Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Dennis D. Sadorra, Petitioner v. Starlight Dunes HOA, a California Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporation

APPENDIX

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TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 19,2024....

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APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 19,2024....

3a

APPENDIXC—CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT

OF CALIFORNIA, FILED MAY 30 2024....

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APPENDIX D — RELEVANT STATUTORY

PROVISIONS.................................................

18a

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APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,

FILED JULY 19, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4006

D.C. No.

5:24-cv-00514-JGB-DTB

Central District of California,

Riverside

STARLIGHT DUNES HOA, A CALIFORNIA

NONPROFIT MUTUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DENNIS D. SADORRA, AN INDIVIDUAL,

Defendant-ctr-claimant-Appellant,

v.

DESERT RESORT MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,

A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; et al,

Counter-defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Before: BADE, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

2a

Appendix A

A review of the record demonstrates that this court

lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the order

challenged in the appeal is not reviewable. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(d); Schmitt v. Ins. Co. ofNorth Am., 845 F.2d 1546,

1549 (9th Cir. 1988) (order remanding based on untimely

removal is not reviewable, on appeal or otherwise); Kunzi

v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291, 1293

(9th Cir. 1987) (order remanding a removed action to

state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not

reviewable); see also United States v. Washington, 573

F.2d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1978) (order denying motion to

disqualify judge is not final or appealable). Consequently,

this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.

3a

APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,

FILED JULY 19,2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4009

D.C. No.

5:24-cv-00540-JGB-DTB

Central District of California,

Riverside

STARLIGHT DUNES HOA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DENNIS D. SADORRA, AN INDIVIDUAL,

Defendant-cross-claimant-Appellant,

v.

DESERT RESORT MANAGMENT ASSOCIATION;

et al.,

Cross-defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Before: BADE, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

4a

Appendix B

A review of the record demonstrates that this court

lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the order

challenged in the appeal is not reviewable. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(d); Schmitt v. Ins. Co. ofNorth Am., 845 F.2d 1546,

1549 (9th Cir. 1988) (order remanding based on untimely

removal is not reviewable, on appeal or otherwise); Kunzi

v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291, 1293

(9th Cir. 1987) (order remanding a removed action to

state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not

reviewable); see also United States v. Washington, 573

F.2d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1978) (order denying motion to

disqualify judge is not final or appealable). Consequently,

this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.

53-

APPENDIX C — CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,

FILED MAY 30 2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL

Case Nos. EDCV 24-0514JGB (DTBx)

24-0540JGB (DTBx)

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262 *; 2024 WL 2804100

STARLIGHT DUNES HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION,

v.

DENNIS SADORRA, et al.

May 30,2024, Decided

May 30, 2024, Filed

JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE.

Proceedings: Order (1) GRANTING Plaintiff’s Motions

to Remand (24-0514-Dkt. No. 9; 24-0540 Dkt. No. 12); (2) DENYING Defendant’s

Motion to Disqualify (Dkt. No. 20); and

(3) VACATING the June 3,2024 Hearing

(IN CHAMBERS)

\

6a

Appendix C

Before the Court are Plaintiff Starlight Dunes

Homeowners Association’s (“Starlight” or “Plaintiff”)

motions pertaining to two nearly identical cases: ED

CV 24-0540 (“Complaint Case”); and ED CV 24-0514

(“Cross Complaint Case”). Starlight brings motions to

remand in the Complaint Case (Dkt. No. 12); and the

Cross Complaint Case (Dkt. Nos. 9-10) (collectively, the

“MTR” ).x Defendant Dennis D. Sadorra (“Sadorra” or

“Defendant”) brings a motion to disqualify Judge Jesus

Bernal in the Cross Complaint Case(“MTD,” Dkt. No. 20).

The Court refers to the MTR and MTD collectively as the

“Motions.” The Court finds these matters appropriate for

resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R.

7-15. After considering all papers filed in support of and in

opposition to the Motions, the Court GRANTS the MTR

and DENIES the MTD. The Court VACATES the June

3, 2024 hearing.

I.

BACKGROUND

On July 8, 2020, Starlight filed a complaint against

Sadorra in the Superior Court of California, County of

Riverside. (“Complaint,” Cross Complaint Case, Dkt.

No. 12, Ex. 4.) The Complaint alleges two claims: (1)

breach of covenant; and (2) declaratory relief. (See id.) On

August 12,2020, Sadorra filed a cross-complaint against

1. Both of these cases involve the same underlying state court

action—in one case, defendant removed the Complaint, in the other,

defendant removed the Cross Complaint. Additionally, the motions to

remand, oppositions, and replies in each case are identical. As such,

the Court need not distinguish between the two cases or conduct

separate analysis for the purposes of this Order.

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Appendix C

Starlight in the Superior Court of California, County of

Riverside. (“Cross-Complaint,” Cross Complaint Case,

Dkt. No. 1 at 5) (collectively, “State Court Action”). The

Cross-Complaint alleges six claims: (1) breach of contract;

(2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) violations of

the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Code Reg.

§ 12120-12130 (“FEHA”); (5) intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”); and (6) declaratory relief.

(See id.) On October 3, 2023, the state court scheduled a

trial in the State Court Action for January 26, 2024 and

later continued the trial date to March 8, 2024. (Cross

Complaint Case, Dkt. No. 12, Ex. 5.)

On March 7,2024, Sadorra filed two separate notices

of removal to remove the State Court Action to this Court.

(“NOR,” Cross Complaint Case, Dkt. No. 1); see Complaint

Case, Dkt. No. 1.) Sadorra removed the actions based on

federal question jurisdiction. (NOR at 2; see Complaint

Case.)

On March 7,2024, Sadorra filed a request to proceed

in forma pauperis. (“IFP,” Dkt. No. 2.)2 On April 8,2024,

Starlight filed this MTR on the grounds that the NOR is

untimely, defective, and lacks federal jurisdiction. (MTR

at 2.) In support, Starlight filed the declaration of Kyle

E. Lakin (“Lakin Deck,” Dkt. No. 11); and a request for

judicial notice (“RJN,” Dkt. No. 12).3

2. Unless the Court specifies otherwise, all docket numbers

refer to the Cross Complaint Case.

3. The Court may take judicial notice of matters that are either

(1) generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction

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Appendix C

On April 8, 2024, Sadorra filed a notice of dismissal

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a) or (c).4

(“Notice of Dismissal,” Dkt. No. 16.) On April 15, 2024,

Sadorra filed this MTD pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.

(MTD.) In support, Sadorra filed his own declaration.

(“Sadorra MTD Decl.,” Dkt. No. 21.) On April 16, 2024,

Sadorra opposed the MTR. (“MTR Opposition,” Dkt.

No. 24.) In support, Sadorra filed his own declaration.

(“Sadorra MTR Decl.,” Dkt. No. 23.)

On April 29, 2024, Starlight replied to the MTR

Opposition. (“MTR Reply,” Dkt. No. 25.) The same day,

Starlight filed an objection to the Sadorra MTR Decl.

(“Sadorra MTR Decl. Objection,” Dkt. No. 26.) On May

10, 2024, Sadorra filed a response to the MTR Reply.5

(Dkt. No. 31.)

On May 8, 2024, Sadorra filed a response to the

Sadorra MTR Decl. Objection. (Dkt. No. 28.) On May 9,

or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b). Because the Court “may take judicial notice of court

filings and other matters of public record,” Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC

v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006), the Court

GRANTS the R JN.

4. Sadorra, who is the defendant in this matter, incorrectly

checked a box which states “[t]his action is dismissed by the

Plaintiff(s) in its entirety.” (Dkt. No. 16.)

5. Sadorra filed a surreply even though he did not request or

receive leave to file a surreply. (Dkt. No. 31.) Because this filing

violates Local Rule 7-10, “[a]bsent prior written order of the Court,

the opposing party shall not file a response to the reply,” the Court

will not consider the surreply (Dkt. No. 31). L. R. 7-10.

9a

Appendix C

and May 15, 2024, Sadorra filed motions to continue the

hearing on the MTR.6 (Dkt. Nos. 30, 32.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Disqualification

Under 28 U.S.C. § 144 (“Section 144”), a party may

seek to disqualify a judge based on assertions stated in

an affidavit that “the judge before whom the matter is

pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against

him or in favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. To

be timely, the affidavit “shall be filed not less than ten days

before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding

is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to

file it within such time.” Id. It also must “be accompanied

by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made

in good faith.” Id.

A motion to disqualify a judge may also be brought

under 28 U.S.C. § 455 (“Section 455”), which addresses

additional circumstances that may merit a judge’s recusal.

Section 455 provides that a judge “shall disqualify

himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality

might reasonably be questioned.” Id. § 455(a). Recusal

is also proper “[wjhere [a judge] has a personal bias or

prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of

disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”

Id. § 455(b)(1). “While no per se rule exists regarding

6. In light of this Order, the Court DENIES AS MOOT

Sadorra’s requests to continue.

10a

Appendix C

the time frame in which recusal motions [under Section

455] should be filed... recusal motions should be filed with

reasonable promptness after the ground for such a motion

is ascertained.” Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731,

733 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “the substantive

standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 455 is the same: ‘[WJhether a reasonable person with

knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United

States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450,1453 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th

Cir. 1986)). A party may demonstrate disqualifying bias

or prejudice when “the alleged bias [ ] stem[s] from an

‘extrajudicial source.’” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.

540, 554-56, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994)).

“[JJudicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid

basis for a bias or partiality recusal motion.” Id. at 555.

Moreover, “opinions formed by the judge on the basis

of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of

the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not

constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless

they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that

would make fair judgment impossible.” Id.

The party seeking disqualification bears a “substantial

burden” and affidavits in support of disqualification

are strictly construed against the party seeking

disqualification. Id. The affidavit must set forth “facts and

reasons” establishing the judge’s bias, including: material

facts stated with particularity; facts that, if true, would

11a

Appendix C

convince a reasonable person that bias exists; and facts

showing that the bias is personal, rather than judicial, in

nature. Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1016,

1021-22 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see Grimes v. United States, 396

F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1968) (“Detail of definite time and

place and character are an absolute necessity to prevent

the abuse” of Section 144) (internal quotations omitted).

Conclusory allegations without details are not sufficient.

See Martelli v. City of Sonoma, 359 F. Supp. 397, 399

(N.D. Cal. 1973) (“In order to be legally sufficient^] the

allegations, taken as true, must contain information that

is definite as to time and place”). “The judge is presumed

to be qualified, and there is a substantial burden upon the

movant to show that such is not the case.” United States

v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 501 (N.D. Cal 1976).

The judge against whom an affidavit of bias is filed

“may pass on its legal sufficiency because ... ‘the reasons

and facts for the belief the litigant entertains are an

essential part of the affidavit, and must give fair support

to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede

impartiality of judgment.’” United States v. Azhocar, 581

F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Berger v. United

States, 255 U.S. 22, 32-34, 41 S. Ct. 230, 65 L. Ed. 481

(1922)). “Only after the legal sufficiency of the affidavit

is determined does it become the duty of the judge to

‘proceed no further’ in the case.” Azhocar, 581 F.2d at 738

(quoting United States v. Montecalvo, 545 F.2d 684, 685

(9th Cir. 1976)). The Ninth Circuit has “held repeatedly

that the challenged judge himself should rule on the legal

sufficiency of a recusal motion in the first instance.” See

United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934,940 (9th Cir. 1986).

12a

Appendix C

B. Remand

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may

remove a matter to federal court where the district

court would have original jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc.

v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,392,107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed.

2d 318 (1987). Federal courts have limited jurisdiction,

“possessing only that power authorized by Constitution

and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256, 133 S.

Ct. 1059,185 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2013). As such, a defendant may

remove civil actions in which a federal question exists or in

which complete diversity of citizenship between the parties

exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,1332. A removing defendant must file

a notice of removal within thirty days after receipt of the

initial pleading. Id. § 1446(b).

The Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] the removal

statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[fjederal

jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the

right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

980 F.2d 564,566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The strong presumption

against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant

always has the burden of establishing that removal is

proper.” Jackson v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC,

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154837, 2014 WL 5514142, at *6

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014). The court must resolve doubts

regarding removability in favor of remanding the case to

state court. Id.

13a

Appendix C

III.

DISCUSSION

Sadorra moves to disqualify Judge Jesus Bernal

because his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned

due to his prior erroneous ruling in a separate but related

federal case,” as well as “potential conflicts of interest.”

(MTD at 1.) Starlight moves the Court to remand this

matter on the grounds that removal is untimely, defective,

and lacks jurisdiction. (MTR at 2.) The Court addresses

each argument in turn.

A. Motion to Disqualify

While Sadorra’s MTD asserts that Judge Bernal is

impartial based on a previous ruling and “inconsistency

in reported assets,” Sadorra’s allegations fail to indicate

that this “Court’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Hayes v. Nat’l Football League, 463 F. Supp.

1174,1181 (C.D. Cal. 1979).

Sadorra asserts that Judge Bernal must be disqualified

because he presided over Sadorra’s separate but related

case (Case No. 5:24-cv-0396)—“Judge Bernal’s decision

to dismiss Sadorra’s well-pleaded RICO complaint

as frivolous, despite the clear presence of alleged

racketeering activity, raises significant concerns about

his ability to fairly and impartially adjudicate the instant

case.” (Motion at 2.) Sadorra asserts that the dismissal

constitutes an “erroneous ruling” and appealed the

decision—the appeal is still pending. See Dennis D.

Sadorra v. Starlight Dunes HOA, et at., Case No. 5:24-cv0396-JGB-DTB (C.D. Cal. 2024).

14a

Appendix C

Under Sections 144 and 455 “the alleged prejudice

must result from an extrajudicial source; a judge’s

prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal.”

Studley, 783 F.2d at 939. Sadorra’s allegation is not

extrajudicial because it involves “the judge’s performance

while presiding over [his] case.” Id. Because “[ajdverse

rulings do not constitute the requisite bias or prejudice,”

Sadorra’s allegations are insufficient. Azhocar, 581 F.2d

at 739; see Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (“[JJudicial rulings

alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality motion ... they are proper grounds for appeal,

not recusal.”); see Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1163

(9th Cir. 1981) (“In the absence of specific allegations of

personal bias, prejudice, or interest, neither prior adverse

rulings of a judge nor his participation in a related or prior

proceeding is sufficient.”).

Sadorra also alleges that “a discrepancy has been

discovered between Judge Bernal’s Judiciary Financial

Disclosure and a report prepared by a private investigator

hired by [Sadorra].” (Motion at 3.) Sadorra admits the

“specific nature of these potential conflicts is not yet

clear,” and provides no evidence except for what appears

to be a blurry screenshot of a location history on Jesus

Bernal. (Id. at 5-6, 9.) “Detail of ‘definite time and place

and character’ are an absolute necessity to prevent the

abuse” of §§ 144 and 455(a). Grimes v. United States,

396 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1968). Conclusory allegations

without details are not sufficient. See Martelli v. City of

Sonoma, 359 F. Supp. 397,399 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (“In order

to be legally sufficient[,] the allegations, taken as true,

must contain information that is definite as to time and

place.”); see United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450,

15a

Appendix C

1453 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, Sadorra offers no evidence that would lead

a reasonable person to conclude that Judge Bernal’s

impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See

Rodriguez v. Mortimer, 145 F.3d 1340 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citing Hirsh v. Justices ofSupreme Court of Cal., 67 F.3d

708, 715 (9th Cir.1995)) (“Rodriquez also contends that

the district court erred by denying his motion to recuse

Judge Panner on the basis of personal bias. We review

for abuse of discretion and we affirm because Rodriguez

failed to present any evidence to support his motion for

recusal.”) Sadorra identifies no facts to support the claim

that Judge Bernal is biased toward Sadorra. Sadorra’s

conclusory statements are insufficient. Liteky, 510 U.S.

at 555 (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute

a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion ... they are

proper grounds for appeal, not recusal”).

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the MTD.

B. Motion to Remand

Next, the Court turns to the question of remand.

The Court first considers whether removal was timely.

Timeliness for removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)

which requires that the notice of removal be filed within

30 days after the receipt by the defendant of a copy of

the initial pleading, or within 30 days after the service of

summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has

then been filed in court and is not required to be served

on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(b)(1).

16a

Appendix C

Here, Starlight initiated the State Court Action on

July 8, 2020, and served Sadorra with the Complaint

and summons on July 16, 2020. (Motion at 9; RJN, Ex.

6.) At no time during the three and a half years of state

court proceedings did Sadorra dispute the state court’s

jurisdiction. Instead, Sadorra “actively participated in

the action” by filing an answer to the Complaint, and

litigating a Cross-Complaint up to the eve of trial. (Motion

at 9; RJN, Ex. 5.) Sadorra argues that removal was timely

because of a “recent discovery” which allowed the State

Court Action “to be publicly traded on the U.S. stock

market.” (MTR Opposition at 9-10.) Sadorra contends

that upon this discovery, he promptly filed a federal RICO

complaint against Starlight, which is directly related to

and intertwined with the claims in the instant matter.

(Id.) Sadorra also argues that removal was timely and

proper because of “the revelation of the [state court]

judge’s bias.” (Id.) Sadorra largely fails to include any of

this alleged information in the NOR and merely states

that he has “been augmenting initial complaints that

shape Federal Questions . .. adding more claims and

individuals involved in violations of the First, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments, including acts that exceed the

threshold for RICO Complaint.”7 (NOR at 2.) Sadorra fails

to demonstrate any valid excuse for his three-year delay

in removal, nor has he shown any bad faith that prevented

him from removing the action. (MTR Reply at 2; see MTR

Opposition.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the MTR

on the grounds that the removal was not timely.

7. Sadorra does not allege RICO violations in either of the

instant cases.

17a

Appendix C

Although Sadorra’s lack of timeliness is sufficient

grounds to remand this case, the Court briefly addresses

the lack of federal jurisdiction. Starlight argues that

remand is appropriate because there is no federal

jurisdiction—the parties are not diverse, the amount in

controversy is less than $75,000, and there is no federal

question jurisdiction. (MTR at 10-12.) Sadorra argues

that there is both federal question jurisdiction based on

his RICO allegations and diversity jurisdiction based on

“complete diversity of citizenship between the parties” and

his amount in controversy of more than $75,000. (MTR

Opposition at 15-20.) The instant case does not involve

a RICO claim or any other claim that would implicate a

federal question. {See NOR; MTR Reply at 3.) Sadorra

does not substantively dispute the fact that all parties

are citizens of California, as such there is no diversity

jurisdiction. (See MTR Opposition); 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the MTR on the grounds

that the instant case lacks federal jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Sadorra’s

motion to disqualify Judge Bernal and GRANTS

Starlight’s motions to remand and REMANDS both of

these actions to the California Superior Court for the

County of Riverside. The Court VACATES the June 3,

2024 hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

18a

APPENDIX D — RELEVANT STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

STATUTES

a. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of

Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of

which the district courts of the United States have original

jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the

defendants, to the district court of the United States for

the district and division embracing the place where such

action is pending

b. 28 U.S.C. § 1443

Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions,

commenced in a State court may be removed by the

defendant to the district court of the United States for

the district and division embracing the place wherein it

is pending:

(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in

the courts of such State a right under any law providing

for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States,

or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;

(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any

law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act

on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law.

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Appendix D

c. 28 U.S.C. § 144

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court

makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the

judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal

bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any

adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further

therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such

proceeding.

d. 42. U.S.C. § 1982

All citizens of the United States shall have the same

right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white

citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and

convey real and personal property.