Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gilda Ryan, et al., Petitioners v. County of Imperial, California, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 18, 2025

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Text

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

FEB 1 8 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Dkt. #

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

Gilda Ryan, etal

Petitioner(s)

v.

i

i

Imperial County etal

Respondents)

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari To

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

/

Gilda Ryan, and

Joseph Ryan

self- rep resented

53 Sunset Way

PO Box 183

Palo Verde, Ca. 92266

760-854-1009

i

I

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

sanctioning of The District Court’s effective use of

a pro-se litigants §1983 based civil action as a type

of on-the-job training platform for inexperienced

Jurist and attorneys; Leading to Petitioner’s

claims being decided on the basis of false

narratives, alterations of caselaw text, and legal

propositions that conflict with Supreme Court

precedent, constitutes the type of severe departure

from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings that calls out for an exercise of This

Court’s powers of supervision.

2. Whether The Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals,

has severely departed from the accepted and usual

course of judicial proceedings, by ratifying the

District Court’s failure to acknowledge or properly

address a large volume of sanctionable conduct

occurring in an action, including but not limited to

a comprehensive denial of due process inflicted on

self-represented Plaintiffs, after they requested

terminating sanctions be levied against members

of the bar association and the clients they

represent, to a degree that calls for an exercise of

The Supreme Court’s powers of supervision.

II. PARTIES TO PROCEEDING

PETITIONERS:

Gilda Ryan, and Joseph Ryan, Petitioners

RESPONDENTS:

COUNTY OF IMPERIAL; GILBERT OTERO,

Imperial County District Attorney; RAYMOND

LOERA,

Imperial

County

Sheriff;

FRED

MIRAMONTES, Imperial County UnderSheriff;

KATHERINE TURNER, Imperial County Counsel;

ADAM GREGORY CROOK, Imp. County Counsel;

TONY ROUHOTAS, Jr., Imperial County CEO;

ESPERANZA COLIO-WARREN, Imperial County.

Vice-CEO;

RAYMOND

CASTILLO,

RYAN

KELLEY,

MICHAEL

KELLEY,

LUIS

PLANCARTE, JESUS ESCOBAR, Imperial County

Supervisors; BLANCA ACOSTA, Imperial County.

Clerk of The Board; CLIFTON ERRO, RENE

MCNISH, Imperial County Sheriff Deputies; PALO

VERDE COUNTY WATER DISTRICT; RONALD

WOODS, JESS PRESTON, JAN AYALA, DAVID

KHOURY, PVWD County Board members; KATHI

FRICE SANDERS, Clerk of PVCWD Board;

BARBARA HOPTON; DONNA LORD; CELESTE

PRESTON; DAVID AYALA; THOMAS CALVERT;

PATSY

CALVERT;

ANNE

MARIE

DELCASTILLO; YUMA SUN, INC., DBA Palo

Verde Valley Times; URIEL AVENDANO; LISA

REILLY

III. OPINIONS/ORDERS RELATED CASES

ORDERS BY APPELLATE COURT

Gilda Ryan et al v. Imperial County et al: 23-55042

1. Ninth Cir. No. 23-55042,

MANDATE (11/27/2024),............

Document 59,

..................Pg. 1

2. Ninth Cir. No. 23-55042, Document 56, ORDER

(denying Rehearing and Rehearing enbanc)

(11/19/2024),

Pg. 2-3

3. Ninth Cir. No. 23-55042, Document 54.1,

MEMORANDUM (09/192024),................ Pg. 4-11

ORDERS FROM DISTRICT COURT

Ryan v. Imperial County: No. 3:21cv-01076-JO-LR

4. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 152, JUDGMENT IN A

Pg. 12-16

CIVIL CASE, (Dec. 07, 2022)

5. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 151, ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S RECUSAL MOTION, (Dec. 07,

Pg. 16-22

2022),

6. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 150, ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF JOSEPH RYAN’S RECUSAL

MOTION, (Dec. 07, 2022)....................... Pg. 23-25

7. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 149, ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS

Pg. 26-28

(Dec. 07, 2022)

m

8. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 134, ORDER

GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, (Sept. 29,

2022),

...Pg. 29-59

9. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 133, ORDER

GRANTING MEDIA DEFENDANT’S ANTISLAPP MOTION TO STRIKE, (Sept. 29, 2022)

...................................................................... Pg. 60-73

10. Dist.Ct.So.Cal.Dkt. 132, ORDER GRANTING

WATER DISTRICT DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO SET-ASIDE DEFAULT (Sept. 29, 2022)

Pg. 74-78

11. Dist. Ct. So. Cal., Dkt. 6, ORDER OF

DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Filed:

Pg. 79-80

July, 14, 2021)

12. Dist.Ct.So.Cal.,Dkt. 142,141, Minute Orders

by Judge Jinsook Ohta, (October 26, 2022) .. Pg. 81

iv

IV. TABLE OF CONTENTS

I

QUESTIONS PRESENTED......................

II

II. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

III. ORDERS FROM RELATED CASES .... Ill, IV

V, VI, VII

IV. TABLE OF CONTENTS..............

VIII

V. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......

IX

VI. JURISDICTION, THIS COURT

VII. CONST. PROVISIONS, ORDINANCES .... X

1

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............

1-4

§1-4. Background Facts.......................................

4-11

§5-8. Litigation Facts and developments........

7

§9. Judge Ohta assigned, matter continues .

7

§10. Defaulted Parties appear 4 Months Late

8

§11. Petitioner’s Request Sanctions................

8

§12. Judge Ohta Dismisses all Causes...........

9

§13. Sample Judge Ohta’s Findings/Rulings ..

§14. “Only” removed caselaw text. 12b6 applied .... 9

9

§15. §1983 action turned into defamation ...

10

§16. Fake Cause created and dismissed.....

11

§17. Heckler’s Veto ignored in ruling...........

11

§18. Magistrate meets defendants ex-parte

12

§19. Orders Finalized, Requests Denied.....

13-14

§20-22. Bad Sanctions test altered, ratified

15

§23. Standards of Review used by Court —

§IX. JURISDICTION CT FIRST INSTANCE .. 16

16

§X. REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

16

§24. Appeals Court’s Severe Departure.....

17

§25. Critical Court Review obscure matter

18-20

§26. Shocking abuse of Rights unremedied

§27. Jurist refuse to acknowledge misconduct. 20-21

21

§28. Attorneys engaged in lots of misconduct

§29. Attorneys won’t come clean with Court. 21-22

§30. Abysmal adjudication denies due process ..22-23

§31. Horrible record with lack of 1A knowledge ... 23

v

23-31

§32. Findings, orders, defective (§A-L) ...

31

§33. Magistrate recusal done incorrectly

§34-36. Officers of The Court bad approach .... 31-33

§37. Memo done without Jurist involvement... 33-34

§38. Request rehearings gaslit by staff too .... 34-35

35

§39. Bar members abusing Pro se is immoral

§40. Harming child to censor speech is cold ..

36

§41. Repugnant ordinance remains if no review ... 37

37

XI. PETITIONER’S REQUESTS........

APPENDIX CONTENTS

Pg. 1

1. Ninth Circuit Mandate

2. Order denying Rehearing, Rhrng enbanc Pg. 2-3

Pg. 4-11

3. Ninth Cir. Memorandum of Decision

ORDERS FROM DISTRICT COURT

Pg. 12-16

4. Judgment in a Civil case

5. Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for recusal of

Pg. 16-22

Magistrate Lupe Rodriguez

6. Order denying Joseph Ryan’s request for recusal

Pg. 23-25

of Judge Jinsook Ohta

7. Order denying Motions for Sanctions .. Pg. 26-28

Pg. 29-59

8. Order Granting Motions to Dismiss

9. Order granting Media defendant’s anti-SLAAP

Pg. 60-73

Motion to strike

10. Order granting County Water District’s request

Pg. 74-78

to set-aside ten defaults

11. Judge Burns Order of Dismissal with leave to

Pg. 79-80

amend

12. Minute Orders issued by Judge Ohta..... Pg. 81

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

ORDINANCES AT ISSUE IN MATTER

82

13a. 1ST AMENDMENT:......... ..................

82

13b. 14™ AMENDMENT: Section One: ..

13c. IMPERIAL COUNTY PUBLIC MEETING

82-83

ORDINANCE

vi

OTHER RELEVANT MATERIAL

14. Exhibit #11, attached to Request to Recuse

Judge Ohta (doc 140), showing how Norwalk’s

ordinance has a warning clause, that Imperial

County’s ordinance lacks...................................... 84

15. Exhibit #11, attached to request for recusal

Judge Ohta, illustrating removal of word ‘only’

from caselaw ruling.............................................. 85

16. Exhibit #1, attached to Ryan’s MTCR compiling

86-87

caselaw text altered by attorneys

17. Select Text from Plaintiffs Facial and asapplied challenges to Constitutionality of Imperial

88-101

County’s meeting ordinance,

18. Select Text from Petitioner’s FAC wherein

102

defendants are informed why being sued

19. Select Text from FAC, where Plaintiffs explain

events happening in 2018 pled to establish Monell

policy, like standard operating procedure... 103

20. Select Text from FAC, illustrating that

Petitioner’s pled multiple basis’ of Monell liability,

not reached by District or Appeals Court.... 104-09

21. Select Text from FAC, illustrating that the

Ryan’s pled a Paul-stigma based upon federal law

against media, and not defamation.................. 110

22. Select Text from Plaintiffs first complaint

illustrating the County Supervisor’s have a policy

of not ‘tolerating’ criticism of public officials ... Ill

23. Text from Plaintiffs first complaint (text from

a claim filed with County), illustrating

112

policymakers indifferent to harming child,

vii

V. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

1. Litekv v. United States. 510 U.S. 540

22

2. Lozman v City of Riviera Beach. 585 U.S._

18, 19, 26

(2018)

3. U.S. Const, amend. I

4. U.S. Const, amend. XIV

5. 18 U.S.C. §241

9

6. 28 U.S.C. §1331

16

6. 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3)l

16

6. 42. U.S.C. §1983

4, 16

7. ICRCBM(II)(D)(3)

24, 25, 37

8. Supreme Court Rule 29 (SCt. R. 29)

viii

IX

VI. JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed

the Judgment of The District Court, on September

19th, 2024. See Pet. Appx. 11.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

entertained Appellant’s Request for Rehearing,

and Request for Rehearing enbanc and denied

review on November 19th, 2025. See Pet. Appx. 2-3.

The Court received petitioner’s timely filed

petition for writ of certiorari and pursuant to

Supreme Court rule 29 {Set. R. 29), on March 6th,

2025, this Court granted the Petitioner’s sixty days

to file a petition for writ of certiorari that corrects

deficiencies noted by The Court, and that complies

with all other applicable rules for filing a writ of

certiorari in The United States Supreme Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to

consider Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

IX

VII. PROVISIONS AND ORDINANCE

1. 1st Amendment to The U.S. Constitution.

U.S. Const, amend. 1.

See Pet. Appx. pg. 82

2. 14th Amendment to The U. S. Constitution.

U.S. Const, amend. XIV.

See Pet. Appx. pg. 82

3. IMPERIAL COUNTY RULES FOR THE

CONDUCT OF BOARD MEETINGS, §11. ROLE

OF BOARD CHAIRPERSON. §D.

Short form citation: ICRCBM(II)(D)(3).

See Pet.Appx. pg. 82-83

x

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. BACKGROUND FACTS: EVENT AT ISSUE

This matter involves County government

officials creating a pre-meditated plan to retaliate

against Ryan family members, by ‘setting them up

like bowling pins’, to create an opportunity for

Imperial County’s policymakers and their allies to

inflict various harms upon all Ryan family

members, to punish the Ryan’s for their previous

speech concerning their performance in office (see

introductory section of Plaintiff-petitioner’s FAC,

repr. Id in Pet. FAC 2-ER-65, Ins. 9-15; and see Pet

Appx. pg. 102), while entertaining themselves in

the process. See 9th Cir. Dkt. No. 41, Petitioner’s

Motion to Correct The Record, Ex. No. 6, souvenir

photos taken before event by County agent.

After receiving 24-hour advance-notice of

what topics Gilda Ryan and Joseph Ryan would

like to speak about at one of their meetings, The

Imperial County Supervisor Ryan Kelley caused

the Ryan’s to be invited to the podium during the

public comment period of a County Supervisor’s

off-site meeting held on June 4th, 2019 in Palo

Verde California, not to actually let them speak

about the conduct in office of County officers as the

Ryan’s requested, but rather to accomplish illicit

aims (retaliation-driven deprivation of rights, etc.,

done pursuant to policy). Id Pet.Appx. pg. Ill', see

Pet. App. excerpts 2-ER-58-72, see video of meeting

at 55:00 to 1:03:00, available at Imperial County

website, under the Supervisors agenda entries for

June 4th, 2019, where content from offsite meeting

held in Palo Verde California, is available using

the ‘audio’ link, which links to the following URL:

1

/i££ps.7/imperial.granicus.com/player/clip/1773?view_id=2&

redirect=true (hereafter, Id at VOM [time])

2. ACTUAL WORDS SPOKEN BY GILDA

RYAN AND JOSEPH RYAN, BEFORE BOTH

WERE DETAINED AS A MATTER OF LAW

Gilda Ryan only spoke the following words

about a public official’s performance in office at

and during a previous County District meeting

before she was confronted by both The Clerk of The

Board of Supervisors and a Sheriff Deputy, and

intimidated into forfeiting the microphone and

leaving the venue.

56:12 - Hello, my name is Gilda Ryan.

56: 15 - You know we had a problem in here.

56:16 - We had a problem in here when on May 17th

we went to a meeting in there,

OK... .

56:19- Your member, Jessie Preston

He’s threatening this little girl to kidnap her

56:28- I’m asking,

56:29 - I’m asking,

56:37- Leave Me Alone,

56:38 - Leave me Alone

56:52 - We did

Id. in video of meeting at issues, at stated times;

and see 9th Cir. Ct. App. dkt. 41, Appellant’s Motion

to Correct the Record, exhibit #4, Timeline of

Events Related to Gilda Ryan’s speech and

detainment, pg. 1-4.

2

Petitioner Joseph Ryan simply tried to

defend his wife’s honor and only spoke the

following words directly in response to the wife of a

County official Gilda Ryan was commenting about

(pointing directly at such person, and no one else

as he spoke), before he was detained as a matter of

law and forced to forfeit his own speech assembly,

association, and petition rights in and outside of

the venue for the remainder of the evening.

56:26 - Yes he did threaten this little girl

56:29 - You weren’t there

Id. in VOM, at stated times; and see 9th App.

dkt. 41, Pet. Motion to Correct the Record (hereafter

MTCR), ex #4, pg. 1-2.

3. GOVERNMENT’S HECKLERS ENABLED BY

SHERIFF DEPUTIES ON SCENE

In accord with The County’s premeditated

plan, instead of confronting persons actually

disturbing the meeting at issue (by heckling Gilda

and Joseph Ryan in an out-of-control manner from

their seats in the audience), each of the numerous

Sheriff Deputies at the scene were instructed,

beforehand, to either focus all law enforcement

activity on inhibiting and stopping the speech of

The Ryan’s, and making a public display of their

detainment (Id at. 56:00 to 1:10:00), or to stay out

of camera view unless needed (see Pet FAC 2-ER16, Ins. 12-14, and Id. in video at 58:02-09, where

officer seemingly signals to other deputy’s, that

can’t be seen on the video recording).

3

4. VIDEO OF MEETING AT ISSUE WITHHELD

FROM PUBLIC, THEN ALTERED BEFORE

PUBLISHED OVER ONE YEAR AFTER EVENT

After the meeting at issue took place, County

officials failed to publish a video of the public

meeting at issue, upon its’ completion, as is the

norm. Id. Pet. FAC, at 2-ER-67, §38.

Over a year later, after assistant County

Counsel Eric Havens repeatedly denied a video of

the meeting at issue existed at all, The County of

Imperial’s agents did cause a video of the meeting

at issue to be published at a link on the County’s

website. Id. 2-ER-67, §39. However, before

releasing the video to the public, The County used

commonly available software to manipulate the

recording’s audio tracks, so that the words yelled

by the wife of the public official that verbally

accosted Gilda Ryan, just after Gilda Ryan tried to

speak from the podium, were removed from the

recording, along with noise made by other

defendants, engaged in similar behavior at the

County’s behest. Id. at, 2-ER-67, §40, 41; and Id.

video of meeting at issue, at 56:30 to 56:40, where

yelling noise that seems to come from a woman who

stands up and faces Gilda Ryan, can be heard for a

fraction of a second (id. about 56:31) before it’s

replaced by a gargling, crackling noise.

5. ON THE TWO-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF

THE MEETING AT ISSUE, PETITIONERS

FILED THEIR ACTION

On June 4th, 2021, Plaintiffs Joseph and

Gilda Ryan filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§1983 in The Southern California Federal District

Court which named a relatively large number of

Policymakers, public officials, and law enforcement

4

officers employed by The County of Imperial as

defendants. Also named were Private parties

alleged to have acted in concert with government

officials in order to carry-out or otherwise support

the County policymakers plan to violate the rights.

(see PI. FAC id. at 2-ER-50-78).

6. FIRST COMPLAINT DISMISSED FOR

BEING TOO LONG. FAC LIMITED TO

THIRTY PAGES

On July 14th, 2021, just after the Ryan’s

completed physical service of their initial

complaint on over fifty defendants, honorable

Judge Alan Burns dismissed the Ryan’s initial

complaint, limited any FAC to thirty pages, and

requiring the Ryan’s drop their children as

plaintiffs. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. No. 6, id. Pet. Appx. 5455.

After dismissal, the Ryan’s complied with

Judge Burn’s directives, and restarted their action;

which still included facial and as-applied

ordinance challenges. See Dist.Ct. Dkt.9, and 9.1.

Then, on October 21st, 2021, The District

Court transferred the Ryan’s matter to honorable

Judge Curiel’s docket. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. No. 59.

7. THE RYAN’S ARE THREATENED WITH

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, TWICE

IN A ROW, DUE TO JURIST’ MISTAKES

The Ryan’s filed ten simple requests for

entry of clerk’s-defaults (not entry of defaultjudgment) with the Clerk of Courts1; However,

1 The docket no longer contains a record of the Ryan’s filing

of ten entries of clerk’s defaults. The statement in Judge

5

honorable Judge Gonzalo Curiel instructed the

Clerk of Court to reject the Ryan’s request(s) for

not including points and authorities (prove-up

material) with each request, and threatened the

Ryan’s with civil and criminal sanctions for not

doing so. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. No. 65. The Ryan’s

wrote to the clerk of court and requested to be

allowed to file a new set of clerks-defaults. Judge

Curiel then threatened the Ryan’s with civil and

criminal sanctions, again, for purportedly sending

correspondence to the Judge.2 Id. Dkt. No. 75.

8. THREE SETS OF ATTORNEYS AND

CLIENTS ANSWERED COMPLAINT

Three sets of attorneys, representing

defendants associated with The County of

Imperial, a local media entity and a group of

private parties accused of acting in concert with

County officials, responded to the Ryan’s suit;

filing three motions to dismiss in November and

December of 2021. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. entries No.’s

67, 88, 101. In addition, attorneys representing the

media filed an anti-SLAAP motion to strike,

seeking dismissal of The Ryan’s §1983 based

federal cause of action based upon the Paul stigma

doctrine, as well Appellant’s only pendant state

claim. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. No. 87.

Curiel’s order (#65) indicating only one entry of default was

thrown out, is not correct.

2 Which did not happen. The Ryan’s sent their correspondence

to The Clerk of Court. See Dkt. 75, copy of letter to clerk.

6

9. NEW DISTRICT JUDGE LACKING BASIC

JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE ASSIGNED TO

RYAN FAMILY’S MATTER

On January 6th, 2022, about three weeks

after honorable Judge Jinsook Ohta’s was

appointed to be a Federal Court District Judge, the

Ryan’s action was transferred to the Jurist docket.

See Dist.Ct. Dkt.No. 110.

Unfortunately, Judge Ohta hadn’t authored

a single judicial order and hadn’t ever overseen a

single jury-trial before the full Senate approved

the jurist appointment to the federal judiciary. See

‘SENATE QUESTIONNAIRE, PUBLIC’, records of

The Senate Judiciary committee, Nomination of

Judge Jinsook Ohta, Section 13, Part (a)(i), and

(b).

10. TEN DEFENDANTS ANSWER SUMMONS

OVER FOUR MONTHS LATE, AND REQUEST

ENTRIES OF DEFAULT BE SET-ASIDE

On March 4th, 2022, ten defendants

associated with the local Palo Verde County Water

District appeared through an attorney and

requested defaults entered against them the

previous fall be set-aside. See Dist.Ct. Dkt.115.

Without submitting a single declaration from any

one of his ten clients, the attorney for the ten

defaulted parties (attorney Orlando Foote Jr.)

claimed in his own declaration, that he’d forgotten

all about the action for a few months (see 4-ER-548

§22, and 549 §23), and that not one of his ten

clients, his staff, nor anyone else, had reminded

him the case was ongoing during the default-period

(over four months time). Attorney Orlando Foote

also submitted a declaration wherein he admitted

7

repeatedly inhibiting or avoiding service of process

of the Ryan’s FAC on his ten clients; and wouldn’t

even identify who he purported to be representing3.

See docket, 115.1, 4-ER-540-550, Dec. of Orlando

Foote, specifically at Id at 4-ER-545-6, §§§12, 13,

14.

11. PETITIONERS FILED REQUESTS FOR

SANCTIONS AGAINST THREE SETS OF

ATTORNEYS APPEARING IN THE ACTION

In August, and October of 2022, The Ryan’s

filed requests for terminating sanctions against

three sets of attorneys appearing in the action, and

by extension, their clients (petitioner’s averred

should be held responsible the conduct of their

chosen representative). See Dist.Ct. dkt. #128, 129,

131.

12. AFTER THE RYAN’S REQUESTED

SANCTIONS, JUDGE

OHTA SET-ASIDE

DEFAULTS AND DISMISSED ACTIONS

After the Ryan’s filed their requests for

sanctions, and terminating sanctions against two

sets of attorneys (and their clients), in August of

2022, Judge Ohta released orders on September

29, 2022, granting all requests to set-aside

defaults, dismissing all of The Ryan’s actions, and

granting the media defendant’s anti-SLAPP

motion to strike. See Dist.Ct. dkt. No. 132, 133,

134, repr. in Pet. Appx. pg. 30-70.

3 The attorneys intransigence caused the Ryan’s to have to

serve each of his ten clients with physical service of their FAC

at each of their residences or offices. See dist. Ct. dkt. entries.

8

13.

SAMPLE

OF

SOME

DETAILS

CONNECTED TO CONTENT OF JUDGE

OHTA’S ORDERS:

14. REMOVAL OF WORD “ONLY” FROM

CASELAW RULING , CHANGES STANDARD

OF REVIEW. DISCOVERY AVOIDED

After Judge Ohta removed the word “only”

from a caselaw ruling (see Pet.App. at pg. 65, Ins.

9-15, and at pg. 85), and then applied the 12(b)(6)

standard to the adjudication of the media’s antiSLAAP motion, before any discovery took place,

and after the media pled facts in their motions to

dismiss and strike (see 9th. Cir. Dkt. 41, MTCR, ex

No. 8, listing fact based arguments in the media’s

motions to dismiss and strike), the Ryan’s

opportunity to receive communications

(in

discovery) between persons they have alleged

conspired to carry-out a pre-meditated plan to

violate the Ryan family members civil rights, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. $241. and other federal

statutes (see as-applied ordinance challenge, Id. at

2-ER-117-126), was, for all practical purposes,

extinguished.

15. ANTI-SLAPP MOTION GRANTED AFTER

COURT CONVERTED THE RYAN’S §1983

PAUL STIGMA CAUSE INTO A PENDANT

STATE DEFAMATION ACTION

In Judge Ohta’s order granting the media’s

anti-SLAPP motion to strike (Id. Pet. Appx. pg. 6078), following the media attorney’s lead, the Jurist

repeatedly declared that the Ryan’s had filed a

pendant cause action for defamation, and then

substituted the Jurist’ cause of action in place of

9

the Ryan’s federal cause of action based upon the

Paul-Stigma Doctrine. Then the Court dismissed

its’ own judicially created defamation claims for

exceeding a one-year statute of limitations. See

Pet. Appx. Order Granting Anti-SLAAP motion to

strike, specifically at Pg. 63, Ins. 29-31 cont. pg. 64,

Ins. 1-2; and see pg. 71, Ins. 23-25, and compare to

Pet. FAC, Paul-Stigma cause description, Dist.Ct.

Dkt.9 in Pet. App. Excerpts, Counts 64-76 at 2-ER74, In. 19-26, cont. 2-ER-76. In. 19.

16. JUDGE OHTA CREATED A SECOND

CAUSE OF ACTION RYAN’S DIDN’T PLEAD,

THEN DISMISSED IT TOO, FOR EXCEEDING

A TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Judge Ohta created facts concerning a

supposed ongoing plot to actually kidnap the

Ryan’s child that purportedly began in 2018 {id. at

pet. Appx. pg. 41, Ins. 30-31; and id. at 6-ER-956,

exhibit #5, attached to Pet. Request for recusal

showing evolving facts connected to Gilda Ryan’s

speech), long before the meeting at issue took place

on June 4th, 2019; and then declared the Ryan’s

hadn’t pled the judicially created cause of action

sufficiently, or how it was connected to the meeting

at issue in 2019 (Id. at pg. 42, Ins. 1-29); and then

dismissed most of the Ryan’s actual 1st

Amendment §1983 based causes of action for

exceeding a two-year statute of limitations (id. at

pg. 42, Ins. 29-31, cont. pg. 43, In. 1-2), that started

at some unknown point in the year 2018. 4

4 Repeated in the Appeal Panel’s memorandum, repr. in Pet.

Appx. at pg. 6, Ins. 24-29, and pg. 7, Ins. 1-3

10

17. JUDGE OHTA RULED GILDA RYAN

DISRUPTED THE MEETING AT ISSUE, DUE

TO AUDIENCE REACTION TO HER SPEECH

In the Jurist order of dismissal {Id. Pet.

Appx. pg. 29-59) Judge Ohta found that the words

spoken by Gilda Ryan from the podium, which

Judge Ohta’s repeatedly referred to as Gilda

Ryan’s “conduct” {id. at pg. 56, In. 2, 10) “sparked

loud noises and shouting by the crowd” (emp.

Added) (id. at pg. 55, Ins. 30-31, cont. pg. 56, Ins. 14) and alternately declared that Gilda Ryan’s

“conduct” “caused an immediate hubbub” (emp.

Added) {id. at pg. 55, Ins. 3-5). Finally, Judge Ohta

extrapolated from such findings and concluded

that Gilda and Joseph Ryan’s “conduct” rendered

them persons guilty of ‘disrupting’ the meeting at

issue, as a matter of law. 5 Id. at pg. 56, Ins. 7-14.

MAGISTRATE

FEDERAL

18.

NEW

BEFORE

EX-PARTE

APPEARED

PLEDGES,

AND

DEFENDANTS,

MADE

ISSUED INVITATIONS

On October 11th, 2022, Judge Ruth

Montenegro and newly appointed Magistrate Lupe

Rodriguez addressed the County Supervisors and

the Clerk of The board of Supervisors. The video of

the honorable Jurist remarks are available at the

County’s website at the following web-link:

https://imperial.granicus.com/player/clip/22267view_i

d=2&meta id=373306&redirect=true

5 In The Ryan’s as-applied ordinance challenge, Petitioner’s

establish why Gilda Ryan’s speech from the podium was in

accord with applicable time and place restrictions, on an

appropriate subject, and it didn’t present a any clear and

present danger. See Dist.Ct. Dkt.9.1, 2-ER-110-113

11

In the remarks, after Judge Montenegro

declared the two jurist were speaking for all the

Southern District’s Judges, Magistrate Rodriguez

declared that ‘the Court would do whatever was

necessary to keep the good relationship between

the Court and the County intact’; and then he

invited the defendants to visit him at his office,

whenever they’d like. Id. video of meeting at 46.45

to 48:00

Then after defendant County Supervisor

Michael Kelley referred to the Magistrate

Rodriguez as his “homie”, he declared that he was

“tickled” that the Magistrate was “representing

[pause] .... Us, on the federal court”. Id. at 48:00 to

48:40.

19. COURT FINALIZES PREVIOUS ORDERS

AND DENIES ALL OF THE RYAN’S

REQUESTS FOR SANCTIONS AND RECUSAL

On December 7th, 2022, in addition to

finalizing all orders of dismissal, the Court denied

all of The Ryan’s requests for sanctions, as well as

the Petitioner’s request that each Jurist recuse.

The honorable Judge Ohta also affirmed the order

setting aside ten defaults. See District Court’s

orders, 151, 150, 149, and 148, in Pet.Appx. pg. 1678.

20. COURT’S SANCTIONS TEST WAS BASED

UPON WHETHER ANY ‘DEFENDANT’ WAS

ABLE TO SUCCESFULLY DECEIVE THE

COURT

Judge Ohta’s order denying sanctions, filed

against attorneys appearing in the action, refers to

“defendants” as being the target of the Ryan’s

12

motion, before a sanctions test is applied that

focuses on whether or not a “defendant” was able

to successfully deceive the Court by altering

caselaw text or via other misconduct, rather than

whether attempts to connive the Court occurred.

The sanctions test employed by Judge Ohta

follows:

Upon review of their motions and related

filings, the Court does not find any instances

where Defendants deceived the court by mis­

stating the law or facts, or engaging in any

other misconduct meriting sanctions. Emp.

added.

Dist.Ct. Dkt.149, l-ER-13, In. 7-9, repr. Pet.

Appx. pg. 27, lines 21-26. .

21. IN APPELLATE BRIEF, ATTORNEY FOR

COUNTY, ADDED THE WORD “ATTEMPTED”

AND ALTERED JUDGE OHTA’S FINDINGS

Imperial County’s Attorney Kristen Bush,

recited the sanctions test Judge Ohta used in the

district Court, but added the word “attempted”,

and deleted reference to a qualifier (“meriting

sanctions”) in her version. That enabled her to

modify Judge Ohta’s conclusion. Attorney Kristen

Bush’s altered conclusion, her version of Judge

Ohta’s sanctions-test follows:

A. County Appellees did not

engage

in

any

Litigation

Misconduct

As Judge Ohta reviewed all of

Appellant’s motion related filings, she

13

did not find any instances where

County Appellants attempted to

deceive the Court or engage in any

litigation misconduct (Emp. Ad.)

See 9th Cir. App.Ct. dkt. No. 23, Cnty. opp.

brief, pg. 16, Ins. 8-11.

Changing the words of the sanctions test by

adding “attempted” naturally altered the import of

Judge Ohta’s conclusion (that she wasn’t

successfully tricked) into a statement that

expresses

that

no

misconduct

(including

alterations of caselaw) happened at all.

22.

THREE-JUDGE

APPEALS

PANEL

IGNORES ARGUMENTS IN RYAN’S REPLY

AND

RATIFIES

MANIPULATION

OF

SANCTIONS TEST AND ALTERATION OF

JUDGE OHTA’S EVIDENTIARY FINDINGS

The Appeals court accepted the alteration of

Judge Ohta’s sanctions test by attorney Kristen

Bush, as well as the conclusion that naturally

flowed from such alteration, and stated:

The district court did not abuse its’

discretion in denying the Ryan’s

motions for sanctions, in the absence

of misstatements of the law or other

litigation misconduct. (Eph. Ad.)

See 9th Cir. App. Memo. Pg. 6, Ins. 13-15.

Repr. in Pet. Appx. at 7.

14

23. STANDARDS OF REVIEW UTILIZED BY

APPEALS COURT PANEL

The Appeals Court stated that it applied

denovo review to all of the orders of dismissal, the

Petitioner’s request that ordinance challenges be

determined, and the media’s anti-SLAAP motion to

strike. Id. Pet. Appx. 6, Ins. 21-22.

The Appeals Court applied abuse of

discretion standard, to Petitioner’s request for

sanctions, the requests for recusal of Judge Ohta

and magistrate Rodriguez, and the Petitioner’s

challenge to the District Court’s decision to setaside the defaults of ten defendants. Id. at pg. 6-7.

15

IX. JURISDICTION IN THE COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE

Plaintiffs action was filed pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983. and arises under the Constitution of

The United States, and 28 U.S.C. §1343 (a)(3), to

redress the deprivation of a right secured by The

U.S. Constitution. Jurisdiction in United States

Federal Court, Southern District of California, was

proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331.

X. ARGUMENT FOR GRANTING

CERTIORARI

24. NINTH CIRCUIT’S SEVERE DEPARTURE

FROM USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF

ADJUDICATION AT ISSUE

This is not your run-of-the-mill petition for

certiorari. It’s not just that it’s been filed by

extremely low-income (Id. at 5-ER-684-5, 728,

823), geographically isolated, self-represented

Petitioners who aren’t incarcerated.6 There’s

nothing normal about what happened before

Petitioner’s matter might reach the Supreme

Court. So, the form of argument offered here by

Appellants doesn’t follow the usual path, with

numerous citations to caselaw advanced to support

complicated conflicts of law, an army of legal

scholars might want to weigh in on.7

6 Yet. Note: only Appellant Joseph Ryan signed the request for

Judge Ohta’s recusal. See Dist.Ct. Dkt. 140, pg. 29, avail. 6-ER913.

7 Nonetheless, District Court unique style of adjudication

created 108 issues, See 9th, App. dkt. 10, Pet. Opening Brief,

pages 17-45; and many more issues were created via the

arguments advanced in opposition briefs that the Ryan’s

opposed. Id. at dkt. No. 39, Pet. Reply Brief, pages 4-28 §§1-37.

16

While Petitioner’s writ does touch upon the

application of tests and rules that openly conflict

with precedent set-down by This Court8

Petitioner’s writ of certiorari is simply about

severe departures from the accepted and usual

course of judicial proceedings, which at its base,

concerns a complete breakdown in the normal and

usual processes of the federal court, that happened

in both the District and Appeals Court setting.

25. PETITIONERS AWARE SUPREME COURT

HAS MORE IMPORTANT THINGS TO DO

THAN REVIEW FINDINGS AND RULINGS

UNPUBLISHED

OBSCURE,

FROM

DECISIONS

Despite this matters obscurity, it’s critical

that this Court exercise it supervisory powers to

reign-in a Circuit Court of Appeals, that’s

functioning as if it’s The U.S. Supreme Court; and

therefore can’t be bothered with reviewing rulings

from three-judge panels that - in sum - openly and

obviously constitutes the commission of a charade

or fraud upon the Federal Judiciary.

In a world with approximately eight billion

inhabitants who all matter, it’s not going to be the

end of the world if the Appellant’s don’t get a

remedy; but if the Supreme Court lets The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals, and the District Court it

sanctioned, get away with what they pulled in this

matter, then the supposedly vaunted Federal

Appeals Court process, which is touted as the

8. Which Petitioner’s don’t analyze in depth because it would be

disrespectful to The Justices of This Court for a pro-per to

explain how the heckler’s veto or qualified immunity works;

and that’s not the point or focus of the Ryan’s petition.

17

proper way to show disagreement with judicial

orders (rather than disobeying orders or giving no

import to facially flawed rulings) is hardly what

it’s cracked-up to be. The supposed existence of

Constitutional or civil rights shouldn’t be subject

to being reduced into a cheap public relations

scam whenever pro-se litigants don’t get any

positive press from an honest journalist, have a

case worth a million dollars, or enough income or

savings to pay an attorney - who practices in

Federal Courts - by the hour.

26. THIS MATTER INVOLVES SHOCKING

ABUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO

FACILITATE RETALIATION BY PUBLIC

OFFICIALS AGAINST PUBLIC SPEAKER

In Lozman v City of Riviera Beach. 585 U.S.

____; 138. S.Ct. 1945 (2018), Writing for the Court,

and alluding to facts alleging retaliatory conduct

pursuant to municipal policy targeting a

disfavored party-of-one, Justice Kennedy found

that

An official retaliatory policy is a particularly

troubling and potent form of retaliation, for

a policy can be long-term and persuasive,

unlike an ad hoc on-the-spot decision by an

individual officer. An official policy can also

be difficult to dislodge. A citizen who suffers

retaliation can seek to have the officer

disciplined or removed from service, but

there may be little practical recourse when

the government itself orchestrates the

retaliation.

For these reasons, when

retaliation against protected speech is

18

elevated to the level of official policy, there

is a compelling need for adequate avenues of

redress. Id at pg. 11; id. at 1954.

But what happened to Gilda Ryan, her

husband Joseph Ryan, after the Ryan’s attempted

to exercise speech rights on June 4th, 2019 in Palo

Verde, California, absolutely dwarfs the depth and

severity of the petition-rights violations alleged in

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach.9 This matter is

Lozman on steroids. See below. 10

Both In Lozman and in this matter,

members of a legislative body were alleged to have

devised a pre-meditated plan to have a speaker

engaged in public comment (from the government’s

podium) arrested (id. at 585 U.S. ___(2018), pg. 1,

11; and see Id in Pet. FAC, at 2-ER-65, §33. But in

this matter, a group of public officials were

involved in the creating of a non-organic rout to

drown out lawful speech (id at 2-ER-64 §28, 69

§49, 70 §53); The County Counsel, Katherine

Turner (id. 2-ER-65-66 §33, 2-ER-70 §52, 2-ER-71

§54; and see VOM 55:30 to 55:50 County Counsel

instructing Deputy just before Gilda Ryan speaks));

and The County Clerk, Blanca Acosta, were

directly involved in the commission of rights

violations 2-ER-61 §15, 2-ER-80; and Id. VOM

57:07, 01:01:15 (Blanca Acosta directing Deputy in

street); there was no probable cause for arrest of

9 No disrespect intended to Fran Lozman or his attempts to

defend his valuable speech rights.

10 In Pet. Opening brief they also noted some similarities

between how the Ryan’s were ambushed by hecklers in Palo

Verde and what happened to federal Judge Duncan, when he

tried to speak at Berkeley. Id. at 9th Cir. App. Dkt. 10, Pet.

Opening Brief, pgs.4-5.

19

either speaker (id in Pet. As-applied ord. challenge,

2-ER-110-117 §5-10; 2-ER-124, Ins. 13-18; and Id.

in video of meeting at 55:45 to 57:10); The County

Sheriff and UnderSheriff planned and orchestrated

having subordinates unlawfully detain the Ryan’s

(id at 2-ER-66 §35, 70 §50, 71 §55); Deputies were

instructed to ‘not intervene’ while audience

members and other Deputies violated rights (id at

2-ER-67 §37); the media got paid, before the

meeting at issue took place, by the County

government, for agreeing to create a knowingly

false narrative about the meeting, after the fact (id

at 2-ER-213-223, 235-237); and did publish a news

article wherein the Ryan’s were falsely portrayed

as lawbreakers, while County policymakers and

Sheriff Deputies were portrayed as innocent actors

(id at 2-ER-76 §E); the video of the meeting at

issue was withheld from the public for over a year

(id at 2-ER-67 §38); its’ existence was denied (id. at

§39) and then it was altered before it was finally

released (id at 2-ER-68 §§ 40-41); and all risk of

harm to the Ryan’s children, who accompanied the

Ryan’s on June 4th, 2019, was disregarded in the

most cold-hearted way imaginable by defendants

intent on achieving goals and aims. Id. at 2-ER-57

§M.

27. ALL ATTEMPTS TO HAVE ANY JURIST

ACKNOWLEDGE THE INCONTROVERTIBLE

TRUTH CONCERNING MISCONDUCT BY

BAR MEMBERS HAVE BEEN FUTILE

So far, at both the district and Appeals court

levels, there is no Jurist who has acted upon or

even acknowledged in any way, shape, manner or

form, that any attorney appearing in the action did

20

anything wrong whatsoever. See writ §19-22 above,

where handling of requests for sanctions by District

Court and Appeals Court Panel are described.

28. IT’S INDISPUTABLE THAT ATTORNEYS

APPEARING IN THE ACTION ALTERED

CASELAW TEXT AND ENGAGED IN OTHER

MISCONDUCT

It is undeniable, that attorneys appearing in

the action, not only altered caselaw text, but they

did it in very conniving ways. See Pet.Appx. at 8687; Pet. App. Excerpts at 5-ER-557-578, 5-ER670673, 5-ER-816-17, 5-ER-845-54 §§30-56, and they

also committed other serious acts of misconduct as

well. Id. Pet. MTCR, dkt. No. 41, pg. 14-19 §§§ B-D;

and see PI. request for sanctions, Dist.Ct. dkt. No.

128, and No. 131 databases cataloguing bad conduct

at 5-ER-651-654, 655-659, 660-661, 810, 811, 812813; 5-ER-628 §41 and 5-ER-635 §77; 5-ER-877-879

(altered exhibit submitted to Court to support

argument); 5-ER-621-2 §§3, 7; 5-ER-626-7 §§§30, 31,

32; 5-ER-627-8 §§§35, 36, 37; 5-ER-630 §§§47, 48, 49;

and see Pet. App. excerpts, Vol. 5, in entirety.

29. BAR MEMBERS NEVER CAME CLEAN

HIGHLY

ABOUT

WITH

COURT

OF

ALTERATIONS

MANIPULATIVE

EVIDENCE BY CLIENTS

It’s beyond dispute that The Petitioner’s

allegation,

that

the

County

of Imperial

manipulated the video-recording at issue, before

releasing the video to the public, is true (see writ

§4 above); and most of the defendants named in

the action who attended the meeting at have

benefited from having the County’s manipulation

21

of the recording at issue obscure the noise they

created with associates, (see pet. FAC, 2-ER-68

§41, 2-ER-61 §16), that even the attorney for the

County defendants admitted occurred. Id. at 3-ER505, Ins. 2-5. 11

Even in the Appeals Court, the attorney for

the media, Jonathan Segal, won’t come clean about

the creation of a specially prepared version of the

article at issue that was substituted in place of the

original article at issue, in order to provide support

for an argument, by his co-counsel, Samantha

Lachman. See 9th. Cir. Dkt. No. 25, Media Reply

Brief, pg. 30-31.

30. RYAN FAMILY DENIED ACTUAL DUE

PROCESS BY ABYSMAL QUALITY OF

ADJUDICATION IN DISTRICT COURT

It’s hard to imagine any litigants in federal

court ever having had to tolerate being subjected to

a worse course of judicial proceedings than the

Petitioners were subjected to by honorable Judge

Jinsook Ohta, including, just for starters, the

Jurist dependence on a horrible factual record,

wherein the Jurist got every fact of material

significance wrong in some way; which according to

the Supreme Court, violates her oath of office. See

Litekv v. United States. 510. U.S. 540, 561-2

(1994); and see Pet. Opening appellate brief, 9th Cir.

dkt. 41, exhibits 3, and 5; and see summary of

mistakes of facts and law by Judge Ohta. Id. at 6ER-914-997.; and see arguments centered on

mistakes of law in Pet. App. Opening Brief, §1 thru

11 Nonetheless, attorneys appearing in the action still went

ahead and represented large groups of clients with

conflicting interests. See writ §1-4 above.

22

§108, pg. 17-45; and see §13-17, and §27, 28, 29,

above, and §32 below.

31. AFFECT OF USING BAD RECORD

COMPOUNDED BY JURIST LACK OF

FAMILIARITY WITH CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

After Judge Ohta got every single fact of

significance wrong in some way or manner, and

combined such distortions with the Jurist own

judicially created facts, there was no hope the

honorable Jurist could apply the law in a way that

had material relevance to the action, but it also

didn’t help that Judge Ohta lacked familiarity with

First Amendment speech issues (at least at the

time of her confirmation). See Judge Ohta’s

response to Questions from Senator Thom Tillis for

Jinsook Ohta. Nominee to be United States District

Judse for the Southern District of California. part

15D.

32. A NON-COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF

ADDITIONAL MATTERS OF LAW THAT

JUDGE OHTA BOTCHED IN HER ORDERS

A. It’s apparent that honorable Judge Ohta

doesn’t have any significant grasp on what the

‘heckler’s veto’ is, (or even a cognizable notion that

it exists in the law). The honorable Jurist clearly

believes that speech about a public official’s

conduct in office can result in the speaker being

instantaneously detained, if the lawful speech

upsets listeners. See Pet. Writ §17 (above), and

compare to Pi-Pet. Facial Ordinance challenge, 2ER-87-100, where the relationship between features

23

of ordinance at issue and County’s utilization of its’

own heckler’s veto, are explored

B. Judge Ohta also doesn’t understand what might

constitute an ‘actual’ meeting ‘disruption’. It starts

with not having knowledge related to the heckler’s

veto (see above and writ §17), but also encompasses

a very basic failure to understand, or recognize,

the importance of a warning clause contained in a

speech ordinance12, as opposed to or compared to

an ordinance regulating speech taking place at a

public meeting, that lacks such a safeguard. See

Pet. Appx. 50-51, where warning clause is not part

of consideration of issue by Judge Ohta; and see

Pet. Appx. 84 (warning clause in City of Norwalk’s

speech-ordinance, that Imperial County’s lacks).

C. Since the Judge doesn’t understand the

significance of a warning clause in an ordinance

regulating speech (see proceeding section, above),

the Jurist found that The City Of Norwalk’s

ordinance is equivalent to Imperial County’s

version (See Pet. Appx. pg. 50, In. 28 cont. pg. 51,

In. 28); and then concluded that since the City of

Norwalk’s ordinance was constitutional so was

Imperial County’s. Id. at Pg. 51, Ins. 13-15.

D. That enabled the Judge to basically ignore all

the arguments in Appellant’s ordinance challenges,

concerning how the Ryan’s allege The County’s

12 Which was illustrated at the State of The Union speech that

took place on March 4, 2025, attended by the Justices of this

Court, wherein a person who had physical frailties was first

given two warnings to stop disrupting, before physical removal

was considered proper, and was commenced.

24

alterations

of The

State

of California’s,

presumptively Constitutional, Brown Act meetingordinance, evidences County policy. See Pet. Facial

ordinance challenge, Id at. 2-ER-87-91, §§6-9.

Additionally, Judge Ohta also refused to

entertain the Ryan’s facial ordinance challenge

because it supposedly didn’t name the correct

party (id. Pet. Appx. pg. 52, Ins. 9-16), even though

it names the County and the policymakers

responsible for maintaining the ordinance at issue,

on the books. Id at 2-ER-81.

E. After illogically labeling both Gilda Ryan and

Joseph Ryan as lawbreakers, for Judge Ohta’s

purposes, everything that followed was rendered a

non-issue. So none of the Ryan’s 1st or 4th

amendment claims related to their extended

detention outside of the venue, were acknowledged

by Judge Ohta in her order of dismissal. Id in Pet.

FAC at 2-ER-73, Ins. 7-20; and see Judge Ohta’s

order of dismissal in entirety, Id. in Pet. Appx. 2959.

F. Honorable Judge Ohta misunderstands how

qualified immunity works. The Jurist apparently

not only believes that heat-of-the-moment analysis

applies to every fact situation (see Dist.Ct. dkt.

134, order dismissing Petitioners causes of action,

in pet. Appx at 20-59, specifically in Pet. Appx. pg.

54, Ins. 13-16, 17-22; pg. 55 lines 24-29; pg. 55, Ins.

30-31 cont. pg. 56. Ins. 1-6, 12-14), but also that

qualified immunity from liability immunizes

persons

alleged

to

have

separately

and

independently plotted to retaliate to violate a

citizen’s rights, just because the doctrine protects

25

an arresting officer from liability, in particular

circumstances. See Judge Ohta’s order of

dismissal, Dist. Ct. dkt. 134, in Pet. App. Excerpts

at l-ER-31, Ins. 12-17, and compare to Supreme

Court’s holding in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach.

which affords qualified immunity to arresting

officer, that doesn’t extend to legislators who

allegedly ordered a speaker’s arrest, pursuant to a

pre-meditated plan to retaliate against the speaker

(Fran Lozman). Lozman v City of Riviera Beach.

U.S. 585___(2018), pg. 6 §3, pg. 10-13.

G, Judge Ohta found the Ryan’s were basing Monell

liability on respondeat superior, even though no

where in the Ryan’s complaint (or ordinance

challenges) do they claim liability on such grounds

{Id. PI. FAC, 2-ER-50-130), and the Ryan’s

description of the basis of the Monell claims doesn’t

rely upon such grounds (id. at 2-ER-57 §C, and §0).

Judge Ohta (and the Appeals Panel) then decided

Monell issues based upon such ‘findings’. See Pet.

Appx. §D, pg. 48-52, and at pg.7, Ins. 17-24. The

Court never reached the four basis of Monell

claims, Petitioners did actually plead. Id. Pet.Appx.

pg. 104-09, where petitioners provide relevant parts

of FAC text, illustrating where Petitioners pled

Monell longterm policy, direct involvement of

policymakers in violations, supervisory liability,

and ratification by policymakers. 13.

13 The Courts did consider whether Imperial County’s

ordinance reflected County policy, but circumcised that line of

inquiry by declaring that the ordinance at issue was

constitutional in all respects. Id. at Pet.Appx. pg. 49-51.

26

H. As it concerns the liberal pleading standard: In

the matter below, bar members unwilling to stick

to the actual facts at issue that indicate their

clients broke the law {Id. at 2-ER-117-126 list of

crimes committed by defendants to carry-out

premeditated ambush of Ryan family), were given

more leeway with their pleading than one might

imagine possible. See 9th Cir. Dkt. 41, Appellant’s

Motion to Correct the Record, exhibits 7, 8; and id.

Pet. App. excerpts 5-ER-663, 5-ER-631, §50; 5-ER814, 815, 880-81, 6-ER-956; 6-ER-956, exhibits

illustrating use of faulty facts by attorneys,

accepted and

repeated by Judge Ohta in her

orders.

In contrast, the Ryan’s were required to

plead fourteen somewhat complicated causes of

actions, including novel claims seeking to extend

the recognition of clearly established law {id. at 2ER-55 §E, 2-ER-56 §H, 2-ER-73-4 No. 3, and

counts 29-35), plus Monell policy claims against

over fifty defendants using thirty pages or less {Id.

Pet. Appx. pg. 79-80, Judge Burns Order of

dismissal with refilling conditions).14

Additionally, in Judge Ohta’s various orders,

every allegation the Ryan’s made in their FAC was

either wholly disregarded, distorted, considered

out of context, or changed into something they

didn’t plead or even recognize. See Pet. Request for

recusal of Judge Ohta, 6-ER-926-952, 956, where

distortions of the record Judge Ohta used to

support her findings and conclusions are listed in

14 Which necessitated the Ryan’s dropping damning details

about Imperial County’s longterm policy causing previous

harms to Ryan family members, (id. .at 2-ER-180-189, sample

text dropped from initial complaint)).

27

an exhibit; and see Pet. Motion to correct the record,

9th Cir. App. dkt. 41, App. MTCR, ex. #3, exhibit

detailing 102 mistakes of fact made by Judge Ohta,

and exhibit #5, listing material facts not taken into

consideration by Judge Ohta in the Jurist’ orders.

I. The Ryan’s were denied Leave to Amend on all

fourteen express causes of action against all

defendants, based upon Judge Ohta’s reliance on

all the other mistakes of fact and law the Jurist

made (see writ §14-17, above; and see progression

in Pet.Appx. pg. 71, In. 25, 31 cont. pg. 72, Ins. 1-2,

9-13, and finally ruling the Ryan’s claims must be

stricken without leave, pg. 72, Ins. 17-22); and the

Jurist supported her rulings with reliance on nonanalogous caselaw applied to the procedural facts

relevant in this matter (for example see Pet. Appx.

pg. 37, Ins. 27-29; pg. 38, Ins. 11-13), which herein,

concerns Plaintiffs who only amended their claim

one time to reduce it’s size, as a condition of re­

filing before any motion had taken place. Id. Pet.

Appx. pg. 80-81; and see Dist. Ct. dkt. entries 1-9.

J. In Judge Ohta’s orders setting-aside the

defaults of ten sophisticated defendants, the Court

found that all ten defaulters had each met their

burden to establish good faith and lack of

culpability, even though attorney Orlando Foote’s

excuses

for

defaulting

were

far

beyond

preposterous (id. Dist. Ct. dkt. 115.1, dec. atty.

Orlando Foote jr., avail, id. at 4-ER-548 §22, 4-ER549 §23); he admitted he fastidiously and

repeatedly avoiding service of process for his ten

clients (Id. at see 4-ER-545 §§§ 11, 12, 4-ER-546

§14), and didn’t supply any declarations to

28

establish the mental state and conduct of each of

his ten clients during the four months they spent

in default. Id. at Pet. Appx. pg. 77, Ins. 27-29 cont.

pg. 76, Ins. 1-7.

Additionally, Judge Ohta supported her

good-faith and culpability findings with judicially

created facts attributed to attorney Orlando Foote;

incorrectly stating that Orlando Foote suffered

“various” medical “emergencies” during the default

period; and that the attorney in question was

confused about which complaint “was operative”

(Id. Pet. Appx. 76, Ins. 13-25). Further support for

setting aside the defaults involved reliance on

invalid criteria (the crush of business). Id. at 4-ERER-558 Ins. 23-26, 4-ER-559, Ins. 1-8); and Id. at

Pet. Appx. 76, Ins. 22-23); and id. at 4-ER-525, Ins.

7-14.

K. In the Court’s order granting the media’s antiSLAAP motion to strike, attacking Plaintiffs First

Amendment based actions, Judge Ohta made the

astonishing claim that the Ryan’s allegations

against the media were based solely on ‘the media

attending a meeting and publishing a news article

about it’ {Id. Pet. Appx. pg. 47, Ins. 25-31)15; and

then, in accord with the Court’s judicially created

narrative, concluded that the Ryan’s whole §1983

action ‘arose from’ the publishing of said article (a

simple overt act done in furtherance), rather than

the agreement to act in concert that allegedly

binds all defendants, and is at the crux of the

Ryan’s causes of action. Id. Pet. Appx. pg. 69, Ins.

9-16; and id. at 5-ER-875, 882, ex. No’s. 6, and 13,

15 Which was picked up and repeated in the Memorandum

released by the Appeals Court. Id. Pet.Appx. pg.9, Ins. 17-20

29

describing what the Ryan’s causes

from. 16

actually arise

L. In denying recusal, Judge Ohta claimed that the

Petitioner only made one accusation involving

conduct that might defile court processes (Id. Pet.

Appx. at bot. pg. 23 cont. to pg. 24). But that’s just

semantics. Joseph Ryan was required by

circumstances to advance his charges using the

objective standard, and to disavow making any

subjective claims. See Pet. Request for recusal, 6ER-897-912, §23-74, where Joseph Ryan makes

over fifty allegations, many which involve conduct

that defiled processes and which has already left a

permanent stain on the federal Judiciary. 17

Additionally, Judge Ohta applied §455(a)

without considering the extra-judicial bias

exception that Petitioners relied upon in their

request (Pet. Appx. pg. 24, In. 31 cont. to pg. 25; Id.

at 6-ER-894 §§§ 2, 3, 4), and then quoted an

allegation verbatim where Joseph Ryan wrote that

it looked like Judge Ohta was a ‘wholly dishonest,

sneaky Judge acting for corrupt reasons’ (id. at

Pet. Appx. pg. 25, Ins. 8-11)18; and finally, claimed

16 All of Petitioner’s arguments going to whether the County

was acting as a business, as opposed to performing a personal

service, and whether Petitioner’s pleading were ‘conclusory’

weren’t even acknowledged by the Court; Id. at 3-ER-460-61,

or it could be Judge Ohta simply doesn’t understand what

‘conclusory’ even means. Id at; 3-ER-399, In. 21 cont. to 3-ER400, line 12.

17 Using the objective standard keeps pro-se litigants out of jail,

so, unfortunately, subjective standard had to be put aside for

another day.

18 Which, in context, seems like a dog whistle to judicial

colleagues to retaliate against the Ryan’s for saying ‘bad things’

about a member of the federal judiciary.

30

the Ryan’s didn’t produce even a scintilla of

evidence that indicated that the Jurist could be

biased or failed to act with impartiality, Pet. Appx.

Id. at pg.25, Ins. 14-16, before denying recusal. Id.

at Ins. 16-28. Such finding is ridiculous on the face.

33.

REQUEST

FOR

RECUSAL

MAGISTRATE HANDLED IMPROPERLY

OF

In the Jurist order denying recusal, after

mentioning the disappearance from the federal

courthouse of the Ryan’s reply document exposing

judicial misconduct (see details in exhibit form, at

6-ER-1026-39), Magistrate Rodriguez also relied

upon non-applicable caselaw {id. at pg. 21, Ins. 1520, 20-23, 30-31), that he failed to apply to the

actual facts put at issue by the Ryan’s (id. at 6-ER1007-22). Then Magistrate Rodriguez stated he

wouldn’t ‘countenance’19 the Court being accused of

wrongdoing by petitioner {id. at pg. 22, Ins. 19).

34. ATTORNEYS APPEARING IN MATTER

INVOKE JUDICIAL BIAS TO ABORT ANY

SERIOUS INQUIRY INTO THEIR CONDUCT

Throughout the running of this matter, right

up into the Appeals Court, attorneys appearing in

the matter invoked the bias of the Court. See Pet.

Motion for sanctions, Dist. Ct. dkt. 128, ex. 1, 2,

and dkt. 131.2, ex. 1-2, §11, where the location of

many instances of ‘invocation of bias’ by attorneys

are compiled. For example, In the County Water

District’s opposition {Dkt. 45) to the Appellant’s

Motion to Correct the Record {9th. App. Ct. Dkt. 42)

attorney Melissa Blackburn Joniaux decried that

“Additionally, Appellants’ briefing contained

19 Whatever that means.

31

personal attacks on all parties, their counsel and

the presiding judges”; and then just ten lines later

wrote

. . in addition to further personal attacks

on Appellees, their counsel, and the presiding

judges”. 9th. App. Ct. Dkt. 45, pg. 2, Ins. 10-12, and

16-18.

These invocations illustrate why every

attorney who essentially cries out for their fellow

bar members on the bench to protect them from

the ‘mean’ pro-per plaintiffs, which is essentially a

call for Jurist to harm the Ryan’s by depriving

them of the full and fair due processes of The

federal Court because the Ryan’s wrote ‘bad things

about members of the bar’ in their various

pleadings, is not just being unprofessional, but

letting members of the judiciary know that socalled officers of the court expect favoritism from

Jurist when they’re opposing self-represented

litigants, and they aren’t afraid to all but demand

it from bar members sitting on the bench, as if it’s

an obligation owed other club members.

35. ‘ROYAL’ ATTITUDE DOES NOT BECOME

THE DISTRICT AND APPEALS COURT

The Ryan family doesn’t represent a gaggle

of serfs begging for some cake at the gates of the

federal court’s castle. The Appellant’s pleadings —

may not have all the

including this one

hallmarks of a polished litigator and Petitioner’s

don’t pretend to be anything other than

inexperienced amateurs when it comes to litigating

in

federal

court.

Nonetheless,

a

careful

examination of the facts pled by The Ryan’s

compared to the elements of the causes of action at

issue, reveals The Ryan’s operative complaint - if

32

subjected to normal processes of adjudication contains sufficient allegations asserted using nonconclusory facts, to carry most of their causes of

action to trial, without even requiring the benefit

of discovery. See Pet. FAC in entirety, avail, in Pet.

App. Excerpts at 2-ER-50-80.

36. ANGER ISSUES AFFECTED QUALITY OF

JURISDICTION

In this matter, judge Ohta proceeded in all

regards with callous disregard for the detrimental

effect her unfair, malignant approach to the Ryan’s

matter (see 6-ER-911 §69, Ins. 12-19; §70; §71, Ins.

24-26; 6-ER-912, Ins. 1-2; §§ 72-73; 6-ER-1015

§43(A), Ins. 16-25; 6-ER-907 §61) would have, not

only upon the Appellants, but also upon the Ryan’s

minor children, who were named as plaintiffs in

Appellant’s initial complaint, due to the damage

they’ve suffered at the hands of government actors

on June 4th, 2019, and at all other relevant times.

See Dist.Ct. dkt. 141, 142, minute orders of Judge

Ohta, issued early on the morning after Petitioner’s

requested the jurist recusal, cutting off the Ryan’s

reply rights. See dist. Ct dkt. 141, 142, rprd. Pet.

Appx. at 80; and id. at 6-ER-1015-19.

37. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT ABDICATED

JUDICIAL DUTIES BY ALLOWING STAFF TO

ENGINEER A DENOVO CHARADE

Comparing the content of the Ryan’s opening

brief, reply brief, and motion to correct the record

to the Appeals Court Panels’ memorandum of

decision, establishes beyond any doubt that not one

of the three judges on the panel ever read anything

the Ryan’s submitted to The Appeals Court, or the

33

most, couldn’t be bothered to give any weight or a

single drop of consideration to any material

contained in their opening brief, reply brief, motion

to correct the record, replies to MTCR opposition,

and the voluminous excerpts of record the Ryan’s

painstakingly created for the Court’s benefit,

before unsigned orders were released in the threejudge panel’s name(s). See App. dkt. 10, 11, 39, 41,

48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 58.

Either nothing was read or given due

material consideration by any of the Judges on the

panel, or every one of them was willing to sign-on

to what unequivocally constitutes the commission

of a fraud upon the federal court system, It’s one or

the other; there are no other possibilities in play.

See Pet. Writ §§ 20-22 (above).

38. MOTIONS FOR REHEARING LIKELY

‘HANDLED’ BY THE SAME STAFF MEMBER

WHO ENGINEERED DENOVO CHARADE

If the judges assigned to the panel couldn’t

be bothered to read the Appellants’ briefing

material, it doesn’t seem logical to presume any of

the Jurist developed a sudden interest in finding

out how The Ryan’s Appeal was being ‘taken care’

of by the staff during the rehearing process.

By all indications, a staff member was given

permission or leeway to simply clear The Ryan’s

matter off the docket, without the material

involvement of any judge, whatsoever.; and which

came entirely at the Ryan Family’s expense; with

their Constitutional right to due process being

34

jettisoned, at least in some part, for the sake of

expediency. 20

39. IMMORAL TO INVITE PRO-SE LITIGANTS

INTO COURT, ALLOW ATTORNEYS TO

AMBUSH THEM WITH PROCESS ABUSES,

AND USE MATTER AS A PRACTICE FIELD

FOR NEW JURIST

If Judges won’t police so-called ‘officers of

The Court’, the rules allowing pro-pers to file are

just a set-up for vulnerable litigants to be harmed

by bar members. The Federal Court simply morphs

into a convenient forum for attorneys to carry-out

against citizens

speech based retaliation

criticizing public officials in court documents — at

the behest of their government clients; which is

exactly what occurred in this matter. For example,

see 9th. Cir. Dkt. 39, pg. 11-13, §12, where County’s

use of reply document to mock death of the Ryan’s

second child is described; and id. at ex. 5-ER-666.

The Petitioner’s lives have to matter as

much as the career advancement of any individual

federal District Judge. The lives and due process

rights of four people living in the middle of the

desert shouldn’t be disregarded on those illicit

grounds.

20. Although the Ryan’s status as pro-pers, the desire to

obstruct justice for clients who obviously were involved in the

commission of serious crimes, and to continue to carry-out

County policy regarding retaliating against persons who say

‘bad’ things about Imperial County’s public officials, using

federal court processes, were also critical factors at play.

35

40. THIS MATTER CRIES OUT FOR A

REMEDY DUE TO DEPRAVITY OF CONDUCT

AT ISSUE

After Appellant’s filed claims with The

County of Imperial and alleged bad conduct by a

public official, had caused the Ryan’s 2-year old

little girl to suffer nightmares (see Pet. App, at 112,

a reproduction of text from a claim for damages

sent to The Count; and see text from Petitioner’s

subsequently filed complaint at 2-ER-230-231),

Imperial County’s policymakers intentionally

caused a whole mass of angry adults, and adults

feigning anger, to yell directly in the direction of

the Ryan’s 3-year old, impressionable little girl;

which resulted in her suffering further nightmares

connected to what she witnessed happen to her

parents. Id. in VOM at 58:05 to 1:02:50 (where

child tries to not be separated from Mother, as

Mother bothered by Deputies).

The Ryan’s would have never brought their

minor daughter to a public meeting, again, if they

thought for an instant that the various defendants

would carry-out a boisterous, confrontational

speech-ambush in the presence of a large group of

public witnesses; but unfortunately for the Ryan’s

minor children, harmed deeply by the defendant’s

conduct, that’s water under the bridge; just like

the Petitioner’s matter flowed through the Appeals

Court setting.

36

41. WITHOUT RELIEF FROM THIS COURT, A

BLATANTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE,

WHICH MAKES ONE RISK LIFE AND LIMB

TO CRITICIZE A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IN

IMPERIAL COUNTY CALIFORNIA, WILL LIVE

ON IN INFAMY

See Pet. Facial ordinance challenge, avail at

2-ER-81-104, where Petitioners describe how

Imperial County’s ordinance does not regulate

speech within Constitutional acceptable bounds,

(rprd. in part in Pet. Appx. pg. 88-101).

XI. PETITIONER’S REQUESTS:

1. Grant Certiorari; and then:

2. Recall Mandate issued by Appeals Court

3. Decide matter(s) on merits, or remand for

meaningful adjudication of causes of action.

4. Decide all sanctions related issues on the merits,

or remand for proper consideration

5. Order Appeals Court to appoint special master

to investigate why normal, acceptable processes of

adjudication broke down in this matter.

6. Review the facial Constitutionality of Imperial

County’s Meeting law (including the attached

declaration establishing Petitioner’s standing); and

declare it to be unconstitutional as appropriate.

37

XII. PETITIONER’S INFORMATION

Respectfully Submitted

Gilda Ryan

April 29, 2025

Joseph Ryan

April 29, 2025

Gilda Ryan

Joseph Ryan

Self-represented

53 Sunset Way

PO Box 183

Palo Verde, Ca. 92266

itsjoeryan@gmail.com

760-854-1009

38

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gilda Ryan, et al., Petitioners v. County of Imperial, California, et al. | Frix