Amicus Curiae Brief — John Doe, Petitioner v. Grindr Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 18, 2025

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No. 24-1202

In The

Supreme Court of the

United States

JOHN DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL,

Petitioner,

GRINDR INC. AND GRINDR LLC,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

PAVING THE WAY FOUNDATION, INC.

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Marc J. Randazza

Counsel of Record

Ronald D. Green, Jr.

RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC

8991 West Flamingo Road, Suite B

Las Vegas, NV 89147

(702) 420-2001

ecf@randazza.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Paving the Way Foundation, Inc

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iv

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE .................. 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 2

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 3

Congress passed FOSTA to prevent the harms

suffered by victims of Backpage and similar

platforms, and Grindr is a successor to these

illicit victimization enterprises. .......................... 5

A. Grindr functions in substantially similar

ways to Backpage through knowing

misconduct that furthers sexual abuse and

human trafficking. .................................................. 7

B. Remedial Statutes should be interpreted in a

way that effectuates their meaning. ................ 8

II. Despite Congress adopting FOSTA to course

correct the broad immunization facilitating sex

trafficking and sexual abuse, the Ninth Circuit

invented requirements to continue immunizing

platforms for their sexual exploitation. ............. 9

A. With regard to Plaintiff’s Direct Perpetrator

Claim, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly read in

additional mens rea and causal relationship

requirements, despite the plain text of

§ 1591(a)(1). ............................................................. 11

iii

B. With regard to Petitioner’s Beneficiary

Claim, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly read in

a requirement that advertisement revenues

are insufficient for liability, despite

§ 1591(a)(2)’s text that liability attaches

whenever one receives “anything of value.” 16

Conclusion ................................................................ 19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Doe #1 v. Twitter, Inc., No. 22-15103, 2023 WL

3220912 (9th Cir. May 3, 2023) .............................. 9

Doe v. Bates,

No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758 (ED

Tex., Dec. 27, 2006) ................................................. 4

Doe v. Grindr Inc.,

128 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2025) ....................... 11, 16

Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,

528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) ................................... 4

Doe v. Twitter, Inc.,

555 F. Supp. 3d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2021) ..................... 9

Does v. Reddit, Inc.,

51 F.4th 1137 (9th Cir. 2022) ................... 11, 14, 16

Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton,

145 S. Ct. 2291 (2025) ........................................... 12

Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC,

817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) ..................................... 5

Tcherepnin v. Knight,

389 U.S. 332 (1967) ................................................. 8

United States v. Epstein,

426 F.3d 431 (1st Cir. 2005) ................................. 11

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 1591 ........................................... 10, 11, 17

18 U.S.C. § 1595 ......................................................... 9

47 U.S.C. § 230 ........................................................... 3

Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex

Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA), Pub. L. No. 115164, § 4, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018). .................... 6, 9, 10

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Understanding the

Mechanisms of Interpretive Change, 103 N.C. L.

Rev. 1083 (2025)...................................................... 9

Adam Forrest, Government minister to demand

Tinder and Grindr explain what they’re doing to

protect children, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 10, 2019)

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ . 8

Eric Goldman, The Complicated Story of FOSTA and

Section 230, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 279, 279-80

(2019). ...................................................................... 5

Grindr Editorial Team, How does Grindr Work?

(June 27, 2024) https://www.grindr.com/blog/howdoes-grindr-work ................................................... 14

Grindr Editorial Team, What’s a Twink? Unpacking

the Allure of the Slim & Smooth (May 13, 2024)

https://www.grindr.com/blog/what-is-a-twink ....... 8

Grindr Inc., Grindr Help Center, What is Grindr?,

(last visited Aug. 17, 2025) https://help.grindr

.com/hc/en-us/articles/1500012478721-What-is

Grindr#:~:text=Grindr%20collects%20your%20loca

tion%20info,between%20you%20and%20other%20

members ................................................................ 13

Grindr Inc., Grindr Investor Day 2024 Presentation,

Grindr.com (June 26, 2024) https://s203.

q4cdn.com/415221501/files/doc_presentation/2024/

06/Grindr-Investor-Day-6-26-2024.pdf ................ 17

Grindr Inc., Unlimited, Grindr.com

https://www.grindr.com/unlimited ....................... 18

Jeff Kosseff, The Twenty-Six Words that Created the

Internet 264 (2019) .............................................. 6, 7

U.S. Air Force, Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU31/32/38, (last visited Aug 17, 2025)

https://www.af.mil/About-Us/FactSheets/Display/Article/104572/joint-direct-attackmunition-gbu-313238/#:~:text=In%20its%20most

%20accurate%20mode,quality%20handoff%20from

%20the%20aircraft ............................................... 13

United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on

Investigations, Staff Report, Backpage.com’s

Knowing Facilitation of Online Sex Trafficking

(Jan. 2017)............................................................... 7

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE.1

Founded in 2016, PAVING THE WAY FOUNDATION,

INC. (“Paving the Way Foundation”) has expertise in

cultivating informed and engaged youth leaders

throughout Central Florida. In the past nine years, it

has educated more than 41,000 youth and parents in

Central Florida and across the country, becoming a

trusted resource for equipping communities to

prevent child exploitation.

Child exploitation is a pervasive and growing

threat, affecting millions of children worldwide. While

many organizations focus on rescuing and rehabilitating victims, far fewer are dedicated to preventing

exploitation before it occurs. With the alarming rise

in internet-based sexual abuse, online exploitation,

and the use of artificial intelligence to produce abusive

material and extort children, prevention education is

more critical than ever.

Paving the Way Foundation believes—and has

demonstrated through its work—that education and

empowerment are essential to preventing child trafficking and online exploitation. Children are our future,

and they are continually being targeted and harmed by

online predators, facilitated by hundreds of platforms

1 Under Rule 37.6, amicus affirms that no counsel for a party

authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person other

than amicus or its counsel contributed money intended to fund

preparing or submitting this brief. Under Rule 37.2, amicus

affirms that all parties received timely notice of the intent to file

this brief.

that are not being held accountable to remove harmful

content when asked, leaving children vulnerable to

additional cyberbullying and online exploitation.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Grindr’s purpose is to arrange for sexual hookups

between strangers. Grindr markets itself to children.

Children use the app and inevitably get raped. Grindr

shrugs its shoulders and says “not our problem.” The

9th Circuit agreed that Grindr should have no responsibility for the harms it causes, because of a ghoulish

interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”) of the

Communications Decency Act (CDA). Congress,

presented with prior misinterpretations of Section

230 created clear liability for those who knowingly

profit from sex trafficking in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)

and 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2). However, in this case, the

9th Circuit also chose to protect Grindr’s sex trafficking

scheme under those statutes as well.

There are neutral, innocent platforms that deserve

some degree of protection under Section 230. Grindr

is not one of them in this circumstance. Grindr could

have easily prevented the harms it caused – it does

not want to. In fact, it affirmatively courts and causes

the harms – and it is profitable to do so. John Doe is

one of many and stands as a representative of all the

children swept into this trauma trap. A trap whose

gears are built out of these gross misinterpretations

of the law.

This Court should grant certiorari.

ARGUMENT

This case presents a critical opportunity for the

Supreme Court to clarify the scope of 47 U.S.C. § 230

(“Section 230”) of the Communications Decency Act

(CDA). Despite Congress’s 2018 Allow States and

Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”)

Amendment to Section 230, courts have failed to

apply the statute’s plain text and instead have

invented protections for platforms that knowingly

commercialize the sexual exploitation of minors. The

Ninth Circuit’s decision to extend Section 230

immunity to Grindr, despite the plaintiff’s demonstration that his harm flowed from Grindr’s own

misconduct, represents a dangerous misinterpretation

of the statute.

Section 230 was passed by Congress in 1996 when

the internet was in its infancy. Today’s internet bears

little resemblance to the internet of thirty years ago,

and technology has advanced by leaps and bounds

since then. However, Section 230 has stagnated and

degraded into its current condition – a “heads the

people lose, tails the tech companies win” statute that

shields technology companies from all accountability

or responsibility, which they have fully taken

advantage of, with no sense of responsibility for the

harms they might cause. And in this case, Grindr

took advantage of it in a nightmarish manner –

serving up children for sexual abuse. Delivering

children to rapists, with no conscience at all.

The statute may have served some purpose when

the internet industry was in its infancy. Every

website has updated its terms of service since 1996.

An industry made up of startups that may have

needed some breathing room while the culture caught

up to it is now an industry of juggernauts who shrewdly

use interpretations of Section 230 to cover their lack

of willingness to exercise even a bare minimum of

accountability or responsibility.

Their unwillingness to be responsible has been

pathological and necessitates reform. Prior misinterpretations of Section 230 protected human traffickers

and those who partnered with them. See e.g., Doe v.

MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008)

(affirming dismissal of a negligence claim against

MySpace for failing to implement age verification and

enabling an adult to sexually assault a thirteen-yearold); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL

3813758, *1, *20 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 27, 2006) (dismissing

plaintiff’s negligence claim against Yahoo! for

“knowingly host[ing] child pornography.”) Yet even

when presented with the undeniable truth that their

actions were harming children, tech companies cried

that it would be the end of the internet as we know it

if they had to show even a bare minimum of

responsibility. They are being disingenuous. However,

even if they are not, if the internet as we know it has

a slim and marginal element that we can do without.

Since companies would not take even basic steps

to clean up their acts voluntarily, Congress passed

FOSTA to prevent Section 230 from shielding them

from liability for human trafficking and other foreseeable harm.

Grindr’s profit-driven app design is a new iteration

on the same illicit business ventures that Congress

passed FOSTA to remedy. Grindr knowingly and

willfully markets itself to children and then serves

them up to predators. It knows that it does this, but

it claims an inability to do anything about it – but

“can’t” actually means “won’t” in this case. Section 230

was never intended to create a shield for companies

knowingly and intentionally profiting from child sex

abuse.

This Court must intervene to ensure Section 230’s

proper application: as a protection for platforms

hosting third-party content, not as a shield for

platforms that profit by seeking out minors to feed

predatory users.

I. Congress passed FOSTA to prevent the

harms suffered by victims of Backpage and

similar platforms, and Grindr is a successor

to these illicit victimization enterprises.

After Congress passed Section 230, the Internet

blossomed, but victims suffered. Eric Goldman, The

Complicated Story of FOSTA and Section 230, 17

FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 279, 279-80 (2019). Bad-faith

platforms shielded themselves in Section 230’s

protections and profited from the sexual abuse and

exploitation plaguing their platforms. Id. at 280-81.

For years, judges reluctantly dismissed victims’

claims as precluded by Section 230 and begged

Congress for legislative fixes. See e.g., Jane Doe No. 1

v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016)

(“If the evils that the appellants have identified are

deemed to outweigh the First Amendment values that

drive the CDA, the remedy is through legislation, not

litigation.”) In 2018, Congress responded to these

calls from victims and the courts by recalibrating

Section 230’s protections. Allow States and Victims to

Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA),

Pub. L. No. 115-164, § 4, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018).

Congress’s intent in passing FOSTA was to

respond to and curtail Section 230 protections for

Backpage and similar actors who profited from their

assistance in human trafficking. Jeff Kosseff, The

Twenty-Six Words that Created the Internet 264

(2019). Backpage, one of the largest, online classified

advertising websites became known as a marketplace

for commercial sex and human trafficking. Specifically,

Backpage was found to have facilitated sex trafficking

through editorial and website design choices, such as

hosting sections for users to post content related to

“escorting” and “adult entertainment.” Id. at 253.

Further, Backpage was aware of its role as a

conduit for human trafficking; indeed, forty-five state

attorneys general had written to Backpage emphasizing that the webpage was not sufficiently moderating

content to prevent human and child sex trafficking.

Id. But Backpage maintained that its “strict content

policies to prevent illegal activity” were sufficient. Id.

Specifically, Backpage adopted a list of prohibited

terms, which users could not include in advertisements.

Id. at 254. And despite its claim that it was strictly

moderating content for these prohibited terms,

Backpage adopted policies that only edited posts

containing these terms. Id. For example, a user who

posted an advertisement with the prohibited term “teen”

would be given the option to repost without that term.

United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on

Investigations, Staff Report, Backpage.com’s Knowing

Facilitation of Online Sex Trafficking, at 34-35 (Jan.

10, 2017).

These editorial decisions were motivated not by a

goal of protecting victims but instead by a concern

that some terms “might attract law enforcement

attention.” Kosseff, supra, at 254-55.

A. Grindr functions in substantially similar

ways to Backpage through knowing

misconduct that furthers sexual abuse

and human trafficking.

Like Backpage, Grindr publicly claims to have

strict content moderation policies but operates under

a business model and platform design that knowingly

fail to protect minors. It follows Backpage’s tradition

of lax enforcement, paired with assertions that it

cannot do more. Grindr’s design choices appear

calculated to avoid law enforcement scrutiny while

sustaining a platform that facilitates, and even

encourages, child sexual abuse.

Whereas Backpage edited ads to remove prohibited

terms referencing minors, Grindr allows minors to

join simply by self-reporting that they are over 18—

without any verification. App. 4a. A user under 18 can

simply claim a higher age and gain full access. As

Backpage’s superficial edits made it no more difficult

for predators to find victims, Grindr’s features allow

predators to identify potential victims through “tribe”

labels, including descriptors such as “twink,” which

denotes younger-appearing users. In the words of

Grindr’s own blog, “[twinks] are coveted for their

youthful appearance and baby-smooth skin.” Grindr

Editorial Team, What’s a Twink? Unpacking the Allure

of the Slim & Smooth (May 13, 2024).2 Presumably,

John Doe is not “flattered” by this description.

Just like government officials alerted Backpage to

the harms occurring on their platform, Grindr has

been alerted to the harms that flow from its app.

Adam Forrest, Government minister to demand Tinder

and Grindr explain what they’re doing to protect

children, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 10, 2019).3 Grindr

has been, and continues to be, a tool for sexual

abusers to identify vulnerable minors. Lawsuits

eerily similar to the present Doe complaint continue

to materialize, and yet Grindr refuses to implement

proper safeguards. Pet. 10.

B. Remedial Statutes should be interpreted

in a way that effectuates their meaning.

In applying FOSTA to Grindr’s facilitation of sex

trafficking, courts should use the “familiar canon of

statutory construction that remedial legislation should

be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.”

Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Under

this canon, courts should apply a meaning to the

statute that accomplishes the congressional goal to

inhibit sex trafficking enterprises.

Prior district court decisions correctly applied the

canon in reading a liberal meaning into FOSTA. Doe

Available at: https://www.grindr.com/blog/what-is-a-twink.

Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/

jeremy-wright-tinder-grindr-culture-secretary-children-datingapps-police-protection-a8772116.html.

v. Twitter, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 3d 889, 921 (N.D. Cal.

2021) (reversed by Doe #1 v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2215103, 2023 WL 3220912, at *1 (9th Cir. May 3,

2023)). In Twitter, Inc., the district court correctly

noted that when a remedial statute is ambiguous,

courts should apply a broader meaning. Id. at 920.

While this canon has fallen out of favor in recent

years, courts should not create an anti-canon whereby

they can ignore a statute’s text to undercut a statute’s

commands. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Understanding the Mechanisms of Interpretive Change, 103

N.C. L. Rev. 1083, 1107 (2025). In the years since

Twitter, Inc., courts have interpreted FOSTA according

to this anti-canon whereby the most “restrictive

possible reading” is used to circumvent equally

plausible textual requirements that adhere to

Congress’s intent. Twitter, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 3d at

920.

II. Despite Congress adopting FOSTA to course

correct the broad immunization facilitating

sex trafficking and sexual abuse, the Ninth

Circuit invented requirements to continue

immunizing platforms for their sexual

exploitation.

FOSTA’s long title emphasizes its purpose as

“clarify[ing] that section 230 … does not prohibit the

enforcement against providers…of interactive computer

services Federal and State criminal and civil law

relating to sexual exploitation of children….” FOSTA

§ 1, 132 Stat. 1253. To accomplish this clarification,

Congress added a new carve out to Section 230 and

provided for civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 for

violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) or § 1591(a)(2).

Pub. L. No. 115-164, §4, 132 stat. 1254 (2018) (codified

at 47 U.S.C. 230(e)(5). 18 U.S.C. § 1595 provides

victims of human trafficking with a civil remedy

against their “perpetrator” and those who knowingly

benefited from their harm, and 18 U.S.C. § 1591

provides the requisite standard for liability. Together,

these statutes provide a cause of action for victims

against (1) “whoever knowingly recruits, entices,

harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises,

maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a

person;” or (2) “benefits financially or by receiving

anything of value, from participation in a venture

which has engaged in an act described in violation of

paragraph (1).” 18. U.S.C. § 1591(a). In other words,

its plain language clearly subjects Grindr to civil

liability for knowingly participating in activities that

facilitate the trafficking of minors.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), victims can bring

claims against a platform for their direct participation

in their victimization and, under subsection 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a)(2), for benefitting from their victimization.

A platform that knowingly facilitates a predator’s

access to a victim cannot shield itself behind Section

230.

But despite Congress’s clear commandment that

Section 230 does not protect platforms that choose to

profit from sexual exploitation, courts have coalesced

around a misreading of FOSTA that empowers, and

even encourages, platforms to engage in victimizing

minors as a course of business and a source of profit.

This misreading creates atextual and additional

burdens for a plaintiff to overcome.

A. With

regard

Plaintiff’s

Direct

Perpetrator Claim, the Ninth Circuit

incorrectly read in additional mens rea

and causal relationship requirements,

despite the plain text of § 1591(a)(1).

Relying on prior Ninth Circuit precedent, the court

below found that Petitioner’s direct perpetrator claim

failed because “not only must the defendant have

actual knowledge of the sex trafficking, but there

must be a ‘causal relationship between affirmative

conduct…and receipt of a benefit.’” Doe v. Grindr Inc.,

128 F.4th 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Does v.

Reddit, Inc., 51 F.4th 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 2022).

But Congress knows how to write a mens rea and

nexus requirement into a statute, and here, the

statute provides that knowledge of “recruiting,

enticing, harboring…” is sufficient. See 18 U.S.C. §

1591(a)(1). And even if the Ninth Circuit correctly

applied the statute’s requirements, Petitioner

sufficiently alleged both actual knowledge and a

causal relationship between Grindr’s recruitment of

victims and the benefit Grindr received from their

victimization.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the

plaintiff’s claim because it held Grindr merely turned

a “blind eye to trafficking that may occur” on their

platform, which was insufficient to constitute active

participation in sex trafficking.” Grindr Inc., 128

F.4th at 1155. But a defendant’s willful ignorance of

illicit activity can constitute knowledge. See e.g.,

United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 440-41 (1st Cir.

2005) (finding that “a conscious course of deliberate

ignorance” could support a jury finding that the

defendant had requisite knowledge). Further, Grindr

was alleged to have actual knowledge of sexual abuse

on their app through their active participation in

soliciting minors on the app, prior reports of sexual

abuse, and nationwide statistics showing that Grindr

was responsible for large percentages of underage

sexual acts. Pet. 10. Grindr cannot be allowed to market

to minors, depict minors using the app, celebrate their

app as a safe and secure environment, and then be

described as only “turning a blind eye” to minor usage.

Grindr wants underage users, and it actively courts

them, while giving us a Cheshire smile and feigned

ignorance and impotence.

The app’s design infrastructure forbids this “blind

eye” conclusion. In signing up for the hookup app,

potential users are informed that they must be over

the age of 18 and then are presented with the option

to self-select into any age, without any verification

requirement.4 After inviting minors to the app

through their advertisements and marketing, Grindr

As this court held only weeks ago, “age verification, as a

practical matter, is necessary for an effective prohibition on

minors accessing age-inappropriate sexual content” and “Only

an age-verification requirement can ensure compliance with an

age-based restriction.” Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton, 145

S. Ct. 2291, 2297 (2025) While no party claims Grindr’s lack of

verification violates a statutory mandate, this court has clarified

that age-based requirements are paper shields absent ageverification.

presents no barriers for them to use the app, nor to

segregate them from men with pedophilic tendencies.5

Further, after signing up, the app permits users to

freely alter their age. A user who describes themselves

as 18 can continue purporting to be 18 for as long as

they want, potentially misleading other users for

sexual encounters they would otherwise deem too

risky. The app also encourages users to sort

themselves into tribes such as “twink,” denoting a

younger appearance. Users can go so far as to filter

proximate users by self-selected age and tribe. The

5 Grindr has claimed that protecting children would be either

impossible or simply not it’s problem, it takes very little to

imagine simple steps it could take: Grindr’s very allure is that

it geo-locates users, so that they can find sexual hookups with

strangers by proximity – with a locational accuracy that is nearly

as precise as military smart bomb targeting. Compare, Grindr

Inc., Grindr Help Center, What is Grindr?, (last visited Aug. 17,

2025) https://help.grindr.com/hc/en-us/articles/1500012478721What-is

Grindr#:~:text=Grindr%20collects%20your%20location%20info,

between%20you%20and%20other%20members

(describing

geolocation tracking with “100m radius of accuracy”), with U.S.

Air Force, Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU-31/32/38, (last

visited Aug 17, 2025) https://www.af.mil/About-Us/FactSheets/Display/Article/104572/joint-direct-attack-munitiongbu313238/#:~:text=In%20its%20most%20accurate%20mode,qualit

y%20handoff%20from%20the%20aircraft. (describing a category

of smart munition as accurate to within 30-meters depending on

conditions). If Grindr can tell a user that there is someone ready

to have sex with them down to the number of feet away they

might be, Grindr could apply the slightest bit of responsibility by

(at a minimum) requiring some additional verification if the

location is (for example) inside a middle school during school

hours. Grindr, however, prefers to be the internet’s bacha bazi

marketplace.

app empowers predators to find minors through these

filters, misleads the minors into thinking they are

about to meet with someone close to their age, and

then face life-altering sexual abuse.

Despite these curated features streamlining

sexual abuse, the Ninth Circuit below found this was

identical to the willful ignorance in Reddit. But

Reddit is inapposite. There, the plaintiffs primary

allegation was that Reddit knowingly participated in

sex trafficking by “provid[ing] a platform where it is

easy to share child pornography, highlight[ing]

subreddits that feature child pornography, “allow[ing]

users who share child pornography to serve as

subreddit moderators, and failing to remove child

pornography even when users report[ed] it.” Reddit,

Inc., 51 F.4th at 1145.. In rejecting the plaintiffs’

claims in Reddit, the court held this passive hosting

was insufficient for alleging that Reddit “actively

participated in sex trafficking.” Id.

Grindr’s design choices are factually different than

Reddit. “Making it easy” might not be enough, but

“actively encouraging and profiting from it” is different.

Unlike Reddit, which plausibly only had a surfacelevel awareness of the Child Sexual Abuse Material

(CSAM) on their platform, Grindr has curated a

platform premised on sexual encounters. Grindr

Editorial Team, How does Grindr Work? (June 27,

2024)6 (“you probably know by now that we’re a gay

hookup app.”) And after creating this platform to

facilitate sexual encounters, Grindr was not satisfied

Available at: https://www.grindr.com/blog/how-does-grindrwork.

with its profitability by serving up adults to each

other. Instead, Grindr solicited minors to participate.

Reddit’s hosting of third-party content, including

CSAM, was incidental and a byproduct of offering a

generalized platform hosting a myriad of content

categories. But Grindr chooses to seek out minors for

a platform designed around sexual encounters.

Comparing Grindr’s actions to a traditional brickand-mortar store helps answer the question of whether

a platform is knowingly active in sexual exploitation.

If an adults-only store, such as a liquor or sex store,

advertised on areas frequented by minors (as Grindr

does through in-app ads on Instagram and TikTok)

and depicted minors entering the adult store (as

Grindr does in depicting school-age users in those

ads), it would be strange to say that they did not know

or constructively know that minors would attempt to

enter the store. Further, if—after soliciting their

presence—the brick-and-mortar store permitted entry

on the mere promise that a consumer was an adult, it

would approach absurdity to claim that the store did

not know that minors would enter the store. Physical

stores cannot, with one side of their mouth, invite

minors in, and then with the other claim they did not

know minors actually come in. Similarly, Grindr

cannot claim ignorance of minors on their app after

seeking them out, ensuring their ease of access, geolocating them, but ignoring their locations, and

asking for their age, but willfully avoiding any actions

that might reveal false claims of majority.

B. With regard to Petitioner’s Beneficiary

Claim, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly read

in a requirement that advertisement

revenues are insufficient for liability,

despite § 1591(a)(2)’s text that liability

attaches whenever one receives “anything

of value.”

The Ninth Circuit further held that Doe’s

beneficiary liability claim failed because Grindr only

“generally benefited from sex traffickers’ use of the

App.” Grindr Inc., 128 F.4th at 1156. The Ninth

Circuit was concerned that the plaintiff did not

sufficiently connect “Grindr’s advertising revenues with

any affirmative conduct by Grindr that furthered the

sex-trafficking venture alleged in this case.” Id. at

1155–56.

In creating this additional requirement, the Ninth

Circuit again relied on Reddit, this time for the

proposition that general benefits are insufficient for a

beneficiary claim. Id. at 1156. Reddit held that

plaintiffs must allege a connection between the

defendant’s actions and the benefit received. Reddit,

Inc., 51 F.4th at 1145-46. The court held that generalized advertisement revenue from CSAM was too

attenuated to state a claim because the CSAM

revenue was on the same terms as “all popular

subreddits.” Id.

But the plain text of 18 U.S.C § 1591(a)(2) provides

no attenuation or causal relationship inquiry. To the

contrary, the text simply requires that a platform

“knowingly…benefits, financially or by receiving

anything of value, from participation in a [human

trafficking] venture,” so long as the defendant also

knows that “the person has not attained the age of 18

years and will be caused to engaged in a commercial

sex act.” 18 U.S.C § 1591(a) (emphasis added). Under

the statute’s plain text, a beneficiary who knows they

are a beneficiary of commercial child abuse must

abstain from gaining that benefit. Failing to do so by

enjoying the resulting advertisement revenue is

sufficient to establish liability. Here, Grindr generates

millions of dollars in revenue each year from hosting

advertisements. Grindr Inc., Grindr Investor Day

2024 Presentation, Grindr.com (June 26, 2024).7

But even if the Ninth Circuit correctly invents

additional requirements, plaintiffs sufficiently alleged

a “causal connection” between Grindr’s actions and

the sex trafficking on the platform. The plaintiff

alleged that Grindr makes its money based on both

advertisements and tiered subscriptions. Pet. 10-11.

(“The more people who use [Grindr’s app] and the

more time they spend on it, the more money Grindr

makes.”) Further, Petitioner alleged Grindr seeks out

minors to join the app through its targeted

advertisements depicting minors using the app.

Pet. 32. Unlike the generalized benefit received by

Reddit for the hosting of CSAM on equal terms as

other content, here Grindr is reaping the benefit from

their business model of actively cultivating minors to

join. This is not a generalized or incidental benefit.

Available at:

https://s203.q4cdn.com/415221501/files/doc_presentation/2024/0

6/Grindr-Investor-Day-6-26-2024.pdf.

Instead it is Grindr’s actual mission – to attract

minors.

In addition to Grindr’s considerable advertisement

revenue, tiered subscriptions represent a substantial

portion of Grindr’s profits. Grindr Inc., Grindr

Investor Day 2024 Presentation, supra. These tiered

subscriptions also form a close nexus between sexual

exploitation and the benefit. Premium features

empower users to utilize enhanced search capabilities,

view profiles “incognito,” and unsend photos and

messages. Grindr Inc., Unlimited, Grindr.com.8

(describing premium features and noting that with

Grindr Unlimited, “nothing will delay your satisfaction”). Each of these additional features can empower

a predator to target minor victims with more

precision, while cloaking themselves with protections

against getting caught.

Available at: https://www.grindr.com/unlimited.

CONCLUSION

Congress enacted FOSTA to ensure that Section

230 no longer shields platforms that knowingly

facilitate or profit from the sexual exploitation of

children. The Ninth Circuit’s decision misreads that

statute, inventing requirements Congress did not

enact and granting immunity to conduct Congress

meant to deter. This case squarely presents an urgent,

recurring question of statutory interpretation with

profound consequences for victims, platforms, and the

uniform application of federal law. The Court should

grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully Submitted,