Motion to Dismiss or Affirm — Press Robinson, et al., Appellants v. Phillip Callais, et al.

No. 24-110

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

PRESS ROBINSON, ET AL.,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, ET AL.,

Appellants,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the

United States District Court for

the Western District of Louisiana

BRIEF OPPOSING

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

JANAI NELSON

SAMUEL SPITAL

STUART NAIFEH

Counsel of Record

VICTORIA WENGER

COLIN BURKE

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE

& EDUCATIONAL FUND,

INC.

40 Rector St., 5th Floor

New York, NY 10006

(212) 965-2200

snaifeh@naacpldf.org

ROBERT A. ATKINS

YAHONNES CLEARY

JONATHAN H. HURWITZ

AMITAV CHAKRABORTY

ADAM P. SAVITT

ARIELLE B. MCTOOTLE

ROBERT KLEIN

NEIL CHITRAO

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON

LLP

1285 Avenue of the

Americas,

New York, NY 10019

TRACIE WASHINGTON

LOUISIANA JUSTICE

INSTITUTE

3157 Gentilly Blvd.

Suite 132

New Orleans LA, 70122

JOHN ADCOCK

ADCOCK LAW LLC

3110 Canal St.

New Orleans, LA 70119

SARAH BRANNON

MEGAN C. KEENAN

ADRIEL I. CEPEDA

DERIEUX

DAVID D. COLE

AMERICAN CIVIL

LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

915 15th St., NW

Washington, DC 20005

T. ALORA THOMASLUNDBORG

DANIEL HESSEL

ELECTION LAW CLINIC

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

6 Everett St., Ste. 4105

Cambridge, MA 02138

DEUEL ROSS

R. JARED EVANS

I. SARA ROHANI

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE

& EDUCATIONAL FUND,

INC.

700 14th St. N.W. Ste. 600

Washington, DC 20005

SOPHIA LIN LAKIN

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

125 Broad St., 18th Floor

New York, NY 10004

CECILLIA D. WANG

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

425 California St., Ste. 700

San Francisco, CA 94104

NORA AHMED

ASHLEY FOX

ACLU FOUNDATION OF

LOUISIANA

1340 Poydras St., Ste.

2160

New Orleans, LA 70112

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................1

ARGUMENT ...............................................................2

I. Appellants Have Standing Because the Panel’s

Decision Threatens to Once Again Dilute Their

Votes. ................................................................2

II. Appellees and the Panel Fail to Disentangle

Race and Politics. .............................................4

III.The Panel Erred in Its Application of Strict

Scrutiny ............................................................6

IV. The Panel Abused Its Discretion by Expediting

Proceedings .....................................................11

CONCLUSION ..........................................................13

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Abbott v. Perez,

585 U.S. 579 (2017).................................... 2, 5, 6, 9

Abrams v. Johnson,

521 U.S. 74 (1997) .........................................3, 4, 6

Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP,

144 S. Ct. 1221 (2024)...................... 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023)....................................................4

Bartlett v. Strickland,

556 U.S. 1 (2009)....................................................1

Bethune-Hill v. State Bd. of Elections,

580 U.S. 178 (2017).............................. 1, 2, 5, 6, 12

Bush v. Vera,

517 U.S. 952 (1995)................................ 4, 7, 11, 12

Easley v. Cromartie,

532 U.S. 234 (2001)................................ 3, 6, 10, 11

Gill v. Whitford,

585 US 48 (2018)....................................................3

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

570 U.S. 693 (2013)................................................3

Lawyer v. Dep't of Just.,

521 U.S. 567 (1997)..............................................10

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,

548 U.S. 399 (2006)..........................................1, 11

iii

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803)....................................................8

Miller v. Johnson,

515 U.S. 900 (1995)................................................8

North Carolina v. Covington,

585 U.S. 969 (2018)............................................2, 4

Robinson v. Ardoin,

86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023) ..............................1, 6

Robinson v. Ardoin,

37 F.4th 208 (5th Cir. 2022) ..................................1

Robinson v. Ardoin,

605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022) ................1, 5

Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Co-op. Bldg.,

463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972)..............................12

Shaw v. Hunt,

517 U.S. 899 (1996)................................................8

Shaw v. Reno,

509 U.S. 630 (1993)................................................1

Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch,

451 U.S. 390 (1981)..............................................12

Wise v. Lipscomb,

437 U.S. 535 (1978)................................................7

1

INTRODUCTION

The Louisiana Legislature acted within the

breathing room the Constitution affords when it

pursued political goals in redrawing Louisiana’s

congressional map in response to multiple federal

court rulings finding that the State’s 2022 plan (HB1)

likely violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). See

Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023);

Robinson v. Ardoin, 37 F.4th 208 (5th Cir. 2022);

Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La.

2022). In an extraordinary request, Appellees ask this

Court to deny Louisiana any presumption of good

faith, ignore court decisions in Robinson, and reject

decades of precedent. This Court has consistently

held that “race consciousness does not lead inevitably

to impermissible race discrimination,” Shaw v. Reno,

509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993), and that states “retain

broad discretion” in complying with the VRA, League

of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,

429 (2006) (“LULAC”); see also Bethune-Hill v. State

Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 193–196 (2017);

Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 23 (2009) (Ҥ2

allows States to choose their own method of complying

with the Voting Rights Act”).

Appellees concede that protecting specific

incumbents, not race, was the Legislature’s primary

motive for choosing the plan it adopted (SB8). See

Mot.8–9. This includes Louisiana’s placement of a

new majority-Black district along the Red River

between Shreveport and Baton Rouge instead of

creating a more compact district in the Delta as

Appellants proposed in Robinson. This concession

requires reversal and should end this appeal. See

2

Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 144 S. Ct.

1221, 1241–1243 (2024). Appellees insist these

political considerations do not matter, arguing that

Louisiana’s decision to create a second majority-Black

district itself constitutes racial predominance,

regardless of the motivations for the plan’s specific

configuration. But this Court has repeatedly and

unequivocally rejected that premise. A legislature’s

consideration of race for the “lawful purpose” of

complying with §2—and then prioritizing politics

with respect to the specific district it creates—is not

racial predominance. Id. at 1242; see also North

Carolina v. Covington, 585 U.S. 969, 977–978 (2018)

(permitting race-conscious remedial districts); Abbott

v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 616 (2017) (same). Even if it

were, Louisiana’s balancing of race with political

considerations in SB8 would satisfy strict scrutiny.

Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 193–195. Any other decision

would leave states no breathing room between VRAcompliance and racial gerrymandering—the very

bind this Court has repeatedly warned lower courts

not to impose.

Appellees’ motion should be denied.

ARGUMENT

I.

Appellants Have Standing Because the

Panel’s Decision Threatens to Once Again

Dilute Their Votes.

Contrary to Appellees’ contention, Appellants

have “a direct stake in the outcome” of this appeal. As

the panel and this Court’s settled precedent

recognize, the substantial harm the current

3

injunction would cause to Appellants’ individual right

to cast undiluted votes constitutes a direct and

concrete injury. App.16a. In redistricting cases, this

Court has repeatedly entertained similar appeals by

private intervenors alone, Abrams v. Johnson, 521

U.S. 74, 78 (1997), or in conjunction with State

officials, Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241

(2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957 (1995).

Additionally, Appellant Davante Lewis resides in the

enjoined majority-Black district, CD6. App.145a. If

the district court’s injunction is upheld, Mr. Lewis,

like other Black voters in CD6—and not like every

Louisiana voter—would be deprived of his individual

right to an undiluted vote. That is all that is required.

The threatened dilution of Appellants’ votes is a

particularized injury that is “personal and individual”

and traceable to the district court’s injunction. Gill v.

Whitford, 585 US 48, 65 (2018) (citations omitted).

Appellants’ interest in avoiding that dilution is wholly

distinct from the State’s interest in enforcing its laws.

Thus, Appellants neither seek to vindicate a

generalized “interest in proper application of the

Constitution and laws” shared by every citizen,

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013), nor

to assert the State’s interest as the basis for their

standing.

The risk that Appellants will be made to vote

under a map that dilutes their vote is not speculative

or abstract. In 2022, Appellants were forced to vote

under a map that the Robinson courts found likely

diluted their votes. Appellees would impose a map

that reproduces that same illegal dilution. Mot.22.

Appellants have standing to maintain this appeal. Cf.

4

Abrams, 521 U.S. at 78 (permitting private

intervenors to appeal court-ordered plan that

allegedly failed to comply with §2).

II.

Appellees and the Panel

Disentangle Race and Politics.

Fail

to

This Court has held that racial-gerrymandering

plaintiffs and the district court must “disentangle

race from politics.” Alexander, 144 S. Ct. at 1233.

Appellees acknowledge that the Legislature pursued

political goals in SB8, specifically the desire to protect

favored incumbents over the Governor’s political

rival. 1 Mot.8. Appellees say none of this political

context matters—even though politics alone explains

the preference for SB8 over more-compact

alternatives, App.395a—because the State considered

politics only after concluding that the Robinson

decisions required a §2 remedy. They contend race

would predominate in any map that intentionally

complied with §2, and they dismiss the Legislature’s

district-specific considerations. Mot.21–22.

But the use of race to remedy racial

discrimination, without more, cannot establish racial

predominance or violate the Constitution. See

Covington, 585 U.S. at 978; Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S.

1, 41 (2023). Even where a State employs an “express

1 Appellees assert that the Legislature espoused no policy goal

for CD6, but the Legislature identified social, religious,

healthcare, and economic interests that CD6 protected,

App.224a-226a, 252a, and sought to craft CD6 so that the

preferred incumbents remained unpaired in their districts

without violating one-person-one-vote—no easy task according

to Appellees’ own expert. App.220a–221a.

5

racial target,” a “holistic analysis” is necessary to

evaluate claims of racial predominance. Bethune-Hill,

580 U.S. at 192. Here, the Robinson courts’ finding

that a reasonably configured majority-Black district

could be drawn provided “good reasons” for Louisiana

to believe it could draw a remedial district without

violating the Constitution. See Abbott, 585 U.S. at 616

(legislature had “good reason” to believe §2 required

majority-minority district based on court’s prior

“extensive[]” analysis). The Legislature’s exercise of

its leeway to draw a less-compact remedial district for

political reasons is not racial predominance.

Appellees’ acknowledgment that politics animated

the choice of SB8, combined with the concurrence of

seven federal judges in Robinson that a second

majority-Black district could be drawn without race

predominating, dooms this appeal. At the very least,

these facts required Appellees to “disentangle race

from politics by proving that the former drove [CD6’s]

lines.” Alexander, 144 S. Ct. at 1235 (citation

omitted). Yet Appellees offered no evidence that a

single line in SB8 was driven by racial considerations

over political ones.

Appellees also failed to produce an alternative

map that accomplished Louisiana’s political goals

with less reliance on race. Alexander, 144 S. Ct. at

1234–1236. Instead, they now contend that HB1,

Louisiana’s 2022 congressional map, satisfies the

alternative-map requirement because it protected the

same incumbents as SB8. Mot.22. But HB1 is the very

map Robinson found likely to violate §2. 605 F. Supp.

3d at 851. Had the State kept HB1, the Robinson

court likely would have imposed a map with no heed

6

to the Legislature’s incumbent preferences. See, e.g.,

Abrams, 521 U.S. at 84 (approving court-drawn plan

that gave low priority to incumbency protection).

Avoiding that outcome was precisely what the

Legislature sought by selecting SB8. The State thus

could not have achieved its political goals by keeping

HB1. 2

Because the record demonstrates “that politics

pervaded the highly visible mapmaking process from

start to finish,” Alexander, 144 S. Ct. at 1244, this

Court should note jurisdiction and reverse.

III.

The Panel Erred in Its Application of

Strict Scrutiny.

Even if Appellees had demonstrated racial

predominance, SB8 easily survives strict scrutiny.

Robinson provided “good reasons” for Louisiana to

believe that a plan with a second Black-opportunity

district was feasible and necessary to comply with the

VRA, which is all narrow tailoring requires. BethuneHill, 580 U.S. at 194–195. While this “standard does

not require the State to show that its action was

actually necessary to avoid a statutory violation,” id.

at 194, where judicial findings of a likely §2 violation

exist—such as those in a preliminary injunction

affirmed as “valid when it was issued,” Robinson, 86

F.4th at 599—they can provide good reason for a

state’s drawing of majority-minority districts, see

Abbott, 585 U.S. at 616; Vera, 517 U.S. at 994–995

Appellees also cite an illustrative map introduced at trial

which, like HB1 had one Black-opportunity district. But there

was no evidence of that map’s origins, and the panel hardly

mentioned it.

2

7

(O’Connor,

J.,

concurring).

With

Robinson

establishing the required good reasons, the

Legislature drafted SB8 with political considerations

at the forefront. App.395a. Appellees cite no evidence

that the Legislature considered race more than

necessary to honor §2. They concede that CD6

contains just over 50% BVAP, and the record shows

SB8’s sponsor believed this was the level needed to

elect Black voters’ candidates of choice. App.396a.

Appellees disparage the State’s interest in

complying with §2 as merely “[a] desire to beat the

Robinson district court to the punch,” Mot.23, even

speculating, without evidence, that the State used the

VRA litigation strategically as cover for “its own

racial gerrymander,” Mot.25. But they fail to offer any

motive for the Legislature to pursue this goal other

than VRA-compliance, nor evidence that its political

goals were anything but genuine. Appellees’ effort to

cast doubt on the Legislature’s record-substantiated

motives contravenes the presumption of legislative

good faith. Alexander, 144 S. Ct. at 1235–1236; cf.

Abbott, 585 U.S. at 608–609 (rejecting argument that

adopting remedial map to resolve §2 litigation

evidences legislative bad faith). Moreover, “beating

[the court] to the punch,” and avoiding displacement

of the Legislature’s redistricting prerogative, is

precisely what this Court (and the Fifth Circuit in its

Robinson remand) has long held is the proper course.

E.g., Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978)

(redistricting “is a legislative task which the federal

courts should make every effort not to preempt”).

Appellees argue that multiple adverse rulings in

the Robinson plaintiffs’ VRA litigation failed to

8

render VRA-compliance a compelling state interest,

likening those federal-court decisions to “third party

litigation threats”

and Justice

Department

preclearance objections. Mot.26, 28. But federal

courts do not issue litigation threats; they decide the

cases before them. And, unlike the Justice

Department, it is “emphatically the province and duty

of the judicial department to say what the law is,”

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). That is

precisely what the Robinson courts did when they

concluded that HB1 likely violated §2 and alternative

plans with two majority-Black districts were not

racial gerrymanders. Moreover, in the cases

Appellees cite, this Court ruled that the Justice

Department’s policy of maximizing majority-minority

districts misconstrued §5’s requirements. See, e.g.,

Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 911–912 (1996); Miller v.

Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921–924 (1995). There is no

basis to suggest the Robinson district court similarly

misapplied §2: The Fifth Circuit twice upheld its

merits determinations, and this Court declined to

intervene.

Nevertheless, according to Appellees, even if the

Robinson courts correctly applied §2, it was improper

for the State to rely on their rulings. To Appellees,

this amounted to “outsourc[ing]” the inquiry into

Louisiana’s VRA obligations to the federal courts.

Mot.28. They maintain that the State could not

validly rely on the Robinson courts’ determination

that Gingles had been satisfied and that HB1 likely

violated §2 because 1) the Attorney General told

legislators she disagreed with the Robinson courts’

conclusions even as she advised them to accede to

their rulings, Mot.4–6; 2) legislators had not

9

independently reviewed or relied on the Robinson

preliminary-injunction evidence, Mot.29–30; and 3)

the Robinson rulings arose in a preliminaryinjunction posture, and the State made a “strategic

misstep” by failing to raise unspecified legal defenses

that it might have raised at trial, Mot.31. None of

these observations undermine Louisiana’s “good

reasons” for engaging in remedial redistricting.

By Appellees’ logic, states must exhaust time and

resources litigating losing vote-dilution cases to final

judgment before they have a strong enough basis to

consider race for VRA-compliance; even then,

Appellees would require states to defy a federal court

order unless they subjectively agree with its legal

analysis and independently verify its evidentiary

foundation. That is not the law. First, even if the

Attorney General believed HB1 remained lawful,

Louisiana made a reasoned judgment that the courts

disagreed, and there is no evidence that she believed

SB8 was unlawful. Cf. Abbott, 585 U.S. at 609.

Appellees identify no law that would require the State

to concede liability in Robinson or legislators to

subjectively agree with the courts’ §2 rulings to have

good reasons to adopt a race-conscious remedy.

Second, the “good reasons” standard did not require

the Legislature to conduct its own independent

Gingles analysis or concur with the Robinson courts’

assessment of the expert analysis and evidentiary

record. See id. at 616 (where legislature adopted new

districts to resolve VRA litigation, evidence from

litigation record could provide “good reasons” to draw

non-compact majority-minority district). Moreover,

Appellees’ assertion that the Legislature was

unfamiliar with the expert analysis is false. During

10

the 2024 Special Session, at the request of the Senate

and Governmental Affairs Committee, the Robinson

plaintiffs’ counsel gave a presentation to legislators

on the experts’ data and conclusions. Dkt.181-4,

61:18–74:22. Third, the State was not required to go

to trial or await a “fully litigated decision” finding a

§2 violation, Mot.27, before having “good reasons” to

take remedial action. 3 Cf. Lawyer v. Dep’t of Just., 521

U.S. 567, 576 (1997) (court not required to find plan

unconstitutional before approving settlement).

Appellees’ assertion that the State “never frontally

attacked the plaintiffs’ VRA showings[,]” Mot.30, is

belied by the Robinson decisions and does not change

the analysis: The Governor and Attorney General,

who represented the State in Robinson, concluded—

and advised the Legislature—that they had

exhausted their legal options and further litigation

would be fruitless.

Appellees contend that CD6 is not narrowly

tailored because it could have been more compact.

There is no dispute that SB8’s CD6 is less compact

than necessary for VRA-compliance or that the morecompact alternatives offered in Robinson wouldn’t

have accomplished the Legislature’s political goals.

J.S.27–30. The question for strict scrutiny, however,

is not whether the district is narrowly tailored to

remedy the VRA violation; it is whether the

Legislature’s use of race in drawing the district is

narrowly tailored. Vera, 517 U.S. at 962–963. This is

What Appellees repeatedly dismiss as the “preliminary

opinions from Robinson,” Mot.30, were based on a significantly

more extensive evidentiary record than the ruling by the panel

below.

3

11

not a case where a legislature drew a less-thancompact district because of race. As Appellees

recognize, Louisiana considered race only as

necessary to create a second majority-Black district,

see Mot.9 (recognizing that CD6 is just over 50%

BVAP), which was required to satisfy the VRA as

construed by the courts in Robinson. That is the

essence of narrow tailoring. The Legislature then

chose a less-compact majority-Black district for

political reasons, precisely the kind of policy choice

the Constitution gives states leeway to make. See,

e.g., Vera, 517 U.S. at 978.

Finally, assuming Robinson provided good reasons

to draw a remedial VRA district in Baton Rouge and

the Delta, Appellees contend that it was improper for

the State to create a Black-opportunity district “just

anywhere.” Mot.27 (citing LULAC, 548 U.S. at 431).

But SB8’s CD6 is not “elsewhere in the state” from the

illustrative districts in Robinson, LULAC, 548 U.S. at

430–432: Less than 23% of the population in CD6

comes from the three Northwest Louisiana parishes,

Caddo, Natchitoches, and DeSoto, that are not in

whole or in part in the Delta-based district. Dkt.18310, Dkt.183-7 Because it was not possible to draw a

Black-opportunity district that included both

Northeast and Northwest Louisiana, the State had to

make a choice. Under this Court’s precedents, it was

permitted to do so. See, e.g., LULAC, 548 U.S. at 430.

IV.

The Panel Abused Its Discretion by

Expediting Proceedings.

Appellees miss the key problem with the district

court’s trial schedule. Even if the expedited schedule

12

were appropriate for preliminary relief, it was

inappropriate in proceedings leading to a final

judgment. Appellees’ only argument in favor of

consolidation of the preliminary injunction and trial

is that the Secretary claimed that a new map had to

be in place by May 15 to avoid disrupting the 2024

election.

Mot.33–35. But consolidation was

unnecessary to address that concern. A preliminary

injunction, followed by trial on a reasonable timeline,

would have sufficed.

Appellees’ insistence that the case “was the State’s

to defend” or that Appellants were permissive

intervenors not entitled to a process sufficient to fully

present their case is no answer (nor is it accurate).

Mot.34. The State had not yet intervened when the

Appellees proposed consolidation, and the Secretary

of State—who refused to defend SB8—did not oppose.

Moreover, neither the State nor the Secretary put on

any evidence at trial. Put another way, until twentyfour days before trial, no party that sought to present

evidence to defend SB8 was able to object to

consolidation or the truncated discovery process. See

Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981);

Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Co-op. Bldg., 463

F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.) (“A

litigant . . . should seldom be required . . . to forego

discovery” due to consolidation). Further, “extensive

experience in Louisiana redistricting litigation[,]”

Mot.34, is no substitute for an opportunity to develop

a factual record and test witness testimony, especially

on an issue as fact-dependent as racial

gerrymandering. See Alexander, 144 S. Ct. at 1243;

Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 192.

13

CONCLUSION

This Court should deny Appellees’ motion, note

probable jurisdiction, and reverse.

September 16, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

TRACIE L. WASHINGTON

LOUISIANA JUSTICE

INSTITUTE

8004 Belfast St.

New Orleans, LA 70125

STUART NAIFEH

Counsel of Record

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE

& EDUCATIONAL FUND,

INC.

40 Rector St., 5th Fl.

New York, NY 10006

Tel: (212) 965-2200

snaifeh@naacpldf.org

Counsel for Appellants

Dorothy Nairne,

Martha Davis, Clee

Earnest Lowe, and

Rene Soule

Counsel for Appellants

14

JANAI NELSON

SAMUEL SPITAL

VICTORIA WENGER

COLIN BURKE

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE

& EDUCATIONAL FUND,

INC.

40 Rector St., 5th Fl.

New York, NY 10006

DEUEL ROSS

R. JARED EVANS

I. SARA ROHANI

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE

AND EDUCATIONAL

FUND, INC.

700 14th St. NW, Ste.

600

Washington, DC 20005

SARAH BRANNON

MEGAN C. KEENAN

ADRIEL I. CEPEDA

DERIEUX

DAVID COLE

AMERICAN CIVIL

LIBERTIES UNION

FOUNDATION

915 15th St. NW

Washington, DC 20005

ROBERT A. ATKINS

YAHONNES CLEARY

JONATHAN H. HURWITZ

AMITAV CHAKRABORTY

ADAM P. SAVITT

ARIELLE B. MCTOOTLE

ROBERT KLEIN

NEIL CHITRAO

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON

LLP

1285 Avenue of the

Americas

New York, NY 10019

CECILLIA D. WANG

AMERICAN CIVIL

LIBERTIES UNION

FOUNDATION

425 California St., Ste.

700

San Francisco, CA

94104

SOPHIA LIN LAKIN

AMERICAN CIVIL

LIBERTIES UNION

FOUNDATION

125 Broad St., 18th Fl.

New York, NY 10004

15

NORA AHMED

ASHLEY FOX

ACLU FOUNDATION OF

LOUISIANA

1340 Poydras St., Ste.

2160

New Orleans, LA 70112

JOHN ADCOCK

ADCOCK LAW LLC

3110 Canal St.

New Orleans, LA 70119

Additional counsel for

Appellants

T. ALORA THOMASLUNDBORG

DANIEL HESSEL

ELECTION LAW CLINIC

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

6 Everett St., Ste. 4105

Cambridge, MA 02138