Amicus Curiae Brief — Shawn Montgomery, Petitioner v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al.

No. 24-1238

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

SHAWN MONTGOMERY,

Petitioner,

v.

CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF OF THE TRUCK SAFETY COALITION,

PARENTS AGAINST TIRED TRUCKERS, AND

CITIZENS FOR RELIABLE AND SAFE

HIGHWAYS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF PETITIONER

Jeffrey Burns

DOLLAR, BURNS, BECKER

& HERSHEWE LC

1100 Main St.

Suite 2600

Kansas City, MO 64105

(816) 876-2600

jeffb@dollar-law.com

Hyland Hunt

Counsel of Record

Ruthanne Deutsch

DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC

300 New Jersey Ave. NW

Suite 300

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 868-6915

hhunt@deutschhunt.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT .........................................................3

ARGUMENT ...............................................................7

I.

Broker Decisions about Carrier Hiring Are

Integral to Safe Trucking. ....................................7

A. Brokers play a large and expanding role

in the trucking industry. ................................7

B. Broker hiring decisions are at the heart

of motor vehicle safety. ..................................9

II. Longstanding State Common Law Duties

Are the Only Meaningful Mechanism

Governing Brokers’ Key Role in Motor

Vehicle Safety. ....................................................19

A. Congress did not disturb the pre-existing

common law regime under which States

regulate motor vehicle safety by

imposing duties of care on brokers. .............19

B. The alternative to state regulation would

be no regulation, which would degrade

motor vehicle safety. ....................................24

C. Excluding brokers from the safety

exception risks eviscerating state safety

regulatory authority for motor carriers,

too..................................................................26

CONCLUSION ..........................................................30

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Basic Energy Servs., L.P. v. Petroleum Res. Mgmt.,

343 P.3d 783 (Wyo. 2015).......................................21

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,

569 U.S. 251 (2013) ................................................19

Dixon v. Stone Truck Line, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-000945,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226414

(D.N.M. Nov. 23, 2021) ..........................................27

Fuelling v. S&J Logistics LLC, No. 7:22-cv-00905,

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207892

(D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2024) ............................................29

Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,

529 U.S. 861 (2000) ................................................24

Jones v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,

558 F. Supp. 2d 630 (W.D. Va. 2008) ....................21

Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp.,

565 U.S. 625 (2012) ...............................................22

Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide,

976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020) ................................18

Miller v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,

No. 3:17-cv-00408, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30504

(D. Nev. Feb. 22, 2022)...........................................18

Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc.,

78 S.W.3d 28, 39 (Tex. App. 2002) .........................27

iii

Soto v. Shealey, 331 F. Supp. 3d 879

(D. Minn. 2018) ......................................................21

Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller

Freight Sys., Inc., 423 U.S. 28 (1975) ....................28

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) .......................24

Statutes

49 U.S.C.

§ 13102 ......................................................................7

§ 13902 ......................................................................9

§ 14102 ....................................................................28

§ 14501 ........................................ 6, 19, 20, 22, 23, 29

§ 31136 ..........................................................6, 19, 24

Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act,

Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015) ......16, 17

Regulations

49 C.F.R.

§ 385.3 ...............................................................12, 13

§ 385.9 .....................................................................12

§ 385.11 ...................................................................12

§ 385.13 ...................................................................12

§ 385.1005 ...............................................................16

§ 390.5 .....................................................................28

iv

Enhanced Carrier Safety Measurement System

(SMS), 89 Fed. Reg. 91874 (Nov. 20, 2024) ..........14

Revised Carrier Safety Measurement System, 88

Fed. Reg. 9954 (Feb. 15, 2023)...............................15

Safety Fitness Determinations, 88 Fed. Reg. 59489

(Aug. 29, 2023) .................................................12, 13

Other Authorities

Am. Transp. Res. Inst., Predicting Truck Crash

Involvement: 2022 Update (2022) .............. 11, 14, 15

Boehne v. C.H. Robinson, No. 3:23-cv-00158,

Compl., Dkt. No. 1 (S.D. Ohio).................................3

Dave Bozeman, President & Chief Exec. Officer,

C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 2024 Investor Day

Presentation (Dec. 12, 2024) ....................................8

Carrier411 Overview: Qualify Carriers &

Automatically Monitor Changes, Carrier411 ........17

Carrier Vetting: 7 Ways Brokers Can Verify Quality

Carriers, truckstop.com (Aug. 12, 2021) ...............23

Coping, Truck Safety Coalition ................................10

Thomas M. Corsi, Broker/Third Party Logistics

Provider and Shipper Responsibility, in Motor

Carrier Selection, in Transportation Policy &

Economic Regulation

(John D. Bitzan & James H. Peoples eds., 2018) ....7

Everything Carriers & Brokers Need to Know About

CSA Scores, truckstop.com (Aug. 27, 2025) .........17

v

FMCSA, 2024 Pocket Guide to Large Truck and Bus

Statistics (2025) .................................. 4, 7, 10, 12, 19

FMCSA, Prioritization: Approved Changes to the

SMS Methodology (Dec. 2024) ...............................14

FMCSA, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

Crash Cost Methodology Report (2024) ...................11

The Freight Industry by the FMCSA Data: 2024 in

Review, Carrier Details ............................................4

Fuelling v. Pratt Indus., Inc., No. 7:22-cv-00905,

Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 27 (D.S.C.) .........................29

Craig Fuller, Freight Recession Unlike any Other in

History, FreightWaves (Oct. 15, 2023) ............7, 8, 9

Get Operating Authority (Docket Number), FMCSA

(Oct. 16, 2025) ..........................................................9

Tom Gresham, 2025 Inbound Logistics Perspectives:

3PL Market Research Report, Inbound Logistics

(July 2025) ................................................................8

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law

(1881) ......................................................................21

How to Avoid “Chameleon” Carriers and Other

Scammers, DAT Freight & Analytics

(Aug. 13, 2012) ......................................................17

Andrew Johnson, Unlocking Success: The Key

Elements of Carrier Vetting and Managing

Liability, TIA (Aug. 1, 2024) ..................................22

vi

Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Motor Freight Brokers: A Tale of

Federal Regulatory Pandemonium, 14 Nw. J. Int’l

L. & Bus. 289 (1993) ................................................7

Craig D. Lack et al., Insights into Motor Carrier

Crashes: A Preliminary Investigation of FMCSA

Inspection Violations, 156 Accident Analysis &

Prevention, Article 106105 (2021) ............. 11, 12, 15

Michael Jay Leizerman & Rena Leizerman,

Litigating Truck Accident Cases (2025) ..........27, 28

Noi Mahoney, ELD Loopholes Fueling Fraud,

Driving Good Carriers Out of Business,

Experts Warn, FreightWaves (Nov. 12, 2025) .......25

Joe McDevitt, News and Analysis for Transportation

Industry Shippers, TLI (July 30, 2024) .................27

Erick Mumm, How Do Freight Brokers Grow and

Maintain a Reliable Carrier Network?, ATS ...........9

Nat’l Freight Advisory Comm., Recommendations to

U.S. Dep’t of Transp. for the Dev. of the

Nat’l Freight Strategic Plan (2014) .................25, 28

New Entrant Safety Assurance Program,

FMCSA .............................................................13, 15

North America Truckload Services that Strengthen

Your Supply Chain, C.H. Robinson .......................23

Our Stories: Jim “Big Jim” Fuelling, Truck Safety

Coalition ..................................................................29

Pre-Employment Screening Program, FMCSA ........13

Restatement (First) of Torts § 411 (1934) ................20

vii

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 (1965) ......20, 21

Roadside Inspection Activity, FMCSA

(Oct. 31, 2025) ........................................................14

C.H. Robinson, Key Factors in Motor Carrier

Selection: Balanced Risk Assessment

(2013) ............................................................8, 23, 25

SAFER – Company Snapshot, U.S. Dep’t of Transp.

(May 23, 2024) ........................................................16

Wonmongo Lacina Soro et al., The Relationships

between Financial Performance and Driver

Compensation and Safety Outcomes in the

Trucking Industry: A Systematic Review, 45

Transp. Revs. 239 (2025) .......................................26

SMS Help Center: Using the SMS Website,

FMCSA ...................................................................16

Summary of Closed Enforcement Cases, FMCSA

(Oct. 31, 2025) ........................................................19

TIA, Carrier Selection Framework (2023) ................22

Vehicle Inspection File, U.S. Dep’t of Transp.

(Dec. 2, 2025) ..........................................................16

John A. Volpe, FMCSA, Addendum: SMS

Effectiveness (ET) Update (2018) ..........................15

John A. Volpe, FMCSA, The Carrier Safety

Measurement System (CSMS) Effectiveness Test by

Behavior Analysis and Safety Improvement

Categories (BASICs) (2014) .......................13, 14, 15

viii

U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Large Truck and Bus Crash

Facts 2022 (2025) ..............................................9, 10

U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Privacy Impact Assessment

(2014) ......................................................................13

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO 12-364,

Motor Carrier Safety: New Applicant Reviews

Should Expand to Identify Freight Carriers

Evading Detection (2012) .................................15, 16

Why Does a Motor Carrier Open a Freight

Brokerage?, Freight360 (Dec. 8, 2023) ..................27

Adam Wingfield, Are Some Brokers Willingly Using

Known Non-Domiciled Drivers to Save Margins?,

FreightWaves (Oct. 27, 2025) ................................18

Xiaoyu Zhu & Sivaramakrishnan Srinivasan,

A Comprehensive Analysis of Factors Influencing

the Injury Severity of Large-Truck Crashes,

43 Accident Analysis & Prevention 49 (2011) .......10

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici

are

organizations

dedicated

to

understanding and preventing the truck crashes that

kill and injure far too many people each year, and to

helping the victims and their families deal with the

pain and trauma inflicted by these tragedies.

The Truck Safety Coalition (TSC) is a national

network of victim and survivor volunteers dedicated

to providing compassionate, immediate support to

truck crash victims and their families. Members of

TSC have been fighting for improved motor vehicle

safety on our nation’s highways for more than 35

years. The TSC provides information and resources to

people affected by truck crashes in their time of

greatest need. Besides offering support and peer-topeer community from those who have experienced the

trauma of truck crashes firsthand, the TSC advocates

for effective laws and regulations to improve motor

vehicle safety for all, including truck drivers and their

loved ones.

Parents Against Tired Truckers (P.A.T.T.) was

formed in 1994 by bereaved victims after a truck

driver fell asleep at the wheel of his 80,000-pound rig,

killing four innocent teenagers and seriously injuring

a fifth. It has evolved into a national nonprofit that

focuses primarily on addressing truck driver fatigue,

with the founder of P.A.T.T. awarded the White

House’s “Champion of Change Award” for

1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no person or entity other than amici curiae, their

members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution

intended to fund the brief’s preparation or submission.

(1)

2

instrumental work in bringing attention to the urgent

need for change in truck safety policy. P.A.T.T.

advocates for changes that ensure that motor vehicle

safety is a top priority for all involved in the trucking

industry, including hours-of-service rules, pay

policies that ensure drivers are paid for all hours

worked, and the establishment of sufficient, safe rest

areas.

Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways

(CRASH) is a nationwide, non-profit organization

that was formed in 1990 to help mitigate the

devastating problem of truck crashes. CRASH is

dedicated to improving truck safety in the United

States. Its members include truck drivers, other

motorists, crash survivors, families of truck crash

victims, emergency care workers, academic

researchers,

law

enforcement,

and

crash

reconstruction specialists. CRASH works at all levels

of government to advocate for motor vehicle safety

legislation and regulation related to trucking,

regarding truck size and weight, truck driver fatigue,

and truck driver training, among many other issues.

Propelled in many cases by personal grief and

loss, amici and their members have a deep and

abiding interest in improving truck safety. They have

no stake here but their desire to reduce the risk that

other families will suffer the tragedies that they have

suffered. For many, this objective has become a

central purpose of their lives—a way to create

meaning from senseless tragedy. From decades of

study and experience, amici and their members

understand that freight brokers can make trucking

safer—or more dangerous—and thereby change

motor vehicle safety for everyone. Amici write to

3

illuminate brokers’ lynchpin role and to explain the

devastating consequences for all motorists’ safety if

States were prohibited from any motor vehicle safety

regulation regarding brokers.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT

Life can change in an instant. For the Hahn and

Boehne families, it happened on Christmas Eve three

years ago. A truck driver high on cocaine,

methamphetamines, and amphetamines crossed the

median on I-75 in Franklin Township, Ohio, crashing

into two cars. Traveling in the first car was a married

couple, Karen (Hahn) Boehne and Jeremy Boehne;

Karen was pregnant. In the next car was Karen’s

mother, Kimberly Siegrist, and Karen’s sister,

Lauren Hahn. Everyone in those two cars died.

That truck driver should never have been on the

road. Per the allegations, he was there because a

broker hired that carrier to transport a load that

night—despite knowing the carrier was an unsafe

reincarnation of the same single-truck carrier that

had already twice been shut down for safety

violations. The consequences of that broker’s decision

decimated the Hahn and Boehne families on

Christmas Eve.2

Such tragedies are far too common, killing or

injuring more than 160,000 people a year. Due to

truck size and weight, truck crashes are more likely

2 See Boehne v. C.H. Robinson, No. 3:23-cv-00158, Compl.,

Dkt. No. 1 (S.D. Ohio filed June 12, 2023).

4

to be fatal. And the number of fatal truck crashes is

ticking up.

How can this be? To start, some motor carriers—

the “underbelly” of the industry—flout safety rules

and cut corners because it is cheaper to avoid paying

for things like driver training or vehicle maintenance.

These companies stay in business despite (or perhaps

because of) their disregard for motor vehicle safety

because they can charge less than the motor carriers

that follow the safety rules. These fly-by-night

carriers have no assets and nothing to lose. If their

reckless driving and unsafe trucks cause an accident,

they simply close up shop and start again under a new

name by paying $300 for a new Department of

Transportation registration. But their crash victims’

lives are changed instantly and forever.

The

Federal

Motor

Carrier

Safety

Administration (FMCSA) registers new motor

carriers and thereby authorizes them to haul

freight—called “operating authority.” But such

registration does not mean that these carriers have

been rated as safe. The FMCSA almost certainly

hasn’t rated them at all. More than 94% of the

carriers on the road today have never received a

safety rating. 3 There are hundreds of thousands of

carriers operating today, with 6,000 to 9,000-plus new

registrations each month.4

3 FMCSA,

Statistics

Guide).

27

2024 Pocket Guide to Large Truck and Bus

(2025), https://tinyurl.com/mryjukkk (Pocket

4 The Freight Industry by the FMCSA Data: 2024 in Review,

Carrier Details, https://tinyurl.com/5d9vpezw.

5

The FMCSA can’t keep up. But it can—and

does—collect and make available a trove of data,

mostly gathered by state safety and law enforcement

personnel. The data is accessible to those that care,

and it is highly predictive of safety risk.

Enter the brokers. Most shippers don’t have the

resources to vet carriers, so they rely on brokers to

make decisions about which carriers to bring into

broker-vetted networks and to hire for specific freight

loads and routes. And most carriers depend on

brokers, too—because they need brokers to find them

freight to haul. Without a broker assigning them a

load, carriers likely won’t be on the road. So brokers

effectively operate as gatekeepers, determining which

carriers carry loads on which highways and which

carriers are sidelined and off the roads.

That decision—which carrier to hire—is integral

to whether motor vehicles are operated safely or not.

Some carriers operate safely; others don’t. And

brokers have easy access to data that can help identify

the least safe carriers.

Study after study has shown that safety records

are probative of future crash risk. Some indicators

signal double or triple the future crash risk. This

safety data is readily available. Data services offer it

packaged in user-friendly tools and formats. The

brokers that use this extensive carrier safety data to

reasonably assess whether a carrier can safely

operate a truck put safer trucks on the roads. Those

that ignore the safety risks revealed in the data put

dangerous trucks on the road and place lives at risk.

It is thus entirely sensible for States to oblige brokers

to exercise reasonable care when making carrierhiring decisions by holding them financially

6

responsible for the devastating consequences if they

don’t. And it is fully consistent with congressional

design for States to exercise this safety regulatory

authority.

The federal government has adopted some

“regulations on commercial motor vehicle safety”

governing brokers. 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(5). But

federal safety regulation in this area is minimal, and

enforcement is all but non-existent. This is

unsurprising, as Congress left safety regulation to the

States, legislating against a decades-long backdrop of

tort principles requiring brokers to exercise

reasonable care when choosing carriers to engage in

inherently risky endeavors. When brokers insist,

nonetheless, that Congress preempted this

longstanding tort law, they aren’t seeking to

substitute federal broker safety standards for state

ones. Instead, they want to operate in a safetyregulation-free zone.

But Congress never carved out such a zone.

Quite the opposite. Congress expressly ensured that

States could exercise their “safety regulatory

authority … with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2)(A). That safety exception comfortably

covers state common law duties requiring brokers to

exercise reasonable care when hiring a carrier. To

hold otherwise would kick off a race to the bottom on

safety, with States powerless to keep their roads safe

for travelers like the Hahn and Boehne families. That

is not the statute Congress wrote.

7

ARGUMENT

I. Broker Decisions about Carrier Hiring Are

Integral to Safe Trucking.

A. Brokers play a large and expanding role

in the trucking industry.

Brokers are an integral and growing part of the

modern trucking industry—as Respondents’ amici

agree. Br. for Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. as Amici Curiae in

Support of Resps. 7-8.

Brokers “arrang[e] for transportation by motor

carrier[s] for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2). In

simple terms, a shipper with freight to move contracts

with a broker, who in turn selects a carrier to move

the freight. Craig Fuller, Freight Recession Unlike

any Other in History, FreightWaves (Oct. 15, 2023),

https://tinyurl.com/4makwkr6. Viewed from the

carriers’ perspective, the broker is the party that finds

them loads to move. Id. Brokers make their money

from the “spread” between what a shipper pays to

move a load and how much the broker pays a carrier

to take it. See Thomas M. Corsi, Broker/Third Party

Logistics Provider and Shipper Responsibility in

Motor Carrier Selection, in Transportation Policy &

Economic Regulation 311, 321 (John D. Bitzan &

James H. Peoples eds., 2018).

Freight brokerage has grown exponentially over

the years. In 1975, just 70 brokers operated in the

United States. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Motor Freight

Brokers: A Tale of Federal Regulatory Pandemonium,

14 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 289, 298 (1993). Today, there

are more than 28,000 brokers. Pocket Guide, supra,

at 10. The share of freight traffic handled by brokers

8

has more than quadrupled since 2000, rising to nearly

a third of all traffic by 2024. Dave Bozeman, President

& Chief Exec. Officer, C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,

2024 Investor Day Presentation 12 (Dec. 12, 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/bd5yhfax; Fuller, supra.

Even that exponential growth in percentage-offreight understates the importance of brokers’ roles.

About 80% of shippers use brokers. Tom Gresham,

2025 Inbound Logistics Perspectives: 3PL Market

Research Report, Inbound Logistics (July 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/ywjr7hu9.

Smaller

shippers,

especially, depend upon brokers to identify “reliable

carriers.” Fuller, supra. Why? As Respondent and

broker C.H. Robinson explains, “[s]electing motor

carriers” involves “due diligence” that “is often

outside of a shipper’s core competency,” making

brokers—at least in theory, and especially if held to

account—“useful in helping shippers with proper risk

assessment.” C.H. Robinson, Key Factors in Motor

Carrier Selection: Balanced Risk Assessment 6 (2013)

(CHR White Paper).

It's no wonder that most shippers need a broker

to undertake the necessary due diligence. The

number of carriers has also ballooned from about

18,000 in 1980 to more than 531,000 in 2023. Fuller,

supra. The pandemic supercharged market entry for

a time, too. From 2010 to 2020, the industry added

about 199 new trucking carriers per week. Id. From

August 2020 to September 2022, the new entrant rate

spiked to over 1,124 new carriers per week—a morethan-five-fold increase. Id.

Market

entry—obtaining

“operating

authority”—is not hard. It involves paying a few

hundred dollars, promising to comply with the rules,

9

and obtaining insurance. See 49 U.S.C. § 13902(a);

Get Operating Authority (Docket Number), FMCSA

(Oct. 16, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/nhhvf359.

Unsurprisingly, given these numbers, nearly all

carriers in the modern era are small outfits. Close to

97% of carriers have fewer than 10 trucks. Fuller,

supra. For these smaller carriers, brokers act as their

“sales agents” and “take on the sales and customer

service roles that small carriers cannot afford.” Id. To

avail themselves of these services, carriers join

“carrier networks” curated by brokers. See Erick

Mumm, How Do Freight Brokers Grow and Maintain

a

Reliable

Carrier

Network?,

ATS,

https://tinyurl.com/mv2scfkh. Driving an empty truck

is a losing proposition. Carriers—especially the small

ones that form an increasing percentage of the

vehicles on the road—depend on brokers to “provide a

continual stream of freight” that allows them to stay

in business—and on the roadways. Fuller, supra.

In short, brokers are increasingly the

gatekeepers in determining who hauls freight on the

roadways and who doesn’t. Motor vehicle safety for

everyone depends on whether brokers exercise care in

making those decisions.

B. Broker hiring decisions are at the heart of

motor vehicle safety.

1. The safety of motor vehicles—and their

occupants—hinges on the safety of trucking. Large

trucks were involved in more than 500,000 crashes in

2022. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Large Truck and Bus

Crash

Facts

2022

7,

13,

18

(2025),

https://tinyurl.com/5y2ea6hs (Truck Crash Facts).

Those numbers are up in recent years. Id. at 3

(reporting 25% and 11% increases from 2016 to 2022

10

in fatal and injury-only crashes, respectively). Not

just because there are more large trucks on the road,

but because more serious accidents are on the rise:

fatal crash rates per million miles traveled are up. Id.

at 7.

If a large truck is involved, it’s all the more likely

the crash will be fatal. Id. at 11 (comparing fatal

crashes per miles traveled for large trucks and

passenger cars). This is due in part to trucks’ large

size and heavy weight; more than 65% of fatal truck

crashes involved trucks in the highest weight class.

Pocket Guide, supra, at 40. Nearly 166,000 people, on

average in their 40s, were injured or died in crashes

involving large trucks in 2022. Truck Crash Facts,

supra, at 88, 90.

The consequences of these crashes are

devastating for the accident victims—including the

truck drivers—and their families. Family members

face overwhelming grief for their lost loved ones. For

those who are injured but survive (like Petitioner

here, Pet. Br. 12), recovery from physical injuries may

take years—or not be entirely possible. Disabling

injuries are common. One study found victims

suffered incapacitating injuries in 36-45% of fatal or

injury-only truck crashes. Xiaoyu Zhu &

Sivaramakrishnan Srinivasan, A Comprehensive

Analysis of Factors Influencing the Injury Severity of

Large-Truck Crashes, 43 Accident Analysis &

Prevention 49, 52 (2011). On top of that struggle is the

“psychological and emotional trauma that comes with

being affected by a truck crash,” both for those

involved and their families. Coping, Truck Safety

Coalition, https://tinyurl.com/5n93sftx.

11

The financial cost, too, is immense. Medical bills,

lost wages, and other costs add up to more than $14.5

million per fatal truck crash, and more than $380,000

per injury-only truck crash. FMCSA, Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Administration Crash Cost Methodology

Report 5 (2024), https://tinyurl.com/5yzu9vne. Truck

crashes irrevocably change lives.

2.a. Not all carriers are equally likely to have

accidents. Some carriers are more dangerous than

others. And which carriers are more dangerous can

often be assessed with readily available data.

Among the most probative indicators is a past

crash. A study by the American Transportation

Research Institute determined that a driver’s past

crash more than doubled the risk of a future crash.

Am. Transp. Res. Inst., Predicting Truck Crash

Involvement:

2022

Update

15

(2022),

https://tinyurl.com/4pwtec6z (ATRI Study). A past

crash and improper lane change violation have been

among the top ten crash-predictive characteristics

across four different studies spanning nearly two

decades. Id. at 16. Past reckless driving, improper

signal, and right-of-way violations round out the top

five most stable driver-behavior predictors of crash

risk. Id. at 17.

Another study documented a significant link

between roadside inspection violations and the

likelihood of future crashes. Craig D. Lack et al.,

Insights into Motor Carrier Crashes: A Preliminary

Investigation of FMCSA Inspection Violations, 156

Accident Analysis & Prevention, Article 106105, at 1,

4 (2021). The violations with the most predictive

power were those indicative of a “safety culture” (or

lack thereof), in that they involved “simple checks and

12

standard maintenance before driving.” Id. at 5. Many

of these items, while “certainly important for a safe

drive,” may not independently be that risky, but

nonetheless show a disregard for safety, and a

corresponding risk of unsafe operations. Id. For

example, “inoperative required lamps” and defective

windshield wipers were highly correlated with

crashes. Id. The key commonality among the most

predictive violations is that they “might very easily be

identified in a visual inspection,” and thus indicate

whether a carrier takes safety seriously. Id.

b. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Administration collects and publishes extensive

safety data about carriers, but generally lacks the

resources to itself evaluate most carriers’ safety.

FMCSA does issue safety ratings to some

carriers,

rating

them

as

“unsatisfactory,”

“conditional,”

or

“satisfactory”

following

a

“compliance review.” 49 C.F.R. §§ 385.3, 385.9. But

the vast majority of carriers—more than 94%—have

not had a compliance review and therefore remain

unrated by FMCSA. Pocket Guide, supra, at 27;

Safety Fitness Determinations, 88 Fed. Reg. 59489,

59492 (Aug. 29, 2023). 5 Where available, however,

the FCMSA ratings are informative. A “conditional”

rating, for example, held by over a quarter of rated

carriers, Pocket Guide, supra, at 27, “means a motor

5 An “unsatisfactory” rating, issued to about 2% of rated

carriers, Pocket Guide, supra, at 27, results in the loss of

operating authority if the rating becomes final after the carrier

fails to make safety improvements during a 45- or 60-day period.

49 C.F.R. §§ 385.11(d), 385.13(e).

13

carrier does not have adequate safety management

controls in place.” 49 C.F.R. § 385.3.6

The agency also collects an extensive array of

safety data through the Carrier Safety Measurement

System, even though such data is not used to generate

safety ratings. 88 Fed. Reg. at 59492. FMCSA uses

this data “to identify carriers with potential safety

issues” and target them for interventions like

cautionary letters or targeted inspections. John A.

Volpe, FMCSA, The Carrier Safety Measurement

System (CSMS) Effectiveness Test by Behavior

Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories

(BASICs) 4 & n.1 (2014), https://tinyurl.com/58eejpvh.

The data also “empower[s] motor carriers and other

stakeholders involved with the motor carrier industry

to make safety-based business decisions.” U.S. Dep’t

of Transp., Privacy Impact Assessment 2 (2014),

https://tinyurl.com/ss9h5xu3.7

The agency collects this data in seven Behavior

Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories

(BASICs), which are: unsafe driving, hours-of-service

compliance, driver fitness, controlled substances and

alcohol, vehicle maintenance, hazardous material

6 New entrants can begin operating immediately, with no

safety evaluation. They are supposed to receive a safety audit

within the first 12 months, but it is not a compliance review and

does not result in a rating. See New Entrant Safety Assurance

Program, FMCSA, https://tinyurl.com/37u87rm9 (New Entrant

Program).

7 For example, driver-level Safety Measurement System data

informs the Pre-Employment Screening Program. Carriers that

use the program have 8% lower crash rates and 17% lower outof-service rates than other carriers. Pre-Employment Screening

Program, FMCSA, https://tinyurl.com/2u684272.

14

compliance, and crash involvement. Volpe, supra, at

4. 8 FCMSA’s source material for the BASIC

categories includes “relevant inspection, violation,

and crash data” from the Motor Carrier Management

Information System. Id. at 16. Much of this source

data, in turn, is generated from state-level

inspections and reports (e.g., state law enforcement

crash reports), as States conduct the lion’s share of

roadside inspections. See Roadside Inspection

Activity,

FMCSA

(Oct.

31,

2025)

https://tinyurl.com/3rh3yd4z Each data point is

categorized and weighted by time and severity. Volpe,

supra, at 16. For example, in the unsafe driving

category, a reckless driving violation has a weight of

10 and failure to yield has a weight of 5. ATRI Study,

supra, at 25. The time weighting puts more emphasis

on recent events. Volpe, supra, at 16.

The weighted violations are then added together

and used to generate a percentile score, reflecting how

each carrier compares to other similar carriers in a

particular category like unsafe driving or vehicle

maintenance. Id. The agency sets “intervention

thresholds” for each category, i.e., percentile scores at

which the agency prioritizes carriers for interventions

like warning letters. Id. at 4 & n.1.

This methodology works well to predict crash

risk. The 40% of carriers with the worst scores for

8 In 2024, FMCSA reorganized the categories (now called

“compliance categories”) and announced some methodological

changes, but the core approach outlined here still applies. See

Enhanced Carrier Safety Measurement System (SMS), 89 Fed.

Reg. 91874 (Nov. 20, 2024); FMCSA, Prioritization: Approved

Changes

to

the

SMS

Methodology

(Dec.

2024),

https://tinyurl.com/46ze2feu.

15

unsafe driving had nearly double the national

average crash rate. Id. at 8 (crash rates); Revised

Carrier Safety Measurement System, 88 Fed. Reg.

9954, 9959 (Feb. 15, 2023) (intervention thresholds).

The data on hours-of-service violations and past

crashes are also tightly tied to increased crash risk,

with poor performance increasing crash rates by more

than 80%. Volpe, supra, at 8. Poor performance on

vehicle maintenance measures raised crash rates by

65%. Id. Multiple studies have confirmed the

predictive value of these metrics. See John A. Volpe,

FMCSA, Addendum: SMS Effectiveness (ET)

Update 7 (2018); ATRI Study, supra, at 25

(evaluating driver-related violations and concluding

that “[m]ost of the violations that fit into a BASIC

violation are statistically significant in increasing

crash likelihood”). These are just some of the studies

documenting strong links between past safety

violations and a heightened risk of future crashes. See

Lack, supra, at 2-3 (discussing other studies).

Another indicator a carrier is potentially unsafe

is “chameleon carrier” status, i.e., a carrier that is

“using a new identity in an effort to disguise their

former identity and evade enforcement actions issued

against them by” the FMCSA, such as out-of-service

orders. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO 12-364,

Motor Carrier Safety: New Applicant Reviews Should

Expand to Identify Freight Carriers Evading

Detection 1 (2012) (GAO Report); New Entrant

Program, supra. Carriers with chameleon attributes

are three times more likely to be involved in fatal or

injury-only crashes than other new entrants. GAO

Report, supra, at 17. Chameleon carriers are legally

prohibited. 49 C.F.R. § 385.1005. Yet, per FMCSA, “it

does not have the resources to vet all new carriers.”

16

GAO Report, supra, at 11. Still, while it is difficult for

FMCSA to prevent them due to lack of enforcement

resources, potential chameleon carriers can be

flagged based on a few match criteria (like name,

phone number, and address). A GAO analysis of

publicly available FMCSA data identified more than

1,100 potential chameleon carrier applicants in 2010

based on match criteria and a “motive” to hide their

identities like past safety violations. Id. at 13-14.

3. This extensive array of safety data is available

to brokers when they make decisions about whether

to bring a carrier into their network or to hire them to

move freight. FMCSA maintains several websites

that provide easy access to safety-related information.

See Online Safety Data Resources, FMCSA, (Nov. 4,

2024), https://tinyurl.com/4f43p7ex. The websites and

databases provide, among other things, motor

carriers’ safety ratings (if issued), roadside inspection

results, operating authority and insurance history,

and their out-of-service rates compared to national

averages—i.e., the rates of inspection violations

resulting in either a driver or a truck being required

to go out-of-service. See, e.g., Vehicle Inspection File,

U.S.

Dep’t

of

Transp.

(Dec.

2,

2025),

https://tinyurl.com/4ecb3hk2; SAFER – Company

Snapshot, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (May 23, 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/52m46vxx.

Under federal law, the BASIC percentile scores

are not publicly available. Fixing America’s Surface

Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94,

§ 5223(a), 129 Stat. 1312, 1541 (2015). But carriers

can access their own scores and share them during

the on-boarding process for a broker’s carrier

network. SMS Help Center: Using the SMS Website,

17

FMCSA,

https://tinyurl.com/y9jjf3x8.

More

fundamentally, federal law requires most safety data

underlying the BASIC scores to be publicly accessible.

FAST Act § 5223(c), 129 Stat. at 1541; see also

FMCSA Data Dissemination Program, FMCSA (Oct.

8, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/42467azs. 9

Brokers need not crunch the data themselves.

Third-party data aggregators offer services that

compile and present safety data to brokers, including

by calculating scores comparable to the BASIC

percentiles. See, e.g., Everything Carriers & Brokers

Need to Know About CSA Scores, truckstop.com (Aug.

27, 2025), https://tinyurl.com/434ftr3r (describing

SaferWatch’s service for calculating and monitoring

BASIC-equivalent scores); Carrier411 Overview:

Qualify Carriers & Automatically Monitor Changes,

Carrier411, https://tinyurl.com/4r636few. Similar

services help brokers identify chameleon carriers. See

How to Avoid “Chameleon” Carriers and Other

Scammers, DAT Freight & Analytics (Aug. 13, 2012),

https://tinyurl.com/ma99e4zz. Bottom line: the data

exists, as do services that help analyze it, facilitating

its use by brokers making decisions about which

carriers to hire to carry freight on the roads.

Brokers know about this data, although they

may not always act on it. Cases illustrate both

brokers’ awareness of carrier safety deficiencies and

9 Congress mandated the publication of a disclaimer that

safety conclusions should not be drawn solely from the BASIC

system. FAST Act § 5223(d)(2), 129 Stat. at 1542. Any dataset or

methodology may have some errors. But the agency encourages

use of the data for safety-related decisions, see supra p.13 & n.7,

and studies confirm that at minimum, the data can raise safety

flags for further inquiry.

18

their failure to act on such knowledge. For example,

in Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 976 F.3d 1016

(9th Cir. 2020), the broker hired a carrier that had

“red flags” in its safety record—including that “over

40% of their trucks have been deemed illegal to be on

the road when stopped for random inspections” and

double the national-average rate of out-of-service

violations. Id. at 1021. Worse still, the broker’s own

database contained information that indicated the

carrier was a chameleon carrier. Miller v. Costco

Wholesale Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00408, 2022 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 30504, at *6-9 (D. Nev. Feb. 22, 2022). Yet the

broker hired the carrier anyway, with tragic

consequences. Miller, 976 F.3d at 1020. Besides cases,

recent news reports have highlighted brokers’

knowing use of non-domiciled drivers who often lack

valid commercial drivers’ licenses, despite the safety

risks. See Adam Wingfield, Are Some Brokers

Willingly Using Known Non-Domiciled Drivers to

Save Margins?, FreightWaves (Oct. 27, 2025),

https://tinyurl.com/3vphjasp.

Given the extent and probative force of these

safety records and indicators, one way that States can

govern motor vehicle safety is to hold brokers

accountable for considering whether the carriers they

are hiring can safely operate motor vehicles before

putting those carriers on the road. This form of

regulation is effective because when brokers hire

safer carriers, it directly reduces the likelihood of

devastating truck crashes.

19

II. Longstanding State Common Law Duties Are

the Only Meaningful Mechanism Governing

Brokers’ Key Role in Motor Vehicle Safety.

A. Congress did not disturb the pre-existing

common law regime under which States

regulate motor vehicle safety by imposing

duties of care on brokers.

1. Freight brokers are subject to some federal

safety-related rules, but they are minimal. For

example, Congress required the Secretary of

Transportation to “prescribe regulations on

commercial motor vehicle safety” that ensure that

brokers cannot “coerce” “an operator of a commercial

motor vehicle … to operate a commercial motor

vehicle in violation” of federal safety regulations. 49

U.S.C. § 31136(a)(5). Even that limited broker rule is

rarely enforced, however: FMCSA reports just

thirteen closed enforcement cases involving brokers

in the past seven years (out of a universe of nearly

30,000 brokers). Summary of Closed Enforcement

Cases,

FMCSA

(Oct.

31,

2025),

https://tinyurl.com/3m7h65kn; Pocket Guide, supra,

at 10.

Congress’s exceedingly light exercise of federal

safety regulatory authority over brokers is consistent

with its overall statutory design to leave States free

to exercise their pre-existing and longstanding

authority to regulate motor vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2). As Petitioner explains, when “Congress

completed the deregulation” of the trucking industry

“by expressly preempting state trucking regulation,”

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 256

(2013), its target was state economic regulation of

20

trucking. Pet. Br. 23-25. It expressly saved from

preemption “the safety regulatory authority of a State

with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2)(A).

2. The background state safety regulation

against which Congress enacted this provision had

long included common law negligent hiring claims.

For decades before the safety exception’s enactment,

such claims had imposed liability on those who failed

to exercise reasonable care when hiring independent

contractors for work that involves a risk of physical

harm, including when hiring carriers to transport

freight.

The Restatement of Torts (First) in 1934

illustrated the tort of “negligent hiring” with a freight

example remarkably like a modern broker’s role. The

example was based on a builder (Company A) hiring

Company B to haul material, knowing “that B's

trucks are old and in bad condition and that B

habitually employs inexperienced and inattentive

drivers.” Restatement (First) of Torts § 411 cmt.d,

illus.4 (1934). The illustration explained that if

bystander “C is run over by a truck … driven by one

of B’s employees,” then A (who hired the carrier) “is

liable to C if the accident is due either to the bad

condition of the truck or the inexperience or

inattention of the driver.” Id.

Thirty years later, the Second Restatement

reiterated the same tort principles again using a

freight-hauling illustration, whereby Company A

hired Company B to “haul large logs over the public

highway.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 cmt.a,

illus.2 (1965). The Restatement explained that if,

during transport, a log fell “onto C's passing car,

21

injuring C,” Company A (who did the hiring) would be

liable to injured C if “[w]ith reasonable inquiry,”

Company A “could have discovered that B Company’s

only equipment … [was] unsuitable for safely hauling

such logs.” Id. Consistent with these deep roots, the

“overwhelming majority of states” recognize the tort.

Soto v. Shealey, 331 F. Supp. 3d 879, 886 (D. Minn.

2018). Most follow the same basic criteria from

Restatement § 411. See, e.g., Basic Energy Servs., L.P.

v. Petroleum Res. Mgmt., 343 P.3d 783, 790 (Wyo.

2015) (collecting cases). Nothing in the Federal

Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994

purports to displace these bedrock tort duties that

regulate motor vehicle safety and its express safety

exception preserves them.

As applied to brokers, the gravamen of the tort

is the failure to exercise reasonable care when hiring

a carrier—though of course plaintiffs must prove

additional elements, including that the broker’s

hiring failure proximately caused their injuries. See,

e.g., Jones v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 558 F.

Supp. 2d 630, 641-42 (W.D. Va. 2008).

The duty of reasonable care requires just that—

reasonableness. Rather than reflecting prescriptive

state regulation, the tort of negligent hiring allows

brokers flexibility in approaches to carrier selection,

so long as they act reasonably when doing so. The tort

reflects the central pillar of tort law that the “safest

way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person

who decides what precautions shall be taken.” Oliver

Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 117 (1881).

Brokers decide which precautions will be taken when

hiring carriers. Those precautions (or the lack

thereof)—such as taking account of crash-predictive

22

public safety data or choosing to ignore it—alter the

likelihood of unsafe vehicle conditions and operation

on the roadways, and therefore the risk of life-altering

truck crashes. Requiring brokers to pay for the harm

resulting from crashes proximately caused by their

negligent carrier hiring is one way States regulate—

i.e., “govern[] conduct and control[] policy,” Kurns v.

R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 637 (2012)—

regarding “safety … with respect to motor vehicles,”

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

3. Nor do brokers act in a standardless vacuum.

Numerous industry guides already exist to help

brokers in determining what is reasonable. The

Transportation Intermediaries Association (TIA),

which represents the brokerage industry, explains on

its website that two of the four “cornerstones for

carrier vetting” are to “develop standards for carrier

safety” and “implement a carrier review program.”

Andrew Johnson, Unlocking Success: The Key

Elements of Carrier Vetting and Managing Liability,

TIA (Aug. 1, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/mr272rep.

The Association publishes a Carrier Selection

Framework to assist its members with carrying out

those tasks. See TIA, Carrier Selection Framework

(2023), https://tinyurl.com/rwtwwfx3. Although the

Framework eschews reliance on BASIC scores, it

advises brokers to investigate potential chameleon

carriers and probe for more details about safety for

carriers with a “conditional” rating or new entrants.

Id. at 36-39.10

10 The questions of whether BASIC scores are predictive of

safety and whether it is reasonable to consult them are questions

for state courts and juries resolving negligent hiring suits. What

23

The Framework is not the only guidance. To give

just a few examples, Respondent (C.H. Robinson)

publishes a White Paper explaining how to conduct

“due diligence” on carriers, including evaluation of

safety data beyond the formal safety ratings in some

situations. CHR White Paper, supra, at 5. Additional

guidelines come from industry service providers that

provide real-time monitoring of carriers’ safety

compliance. See Carrier Vetting: 7 Ways Brokers Can

Verify Quality Carriers, truckstop.com (Aug. 12,

2021),

https://tinyurl.com/56zpj9sw.

Reasonable

carrier vetting is not a novel and unknowable

undertaking. Brokers advertise that such vetting is

part of their process. See North America Truckload

Services that Strengthen Your Supply Chain, C.H.

Robinson, https://tinyurl.com/2vkbfhpr (advertising

“the largest network of vetted, high-quality carriers

in North America”).

In sum, longstanding and near universal state

law requires brokers to exercise reasonable care when

making decisions that are directly relevant to “safety

… with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2). For example, should a single-truck

carrier with a history of past crashes, failure to

complete required inspections, and repeat violations

forcing them out-of-service for faulty brakes and tires

be assigned a cross-country load? The freight broker

is the first line of defense in preventing that from

happening. But if a broker does hire that carrier, the

result is thousands of miles driven by an unsafe truck

that might otherwise be sitting on the sidelines.

is crucial here is the link between broker vetting and vehicle

safety, such that requiring brokers to reasonably vet carrier

safety records is a means to regulate motor vehicle safety.

24

Brokers are well-informed and well-positioned to

keep the roads safe, by making choices that can

prevent unsafe vehicles from carrying freight. State

regulation obliging brokers to use reasonable care

when hiring carriers is state motor vehicle safety

regulation.

B. The alternative to state regulation would

be no regulation, which would degrade

motor vehicle safety.

Respondents’ cramped interpretation of the

safety exception would wipe nearly a century of welldeveloped, important motor vehicle safety law off the

books. And replace it with—almost nothing. No state

safety regulation and no obligation to exercise

reasonable care. Creating that sort of regulation-freezone would be highly unusual, to say the least.

Congress sometimes sets federal minimum

safety standards while permitting States to impose

more stringent ones (or additional remedies). See, e.g.,

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578-579 (2009). That is

the approach Congress took here, requiring

regulations to set “minimum safety standards,”

including rules related to brokers. 49 U.S.C.

§ 31136(a)(5); see also Pet. Br. 8-10. And sometimes

Congress sets (or authorizes agencies to set) federal

safety standards that completely displace state tort

remedies. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,

Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 875 (2000). But under

Respondents’ approach, the statute here would do

something else entirely: it would dictate that brokers,

despite their integral role in motor vehicle safety, are

exempt from any state law duty of care, without

Congress having established a full set of federal

safety standards.

25

The motor vehicle safety exception cannot

sensibly be read to generate such a topsy-turvy result.

See Pet. Br. 18-23. The consequences for motor vehicle

safety would be dire. Not only could brokers hire

carriers with no safety vetting at all (never mind a

reasonable inquiry), they could also select carriers

with actual knowledge of major safety pitfalls—

profiting from the carrier’s near-certain lower rates—

and share no responsibility when that carrier kills or

maims someone.

If that scenario seems far-fetched, consider

economic incentives that would yield a race to the

safety bottom if States are barred from imposing any

duty of care on brokers. The absence of any duty of

care will encourage brokers to select carriers only on

price. See Nat’l Freight Advisory Comm.,

Recommendations to U.S. Dep’t of Transp. for the Dev.

of the Nat’l Freight Strategic Plan 39 (2014) (minority

report) (“The degree to which a company can be

required to pay for the losses it causes has a direct

relationship to the extent to which it is willing to

spend funds to prevent crashes.”) (NFAC Report).

Less safe carriers tend to charge less, because they

are evading safety costs that compliant carriers incur.

See, e.g., CHR White Paper, supra, at 5 (“only

choos[ing] motor carriers with a Satisfactory rating”

means “costs could rise”); See Noi Mahoney, ELD

Loopholes Fueling Fraud, Driving Good Carriers Out

of Business, Experts Warn, FreightWaves (Nov. 12,

2025), https://tinyurl.com/2er2y68z (describing 50cent difference in costs per mile between electroniclogging-compliant carriers and non-compliant ones).

That means a broker’s increased spread from hiring a

less safe, cheaper carrier is profit derived directly

from avoiding safety costs that should have been

26

incurred. And who ultimately pays? Families like the

Hahns and the Boehnes, with suffering that could and

should have been avoided.

While one would like to imagine otherwise, if

immunized from any responsibility for the safety of

the vehicles they hire to drive on the roadways, some

brokers will inevitably trade safety for lower rates

(increasing their profit margin). That reality is

evidenced by the facts here and in similar cases. See

Pet. Br. 11-12. The economic pressures, in turn, would

force ever more carriers to reduce some of their safety

measures to better compete at lower prices. See Br.

for Am. Truckers United as Amicus Curiae in Support

of Pet’r 9-11; Wonmongo Lacina Soro et al., The

Relationships between Financial Performance and

Driver Compensation and Safety Outcomes in the

Trucking Industry: A Systematic Review, 45 Transp.

Revs. 239, 240 (2025) (describing competitive

pressures on carriers to “reduce safety investments”).

The upshot is a destructive race to the bottom on

safety.

C. Excluding brokers from the safety

exception risks eviscerating state safety

regulatory authority for motor carriers,

too.

Worse yet, releasing brokers from exercising any

duty of care will increasingly vitiate state authority to

hold carriers to any duty of care for the negligence of

their drivers. For starters, some of Respondents’

arguments would undercut state negligence suits

against carriers and drivers. See Pet. Br. 42-43.

Beyond that, immunizing brokers will have knock-on

effects that tend to minimize carrier responsibility for

safety, too. Here’s why:

27

Larger carriers have taken notice of the

brokerage industry, and are increasingly setting up

their own brokerage divisions. Joe McDevitt, News

and Analysis for Transportation Industry Shippers,

TLI (July 30, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/mptbr9tj. One

reason is to reduce costs by bringing brokers’ margins

in-house. Why Does a Motor Carrier Open a Freight

Brokerage?,

Freight360

(Dec.

8,

2023),

https://tinyurl.com/533x6kcv. But there is another

advantage: Operating as both a carrier and broker

provides opportunities to structure freight shipping

transactions so that an entity appears as the broker

rather than the carrier. See, e.g., Dixon v. Stone Truck

Line, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-000945, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 226414, at *52-53 (D.N.M. Nov. 23, 2021)

(finding contractual ambiguity regarding whether

entity was operating as broker or carrier for a

particular shipment). Even now, the difference

between carriers and brokers matters a great deal

when there is a truck crash.

Carriers are usually vicariously liable for their

drivers’ negligence. See, e.g., Morris v. JTM Materials,

Inc., 78 S.W.3d 28, 39 (Tex. App. 2002) (collecting

cases). That result followed decades of struggle with

creative carrier-driver arrangements. For example,

rather than hire drivers as employees, carriers would

permit truck owner-operators “to drive under the

carrier’s operating authority” and then rely “on

standard independent contractor defenses to avoid

liability.” Michael Jay Leizerman & Rena Leizerman,

Litigating Truck Accident Cases § 3:1.3 (2025). 11

11 Owner-operators are small businesses that own at least

one truck but typically lack their own motor carrier operating

authority. Id.

28

Congress made several changes to address this issue.

Id. One of the fixes was to authorize regulations

making carriers “statutory employers” of their

drivers, regardless of the form of the carrier-driver

arrangement. See id. § 3.2; 49 U.S.C. § 14102(a); 49

C.F.R. § 390.5 (defining employer and employee). The

imposition of this liability encouraged larger carriers,

with assets potentially subject to tort judgments, to

invest in safety. It encourages safety investment “not

only because [the larger carriers] can afford to do so,

but also because they cannot afford not to.” NFAC

Report, supra, at 40.

Brokers, on the other hand, are not “statutory

employers” under federal law. Thus, they are not

generally vicariously liable for a truck driver’s

negligence. Instead, as described above, brokers (at

least now) are liable only for their own negligent

acts—a harder standard to meet.

If, however, Respondents prevail, then brokers

could not be held liable even for their own negligence.

This immunity would only magnify the incentives to

structure contractual arrangements so that larger

carriers appear as brokers, with some other

(presumably judgment-proof) entity as the nominal

carrier. Such creative arrangements to further avoid

liability would reinstate similar “difficulties of

enforcing safety requirements and of fixing financial

responsibility for damage and injuries to shippers and

members of the public,” Transamerican Freight Lines,

Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 423 U.S. 28, 37

(1975), that Congress has long strived to avoid for

carriers. And it would vitiate “the safety regulatory

authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles”

29

that Congress expressly excepted from preemption.

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

Allowing brokers to operate in a safety-regulationfree zone would create compounding risks for motor

vehicle safety and render States powerless to do

anything about it. The statute manifests no such

intent to kneecap state regulation of motor vehicle

safety in this way.

*****

The many stories of lives irrevocably changed by

truck accidents are heartbreaking: Jim Fuelling was

a “gentle giant” of a man with a “big heart” on his way

to work with a co-worker in a pickup truck when he

stopped for road construction on I-85 on the way to

Charlotte, North Carolina. He was killed by a truck

that slammed into him at 55 miles per hour without

braking. Our Stories: Jim “Big Jim” Fuelling, Truck

Safety Coalition, https://tinyurl.com/5cxumpdp. The

carrier involved was known to shirk safety—with two

prior crashes in seven months and 31 safety violations

in just a year and a half. Had the broker exercised

reasonable care in hiring carriers, the carrier would

not have been on the road, carrying that load, causing

that crash, and leaving Angela Sims-Fuelling

widowed. 12 State regulation requiring brokers to

exercise reasonable care when hiring motor carriers

is safety regulation “with respect to motor vehicles.”

12 See Fuelling v. Pratt Indus., Inc., No. 7:22-cv-00905, Am.

Compl. ¶ 26, Dkt. No. 27 (D.S.C.); Fuelling v. S&J Logistics LLC,

No. 7:22-cv-00905, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207892 (D.S.C. Nov.

15, 2024) (holding negligent hiring claim against broker was

preempted).

30

It makes the trucks on the road safer. It saves lives.

Congress did not preempt it.

CONCLUSION

The judgment should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Jeffrey Burns

DOLLAR, BURNS, BECKER

& HERSHEWE LC

1100 Main St.

Suite 2600

Kansas City, MO 64105

(816) 876-2600

jeffb@dollar-law.com

December 8, 2025

Hyland Hunt

Counsel of Record

Ruthanne Deutsch

DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC

300 New Jersey Ave. NW

Suite 300

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 868-6915

hhunt@deutschhunt.com