Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Chelsea Koetter, Petitioner v. Manistee County Treasurer, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 17, 2025

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Text

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_________

CHELSEA KOETTER,

Petitioner,

MANISTEE COUNTY TREASURER,

Respondent.

_________

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Michigan Court of Appeals

_________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_________

CHRISTINA M. M ARTIN

Counsel of Record

D EBORAH J. L A F ETRA

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.

Suite 1000

Arlington, VA 22201

Telephone: (916) 330-4059

CMartin@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Manistee County Treasurer foreclosed and

sold Chelsea Koetter’s home for $106,000 to collect

$3,863.40 in taxes, interest, and fees. The Takings

Clause requires the government to return the surplus

proceeds—$102,636—from the sale to avoid an

unconstitutional taking. Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., 598

U.S. 631 (2023). But the County kept it all pursuant

to Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78t, which gives the

proceeds to the County if, weeks before the sale, the

property owner fails to properly notify the government

of her desire to be paid for her property. Federal and

state courts in Michigan allow this end-run around

Tyler based on dicta in Nelson v. City of New York, 352

U.S. 103 (1956). As a result, only about 5% of

Michigan tax debtors successfully navigate the

statute’s procedures. The statute violates due process

and flouts the government’s “constitutional duty” to

make “reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for

obtaining compensation.” Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan.

Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 658 (1890). The questions

presented are:

1. Does the government violate the Due Process or

Takings Clause by denying just compensation

to property owners who miss a narrow and

premature window to preserve their right to

just compensation?

2. To the extent it authorizes Michigan’s

confiscatory claim statute, should the Court

overrule Nelson v. City of New York?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner Chelsea Koetter was defendantappellant in the proceedings below.

Respondent Manistee County Treasurer was

plaintiff-appellee below.

Respondent Ann Culp was defendant-appellant in

the proceeding below.

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

These proceedings are directly related to the abovecaptioned case under Rule 14.1(b)(iii):

In re Petition of Manistee County Treasurer for

Foreclosure, No. 167367 (Mich. Jan. 31, 2025)

In re Petition of Manistee County Treasurer for

Foreclosure, No. 363723 (Mich. Ct. App. June 13,

2024)

In the Matter of the Petition of Manistee County

Treasurer for the Foreclosures of Certain Parcels of

Property Due to Unpaid 2018 and Prior Years’

Taxes, Interest, Penalties, and Fees, No. 20-17073CZ (Manistee County Circuit Court Aug. 10, 2021).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari ................................. 1

Opinions Below ........................................................... 4

Jurisdiction ................................................................. 4

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .... 5

Statement of the Case ................................................ 5

A. Michigan’s claim statute............................... 5

B. Pursuant to Michigan’s claim statute,

Manistee County keeps $102,636 more

than Chelsea Koetter owed ........................... 7

C. The Michigan Court of Appeals holds the

County did not violate due process or take

property without just compensation ............. 9

Reasons for Granting the Petition ........................... 10

I. This Case Presents an Important Takings

Question Arising Directly from the Court’s

Own Conflicting Opinions ............................... 10

A. Michigan’s burdensome claim procedure

violates the government’s traditional duty to

pay surplus proceeds and just compensation

to rightful owners ........................................ 12

B. The Court should grant certiorari to resolve

the confusion and widespread deprivations of

property caused by dicta in Nelson v.

City of New York .......................................... 18

C. If Nelson’s commentary on takings is not

dicta, the Court should grant review to

overturn it .................................................... 22

II. The Lower Court’s Decision Conflicts with

This Court’s Due Process Decisions................ 26

A. The Court should grant certiorari to hold

that Michigan’s notice is inadequate

under the circumstances ............................. 28

B. The lower court’s opinion conflicts with

this Court’s decisions rejecting unreasonably

short deadlines to protect constitutional

rights ............................................................ 31

C. The Court should grant certiorari to

determine whether the pre-claim notice form

meets the standards of fairness required by

the Due Process Clause ............................... 32

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 35

APPENDIX

Michigan Court of Appeals, No. 363723,

Opinion, filed June 13, 2024................................. 1a

Michigan 19th Circuit Court for the County of

Manistee, No. 20-17073-CZ, Opinion and Order

Regarding Claim of Chelsea Koetter and Ann

Culp, filed August 29, 2022 ................................ 17a

Michigan Supreme Court, No. 167367,

Order Denying Application for Review,

filed November 22, 2024 ..................................... 20a

Michigan Supreme Court, No. 167367, Order

Denying Motion for Reconsideration,

Jan. 31, 2025 ....................................................... 22a

MCL § 211.78m (excerpts) ...................................... 24a

MCL § 211.78t (excerpts)........................................ 25a

Michigan 19th Circuit Court for the County of

Manistee, No. 20-17073-CZ, Judgment of

Foreclosure, filed February 12, 2021

(with relevant excerpt of Attachment A) ........... 36a

Mailed notice to Chelsea Koetter: Payment

Deadline .............................................................. 43a

Mailed notice to Chelsea Koetter: Notice of

Foreclosure .......................................................... 46a

Form 5743 – Notice of Intention to Claim Interest

in Foreclosure Sales Proceeds by Chelsea Koetter,

filed July 9, 2021 ................................................. 49a

Amended Form 5743 – Notice of Intention to Claim

Interest in Foreclosure Sales Proceeds by Chelsea

Koetter, filed August 10, 2021............................ 50a

Michigan 19th Circuit Court for the County of

Muskegon, No. No. 20-17073-CZ, Koetter Verified

Motion to Disburse Remaining Proceeds from Tax

Foreclosure Sale, filed May 10, 2022 (omitting

exhibits) ............................................................... 52a

Michigan 19th Circuit Court for the County of

Manistee, No. 20-17073-CZ,

Affidavit of Chelsea Koetter ............................... 55a

Michigan 19th Circuit Court for the County of

Manistee, No. 20-17073-CZ, Affidavit of

Robert Mick (omitting exhibits) ......................... 58a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

257-261 20th Ave., Realty, LLC v.

Roberto, 259 N.J. 417 (2025) ................................. 1

In re Alger Cnty. Treasurer for

Foreclosure, Nos. 363803, 363804,

2024 WL 4174925 (Mich. Ct. App.

Sept. 12, 2024), rev. denied,

Nos. 167712, 167713,

2025 WL 945725 (Mar. 28, 2025) ........................ 14

Armstrong v. United States,

364 U.S. 40 (1960) ............................................... 11

Biesemeyer v. Municipality of

Anchorage,

No. 3:23-CV-00185, 2024 WL

1480564 (D. Alaska Mar. 13, 2024) .................... 20

Bogie v. Town of Barnet,

129 Vt. 46 (1970).................................................. 13

Bolling v. Sharpe,

347 U.S. 497 (1954) ............................................. 26

Bourne Valley Court Trust v.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................. 16

Breithaupt v. Abram,

352 U.S. 432 (1957) ............................................. 26

Brody v. Village of Port Chester,

434 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005) ................................. 28

Burnett v. Grattan,

468 U.S. 42 (1984) ............................................... 31

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,

594 U.S. 139 (2021) ............................................. 10

Cherokee Equities, L.L.C. v. Garaventa,

382 N.J. Super. 201 (Ch. Div. 2005) ................... 29

vii

Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co.,

135 U.S. 641 (1890) ............................. 2, 10, 14, 18

City of New York v. Nelson,

309 N.Y. 801 (1955) ............................................. 19

Clement v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

75 F.4th 1193 (11th Cir. 2023) ............................ 17

Cocks v. Izard,

74 U.S. 559 (1868) ............................................... 13

Collins v. City of Harker Heights,

503 U.S. 115 (1992) ......................................... 3, 26

Covey v. Town of Somers,

351 U.S. 141 (1956) ....................................... 25, 28

Culley v. Marshall,

601 U.S. 377 (2024) ............................................. 34

FDA v. Wages and White Lion Inv.,

LLC, 145 S. Ct. 898 (2025) .................................. 22

Felder v. Casey,

487 U.S. 131 (1988) ....................... 17, 24-25, 32-33

First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church of Glendale v.

Los Angeles Cnty.,

482 U.S. 304 (1987) .............................. 2, 10, 14-15

In re Franco v. Real Portfolio 13, LLC,

No. 24-21084-ABA, 2025 WL 884067

(Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2025) ............................ 20

Garcia v. Title Check, LLC,

No. 22-1574, 2023 WL 2787298

(6th Cir. Apr. 5, 2023) ......................................... 16

Garcia-Rubiera v. Fortuno,

727 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2013) ................................ 32

Gates v. City of Chicago,

623 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2010) ............................... 31

viii

Grainger v. Ottawa Cnty.,

90 F.4th 507 (6th Cir. 2024) .......................... 15, 32

Groesbeck v. Seeley,

13 Mich. 329 (1865) ............................................. 29

Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108,

111 U.S. 701 (1884) ............................................. 26

Harmelin v. Michigan,

501 U.S. 957 (1991) ............................................. 34

Hart v. City of Detroit,

416 Mich. 488 (1982) ..................................... 15, 32

Hathon v. Michigan,

17 N.W.3d 686 (Mich. 2025) ........... 2, 10-11, 20, 24

HBI, LLC v. Barnette,

305 Neb. 457 (2020) ............................................. 34

Hetelekides v. Cnty. of Ontario,

39 N.Y.3d 222 (2023) ........................................... 34

Hodel v. Irving,

481 U.S. 704 (1987) ............................................. 17

Howard v. City of Detroit,

40 F.4th 417 (6th Cir. 2022) ................................ 33

Howard v. Cnty. of Macomb,

No. 24-1665, __ F.4th __,

2025 WL 941511

(6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2025) ........... 11, 18, 20-21, 23-24

Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty.,

and Municipal Employees,

585 U.S. 878 (2018) ....................................... 16, 22

Jones v. Flowers,

547 U.S. 220 (2006) ......................................... 3, 27

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

568 U.S. 519 (2013) ............................................. 19

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) ........................................ 22-24

Koontz v. St. Johns River

Water Mgmt. Dist.,

570 U.S. 595 (2013) ........................................ 16-17

Lamont v. Postmaster General,

381 U.S. 301 (1965) ............................................. 16

Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of

Durham Cnty.,

452 U.S. 18 (1981) ............................................... 26

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,

455 U.S. 422 (1982) ............................................. 28

Magruder v. Drury,

235 U.S. 106 (1914) ............................................. 19

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,

446 U.S. 238 (1980) ............................................. 34

Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976) ............................................. 32

McDuffee v. Collins,

117 Ala. 487 (1898) .............................................. 13

Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,

462 U.S. 791 (1983) ............................................. 28

Minnesota v. Barber,

136 U.S. 313 (1890) ............................................. 27

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover

Bank & Tr. Co.,

339 U.S. 306 (1950) ........................................ 27-28

In re Muskegon Cnty. Treasurer for

Foreclosure, No. 363764,

__ N.W.3d __, 2023 WL 7093961

(Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2023),

petition for writ of certiorari pending

sub nom. Beeman v. Muskegon

County Treasurer, No. 24-858 ................ 2, 9-10, 17

Nelson v. City of New York,

352 U.S. 103 (1956) ....................... 2-3, 9, 11, 17-26

Nelson v. Colorado,

581 U.S. 128 (2017) ............................................. 27

Niz-Chavez v. Garland,

593 U.S. 155 (2021) ............................................. 30

O’Connor v. Eubanks,

83 F.4th 1018 (6th Cir. 2023) .............................. 14

In re Petition of Manistee Cnty.

Treasurer for Foreclosure,

No. 363723, 2024 WL 2981520

(Mich. Ct. App. June 13, 2024) ............................. 4

Phillips v. Washington Legal Found.,

524 U.S. 156 (1998) ............................................. 16

Rafaeli LLC v. Cnty. of Oakland,

505 Mich. 429 (2020) ............................................. 5

Robinson v. Hanrahan,

409 U.S. 38 (1972) ............................................... 28

Ross v. Blake,

578 U.S. 632 (2016) ............................................. 27

Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.

Wullschleger,

604 U.S. 22 (2025) ............................................... 19

Sage v. Brooklyn,

89 N.Y. 189 (1882) ............................................... 14

Schafer v. Kent Cnty.,

No. 164975, __ Mich. __,

2024 WL 3573500 (July 29, 2024)....................... 24

People ex rel. Seaman v. Hammond,

1 Doug. 276 (Mich. 1844)..................................... 13

Slater v. Maxwell,

73 U.S. 268 (1867) ......................................... 12, 29

Small Engine Shop, Inc. v. Cascio,

878 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1989) ............................... 16

Smith v. Berryhill,

587 U.S. 471 (2019) ............................................. 32

State Hwy. Comm’r v. Kreger,

128 Va. 203 (1920) ............................................... 14

In re State Treasurer for Foreclosure,

No. 365005, 2024 WL 3995365

(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2024),

review denied, 16 N.W.3d 729

(Mich. 2025) .................................................... 11-12

Tafflin v. Levitt,

493 U.S. 455 (1990) ............................................. 20

Taylor v. Yee,

136 S. Ct. 929 (2016) ............................................. 3

Terrace v. Thompson,

263 U.S. 197 (1923) ............................................. 10

Terry v. Anderson,

95 U.S. 628 (1877) ............................................... 31

Texaco, Inc. v. Short,

454 U.S. 516 (1982) ............................................. 27

Todman v. Mayor & City Council of

Baltimore,

104 F.4th 479 (4th Cir. 2024) .............................. 32

xii

Tyler v. Hennepin County,

598 U.S. 631 (2023) ................... 1, 5, 10-12, 14, 18,

20-21, 25, 33-34

United States v. James Daniel Good

Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993) ....................... 32-34

United States v. Reynolds,

397 U.S. 14 (1970) ........................................... 3, 16

United States v. Taylor,

104 U.S. 216 (1881) ....................................... 13, 31

United States v. Williams,

504 U.S. 36 (1992) ............................................... 19

Valancourt Books, LLC v. Garland,

82 F.4th 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ............................ 18

Vargas v. Trainor,

508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1974) ............................... 29

Williams v. Reed,

145 S. Ct. 465 (2025) ........................................... 24

Williamson Cnty. Regional Planning

Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank,

473 U.S. 172 (1985) ........................................ 22-24

Wilson v. Hawaii,

145 S. Ct. 18 (2024) ............................................. 23

Wilson v. Iseminger,

185 U.S. 55 (1902) ......................................... 17, 31

Wright v. Rollyson,

No. 2:24-CV-00474, 2025 WL 835040

(S.D.W.V. Mar. 17, 2025) .................................... 20

Constitutions

U.S. Const. amend. V ............................. 4-5, 10, 15, 23

U.S. Const. amend. XIV .............................................. 4

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ....................................... 5

xiii

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257 .......................................................... 4

28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) ..................................................... 4

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................................... 31-32

72 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5860.205(f) ............................... 26

Ala. Code § 40-10-197(i)(1)(b) ..................................... 1

Ala. Code § 40-10-197(i)(1)(e)(1)(v) ............................ 1

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-18204(B) .................................... 1

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-18231-36 .................................... 1

Ark. Code Ann. § 26-37-205(b) ................................. 26

Code of Washington § 367.5 (1881) .......................... 21

Fla. Stat. § 197.582 ................................................... 26

Idaho Code § 31-808(2)(c) ......................................... 26

Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-7(c) ........................................... 26

Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-7(e)(2) ...................................... 26

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-2803 ........................................ 26

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78k(5)(b) ......................... 5, 7

§ 211.78k(8) .............................................................. 6

§ 211.78m(1) ............................................................. 6

§ 211.78m(2) ............................................................. 6

§ 211.78m(16)(c) ............................................ 6, 15-16

§ 211.78t ................................................... 1, 5, 10, 23

§ 211.78t(2) ............................................................... 6

§ 211.78t(3)(i) ........................................................... 6

§ 211.78t(3)(k) .......................................................... 6

§ 211.78t(4) ............................................................... 6

§ 211.78t(5) ............................................................... 6

§ 211.78t(9) ............................................................... 6

§ 211.78t(10) ............................................................. 6

§ 211.78t(12)(b)................................................... 6, 15

§ 213.55(5) .............................................................. 15

xiv

§ 213.58 ................................................................... 15

§ 324.8905c ............................................................. 14

§ 567.233 ................................................................. 14

§ 567.234 ................................................................. 14

§ 567.241 ................................................................. 33

§ 567.245 ................................................................. 33

§ 567.245(1) ............................................................ 32

§ 600.3252 ............................................................... 13

§ 600.6044 ............................................................... 14

Me. Stat. tit. 36, § 943-C........................................... 26

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 140.230(2)....................................... 26

Mont. Code Ann. § 15-18-221 ................................... 26

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-38-71(A)-(C) .............................. 26

N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1136(3) ............................ 1

N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1197(4) ............................ 1

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5721.20 ................................ 26

S.D. Codified Laws § 10-25-39.................................. 26

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2702 ................................... 26

Tex. Tax Code § 34.03(a)(2) ...................................... 26

Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3967........................................ 26

Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3970........................................ 26

Wash. Rev. Code § 84.64.080 .................................... 26

Wis. Stat. § 75.36(2m)(b) .......................................... 26

Other Authorities

2 Blackstone, Commentaries on the

Laws of England (1768) ...................................... 12

Brief for Appellants, Nelson v. City of

New York, No. 30, 1956 WL 89027

(Sept. 14, 1956) .................................................... 19

Michigan Dep’t of Treasury,

Foreclosure Report for 2021,

www.michigan.gov/taxes//media/Project/Websites/taxes/

Auctions/2021-Foreclosure-SalesState-Wide-Reports.pdf?

rev=2dabee8d90ed4b488 ..................................... 11

Pacific Legal Foundation, Confusing

Procedures Can Result in Shadow

Equity Theft: Michigan,

homeequitytheft.org/shadow-equitytheft#michigan

(visited Apr. 14, 2025) ......................................... 11

Public Land Auction Salebook for

August 2, 2021, https://www.taxsale.info/forms/salebook/auction/663/

print/salebook/2021-0802_salebook_final.pdf

(visited Apr. 14, 2025) ........................................... 7

U.S. Census Bureau, Computer and

Internet Use in the United States:

2021 (June 18, 2024),

https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pr

ess-releases/2024/computer-internetuse-2021.html ...................................................... 30

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 639 (2023),

held that the government violates the Takings Clause

when it confiscates more property than necessary to

collect delinquent property taxes, penalties, interest,

and fees. Id. at 647. But five states continue to

regularly take more than what is owed by denying

compensation to owners who do not successfully

navigate the government’s unreasonable procedures

to recover the excess value of their property.1 When

owners do not strictly comply with those states’ first

step of the claim process—staking their claim to their

own money weeks before the property is even sold—the

government confiscates the whole property. For most

owners in these states, Tyler’s promise remains

unfulfilled as the government continues to withhold

just compensation.

Here, Petitioner Chelsea Koetter mistakenly failed

to pay part of the 2018 taxes on her home. Although

she paid her 2019 and 2020 taxes in full, the Manistee

County Treasurer (County) foreclosed to collect

approximately $1,200 in overdue 2018 taxes. App.

42a, 58a. After rejecting Koetter’s tardy attempt to

redeem the property, it sold her home for $106,000.

App. 5a. The County kept it all—$102,636 more than

taxes, penalties, interest, and costs—because Koetter

was eight days late filing an administrative claim

form preserving her statutory right to be paid for her

property. Koetter’s compliance with every other

1 See Ala. Code § 40-10-197(i)(1)(b), (e)(1)(v); Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§§ 42-18204(B), 42-18231-36; MCL § 211.78t; 257-261 20th Ave.,

Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 259 N.J. 417, 434 (2025) (describing new

process); N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 1136(3), 1197(4).

aspect of the claims statute was for nought. The lower

court upheld this injustice based on dicta in Nelson v.

City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 110 (1956). Nelson

suggested that a brief opportunity during the

foreclosure action to preserve a right to be paid for the

excess value of foreclosed property defeats a takings

claim. The court below upheld the taking of Koetter’s

surplus proceeds and rejected her claims under the

Takings and Due Process Clauses, based on Nelson.

App. 11a, 14a (relying on In re Muskegon Cnty.

Treasurer for Foreclosure, No. 363764, __ N.W.3d __,

2023 WL 7093961 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2023)

(construing Nelson)), petition for writ of certiorari

pending sub nom. Beeman v. Muskegon County

Treasurer, No. 24-858; accord Hathon v. Michigan, 17

N.W.3d 686, 686 n.1 (Mich. 2025) (following Muskegon

in holding the claim statute is the exclusive remedy

for recovering surplus proceeds).

This case asks the Court to reject Nelson’s takings

analysis as dicta or to reconsider and overturn it.

Debt collectors who seize property to collect a debt are

bound by a fiduciary duty to fairly sell the property

and make a good faith effort to return the money to

the owner. The claim statute here strays from that

traditional duty to give the government a windfall.

Moreover, the Takings Clause promises owners

“reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for

obtaining compensation.” Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan.

Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890). It imposes an

affirmative duty on the government to pay owners.

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304, 315

(1987).

In conflict with that traditional duty and decades of

Takings Clause jurisprudence, the lower court—like

some other jurisdictions—allows the government to

avoid its obligation, holding that Nelson authorizes

any procedure to pay compensation, even those that

are unreasonable. Very few owners successfully

navigate Michgan’s process. Those who do still collect

less than the “full monetary equivalent” of the

property taken, United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S.

14, 16 (1970), because the government siphons an

additional cut to the government that includes

interest earned on owners’ money held by the

government for approximately one year after the sale.

This Court should grant the Petition because Tyler’s

protection is rendered illusory by Nelson’s poorly

reasoned dicta. The Constitution’s promise of just

compensation requires more than procedural

gimmicks that deprive virtually all owners of just

compensation.

The Court should also grant the Petition because

the Due Process Clause “guarantee[s] fair procedure

in connection with any deprivation of .-.-. property by

a State.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.

115, 125 (1992) (emphasis added). Due process

requires procedures designed to return property to the

rightful owner, not to enrich the government. See

Taylor v. Yee, 136 S. Ct. 929, 930 (2016) (Alito, J.,

concurring on denial of cert.); cf. Jones v. Flowers, 547

U.S. 220, 229 (2006) (due process requires notice that

would be used by one “who actually desired to inform

a real property owner of an impending tax sale”).

Michigan’s uniquely self-serving statute provides less

notice and swifter deadlines than would be adopted if

the government weren’t seeking a windfall. Under the

circumstances, the procedures violate due process.

This Court should grant the Petition to hold that

Michigan’s statute violates the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments’ guarantees of just compensation and

due process.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals (App.

1a-16a) is unpublished but available at In re Petition

of Manistee Cnty. Treasurer for Foreclosure, No.

363723, 2024 WL 2981520 (Mich. Ct. App. June 13,

2024). The trial court’s opinion dismissing the claims

raised here (App. 17a-19a) is unpublished. The

Michigan Supreme Court’s order denying review is

attached at App. 20a. The denial of reconsideration by

the Michigan Supreme Court is attached at App. 22a.

JURISDICTION

On June 13, 2024, the Michigan Court of Appeals

issued the opinion at issue here. App. 1a. On

November 22, 2024, the Michigan Supreme Court

denied a timely application seeking leave to appeal

the decision. App. 20a. On January 31, 2025, the

Michigan Supreme Court denied a timely motion for

reconsideration. App. 22a. This Petition raises

federal questions under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

28 U.S.C. § 2403(b), which allows a state to

intervene to defend the constitutionality of a state

statute, may apply.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides, “nor shall private property be taken for

public use, without just compensation.”

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution provides in part, “No state shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law .-.-. .”

Relevant portions of the Michigan statutes are

reproduced at App. 24a-35a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Michigan’s claim statute

1. Three years before Tyler, the Michigan Supreme

Court held in Rafaeli LLC v. Cnty. of Oakland, 505

Mich. 429 (2020), that the government violated the

Michigan Constitution when it took property to collect

a tax debt and kept more than the taxes, penalties,

interest, and costs. In response, Michigan amended

its tax foreclosure statute. App. 2a. As relevant here,

tax foreclosures occur in February or March each year.

MCL § 211.78t. If a tax debt is not paid by March 31,

the foreclosing government unit (here, the County)

obtains fee simple title and extinguishes the owner’s

rights in the property. MCL § 211.78k(5)(b). By

July 1—while the owner usually retains possession of

the property, and weeks before the sale—the owner

must submit a notarized Form 5743 by personal

service acknowledged by the County or by certified

mail, return receipt requested, to notify the County

that she wants to be paid any future surplus proceeds

from the sale of her property. MCL § 211.78t(2);

App. 3a.

If the government declines the right of first refusal

to purchase the property, the County sells it at a

public auction several months after foreclosure. MCL

§ 211.78m(1), (2). The following January, up to six

months after the sale, the government calculates the

proceeds remaining after deducting all tax debts,

expenses, interest, and penalties, and mails notice to

those who filed Form 5743 that they must file a

motion in the original foreclosure action to recover the

proceeds. MCL § 211.78t(3)(i), (k), (4).

Once owners file a motion, the government

approves or disapproves the disbursement. MCL

§ 211.78t(5); App. 4a. The court hearing on the motion

determines the relative priority of all claims

(including any lienholders’ claims). The statute

grants first priority to the government’s 5% cut of the

purchase price in addition to the debt, interest, and

sale costs, MCL §§ 211.78t(12)(b), 211.78m(16)(c);

then other liens; and finally the remainder to the

former owner who timely filed both Form 5743 and the

motion to recover the surplus. MCL § 211.78t(9). The

government pays the amounts ordered by the circuit

court. MCL § 211.78t(10). Prior to disbursement, the

county holds the tax debtors’ money for approximately

one year, accruing interest that the county keeps for

itself. MCL § 211.78k(8).

It all turns on Form 5743. If an owner fails to

submit a notarized Form 5743 by the proper delivery

method, long before the foreclosure sale, the County

cuts off the owner’s right to any future claim or

constitutional challenge and keeps the windfall of the

owner’s equity.

B. Pursuant to Michigan’s claim statute,

Manistee County keeps $102,636 more than

Chelsea Koetter owed

Chelsea Koetter owned a two-bedroom home in

Bear Lake, Michigan, where she lived with her sons

since 2016. App. 49a.2 She owned the home free of

any mortgages or other liens. App. 53a. When she

experienced personal and financial difficulties, her

father paid her 2019 and 2020 taxes, but mistakenly

did not pay one installment of her 2018 property

taxes. App. 58a. Koetter did not realize the error or

the consequences until it was too late. App. 56a.

The County foreclosed on her home on February 12,

2021, to collect $1,199.59 in 2018 property taxes, plus

$831.93 in interest and fees. App. 42a. On March 3,

2021, the County mailed one notice entitled

“PAYMENT DEADLINE,” warning that the foreclosure judgment had been entered and that Koetter

could redeem the property until March 31, 2021. The

bottom of the notice mentioned a potential right to

claim remaining proceeds by submitting Form 5743 by

July 1, 2021. App. 43a-45a.

When Koetter did not pay her debt by March 31,

2021, the County took fee simple title and

extinguished her rights in the property.

MCL

§ 211.78k(5)(b). On April 23, 2021, the County mailed

a notice that “[a]ny interest” Koetter had in the

property “has been lost” and that she must file Form

5743 by July 1, 2021, to claim any remaining proceeds

from sale of the property. App. 46a-47a. The County

never sent this critical form.

On July 9, 2021—just 8 days after the deadline—

Koetter obtained Form 5743 at the Treasurer’s office,

See Public Land Auction Salebook for August 2, 2021

(hereinafter “2021 Salebook”) at 22, https://www.taxsale.info/forms/salebook/auction/663/print/salebook/2021-08-02_

salebook_final.pdf (visited Apr. 14, 2025) (publicly available

record on official website advertising her home for the 2021

auction).

filled it out, notarized, and submitted it by personal

service at the clerk’s office. App. 49a. The County

rejected the form as tardy. App. 4a-5a.

The County sold the property at auction on

August 2, 2021, to Koetter’s father for $106,500 plus a

$10,650 auction fee to the private company that

conducts the County’s auctions—a total of $117,150.

App. 5a; supra n.2 at 9. The County kept $102,636

more than Koetter’s total debt of $3,863.40 including

all costs, interest, and fees. App. 5a, 53a.

Koetter again attempted to submit a notarized

Form 5743 on August 18, 2021—still only 48 days

after the July 1 deadline. App. 50a. The County

refused it.

Undaunted, one year after foreclosure, on May 10,

2022, Koetter timely filed the required motion to

disburse surplus proceeds in the original foreclosure

action to claim the $97,311.60 remaining after the

County took its 5% cut. See App. 54a. The County

opposed her motion solely because she submitted

Form 5743 eight days late. App. 14a. The trial court

allowed supplemental briefing on the constitutional

issues presented by the County’s implementation of

the claim statute. Koetter argued that denial of her

claim would violate due process and result in an

unconstitutional taking in violation of the United

States Constitution. See App. 18a-19a.

Rejecting these arguments, the court denied her

motion for surplus proceeds, holding that the claim

procedure was the sole mechanism to receive any of

the proceeds and because she missed the July 1, 2021,

deadline for Form 5743, the County could keep a

$102,636 windfall at Koetter’s expense. Ibid.

C. The Michigan Court of Appeals holds the

County did not violate due process or take

property without just compensation

On appeal, Koetter again asserted that the

County’s confiscation of her surplus proceeds violated

her federal right to procedural due process and took

her property without just compensation. App. 8a, 12a.

The Court of Appeals ruled against Koetter’s

takings claim based on a prior panel’s decision,

Muskegon County Treasurer, 2023 WL 7093961.

Muskegon construed dicta in Nelson, 352 U.S. 103, to

mean that no compensable taking occurs “when there

[i]s a statutory path for property owners to recover

surplus proceeds, but the property owners failed to

avail themselves of that procedure.”

2023 WL

7093961, at *8. Thus, because Koetter failed to timely

file the pre-sale claim notice (Form 5743), there was

no “compensable taking.”

App. 13a-14a (citing

Muskegon).

As to due process, the Court held in circular fashion

that Koetter’s right to due process was not violated

because “[t]he statutory scheme satisfies due process,

and [the County] followed the scheme.” App. 9a. The

court thus deferred entirely to the legislature:

“whether such a scheme makes sense or not, or

whether a ‘better’ scheme could be devised, are policy

questions for the Legislature, not legal ones for the

Judiciary.” App. 10a (quoting Muskegon).

The Michigan Supreme Court denied review, App.

20a, but subsequently followed Muskegon when

dismissing

takings

claims

(challenging

the

confiscation of surplus proceeds) that were filed two

years before the claim statute was even adopted by the

Michigan Legislature. Hathon, 17 N.W.3d at 686-87.

The court held owners “must first utilize the statutory

process provided by MCL 211.78t for recovery of

remaining post-foreclosure sale proceeds before”

pursuing their constitutional claims seeking just

compensation. Ibid.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Case Presents an Important Takings

Question Arising Directly from the Court’s

Own Conflicting Opinions

The Fifth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty

on the government to pay just compensation when it

takes private property for public use. Cedar Point

Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 152 (2021); First

English, 482 U.S. at 315. Moreover, “the owner is

entitled to reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.” Cherokee Nation,

135 U.S. at 659. An “adequate” legal remedy “must be

as complete, practical and efficient as that which

equity could afford.” Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.

197, 214 (1923).

This constitutional duty applies with full force

when the government seizes private property to pay a

tax debt. While it “ha[s] the power” to sell property to

recover unpaid property taxes, it cannot “use the

toehold of the tax debt to confiscate more property

than was due.” Tyler, 598 U.S. at 639. When the

government takes and keeps more than what is owed,

it violates the Takings Clause, forcing the debtor “to

bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,

should be borne by the public as a whole.” Id. at 647

(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49

(1960)).

Unfortunately, federal and state courts are

authorizing an end-run around Tyler and the Constitution’s requirement that compensation be reasonable, certain, and adequate. These courts construe

Nelson to allow government to confiscate property

without just compensation if it provides a uniquely

narrow window for owners to preserve a future,

inchoate right to recover their payment for the excess

property taken. See, e.g., Howard v. Cnty. of Macomb,

No. 24-1665, __ F.4th __, 2025 WL 941511, at *3-4 (6th

Cir. Mar. 28, 2025). Alabama, Arizona, Michigan,

New Jersey, and New York rely on Nelson to continue

confiscatory tax foreclosures after Tyler, supra n.1,

devastating thousands of taxpayers each year. In

Michigan, the claim statute bars up to 95% of owners

from collecting the surplus proceeds from the sale of

their foreclosed properties.3 State records document a

widespread problem as counties confiscate millions of

dollars.4 For example, in 2021, Genessee County

returned only $56,171 in surplus proceeds to former

owners while it confiscated $5,399,694.5

Oakland County took tax debtors’ surplus proceeds from 187

out of 196 foreclosed properties in 2022. Pacific Legal

Foundation, Confusing Procedures Can Result in Shadow Equity

Theft: Michigan, homeequitytheft.org/shadow-equity-theft#

michigan (visited Apr. 14, 2025).

4 See Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, Foreclosure Report for 2021,

www.michigan.gov/taxes/-/media/Project/Websites/taxes/

Auctions/2021-Foreclosure-Sales-State-Wide-Reports.pdf?

rev=2dabee8d90ed4b488 (disclosing all counties’ surplus

proceeds windfalls in column xii and returned proceeds in

column xi).

5 See supra n.4, at 24. The Michigan Court of Appeals has

denied dozens of claimants in at least eleven cases. See, e.g., In

re State Treasurer for Foreclosure, No. 365005, 2024 WL

The decision below violates the traditional duty

imposed on debt collectors to return surplus proceeds

to debtors—a duty that Michigan recognizes in all

other debt collection contexts. It contradicts this

Court’s takings jurisprudence and allows the government to burden the Takings Clause with a preservation requirement that this Court rejects when

applied to other constitutional rights. The Court

should grant certiorari to correct the confusion caused

by Nelson’s dicta. If Nelson’s takings discussion is not

dicta, this Court should overrule it to ensure the right

to just compensation is not relegated to second class

status.

A. Michigan’s burdensome claim procedure

violates the government’s traditional

duty to pay surplus proceeds and just

compensation to rightful owners

1. Traditional Anglo-American law treated seized

property to collect a debt as a bailment. 2 Blackstone,

Commentaries on the Laws of England 453 (1768).

The debt collector who seized the property was “bound

by an implied contract in law to restore [it] on payment of the debt, duty, and expenses, before the time

of sale; or, when sold, to render back the overplus.”

Ibid.; Tyler, 598 U.S. at 639-40. This includes tax

debts. Ibid. Tax collectors must protect the financial

interest of debtors whose properties they seize. See,

e.g., Cocks v. Izard, 74 U.S. 559, 562 (1868); Slater v.

Maxwell, 73 U.S. 268, 276 (1867). Thus, the tax

collector traditionally had an affirmative duty to pay

the taxpayer any overage, or deposit the money for the

3995365, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2024), review denied, 16

N.W.3d 729 (Mich. 2025).

taxpayer’s benefit until the taxpayer claimed it. See,

e.g., People ex rel. Seaman v. Hammond, 1 Doug. 276,

280-81 (Mich. 1844) (treasurer “is to place the surplus

to the credit of the owner, who shall at all times be

entitled to receive it”); McDuffee v. Collins, 117 Ala.

487, 492 (1898) (tax collector bore the “duty of seeking

the owner and paying him the balance” and if not

found, holding it for him); Bogie v. Town of Barnet, 129

Vt. 46, 52 (1970) (for the privilege of wielding such tax

collection power, the government “must suffer the

restraints of fiduciary duty”).

This Court followed that tradition in United States

v. Taylor, 104 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1881). There, the

federal government denied an Arkansas taxpayer’s

claim for surplus proceeds from a tax sale, arguing in

part that a six-year catch-all statute of limitations

barred the taxpayer’s claim. Id. at 221. Since the

statute did not specify the deadline for claims for

surplus proceeds, the government had a duty to hold

surplus proceeds “indefinite[ly]” as “trustee” for the

taxpayer. Id. at 221-22. Imposing a statutory “construction consistent with good faith on the part of the

United States,” the government acts as “trustee” for

the taxpayer and the claim was timely because the

statute of limitations only began to run when the

taxpayer demanded his money. Id. at 222.

Michigan’s other debt collection statutes follow this

same tradition, imposing a fiduciary duty on debt

collectors to pay any surplus to the former owner.

MCL § 600.3252 (surplus money “shall be paid over

. . . on demand, to the mortgagor”); MCL § 600.6044

(when property is sold via execution on judgment, “the

officer shall pay over such surplus to the judgment

debtor .-.-. on demand”); MCL § 324.8905c (surplus

“proceeds of the foreclosure sale shall be distributed

. . . [t]o the owner of the vehicle”). When former

owners can’t be found or fail to demand the money, the

State holds it “indefinitely” for them. See O’Connor v.

Eubanks, 83 F.4th 1018, 1021 (6th Cir. 2023); MCL

§§ 567.233, 567.234.

Michigan departs dramatically from this tradition

when it takes real estate to pay property taxes.

Rather than hold surplus property or money in trust

for the owner, the statute requires owners to quickly

navigate a complicated process to recover their own

money. When up to 95% of the owners fail to strictly

comply with even one element6 of the multiple

requirements, the counties keep the money as a

windfall and bar owners from pursuing their

constitutional rights in court. Government cannot

“make[] an exception only for itself ” to avoid paying

just compensation. Tyler, 598 U.S. at 645.

2. The government must provide a process for

obtaining compensation that is “reasonable, certain,

and adequate.” Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659;

Sage v. Brooklyn, 89 N.Y. 189, 194 (1882) (process

must be “sure, sufficient and convenient”); State Hwy.

Comm’r v. Kreger, 128 Va. 203, 212-13 (1920) (valid

statute pays just compensation “with reasonable

certainty and without unnecessary or unreasonable

delay”). The Fifth Amendment imposes on the government an “implied” “promise to pay” whenever the

government takes property for a public use. First

See, e.g., In re Alger Cnty. Treasurer for Foreclosure, Nos.

363803, 363804, 2024 WL 4174925, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App.

Sept. 12, 2024) (owner’s claim denied for sending Form 5743 via

trackable Priority Mail Express instead of return receipt

requested), rev. denied, Nos. 167712, 167713, 2025 WL 945725

(Mar. 28, 2025).

English, 482 U.S. at 315. And when the government

effects a taking, “no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation.” Id. at 321.

Michigan’s process for paying just compensation in

the usual eminent domain context complies with that

traditional duty: the government deposits an estimated amount of just compensation in escrow, “held

for the benefit of the owners,” MCL § 213.55(5), until

the court orders payment. MCL § 213.58. When

government takes property without invoking eminent

domain, property owners have six years to bring an

inverse condemnation claim seeking just compensation under the Michigan Constitution’s Takings

Clause and three years under the federal Takings

Clause. Hart v. City of Detroit, 416 Mich. 488, 503

(1982); Grainger v. Ottawa Cnty., 90 F.4th 507, 510

(6th Cir. 2024). By contrast, tax debtors like Koetter

must act within 92 days of foreclosure to preserve

their inchoate, future right to collect any just

compensation.

Moreover, the statute in all cases fails to provide an

“adequate” remedy of just compensation, because it

awards claimants less than they are constitutionally

due. The statute gives counties interest earned on the

principal for the year the county holds the money, plus

5% of the sale price, on top of all taxes, penalties,

interest, fees, and expenses, even if the county

purchased the property. MCL §§ 211.78t(12)(b),

211.78m(16)(c). The statute calls this 5% deduction a

“commission,” but the realtor’s fee is already deducted

pursuant to MCL § 211.78m(16)(c).

Moreover,

Manistee County, like most Michigan counties, contract with a private company to administer the

statute; the company charges buyers a 10% commis-

sion. See Garcia v. Title Check, LLC, No. 22-1574,

2023 WL 2787298, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 2023).

Hence, owners who successfully navigate the statute

recover at most only 95% of surplus proceeds and are

deprived of the accrued interest. This cannot be

squared with the constitutional requirements. “‘[J]ust

compensation’ means the full monetary equivalent of

the property taken.” Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 16; Phillips

v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 165 (1998)

(“The rule that ‘interest follows principal’ has been

established under English common law since at least

the mid-1700’s.”).

3. Michigan’s statute also conflicts with this Court’s

holdings that burdening a constitutional right with an

opt-in process to preserve the right works the same

harm as violating the right directly. See, e.g., Janus

v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Municipal

Employees, 585 U.S. 878, 939 (2018) (statute that

requires workers to affirmatively reject garnishment

of wages to subsidize union speech violates workers’

free speech rights); Lamont v. Postmaster General,

381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (impermissible burden on

First Amendment right where post office withheld

“communist political propaganda” unless addressee

affirmatively requested delivery). The same rule

applies to notice in the due process context. See, e.g.,

Small Engine Shop, Inc. v. Cascio, 878 F.2d 883, 884

(5th Cir. 1989) (government cannot “shift the entire

burden of ensuring adequate notice” onto property

owners); Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., 832 F.3d 1154, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2016)

(statute violates due process by requiring lienholders

to “opt-in” to notice). The right to just compensation

similarly cannot be burdened. Cf. Koontz v. St. Johns

River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 607 (2013)

(“Extortionate demands for property in the land-use

permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not

because they take property but because they

impermissibly burden the right not to have property

taken without just compensation.”) (emphasis added);

Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988) (120-day

notice of claim requirement would impermissibly

“burden” rights protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

In direct conflict with these precedents, Michigan

courts and other courts construe Nelson to allow the

government to burden constitutional rights with

accidental waivers. Muskegon, 2023 WL 7093961;

Clement v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 75 F.4th 1193, 1202-03

(11th Cir. 2023) (immigration case construing Tyler’s

citation of Nelson to mean that “a mere lack of

diligence is sufficient to forfeit a constitutional or

statutory right”).

4. The procedure used here cannot be justified

under any traditional government power. “[A] statute

providing for the lapse, escheat, or abandonment of

private property” must provide owners with a “reasonable opportunity” to avoid accidental loss. Hodel v.

Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 728 n.11, 729-30 (1987) (Stevens,

J., concurring in the judgment) (government ordinarily provides “a grace period and bears an affirmative responsibility to prevent escheat”). A statute that

“bar[s] the existing rights of claimants without

affording” a “reasonable time” to assert those rights

amounts to an “unlawful attempt to extinguish” those

rights. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902). In

short, Michigan’s claim process is unreasonable,

uncertain, and inadequate, and thus violates the

government’s duty to provide just compensation for a

taking. Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659.

B. The Court should grant certiorari to

resolve the confusion and widespread

deprivations of property caused by dicta

in Nelson v. City of New York

Michigan courts and some federal courts construe

Nelson to mean that foreclosing governments comply

with the constitutional duty to remit surplus proceeds

if there is any process to recover the surplus—even an

unreasonably short and complicated one. See, e.g.,

App. 10a; Howard, 2025 WL 941511, at *3. And

Nelson is now infecting broader takings jurisprudence. The D.C. Circuit recently held that a

statutorily “known and costless option” to avoid an

uncompensated taking is sufficient to avoid the

Takings Clause. Valancourt Books, LLC v. Garland,

82 F.4th 1222, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (citing Nelson

and Tyler).

Tyler did not address Nelson’s inconsistency with

the Court’s takings decisions because it was “readily

distinguished.” Tyler, 598 U.S. at 643. But Nelson is

hopelessly out of step with modern takings precedent

and immunizes confiscatory processes from constitutional challenge.

In Nelson, because of a bookkeeper’s misconduct,

the property owners failed to pay their water bills on

two properties. Nelson, 352 U.S. at 105, 108. To

satisfy the debts, the City of New York foreclosed, kept

one property and sold the other, retaining a windfall

for the public. Id. at 105-06. The bookkeeper

“concealed” the debt and foreclosure action from the

owners. Id. at 107. When the owners learned of their

loss, they filed a motion to set aside the foreclosure

judgment based on violations of procedural due

process and equal protection. Id. at 106, 109. The

New York courts denied relief, City of New York v.

Nelson, 309 N.Y. 801 (1955), and the owners

petitioned this Court, again arguing denial of equal

protection and violation of due process based on

insufficient notice. See Nelson, 352 U.S. at 107; Brief

for Appellants, Nelson, No. 30, 1956 WL 89027, at *3

(Sept. 14, 1956). Nelson held the lack of actual notice

did not violate due process because “the City cannot

be charged with responsibility for the misconduct of

the bookkeeper in whom appellants misplaced their

confidence nor for the carelessness of the managing

trustee in over-looking notices of arrearages.” 352

U.S. at 108.

In the reply brief on the merits in this Court, the

owners suggested for the first time that the City took

property without just compensation. Id. at 109.

Although it was not raised, argued, or decided below,

the Court stated that there was no taking because the

owner missed the window to request payment for the

excess. Id. at 110. This window closed before foreclosure and before there was any money to claim. Ibid.

Claims “not brought forward” in the lower court

“cannot be made” in the Supreme Court. Magruder v.

Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 113 (1914); United States v.

Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992) (“Our traditional

rule, as the dissent correctly notes, precludes a grant

of certiorari only when the question presented was not

pressed or passed upon below.”) (internal quote

omitted); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568

U.S. 519, 548 (2013) (court’s “rebuttal to a counterargument” that went outside the issue before the court

was dicta). Courts cannot rely on judicial remarks

that have “no bearing” on the questions actually

before the Court. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 42 (2025). Resolution of the

takings argument in Nelson was unnecessary to the

case and thus dicta.

Despite Nelson’s posture, nearly all courts assume

Nelson’s rejection of the takings argument is binding

and requires them to rubber stamp confiscatory tax

foreclosures. “[D]icta, when repeatedly used as the

point of departure for analysis, have a regrettable

tendency to acquire the practical status of legal rules.”

Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 469 (1990) (Scalia, J.,

concurring). This “regrettable tendency” is evident

here. Courts construe Nelson to mean there is no

taking or due process violation so long as the

government provides any opportunity to recover the

surplus—no matter how fleeting or complicated. See,

e.g., Howard, 2025 WL 941511, at *3 (“The Supreme

Court stood by Nelson in Tyler, explaining that the

Takings Clause permits each State to ‘define the

process through which an owner can claim the

surplus’ and to keep the surplus if the owners do not

comply.”) (cleaned up); Hathon, 17 N.W.3d at 687 n.1;

Wright v. Rollyson, No. 2:24-CV-00474, 2025 WL

835040, at *3 (S.D.W.V. Mar. 17, 2025) (Tyler and

Nelson mean “[t]here is no Takings Clause violation

when a sovereign’s statutory scheme provides an

opportunity for the taxpayer to recover the excess

value.”) (cleaned up); In re Franco v. Real Portfolio 13,

LLC, No. 24-21084-ABA, 2025 WL 884067, at *7

(Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2025) (statute “complies with

both Tyler and Nelson” even though it gives taxlienholders a windfall from the owner because she

failed to request a judicial sale before the foreclosure

judgment was final); Biesemeyer v. Municipality of

Anchorage, No. 3:23-CV-00185, 2024 WL 1480564, at

*7 (D. Alaska Mar. 13, 2024) (Alaska’s six-month

claim process “meets the low threshold implied by

Tyler and Nelson,” and therefore takings and due

process claims seeking $243,235 in excess proceeds

must be dismissed).

Nelson results in confused takings decisions. For

example, when deciding whether Michigan’s claim

statute violates the Takings Clause, the Sixth Circuit

cited historical examples of claim processes in early

America; yet all opportunities for debtors to claim the

surplus proceeds followed the sale and most gave

owners years to do so.7 Howard, 2025 WL 941511, at

*3-4. By contrast, Michigan’s claim statute requires

owners to make their first claim at least a month

before the sale and then requires the owner to make

the same claim again later in court. Yet because the

Sixth Circuit construed Nelson as meaning simply

“that States may require owners to follow a statutory

process,” it upheld Michigan’s statute as compliant

with the Takings Clause.

This Court should grant the Petition to resolve this

confusion and hold that Nelson’s takings discussion is

nonbinding and unpersuasive.

The Sixth Circuit’s citations of processes that supposedly

comport with Nelson are inaccurate: An 1867 Minnesota statute

that ostensibly gave owners only three months to claim their

money, refers to a section of code that does not exist. The 1881

Washington statute did require owners to “file with the [state

court] clerk a waiver of all objections’ to the sale” in order to

obtain the surplus proceeds, but the next sentence says that,

even if the owner didn’t file the waiver, once the court certifies

the regularity of the sale, “such proceeds shall be paid to [the

judgment debtor] of course.” Code of Washington § 367.5 (1881)

(emphasis added). The waiver only accelerated recovery of the

surplus.

C. If Nelson’s commentary on takings is not

dicta, the Court should grant review to

overturn it

Nelson’s discussion of the Takings Clause cannot be

reconciled with this Court’s takings jurisprudence; if

it is binding, the Court should overrule it. Stare

decisis is weakest in the realm of constitutional interpretation. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180,

202 (2019). The factors relevant to deciding whether

to overturn precedent include “the quality of [its]

reasoning, the workability of the rule it established,

its consistency with other related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and

reliance on the decision.” Janus, 585 U.S. at 917-18.

Every factor weighs in favor of rejecting the takings

analysis in Nelson:

1. Nelson’s scant reasoning was inconsistent with

this Court’s takings decisions, see supra at 12-17,

because the issue was scarcely briefed and there were

no relevant holdings below. Cf. FDA v. Wages and

White Lion Inv., LLC, 145 S. Ct. 898, 916 (2025) (“We

did not grant certiorari on that question, and without

adequate briefing, it would not be prudent to decide it

here.”).

2. Developments since Nelson support reconsideration. In 1985, mirroring the reasoning in Nelson,

this Court held in Williamson County Regional

Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank that a

plaintiff does not have a ripe federal takings claim if

a claimant failed to “seek compensation through the

procedures the State has provided for doing so.” 473

U.S. 172, 194 (1985). Unless the claimant sought and

was denied such compensation in a state court action,

federal courts would not even consider a takings

claim. Id. at 194-96. That decision proved unworkable, closing the federal courthouse doors to most

federal claims seeking just compensation, and led to

injustice. See Knick, 588 U.S. at 185 (procedural

“trap” foreclosed adjudication of takings claims in

both federal and state courts).

Knick overruled Williamson County, holding that “a

property owner has a [ripe federal] claim for a

violation of the Takings Clause as soon as a

government takes his property for public use without

paying for it.” Id. at 189. When “government takes

private property without paying for it, that

government has violated the Fifth Amendment—just

as the Takings Clause says—without regard to

subsequent state court proceedings.” Ibid. Knick

reopened the federal courthouse doors and restored

the traditional understanding that offering a process

is not the same thing as timely paying just

compensation.

“[T]he availability of state-law compensation

remedies cannot delay or undo the accrual of a takings

claim.” Wilson v. Hawaii, 145 S. Ct. 18, 20 (2024)

(Thomas, J., statement on denial of cert.) (citing

Knick, 588 U.S. at 193-94). Yet contrary to Knick,

Michigan courts and the Sixth Circuit construe Nelson

to mean that an owner’s failure to strictly comply with

the state administrative and court process described

in MCL § 211.78t defeats a claim for just

compensation. App. 15a; Howard, 2025 WL 941511,

at *4. These courts do not hold that they lack

jurisdiction to decide the question because claimants

missed the deadline; they hold that missing the notice

of claim deadline means there was no taking. Ibid.

(“Michigan’s procedures for collecting the surplus do

not compensate the property owner for a taking. They

prevent a taking from happening in the first place.”).

Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court’s Hathon

decision dismissed as unripe takings claims that

concededly were ripe when filed seven years ago—

before Michigan enacted its claim statute. Hathon, 17

N.W.3d at 686-87. The Court held that the owners

have no takings claims unless they first comply with

the claim statute, and gave owners 11 days to submit

Form 5743. Ibid. Just like the overturned decision in

Williamson, the court held that the owners’ claim is

unripe until they comply with the statute. Ibid. This

holding mimics the rationale of Williamson that this

Court rejected in Knick. See also Schafer v. Kent

Cnty., No. 164975, __ Mich. __, 2024 WL 3573500, at

*6, *16 n.94, *17 (July 29, 2024) (explaining the

background in Hathon, holding that the claim statute

in MCL § 211.78t is fully retroactive, and noting that

its holding might “help government entities in

Michigan”).

This Court similarly rejected the rationale underlying Nelson in Felder, 487 U.S. at 142.8 There, a

Wisconsin statute required plaintiffs to file an administrative notice of claim within 120 days of the

government’s violation of their rights. Id. at 136. The

claim requirement was designed to protect the government and stood out “rather starkly, from rules

uniformly applicable to all suits.” Id. at 145. Thus the

Court held failure to follow the claim statute could not

bar relief in federal court. Ibid. Like Felder, the claim

statute here requires a series of unnecessary proce8 Cf. Williams v. Reed, 145 S. Ct. 465, 468-69 (2025) (states may

not employ an “exclusive” statutory process requirement that

effectively immunizes state officials from lawsuits brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983).

dures that “minimize governmental liability” and

burden the right to just compensation. See id. at 141.

While victims of other uncompensated takings have

three to six years to bring their constitutional claims

in Michigan, owners of tax-foreclosed property have

only 92 days to preserve their inchoate future right to

collect surplus proceeds as just compensation, and

still only get paid if they properly file a motion in court

in another 104-day window.

These legal developments support overturning

Nelson.

3. Nelson’s rule is not workable in practice. Here,

the lower court construed Nelson to immunize claims

procedures from the judicial scrutiny typically applied

to constitutional challenges to state laws. App. 20a.

As a result, the vast majority of owners cannot recover

their own money, the government keeps the windfalls,

and owners are barred from pursuing any constitutional challenge. See supra at 11.

4. The government has no legitimate reliance

interest in obtaining tax debtors’ property beyond the

amount owed. Tyler, 598 U.S. at 639-40. Worse, that

improper reliance exploits owners’ ignorance, illness,

and incapacity. Cf. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S.

141, 146 (1956) (government cannot take advantage of

incompetent property owner’s inability to comprehend notice of foreclosure). Most states comply with

Tyler by automatically remitting surplus proceeds to

owners9 or giving them years after sale to recover

9 See, e.g., Idaho Code § 31-808(2)(c); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-2803;

Me. Stat. tit. 36, § 943-C; Mont. Code Ann. § 15-18-221; S.D.

Codified Laws § 10-25-39; Wis. Stat. § 75.36(2m)(b).

their money.10 Five states, however, amended their

statutes to take advantage of the loophole left by

Nelson to make it difficult, if not impossible, for tax

debtors to recover their own money so that government (or other tax lienholders) would continue to

enjoy the windfalls of others’ misfortune.

II. The Lower Court’s Decision Conflicts with

This Court’s Due Process Decisions

The Due Process Clause “provide[s] a guarantee of

fair procedure in connection with any deprivation of

life, liberty, or property by a State.” Collins v. City of

Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). “Fairness”

is the watchword for due process. Bolling v. Sharpe,

347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of

Social Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981)

(due process requires “fundamental fairness”); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957) (due process

reflects the “whole community sense of ‘decency and

fairness’”). Due process therefore requires procedures

“appropriate to the case, and just to the parties to be

affected .-.-. it must be adapted to the end to be

attained.” Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111

U.S. 701, 708 (1884).

The government’s function is to protect private

property, not confiscate it. When the government has

a legitimate reason to deprive someone of real

property, such as tax foreclosure or to manage

abandoned or nuisance property that burdens the

10 Ark. Code Ann. § 26-37-205(b); Fla. Stat. § 197.582; Ind. Code

§ 6-1.1-24-7(c), (e)(2); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 140.230(2); N.M. Stat. Ann.

§ 7-38-71(A)-(C); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5721.20; 72 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 5860.205(f); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2702; Tex. Tax Code

§ 34.03(a)(2); Va. Code Ann. §§ 58.1-3967, -3970; Wash. Rev.

Code § 84.64.080.

community, the government must notify the owner of

procedures available to protect her property and

provide “a reasonable opportunity” to comply with

those requirements. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.

516, 532 (1982). Moreover, the government must use

reasonable procedures that would be used by one who

actually wanted to return seized property to its

rightful owner. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 229.

Michigan’s process is unreasonable, depriving up to

95% of owners of their surplus proceeds. Its unduly

complicated procedures are designed to give the

government a windfall, not to remit payment to rightful owners. As the 95% failure rate attests, the claim

statute fails to provide owners adequate notice or time

to protect their interests. Cf. Minnesota v. Barber, 136

U.S. 313, 323 (1890) (noting this Court’s “duty to

maintain the constitution will not permit us to shut

our eyes to these obvious and necessary results of the

Minnesota statute”); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643

(2016) (“an administrative scheme might be so opaque

that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of

use”); Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 137 (2017); id.

at 143 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“harsh,

inflexible” procedure that “prevents most defendants

whose convictions are reversed from demonstrating

entitlement to a refund” violates due process).

A. The Court should grant certiorari to

hold that Michigan’s notice is

inadequate under the circumstances

“[W]hen notice is a person’s due, process which is a

mere gesture is not due process. The means employed

must be such as one desirous of actually informing the

absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S.

306, 314-15 (1950). Notice must be reasonable under

the circumstances. Id.; Brody v. Village of Port

Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2005) (inadequate

notice where “[un]likely that the average landowner

would have appreciated that [the] notice .-.-. began the

exclusive period in which to initiate a challenge to the

condemnor’s determination.”). Here, Michigan’s

procedures are apparently designed to fail at high

rates.

Although the government may often satisfy its duty

to provide notice through simply mailing a letter,

under some circumstances this Court requires more.

See, e.g.¸ Covey, 351 U.S. at 146-47 (foreclosure by

mailing, posting, and publication was inadequate

when town officials knew the owner was incompetent

and without a guardian’s protection); Robinson v.

Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40 (1972) (forfeiture notice

sent to a vehicle owner’s home was inadequate when

government knew the property owner was in prison).

A permanent deprivation requires more notice. Logan

v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982).

Moreover, “a party’s ability to take steps to safeguard

its interests does not relieve the State of its

constitutional obligation.” Mennonite Bd. of Missions

v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983).

Ordinarily, owners of “tangible property” are

notified about potential loss of their property with

conventional notice and through physical seizure of

movable property or entry onto real estate. See

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316. Indeed, traditionally a

former owner would face eviction before being subjected to time limits on her ability to dispute her rights

relating to the property. Cf. Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13

Mich. 329, 343 (1865) (“A person who has a lawful

right, and is actually or constructively in possession,

can never be required to take active steps against

opposing claims.”). An owner whose property is seized

and sold to pay a tax debt is “generally ignorant” of his

peril “until it is too late to prevent it.” Slater v. Maxwell, 73 U.S. 268, 276 (1867). All the struggles that

led to tax foreclosure in the first place are typically

still present after foreclosure: poverty, age, disability,

and physical and mental medical conditions are

especially common. See, e.g., Cherokee Equities,

L.L.C. v. Garaventa, 382 N.J. Super. 201, 211 (Ch.

Div. 2005) (Tax foreclosure defendants are often

“among society’s most unfortunate.”); Vargas v.

Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1974) (due process

requires additional notice when addressed to people

who may be suffering physical or mental handicaps,

particularly the elderly). When a statute confiscates

the savings built up in a person’s home, due process

requires clear and weighty notice.

Here, the County’s two notices obfuscated the

critical point that Koetter must protect her right to

just compensation before losing possession of her

home by filing an unenclosed form. The first notice,

titled “PAYMENT DEADLINE” warns of impending

foreclosure, then states that foreclosed property “may

be sold” and the former owner “has a right to file a

claim for remaining excess money, if any” by

“SUBMIT[TING] A NOTICE OF INTENTION FORM

.-.-. NO LATER THAN July 1, 2021.” App. 44a-45a

(emphasis in original). The second notice, also prior

to any sale, is labeled “NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE” and states the property is “now owned by the

Manistee County Treasurer. Any interest that

you possessed in this property prior to foreclosure, including any equity associated with

your interest, has been lost.” App. 46a. Only after

this hopeless and emphatic message does the notice

state—in seeming contradiction—that the owner may

claim “remaining proceeds” by submitting “FORM

5743 TO THE MANISTEE COUNTY TREASURER

NO LATER THAN JULY 1, 2021.” App. 47a. Both

notices omit a copy of Form 5743.11

The County’s notices also necessarily omit the

amount of surplus proceeds, since this notice is sent

before the property is sold and while owners still enjoy

possession of the property. There’s no neon sticker

attached to the owner’s door or sheriff’s visit warning

that property worth tens of thousands of dollars will

soon be forfeited. Without properly submitting the

notarized Form 5743, the statute provides no post-sale

opportunity for owners to recover their money. With

such grave consequences, the government must

provide a simple process for remittance. See NizChavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021) (“If men

must turn square corners when they deal with the

government, it cannot be too much to expect the

government to turn square corners when it deals with

them.”); Gates v. City of Chicago, 623 F.3d 389, 404

(7th Cir. 2010) (owners are not “willingly abandoning

millions of dollars” where government “has made the

process obtuse and unreasonably difficult”).

11 The notices include a url for the Form.

But many elderly and

indigent tax debtors do not have internet and printer access. See

U.S. Census Bureau, Computer and Internet Use in the United

States:

2021

(June

18,

2024),

https://www.census.

gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024/computer-internet-use2021.html.

B. The lower court’s opinion conflicts with

this Court’s decisions rejecting

unreasonably short deadlines to

protect constitutional rights

Laws that bar civil rights lawsuits based on the

passage of time must give “a reasonable time” for the

claimant to enforce her rights before eliminating her

ability to do so. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 63233 (1877) (“[S]tatutes of limitation affecting existing

rights are” constitutional only “if a reasonable time is

given for the commencement of an action before the

bar takes effect.”); Wilson, 185 U.S. at 63.

In Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984), a sixmonth statute of limitations for raising constitutional

claims from administrative proceedings was too short

and violated the intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was

enacted to allow individuals to enforce their federal

constitutional rights. See also Taylor, 104 U.S. at 22122 (refusing to interpret federal statute of limitations

to bar former owner’s right to claim surplus proceeds,

because “[a] construction consistent with good faith on

the part of the United States should be given to these

statutes”).

The deadline here is a mere 92 days, while owners

still possess their property and often don’t realize

they’ve lost title. Contrast this short window with the

six-year deadline for a state inverse condemnnation

action or three-year deadline for a federal takings

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hart, 416 Mich. at 503;

Grainger, 90 F.4th at 510. Michigan’s Uniform

Unclaimed Property Act requires the government to

hold unclaimed money in trust indefinitely until the

owners file a single (unnotarized) document to claim

their property. MCL § 567.245(1). The claim statute

here overrides otherwise standard deadlines by

requiring owners to stake their claim within 92 days

of foreclosure—long before the sale generates surplus

proceeds—or be forever barred from recovering their

constitutionally-protected money. This is not reasonable. See Todman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 104 F.4th 479, 484-86, 490 (4th Cir. 2024)

(failure to provide post-deprivation opportunity to

recover personal property violates due process);

Felder, 487 U.S. at 141-42; Garcia-Rubiera v. Fortuno,

727 F.3d 102, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2013) (120-day claim

period is not a “reasonable opportunity” to avoid

escheat).

C. The Court should grant certiorari to

determine whether the pre-claim notice

form meets the standards of fairness

required by the Due Process Clause

When determining whether procedures satisfy due

process, courts consider the private interest affected

by the official action; the risk of erroneous deprivation

under the challenged procedures and the probable

value of additional or substitute safeguards; and the

government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedures would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 332, 335 (1976); Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471,

478 n.7 (2019) (confirming Mathews as the appropriate test for constitutional claims). The court below

refused to apply any judicial scrutiny to the statute,

instead deferring to Michigan’s Legislature. App. 9a.

1. A debtor’s right to be paid the surplus proceeds

left over from the sale of foreclosed property is deeply

rooted in history and required by the Constitution.

Tyler, 598 U.S. at 647; see also United States v. James

Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1993) (the

“economic value” of a home “weigh[s] heavily”).

2. The risk of erroneous deprivation is demonstrably high. As few as 5% of Michiganders successfully navigate the complicated process to recover their

own money. See supra at 11; cf. Howard v. City of

Detroit, 40 F.4th 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2022) (“The fact

that around one percent of homeowners navigated the

murky modified appeal process does not demonstrate

the adequacy of the process or cure the uncertainty of

the remedy.”).

This risk would be substantially mitigated if

proceeds were disbursed via Michigan’s unclaimed

property statute. See MCL §§ 567.241, 567.245 (state

administrator holds unclaimed property in trust for

the rightful owner indefinitely until owner files

required form). The lower court refused to consider

such alternative procedures otherwise available in

Michigan. App. 10a. Although the government would

not be able to confiscate as much just compensation

for the public purse, that cannot outweigh property

owners’ interest in a fair process. See Felder, 487 U.S.

at 141-42 (rejecting short notice of claim requirement

“to minimize governmental liability”).

3. The government’s direct “pecuniary interest in

the outcome” of a seizure increases the risk of erroneous deprivation, and weighs in favor of a more

protective process. James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at

55-56. Cf. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 250

(1980); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n.9

(1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“[I]t makes sense to

scrutinize governmental action more closely when the

State stands to benefit.”). As several members of this

Court acknowledge, “financial incentives to pursue

forfeitures” raise serious due process concerns. Culley

v. Marshall, 601 U.S. 377, 396 (2024) (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). Due process

requires heightened protection in cases where “cash

incentives .-.-. encourage counties to create

labyrinthine processes for retrieving property.” Id. at

405 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Kagan and

Jackson, JJ.).

Rather than consider the heightened risk caused

by the government’s pecuniary interest, or the practical consequences of the claim statute, the Michigan

court joins the Nebraska Supreme Court and New

York Court of Appeals in refusing to do so. See HBI,

LLC v. Barnette, 305 Neb. 457, 474, 479 (2020)

(faulting owner’s failure to pick up unclaimed certified

mail rather than scrutinizing the tax collector’s

pecuniary interest in taking the owner’s property);

Hetelekides v. Cnty. of Ontario, 39 N.Y.3d 222, 240

(2023) (rather than weighing government’s pecuniary

interest in confiscating the windfall from a foreclosure, the court faulted a recent widow for not acting

faster than three days after receiving notice and for

not setting up probate sooner). This cannot comport

with the “fundamental fairness” demanded by the Due

Process Clause. This case identifies pressing national

problems left unresolved by Tyler and an excellent

vehicle to address them.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTINA M. MARTIN

Counsel of Record

DEBORAH J. LA FETRA

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.

Suite 1000

Arlington, VA 22201

Telephone: (916) 330-4059

CMartin@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Petitioner

APRIL 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.