Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gilda Ryan, et al., Petitioners v. County of Imperial, California, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 18, 2025
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.Sr
- ll4fo
Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
FEB 1 8 2025
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Dkt. #
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
Gilda Ryan, etal
Petitioner(s)
v.
i
i
Imperial County etal
Respondents)
On Petition For Writ of Certiorari To
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
/
Gilda Ryan, and
Joseph Ryan
self- rep resented
53 Sunset Way
PO Box 183
Palo Verde, Ca. 92266
760-854-1009
i
I
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
1. Whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
sanctioning of The District Court’s effective use of
a pro-se litigants §1983 based civil action as a type
of on-the-job training platform for inexperienced
Jurist and attorneys; Leading to Petitioner’s
claims being decided on the basis of false
narratives, alterations of caselaw text, and legal
propositions that conflict with Supreme Court
precedent, constitutes the type of severe departure
from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings that calls out for an exercise of This
Court’s powers of supervision.
2. Whether The Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals,
has severely departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, by ratifying the
District Court’s failure to acknowledge or properly
address a large volume of sanctionable conduct
occurring in an action, including but not limited to
a comprehensive denial of due process inflicted on
self-represented Plaintiffs, after they requested
terminating sanctions be levied against members
of the bar association and the clients they
represent, to a degree that calls for an exercise of
The Supreme Court’s powers of supervision.
II. PARTIES TO PROCEEDING
PETITIONERS:
Gilda Ryan, and Joseph Ryan, Petitioners
RESPONDENTS:
COUNTY OF IMPERIAL; GILBERT OTERO,
Imperial County District Attorney; RAYMOND
LOERA,
Imperial
County
Sheriff;
FRED
MIRAMONTES, Imperial County UnderSheriff;
KATHERINE TURNER, Imperial County Counsel;
ADAM GREGORY CROOK, Imp. County Counsel;
TONY ROUHOTAS, Jr., Imperial County CEO;
ESPERANZA COLIO-WARREN, Imperial County.
Vice-CEO;
RAYMOND
CASTILLO,
RYAN
KELLEY,
MICHAEL
KELLEY,
LUIS
PLANCARTE, JESUS ESCOBAR, Imperial County
Supervisors; BLANCA ACOSTA, Imperial County.
Clerk of The Board; CLIFTON ERRO, RENE
MCNISH, Imperial County Sheriff Deputies; PALO
VERDE COUNTY WATER DISTRICT; RONALD
WOODS, JESS PRESTON, JAN AYALA, DAVID
KHOURY, PVWD County Board members; KATHI
FRICE SANDERS, Clerk of PVCWD Board;
BARBARA HOPTON; DONNA LORD; CELESTE
PRESTON; DAVID AYALA; THOMAS CALVERT;
PATSY
CALVERT;
ANNE
MARIE
DELCASTILLO; YUMA SUN, INC., DBA Palo
Verde Valley Times; URIEL AVENDANO; LISA
REILLY
III. OPINIONS/ORDERS RELATED CASES
ORDERS BY APPELLATE COURT
Gilda Ryan et al v. Imperial County et al: 23-55042
1. Ninth Cir. No. 23-55042,
MANDATE (11/27/2024),............
Document 59,
..................Pg. 1
2. Ninth Cir. No. 23-55042, Document 56, ORDER
(denying Rehearing and Rehearing enbanc)
(11/19/2024),
Pg. 2-3
3. Ninth Cir. No. 23-55042, Document 54.1,
MEMORANDUM (09/192024),................ Pg. 4-11
ORDERS FROM DISTRICT COURT
Ryan v. Imperial County: No. 3:21cv-01076-JO-LR
4. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 152, JUDGMENT IN A
Pg. 12-16
CIVIL CASE, (Dec. 07, 2022)
5. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 151, ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S RECUSAL MOTION, (Dec. 07,
Pg. 16-22
2022),
6. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 150, ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF JOSEPH RYAN’S RECUSAL
MOTION, (Dec. 07, 2022)....................... Pg. 23-25
7. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 149, ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS
Pg. 26-28
(Dec. 07, 2022)
m
8. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 134, ORDER
GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, (Sept. 29,
2022),
...Pg. 29-59
9. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 133, ORDER
GRANTING MEDIA DEFENDANT’S ANTISLAPP MOTION TO STRIKE, (Sept. 29, 2022)
...................................................................... Pg. 60-73
10. Dist.Ct.So.Cal.Dkt. 132, ORDER GRANTING
WATER DISTRICT DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO SET-ASIDE DEFAULT (Sept. 29, 2022)
Pg. 74-78
11. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 6, ORDER OF
DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Filed:
Pg. 79-80
July, 14, 2021)
12. Dist.Ct.So.Cal.,Dkt. 142,141, Minute Orders
by Judge Jinsook Ohta, (October 26, 2022) .. Pg. 81
iv
IV. TABLE OF CONTENTS
I
QUESTIONS PRESENTED......................
II
II. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
III. ORDERS FROM RELATED CASES .... Ill, IV
V, VI, VII
IV. TABLE OF CONTENTS..............
VIII
V. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......
IX
VI. JURISDICTION, THIS COURT
VII. CONST. PROVISIONS, ORDINANCES .... X
1
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............
1-4
§1-4. Background Facts.......................................
4-11
§5-8. Litigation Facts and developments........
7
§9. Judge Ohta assigned, matter continues .
7
§10. Defaulted Parties appear 4 Months Late
8
§11. Petitioner’s Request Sanctions................
8
§12. Judge Ohta Dismisses all Causes...........
9
§13. Sample Judge Ohta’s Findings/Rulings ..
§14. “Only” removed caselaw text. 12b6 applied .... 9
9
§15. §1983 action turned into defamation ...
10
§16. Fake Cause created and dismissed.....
11
§17. Heckler’s Veto ignored in ruling...........
11
§18. Magistrate meets defendants ex-parte
12
§19. Orders Finalized, Requests Denied.....
13-14
§20-22. Bad Sanctions test altered, ratified
15
§23. Standards of Review used by Court —
§IX. JURISDICTION CT FIRST INSTANCE .. 16
16
§X. REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT
16
§24. Appeals Court’s Severe Departure.....
17
§25. Critical Court Review obscure matter
18-20
§26. Shocking abuse of Rights unremedied
§27. Jurist refuse to acknowledge misconduct. 20-21
21
§28. Attorneys engaged in lots of misconduct
§29. Attorneys won’t come clean with Court. 21-22
§30. Abysmal adjudication denies due process ..22-23
§31. Horrible record with lack of 1A knowledge ... 23
v
23-31
§32. Findings, orders, defective (§A-L) ...
31
§33. Magistrate recusal done incorrectly
§34-36. Officers of The Court bad approach .... 31-33
§37. Memo done without Jurist involvement... 33-34
§38. Request rehearings gaslit by staff too .... 34-35
35
§39. Bar members abusing Pro se is immoral
§40. Harming child to censor speech is cold ..
36
§41. Repugnant ordinance remains if no review ... 37
37
XI. PETITIONER’S REQUESTS........
APPENDIX CONTENTS
Pg. 1
1. Ninth Circuit Mandate
2. Order denying Rehearing, Rhrng enbanc Pg. 2-3
Pg. 4-11
3. Ninth Cir. Memorandum of Decision
ORDERS FROM DISTRICT COURT
Pg. 12-16
4. Judgment in a Civil case
5. Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for recusal of
Pg. 16-22
Magistrate Lupe Rodriguez
6. Order denying Joseph Ryan’s request for recusal
Pg. 23-25
of Judge Jinsook Ohta
7. Order denying Motions for Sanctions .. Pg. 26-28
Pg. 29-59
8. Order Granting Motions to Dismiss
9. Order granting Media defendant’s anti-SLAAP
Pg. 60-73
Motion to strike
10. Order granting County Water District’s request
Pg. 74-78
to set-aside ten defaults
11. Judge Burns Order of Dismissal with leave to
Pg. 79-80
amend
12. Minute Orders issued by Judge Ohta..... Pg. 81
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
ORDINANCES AT ISSUE IN MATTER
82
13a. 1ST AMENDMENT:......... ..................
82
13b. 14™ AMENDMENT: Section One: ..
13c. IMPERIAL COUNTY PUBLIC MEETING
82-83
ORDINANCE
vi
OTHER RELEVANT MATERIAL
14. Exhibit #11, attached to Request to Recuse
Judge Ohta (doc 140), showing how Norwalk’s
ordinance has a warning clause, that Imperial
County’s ordinance lacks...................................... 84
15. Exhibit #11, attached to request for recusal
Judge Ohta, illustrating removal of word ‘only’
from caselaw ruling.............................................. 85
16. Exhibit #1, attached to Ryan’s MTCR compiling
86-87
caselaw text altered by attorneys
17. Select Text from Plaintiffs Facial and asapplied challenges to Constitutionality of Imperial
88-101
County’s meeting ordinance,
18. Select Text from Petitioner’s FAC wherein
102
defendants are informed why being sued
19. Select Text from FAC, where Plaintiffs explain
events happening in 2018 pled to establish Monell
policy, like standard operating procedure... 103
20. Select Text from FAC, illustrating that
Petitioner’s pled multiple basis’ of Monell liability,
not reached by District or Appeals Court.... 104-09
21. Select Text from FAC, illustrating that the
Ryan’s pled a Paul-stigma based upon federal law
against media, and not defamation.................. 110
22. Select Text from Plaintiffs first complaint
illustrating the County Supervisor’s have a policy
of not ‘tolerating’ criticism of public officials ... Ill
23. Text from Plaintiffs first complaint (text from
a claim filed with County), illustrating
112
policymakers indifferent to harming child,
vii
V. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1. Litekv v. United States. 510 U.S. 540
22
2. Lozman v City of Riviera Beach. 585 U.S._
18, 19, 26
(2018)
3. U.S. Const, amend. I
4. U.S. Const, amend. XIV
5. 18 U.S.C. §241
9
6. 28 U.S.C. §1331
16
6. 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3)l
16
6. 42. U.S.C. §1983
4, 16
7. ICRCBM(II)(D)(3)
24, 25, 37
8. Supreme Court Rule 29 (SCt. R. 29)
viii
IX
VI. JURISDICTION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the Judgment of The District Court, on September
19th, 2024. See Pet. Appx. 11.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
entertained Appellant’s Request for Rehearing,
and Request for Rehearing enbanc and denied
review on November 19th, 2025. See Pet. Appx. 2-3.
The Court received petitioner’s timely filed
petition for writ of certiorari and pursuant to
Supreme Court rule 29 {Set. R. 29), on March 6th,
2025, this Court granted the Petitioner’s sixty days
to file a petition for writ of certiorari that corrects
deficiencies noted by The Court, and that complies
with all other applicable rules for filing a writ of
certiorari in The United States Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
consider Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
IX
VII. PROVISIONS AND ORDINANCE
1. 1st Amendment to The U.S. Constitution.
U.S. Const, amend. 1.
See Pet. Appx. pg. 82
2. 14th Amendment to The U. S. Constitution.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
See Pet. Appx. pg. 82
3. IMPERIAL COUNTY RULES FOR THE
CONDUCT OF BOARD MEETINGS, §11. ROLE
OF BOARD CHAIRPERSON. §D.
Short form citation: ICRCBM(II)(D)(3).
See Pet.Appx. pg. 82-83
x
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. BACKGROUND FACTS: EVENT AT ISSUE
This matter involves County government
officials creating a pre-meditated plan to retaliate
against Ryan family members, by ‘setting them up
like bowling pins’, to create an opportunity for
Imperial County’s policymakers and their allies to
inflict various harms upon all Ryan family
members, to punish the Ryan’s for their previous
speech concerning their performance in office (see
introductory section of Plaintiff-petitioner’s FAC,
repr. Id in Pet. FAC 2-ER-65, Ins. 9-15; and see Pet
Appx. pg. 102), while entertaining themselves in
the process. See 9th Cir. Dkt. No. 41, Petitioner’s
Motion to Correct The Record, Ex. No. 6, souvenir
photos taken before event by County agent.
After receiving 24-hour advance-notice of
what topics Gilda Ryan and Joseph Ryan would
like to speak about at one of their meetings, The
Imperial County Supervisor Ryan Kelley caused
the Ryan’s to be invited to the podium during the
public comment period of a County Supervisor’s
off-site meeting held on June 4th, 2019 in Palo
Verde California, not to actually let them speak
about the conduct in office of County officers as the
Ryan’s requested, but rather to accomplish illicit
aims (retaliation-driven deprivation of rights, etc.,
done pursuant to policy). Id Pet.Appx. pg. Ill', see
Pet. App. excerpts 2-ER-58-72, see video of meeting
at 55:00 to 1:03:00, available at Imperial County
website, under the Supervisors agenda entries for
June 4th, 2019, where content from offsite meeting
held in Palo Verde California, is available using
the ‘audio’ link, which links to the following URL:
1
/i££ps.7/imperial.granicus.com/player/clip/1773?view_id=2&
redirect=true (hereafter, Id at VOM [time])
2. ACTUAL WORDS SPOKEN BY GILDA
RYAN AND JOSEPH RYAN, BEFORE BOTH
WERE DETAINED AS A MATTER OF LAW
Gilda Ryan only spoke the following words
about a public official’s performance in office at
and during a previous County District meeting
before she was confronted by both The Clerk of The
Board of Supervisors and a Sheriff Deputy, and
intimidated into forfeiting the microphone and
leaving the venue.
56:12 - Hello, my name is Gilda Ryan.
56: 15 - You know we had a problem in here.
56:16 - We had a problem in here when on May 17th
we went to a meeting in there,
OK... .
56:19- Your member, Jessie Preston
He’s threatening this little girl to kidnap her
56:28- I’m asking,
56:29 - I’m asking,
56:37- Leave Me Alone,
56:38 - Leave me Alone
56:52 - We did
Id. in video of meeting at issues, at stated times;
and see 9th Cir. Ct. App. dkt. 41, Appellant’s Motion
to Correct the Record, exhibit #4, Timeline of
Events Related to Gilda Ryan’s speech and
detainment, pg. 1-4.
2
Petitioner Joseph Ryan simply tried to
defend his wife’s honor and only spoke the
following words directly in response to the wife of a
County official Gilda Ryan was commenting about
(pointing directly at such person, and no one else
as he spoke), before he was detained as a matter of
law and forced to forfeit his own speech assembly,
association, and petition rights in and outside of
the venue for the remainder of the evening.
56:26 - Yes he did threaten this little girl
56:29 - You weren’t there
Id. in VOM, at stated times; and see 9th App.
dkt. 41, Pet. Motion to Correct the Record (hereafter
MTCR), ex #4, pg. 1-2.
3. GOVERNMENT’S HECKLERS ENABLED BY
SHERIFF DEPUTIES ON SCENE
In accord with The County’s premeditated
plan, instead of confronting persons actually
disturbing the meeting at issue (by heckling Gilda
and Joseph Ryan in an out-of-control manner from
their seats in the audience), each of the numerous
Sheriff Deputies at the scene were instructed,
beforehand, to either focus all law enforcement
activity on inhibiting and stopping the speech of
The Ryan’s, and making a public display of their
detainment (Id at. 56:00 to 1:10:00), or to stay out
of camera view unless needed (see Pet FAC 2-ER16, Ins. 12-14, and Id. in video at 58:02-09, where
officer seemingly signals to other deputy’s, that
can’t be seen on the video recording).
3
4. VIDEO OF MEETING AT ISSUE WITHHELD
FROM PUBLIC, THEN ALTERED BEFORE
PUBLISHED OVER ONE YEAR AFTER EVENT
After the meeting at issue took place, County
officials failed to publish a video of the public
meeting at issue, upon its’ completion, as is the
norm. Id. Pet. FAC, at 2-ER-67, §38.
Over a year later, after assistant County
Counsel Eric Havens repeatedly denied a video of
the meeting at issue existed at all, The County of
Imperial’s agents did cause a video of the meeting
at issue to be published at a link on the County’s
website. Id. 2-ER-67, §39. However, before
releasing the video to the public, The County used
commonly available software to manipulate the
recording’s audio tracks, so that the words yelled
by the wife of the public official that verbally
accosted Gilda Ryan, just after Gilda Ryan tried to
speak from the podium, were removed from the
recording, along with noise made by other
defendants, engaged in similar behavior at the
County’s behest. Id. at, 2-ER-67, §40, 41; and Id.
video of meeting at issue, at 56:30 to 56:40, where
yelling noise that seems to come from a woman who
stands up and faces Gilda Ryan, can be heard for a
fraction of a second (id. about 56:31) before it’s
replaced by a gargling, crackling noise.
5. ON THE TWO-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF
THE MEETING AT ISSUE, PETITIONERS
FILED THEIR ACTION
On June 4th, 2021, Plaintiffs Joseph and
Gilda Ryan filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983 in The Southern California Federal District
Court which named a relatively large number of
Policymakers, public officials, and law enforcement
4
officers employed by The County of Imperial as
defendants. Also named were Private parties
alleged to have acted in concert with government
officials in order to carry-out or otherwise support
the County policymakers plan to violate the rights.
(see PI. FAC id. at 2-ER-50-78).
6. FIRST COMPLAINT DISMISSED FOR
BEING TOO LONG. FAC LIMITED TO
THIRTY PAGES
On July 14th, 2021, just after the Ryan’s
completed physical service of their initial
complaint on over fifty defendants, honorable
Judge Alan Burns dismissed the Ryan’s initial
complaint, limited any FAC to thirty pages, and
requiring the Ryan’s drop their children as
plaintiffs. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. No. 6, id. Pet. Appx. 5455.
After dismissal, the Ryan’s complied with
Judge Burn’s directives, and restarted their action;
which still included facial and as-applied
ordinance challenges. See Dist.Ct. Dkt.9, and 9.1.
Then, on October 21st, 2021, The District
Court transferred the Ryan’s matter to honorable
Judge Curiel’s docket. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. No. 59.
7. THE RYAN’S ARE THREATENED WITH
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, TWICE
IN A ROW, DUE TO JURIST’ MISTAKES
The Ryan’s filed ten simple requests for
entry of clerk’s-defaults (not entry of defaultjudgment) with the Clerk of Courts1; However,
1 The docket no longer contains a record of the Ryan’s filing
of ten entries of clerk’s defaults. The statement in Judge
5
honorable Judge Gonzalo Curiel instructed the
Clerk of Court to reject the Ryan’s request(s) for
not including points and authorities (prove-up
material) with each request, and threatened the
Ryan’s with civil and criminal sanctions for not
doing so. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. No. 65. The Ryan’s
wrote to the clerk of court and requested to be
allowed to file a new set of clerks-defaults. Judge
Curiel then threatened the Ryan’s with civil and
criminal sanctions, again, for purportedly sending
correspondence to the Judge.2 Id. Dkt. No. 75.
8. THREE SETS OF ATTORNEYS AND
CLIENTS ANSWERED COMPLAINT
Three sets of attorneys, representing
defendants associated with The County of
Imperial, a local media entity and a group of
private parties accused of acting in concert with
County officials, responded to the Ryan’s suit;
filing three motions to dismiss in November and
December of 2021. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. entries No.’s
67, 88, 101. In addition, attorneys representing the
media filed an anti-SLAAP motion to strike,
seeking dismissal of The Ryan’s §1983 based
federal cause of action based upon the Paul stigma
doctrine, as well Appellant’s only pendant state
claim. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. No. 87.
Curiel’s order (#65) indicating only one entry of default was
thrown out, is not correct.
2 Which did not happen. The Ryan’s sent their correspondence
to The Clerk of Court. See Dkt. 75, copy of letter to clerk.
6
9. NEW DISTRICT JUDGE LACKING BASIC
JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE ASSIGNED TO
RYAN FAMILY’S MATTER
On January 6th, 2022, about three weeks
after honorable Judge Jinsook Ohta’s was
appointed to be a Federal Court District Judge, the
Ryan’s action was transferred to the Jurist docket.
See Dist.Ct. Dkt.No. 110.
Unfortunately, Judge Ohta hadn’t authored
a single judicial order and hadn’t ever overseen a
single jury-trial before the full Senate approved
the jurist appointment to the federal judiciary. See
‘SENATE QUESTIONNAIRE, PUBLIC’, records of
The Senate Judiciary committee, Nomination of
Judge Jinsook Ohta, Section 13, Part (a)(i), and
(b).
10. TEN DEFENDANTS ANSWER SUMMONS
OVER FOUR MONTHS LATE, AND REQUEST
ENTRIES OF DEFAULT BE SET-ASIDE
On March 4th, 2022, ten defendants
associated with the local Palo Verde County Water
District appeared through an attorney and
requested defaults entered against them the
previous fall be set-aside. See Dist.Ct. Dkt.115.
Without submitting a single declaration from any
one of his ten clients, the attorney for the ten
defaulted parties (attorney Orlando Foote Jr.)
claimed in his own declaration, that he’d forgotten
all about the action for a few months (see 4-ER-548
§22, and 549 §23), and that not one of his ten
clients, his staff, nor anyone else, had reminded
him the case was ongoing during the default-period
(over four months time). Attorney Orlando Foote
also submitted a declaration wherein he admitted
7
repeatedly inhibiting or avoiding service of process
of the Ryan’s FAC on his ten clients; and wouldn’t
even identify who he purported to be representing3.
See docket, 115.1, 4-ER-540-550, Dec. of Orlando
Foote, specifically at Id at 4-ER-545-6, §§§12, 13,
14.
11. PETITIONERS FILED REQUESTS FOR
SANCTIONS AGAINST THREE SETS OF
ATTORNEYS APPEARING IN THE ACTION
In August, and October of 2022, The Ryan’s
filed requests for terminating sanctions against
three sets of attorneys appearing in the action, and
by extension, their clients (petitioner’s averred
should be held responsible the conduct of their
chosen representative). See Dist.Ct. dkt. #128, 129,
131.
12. AFTER THE RYAN’S REQUESTED
SANCTIONS, JUDGE
OHTA SET-ASIDE
DEFAULTS AND DISMISSED ACTIONS
After the Ryan’s filed their requests for
sanctions, and terminating sanctions against two
sets of attorneys (and their clients), in August of
2022, Judge Ohta released orders on September
29, 2022, granting all requests to set-aside
defaults, dismissing all of The Ryan’s actions, and
granting the media defendant’s anti-SLAPP
motion to strike. See Dist.Ct. dkt. No. 132, 133,
134, repr. in Pet. Appx. pg. 30-70.
3 The attorneys intransigence caused the Ryan’s to have to
serve each of his ten clients with physical service of their FAC
at each of their residences or offices. See dist. Ct. dkt. entries.
8
13.
SAMPLE
OF
SOME
DETAILS
CONNECTED TO CONTENT OF JUDGE
OHTA’S ORDERS:
14. REMOVAL OF WORD “ONLY” FROM
CASELAW RULING , CHANGES STANDARD
OF REVIEW. DISCOVERY AVOIDED
After Judge Ohta removed the word “only”
from a caselaw ruling (see Pet.App. at pg. 65, Ins.
9-15, and at pg. 85), and then applied the 12(b)(6)
standard to the adjudication of the media’s antiSLAAP motion, before any discovery took place,
and after the media pled facts in their motions to
dismiss and strike (see 9th. Cir. Dkt. 41, MTCR, ex
No. 8, listing fact based arguments in the media’s
motions to dismiss and strike), the Ryan’s
opportunity to receive communications
(in
discovery) between persons they have alleged
conspired to carry-out a pre-meditated plan to
violate the Ryan family members civil rights, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. $241. and other federal
statutes (see as-applied ordinance challenge, Id. at
2-ER-117-126), was, for all practical purposes,
extinguished.
15. ANTI-SLAPP MOTION GRANTED AFTER
COURT CONVERTED THE RYAN’S §1983
PAUL STIGMA CAUSE INTO A PENDANT
STATE DEFAMATION ACTION
In Judge Ohta’s order granting the media’s
anti-SLAPP motion to strike (Id. Pet. Appx. pg. 6078), following the media attorney’s lead, the Jurist
repeatedly declared that the Ryan’s had filed a
pendant cause action for defamation, and then
substituted the Jurist’ cause of action in place of
9
the Ryan’s federal cause of action based upon the
Paul-Stigma Doctrine. Then the Court dismissed
its’ own judicially created defamation claims for
exceeding a one-year statute of limitations. See
Pet. Appx. Order Granting Anti-SLAAP motion to
strike, specifically at Pg. 63, Ins. 29-31 cont. pg. 64,
Ins. 1-2; and see pg. 71, Ins. 23-25, and compare to
Pet. FAC, Paul-Stigma cause description, Dist.Ct.
Dkt.9 in Pet. App. Excerpts, Counts 64-76 at 2-ER74, In. 19-26, cont. 2-ER-76. In. 19.
16. JUDGE OHTA CREATED A SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION RYAN’S DIDN’T PLEAD,
THEN DISMISSED IT TOO, FOR EXCEEDING
A TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Judge Ohta created facts concerning a
supposed ongoing plot to actually kidnap the
Ryan’s child that purportedly began in 2018 {id. at
pet. Appx. pg. 41, Ins. 30-31; and id. at 6-ER-956,
exhibit #5, attached to Pet. Request for recusal
showing evolving facts connected to Gilda Ryan’s
speech), long before the meeting at issue took place
on June 4th, 2019; and then declared the Ryan’s
hadn’t pled the judicially created cause of action
sufficiently, or how it was connected to the meeting
at issue in 2019 (Id. at pg. 42, Ins. 1-29); and then
dismissed most of the Ryan’s actual 1st
Amendment §1983 based causes of action for
exceeding a two-year statute of limitations (id. at
pg. 42, Ins. 29-31, cont. pg. 43, In. 1-2), that started
at some unknown point in the year 2018. 4
4 Repeated in the Appeal Panel’s memorandum, repr. in Pet.
Appx. at pg. 6, Ins. 24-29, and pg. 7, Ins. 1-3
10
17. JUDGE OHTA RULED GILDA RYAN
DISRUPTED THE MEETING AT ISSUE, DUE
TO AUDIENCE REACTION TO HER SPEECH
In the Jurist order of dismissal {Id. Pet.
Appx. pg. 29-59) Judge Ohta found that the words
spoken by Gilda Ryan from the podium, which
Judge Ohta’s repeatedly referred to as Gilda
Ryan’s “conduct” {id. at pg. 56, In. 2, 10) “sparked
loud noises and shouting by the crowd” (emp.
Added) (id. at pg. 55, Ins. 30-31, cont. pg. 56, Ins. 14) and alternately declared that Gilda Ryan’s
“conduct” “caused an immediate hubbub” (emp.
Added) {id. at pg. 55, Ins. 3-5). Finally, Judge Ohta
extrapolated from such findings and concluded
that Gilda and Joseph Ryan’s “conduct” rendered
them persons guilty of ‘disrupting’ the meeting at
issue, as a matter of law. 5 Id. at pg. 56, Ins. 7-14.
MAGISTRATE
FEDERAL
18.
NEW
BEFORE
EX-PARTE
APPEARED
PLEDGES,
AND
DEFENDANTS,
MADE
ISSUED INVITATIONS
On October 11th, 2022, Judge Ruth
Montenegro and newly appointed Magistrate Lupe
Rodriguez addressed the County Supervisors and
the Clerk of The board of Supervisors. The video of
the honorable Jurist remarks are available at the
County’s website at the following web-link:
https://imperial.granicus.com/player/clip/22267view_i
d=2&meta id=373306&redirect=true
5 In The Ryan’s as-applied ordinance challenge, Petitioner’s
establish why Gilda Ryan’s speech from the podium was in
accord with applicable time and place restrictions, on an
appropriate subject, and it didn’t present a any clear and
present danger. See Dist.Ct. Dkt.9.1, 2-ER-110-113
11
In the remarks, after Judge Montenegro
declared the two jurist were speaking for all the
Southern District’s Judges, Magistrate Rodriguez
declared that ‘the Court would do whatever was
necessary to keep the good relationship between
the Court and the County intact’; and then he
invited the defendants to visit him at his office,
whenever they’d like. Id. video of meeting at 46.45
to 48:00
Then after defendant County Supervisor
Michael Kelley referred to the Magistrate
Rodriguez as his “homie”, he declared that he was
“tickled” that the Magistrate was “representing
[pause] .... Us, on the federal court”. Id. at 48:00 to
48:40.
19. COURT FINALIZES PREVIOUS ORDERS
AND DENIES ALL OF THE RYAN’S
REQUESTS FOR SANCTIONS AND RECUSAL
On December 7th, 2022, in addition to
finalizing all orders of dismissal, the Court denied
all of The Ryan’s requests for sanctions, as well as
the Petitioner’s request that each Jurist recuse.
The honorable Judge Ohta also affirmed the order
setting aside ten defaults. See District Court’s
orders, 151, 150, 149, and 148, in Pet.Appx. pg. 1678.
20. COURT’S SANCTIONS TEST WAS BASED
UPON WHETHER ANY ‘DEFENDANT’ WAS
ABLE TO SUCCESFULLY DECEIVE THE
COURT
Judge Ohta’s order denying sanctions, filed
against attorneys appearing in the action, refers to
“defendants” as being the target of the Ryan’s
12
motion, before a sanctions test is applied that
focuses on whether or not a “defendant” was able
to successfully deceive the Court by altering
caselaw text or via other misconduct, rather than
whether attempts to connive the Court occurred.
The sanctions test employed by Judge Ohta
follows:
Upon review of their motions and related
filings, the Court does not find any instances
where Defendants deceived the court by mis
stating the law or facts, or engaging in any
other misconduct meriting sanctions. Emp.
added.
Dist.Ct. Dkt.149, l-ER-13, In. 7-9, repr. Pet.
Appx. pg. 27, lines 21-26. .
21. IN APPELLATE BRIEF, ATTORNEY FOR
COUNTY, ADDED THE WORD “ATTEMPTED”
AND ALTERED JUDGE OHTA’S FINDINGS
Imperial County’s Attorney Kristen Bush,
recited the sanctions test Judge Ohta used in the
district Court, but added the word “attempted”,
and deleted reference to a qualifier (“meriting
sanctions”) in her version. That enabled her to
modify Judge Ohta’s conclusion. Attorney Kristen
Bush’s altered conclusion, her version of Judge
Ohta’s sanctions-test follows:
A. County Appellees did not
engage
in
any
Litigation
Misconduct
As Judge Ohta reviewed all of
Appellant’s motion related filings, she
13
did not find any instances where
County Appellants attempted to
deceive the Court or engage in any
litigation misconduct (Emp. Ad.)
See 9th Cir. App.Ct. dkt. No. 23, Cnty. opp.
brief, pg. 16, Ins. 8-11.
Changing the words of the sanctions test by
adding “attempted” naturally altered the import of
Judge Ohta’s conclusion (that she wasn’t
successfully tricked) into a statement that
expresses
that
no
misconduct
(including
alterations of caselaw) happened at all.
22.
THREE-JUDGE
APPEALS
PANEL
IGNORES ARGUMENTS IN RYAN’S REPLY
AND
RATIFIES
MANIPULATION
OF
SANCTIONS TEST AND ALTERATION OF
JUDGE OHTA’S EVIDENTIARY FINDINGS
The Appeals court accepted the alteration of
Judge Ohta’s sanctions test by attorney Kristen
Bush, as well as the conclusion that naturally
flowed from such alteration, and stated:
The district court did not abuse its’
discretion in denying the Ryan’s
motions for sanctions, in the absence
of misstatements of the law or other
litigation misconduct. (Eph. Ad.)
See 9th Cir. App. Memo. Pg. 6, Ins. 13-15.
Repr. in Pet. Appx. at 7.
14
23. STANDARDS OF REVIEW UTILIZED BY
APPEALS COURT PANEL
The Appeals Court stated that it applied
denovo review to all of the orders of dismissal, the
Petitioner’s request that ordinance challenges be
determined, and the media’s anti-SLAAP motion to
strike. Id. Pet. Appx. 6, Ins. 21-22.
The Appeals Court applied abuse of
discretion standard, to Petitioner’s request for
sanctions, the requests for recusal of Judge Ohta
and magistrate Rodriguez, and the Petitioner’s
challenge to the District Court’s decision to setaside the defaults of ten defendants. Id. at pg. 6-7.
15
IX. JURISDICTION IN THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE
Plaintiffs action was filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §1983. and arises under the Constitution of
The United States, and 28 U.S.C. §1343 (a)(3), to
redress the deprivation of a right secured by The
U.S. Constitution. Jurisdiction in United States
Federal Court, Southern District of California, was
proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331.
X. ARGUMENT FOR GRANTING
CERTIORARI
24. NINTH CIRCUIT’S SEVERE DEPARTURE
FROM USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF
ADJUDICATION AT ISSUE
This is not your run-of-the-mill petition for
certiorari. It’s not just that it’s been filed by
extremely low-income (Id. at 5-ER-684-5, 728,
823), geographically isolated, self-represented
Petitioners who aren’t incarcerated.6 There’s
nothing normal about what happened before
Petitioner’s matter might reach the Supreme
Court. So, the form of argument offered here by
Appellants doesn’t follow the usual path, with
numerous citations to caselaw advanced to support
complicated conflicts of law, an army of legal
scholars might want to weigh in on.7
6 Yet. Note: only Appellant Joseph Ryan signed the request for
Judge Ohta’s recusal. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. 140, pg. 29, avail. 6-ER913.
7 Nonetheless, District Court unique style of adjudication
created 108 issues, See 9th, App. dkt. 10, Pet. Opening Brief,
pages 17-45; and many more issues were created via the
arguments advanced in opposition briefs that the Ryan’s
opposed. Id. at dkt. No. 39, Pet. Reply Brief, pages 4-28 §§1-37.
16
While Petitioner’s writ does touch upon the
application of tests and rules that openly conflict
with precedent set-down by This Court8
Petitioner’s writ of certiorari is simply about
severe departures from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, which at its base,
concerns a complete breakdown in the normal and
usual processes of the federal court, that happened
in both the District and Appeals Court setting.
25. PETITIONERS AWARE SUPREME COURT
HAS MORE IMPORTANT THINGS TO DO
THAN REVIEW FINDINGS AND RULINGS
UNPUBLISHED
OBSCURE,
FROM
DECISIONS
Despite this matters obscurity, it’s critical
that this Court exercise it supervisory powers to
reign-in a Circuit Court of Appeals, that’s
functioning as if it’s The U.S. Supreme Court; and
therefore can’t be bothered with reviewing rulings
from three-judge panels that - in sum - openly and
obviously constitutes the commission of a charade
or fraud upon the Federal Judiciary.
In a world with approximately eight billion
inhabitants who all matter, it’s not going to be the
end of the world if the Appellant’s don’t get a
remedy; but if the Supreme Court lets The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the District Court it
sanctioned, get away with what they pulled in this
matter, then the supposedly vaunted Federal
Appeals Court process, which is touted as the
8. Which Petitioner’s don’t analyze in depth because it would be
disrespectful to The Justices of This Court for a pro-per to
explain how the heckler’s veto or qualified immunity works;
and that’s not the point or focus of the Ryan’s petition.
17
proper way to show disagreement with judicial
orders (rather than disobeying orders or giving no
import to facially flawed rulings) is hardly what
it’s cracked-up to be. The supposed existence of
Constitutional or civil rights shouldn’t be subject
to being reduced into a cheap public relations
scam whenever pro-se litigants don’t get any
positive press from an honest journalist, have a
case worth a million dollars, or enough income or
savings to pay an attorney - who practices in
Federal Courts - by the hour.
26. THIS MATTER INVOLVES SHOCKING
ABUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
FACILITATE RETALIATION BY PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AGAINST PUBLIC SPEAKER
In Lozman v City of Riviera Beach. 585 U.S.
____; 138. S.Ct. 1945 (2018), Writing for the Court,
and alluding to facts alleging retaliatory conduct
pursuant to municipal policy targeting a
disfavored party-of-one, Justice Kennedy found
that
An official retaliatory policy is a particularly
troubling and potent form of retaliation, for
a policy can be long-term and persuasive,
unlike an ad hoc on-the-spot decision by an
individual officer. An official policy can also
be difficult to dislodge. A citizen who suffers
retaliation can seek to have the officer
disciplined or removed from service, but
there may be little practical recourse when
the government itself orchestrates the
retaliation.
For these reasons, when
retaliation against protected speech is
18
elevated to the level of official policy, there
is a compelling need for adequate avenues of
redress. Id at pg. 11; id. at 1954.
But what happened to Gilda Ryan, her
husband Joseph Ryan, after the Ryan’s attempted
to exercise speech rights on June 4th, 2019 in Palo
Verde, California, absolutely dwarfs the depth and
severity of the petition-rights violations alleged in
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach.9 This matter is
Lozman on steroids. See below. 10
Both In Lozman and in this matter,
members of a legislative body were alleged to have
devised a pre-meditated plan to have a speaker
engaged in public comment (from the government’s
podium) arrested (id. at 585 U.S. ___(2018), pg. 1,
11; and see Id in Pet. FAC, at 2-ER-65, §33. But in
this matter, a group of public officials were
involved in the creating of a non-organic rout to
drown out lawful speech (id at 2-ER-64 §28, 69
§49, 70 §53); The County Counsel, Katherine
Turner (id. 2-ER-65-66 §33, 2-ER-70 §52, 2-ER-71
§54; and see VOM 55:30 to 55:50 County Counsel
instructing Deputy just before Gilda Ryan speaks));
and The County Clerk, Blanca Acosta, were
directly involved in the commission of rights
violations 2-ER-61 §15, 2-ER-80; and Id. VOM
57:07, 01:01:15 (Blanca Acosta directing Deputy in
street); there was no probable cause for arrest of
9 No disrespect intended to Fran Lozman or his attempts to
defend his valuable speech rights.
10 In Pet. Opening brief they also noted some similarities
between how the Ryan’s were ambushed by hecklers in Palo
Verde and what happened to federal Judge Duncan, when he
tried to speak at Berkeley. Id. at 9th Cir. App. Dkt. 10, Pet.
Opening Brief, pgs.4-5.
19
either speaker (id in Pet. As-applied ord. challenge,
2-ER-110-117 §5-10; 2-ER-124, Ins. 13-18; and Id.
in video of meeting at 55:45 to 57:10); The County
Sheriff and UnderSheriff planned and orchestrated
having subordinates unlawfully detain the Ryan’s
(id at 2-ER-66 §35, 70 §50, 71 §55); Deputies were
instructed to ‘not intervene’ while audience
members and other Deputies violated rights (id at
2-ER-67 §37); the media got paid, before the
meeting at issue took place, by the County
government, for agreeing to create a knowingly
false narrative about the meeting, after the fact (id
at 2-ER-213-223, 235-237); and did publish a news
article wherein the Ryan’s were falsely portrayed
as lawbreakers, while County policymakers and
Sheriff Deputies were portrayed as innocent actors
(id at 2-ER-76 §E); the video of the meeting at
issue was withheld from the public for over a year
(id at 2-ER-67 §38); its’ existence was denied (id. at
§39) and then it was altered before it was finally
released (id at 2-ER-68 §§ 40-41); and all risk of
harm to the Ryan’s children, who accompanied the
Ryan’s on June 4th, 2019, was disregarded in the
most cold-hearted way imaginable by defendants
intent on achieving goals and aims. Id. at 2-ER-57
§M.
27. ALL ATTEMPTS TO HAVE ANY JURIST
ACKNOWLEDGE THE INCONTROVERTIBLE
TRUTH CONCERNING MISCONDUCT BY
BAR MEMBERS HAVE BEEN FUTILE
So far, at both the district and Appeals court
levels, there is no Jurist who has acted upon or
even acknowledged in any way, shape, manner or
form, that any attorney appearing in the action did
20
anything wrong whatsoever. See writ §19-22 above,
where handling of requests for sanctions by District
Court and Appeals Court Panel are described.
28. IT’S INDISPUTABLE THAT ATTORNEYS
APPEARING IN THE ACTION ALTERED
CASELAW TEXT AND ENGAGED IN OTHER
MISCONDUCT
It is undeniable, that attorneys appearing in
the action, not only altered caselaw text, but they
did it in very conniving ways. See Pet.Appx. at 8687; Pet. App. Excerpts at 5-ER-557-578, 5-ER670673, 5-ER-816-17, 5-ER-845-54 §§30-56, and they
also committed other serious acts of misconduct as
well. Id. Pet. MTCR, dkt. No. 41, pg. 14-19 §§§ B-D;
and see PI. request for sanctions, Dist.Ct. dkt. No.
128, and No. 131 databases cataloguing bad conduct
at 5-ER-651-654, 655-659, 660-661, 810, 811, 812813; 5-ER-628 §41 and 5-ER-635 §77; 5-ER-877-879
(altered exhibit submitted to Court to support
argument); 5-ER-621-2 §§3, 7; 5-ER-626-7 §§§30, 31,
32; 5-ER-627-8 §§§35, 36, 37; 5-ER-630 §§§47, 48, 49;
and see Pet. App. excerpts, Vol. 5, in entirety.
29. BAR MEMBERS NEVER CAME CLEAN
HIGHLY
ABOUT
WITH
COURT
OF
ALTERATIONS
MANIPULATIVE
EVIDENCE BY CLIENTS
It’s beyond dispute that The Petitioner’s
allegation,
that
the
County
of Imperial
manipulated the video-recording at issue, before
releasing the video to the public, is true (see writ
§4 above); and most of the defendants named in
the action who attended the meeting at have
benefited from having the County’s manipulation
21
of the recording at issue obscure the noise they
created with associates, (see pet. FAC, 2-ER-68
§41, 2-ER-61 §16), that even the attorney for the
County defendants admitted occurred. Id. at 3-ER505, Ins. 2-5. 11
Even in the Appeals Court, the attorney for
the media, Jonathan Segal, won’t come clean about
the creation of a specially prepared version of the
article at issue that was substituted in place of the
original article at issue, in order to provide support
for an argument, by his co-counsel, Samantha
Lachman. See 9th. Cir. Dkt. No. 25, Media Reply
Brief, pg. 30-31.
30. RYAN FAMILY DENIED ACTUAL DUE
PROCESS BY ABYSMAL QUALITY OF
ADJUDICATION IN DISTRICT COURT
It’s hard to imagine any litigants in federal
court ever having had to tolerate being subjected to
a worse course of judicial proceedings than the
Petitioners were subjected to by honorable Judge
Jinsook Ohta, including, just for starters, the
Jurist dependence on a horrible factual record,
wherein the Jurist got every fact of material
significance wrong in some way; which according to
the Supreme Court, violates her oath of office. See
Litekv v. United States. 510. U.S. 540, 561-2
(1994); and see Pet. Opening appellate brief, 9th Cir.
dkt. 41, exhibits 3, and 5; and see summary of
mistakes of facts and law by Judge Ohta. Id. at 6ER-914-997.; and see arguments centered on
mistakes of law in Pet. App. Opening Brief, §1 thru
11 Nonetheless, attorneys appearing in the action still went
ahead and represented large groups of clients with
conflicting interests. See writ §1-4 above.
22
§108, pg. 17-45; and see §13-17, and §27, 28, 29,
above, and §32 below.
31. AFFECT OF USING BAD RECORD
COMPOUNDED BY JURIST LACK OF
FAMILIARITY WITH CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
After Judge Ohta got every single fact of
significance wrong in some way or manner, and
combined such distortions with the Jurist own
judicially created facts, there was no hope the
honorable Jurist could apply the law in a way that
had material relevance to the action, but it also
didn’t help that Judge Ohta lacked familiarity with
First Amendment speech issues (at least at the
time of her confirmation). See Judge Ohta’s
response to Questions from Senator Thom Tillis for
Jinsook Ohta. Nominee to be United States District
Judse for the Southern District of California. part
15D.
32. A NON-COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF
ADDITIONAL MATTERS OF LAW THAT
JUDGE OHTA BOTCHED IN HER ORDERS
A. It’s apparent that honorable Judge Ohta
doesn’t have any significant grasp on what the
‘heckler’s veto’ is, (or even a cognizable notion that
it exists in the law). The honorable Jurist clearly
believes that speech about a public official’s
conduct in office can result in the speaker being
instantaneously detained, if the lawful speech
upsets listeners. See Pet. Writ §17 (above), and
compare to Pi-Pet. Facial Ordinance challenge, 2ER-87-100, where the relationship between features
23
of ordinance at issue and County’s utilization of its’
own heckler’s veto, are explored
B. Judge Ohta also doesn’t understand what might
constitute an ‘actual’ meeting ‘disruption’. It starts
with not having knowledge related to the heckler’s
veto (see above and writ §17), but also encompasses
a very basic failure to understand, or recognize,
the importance of a warning clause contained in a
speech ordinance12, as opposed to or compared to
an ordinance regulating speech taking place at a
public meeting, that lacks such a safeguard. See
Pet. Appx. 50-51, where warning clause is not part
of consideration of issue by Judge Ohta; and see
Pet. Appx. 84 (warning clause in City of Norwalk’s
speech-ordinance, that Imperial County’s lacks).
C. Since the Judge doesn’t understand the
significance of a warning clause in an ordinance
regulating speech (see proceeding section, above),
the Jurist found that The City Of Norwalk’s
ordinance is equivalent to Imperial County’s
version (See Pet. Appx. pg. 50, In. 28 cont. pg. 51,
In. 28); and then concluded that since the City of
Norwalk’s ordinance was constitutional so was
Imperial County’s. Id. at Pg. 51, Ins. 13-15.
D. That enabled the Judge to basically ignore all
the arguments in Appellant’s ordinance challenges,
concerning how the Ryan’s allege The County’s
12 Which was illustrated at the State of The Union speech that
took place on March 4, 2025, attended by the Justices of this
Court, wherein a person who had physical frailties was first
given two warnings to stop disrupting, before physical removal
was considered proper, and was commenced.
24
alterations
of The
State
of California’s,
presumptively Constitutional, Brown Act meetingordinance, evidences County policy. See Pet. Facial
ordinance challenge, Id at. 2-ER-87-91, §§6-9.
Additionally, Judge Ohta also refused to
entertain the Ryan’s facial ordinance challenge
because it supposedly didn’t name the correct
party (id. Pet. Appx. pg. 52, Ins. 9-16), even though
it names the County and the policymakers
responsible for maintaining the ordinance at issue,
on the books. Id at 2-ER-81.
E. After illogically labeling both Gilda Ryan and
Joseph Ryan as lawbreakers, for Judge Ohta’s
purposes, everything that followed was rendered a
non-issue. So none of the Ryan’s 1st or 4th
amendment claims related to their extended
detention outside of the venue, were acknowledged
by Judge Ohta in her order of dismissal. Id in Pet.
FAC at 2-ER-73, Ins. 7-20; and see Judge Ohta’s
order of dismissal in entirety, Id. in Pet. Appx. 2959.
F. Honorable Judge Ohta misunderstands how
qualified immunity works. The Jurist apparently
not only believes that heat-of-the-moment analysis
applies to every fact situation (see Dist.Ct. dkt.
134, order dismissing Petitioners causes of action,
in pet. Appx at 20-59, specifically in Pet. Appx. pg.
54, Ins. 13-16, 17-22; pg. 55 lines 24-29; pg. 55, Ins.
30-31 cont. pg. 56. Ins. 1-6, 12-14), but also that
qualified immunity from liability immunizes
persons
alleged
to
have
separately
and
independently plotted to retaliate to violate a
citizen’s rights, just because the doctrine protects
25
an arresting officer from liability, in particular
circumstances. See Judge Ohta’s order of
dismissal, Dist. Ct. dkt. 134, in Pet. App. Excerpts
at l-ER-31, Ins. 12-17, and compare to Supreme
Court’s holding in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach.
which affords qualified immunity to arresting
officer, that doesn’t extend to legislators who
allegedly ordered a speaker’s arrest, pursuant to a
pre-meditated plan to retaliate against the speaker
(Fran Lozman). Lozman v City of Riviera Beach.
U.S. 585___(2018), pg. 6 §3, pg. 10-13.
G, Judge Ohta found the Ryan’s were basing Monell
liability on respondeat superior, even though no
where in the Ryan’s complaint (or ordinance
challenges) do they claim liability on such grounds
{Id. PI. FAC, 2-ER-50-130), and the Ryan’s
description of the basis of the Monell claims doesn’t
rely upon such grounds (id. at 2-ER-57 §C, and §0).
Judge Ohta (and the Appeals Panel) then decided
Monell issues based upon such ‘findings’. See Pet.
Appx. §D, pg. 48-52, and at pg.7, Ins. 17-24. The
Court never reached the four basis of Monell
claims, Petitioners did actually plead. Id. Pet.Appx.
pg. 104-09, where petitioners provide relevant parts
of FAC text, illustrating where Petitioners pled
Monell longterm policy, direct involvement of
policymakers in violations, supervisory liability,
and ratification by policymakers. 13.
13 The Courts did consider whether Imperial County’s
ordinance reflected County policy, but circumcised that line of
inquiry by declaring that the ordinance at issue was
constitutional in all respects. Id. at Pet.Appx. pg. 49-51.
26
H. As it concerns the liberal pleading standard: In
the matter below, bar members unwilling to stick
to the actual facts at issue that indicate their
clients broke the law {Id. at 2-ER-117-126 list of
crimes committed by defendants to carry-out
premeditated ambush of Ryan family), were given
more leeway with their pleading than one might
imagine possible. See 9th Cir. Dkt. 41, Appellant’s
Motion to Correct the Record, exhibits 7, 8; and id.
Pet. App. excerpts 5-ER-663, 5-ER-631, §50; 5-ER814, 815, 880-81, 6-ER-956; 6-ER-956, exhibits
illustrating use of faulty facts by attorneys,
accepted and
repeated by Judge Ohta in her
orders.
In contrast, the Ryan’s were required to
plead fourteen somewhat complicated causes of
actions, including novel claims seeking to extend
the recognition of clearly established law {id. at 2ER-55 §E, 2-ER-56 §H, 2-ER-73-4 No. 3, and
counts 29-35), plus Monell policy claims against
over fifty defendants using thirty pages or less {Id.
Pet. Appx. pg. 79-80, Judge Burns Order of
dismissal with refilling conditions).14
Additionally, in Judge Ohta’s various orders,
every allegation the Ryan’s made in their FAC was
either wholly disregarded, distorted, considered
out of context, or changed into something they
didn’t plead or even recognize. See Pet. Request for
recusal of Judge Ohta, 6-ER-926-952, 956, where
distortions of the record Judge Ohta used to
support her findings and conclusions are listed in
14 Which necessitated the Ryan’s dropping damning details
about Imperial County’s longterm policy causing previous
harms to Ryan family members, (id. .at 2-ER-180-189, sample
text dropped from initial complaint)).
27
an exhibit; and see Pet. Motion to correct the record,
9th Cir. App. dkt. 41, App. MTCR, ex. #3, exhibit
detailing 102 mistakes of fact made by Judge Ohta,
and exhibit #5, listing material facts not taken into
consideration by Judge Ohta in the Jurist’ orders.
I. The Ryan’s were denied Leave to Amend on all
fourteen express causes of action against all
defendants, based upon Judge Ohta’s reliance on
all the other mistakes of fact and law the Jurist
made (see writ §14-17, above; and see progression
in Pet.Appx. pg. 71, In. 25, 31 cont. pg. 72, Ins. 1-2,
9-13, and finally ruling the Ryan’s claims must be
stricken without leave, pg. 72, Ins. 17-22); and the
Jurist supported her rulings with reliance on nonanalogous caselaw applied to the procedural facts
relevant in this matter (for example see Pet. Appx.
pg. 37, Ins. 27-29; pg. 38, Ins. 11-13), which herein,
concerns Plaintiffs who only amended their claim
one time to reduce it’s size, as a condition of re
filing before any motion had taken place. Id. Pet.
Appx. pg. 80-81; and see Dist. Ct. dkt. entries 1-9.
J. In Judge Ohta’s orders setting-aside the
defaults of ten sophisticated defendants, the Court
found that all ten defaulters had each met their
burden to establish good faith and lack of
culpability, even though attorney Orlando Foote’s
excuses
for
defaulting
were
far
beyond
preposterous (id. Dist. Ct. dkt. 115.1, dec. atty.
Orlando Foote jr., avail, id. at 4-ER-548 §22, 4-ER549 §23); he admitted he fastidiously and
repeatedly avoiding service of process for his ten
clients (Id. at see 4-ER-545 §§§ 11, 12, 4-ER-546
§14), and didn’t supply any declarations to
28
establish the mental state and conduct of each of
his ten clients during the four months they spent
in default. Id. at Pet. Appx. pg. 77, Ins. 27-29 cont.
pg. 76, Ins. 1-7.
Additionally, Judge Ohta supported her
good-faith and culpability findings with judicially
created facts attributed to attorney Orlando Foote;
incorrectly stating that Orlando Foote suffered
“various” medical “emergencies” during the default
period; and that the attorney in question was
confused about which complaint “was operative”
(Id. Pet. Appx. 76, Ins. 13-25). Further support for
setting aside the defaults involved reliance on
invalid criteria (the crush of business). Id. at 4-ERER-558 Ins. 23-26, 4-ER-559, Ins. 1-8); and Id. at
Pet. Appx. 76, Ins. 22-23); and id. at 4-ER-525, Ins.
7-14.
K. In the Court’s order granting the media’s antiSLAAP motion to strike, attacking Plaintiffs First
Amendment based actions, Judge Ohta made the
astonishing claim that the Ryan’s allegations
against the media were based solely on ‘the media
attending a meeting and publishing a news article
about it’ {Id. Pet. Appx. pg. 47, Ins. 25-31)15; and
then, in accord with the Court’s judicially created
narrative, concluded that the Ryan’s whole §1983
action ‘arose from’ the publishing of said article (a
simple overt act done in furtherance), rather than
the agreement to act in concert that allegedly
binds all defendants, and is at the crux of the
Ryan’s causes of action. Id. Pet. Appx. pg. 69, Ins.
9-16; and id. at 5-ER-875, 882, ex. No’s. 6, and 13,
15 Which was picked up and repeated in the Memorandum
released by the Appeals Court. Id. Pet.Appx. pg.9, Ins. 17-20
29
describing what the Ryan’s causes
from. 16
actually arise
L. In denying recusal, Judge Ohta claimed that the
Petitioner only made one accusation involving
conduct that might defile court processes (Id. Pet.
Appx. at bot. pg. 23 cont. to pg. 24). But that’s just
semantics. Joseph Ryan was required by
circumstances to advance his charges using the
objective standard, and to disavow making any
subjective claims. See Pet. Request for recusal, 6ER-897-912, §23-74, where Joseph Ryan makes
over fifty allegations, many which involve conduct
that defiled processes and which has already left a
permanent stain on the federal Judiciary. 17
Additionally, Judge Ohta applied §455(a)
without considering the extra-judicial bias
exception that Petitioners relied upon in their
request (Pet. Appx. pg. 24, In. 31 cont. to pg. 25; Id.
at 6-ER-894 §§§ 2, 3, 4), and then quoted an
allegation verbatim where Joseph Ryan wrote that
it looked like Judge Ohta was a ‘wholly dishonest,
sneaky Judge acting for corrupt reasons’ (id. at
Pet. Appx. pg. 25, Ins. 8-11)18; and finally, claimed
16 All of Petitioner’s arguments going to whether the County
was acting as a business, as opposed to performing a personal
service, and whether Petitioner’s pleading were ‘conclusory’
weren’t even acknowledged by the Court; Id. at 3-ER-460-61,
or it could be Judge Ohta simply doesn’t understand what
‘conclusory’ even means. Id at; 3-ER-399, In. 21 cont. to 3-ER400, line 12.
17 Using the objective standard keeps pro-se litigants out of jail,
so, unfortunately, subjective standard had to be put aside for
another day.
18 Which, in context, seems like a dog whistle to judicial
colleagues to retaliate against the Ryan’s for saying ‘bad things’
about a member of the federal judiciary.
30
the Ryan’s didn’t produce even a scintilla of
evidence that indicated that the Jurist could be
biased or failed to act with impartiality, Pet. Appx.
Id. at pg.25, Ins. 14-16, before denying recusal. Id.
at Ins. 16-28. Such finding is ridiculous on the face.
33.
REQUEST
FOR
RECUSAL
MAGISTRATE HANDLED IMPROPERLY
OF
In the Jurist order denying recusal, after
mentioning the disappearance from the federal
courthouse of the Ryan’s reply document exposing
judicial misconduct (see details in exhibit form, at
6-ER-1026-39), Magistrate Rodriguez also relied
upon non-applicable caselaw {id. at pg. 21, Ins. 1520, 20-23, 30-31), that he failed to apply to the
actual facts put at issue by the Ryan’s (id. at 6-ER1007-22). Then Magistrate Rodriguez stated he
wouldn’t ‘countenance’19 the Court being accused of
wrongdoing by petitioner {id. at pg. 22, Ins. 19).
34. ATTORNEYS APPEARING IN MATTER
INVOKE JUDICIAL BIAS TO ABORT ANY
SERIOUS INQUIRY INTO THEIR CONDUCT
Throughout the running of this matter, right
up into the Appeals Court, attorneys appearing in
the matter invoked the bias of the Court. See Pet.
Motion for sanctions, Dist. Ct. dkt. 128, ex. 1, 2,
and dkt. 131.2, ex. 1-2, §11, where the location of
many instances of ‘invocation of bias’ by attorneys
are compiled. For example, In the County Water
District’s opposition {Dkt. 45) to the Appellant’s
Motion to Correct the Record {9th. App. Ct. Dkt. 42)
attorney Melissa Blackburn Joniaux decried that
“Additionally, Appellants’ briefing contained
19 Whatever that means.
31
personal attacks on all parties, their counsel and
the presiding judges”; and then just ten lines later
wrote
. . in addition to further personal attacks
on Appellees, their counsel, and the presiding
judges”. 9th. App. Ct. Dkt. 45, pg. 2, Ins. 10-12, and
16-18.
These invocations illustrate why every
attorney who essentially cries out for their fellow
bar members on the bench to protect them from
the ‘mean’ pro-per plaintiffs, which is essentially a
call for Jurist to harm the Ryan’s by depriving
them of the full and fair due processes of The
federal Court because the Ryan’s wrote ‘bad things
about members of the bar’ in their various
pleadings, is not just being unprofessional, but
letting members of the judiciary know that socalled officers of the court expect favoritism from
Jurist when they’re opposing self-represented
litigants, and they aren’t afraid to all but demand
it from bar members sitting on the bench, as if it’s
an obligation owed other club members.
35. ‘ROYAL’ ATTITUDE DOES NOT BECOME
THE DISTRICT AND APPEALS COURT
The Ryan family doesn’t represent a gaggle
of serfs begging for some cake at the gates of the
federal court’s castle. The Appellant’s pleadings —
may not have all the
including this one
hallmarks of a polished litigator and Petitioner’s
don’t pretend to be anything other than
inexperienced amateurs when it comes to litigating
in
federal
court.
Nonetheless,
a
careful
examination of the facts pled by The Ryan’s
compared to the elements of the causes of action at
issue, reveals The Ryan’s operative complaint - if
32
subjected to normal processes of adjudication contains sufficient allegations asserted using nonconclusory facts, to carry most of their causes of
action to trial, without even requiring the benefit
of discovery. See Pet. FAC in entirety, avail, in Pet.
App. Excerpts at 2-ER-50-80.
36. ANGER ISSUES AFFECTED QUALITY OF
JURISDICTION
In this matter, judge Ohta proceeded in all
regards with callous disregard for the detrimental
effect her unfair, malignant approach to the Ryan’s
matter (see 6-ER-911 §69, Ins. 12-19; §70; §71, Ins.
24-26; 6-ER-912, Ins. 1-2; §§ 72-73; 6-ER-1015
§43(A), Ins. 16-25; 6-ER-907 §61) would have, not
only upon the Appellants, but also upon the Ryan’s
minor children, who were named as plaintiffs in
Appellant’s initial complaint, due to the damage
they’ve suffered at the hands of government actors
on June 4th, 2019, and at all other relevant times.
See Dist.Ct. dkt. 141, 142, minute orders of Judge
Ohta, issued early on the morning after Petitioner’s
requested the jurist recusal, cutting off the Ryan’s
reply rights. See dist. Ct dkt. 141, 142, rprd. Pet.
Appx. at 80; and id. at 6-ER-1015-19.
37. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT ABDICATED
JUDICIAL DUTIES BY ALLOWING STAFF TO
ENGINEER A DENOVO CHARADE
Comparing the content of the Ryan’s opening
brief, reply brief, and motion to correct the record
to the Appeals Court Panels’ memorandum of
decision, establishes beyond any doubt that not one
of the three judges on the panel ever read anything
the Ryan’s submitted to The Appeals Court, or the
33
most, couldn’t be bothered to give any weight or a
single drop of consideration to any material
contained in their opening brief, reply brief, motion
to correct the record, replies to MTCR opposition,
and the voluminous excerpts of record the Ryan’s
painstakingly created for the Court’s benefit,
before unsigned orders were released in the threejudge panel’s name(s). See App. dkt. 10, 11, 39, 41,
48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 58.
Either nothing was read or given due
material consideration by any of the Judges on the
panel, or every one of them was willing to sign-on
to what unequivocally constitutes the commission
of a fraud upon the federal court system, It’s one or
the other; there are no other possibilities in play.
See Pet. Writ §§ 20-22 (above).
38. MOTIONS FOR REHEARING LIKELY
‘HANDLED’ BY THE SAME STAFF MEMBER
WHO ENGINEERED DENOVO CHARADE
If the judges assigned to the panel couldn’t
be bothered to read the Appellants’ briefing
material, it doesn’t seem logical to presume any of
the Jurist developed a sudden interest in finding
out how The Ryan’s Appeal was being ‘taken care’
of by the staff during the rehearing process.
By all indications, a staff member was given
permission or leeway to simply clear The Ryan’s
matter off the docket, without the material
involvement of any judge, whatsoever.; and which
came entirely at the Ryan Family’s expense; with
their Constitutional right to due process being
34
jettisoned, at least in some part, for the sake of
expediency. 20
39. IMMORAL TO INVITE PRO-SE LITIGANTS
INTO COURT, ALLOW ATTORNEYS TO
AMBUSH THEM WITH PROCESS ABUSES,
AND USE MATTER AS A PRACTICE FIELD
FOR NEW JURIST
If Judges won’t police so-called ‘officers of
The Court’, the rules allowing pro-pers to file are
just a set-up for vulnerable litigants to be harmed
by bar members. The Federal Court simply morphs
into a convenient forum for attorneys to carry-out
against citizens
speech based retaliation
criticizing public officials in court documents — at
the behest of their government clients; which is
exactly what occurred in this matter. For example,
see 9th. Cir. Dkt. 39, pg. 11-13, §12, where County’s
use of reply document to mock death of the Ryan’s
second child is described; and id. at ex. 5-ER-666.
The Petitioner’s lives have to matter as
much as the career advancement of any individual
federal District Judge. The lives and due process
rights of four people living in the middle of the
desert shouldn’t be disregarded on those illicit
grounds.
20. Although the Ryan’s status as pro-pers, the desire to
obstruct justice for clients who obviously were involved in the
commission of serious crimes, and to continue to carry-out
County policy regarding retaliating against persons who say
‘bad’ things about Imperial County’s public officials, using
federal court processes, were also critical factors at play.
35
40. THIS MATTER CRIES OUT FOR A
REMEDY DUE TO DEPRAVITY OF CONDUCT
AT ISSUE
After Appellant’s filed claims with The
County of Imperial and alleged bad conduct by a
public official, had caused the Ryan’s 2-year old
little girl to suffer nightmares (see Pet. App, at 112,
a reproduction of text from a claim for damages
sent to The Count; and see text from Petitioner’s
subsequently filed complaint at 2-ER-230-231),
Imperial County’s policymakers intentionally
caused a whole mass of angry adults, and adults
feigning anger, to yell directly in the direction of
the Ryan’s 3-year old, impressionable little girl;
which resulted in her suffering further nightmares
connected to what she witnessed happen to her
parents. Id. in VOM at 58:05 to 1:02:50 (where
child tries to not be separated from Mother, as
Mother bothered by Deputies).
The Ryan’s would have never brought their
minor daughter to a public meeting, again, if they
thought for an instant that the various defendants
would carry-out a boisterous, confrontational
speech-ambush in the presence of a large group of
public witnesses; but unfortunately for the Ryan’s
minor children, harmed deeply by the defendant’s
conduct, that’s water under the bridge; just like
the Petitioner’s matter flowed through the Appeals
Court setting.
36
41. WITHOUT RELIEF FROM THIS COURT, A
BLATANTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE,
WHICH MAKES ONE RISK LIFE AND LIMB
TO CRITICIZE A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IN
IMPERIAL COUNTY CALIFORNIA, WILL LIVE
ON IN INFAMY
See Pet. Facial ordinance challenge, avail at
2-ER-81-104, where Petitioners describe how
Imperial County’s ordinance does not regulate
speech within Constitutional acceptable bounds,
(rprd. in part in Pet. Appx. pg. 88-101).
XI. PETITIONER’S REQUESTS:
1. Grant Certiorari; and then:
2. Recall Mandate issued by Appeals Court
3. Decide matter(s) on merits, or remand for
meaningful adjudication of causes of action.
4. Decide all sanctions related issues on the merits,
or remand for proper consideration
5. Order Appeals Court to appoint special master
to investigate why normal, acceptable processes of
adjudication broke down in this matter.
6. Review the facial Constitutionality of Imperial
County’s Meeting law (including the attached
declaration establishing Petitioner’s standing); and
declare it to be unconstitutional as appropriate.
37
XII. PETITIONER’S INFORMATION
Respectfully Submitted
Gilda Ryan
April 29, 2025
Joseph Ryan
April 29, 2025
Gilda Ryan
Joseph Ryan
Self-represented
53 Sunset Way
PO Box 183
Palo Verde, Ca. 92266
itsjoeryan@gmail.com
760-854-1009
38
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.