Amicus Curiae Brief — Shawn Montgomery, Petitioner v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 21, 2026

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No. 24-1238

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

SHAWN MONTGOMERY,

Petitioner,

CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, et al.,

Respondents.

————

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

————

BRIEF OF THE TRANSPORTATION

INTERMEDIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. AS

AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS

————

MARC S. BLUBAUGH

Counsel of Record

NICHOLAS P. LACEY

BENESCH FRIEDLANDER COPLAN

& ARONOFF LLP

41 South High Street

Suite 2600

Columbus, OH 43215-6164

(614) 223-9300

mblubaugh@beneschlaw.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae The

Transportation Intermediaries

Association, Inc.

January 21, 2026

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF

AMICUS CURIAE ...........................................

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................

ARGUMENT ........................................................

The Savings Statute Cannot Preserve

What Did Not Exist: Personal Injury

Claims Against Brokers............................

A. The Rise of the Motor Carrier

Industry ...............................................

B. Early Preemption of Certain State

Regulation of Motor Carriers ..............

C. The Federal Government’s Exclusive

Authority to Determine Motor Carrier

Safety Fitness Standards ....................

D. The Role of Brokers in the Motor

Carrier Industry ..................................

E. Deregulation of the Motor Carrier

Industry and the FAAAA ....................

F. The USDOT’s Current Role in

Regulating the Safety of Motor

Carriers ................................................

The Practical Dilemma: What’s a Broker

to Do? .........................................................

III. The Text and Structure of the Savings

Statute Demonstrate that it Does Not

Preserve Claims Against Brokers ............

CONCLUSION ....................................................

II.

(i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar

Ranger, Inc.,

65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023) .................

Buck v. Kuykendall,

267 U.S. 307 (1925) ...................................

6, 7

California Trucking Ass’n v. Su,

903 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2018) .....................

Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines,

348 U.S. 61 (1954) .....................................

7, 8

City of Columbus v. Ours Garage &

Wrecker Service, Inc.,

536 U.S. 424 (2002) ...................................

Clark v. Poor,

274 U.S. 544 (1927) ...................................

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,

569 U.S. 251 (2013) ................................... 15, 28

Dixie Midwest Express, Inc., Extension –

General Commodities (Greensboro, AL),

132 M.C.C. 794 (1982) ..............................

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,

529 U.S. 861 (2000) ...................................

George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Malloy,

267 U.S. 317 (1925) ...................................

Lee v. Golf Transp., Inc.,

No. 3:21-CV-01948, 2023 WL 7329523

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2023) .............................

Levinson v. Spector Motor Serv.,

330 U.S. 649 (1947) ...................................

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Ortiz v. Ben Strong Trucking, Inc.,

624 F. Supp. 3d 567 (D. Md. 2022) ...........

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor

Transp. Ass’n,

552 U.S. 364 (2008) ...................................

Sosa v. Alvarez Machain,

542 U.S. 692 (2004) ...................................

Sprout v. South Bend,

277 U.S. 163 (1928) ...................................

Volkova v. C.H. Robinson Co.,

No. 16 C 1883, 2018 WL 741441

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2018) ..............................

Ye v. Global Sunrise, Inc.,

No. 1:18-CV-01961, 2020 WL 1042047

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2020) ............................. 25, 26

Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.,

74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023) ............... 15, 28, 29

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

Property Broker Security for the Protection

of the Public,

3 I.C.C.2d 916, 1987 WL 97298

(July 10, 1987)........................................... 13, 14

Property Broker Security for the Protection

of the Public,

4 I.C.C. 2d 358, 1988 WL 225581

(Mar. 14, 1988) ..........................................

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ...........................

6, 7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Page(s)

49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) .....................................

49 U.S.C. § 13102(16) ...................................

49 U.S.C. § 13901 .........................................

49 U.S.C. § 13902 .........................................

49 U.S.C. § 13902(a)(6).................................

49 U.S.C. § 13904 .........................................

49 U.S.C. § 13904(d)(1) ................................

49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(1).................................

49 U.S.C. § 13906(b)(1).................................

49 U.S.C. § 14501 ......................................... 15, 30

49 U.S.C. § 14501(b) .....................................

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) ..................................... 15, 17

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) ........................... 17, 28, 30

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2) –(4).......................... 17, 30

§ 14501(c)(2)(A) .........................................

49 U.S.C. § 14916(c) .....................................

49 U.S.C. § 14916(d) .....................................

49 U.S.C. § 31144 ......................................... 9, 19

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L.

No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 .........................

Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L.

No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966) ................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108

Stat. 1569 (1994) .. 3, 4, 14-17, 20, 26, 27, 29, 30

§ 601, 108 Stat. 1605 ................................

§ 601(a)(1)(A)-(C), 108 Stat. 1605 .............

§ 601(a)(2), 108 Stat. 1605 ........................

§ 601(c), 108 Stat. 1606.............................

Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat.

803, 804 .....................................................

Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74255, 49 Stat. 543 ....................................... 2, 6-8

§ 203(a)(18), 49 Stat. 545 ..........................

§ 204(a)(1), 49 Stat. 546 ............................

§ 204(a)(2), 49 Stat. 546 ............................

§ 211(a), 49 Stat. 554 ................................

§ 211(b), 49 Stat. 554 ................................

Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96296, 94 Stat. 793 .......................................

Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, Pub. L.

No. 98-554, 98 Stat. 2829 .........................

§ 206(c)(2), 98 Stat. 2834 ..........................

Moving Ahead to Progress in the 21st

Century Act (MAP-21), Pub. L. No. 112141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012) ..........................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

49 C.F.R. §§ 350–99 ......................................

§ 356 ..........................................................

§ 365 ..........................................................

§ 367 ..........................................................

§ 371.7(b) ...................................................

pt. 374 ........................................................

§ 380 ..........................................................

§ 383 ..........................................................

§ 385 ..........................................................

§ 385.1 .......................................................

§ 385.13 .....................................................

§ 387.9 .......................................................

§ 387.307(a) ...............................................

§ 390 ..........................................................

§ 391 ..........................................................

§ 391.23(k) .................................................

§ 392 ..........................................................

§ 393 ..........................................................

§ 397 ..........................................................

§ 398 ..........................................................

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

9.2.3 The Pre Authorization Safety Audit

(PASA) Process, Fed. Motor Carrier

Safety Admin., https://csa.fmcsa.dot.gov/

safetyplanner/MyFiles/SubSections.aspx

?ch=26&sec=90&sub=202 (last visited

Jan. 15, 2026) ............................................

89 Fed. Reg. 90608 (Nov. 18, 2024) .............

65 Fed. Reg. 50919 § 206(c)(2) (Aug. 22,

2000) ..........................................................

65 Fed. Reg. 50919 § 215(a) (Aug. 22,

2000) ..........................................................

Economics and Industry Data, American

Trucking Associations, www.trucking.

org/economics-and-industry-data

(last

visited January 10, 2026) .........................

Ernest G. Cox, One Third Century of Motor

Carrier Safety Regulation, 2 Transp. L. J.

173 (1970) ..................................................

8, 9

Ex Parte No. MC-4, 1 M.C.C. 1 (1936) ........

H.R. Rep. No. 104-311 (1995), reprinted in

1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793 .............................

Interstate Com. Comm’n, 69th Annual ICC

Report to Congress (1955) ........................

Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Motor Freight Brokers: A

Tale of Federal Regulatory Pandemonium, 14 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 289

(1993–1994) ............................................... 10, 11

Report of the I.C.C. on Coordination of

Motor Transp., 182 I.C.C. 263 (1932).......

5, 6

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

SMS: Safety Management System, Fed.

Motor Carrier Safety Admin., https://ai.

fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS/Home/SMStoCrash.a

spx (last visited Jan. 18, 2026) .................

Terrance A. Brown, Freight Brokers and

General Commodity Trucking, 24

Transp. J. 4 (1984) ....................................

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF

AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Curiae Transportation Intermediaries

Association, Inc. (“TIA”) is a not-for-profit trade

association that has, for nearly fifty years, provided

leadership, education and training resources, and

public policy advocacy to the $343 billion per year

third-party transportation logistics industry, which

includes freight brokerage.1 TIA has over 1,700

member companies, ranging from small start-ups to

international shipping companies, including large and

small freight brokers. Over 70% of TIA’s members

generate under $15 million in annual revenue.

TIA members’ core service is to provide “freight

brokerage” by arranging for the interstate transportation of goods on behalf of their shipper customers.

Freight brokers perform this service by retaining

federally-licensed interstate motor carriers to transport the goods from origin to destination. Brokers

arrange transportation of goods on behalf of shippers

from one point to another, either within or across

multiple states or even internationally, according to

the specific needs of the shipper. These services may

involve the use of more than one transportation mode,

such as air, rail, truck, and ship. In short, brokers are

roughly akin to travel agents for freight.

TIA and its members have an interest in this case

as its outcome will have a profound effect on the way

brokers perform their core service of selecting motor

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus curiae affirms that no counsel

for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no

party, party’s counsel, or third-party (other than TIA and its

members) made any monetary contribution intended to fund the

preparation or submission of this brief.

carriers to which they tender loads on behalf of their

shipper customers. TIA thus submits this brief to

inform the Court regarding the legislative and

regulatory framework governing brokers and motor

carriers and the real-world, adverse effects that tort

lawsuits like Petitioner’s lawsuit have on brokers.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case vividly illustrates how Plaintiffs’ personal

injury attorneys have wrongfully manipulated state

tort law in an attempt to supplant the federal government’s exclusive and sacrosanct role in determining

whether a given interstate motor carrier should be permitted to operate in a given jurisdiction at any given time.

Every day, a business needs a load moved from

origin to destination. That business hires a broker.

The broker selects a federally-licensed interstate

motor carrier to perform the transportation. On rare

occasions, the motor carrier is involved in a highway

accident, and someone is injured. The injured party

sues not only the motor carrier involved in the accident

but the broker who selected that motor carrier,

claiming that the broker was negligent in choosing

that particular motor carrier in the first place. No

matter how the claim is couched, the injured party

effectively asserts that the motor carrier in question

should never have been on the public roads

transporting goods in the first place.

However, since at least 1935 with the passage of the

Motor Carrier Act, Congress has designated the

federal government as the exclusive gatekeeper of

which motor carriers may operate in interstate

commerce. Even before 1935, the Court recognized

that certain state-law regulations of motor carriers

were unconstitutional since they interfered with

interstate commerce. Thus, for nearly one hundred

(100) years, states have had no authority to determine

which interstate motor carriers may operate on the

public roads. To allow judges and juries to hold

brokers liable under state law for engaging an

interstate motor carrier that the federal government

has already deemed fit to operate on the public roads

is to allow states to establish fitness standards through

their tort systems despite the states being prohibited

from doing so through legislation or regulation.

Consider an analogy to illustrate this point. A travel

agent arranging a flight is not expected to evaluate

whether a federally-licensed airline has safe hiring

practices, is not expected to scrutinize whether that

federally-licensed airline has a safe maintenance and

repair program, and has no duty to assess if the

federally-licensed airline operates more safely than

other airlines. A travel agent knows that a given

airline is safe to use because the federal government

has deemed that airline fit to operate. The same holds

true with respect to a broker’s use of federally-licensed

motor carriers.

The express preemption provision of the Federal

Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”)

reaffirms this sensible national policy. Under the

FAAAA, states are prohibited from conscripting brokers

to serve as de facto inspectors general charged with

investigating the federal government’s decision to

license a given motor carrier to operate in interstate

commerce.

This brief explains the broad, all-encompassing

scope of Congress’ regulation of interstate motor

carriers (and brokers) and demonstrates that states

have never had the authority to determine safety

fitness standards for interstate motor carriers. As a

result, state common law cannot impose liability on

brokers for their selection of a motor carrier that has

been deemed fit to operate by the federal government.

The FAAAA’s so-called “safety exception,” as a savings

statute, can—at best—only preserve states’ authority

that existed prior to the FAAAA’s enactment. Prior to

the FAAAA, states had no authority to second-guess

the federal government’s own safety fitness determinations for motor carriers. Therefore, they cannot do

so today.

In short, a savings statue cannot preserve what did

not exist in the first place.

ARGUMENT

I. The Savings Statute Cannot Preserve

What Did Not Exist: Personal Injury

Claims Against Brokers.

The federal government has long been the exclusive

arbiter of whether a given interstate motor carrier

may operate on the public roads. While states register

individual motor vehicles and license individual

drivers pursuant to federal standards, and while state

(and federal) courts may enter tort judgments against

negligent motor carriers, the federal government has

never allowed states to suspend or revoke interstate

motor carrier operating authority, whether pursuant

to a state statute or through judicial disposition of a

tort claim. The so-called “safety exception” to the

FAAAA is a savings clause that merely preserves the

limited, historical role of the states. It does not

empower states to fashion and enforce new claims

against brokers that require brokers to avoid using

certain federally-licensed interstate motor carriers.

A. The Rise of the Motor Carrier Industry.

In 1887, Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce

Act (“ICA”) to regulate the railroad industry. Among

other things, the ICA created the Interstate Commerce

Commission (“ICC”).

Naturally, the ICC did not initially regulate the

motor carrier industry because motor carriers did not

exist at the time; the first modern automobile had only

just been invented. But the trucking industry began

to grow in the early 20th century. As the industry

grew, shippers recognized the convenience and

flexibility of trucking, which could often be quicker and

less expensive than rail transit.

By 1914, at least thirty-nine (39) states had passed

laws regulating common carriers of property; thirtyfour (34) states had enacted laws regulating contract

carriers. Report of the I.C.C. on Coordination of Motor

Transp., 182 I.C.C. 263, 371 (1932); see Levinson v.

Spector Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649, 657–58 (1947). In

its 1932 report recommending that Congress take

action to regulate the motor carrier industry, the ICC

examined the scope of state regulation, observing that

“[s]tate regulation is more or less demoralized by the

presence of interstate motor carriers, and it is believed

that this difficulty would be to some extent at least

removed by Federal regulations similar in some

respects to that adopted in the several states.” Report

of the I.C.C. on Coordination of Motor Transp., 182

I.C.C. 263, 371–73 (1932) (“In the States where there

is a density of population that promotes an extensive

use of motor vehicles, State boundaries become

insignificant and the interstate character of the

operations vitiates effective State regulations.”).

Similarly, prior to the federal overhaul of motor

carrier regulation, thirty-seven (37) states required

vehicles “carrying property for hire” to obtain a stateissued certificate or permit before providing intrastate

services. Id. Many states issued safety, size, and

vehicle weight regulations, such that it was “generally

recognized” that a need for more “uniform rules and

regulations” existed in this area. Id. at 373. The states

also attempted to regulate liability insurance for

interstate motor carriers, but a state “could not require

a motor carrier operating exclusively in interstate

commerce to carry . . . insurance against loss or

damage to cargoes.” Id. (citing Sprout v. South Bend,

277 U.S. 163 (1928); Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 544 (1927)).

Recognizing the need for uniformity in the

regulation of interstate motor carriage, Congress

enacted the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (“MCA”), which

granted the ICC authority to regulate the motor

carrier industry. This new authority allowed the ICC

to determine which companies could safely operate as

interstate motor carriers.

B. Early Preemption of Certain State

Regulation of Motor Carriers.

Even before the enactment of the MCA, courts had

begun to strike down certain state regulations of

interstate motor carriers as preempted by the

Interstate Commerce Clause. For instance, in Buck v.

Kuykendall, the Court invalidated a Washington statute

that prohibited common carriers from operating on

certain Washington highways “without having first

obtained from the director of public works a certificate

declaring that public convenience and necessity

require such operation.” 267 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1925).

The Court held that “the provision of the Washington

statute is a regulation, not of the use of its own

highways, but of interstate commerce. Its effect upon

such commerce is not merely to burden, but to

obstruct, it. Such state action is forbidden by the

commerce clause.” Id. at 316.

The Court affirmed the holding of Buck in George W.

Bush & Sons Co. v. Malloy, a case involving a similar

Maryland statute. 267 U.S. 317 (1925). In Bush, the

Court rejected the argument that Buck’s holding did

not apply because the Maryland highways in question

“were not constructed or improved with federal aid,”

unlike the highways in Buck. Id. at 324 (“The federal

aid legislation is of significance not because of the aid

given by the United States for the construction of

particular highways, but because those acts make

clear the purpose of Congress that state highways

shall be open to interstate commerce.”). Similarly, the

Bush Court assigned no significance to the fact the

Maryland regulators applied their discretion to refuse

to issue a permit, unlike in Buck, in which the denial

of a permit was dictated by “a mandatory provision of

the state statute.” Id. The statutes in both Bush and

Buck were unconstitutional because they “invaded a

field reserved by the commerce clause for federal

regulation.” Id. at 325.

After the passage of the MCA, the Court recognized

the independently preemptive scope of the MCA in

Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, in which the Court

invalidated an Illinois statute barring interstate

motor carriers from using Illinois roadways as punishment for repeated violations of state highway

regulations. 348 U.S. 61, 62 (1954). The Court

recognized that “Congress in the Motor Carrier Act

adopted a comprehensive plan for regulating the

carriage of goods by motor truck in interstate

commerce” that was “so all-embracing that [sic] former

power of states over interstate motor carriers was

greatly reduced.” Id. at 63. The Court observed that a

state could not enact a law “amounting to a suspension

or revocation of an interstate carrier’s commissiongranted right to operate.” Id. at 64.

Allowing courts to apply state tort law to force

brokers to eliminate certain motor carriers from the

marketplace creates the very same mischief prohibited

by Castle.

C. The Federal Government’s Exclusive

Authority to Determine Motor Carrier

Safety Fitness Standards.

The MCA of 1935 delegated authority to the ICC to

establish economic and safety regulations governing

the motor carrier industry. Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat.

543. Specifically, the MCA stated that the ICC would,

“regulate common carriers by motor vehicle” and

“establish reasonable requirements with respect to . . .

qualifications and maximum hours of service of

employees, and safety of operation and equipment.” Id.

at § 204(a)(1), (2), 49 Stat. 546.

In 1937, the ICC issued its inaugural Motor Carrier

Safety Regulations, which contained safety requirements for motor carriers including: minimum driver

age, English language proficiency, vehicle control, and

accident reporting requirements. See Ex Parte No.

MC-4, 1 M.C.C. 1, 7–17 (1936). “There had been no

direct safety regulation governing carriers or their

drivers and vehicles by a Federal agency until the

[ICC] made the Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

effective, beginning April 1, 1937.” Ernest G. Cox, One

Third Century of Motor Carrier Safety Regulation, 2

Transp. L. J. 173, 177 (1970). During this early period,

most of the ICC’s work involved evaluating and

determining applications for certificates of public

convenience and necessity. Id. at 178. “[The ICC]

deal[s] with basic accident cause factors peculiar to

highway transportation, which only a Federal government agency can effectively control . . . Our function

has to do, for example, with maximum hours of service,

driver qualifications, and uniform vehicle design

elements, as contrasted with enforcement of traffic

regulations by State and local police.” Interstate Com.

Comm’n, 69th Annual ICC Report to Congress (1955).

In 1966, Congress enacted the Department of

Transportation Act, which transferred the ICC’s safety

functions from the Secretary of Commerce to the

Secretary of Transportation in the U.S. Department of

Transportation (the “USDOT”). Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80

Stat. 931 (1966). The powers delegated to the USDOT

were “first granted to the ICC in the Motor Carrier Act

of 1935.” 89 Fed. Reg. 90608 (Nov. 18, 2024). The

regulations issued under this authority ultimately

became known as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Regulations (“FMCSRs”), codified at 49 Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR) §§ 350–99. Id. at 90609.

Moving forward, the Motor Carrier Safety Act of

1984 created the statute that is now codified at 49

U.S.C. § 31144—“safety fitness of owners and operators,”

which authorizes the USDOT to “establish a procedure

to determine the safety fitness of owners and operators

of commercial motor vehicles.” Pub. L. No. 98-554, 98

Stat. 2829; see 65 Fed. Reg. 50919 § 215(a) (Aug. 22,

2000). The Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 plainly

provides that the safety fitness standards promulgated thereunder preempt state law. The statute

explicitly encourages the USDOT, in issuing safety

regulations, to “consider . . . State laws and regulations

pertaining to commercial motor vehicle safety in order

to minimize unnecessary preemption of such State

laws and regulations under this Act.” Id. at § 206 (c)(2),

98 Stat. 2834.

In short, through a continuous line of legislation,

regulation, and case law dating back to even before

1935, the federal government has had the exclusive

legal authority to regulate motor carriers’ safety

fitness standards.

D. The Role of Brokers in the Motor

Carrier Industry.

Although brokers have existed since the 1920’s, they

largely played an understated role in motor carrier

transportation until the 1980’s. Jeffrey S. Kinsler,

Motor Freight Brokers: A Tale of Federal Regulatory

Pandemonium, 14 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 289, 298

(1993–1994).

When the MCA was enacted, a “broker” was defined

as “any person not included in the term ‘motor carrier’

and not a bona fide employee or agent of any such

carrier, who or which, as principal or agent, sells or

offers for sale any transportation subject to this part,

or negotiates for, or holds himself or itself out by

solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as one who

sells, provides, furnishes, contracts, or arranges for

such transportation.” Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub.

L. No. 74-255, § 203(a)(18), 49 Stat. 543, 545. Under

the MCA, brokers were required to obtain “brokerage

licenses” demonstrating that they are “fit, willing, and

able properly to perform the service proposed and to

conform to the provisions of this part and the requirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission

thereunder, and that the proposed service, to the

extent to be authorized by the license, is, or will be

consistent with the public interest and the policy

declared in section 202 (a) of this part; otherwise such

application shall be denied.” Id. at § 211(a), (b), 49

Stat. 554. The MCA prohibited brokers from dealing

with “any carrier by motor vehicle who or which is not

the lawful holder of an effective certificate or permit

issued as provided in this part.” Id. at § 211(a).

For several decades, the ICC viewed brokers “as

essentially nothing more than independent sales agents

of carriers’ services.” Dixie Midwest Express, Inc.,

Extension – General Commodities (Greensboro, AL),

132 M.C.C. 794, 814 (1982). Indeed, as of 1975, only

seventy (70) property broker licenses even existed. See

Kinsler, supra (citing Terrance A. Brown, Freight

Brokers and General Commodity Trucking, 24 Transp.

J. 4, 6 (1984).

However, brokers’ prominence greatly increased

after the ICC’s 1982 decision in Dixie Midwest Express,

Inc., Extension – General Commodities (Greensboro,

AL), which allowed a broker to contract with motor

carriers in the broker’s own name, rather than in the

name of its shipper customers. This development laid

the foundation for the pervasive role that brokers

enjoy in interstate transportation today, in which large

volumes of freight are arranged by brokers.

As the role of brokers in the marketplace has grown,

plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyers have increasingly

attempted to blur the line between brokerage and

motor carriage in order to impose motor carrier liability upon brokers. However, federal law has always

drawn a sharp distinction between the two roles.

Crucially, brokers and motor carriers are creatures

of federal law and, therefore, federal law—rather

than state law—defines their respective, mutually

exclusive roles. As explained above, federal law

defines a broker as a person “other than a motor

carrier” that arranges for transportation by motor

carrier for compensation.

49 U.S.C. § 13102(2)

(emphasis added). 49 U.S.C. § 13904, which currently

establishes the requirements for a person to operate

as a broker, expressly prohibits a broker from

operating as a motor carrier without first obtaining a

motor carrier’s license. 49 U.S.C. § 13904(d)(1). (“A

broker for transportation may not provide transportation as a motor carrier unless the broker has

registered separately under this chapter to provide

transportation as a motor carrier.”). Similarly, federal

law also bars a motor carrier from operating as a

broker without first obtaining a broker’s license. 49

U.S.C. § 13902(a)(6) (“A motor carrier may not broker

transportation services unless the motor carrier has

registered as a broker under this chapter.”). Federal

regulations further drive home the distinct roles of

brokers and motor carriers. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R.

§ 371.7(b) (“A broker shall not, directly or indirectly,

represent its operations to be that of a carrier.”).

The federal government takes these distinctions

seriously. In fact, a person or company who purports

to provide the federally regulated services of a broker

without a federal license is subject to a private, federal

cause of action as well as a $10,000 civil penalty for

each violation. 49 U.S.C. § 14916(c). This exposure

even extends to the individual officers, directors, and

principals of a company unlawfully engaged in brokerage. 49 U.S.C. § 14916(d). In short, brokers and motor

carriers perform entirely separate, independently

licensed functions and therefore have disparate duties

and responsibilities. Brokers arrange for transportation; motor carriers provide transportation.

The fundamental distinction between the role of a

motor carrier and the role of a broker is plainly

illustrated by the very different financial responsibility requirements established by the federal government

for each of them. Federal law requires motor carriers

to maintain at least $750,000 in auto liability

insurance in order to pay any final judgment that may

be taken against the motor carrier for bodily injury to,

or death of, an individual resulting from the negligent

operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, or

for loss or damage to property, or both. See 49 U.S.C.

§ 13906(a)(1); 49 C.F.R. § 387.9. In contrast, the only

financial responsibility requirement imposed upon a

broker is to post a surety bond in the amount of

$75,000 (or to deposit that amount in trust), which

serves as security for payment of motor carrier freight

charges that the broker agreed to pay pursuant to

contract.

See 49 U.S.C. § 13906(b)(1); 49 C.F.R.

§ 387.307(a). Federal law does not require brokers to

maintain any form of insurance, let alone liability

insurance to protect against bodily injury or death. Id.

The reason for these distinct financial responsibility

requirements is evident: brokers are not responsible

for personal injuries caused by the motor carriers they

retain. Indeed, in 1987, the ICC itself recognized that

brokers are not liable for personal injury claims when

it issued its decision in Property Broker Security for the

Protection of the Public:

The operations and risks associated with the

property brokerage business are quite different

from those associated with motor carriage.

Brokers do not operate vehicles nor do they

transport or otherwise handle cargo under

their ICC licenses. Thus the broker is not

exposed to bodily injury, property damage, or

cargo loss or damage liability. The brokerage

business does not require a large investment

in vehicles, terminals, and personnel. Basically,

brokers arrange (contract) for the transportation of property by authorized motor carriers.

They often receive money from a shipper, from

which they must pay the motor carrier for

providing the transportation.

3 I.C.C.2d 916, 918, 1987 WL 97298, at *2 (July 10,

1987) (emphasis added). The ICC’s decision the

following year reiterated that brokers are not liable for

personal injuries arising out of truck accidents. 4

I.C.C. 2d 358, 366, 1988 WL 225581, at *7 (Mar. 14,

1988) (“there is no need, nor do we deem it appropriate

or workable, to implement a self-insurance program

for brokers similar to that in place for motor carriers.”).

Congress is necessarily aware of these administrative decisions and has never legislatively overruled

them. Indeed, Congress enacted the Moving Ahead to

Progress in the 21st Century Act (“MAP-21”) Pub. L.

No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 in 2012 and, in the course

of doing so, reviewed and increased the financial

responsibility requirements for brokers. Congress presumably would have imposed an auto liability insurance

requirement upon brokers in MAP-21 if it intended

brokers to be liable for negligently selecting motor

carriers involved in highway accidents. It did not do so.

In sum, federal law has long drawn a sharp

distinction between brokers and motor carriers based

on their respective federal licenses and qualitatively

different roles in the interstate transportation market.

As further explained below, the FAAAA was crafted

with these longstanding distinctions in mind. The

Court should reject Petitioners’ invitation to blur the

same.

E. Deregulation of the Motor Carrier

Industry and the FAAAA.

In 1978, Congress largely deregulated the domestic

airline industry by enacting the Airline Deregulation

Act of 1978 (ADA). Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.

Two years later, Congress extended deregulation to

the trucking industry by enacting the Motor Carrier

Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793. See Dan’s

City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 256 (2013).

In 1994, “Congress completed the deregulation . . . by

expressly preempting state trucking regulation.” Dan’s

City, 569 U.S. at 256. Section 601(c), 108 Stat. 1606 of

the FAAAA, which is now codified at 49 U.S.C. §

14501(c), closely “tracks the ADA’s air-carrier

preemption provision.” Id. at 261.

Indeed, in 1994, Congress enacted the FAAAA to

prevent states from regulating certain aspects of

intrastate and interstate transportation provided by

motor carriers. Pub. L. No. 103-305, § 601, 108 Stat.

1569, 1605 (1994), 49 U.S.C. § 14501; see Ye v.

GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453, 457 (7th Cir.

2023) (Congress passed the FAAAA “as part of a

greater push to deregulate interstate transportation

industries.”).

Stability in trucking was among Congress’s key

aims in enacting the FAAAA, given the finding that

state laws presented problems for motor carriers

“attempting to conduct a standard way of doing

business.” City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker

Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440 (2002). Trucking and

brokerage needed help. And Congress provided as

much in the FAAAA by preempting certain state laws.

Congress did so because it “believed deregulation

would address the inefficiencies, lack of innovation,

and lack of competition caused by non-uniform state

regulations of motor carriers.” California Trucking

Ass’n v. Su, 903 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2018).

Congress expressly found that varying state regulations and laws addressing the transportation of goods

had “imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate

commerce,” “impeded the free flow of trade, traffic, and

transportation of interstate commerce,” and “placed an

unreasonable cost on the American consumers.” Pub.

L. No. 103-305, § 601(a)(1)(A)-(C), 108 Stat. 1569, 1605.

“Congress’ overarching goal” was to “help[] assure

transportation rates, routes, and services . . . reflect

‘maximum reliance on competitive market forces,’

thereby stimulating ‘efficiency, innovation, and low

prices,’ as well as ‘variety’ and ‘quality,’” Rowe v. New

Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 371

(2008) (citation omitted), and to avoid “a patchwork of

state service-determining laws, rules and regulations”

that would be “inconsistent with Congress’ major legislative effort to leave such decisions, where federally

unregulated, to the competitive marketplace.” Id. at

373 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). To address

these issues, Congress found that “certain aspects of

the State regulatory process should be preempted.”

Pub. L. No. 103-305, § 601(a)(2), 108 Stat. 1569, 1605.

Then, on December 29, 1995, the U.S. Congress enacted

the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination

Act (ICCTA), effective January 1, 1996. Pub. L. No.

104-88, 109 Stat. 803, 804. ICCTA expanded federal

preemption under the FAAAA to extend federal

preemption to brokers specifically. H.R. Rep. No. 104311, at 119–20 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.

793, 831-32.

Accordingly, § 14501(c) currently provides that a state:

. . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,

or other provision having the force and effect

of law related to a price, route, or service of

any motor carrier . . . or any motor private

carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with

respect to the transportation of property.

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Congress also enacted several

exceptions to that preemption provision. See 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2)–(4). Relevant here, Congress included a

savings statute that provides that the preemption

created under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) “shall not restrict

the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect

to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

This savings clause merely preserves the authority

of the states to regulate the safety of motor carriers to

the extent that the states were permitted to do so before

the FAAAA. While personal injury tort claims against

motor carriers are manifestly preserved by the FAAAA

(since motor carriers operate motor vehicles), personal

injury tort claims against brokers who select motor

carriers are not preserved because (1) no such legally

sound claims against federally-licensed brokers existed

before the enactment of the FAAAA (and Petitioner

cites none) and (2) to allow a judge or jury to dictate

which motor carriers a broker may or may not use is

the equivalent of allowing a judge or jury to determine

which interstate motor carriers should be allowed to

operate on the public roads. As described above, that

function is the exclusive province of the USDOT.

F. The USDOT’s Current Role in Regulating the Safety of Motor Carriers.

Today, consistent with all of the above, the USDOT,

through the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

(“FMCSA”), has promulgated safety standards, including:

extensive regulations governing motor carrier routing,

49 C.F.R. § 356; rules regarding applications for

operating authority, id. § 365; standards for registration with states, id. § 367; passenger carrier regulations,

id. Part 374; training requirements, id. § 380; commercial

driver’s license standards, id. § 383; safety fitness

procedures, id. § 385; federal motor carrier safety

regulations, id. § 390; qualifications of drivers and

longer combination vehicle driver instructors, id.

§ 391; driving of commercial motor vehicles, id. § 392;

parts and accessories necessary for safe operation, id.

§ 393; transportation of hazardous materials, id. § 397;

and employee safety and health standards, id. § 398.

These comprehensive safety regulations and rules

govern motor carriers, the parties tasked with acting

safely on the country’s roadways. A motor carrier is

subject to stringent safety laws and regulations because

it is the party actually operating motor vehicles.

Indeed, a company may not provide transportation on

the public roads as a motor carrier unless it first

obtains a registration from the federal government. 49

U.S.C. § 13901. That registration is only available if

the applicant demonstrates to the federal government

that the applicant is able to comply with, among other

things, safety regulations imposed by the federal

government, the safety fitness requirements established

by the federal government, and the minimum financial

responsibility requirements imposed by the federal

government. 49 U.S.C. § 13902.

To that end, the federal government administers a

“New Entrant Safety Assurance Program” that closely

monitors new motor carriers through inspection to

ensure that the new entrant has basic safety management controls that are operating effectively; the

federal government also conducts a safety audit of new

entrants. 49 C.F.R. § 385.1.

For instance, motor

carriers that cannot meet FMCSA safety requirements

receive an “unsatisfactory” safety rating and may not

operate. 49 C.F.R. § 385.13. In other words, the federal

government screens motor carriers for their safety,

and those carriers operating today have met federal

safety regulatory requirements to the extent necessary

to have the right to operate on the public roads.

In furtherance of its safety mission, the FMCSA has

also developed a Safety Management System (“SMS”),

which FMCSA uses to prioritize safety enforcement

against motor carriers. However, the FMCSA is clear

that the public (including brokers) should not draw

conclusions about a carrier’s competence to transport

goods based on data in the SMS:

The

symbol is not intended to imply any

federal safety rating of the carrier pursuant

to 49 USC 31144. Readers should not draw

conclusions about a carrier's overall safety

condition simply based on the data displayed

in this system. Unless a motor carrier in the

SMS has received an UNSATISFACTORY

safety rating pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or

has otherwise been ordered to discontinue

operations by the FMCSA, it is authorized to

operate on the nation’s roadways.

See SMS: Safety Management System, Fed. Motor

Carrier Safety Admin., https://ai. fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS/

Home/SMStoCrash.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2026).

In other words, no broker (or member of the public)

should be deemed negligent for using a motor carrier

that the federal government has authorized to operate

on the nation’s highways.

II. The Practical Dilemma: What’s a Broker to

Do?

Brokers are essential to ensuring that the domestic

transportation industry and supply chain runs smoothly.

Brokers, however, cannot evaluate whether or not a

motor carrier is “safe enough” more effectively than

the federal government itself.

No valid way exists for a broker to compare and

contrast motor carrier safety records in any consistent

and meaningful way in order to yield uniform outcomes

necessary for efficient interstate commerce. Even

given identical facts, judges and juries across the

nation’s myriad state and federal jurisdictions would

inevitably reach contrary and conflicting conclusions

as to the adequacy of a broker’s choice of federallyauthorized motor carrier. See Geier v. American Honda

Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000) (“[T]he rules

of law that judges and juries create or apply in such

suits may themselves similarly create uncertainty and

even conflict, say, when different juries in different

States reach different decisions on similar facts.”).

This is the very dilemma that Congress intended to

eliminate in the FAAAA.

Consider the following practical problems:

• Hiring Drivers. Plaintiffs often allege that a

broker should have evaluated a motor carrier’s

driver hiring practices. However, the motor

carrier—rather than the broker—hires a motor

carrier’s drivers. Even if a broker wanted to

second-guess a motor carrier’s decision to hire a

particular driver, a broker does not have the

tools to do so. For instance, while motor carriers

must check the federal Drug and Alcohol

Clearinghouse in order to identify any prior

violations of drug and alcohol prohibitions and

the status of return-to-duty compliance, a

broker cannot even access the clearinghouse

since it does not employ drivers. And, of course,

a broker has no visibility to the other confidential information that the motor carrier may

learn during the interview and pre-employment

screening process. In fact, motor carriers are

prohibited by federal regulations from disclosing such information since such information may

only be used in deciding whether to hire the driver,

and the motor carrier “must take all precautions

reasonably necessary to protect the records from

disclosure to any person not directly involved

in the decision whether to hire the driver.” 49

C.F.R. § 391.23(k). Further, little imagination is

required to understand how impractical it

would be for a small broker employing a handful

of employees to begin evaluating the hiring

practices of tens of thousands of motor carriers

across the country and to reach sound decisions

as to whether the motor carrier has “safe

enough” hiring practices. This challenge is

made exponentially more difficult when

considering that judges and juries throughout

the nation will each view such practices in the

light of a given state’s tort law. How would a

broker ever meet such a burden? No one knows.

• Driver Training. Likewise, plaintiffs’ attorneys

often argue that brokers should have evaluated

a motor carrier’s driver training program. First,

any driver holding a commercial driver’s license

has, by definition, already been trained. Second,

if a motor carrier does provide overviews or

updates of safety rules, a broker would have to

collect all of that information (i.e., the motor

carrier’s curriculum, bulletins, announcements,

etc.) and somehow make a judgment that the

“training” was adequate enough to justify using

the motor carrier. Again, how would a broker do

so, and how often would such an evaluation

need to occur before a broker would be deemed

reasonable for tendering a load to the motor

carrier? No one knows.

• Driver Performance. Even when willing to

concede that a motor carrier’s initial hiring and

training is adequate, plaintiffs’ attorneys

nevertheless frequently allege that a broker

should have known that a given driver

developed a record of substandard performance

and should have been terminated. However, a

broker is not privy to the citations received by a

given driver, a driver’s hours-of-service logs, the

driver’s health status, or any other host of other

data points that a motor carrier might take

into consideration when deciding to keep a

driver in its workforce. A small broker cannot

be expected to ask a motor carrier to share all of

this private information with the broker (so that

the broker can independently evaluate the

driver’s competence) before the motor carrier

assigns a driver to haul a given load.

How would the broker’s carrier procurement

representative—a person who does not in fact

hire drivers—ever be able to evaluate the data

provided by the motor carrier (if it was ever

provided), and to do so in a way that ensures

that the broker is not deemed negligent in any

jurisdiction in the nation? No one knows.

• Equipment Maintenance. Similarly, plaintiffs’

personal injury lawyers often lament that a

broker should have evaluated the motor carrier’s

equipment or equipment maintenance program.

In other words, the broker would presumably be

expected to ask for and receive photographs of

the equipment being used to haul the load to

make sure that, for instance, conspicuous

reflective tape appears where dictated by

federal law. Likewise, the broker would have to

request and review all maintenance records for

the motor carrier’s equipment, including confirmation of the fact that the equipment in

question underwent its annual periodic inspection.

Even if this information could be readily

provided by a motor carrier (a challenge in and

of itself), how would a brokerage employee

possibly be qualified to make subjective judgments about the quality of a motor carrier’s

equipment maintenance program and its own

internal compliance with the same? No one

knows.

• Foreign Motor Carriers. All of the foregoing

practical challenges are compounded when a

broker uses a foreign motor carrier that is

licensed to perform long-haul transportation in

the United States. For instance, in order for a

Mexican motor carrier to operate in the United

States, the FMCSA must first conduct a “PreAuthorization Safety Audit” (“PASA”) whereby

the federal government confirms that the motor

carrier has safety management systems in place

to comply with the FMCSRs. The PASA is a

comprehensive evaluation of the carrier’s safety

inspection, maintenance, and repair facilities or

management systems, a determination of

whether the carrier’s drug and alcohol testing

in Mexico is consistent with United States

standards, verification of drivers’ qualifications,

including confirmation of the validity of the

“Licencia Federal de Conductor” or commercial

driver’s license of each driver that the carrier

will use, and the like. See 9.2.3 The PreAuthorization Safety Audit (PASA) Process, Fed.

Motor Carrier Safety Admin., https://csa.fmcsa.

dot.gov/safetyplanner/MyFiles/SubSections.asp

x?ch=26&sec=90&sub=202 (last visited Jan. 15,

2026) (describing the PASA process). Is a

broker required to have staff members fluent in

Spanish, familiar with Mexican governmental

credentials, and otherwise knowledgeable about

comparative employment regulations in the

United States and Mexico so that it can

determine, for instance, if the Mexican motor

carrier’s driver workforce is properly licensed?

What must a broker do to determine whether a

Mexican motor carrier is truly “safe enough” to

use after it has passed its PASA and is

otherwise authorized to operate in the United

States? No one knows.

All of these examples illustrate that brokers do not

have the ability to assess objectively the relative safety

of different carriers. Brokers cannot pry into and

evaluate all the minute operational details regarding

a specific motor carrier. Requiring brokers to conceive

somehow of every potential operational factor that

could possibly implicate negligence under a given

state’s tort law would require brokers to be omniscient.

Even if it was legally possible for brokers to

“outsmart” the FMCSA’s decision to license an

interstate motor carrier as safe, many brokers

(including the vast majority of TIA’s own members) are

small businesses without the resources or ability to do

so. It would be near impossible for small brokers to

impose safety demands—what driver to hire, what

equipment to use, and more—upon larger motor carriers

who are already required to operate safely under law.

For example, consider the impracticality of a small

broker in Illinois that employs three persons telling

UPS, FedEx, or any of the nation’s other large motor

carriers in the United States that the broker cannot

tender a load until the motor carrier changes the way

that it operates. The largest motor carriers in the

United States are publicly-traded, multibillion dollar

enterprises with many thousands of employees and

highly sophisticated operations. A small broker

cannot realistically be expected to instruct such motor

carriers regarding how they should be maintaining

equipment, managing their workforces, or otherwise

administering best safety practices at their companies.

Moreover, it strains credulity to think that such

carriers would modify their enterprise-wide practices

to accommodate a small broker that professes to have

a concern about that motor carrier’s national approach

to safety management. In other words, imposing

liability on brokers does not advance Petitioner’s

apparent goal of enhancing safety among motor

carriers. Petitioner’s expectations are wholly unrealistic.

To allow these lawsuits against brokers to fester will

eventually grind freight shipping to a halt. See

Volkova v. C.H. Robinson Co., No. 16 C 1883, 2018 WL

741441, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2018); Ye v. Global

Sunrise, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-01961, 2020 WL 1042047, at

*3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2020) (“to avoid liability for a

negligent hiring claim like plaintiff ’s, brokers would

need to examine each prospective motor carrier’s

safety history and determine whether any prior issues

or violations would be permissible under the common

law of one or more states.”). “Enforcing such a claim

would have a significant economic impact on . . . broker

services.” Ye, 2020 WL 1042047, at *3; see also Lee v.

Golf Transp., Inc., No. 3:21-CV-01948, 2023 WL

7329523, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2023) (“Application of

the negligence law would require [brokers] to perform

additional services such as hiring, retaining, and

supervising a qualified driver in driving a commercial

motor vehicle, which would in turn subject [brokers] to

a patchwork of laws throughout the country; impose

compliance with new regulations; carry a substantial

financial consequence; and expose brokers to additional

liability.”). That approach, courts have recognized,

would “hinder the objectives of the FAAAA.” Lee, 2023

WL 7329523, at *13.

Moreover, whatever standard of care a broker might

apply, a plaintiff will inevitably assert that the

standard was too low and that the broker should have

done more. As one court has emphasized, “it appears

there is no single national standard of care.” Ortiz v.

Ben Strong Trucking, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 3d 567, 586 (D.

Md. 2022). Indeed, plaintiffs across the country have

tried to capitalize on this very point by, with increasing

frequency, naming brokers as a matter of course in

nearly every truck accident case where a shipper used

a broker. Such cases should be properly brought only

against motor carriers. The cost of a broker’s defense

alone imposes extraordinary burdens on the brokerage

industry.

And, at the very least, imposing upon brokers the

duty to evaluate which of the nearly 750,000 federallylicensed interstate motor carriers should in fact be

allowed to operate in any particular state would cause

brokers to select only the largest and longest-tenured

motor carriers, undermining the FAAAA’s deregulatory goal and destroying hundreds of thousands of

small trucking companies that are the lifeblood of the

modern domestic supply chain.2 It would similarly

chill new applicants from entering the motor carrier

industry in the first place (since no one would use them

for fear of liability). Alternatively, expecting brokers

to evaluate the safety of federally licensed motor

carriers even more effectively than the FMCSA would

destroy tens of thousands of small brokerages. Those

brokers are in no position to develop and deploy

procedures, technologies, and other tools that mimic—

let alone surpass—the extensive safety regulatory

resources already deployed by the FMCSA in determining whether to license an interstate motor carrier

in the first place or whether to allow that motor carrier

to continue to operate as an interstate motor carrier.

In sum, brokers have no practical ability to assess

the comparative safety of federally-licensed motor

carriers when tendering loads to them. It is

impossible to evaluate motor carriers in the way that

plaintiffs’ attorneys suggest. Moreover, imposing a

fluid standard that turns on the idiosyncratic determinations of a particular judge or jury on any given

day in any given jurisdiction creates a substantial

burden on interstate freight transportation, which is

precisely what Congress intended to guard against by

enacting the FAAAA.

Of note, approximately 91.5% of motor carriers registered

with the FMCSA operate only ten (10) trucks or less. Economics

and Industry Data, American Trucking Associations, www.truck

ing.org/economics-and-industry-data (last visited January 10,

2026).

For those reasons, the Court should reject plaintiff ’s

argument and end the plague of private tort lawsuits

against brokers.

III. The Text and Structure of the Savings

Statute Demonstrate that it Does Not

Preserve Claims Against Brokers.

In addition to the overarching historical context and

the practical impediments identified above, the text

and structure of the savings statute in question leave

little room for doubt: it does not save claims against

brokers from preemption. Respondents and others

ably address these legal arguments, and TIA urges the

Court to adopt the rigorous textual analyses provided

by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.

In Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., a surviving

spouse asserted a claim against a broker for negligent

hiring of a motor carrier whose driver allegedly caused

a fatal accident. 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023). The

Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the

plaintiff ’s negligent hiring claim against the broker,

holding that enforcing negligent hiring claims against

brokers are expressly preempted by § 14501(c)(1). Id.

at 460 (“Ye’s claim strikes at the core of GlobalTranz’s

broker services by challenging the adequacy of care

the company took—or failed to take—in hiring Global

Sunrise to provide shipping services.”). The Ye court

considered whether the clause in question saved the

negligent hiring claim from preemption. The court

analyzed the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” in

the savings statute and properly determined that that

language “massively limits the scope” of the clause

based on this Court’s own precedent. Id. (citing Dan’s

City, 569 U.S. at 261). Congress also “massively

limit[ed] the scope” of the savings statute by employing the statutorily-defined term “motor vehicle.” Id.

By limiting the clause to state laws “with respect to

motor vehicles,” Congress “narrowed the scope of the

exception” to laws concerning a “vehicle, machine,

tractor, or semitrailer . . . used on a highway in

transportation.” Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16)). The

Seventh Circuit concluded that a negligent hiring

claim is not one “with respect to motor vehicles”

because “the exception requires a direct link between

a state’s law and motor vehicle safety.” Id. (“We see

no mention of brokers in the safety exception itself or

in Congress’s definition of motor vehicles, which

suggests that such claims may be outside the scope of

the exception’s plain text.”).

In Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar

Ranger, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit considered the

application of the savings statute to a claim for

negligent hiring against a broker arising out of a cargo

theft. 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023). The Aspen court

held that the clause did not apply because the

plaintiff ’s claim was not one “with respect to motor

vehicles.” Id. at 1270. Like the court in Ye, the Aspen

court held that that statutory phrase significantly

limits “the scope of the safety exception that follows.”

Id. at 1271. The Aspen court held that “if an indirect

connection between a state law and a motor vehicle

satisfied the safety exception, then the phrase ‘with

respect to motor vehicles’ would have no meaningful

operative effect.” Id. The Court concluded that “a

mere indirect connection between state regulations

and motor vehicles will not invoke the FAAAA’s safety

exception.” Id. at 1272 (“But we believe an indirect

connection is all that exists between Aspen’s brokernegligence claims and motor vehicles.”).

These well-reasoned decisions relied upon not only

the plain text of the statute but the structure of the

statute, legislative history, and public policy considerations in reaching their conclusions. For instance, these

courts recognize that the phrases “related to” and

“with respect to” are both used in the statute and,

therefore, cannot be synonymous. This Court has

recognized that, as a general rule, that Congress’s use

of “certain language in one part of the statute and

different language in another” indicates that “different

meanings were intended.” Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain,

542 U.S. 692, 711, n. 9 (2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Here, the phrase “related to” in

§ 14501(c)(1) broadly encompasses even indirect

connections, whereas “with respect to” in the motor

vehicle safety exception requires a direct connection.

Similarly, as the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits held,

any connection between brokers and motor vehicles is

indirect at best (since brokers do not own or operate

motor vehicles and do not employ drivers), so the

motor vehicle clause does not apply here. Further,

Congress omitted any comparable motor vehicle savings

clause for intrastate shipments when addressing

brokers but not motor carriers. § 14501(b). Congress

surely did not preserve more state regulation of

brokers in the context of interstate shipments than in

intrastate shipments. To the contrary, the balance of §

14501 applies the motor vehicle savings statute to

motor carriers, but not brokers.

In sum, the text of the FAAAA demonstrates

Congress’ intent: the scope of preemption is intentionally

broad, and the savings clause in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)

does not save negligence claims against brokers.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for all the reasons

set forth in Respondents’ brief, Amicus Curiae

Transportation Intermediaries Association, Inc.,

respectfully urges this Court to affirm the holding of

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

MARC S. BLUBAUGH

Counsel of Record

NICHOLAS P. LACEY

BENESCH FRIEDLANDER COPLAN

& ARONOFF LLP

41 South High Street

Suite 2600

Columbus, OH 43215-6164

(614) 223-9300

mblubaugh@beneschlaw.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae The

Transportation Intermediaries

Association, Inc.

January 21, 2026

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