filed Aug. 4, 2025) ...................... 10, 19

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) ............................. 29

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,

569 U.S. 251 (2013) ................................... 5, 17-19, 21, 23, 25

Day v. SkyWest Airlines,

45 F.4th 1181 (10th Cir. 2022) ............................................. 16

V

Cases—Continued:

Page

Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co.,

467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006) .................................................... 21

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,

529 U.S. 861 (2000) ......................................................... 14, 29

Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,

44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) .................................................. 16

Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.,

565 U.S. 625 (2012) ............................................................... 20

Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,

976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,

142 S. Ct. 2866 (2022) ......................................... 10, 11, 14, 16

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992) ............................................... 4, 12, 15, 19

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,

570 U.S. 472 (2013) ............................................................... 20

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273 (2014) ................ 10

Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,

481 U.S. 41 (1987) ................................................................. 11

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport

Association, 552 U.S. 364 (2008) .............................. 6, 11-15

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,

359 U.S. 236 (1959) ............................................................... 21

Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,

164 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 1998) .................................................. 16

Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898 (Ill. 1998),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999) ........................................ 28

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,

587 U.S. 761 (2019) ............................................................... 21

Watson v. Air Methods Corp., 870 F.3d 812

(8th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................ 16

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) .................................... 21

VI

Cases—Continued:

Page

Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.,

74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied,

144 S. Ct. 564 (2024) ............................................. 7, 10, 13, 26

Statutes and regulations:

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,

Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.......................................... 4

§ 4(a), 92 Stat. 1707-1708 .................................................... 5

49 U.S.C. 41112 .................................................................. 17

49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1) ........................................ 5, 11, 15, 16

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,

29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. ........................................................... 11

Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act

of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569:

§ 601(a), 108 Stat. 1605 ..................................................... 21

§ 601(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1605 .................................................. 5

§ 601(a)(2), 108 Stat. 1605 ................................................ 21

§ 601, 108 Stat. 1605-1607 ................................................ 21

§ 601(c), 108 Stat. 1606-1607 ........................................ 1, 22

49 U.S.C. 13102(2) ......................................... 2, 8, 13, 19, 23

49 U.S.C. 13102(9) ............................................................. 24

49 U.S.C. 13102(14) ....................................................... 6, 24

49 U.S.C. 13102(16) ........................................................... 23

49 U.S.C. 13102(23) ........................................................... 24

49 U.S.C. 13102(23)(B) ..................................... 8, 18, 18, 27

49 U.S.C. 13901 .................................................................. 31

49 U.S.C. 13904(a) ............................................................. 31

49 U.S.C. 13905(d) ............................................................. 31

49 U.S.C. 13905(f ) ............................................................. 31

49 U.S.C. 13906(a)(1) ...................................... 17, 22, 26, 32

49 U.S.C. 13906(b)(2)(A)................................................... 26

49 U.S.C. 14501(b) ......................................................... 3, 25

VII

Statutes and regulations—Continued:

Page

49 U.S.C. 14501(b)(1) ........................................................ 25

49 U.S.C. 14501(c) ................................................... 1, 29, 30

49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1)............. 2, 3, 5, 7-9, 11, 12, 15, 17-23,

25, 27-29

49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)-(4)..................................................... 6

49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A) ...................3, 4, 6-8, 20-23, 25-29

Federal Railroad Safety Act,

Pub. L. No. 91-458, 84 Stat. 971.......................................... 11

Highway Safety Act of 1966,

Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731.......................................... 31

Motor Carrier Act of 1980,

Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793............................................ 5

Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984,

Pub. L. No. 98-554, tit. II, 98 Stat. 2832 .............................. 2

§ 202, 98 Stat. 2829 ............................................................ 30

§ 203, 98 Stat. 2832 ............................................................ 30

National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of

1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718................................ 30

Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,

Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87............................................ 11

8 U.S.C. 1324a .......................................................................... 30

49 U.S.C. 31136 .......................................................................... 4

49 C.F.R.:

Pts. 300-399 .................................................................... 4, 14

Pt. 372:

Section 371.2 .......................................................... 13, 14

Section 371.2(a) ............................................................ 31

Pt. 385 ........................................................................... 14, 31

Subpt. A ........................................................................ 14

Section 385.3........................................................... 31

Subpt. D ........................................................................ 14

VIII

Regulations—Continued:

Page

Pt. 387:

Section 387.301T .......................................................... 26

Pt. 391 ................................................................................. 31

Pt. 396:

Section 396.3(a)(1) ....................................................... 31

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 24-1238

SHAWN MONTGOMERY, PETITIONER

v.

CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

This case presents the question whether a provision

of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization

Act of 1994 (FAAAA or Act), Pub. L. No. 103-305, § 601(c),

108 Stat. 1606, as amended and codified at 49 U.S.C.

14501(c), preempts a state common-law tort claim

against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver whose vehicle is subsequently involved in

an accident. The United States has a substantial interest in the resolution of that question. Congress enacted

Section 14501(c) to prevent States from undermining

federal deregulation of the prices, routes, and services

of motor carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders. And

although Congress preserved state safety regulatory

authority over motor vehicles, it also has authorized the

Department of Transportation (DOT) and its delegees,

(1)

2

including the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), to regulate the safety practices of

commercial motor carriers and drivers. E.g., Motor

Carrier Safety Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-554, Tit. II,

98 Stat. 2832. The United States therefore has a substantial interest in an interpretation of Section 14501(c)

that protects and appropriately balances the Act’s deregulatory, pro-competitive purposes; the federal government’s duties and responsibilities with respect to

commercial motor vehicle safety; and the States’ safety

regulatory authority. In C.H. Robinson Worldwide,

Inc. v. Miller, 142 S. Ct. 2866 (2022) (No. 20-1425), this

Court invited the Solicitor General to express the

United States’ views on the same question as is presented in this case.

INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of an accident in which petitioner’s tractor-trailer was struck by a vehicle owned

and operated by a federally registered motor carrier

that was transporting property in interstate commerce.

The arrangement of such transportation, including the

selection of a motor carrier, often is done by an intermediary called a “broker.” 49 U.S.C. 13102(2). Invoking Illinois common law, petitioner sued (among other

defendants) the broker that had arranged the transportation, alleging that the broker had failed to exercise

due care in selecting the carrier and driver.

The Act establishes a general rule that a State “may

not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision

having the force and effect of law related to a price,

route, or service of any * * * broker * * * with respect

to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1).

The Act further provides, however, that the general

preemption rule in Section 14501(c)(1) “shall not re-

3

strict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A). The

court of appeals held that the Act preempts petitioner’s

negligent-selection claims against the broker. While

resolution of the preemption issue requires analysis of

multiple strands of the statutory text, a central question

here is whether the Illinois common-law rule that petitioner has invoked regulates “with respect to motor vehicles” and therefore is saved from preemption by Section 14501(c)(2)(A). See Pet. Br. 18-37.

In the United States’ view, the Act preempts petitioner’s claims. Read in context, Section 14501(c)(2)(A)’s

reference to “the safety regulatory authority of a State

with respect to motor vehicles” encompasses only those

state-law rules that directly regulate the safety of motor vehicles and their operation, such as traffic-safety

rules and common-law negligence claims against motor

carriers and drivers. A state-law requirement that brokers exercise due care in selecting carriers or drivers

lacks a sufficiently direct connection to motor vehicles

to qualify under that provision.

The court of appeals’ approach ensures that the

phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” imposes a meaningful limit on the types of state safety regulation that

Section 14501(c)(2)(A) saves from preemption. Under petitioner’s reading, by contrast, Section 14501(c)(2)(A)

would encompass substantially all state safety regulation that falls within Section 14501(c)(1)’s general preemption rule. Petitioner’s reading thus would render

the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” largely superfluous, and it would perversely give States greater

leeway to regulate interstate broker services than intrastate broker services, cf. 49 U.S.C. 14501(b) (preempting state regulation of intrastate broker rates,

4

routes, and services, with no safety exception). Construing the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” to

require a direct connection to the operation or maintenance of the vehicles themselves avoids those anomalies.*

The Act’s preemption of petitioner’s claims does not

create an unwarranted safety regulatory gap. DOT and

FMCSA regulate motor carriers and brokers, including

by imposing rigorous safety requirements on motor carriers. See 49 U.S.C. 31136; 49 C.F.R. Pts. 300-399. And

the Act does not preempt common-law safety-based

claims against the motor carriers themselves. Reading

the Act to preempt negligent-selection claims against

brokers would simply respect the balance the Act

strikes between the need for safety regulation and Congress’s overall deregulatory goals.

For those and other reasons set forth below, the

court of appeals’ judgment should be affirmed.

STATEMENT

1. In 1978, Congress largely deregulated the domestic airline industry by enacting the Airline Deregulation

Act of 1978 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.

“To ensure that States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own,” Morales v. Trans

* The government’s brief in C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v.

Miller, 142 S. Ct. 2866 (2022) (No. 20-1425), filed at the invitation of

this Court, expressed the view that a state common-law rule governing a broker’s selection of a motor carrier was a rule “with respect to motor vehicles,” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A), and thus was not

preempted. See U.S. Amicus Br. at 15-18, Miller, supra (No. 201425). The Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari in that

case. Following the change in Administration, additional intragovernmental consultation and deliberation, and further percolation

of the issue in the courts of appeals, the United States has reconsidered that view.

5

World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992), Congress

included an express preemption clause that, as amended,

preempts any state “law, regulation, or other provision

having the force and effect of law related to a price,

route, or service of any air carrier.” 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1);

see ADA § 4(a), 92 Stat. 1707-1708.

Two years later, Congress extended deregulation to

the commercial trucking industry by enacting the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.

See Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251,

256 (2013). Unlike the ADA, the Motor Carrier Act of

1980 did not expressly preempt state regulation. In

1994, however, Congress enacted the FAAAA, which

“completed the deregulation” of the trucking industry

“by expressly preempting state trucking regulation.”

Ibid. Congress found that continued state economic

regulation of motor carriers “imposed an unreasonable

burden on interstate commerce,” “impeded the free

flow” of “transportation of interstate commerce,” and

placed an “unreasonable cost on the American consumers.” FAAAA § 601(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1605. The following

year, Congress amended the Act to extend the preemption provision’s scope to cover state regulation of brokers and freight forwarders. ICC Termination Act of

1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 103, 109 Stat. 899.

As amended, the Act’s preemption provision directs

that, as a general matter, a State “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the

force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier * * * or any motor private

carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the

transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). The

first part of that language “tracks the ADA’s air-carrier

preemption provision.” Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 261.

6

This Court has recognized that the materially identical

language in the two preemption provisions should be interpreted identically. See Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, 552 U.S. 364, 368, 370 (2008).

Congress also enacted several exceptions to the

Act’s preemption provision. See 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(4). Relevant here is the “safety exception,” which provides that the Act’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A); see

City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service,

Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 439 (2002).

2. Respondent C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., is a

federally registered property freight broker. In 2017,

C.H. Robinson arranged for respondent Caribe

Transport II, LLC, a federally registered motor carrier, to transport a shipment of goods in interstate commerce. Pet. App. 2a; see 49 U.S.C. 13102(14) (defining

“motor carrier” to mean “a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation”). On December

7, 2017, the vehicle transporting that shipment drove

onto the right shoulder of Interstate 70 in Cumberland

County, Illinois, and crashed into petitioner’s tractortrailer, which was parked on the side of the road. Pet.

App. 2a; J.A. 1. Petitioner suffered severe injuries. Pet.

App. 12a.

Petitioner filed this diversity action for damages

against the driver of the vehicle; the motor carrier and

an affiliate (collectively, Caribe); and the broker and

various affiliates (collectively, C.H. Robinson). Pet.

App. 2a. As relevant here, petitioner alleged that C.H.

Robinson had breached an Illinois common-law duty to

exercise “reasonable care * * * in selecting and hiring

safe interstate motor carriers to haul its loads of cargo

7

in interstate commerce,” J.A. 22, and in “selecting and

hiring commercial drivers” to haul that cargo, J.A. 25.

C.H. Robinson moved to dismiss, asserting that the

Act preempts state-law negligent-selection claims against

brokers. The district court initially denied the motion,

J.A. 35-41, but the court subsequently granted C.H.

Robinson’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in

light of the Seventh Circuit’s intervening decision in Ye

v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (2023),

cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 564 (2024), see Pet. App. 11a-15a.

The Seventh Circuit in Ye held that the Act preempts

state common-law claims challenging a broker’s selection of a motor carrier. 74 F.4th at 461-464. The court

found that the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles”

in the Act’s safety exception, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A),

“requires a direct connection between the potentially

exempted state law and motor vehicles.” Ye, 74 F.4th at

462. The Ye court concluded that the asserted connection “between a broker hiring standard and motor vehicles” was “too attenuated to be saved [from preemption]

under § 14501(c)(2)(A).” Ibid.

3. Applying Ye, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment in this case. Pet. App. 1a-10a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. Petitioner’s claims fall within the general

preemption rule in Section 14501(c)(1) encompassing

state “provision[s] having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any * * * broker

* * * with respect to the transportation of property.”

49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). State common-law duties are

provisions having the force and effect of law, as this

Court already has held with respect to the parallel

phrase in the ADA. A common-law duty constraining a

broker’s choice of a motor carrier is related to a service

8

of a broker because a broker’s core services include “arranging for[] transportation by motor carrier,” 49

U.S.C. 13102(2). Such a duty also regulates with respect to the transportation of property because the Act

defines “transportation” to include “arranging for” the

“movement” of property, 49 U.S.C. 13102(23)(B), which

is precisely what a broker does.

Petitioner contends that the Act does not preempt

personal-injury claims at all, but that contention relies

on lower-court decisions interpreting an airline’s “service” under the ADA to exclude peripheral operations

like the storing of luggage or the handling of beverage

carts. The common-law duties here, in contrast, directly

relate to a broker’s core service of arranging transportation by a motor carrier.

B. Petitioner’s claims do not fall within the Act’s

“safety exception,” which excludes from Section

14501(c)(1)’s preemptive scope the “safety regulatory

authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49

U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A). Although common-law duties are

part of a State’s regulatory authority, the limiting

phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” is best read to

require the common-law duty to directly concern the

ownership or operation of motor vehicles. A contrary

reading would render that limitation largely superfluous. And because the statute expressly preempts state

regulation of intrastate broker services without any

safety exception, petitioner’s expansive reading of “with

respect to motor vehicles” would anomalously permit

greater state regulation of interstate broker services

than of purely intrastate broker services. Petitioner

defends his expansive reading on the ground that a

common-law rule cannot simultaneously be “with respect to the transportation of property” by a motor car-

9

rier and not be “with respect to motor vehicles.” But

Congress’s choice of different nouns—“transportation”

and “motor vehicles,” respectively—as the objects of

“with respect to” in the two statutory provisions provides a sufficient basis for a common-law rule to satisfy

one but not the other.

It makes sense that Congress would preempt state

negligent-selection claims against brokers arising out of

auto accidents. Unlike a claim that a motor carrier was

negligent on a particular occasion, a claim that a broker

did not exercise due care in selecting a federally registered motor carrier would undermine FMCSA’s determination that the motor carrier satisfied federal registration requirements, including extensive safety requirements.

C. That the Act expressly preempts petitioner’s

claims does not imply an unwarranted safety regulatory

gap. DOT extensively regulates commercial motor vehicle safety, and FMCSA further regulates motor carriers and brokers, including by enforcing registration

and financial-responsibility requirements. And the Act

does not foreclose state-law negligence actions against

motor carriers whose vehicles cause accidents.

ARGUMENT

A. Section 14501(c)(1)’s General Preemption Rule Encompasses State Common-Law Rules Governing A Broker’s

Selection Of A Motor Carrier

The Act provides that, as a general matter, a State

“may not enact or enforce [1] a law, regulation, or other

provision having the force and effect of law [2] related

to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier * * *

or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder [3] with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). As every court of appeals

10

to have addressed the issue has held, a state commonlaw requirement that a broker must exercise due care

in selecting a motor carrier to transport property satisfies each of those conditions. See Cox v. Total Quality

Logistics, Inc., 142 F.4th 847, 852-853 (6th Cir. 2025),

petition for cert. pending, No. 25-145 (filed Aug. 4,

2025); Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th

453, 458-460 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 564

(2024); Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976

F.3d 1016, 1023-1025 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142

S. Ct. 2866 (2022); Aspen American Insurance Co. v.

Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1266-1268 (11th

Cir. 2023).

1. A common-law rule is a “law, regulation, or provision

having the force and effect of law” within the meaning of Section 14501(c)(1)

State common-law rules qualify as state-law “provision[s] having the force and effect of law.” This Court

already has held as much with respect to the ADA. In

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273 (2014), the

Court “ha[d] little difficulty” concluding that a state

common-law rule imposing an implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing was a “provision having the force

and effect of law” within the meaning of 49 U.S.C.

41713(b)(1). Northwest, 572 U.S. at 281. The Court observed that “[i]t is routine to call common-law rules

‘provisions,’ ” and that “a common-law rule clearly has

‘the force and effect of law’ ” where it imposes “ ‘binding

standards of conduct.’ ” Id. at 281-282 (citations omitted). Here, petitioner seeks to invoke an Illinois

common-law rule that requires brokers, under pain of

potential damages liability, to exercise reasonable care

in selecting a motor carrier to transport property.

11

This Court has long given the same meaning to the

similarly worded preemption provisions in the ADA and

the FAAAA. See, e.g., Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor

Transport Association, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008). Because the Court has construed the former provision to

encompass common-law rules, it should construe the

latter provision in the same manner here. Indeed, in

construing preemption provisions in myriad other statutes, this Court has interpreted similar language as encompassing common-law claims. See, e.g., CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)

(Federal Railroad Safety Act); Cipollone v. Liggett

Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969); Pilot Life Insurance Co.

v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (ERISA). There is

no sound reason to interpret Section 14501(c)(1) any differently.

Some States (including California) have codified

much of their common law. Cf. Miller, 976 F.3d at 1027.

A common-law rule that is subsequently codified in a

statute obviously would qualify as a state “law, regulation, or provision having the force and effect of law.” 49

U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). If the same language in Section

14501(c)(1) were read as excluding uncodified commonlaw rules, preemption under the Act would turn on

whether a state rule had been adopted by the legislature or instead had been imposed solely by the judiciary. That would defeat the Act’s deregulatory and

preemptive purposes because, instead of eliminating a

patchwork of state regulation, it would preserve a

patchwork of that patchwork.

12

2. A common-law rule governing a broker’s selection of

a motor carrier is “related to a price, route, or service” of a “broker”

a. A rule that requires brokers to exercise due

care in selecting motor carriers is “related to” a broker’s “service[s].” The phrase “related to” in Section

14501(c)(1) evinces a “broad pre-emptive purpose.”

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,

383 (1992). A state law is “related to” a price, route or

service of a broker if it “ha[s] a connection with, or reference to,” the broker’s prices, routes, or services, even

if its effects are “only indirect.” Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370

(quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 386) (emphasis omitted). A state law is also “related to” a broker’s price,

route, or service if that law has “a ‘significant impact’

related to Congress’ deregulatory and pre-emption related objectives.” Id. at 371 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S.

at 390). But state laws that affect a broker’s prices,

routes, or services “in only a ‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral manner,’ such as state laws forbidding gambling,” might not be preempted by the Act. Ibid. (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390) (ellipsis omitted).

The Court in Morales held that the ADA preempted

state rules governing the advertising of airline prices

because such rules “quite obviously” have a “ ‘connection with, or reference to,’ ” airline prices, even if they

do not “actually prescrib[e] rates.” 504 U.S. at 384-385,

387 (citation omitted). And the Rowe Court held that

the Act preempted a state law requiring tobacco shippers to use carriers who provide certain specialized services because the law “creat[ed] a direct ‘connection

with’ motor-carrier services” and impermissibly effected “a State’s direct substitution of its own governmental commands for ‘competitive market forces’ in de-

13

termining (to a significant degree) the services that motor carriers will provide.” 552 U.S. at 371-372 (citations

omitted).

b. A state-law rule that requires a broker to exercise

due care in selecting a motor carrier to transport property, and that imposes potential damages liability if a

jury finds a breach of that duty, has an obvious connection with the broker’s services. A broker’s core service

is “selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation

by motor carrier.” 49 U.S.C. 13102(2); see 49 C.F.R.

371.2 (defining a broker as a person who “arranges, or

offers to arrange, the transportation of property by an

authorized motor carrier”). A common-law rule that

would impose liability on a broker for its choice of a motor carrier thus not only has a “connection with” that

service; it “strikes at the core of ” what a broker does,

Ye, 74 F.4th at 459.

Petitioner asserts (Br. 46) that his claims would “allow C.H. Robinson to offer whatever prices, routes or

services it chooses, as long as it does not hire negligent

drivers and carriers to do so.” That assertion provides

no sound basis to doubt that the state-law liability rule

that petitioner has invoked is “related to” a broker’s

“services.” Petitioner could not prevail on his claims

against C.H. Robinson simply by proving that Caribe

and its driver acted negligently. Rather, petitioner

must prove that C.H. Robinson negligently performed

its own service of selecting an appropriate motor carrier and “arranging for” that carrier to transport property. 49 U.S.C. 13102(2); see pp. 28-29, infra. And the

“as long as” clause in petitioner’s description (Br. 46) of

a broker’s state-law duty is itself a substantial limitation on the pool of authorized motor carriers a broker

may select—just as the law in Rowe limited the pool of

14

authorized motor carriers that tobacco shippers could

utilize.

Common-law rules governing a broker’s choice of a

motor carrier also will have a significant effect on the

broker’s prices and services. Under the federal regime,

a broker must select “an authorized motor carrier,” 49

C.F.R. 371.2—that is, one that FMCSA already has determined satisfies rigorous safety standards designed

to ensure safe motor carrier operations. See 49 C.F.R.

Pt. 385, Subpts. A and D; see also 49 C.F.R. Pts. 300399; National Association of Manufacturers Amicus Br.

10-11; pp. 30-32, infra. The Illinois common-law rule

that petitioner invokes would require brokers to second-guess federal registration decisions and independently evaluate the safety history of the carriers

they select. And brokers would be required to perform

those inquiries under “a parallel regulatory regime

* * * according to the varied common law mandates of

myriad states.” Miller, 976 F.3d at 1032 (Fernandez, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). The additional costs of that monitoring are likely to be reflected

in the prices that brokers charge. And some brokers

(and carriers) might alter their services as a result, or

even be driven from the market notwithstanding their

federal authorization.

Subjecting brokers to fifty potentially different state

common-law negligence standards thus would significantly impede the achievement of Congress’s deregulatory objectives. “[D]ifferent juries in different States

[could] reach different decisions on similar facts,” Geier

v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000),

creating the “patchwork of state service-determining”

regimes that the general preemption rule is designed to

avoid, Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373. Brokers seeking to avoid

15

liability for their selection of motor carriers might well

gravitate towards the largest, most well-established

carriers, irrespective of cost or quality. The end result

could be a regime characterized not by “competitive

market forces,” id. at 372 (citation omitted), but by the

entrenchment of a few large carriers, practical barriers

to entry by new or smaller competitors, and marketplace stagnation.

Petitioner argues (Br. 42) that his claims simply seek

to correct “negative externalities” of the competitive

market. But the same argument was made and rejected

in Morales, where States attempted to defend their advertising rules as correcting “the market distortion

caused by ‘false’ advertising.” 504 U.S. at 389. However

well-intentioned a state regulation might be, the Act

does not permit “substitution of [the State’s] own governmental commands for ‘competitive market forces.’ ”

Rowe, 552 U.S. at 371-372 (citation omitted).

c. Petitioner suggests (Br. 47-50) that personalinjury claims, as a class, are not covered by Section

14501(c)(1)’s general preemption rule. For that proposition, petitioner relies on the ADA’s preemption provision, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), which petitioner contends

(Br. 47) “does not preempt state safety-related tort

claims for personal injuries caused by negligent airline

operations,” even though the ADA does not have a

safety exception. That contention is unsound.

Petitioner overstates the scope of the implied

personal-injury exception to ADA preemption that

some courts of appeals have recognized. The appellate

decisions that petitioner identifies as having applied

such an exception generally have involved claims arising out of peripheral elements of airline operations,

such as the use of beverage carts, the improper storage

16

of luggage, or the presence of tripping hazards. Charas

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261-1262

(9th Cir. 1998) (involving all three); see Hodges v. Delta

Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)

(luggage); Day v. SkyWest Airlines, 45 F.4th 1181, 1182

(10th Cir. 2022) (beverage cart). Petitioner also cites

inapposite cases involving employment claims, see Watson v. Air Methods Corp., 870 F.3d 812, 814-815 (8th

Cir. 2017) (en banc); Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc.,

342 F.3d 1248, 1251-1252 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,

540 U.S. 1182 (2004), and a defamation claim, see Taj

Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186,

194 (3d Cir. 1998).

Decisions finding such claims not to be preempted

are best understood as resting on the view that the

ADA’s express preemption provision uses the term

“service of an air carrier,” 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), “in the

public utility sense” to refer to “the provision of air

transportation to and from various markets at various

times,” but not to refer to “the pushing of beverage

carts, keeping the aisles clear of stumbling blocks, the

safe handling and storage of luggage, assistance to passengers in need, or like functions.” Charas, 160 F.3d at

1266; see Miller, 976 F.3d at 1025. On that view, the

decisions cited above do not categorically reject federal

preemption of safety-related state-law claims. Rather,

those decisions would simply reflect case-specific determinations that the particular claims at issue did not

have a connection with or reference to the core service

of providing air transportation, and were not likely to

have a significant economic impact on that service. The

decisions should not be read to have created an unwritten exception, governing personal-injury claims writ

large, to the ADA’s express preemption provision.

17

Petitioner’s reliance (Br. 49) on the United States’

amicus brief in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513

U.S. 219 (1995), is misplaced. That brief found it “unlikely that [the ADA’s preemption provision] preempts

safety-related personal-injury claims relating to airline

operations.” U.S. Amicus Br. at 20 n.12, Wolens, supra

(No. 93-1286). But the brief supported that claim by citing a neighboring ADA provision that requires carriers

“to have insurance for amounts for which the carrier

‘may become liable’ for personal injuries and property

losses ‘resulting from the operation or maintenance of

an aircraft.’ ” Ibid. (citation omitted); see 49 U.S.C.

41112 (current codification of provision). That provision

presupposes the viability of negligence actions for at

least some personal injuries arising out of aircraft operation. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 231 n.7. Congress enacted an analogous provision with respect to motor carriers, 49 U.S.C. 13906(a)(1), but not with respect to brokers. That contrast undermines petitioner’s assertion

that negligent-selection claims against brokers are outside the scope of the FAAAA’s preemption provision.

3. A common-law rule imposing liability on a broker

who negligently selects a motor carrier involves broker services “with respect to the transportation of

property”

The Illinois rule that petitioner has invoked also involves a broker’s provision of services “with respect to

the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1).

This Court addressed the meaning of “with respect to

the transportation of property” in Dan’s City Used

Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251 (2013). That case involved a state-law claim challenging a carrier’s allegedly unlawful auction sale of the plaintiff ’s car several

18

months after the car had been towed and stored. See

id. at 258-259, 261-262.

The Court in Dan’s City concluded that the plaintiff ’s “claims escape[d] preemption * * * because they

[were] not ‘related to’ the service of a motor carrier

‘with respect to the transportation of property.’ ” Dan’s

City, 569 U.S. at 261. The Court observed that Congress defined “ ‘transportation’ ” to encompass “ ‘services related to the movement’ of property,” including

“ ‘storage.’ ” Ibid. (citation omitted). The Court recognized that, by towing the plaintiff ’s car to the storage

location, the defendant had provided a “transportation

service” that “did involve the movement of property.”

Id. at 262. The Court explained, however, that this service had “ended months before the conduct on which

[the plaintiff ’s] claims [were] based,” because the plaintiff did “not object to the manner in which his car was

towed or the price of the tow,” but instead alleged that

the subsequent sale of the vehicle violated Maine law.

Id. at 262-263. The Court further explained that, although the statutory definition of “transportation” encompasses “[t]emporary storage of an item en route to

its final destination,” the defendant’s “storage of [the

plaintiff ’s] car after the towing job was done” did “not

involve ‘transportation’ within the meaning of the federal Act” because it did not “relate[] to the movement of

property.” Id. at 262 (citing 49 U.S.C. 13102(23)(B)).

The Court concluded that it “need not venture an allpurpose definition of transportation ‘services’ in order

to conclude that state-law claims homing in on the disposal of stored vehicles fall outside § 14501(c)(1)’s

preemptive compass.” Id. at 263 (brackets omitted).

Here, as in Dan’s City, proper application of Section

14501(c)(1) depends on close parsing of the statutory

19

definition of “transportation.” Unlike the Dan’s City

plaintiff, however, petitioner challenges the defendant’s

performance of “transportation” services. As noted,

Congress defined “transportation” to include “services

related to th[e] movement” of property, and further defined those services to include “arranging for” that

movement. 49 U.S.C. 13102(23)(B). And a broker’s job

includes “arranging for[] transportation by motor carrier.” 49 U.S.C. 13102(2).

Thus, when C.H. Robinson selected Caribe as the

carrier that would transport goods in commerce, C.H.

Robinson itself engaged in “transportation” within the

meaning of the Act. The services that petitioner claims

were negligently performed thus “concern” the transportation of property. Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 261; see

Cox, 142 F.4th at 853 (“The broker services implicated

in this type of tort claim plainly ‘concern’ the transportation, or movement, of property.”). Indeed, if the broker services that C.H. Robinson performed here were

not “with respect to the transportation of property,” 49

U.S.C. 14501(c)(1), it is difficult to see what broker services could qualify.

Petitioner observes (Br. 46-47) that his “claims do

not turn on whether [the] trailer was full or empty or

involved the transport of passengers or property.” That

is beside the point. This Court has long analyzed

preemption under the ADA and FAAAA by reference

to the “particularized application of a general” legal

rule, not the generic rule in the abstract. Morales, 504

U.S. at 386; see, e.g., Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228. In arranging for Caribe to move goods in interstate commerce, C.H. Robinson engaged in “transportation” of

property within the meaning of the Act. And the vehicle

that struck petitioner was engaged in such movement of

20

property at the time of the accident. Petitioner’s specific tort claims against C.H. Robinson therefore are related to a broker’s provision of a service “with respect

to the transportation of property” within the meaning

of Section 14501(c)(1).

B. Section 14501(c)(2)(A) Does Not Exempt From Section

14501(c)(1)’s General Preemptive Scope State CommonLaw Rules Governing Brokers’ Selection Of Appropriate Motor Carriers

The Act contains several exceptions to Section

14501(c)(1)’s general preemption rule. Relevant here is

the safety exception, which provides that Section

14501(c)(1)’s general preemption rule “shall not restrict

[1] the safety regulatory authority of a State [2] with

respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A).

Petitioner invokes an Illinois common-law rule that requires brokers to exercise reasonable care in selecting

motor carriers to move goods in commerce, and that

subjects brokers to potential damages liability for

harms attributable to any breach of that duty. Although

enforcement of that common-law rule constitutes the

exercise of Illinois’s “safety regulatory authority,” that

rule does not regulate “with respect to motor vehicles.”

1. A State’s “safety regulatory authority” under Section 14501(c)(2)(A) includes the authority to adopt

and enforce rules of common-law liability that are

intended to enhance safety

This Court has repeatedly recognized that “state

common-law duties and standards of care” are a form of

“state ‘regulation’ ” that “ ‘is designed to be[] a potent

method of governing conduct and controlling policy.’ ”

Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 565 U.S.

625, 637 (2012) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Mutual

21

Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 480, 482

n.1 (2013); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009);

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359

U.S. 236, 239, 246-247 (1959). “State tort laws, after all,

plainly intend to regulate public safety.” Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761, 774 (2019) (plurality

opinion). And “[h]istorically, common law liability has

formed the bedrock of state regulation.” Desiano v.

Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2006).

Section 14501(c)(2)(A)’s reference to a State’s “safety

regulatory authority” is best read to incorporate that

established understanding.

That straightforward reading is bolstered by related

provisions of the Act. As explained above, Section

14501(c)(1)’s general preemption rule, which encompasses specified types of state “law[s], regulation[s], or

other provision[s] having the force and effect of law,” is

best read as encompassing state common-law duties.

See pp. 10-12, supra. Section 14501(c)(2)(A), in turn, is

expressly framed as a limitation on Section 14501(c)(1)’s

preemptive scope, providing that “Paragraph (1) * * *

shall not restrict” the State’s “regulatory authority” in

the specified areas. 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A). That

framing indicates that “regulatory authority” is simply

a shorthand for the “laws, regulations, or other provisions having the force and effect of law” that are subject

to Section 14501(c)(1) in the first place—including

therefore common-law duties.

Section 601 of the Act reinforces that conclusion. In

Section 601(a), Congress declared that “certain aspects

of the State regulatory process should be preempted,”

FAAAA § 601(a)(2), 108 Stat. 1605 (emphasis added);

see Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 263, and in Section 601(c),

Congress enacted the original version of what is now

22

Section 14501(c), FAAAA § 601(c), 108 Stat. 1606. Congress thus used the shorthand term “regulatory” to describe the full range of state “law[s], regulation[s], [and]

other provision[s],” including common-law duties, that

Section 14501(c)(1) preempts.

To treat state “regulatory authority” in Section

14501(c)(2)(A) as limited to the adoption of statutory or

administrative rules, and as excluding state commonlaw duties, would produce bizarre results. Most obviously, it would produce the same anomaly discussed

above with respect to the scope of Section 14501(c)(1)’s

general preemption rule, causing federal preemption of

some state-law duties to turn on whether particular duties were imposed by the state legislature or executive

branch, on the one hand, or the state judiciary, on the

other. See pp. 11-12, supra.

Such an interpretation also would logically imply

that state common-law negligence claims against motor

carriers would be preempted. That conclusion would be

in tension with the Act’s directive that a motor carrier,

as a condition of federal registration, must carry insurance or provide security sufficient to cover “each final

judgment against the registrant for bodily injury to, or

death of, an individual resulting from the negligent operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles.” 49

U.S.C. 13906(a)(1). As noted earlier (see p. 17, supra),

that directive assumes that motor carriers can be subjected to personal-injury actions, which frequently arise

under the common law.

2. The Illinois common-law rule that petitioner invokes

does not regulate “with respect to motor vehicles”

In order to be saved from preemption under Section

14501(c)(2)(A), a State’s exercise of “safety regulatory

authority” must be “with respect to motor vehicles.” 49

23

U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(A). The Illinois common-law rule

that brokers must exercise due care in selecting safe

motor carriers does not satisfy that requirement, because any such duty lacks the requisite direct connection to motor vehicles.

a. Although this Court has not directly addressed

the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” in Section

14501(c)(2)(A), its decision in Dan’s City, supra, provides useful guidance. Just as the phrase “with respect

to the transportation of property” in Section 14501(c)(1)

means “concerns the transportation of property,” see

Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 261, the term “with respect to

motor vehicles” in Section 14501(c)(2)(A) should be construed to mean “concerns motor vehicles.” And just as

the Court in Dan’s City looked to the statutory definition of “transportation” to determine whether the requisite connection existed, see id. at 261-263, the Court

should look to the statutory definition of “motor vehicle” in applying the Section 14501(c)(2)(A) exception

here.

Under that definition, a state common-law requirement that a broker must exercise due care in selecting

a motor carrier does not “concern” motor vehicles. Congress defined “motor vehicle” as “a vehicle, machine,

tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by

mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation, or a combination determined by the Secretary.” 49

U.S.C. 13102(16). Nothing in that definition refers to or

concerns the services of a broker. The brokers themselves do not own or operate any motor vehicle; nor do

they provide services with motor vehicles. Instead, brokers act as intermediaries between shippers and motor

carriers, see 49 U.S.C. 13102(2), and the carriers in turn

provide the motor vehicles used to transport the cargo,

24

see 49 U.S.C. 13102(14). Accordingly, while a state

common-law requirement that motor carriers safely operate their vehicles is an exercise of the State’s authority “with respect to motor vehicles,” imposition of liability on a broker for negligently selecting the motor carrier is too far removed from the vehicles themselves to

satisfy that requirement. Cf. 49 U.S.C. 13102(9) (defining “motor vehicle safety” as protecting against accidents “because of the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle”).

b. Three contextual clues reinforce that conclusion.

First, “every state law that relates to the prices, routes,

or services of a motor carrier [or] broker * * * will have

at least an indirect relationship to motor vehicles,”

given that “motor vehicles are how motor carriers move

property from one place to another.” Aspen American,

65 F.4th at 1271. “Accordingly, if an indirect connection

between a state law and a motor vehicle satisfied the

safety exception, then the phrase ‘with respect to motor

vehicles’ would have no meaningful operative effect.”

Ibid. Basic canons of statutory construction counsel

against reading the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” in a manner that would render that phrase superfluous.

Petitioner contends that, under his reading, the

phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” would still have

practical effect because it would exclude from the safety

exception claims concerning transportation services

like “packing,” “storage,” “ventilation,” and “refrigeration,” Pet. Br. 35 (quoting 49 U.S.C. 13102(23)), as well

as claims against freight forwarders with respect to water transportation, id. at 35-36. That is an unlikely

reading of a statute aimed at deregulating the trucking

industry. In any event, the listed services like storage

25

and refrigeration are at least indirectly connected to

motor vehicles, given that they refer only to those services that occur during transit. Cf. Dan’s City, 569 U.S.

at 262 (explaining that the statutory definition of

“transportation” encompasses “[t]emporary storage of

an item en route to its final destination,” but not storage

that occurs after the movement of goods is complete).

Even transportation by boat may be indirectly connected to motor vehicles at the front and back ends of a

maritime journey.

All of the services that petitioner describes thus

would arguably fall within petitioner’s expansive reading of “with respect to motor vehicles.” But even if some

of those services might be excluded, the Court in Dan’s

City viewed the phrase “with respect to transportation”

in Section 14501(c)(1) as “massively limit[ing] the

scope” of preemption. 569 U.S. at 261 (citation omitted).

The phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” in Section

14501(c)(2)(A) likewise should perform at least some

meaningful limiting function—not merely exclude idiosyncratic claims about boats and refrigeration.

Second, petitioner’s reading of the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” would produce an odd disparity

between interstate and intrastate broker services. Section 14501(b) preempts state regulation of “intrastate

rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services of any

freight forwarder or broker,” 49 U.S.C. 14501(b)(1), but

it does not contain a safety exception analogous to the

one in Section 14501(c)(2)(A). Accordingly, if the vehicle that collided with petitioner had been engaged in

purely intrastate transportation of property, petitioner’s negligent-selection claims clearly would have

been preempted. But it would be highly anomalous for

Congress to permit greater state regulation of inter-

26

state broker services than of purely intrastate broker

services. Reading the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” in Section 14501(c)(2)(A) as generally excluding

state-law requirements imposed on brokers avoids that

anomaly. Cf. Ye, 74 F.4th at 461 (“Congress’s decision

not to write a safety exception for the broker-specific

preemption provision indicates a purposeful separation

between brokers and motor vehicle safety.”).

Third, the distinct financial-security requirements

that apply to motor carriers and brokers respectively

suggest that brokers are not subject to state-law claims

arising from vehicle accidents involving their selected

motor carriers. A federally registered motor carrier

must file with FMCSA a government-approved “bond,

insurance policy, or other type of security” that is sufficient to pay “for each final judgment against the registrant for bodily injury to, or death of, an individual resulting from the negligent operation, maintenance, or

use of motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. 13906(a)(1); see 49

C.F.R. 387.301T(a). As noted, that requirement presupposes that motor carriers are subject to state laws governing the safe operation of motor vehicles, including

tort liability for personal injuries resulting from those

vehicles’ unsafe operation.

Congress has not imposed any similar requirement

on brokers. Instead, brokers must ensure sufficient security to “pay any claim * * * arising from [the broker’s] failure to pay freight charges under its contracts,

agreements, or arrangements for transportation.” 49

U.S.C. 13906(b)(2)(A); see Ye, 74 F.4th at 463. That difference suggests a congressional expectation that brokers, unlike motor carriers, will not be subject to tort

actions arising from the unsafe operation of motor vehicles. Petitioner asserts (Br. 34-35) that those distinct

27

requirements merely reflect Congress’s assumption

that personal-injury suits arising from motor-vehicle

accidents will more commonly be brought against motor

carriers than against brokers. But that explanation

simply highlights the fact that brokers’ core services

are far removed from the ownership, maintenance, and

use of the motor vehicles themselves.

c. To find preemption here, this Court must conclude both that the relevant Illinois common-law rule

does regulate broker services “with respect to the

transportation of property” under Section 14501(c)(1),

and that the rule does not regulate “with respect to motor vehicles” under Section 14501(c)(2)(A). Petitioner

contends (Br. 46) that, even if each of those propositions

is defensible, the two cannot both be right. That argument lacks merit.

As explained above (see pp. 18-19, supra), Congress

defined “transportation” to include “services related to”

the movement of passengers or property, “including arranging for” such movement. 49 U.S.C. 13102(23)(B).

In selecting Caribe as the carrier that would move the

relevant goods, C.H. Robinson itself thus engaged in

“transportation” as the statute defines that term. A

state-law rule that would impose tort liability for that

selection therefore regulates broker services “with respect to the transportation of property” under Section

14501(c)(1). But because C.H. Robinson’s services lack

a comparable direct connection to motor vehicles, that

state-law rule does not regulate “with respect to motor

vehicles” under Section 14501(c)(2)(A). See pp. 23-24,

supra. Rather than creating an internal contradiction

as petitioner contends, this approach gives effect to

Congress’s use of different nouns (“transportation” and

“motor vehicles” respectively) as the objects of the

28

“with respect to” phrases in Section 14501(c)(1) and

Section 14501(c)(2)(A).

d. It makes sense that Congress would permit negligence claims against motor carriers for personal injuries arising out of vehicle accidents, but not negligentselection claims against brokers for their selection of

unsafe motor carriers. Success on an ordinary personalinjury claim against a carrier does not necessarily impugn the carrier’s services as a whole: even the best

carriers may act negligently on isolated occasions. Subjecting a carrier to state-law tort liability for such a deviation will not tend to change the carrier’s rates,

routes, or services in ways that run counter to the Act’s

deregulatory goals.

A negligent-selection claim against a broker, by contrast, has broader systemic implications. An injured

plaintiff could not establish negligence on the broker’s

part simply by proving that the selected motor carrier

operated its vehicle unsafely on a particular occasion.

Rather, to show that the broker’s selection of a particular carrier was negligent, the plaintiff would be required to prove some broader pre-existing deficiency in

the carrier’s operations.

Under Illinois law, for example, petitioner must

show that Caribe and the driver had a “particular unfitness” giving rise to a “danger of harm to third persons”

that “was known or should have been known at the time

of [their] hiring” by C.H. Robinson. Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 904 (Ill. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

811 (1999); see Pet. Br. 13, 29 n.6. A judgment for petitioner on that claim would thus necessarily impugn Caribe’s overall operations, thereby undermining FMCSA’s

determination that Caribe satisfies federal registration

requirements, including rigorous safety requirements.

29

See pp. 30-32, infra. Indeed, the very existence of such

a judgment likely would dissuade most risk-averse brokers from hiring Caribe in the future, threatening the

latter’s viability as a going concern and reducing the

supply of motor carriers from the level that market

forces otherwise would dictate.

3. This Court need not address respondents’ additional

arguments

Because petitioner’s negligent-selection claims are

encompassed by Section 14501(c)(1)’s general preemption rule, but do not invoke the State’s regulatory authority “with respect to motor vehicles” under Section

14501(c)(2)(A), the Court can affirm the judgment below

without addressing respondents’ alternative arguments

for preemption. Respondents contend (Br. 46-48) that

the “safety regulatory authority of a State” encompasses only the preexisting authority that States possessed to regulate interstate motor transportation before Congress enacted the current federal deregulatory

scheme. Cf. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61,

63 (1954). Respondents further suggest (Br. 48-49)

that, even if Section 14501(c) does not expressly preempt

negligent-selection claims against brokers, such claims

would be impliedly preempted. Cf. Geier, 529 U.S. at

869 (explaining that express preemption provisions do

not necessarily “foreclose or limit the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles”).

Those arguments raise complex issues that have not

been addressed by the courts below or by any other

court of appeals. Accordingly, if this Court agrees that

Section 14501(c) preempts petitioner’s claims on the

grounds set forth in this brief, the Court need not—and

therefore should not—address respondents’ additional

grounds for preemption. Cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544

30

U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not

of first view.”).

C. Preemption Of State Common-Law Rules Governing A

Broker’s Selection Of A Carrier Does Not Create An

Unwarranted Safety Regulatory Gap

That the Act preempts the Illinois common-law rule

that petitioner invokes here does not imply that motorcarrier safety is unregulated. Congress’s economic deregulation of the trucking industry has long coexisted

with federal and state safety regulation of commercial

motor vehicles.

Congress has tasked DOT with, among other things,

“promot[ing] the safe operation of commercial motor

vehicles” through “improved, more uniform commercial

motor vehicle safety measures.” Motor Carrier Safety

Act of 1984, §§ 202, 203, 98 Stat. 2832. To that end, Congress has empowered DOT to “prescribe regulations on

commercial motor vehicle safety.” 49 U.S.C. 31136(a).

Congress has directed that those regulations should, at

a minimum, ensure that “commercial motor vehicles are

maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safety”;

that the “responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles do not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely”; that the physical condition of

the operators is sound enough to enable them to operate

the vehicles; and that the operators are not coerced to

violate such safety regulations. Ibid. And more

broadly, the federal government enforces other federal

laws that could implicate safety concerns, such as laws

prohibiting the unlawful hiring of aliens, see 8 U.S.C.

1324a, and laws governing motor-vehicle safety standards, see National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act

of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (49 U.S.C. 30101

31

et seq.); Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564,

80 Stat. 731 (23 U.S.C. 401 et seq.).

FMCSA further regulates motor carriers and brokers by enforcing federal statutory registration and

financial-responsibility requirements. Carriers generally must demonstrate that their drivers are medically

fit, are properly licensed, and meet the minimum standards established by regulation. See 49 C.F.R. Pt. 391.

Carriers also must implement systematic inspection, repair, and maintenance programs to ensure that their

commercial motor vehicles are in safe operating condition. 49 C.F.R. 396.3(a)(1). FMCSA monitors compliance by evaluating the overall safety fitness of carriers,

see 49 C.F.R. Pt. 385, and by assigning particular carriers a safety rating of “satisfactory,” “conditional,” or

“unsatisfactory,” 49 C.F.R. 385.3. FMCSA may suspend or revoke a carrier’s registration for an unsatisfactory safety rating or other violation. 49 U.S.C.

13905(d) and (f ).

Freight brokers engaged in interstate commerce

must similarly obtain operating authority by registering with FMCSA. 49 U.S.C. 13901. FMCSA will register a broker only if it determines that the broker will

“comply with this [statute] and applicable regulations.”

49 U.S.C. 13904(a). One of those regulations states that

a registered broker may select only “an authorized motor carrier,” 49 C.F.R. 371.2(a) (emphasis added)—that

is, a motor carrier that has active operating authority.

As noted, such a motor carrier by hypothesis satisfies

the financial-security and safety requirements imposed

by federal law and FMCSA.

Finally, if vehicles operated by commercial motor

carriers are involved in accidents despite those prophylactic prescriptive measures, the Act does not foreclose

32

state common-law negligence claims against the motor

carriers—i.e., the persons most directly responsible for

accidents caused by their vehicles. And the applicable

financial-responsibility requirements ensure that a successful plaintiff in such a suit will not be left without

recompense. See 49 U.S.C. 13906(a)(1), 31139(b). Petitioner was able to sue the motor carrier in this case, and

the carrier has tendered the maximum amount payable

under its liability-insurance policy. See Pet. App. 14a.

Although petitioner asserts that the tender is insufficient to cover his extensive injuries, that unfortunate

case-specific circumstance does not justify a strained

judicial interpretation of the Act that would permit

States to regulate a broker’s selection of a federally registered motor carrier.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

GREGORY ZERZAN

General Counsel

CHARLES E. ENLOE

Assistant General Counsel

ERIN D. HENDRIXSON

Senior Trial Attorney

Department of Transportation

REBECCA PETTIT

Chief Counsel

Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration

JANUARY 2026

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorney General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

SOPAN JOSHI

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

MICHAEL S. RAAB

JENNIFER L. UTRECHT

Attorneys