Amicus Curiae Brief — Louisiana, Appellant v. Phillip Callais, et al.

Nos. 24-109, 24-110

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Appellant,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

————

PRESS ROBINSON, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

————

On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Louisiana

————

BRIEF OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NEW YORK,

ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO, CONNECTICUT,

DELAWARE, HAWAII, ILLINOIS, MAINE, MARYLAND,

MASSACHUSETTS, MICHIGAN, MINNESOTA, NEVADA,

NEW JERSEY, NEW MEXICO, NORTH CAROLINA, OREGON,

RHODE ISLAND, VERMONT, WASHINGTON, AND WISCONSIN

AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS

————

LETITIA JAMES

Attorney General for the

State of New York

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD

Solicitor General

JUDITH N. VALE

Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREA W. TRENTO

Assistant Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

28 Liberty Street

New York, NY 10005

(212) 416-8020

barbara.underwood@ag.ny.gov

BRIAN L. SCHWALB

Attorney General for the

District of Columbia

CAROLINE S. VAN ZILE*

Solicitor General

ASHWIN P. PHATAK

Principal Deputy

Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

400 6th Street, NW

Suite 8100

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 724-6609

caroline.vanzile@dc.gov

* Counsel of Record

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the State’s intentional creation of a

second majority-minority congressional district

violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to

the U.S. Constitution.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................ iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .......................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................. 2

ARGUMENT ......................................................... 6

I. Stare Decisis Weighs Strongly In

Favor Of Adhering To This Court’s

Well-Established

RacialPredominance Framework. .......................... 6

A. States have long relied on the racialpredominance framework, which is

well-settled and workable. ......................... 8

B. Abandoning the racial-predominance

framework would upend States’

entrenched reliance interests and

sow uncertainty in redistricting. ............. 14

II. Compliance With Section 2 Remains A

Compelling Interest. ................................... 18

A. Section 2 is not frozen in the past. .......... 19

B. In

Amici

States’

experience,

Section 2 has not become an out-ofcontrol

vehicle

for

racial

gerrymandering........................................ 27

CONCLUSION ................................................... 31

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Abbott v. Perez,

585 U.S. 579 (2018)................................... 9, 21, 27

Alabama Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama,

575 U.S. 254 (2015)....................................... 10, 11

Alexander v. South Carolina State Conf. of the

NAACP,

602 U.S. 1 (2024)............................................. 9, 10

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023).......................3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19,

20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27

Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity Inc. v.

Raffensperger,

700 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (N.D. Ga. 2023) ......... 12, 30

Bartlett v. Strickland,

556 U.S. 1 (2009)........................................... 22, 23

Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,

580 U.S. 178 (2017)....................2, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15

Bush v. Vera,

517 U.S. 952 (1996)............................................. 15

Christian Ministerial All. v. Arkansas,

No. 4:19-CV-402, 2020 WL 12968240 (E.D.

Ark. Feb. 21, 2020).............................................. 12

iv

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,

488 U.S. 469 (1989)............................................. 19

Cooper v. Harris,

581 U.S. 285 (2017)........................9, 10, 11, 18, 22

CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride,

564 U.S. 685 (2011)............................................. 14

Easley v. Cromartie,

532 U.S. 234 (2001)............................................. 10

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,

570 U.S. 297 (2013)............................................. 19

Growe v. Emison,

507 U.S. 25 (1993)............................................... 24

Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm’n,

502 U.S. 197 (1991)............................................. 15

Johnson v. De Grandy,

512 U.S. 997 (1994)....................................... 24, 26

Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC,

576 U.S. 446 (2015)............................................. 15

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry

(LULAC),

548 U.S. 399 (2006)................................. 21, 25, 26

Miller v. Johnson¸

515 U.S. 900 (1995)..................1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 17

v

Mississippi State Conf. of NAACP v. State Bd.

of Election Comm’rs,

739 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D. Miss. 2024) ............... 12

NAACP, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls,

913 F. Supp. 722 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) ..................... 23

Nairne v. Ardoin,

715 F. Supp. 3d 808 (M.D. La. 2024) ................. 29

Nairne v. Landry,

No. 24-30115, 2025 WL 2355524 (5th Cir.

Aug. 14, 2025) ..................................................... 19

North Carolina v. Covington,

585 U.S. 969 (2018)............................................. 10

Perez v. Perry,

No. SA-11-CV-360, 2012 WL 13124278

(W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2012) .................................. 10

Pierce v. North Carolina State Bd. of

Elections,

713 F. Supp. 3d 195 (E.D.N.C. 2024) ................. 12

Pierce v. North Carolina State Bd. of

Elections,

97 F.4th 194 (4th Cir. 2024) ............................... 12

Pope v. County of Albany,

94 F. Supp. 3d 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) ................... 22

Quilter v. Voinovich,

523 U.S. 1043 (1998)........................................... 10

vi

Quilter v. Voinovich,

981 F. Supp. 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1997) .................. 10

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,

438 U.S. 265 (1978)............................................. 19

Reynolds v. Sims,

377 U.S. 533 (1964)............................................... 8

Shaw v. Reno,

509 U.S. 630 (1993)........................................... 1, 7

Shelby County v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013)....................................... 23, 28

Singleton v. Merrill,

582 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Ala. 2022)................. 21

Soto Palmer v. Hobbs,

686 F. Supp 3d 1213 (W.D. Wash. 2023) ........... 29

Students for Fair Admission, Inc. v. President

& Fellows of Harvard Coll. (SFFA),

600 U.S. 181 (2023)................................. 21, 23, 24

Thornburg v. Gingles,

478 U.S. 30 (1986)........ 3, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25

United States v. Brown,

494 F. Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007) ............... 27

United States v. Brown,

561 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009)............................... 27

vii

Vecinos de Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke,

72 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995) ................................. 23

Voinovich v. Quilter,

507 U.S. 146 (1993)............................................. 22

Wesberry v. Sanders,

376 U.S. 1 (1964)................................................... 8

Wise v. Lipscomb,

437 U.S. 535 (1978)............................................. 17

STATUTES

52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)................................................. 24

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Heather K. Gerken,

A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act:

Section 5 and the Opt-in Approach,

106 Colum. L. Rev. 708 (2006) ........................... 21

Jowei Chen & Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,

The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights,

130 Yale L.J. 862 (2021) ..................................... 18

Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Eric McGhee, &

Christopher Warshaw,

Non-Retrogression Without Law,

2023 U. Chi. Legal F. 267 (2024) ....................... 28

viii

Pamela S. Karlan,

Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives:

Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores,

39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 725 (1998) .............. 20, 22

S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982)................................... 25, 26

Travis Crum,

Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting,

70 Duke L.J. 261 (2020)...................................... 20

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1 ...................................... 18

U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2 ...................................... 18

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Under this Court’s settled precedents, States have

long relied on two pathways to redistrict while

complying with both Section 2 of the Voting Rights

Act (“VRA”) and the Constitution. First, States may

consider race in drawing districts without triggering

strict scrutiny so long as racial considerations are not

“the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s

decision to place a significant number of voters within

or without a particular district.” Miller v. Johnson¸

515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). Second, even where racial

considerations do predominate, the resulting district

lines satisfy strict scrutiny where they are narrowly

tailored to further States’ compelling interest in

complying with Section 2. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.

630, 658 (1993).

As sovereigns entrusted with the weighty

responsibility of redistricting, States have strong

interests in ensuring that neither pathway is upended

by the Court’s resolution of this case. For decades,

States have relied on the Court’s racial-predominance

framework in drawing district lines with Section 2

compliance as one goal among many, without

necessarily triggering strict scrutiny. And where race

is found to have predominated over race-neutral

considerations, they have relied on the Court’s

framework by invoking their compelling interest in

complying with Section 2 to defend against claims of

racial gerrymandering.

Stare decisis principles weigh heavily against this

Court jettisoning its settled jurisprudence—which

would upend States’ reliance interests and trigger

massive uncertainty in the already fraught context of

2

redistricting. Accordingly, the District of Columbia

and the States of New York, Arizona, California,

Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,

Maine,

Maryland,

Massachusetts,

Michigan,

Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North

Carolina,

Oregon,

Rhode

Island,

Vermont,

Washington, and Wisconsin (collectively, “Amici

States”) submit this brief as amici curiae in support

of appellants and to explain why the Court should

adhere to its settled framework.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In our initial amicus brief, Amici States explained

that, even if racial considerations did predominate,

Louisiana had the requisite strong basis in evidence

to satisfy strict scrutiny because a different federal

court had earlier ruled that Louisiana’s original map

likely violated Section 2. See Br. of the District of

Columbia, New York, et al. as Amici Curiae in Supp.

of Appellants at 12-16. A contrary conclusion, the

brief explained, would deprive States of the

“breathing room” they need to draw remedial maps

that comply with both Section 2 and the Constitution.

Id. at 11 (quoting Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd.

of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 196 (2017)). These

arguments continue to apply with full force and

warrant reversal of the decision below.

In response to the Court’s supplemental briefing

order, Amici States now make two additional

arguments. First, a ruling that Louisiana violated the

Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments merely because

its creation of a second majority-minority district was

“intentional” would upend the Court’s long-settled

racial-predominance framework—with devastating

3

consequences for States. Second, even if strict

scrutiny applies here, compliance with Section 2

remains a compelling interest that justifies

Louisiana’s consideration of race.

I. More than 30 years ago, this Court established

a framework for evaluating claims of unconstitutional

racial discrimination in the complicated context of

redistricting. Observing that States will “almost

always be aware of racial demographics” as they seek

to “balance competing interests” in this “most

difficult” exercise, the Court imposed strict scrutiny

only where race “predominates” in the redistricting

decision at issue. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 91516 (1995). That approach has proven effective and

workable for States, courts, and litigants.

In cases like this one, the long-settled racialpredominance framework permits States to consider

race in tandem with traditional, race-neutral

redistricting principles to draw a majority-minority

district to remedy a likely Section 2 violation. This

Court held as much just three Terms ago in Allen v.

Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023), when it reaffirmed the

Gingles framework for Section 2 vote-dilution claims,

see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and

recognized that it had for decades “authorized racebased redistricting as a remedy” for Section 2

violations. Milligan, 599 U.S. at 41. Race is an

inevitable consideration in any redistricting exercise

seeking to prevent or remedy a Section 2 violation.

But “intentionally” considering race to draw a

majority-minority district does not necessarily mean

that race “predominated” over race-neutral

districting principles.

4

Stare decisis principles weigh heavily in favor of

adhering to the long-settled racial-predominance

framework. This Court has affirmed and applied that

framework for more than 30 years. During that time,

States have relied on the framework in balancing the

many competing interests that factor into

redistricting, including complying with Section 2. And

the framework has proven workable in practice. It has

allowed States to routinely defeat claims of

unconstitutional racial gerrymandering because race

was merely one consideration among many, while

allowing courts to identify and apply strict scrutiny to

the unique instances where racial considerations

subordinated race-neutral redistricting principles.

Moreover, abandoning the racial-predominance

framework to subject any “intentional” consideration

of race in redistricting to strict scrutiny would upend

States’ long-held reliance interests and cause chaos.

It would introduce a fissure in this Court’s Gingles

analysis, where race must be intentionally considered

in the preparation of illustrative maps to establish

Section 2 liability, but then could not be considered by

States in undertaking to remedy that violation.

Specifically, when such violations are found, States

would face the ultimate Catch-22: attempt to remedy

that violation by considering race and face strict

scrutiny, or attempt to remedy that violation while

remaining blind to race and likely fail to do so, facing

renewed Section 2 litigation. Jettisoning the racialpredominance framework would also cause serious

federal court intrusion into States’ complex

redistricting work. Indeed, it would subject

potentially hundreds of districts across the country,

5

drawn in reliance on that framework, to destabilizing

legal scrutiny.

II. If this Court does conclude that strict scrutiny

applies to Louisiana’s drawing of a second majorityminority district, the Court should ratify its

longstanding assumption that compliance with

Section 2 of the VRA is a compelling interest.

Section 2’s commands are predicated on Congress’s

power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, which

prohibits race-based discrimination in voting. States

have a compelling interest in remedying

constitutional and statutory violations that arise from

current and ongoing racial discrimination.

Appellees, Alabama Amici, and now Louisiana

incorrectly contend that the compelling interest in

complying with Section 2 has lapsed by the mere

passage of time. On their telling, Section 2 is an

outdated provision that mechanically imposes

majority-minority districts wherever discrimination

may once have occurred. But that account is wrong.

This Court’s longstanding framework for Section 2

claims, articulated in Gingles and upheld by this

Court just three Terms ago, makes clear that only

present-day racially discriminatory vote dilution can

violate Section 2. The Gingles framework builds in

durational limits as part of the three Gingles

preconditions and the ultimate totality-of-thecircumstances standard for liability. Specifically, the

Gingles preconditions require courts to examine

current data demonstrating compactness and racially

polarized

voting.

And

the

totality-of-thecircumstances standard requires courts to weigh the

nine fact-intensive Senate factors, most of which turn

6

on evidence of present discrimination and disparities.

To be sure, historical discrimination can play a role in

that inquiry. But this Court has long recognized that

an established pattern of discrimination is relevant to

the extent its effects persist today.

Ignoring this Court’s established Section 2

jurisprudence, Appellees and Alabama Amici

speculate that lower courts apply Section 2 beyond its

proper

scope—purportedly

undermining

the

compelling interest in complying with Section 2. But

States’ extensive experience contradicts that

contention. In States’ decades of drawing district lines

and defending against Section 2 claims, liability has

generally remained limited to current instances of

racially discriminatory vote dilution. Indeed, this

Court recently observed in Milligan that Section 2

plaintiffs rarely satisfy their heavy burden to prove

present-day compactness, racially polarized voting,

and that race-based vote dilution is occurring under

the totality of the circumstances. Alabama Amici’s

hodgepodge of district court decisions, read in context,

prove the point: courts must exhaustively evaluate

and weigh the evidence before finding a Section 2

violation. And such a violation, where found, is a

compelling reason to permit race-conscious

redistricting.

ARGUMENT

I. Stare Decisis Weighs Strongly In Favor Of

Adhering To This Court’s Well-Established

Racial-Predominance Framework.

The Court’s supplemental briefing order asks

“[w]hether the State’s intentional creation of a second

majority-minority congressional district violates the

7

Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U. S.

Constitution.” Order, Aug. 1, 2025. In answering this

question, the Court should be exceedingly careful not

to abandon the long-settled racial-predominance

framework that States, courts, and litigants have

relied on for more than 30 years. Appellees have

asked the Court to do just that in arguing that

Louisiana’s “intent” to create a second majorityminority district alone establishes that race

predominated in its creation of a remedial map and

that strict scrutiny thus applies. See Br. for Appellees

at 33-34. The Court should not endorse that view,

which would upend the racial-predominance

framework with devastating consequences for States.

Under

this

Court’s

well-settled

racialpredominance framework, States may consider race

in drawing election districts without triggering strict

scrutiny under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth

Amendments so long as racial considerations are not

“the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s

decision to place a significant number of voters within

or without a particular district.” Miller¸ 515 U.S. at

916; see Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644-48. But whenever a

State creates a majority-minority district to comply

with Section 2, its creation of that district could be

said to be “intentional” in the sense that it was one

factor that went into the districting process—even

when that factor ultimately did not predominate.

Accordingly, a ruling that any “intention” to create a

majority-minority district triggers strict scrutiny, as

Appellees’ urge, would assume away the racialpredominance framework in the context of creating

majority-minority districts. And Appellees’ argument,

if accepted, risks jettisoning the racial-predominance

8

framework entirely because nearly any consideration

of race in redistricting could be characterized as

“intentional.” But States have long relied on this

Court’s settled precedent that merely considering

race in districting, without allowing it to

predominate, does not raise constitutional concern.

Stare decisis principles counsel strongly against this

Court

abandoning

its

established

racialpredominance

framework—which has proven

workable for States, courts, and litigants, and

undergirds the Gingles test used to adjudicate

liability for alleged Section 2 vote-dilution claims.

A. States have long relied on the racialpredominance framework, which is wellsettled and workable.

More than three decades ago, this Court developed

the racial-predominance framework to ensure that

States could successfully exercise their responsibility

over the complex task of drawing district lines.

Redistricting “is primarily a matter for legislative

consideration and determination.” Reynolds v. Sims,

377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964). As States know from

experience, fulfilling this duty is a difficult endeavor

requiring “a delicate balancing of competing

considerations.” Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 187. For

example, States drawing congressional districts must

ensure that each district’s population is as nearly

equal as possible, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 78 (1964), while balancing traditional redistricting

principles like compactness, contiguity, and respect

for political subdivisions and communities of interest.

And they must complete this challenging task without

violating either the Constitution or the VRA’s

9

prohibition against racially discriminatory vote

dilution. See Milligan, 599 U.S. at 13-14.

Moreover, although States must avoid engaging in

unlawful racial discrimination when drawing district

lines, mapmakers will “almost always be aware of

racial demographics.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 30

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Miller, 515

U.S. at 915-16. Indeed, as this Court has repeatedly

explained, Section 2 often requires consideration of

race to prevent or remedy a districting plan that

unlawfully provides less opportunity to racial

minorities to elect representatives of their choice. See,

e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 587 (2018).

The Court established the racial-predominance

framework to accommodate this complexity, including

the “delicately balanced requirements regarding the

consideration of race” in redistricting. Abbott, 585

U.S. at 585. The racial-predominance framework

provides that strict scrutiny applies only when race is

“the predominant factor motivating” a redistricting

decision. Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 291 (2017)

(emphasis added). In other words, constitutional

concerns are raised only when the State

“subordinated traditional race-neutral districting

principles, including but not limited to compactness,

contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or

communities defined by actual shared interests, to

racial considerations.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.

The racial-predominance framework has proven

effective and workable for States, courts, and

litigants. This Court has regularly applied the

framework. See, e.g., Alexander v. South Carolina

State Conf. of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 17-37 (2024);

10

North Carolina v. Covington, 585 U.S. 969, 975-78

(2018) (summary disposition); Cooper, 581 U.S. at

299-301, 307-22; Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 188-92;

Alabama Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S.

254, 262-68 (2015); see also Milligan, 599 U.S. at 3033. In doing so, the Court has made clear the types of

evidence that may establish predominance, such as

“circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and

demographics or more direct evidence going to

legislative purpose.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 916; see

Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 191.

For 30 years, States have drawn district lines in

reliance on the framework’s core principle that race

may be considered in districting so long as it does not

predominate over other considerations. States have

thus successfully defended against claims of

unconstitutional racial gerrymandering by arguing

that race was merely a consideration, but not a

predominant one, in the redistricting exercise. These

include circumstances where legislators sought a

“fair, geographic, racial, and partisan balance

throughout” the State, Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S.

234, 253 (2001); where race was considered to ensure

that drafted maps complied with the VRA, see

Alexander, 602 U.S. at 22; and where race was

considered to create a majority-minority district to

prevent or remedy a Section 2 violation, see Perez v.

Perry, No. SA-11-CV-360, 2012 WL 13124278, at *1720 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2012); Quilter v. Voinovich,

981 F. Supp. 1032, 1048-49 & n.14 (N.D. Ohio 1997),

aff’d, 523 U.S. 1043 (1998).

As this extensive experience demonstrates, a State

does not necessarily allow racial considerations to

11

predominate when it “intentionally” considers race,

including when it has—as one redistricting goal

among many—the creation of a majority-minority

district. Rather, the creation of such a district may

properly be one factor so long as race-neutral

considerations do not become subordinated to it. See

Milligan, 599 U.S. at 33 (plurality opinion) (“The line

that we have long drawn is between consciousness

and predominance.”)

The ability to “intentionally” draw a majorityminority district without having racial considerations

predominate is further illustrated by the long-settled

Gingles test for Section 2 vote-dilution claims—a test

that this Court reaffirmed just three Terms ago, see

Milligan, 509 U.S. at 38-42. Specifically, the first

Gingles precondition requires a plaintiff to show that

a minority group “‘is sufficiently large and

geographically compact to constitute a majority’ in

some reasonably configured legislative district.”

Cooper, 581 U.S. at 287 (quoting Thornburg v.

Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986)). Satisfying this

precondition involves consideration of race. “The

question whether additional majority-minority

districts can be drawn, after all, involves a

quintessentially race-conscious calculus.” Milligan,

599 U.S. at 31 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Doing so also involves race-neutral

considerations: showing that the district is

reasonably configured requires demonstrating that it

comports with traditional race-neutral criteria. See

Alabama Legis. Black Caucus, 575 U.S. at 272.

Yet no court has held that every illustrative map

adduced to satisfy the first Gingles precondition is

12

necessarily one in which racial considerations

predominated. To the contrary, for three decades,

courts have successfully distinguished maps that

draw a majority-minority district while adhering to

race-neutral criteria, and therefore satisfy the first

Gingles precondition, from maps that are not

reasonably configured. 1 Indeed, in Milligan, a

plurality of the Court specifically rejected the

proposition that every creation of a majority-minority

district necessarily allows race to predominate,

emphasizing that such an approach would require

overruling Gingles, 599 U.S. at 32-33, which a

majority of the Court declined to do, Milligan, 599

U.S. at 41 (majority opinion). And where Milligan

concerned the availability of a potential Section 2

remedy as part of the Gingles vote-dilution analysis,

this case involves an actual remedy following a

1 Compare, e.g., Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity Inc. v.

Raffensperger, 700 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1252-64 (N.D. Ga. 2023)

(holding Gingles 1 satisfied where illustrative Congressional

map contained reasonably compact additional majority-Black

district “that balanced traditional redistricting criteria”), and

Mississippi State Conf. of NAACP v. State Bd. of Election

Comm’rs, 739 F. Supp. 3d 383, 423-25 (S.D. Miss. 2024) (Gingles

1 satisfied as to two districts in illustrative State Senate map,

where districts were “reasonably compact” and “follow[ed]

traditional redistricting principles”), with, e.g., Pierce v. North

Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 713 F. Supp. 3d 195, 224

(E.D.N.C. 2024) (illustrative district did not satisfy Gingles 1

because, in its reasonably compact form, it did not contain a

majority of Black voters), aff’d, 97 F.4th 194 (4th Cir. 2024), and

Christian Ministerial All. v. Arkansas, No. 4:19-CV-402, 2020

WL 12968240, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 21, 2020) (Section 2 claims

failed to plausibly allege that State’s black population was

reasonably compact enough to constitute a majority in singlemember district).

13

judicial finding that Louisiana’s original map likely

violated Section 2 by diluting the voting power of

Black voters. Thus, like in Milligan, the Louisiana

legislature had to consider race to draw a new map to

address that likely VRA violation. But such

intentional consideration of race does not necessarily

mean that racial considerations predominated over

traditional race-neutral redistricting principles or

political considerations. 2

To be sure, a plaintiff alleging an unconstitutional

racial gerrymander may be able to prove, by

presenting sufficient facts, that racial considerations

predominated even where the challenged map does

not drastically depart from traditional redistricting

criteria. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916-18 (courts may

rely on, for example, “direct evidence going to

legislative purpose” and context of redistricting

decisions). But that possibility does not suggest that

every instance where a mapmaker both intentionally

creates a majority-minority district and complies with

race-neutral criteria is an instance where racial

considerations predominated. As this Court has

emphasized,

legislatures

that

engage

in

impermissible racial gerrymandering will very often

“find it necessary to depart from traditional principles

in order to do so.” Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 190. “And,

2 Indeed, appellants have explained in detail that Louisiana

carefully considered a number of traditional redistricting factors

like identifying and assessing communities of interest;

strategizing incumbency protection; calculating how often maps

split parishes, census locations (or municipalities), and

landmarks; and measuring and comparing compactness scores

in promulgating its map. See Br. for Robinson Appellants at 917; Br. for Louisiana at 10-19.

14

in the absence of a conflict with traditional principles,

it may be difficult for challengers to find other

evidence sufficient to show that race was the

overriding factor causing neutral considerations to be

cast aside.” Id. But these examples underscore that

the Court’s existing racial predominance framework

appropriately subjects such instances to rigorous

constitutional scrutiny. There is no reason to depart

from that framework here.

B. Abandoning the racial-predominance

framework

would

upend

States’

entrenched reliance interests and sow

uncertainty in redistricting.

Stare decisis principles counsel strongly against

upending the well-settled racial-predominance

framework—as would occur if the Court were to

accept Appellees’ theory that any intentional creation

of a majority-minority district triggers strict scrutiny.

States have relied on the racial-predominance

framework in drawing district lines and defending

against

claims

of

unconstitutional

racial

gerrymandering. As

explained,

the

racialpredominance framework is well-reasoned, and has

been affirmed and applied by this Court for 30 years

without significant alteration. See CSX Transp., Inc.

v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 699 (2011) (abandoning

precedent that “has been accepted as settled law for

several decades” would “ill serve” stare decisis goals

of stability and predictability (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

Moreover, the well-settled racial-predominance

framework has given rise to entrenched reliance by

States, particularly given the need for advance

15

planning of great precision in redistricting. Indeed,

stare decisis has added force where, as here, “the

legislature, in the public sphere, . . . ha[s] acted in

reliance on a previous decision.” Hilton v. South

Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991).

And in light of States’ long-standing reliance on the

framework, abandoning it would cause substantial

uncertainty in redistricting in several ways. See

Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 459 (2015)

(adhering to stare decisis where abandoning current

precedent “would make the law less, not more,

workable than it is now”).

First, abandoning the racial-predominance

standard would upend the Gingles test by divorcing

the standard for plaintiffs to establish the first

Gingles precondition—which shows the existence of a

potential remedy for a Section 2 violation—from the

standard for States to constitutionally implement an

actual remedy to a probable violation. It would be

incongruous to allow Section 2 plaintiffs to use race to

show that a remedy would be possible but forbid

States from using race in the same way to then craft

such a remedy. The Constitution should not be

interpreted to impose such an artificial distinction.

Second, a ruling that subjects any map drawn with

an “intentional” outcome of creating a majorityminority district to strict scrutiny would trap States

“‘between the competing hazards of liability’ under

the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection

Clause.” Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 196 (quoting Bush

v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996)). Indeed, adopting

such a standard risks an outcome where any majorityminority district drawn with any awareness of the

16

racial make-up of the district’s residents could be

challenged as having been drawn “intentionally.”

Accordingly, mapmakers might feel compelled to

try to blind themselves to race to avoid subjecting the

resulting district plan to the gauntlet of strict

scrutiny. But that would only increase the likelihood

of Section 2 litigation. After all, States often need to

consider race to ensure that the resulting maps do not

“crack” or “pack” members of a racial minority group

in districts in ways that might lead to discriminatory

vote dilution. And being blind to race would extend

litigation when, as here, a court finds that a Section 2

violation is likely (or proven)—a finding that

necessarily includes a showing that a minority group

is sufficiently large and geographically compact to

constitute a majority in a reasonably configured

district. States would be put in the untenable position

of having to remedy that Section 2 violation without

“intentionally” adopting either an illustrative map

used to satisfy the first Gingles precondition or

another map that “intentionally” considered how to

place a majority of the minority group’s members in a

district while adhering to traditional race-neutral

criteria. States would then be left to blindly create a

remedial map with little more than a hope of curing

the violation by chance. If they are unsuccessful in

that effort, another round of Section 2 litigation

awaits. The Court should not subject States to such

endless cycles of litigation.

Third, and relatedly, upending the racialpredominance framework is likely to erode States’

primary authority over redistricting because States

will be more likely to cede the task to federal courts

17

where a Section 2 violation is proven or found to be

likely—rather than attempt to craft a remedy

themselves and be caught in another round of

litigation. That result would undermine the core

principle that States, rather than federal courts, are

best suited to balance the many, often conflicting

considerations of policy and politics that go into

drawing election districts. See, e.g., Wise v. Lipscomb,

437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).

Fourth, jettisoning the racial-predominance

standard would risk broadly exposing States to

further litigation and liability even where they do not

intentionally create a majority-minority district. As

noted, States often successfully defend against claims

of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering by arguing

that race, though considered, did not predominate in

the redistricting exercise. See supra p. 10. But a

framework that looks to whether the consideration of

race was merely “intentional” rather than

predominant threatens to eliminate such longaccepted practices and subject redistricting, the “most

vital of local functions,” to serious intrusion by federal

courts. Miller, 515 U.S. at 915. Given the “sensitive

nature of redistricting and the presumption of good

faith that must be accorded legislative enactments,”

the Court should continue to apply the racialpredominance framework, which ensures that courts

“exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating

claims that a State has drawn district lines on the

basis of race.” Id. at 916.

Finally, jettisoning the racial-predominance

framework might call into question the legality of

hundreds of legislative districts across the country, at

18

all levels of government, that considered, as one factor

among many, the drawing of districts to ensure that

members of a minority group were not given unequal

electoral opportunity. Cf. Jowei Chen & Nicholas O.

Stephanopoulos, The Race-Blind Future of Voting

Rights, 130 Yale L.J. 862, 901-02 (2021) (identifying

over 400 “minority opportunity districts” among State

house districts in a dataset of only 19 states). It would

mean

that

state

legislatures,

independent

redistricting commissions, and courts that have

adopted legislative redistricting plans may have long

engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering

simply by following this Court’s established

precedents. Such a startling change would not only

substantially alter decades of jurisprudence but also

potentially open States’ current maps to novel legal

challenges. Stare decisis warrants adhering to the

racial-predominance framework.

II. Compliance With Section 2

Compelling Interest.

Remains

A

If the Court finds that race predominated in

drawing Louisiana’s map, it should hold that the

State’s effort to comply with Section 2 constitutes a

compelling interest. As explained, “[t]his Court has

long assumed that” compliance with Section 2 is a

“compelling interest.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 285. That is

for good reason: Section 2 is an exercise of Congress’s

authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s

command that “[t]he right of citizens of the United

States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on

account of race, color, or previous condition of

servitude.” U.S. Const. amend. XV, §§ 1-2. And this

Court has long permitted race-conscious remedies to

19

cure “judicial, legislative, or administrative findings

of constitutional or statutory violations.” Fisher v.

Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 308 (2013)

(quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.

265, 307 (1978) (plurality opinion)); see City of

Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500

(1989).

Contrary to some parties’ and amici’s contentions,

this Court’s longstanding approach to Section 2 is

rooted in present reality and current conditions, and

it continues to give States a compelling interest in

redistricting to produce VRA-compliant maps. See

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45; see also, e.g., Nairne v.

Landry, No. 24-30115, 2025 WL 2355524, at *23 (5th

Cir. Aug. 14, 2025) (per curiam) (rejecting argument

that validity of Section 2 “has somehow lapsed” and

explaining that “[t]he Reconstruction Amendments do

not demand that Congress re-justify its judgments on

a rolling basis”).

A. Section 2 is not frozen in the past.

Appellees erroneously proclaim that “[i]t’s time to

retire the assumption that the VRA provides

Louisiana a compelling interest, at least since

January 2024.” Appellees’ Br. 38. For support,

Appellees contend that race-based districting under

Section 2 “cannot extend indefinitely into the future.”

Appellees’ Br. 37 (quoting Milligan, 599 U.S. at 45

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring)). Similarly, certain of

Appellees’ amici posit that Section 2’s reliance on past

racial discrimination in voting risks being “ageless in

[its] reach into the past, and timeless in [its] ability to

affect the future.” Brief of Alabama and 13 Other

States as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees 27,

20

Jan. 28, 2025 (“Alabama Amici Br.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). And, following this Court’s

supplemental briefing order, Louisiana has changed

its tune to align with Appellees’ and Alabama Amici’s

time-limit arguments. See Suppl. Br. for Louisiana

26-33.

These arguments rest on a fundamentally

incorrect understanding of this Court’s Section 2

jurisprudence. The Gingles preconditions and the

Senate factors relevant to the totality-of-thecircumstances

inquiry

turn

on

present-day

circumstances, not merely past discrimination.

Start with the first Gingles precondition:

compactness. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. This Court has

determined whether a proposed majority-minority

district is compact by looking to, among other facts,

decennial census data reflecting current population

demographics. See Milligan, 599 U.S. at 15, 34. That

current data is updated with each census and thus

reflects changing demographics. As the Court

observed in Milligan, Section 2’s compactness

requirement “becomes more difficult” to prove “as

residential segregation decreases—as it has ‘sharply’

done since the 1970s.” Id. at 28-29 (quoting Travis

Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, 70

Duke L.J. 261, 279 & n.105 (2020)).

Likewise, Gingles’s second and third preconditions

build in a natural “durational limit on Section 2’s

operation” by requiring that voting in a jurisdiction is

“characterized by racial polarization.” Pamela S.

Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives:

Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 Wm. &

Mary L. Rev. 725, 741 (1998); see Gingles, 478 U.S. at

21

51. Specifically, courts may not assume that members

of the same minority community necessarily vote for

the same candidates. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48; cf.

Students for Fair Admission, Inc. v. President &

Fellows of Harvard Coll. (SFFA), 600 U.S. 181, 219

(2023) (cautioning against assuming “that minority

students always (or even consistently) express some

characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather,

“plaintiffs must prove it” in every case by establishing

that voting in that jurisdiction is characterized by

racial polarization. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46. Section 2

thus already contains a “functional sunset provision”

in that, “[w]hen people cease to vote along racial lines,

[it] will become a paper tiger.” Heather K. Gerken, A

Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the

Opt-in Approach, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 708, 745 (2006).

Moreover, this Court has long looked to current

circumstances

when

applying

the

Gingles

preconditions to Section 2 disputes. See Milligan, 599

U.S. at 22 (looking to “average” voting behavior over

the prior decade) (quoting Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F.

Supp. 3d 924, 1017 (N.D. Ala. 2022)); Abbott, 585 U.S.

at 617 (evaluating voter behavior over four prior

elections); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.

Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 427-29 (2006) (relying

on election data from year prior to challenged

redistricting).

Alabama Amici and Louisiana incorrectly contend

that courts applying Gingles merely “identify[] a

distant history of discrimination and elections that

didn’t go the ‘right’ way ‘enough.’” Alabama Amici Br.

23; Suppl. Br. for Louisiana 28-29. That contention

misunderstands the role of history in the Gingles

22

framework. An established pattern of racially

polarized voting may inform courts’ understanding of

whether a minority community currently lacks equal

access to the political process. As this Court put the

point in Cooper, “longtime voting patterns are highly

probative of racial polarization.” 581 U.S. at 304

(citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57). Were courts to instead

entirely disregard a jurisdiction’s history of racially

polarized voting—or lack thereof—they might

incorrectly infer a minority’s “loss of political power”

from its “mere inability to win a particular election.”

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57. That would be exactly the

kind of “mechanical[]” application of Gingles this

Court has long forbidden. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556

U.S. 1, 15 (2009) (quoting Voinovich v. Quilter, 507

U.S. 146, 158 (1993)).

In any event, while history helps in gleaning a

potential “pattern of racial bloc voting” under Gingles,

the “ultimate” question remains whether the minority

community currently lacks “an equal opportunity to

participate in the political process and to elect

representatives of their choice.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at

57, 77. Accordingly, “[a]s the lingering effects of racial

discrimination abate, and thus as excluded minorities

become physically and politically integrated into the

dominant society, their ability and need to bring

claims under section 2 will subside as well.” Karlan,

supra, at 741. Moreover, lower courts routinely attach

more weight to recent election results than they do

dated election results in examining the totality of the

circumstances under Gingles. See, e.g., Pope v. County

of Albany, 94 F. Supp. 3d 302, 333 (N.D.N.Y. 2015)

(“In addition, the Court finds that more recent

elections are more probative.” (citing Vecinos de

23

Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 990 (1st

Cir. 1995))); NAACP, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 913

F. Supp. 722, 752 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (“More recent

elections are more probative in discerning the

discriminatory present effects of the electoral

standard, practice, or procedure under scrutiny.”).

Far from having the talismanic effect Alabama Amici

suppose, past discrimination is ultimately relevant

under Gingles only to the extent its effects continue to

be felt today.

Section 2’s

focus

on

remedying

current

discrimination in voting disposes of analogies to the

“time limits” discussed in SFFA. Appellees’ Br. 37

(citing SFFA, 600 U.S. at 212-13); Suppl. Br. for

Louisiana 24. In that case—decided just one month

after this Court reaffirmed Gingles in Milligan—

neither of the university defendants purported to use

race in admissions to remedy civil rights violations.

SFFA, 600 U.S. at 214. Rather, they asserted

interests in preparing students for “an increasingly

pluralistic society” and “enhancing appreciation,

respect, and empathy, cross-racial understanding,

and breaking down stereotypes,” which this Court

rejected as impossible to quantify. Id. By contrast,

Gingles not only requires present racially polarized

voting before imposing Section 2 liability, but its

three preconditions are also readily administrable

based on “objective, numerical” criteria. See Bartlett,

556 U.S. at 18. Nor does the decision in Shelby County

regarding Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA, which “were

intended to be temporary,” call into question the

continued validity of Section 2. Shelby County v.

Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 538 (2013); see id. at 557 (“Our

24

decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide

ban on racial discrimination in voting found in § 2.”).

What

is

more,

Gingles’s

totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry, including the Senate factors,

also requires looking to all present circumstances

relevant to whether Section 2 has been violated.

Alabama Amici argue that courts have transformed

the fact-specific totality analysis into “‘an affirmativeaction program’ for race-based districting in

perpetuity” by looking primarily to “race-based gaps

. . . with respect to the health, wealth, [or] well-being

of American citizens.” Alabama Amici Br. 27 (quoting

SFFA, 600 U.S. at 384 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). But

this is not true.

The Court recently rejected such a “single-minded

view of § 2” where “there is only one ‘circumstance[ ]’

that matters.” Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 at 26 (quoting 52

U.S.C. § 10301(b)). As Section 2 makes plain, it is

violated only where, “based on the totality of the

circumstances,” members of a minority community

“have less opportunity than other members of the

electorate to participate in the political process and to

elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b) (emphasis added). Reviewing courts

therefore “must conduct ‘an intensely local appraisal’

of the electoral mechanism at issue, as well as a

‘searching practical evaluation of the “past and

present reality.”’” Milligan, 478 U.S. at 19 (quoting

Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 79 (1993)); see Johnson

v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1009 (1994) (rejecting

notion that proving “the three Gingles preconditions”

and “that Hispanics had suffered historically from

official discrimination” whose effects “they generally

25

continued to feel” sufficed to show a Section 2

violation).

The Senate factors that are central to the totalityof-the-circumstances inquiry illustrate Section 2’s

focus on ongoing vote dilution. Indeed, the Senate

Committee admonished that Section 2 liability

“depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the

‘past and present reality.’” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45

(quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 30 (1982)). The specific

factors the Senate Committee enumerated drive

home that point: racially polarized voting, “voting

practices or procedures that tend to enhance the

opportunity for discrimination against the minority

group,” exclusion “from candidate slating processes,”

“racial appeals in political campaigns,” lack of

minority electoral success, elected officials being

“unresponsive” to the minority group’s needs, and the

challenged practice resting on a “tenuous” policy. Id.

at 44-45. Each of these factors asks whether ongoing

conditions indicate “that the political process is not

‘equally open’ to minority voters.” Milligan, 599 U.S.

at 18 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45).

True enough, the remaining two Senate factors

concern “the history of voting-related discrimination”

and “the extent to which minority group members

bear the effects of past discrimination.” Gingles, 478

U.S. at 44-45. But this Court has recognized that the

“political, social, and economic legacy of past

discrimination” against a minority “may well hinder

their ability to participate effectively in the political

process.” LULAC, 548 U.S. at 440 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The critical word is “may”: the Senate

Report enumerates only the “typical factors” relevant

26

to a Section 2 violation. S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28

(1982); see LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426. Accordingly,

litigants are free to argue that past discrimination is

irrelevant or outweighed by other evidence in a

particular case. And this Court has shown its ability

to accept such arguments. See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at

1013.

Appellees discount the Senate factors, contending

that litigants and courts “abuse[]” Section 2 “to set

racial quotas.” Appellees’ Br. 38. But this Court in

Milligan repudiated the view that its “existing § 2

jurisprudence

inevitably

demands

racial

proportionality in districting.” 599 U.S. at 26. The

Court explained that its “decisions have frequently

demonstrated” that “the Gingles framework itself

imposes meaningful constraints on proportionality.”

Id. And as the Court further emphasized, “[t]he

numbers”

demonstrate

that

representation

proportional to population is quite rare nationally. Id.

at 28; see infra pp. 27-29 (explaining that the Milligan

Court’s observations hold true today).

In sum, the Gingles preconditions and Senate

factors do real work in limiting Section 2 liability to

current instances of race-based vote dilution. And

proven, present-day vote dilution so severe as to likely

violate Section 2—as the Robinson courts found

here—presents a compelling reason to draw VRAcompliant maps. 3

3 Indeed, outside the redistricting context, lower courts have

understood that Section 2 liability is tailored to current

conditions, not history. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 494 F.

Supp. 2d 440, 486 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (finding Section 2 violation

27

B. In Amici States’ experience, Section 2 has

not become an out-of-control vehicle for

racial gerrymandering.

Appellees erroneously argue that “[a]ggressive

VRA-only litigation before single-judge district courts

has proliferated and expanded racial gerrymanders.”

Appellees’ Br. 38. That argument is belied by reality.

Section 2 liability is hardly automatic, as States’

experience confirms. This Court recently observed in

Milligan that Ҥ 2 litigation in recent years has rarely

been successful” and that “plaintiffs nationwide have

apparently succeeded in fewer than ten § 2 suits,”

redrawing only “a handful of state house districts

near Milwaukee and Houston.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at

29. Section 2 plaintiffs carry a heavy burden of proof

precisely because Gingles focuses on present

conditions. Although residential segregation persists

in the United States, in those locations where it has

declined, plaintiffs may often fail to carry their

burden under Gingles because “minority populations’

geographic diffusion” makes it difficult to “design an

additional majority-minority district or satisfy the

compactness requirement.” Id. at 29 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Gingles’s “exacting

requirements” thus ensure that redistricting remains

“‘primarily the duty and responsibility of the

State[s].’” Id. (quoting Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579,

603 (2018)).

where, following significant changes in political power since the

VRA was enacted, black elected officials intentionally

discriminated against white voters, who were “historically

privileged” and “who as a group do not suffer the effects of past

discrimination”), aff’d, 561 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009).

28

In Alabama Amici’s telling, a “post-2020 surge in

liability” due to “statutory mission creep” has

superseded Milligan’s account of how courts apply

Section 2. Alabama Amici Br. 29; see Suppl. Br. for

Louisiana 26-27 (similar). Alabama Amici neglect to

mention, however, that most of the dozen Section 2

injunctions they cite arose in jurisdictions now no

longer covered by the Section 5 preclearance formula

that this Court ruled unconstitutional in Shelby

County. Compare id. at 29 n.5 (listing cases from

Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama), with

Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 537-38 (noting these

States were covered jurisdictions). Indeed, this Court

foreshadowed in Shelby County that these previously

covered jurisdictions could see increased scrutiny

under Section 2. See 570 U.S. at 557. Though

Alabama Amici sidestep this straightforward

explanation for any uptick in successful Section 2

claims, the single law review article they rely on

ultimately tells the same story. That is, “the recent

litigation record of Section 2 redistricting plaintiffs is

abysmal, including less than a handful of victories

(versus dozens of defeats) over the last two decades.”

Nicholas

Stephanopoulos,

Eric

McGhee,

&

Christopher Warshaw, Non-Retrogression Without

Law, 2023 U. Chi. Legal F. 267, 277 (2024). The fact

that some plaintiffs occasionally prevail is not

evidence that courts fail to faithfully apply the

Gingles framework. Rather, it further establishes

that courts are properly finding Section 2 liability

only where the fact-intensive inquiry proves that

racially discriminatory vote dilution is currently

occurring.

29

Taking a different tack, Alabama Amici find fault

in three district court decisions. Alabama Amici Br.

31-34. But, even setting aside that none of those

handpicked cases are before this Court, Alabama

Amici paint a false picture of them. Alabama seizes

on stray sentences that seemingly support its

narrative that courts too easily find Section 2 liability

based on only one or two of the Senate factors. But

these stray sentences are improperly taken out of the

context of the hundreds of pages of evidentiary

support for each court’s Section 2 findings. For

instance, Alabama Amici cite footnote 461 of the

Middle District’s opinion in Nairne, which recites the

testimony of an expert witness concerning Senate

factor 5. Id. at 34 (citing Nairne v. Ardoin, 715 F.

Supp. 3d 808, 874 n.461 (M.D. La. 2024)). To state the

obvious, that testimony was just one exceedingly

small part of the court’s extensive evaluation of the

volumes of evidence pertaining to the nine Senate

factors, which the defendants there “did not

meaningfully contest.” Nairne, 715 F. Supp. at 876.

Alabama Amici’s reliance on two other cases fails

because they apply the same cherry-picking tactic,

again bypassing many pages of factual findings. 4

4 Compare Alabama Amici Br. 31-32 (citing a sentence in the

Western District of Washington’s opinion noting that many

members of the Latino community were “ineligible to vote

because of their immigration status” (quoting Soto Palmer v.

Hobbs, 686 F. Supp 3d 1213, 1228 (W.D. Wash. 2023)), with Soto

Palmer, 686 F. Supp 3d at 1228 (continuing, in the same

sentence, to reference “literacy and language barriers that

prevent full access to the electoral process” in support of Senate

factor 1), and id. at 1233-34 (finding that “Senate Factors 1, 2,

30

Ultimately, Alabama Amici’s speculation that

Section 2 has become unbounded lacks support and is

contravened by States’ experience and this Court’s

recent precedent in Milligan. Accordingly, the Court

should confirm its longstanding assumption that

Section 2 compliance provides a compelling interest

for States to draw race-conscious remedial maps.

3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 all support” Section 2 liability); compare

Alabama Amici Br. 32-33 (suggesting that the Northern District

of Georgia relied improperly on several voting laws with a

racially disparate impact “determined . . . to not be illegal under

federal law” (quoting Raffensperger, 700 F. Supp. 3d at 1272),

with Raffensperger, 700 F. Supp. at 1272 (explaining in the next

sentence that the practices’ legality “certainly impact[s] the

weight to afford” them), and id. at 1369 (concluding after an

additional hundred pages of evidence that “Senate Factors One,

Two, Three, Five, and Seven weigh in favor of” Section 2

liability).

31

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the judgment of the

three-judge district court in the Western District of

Louisiana.

Respectfully submitted,

LETITIA JAMES

Attorney General for the

State of New York

BRIAN L. SCHWALB

Attorney General for the

District of Columbia

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD

Solicitor General

CAROLINE S. VAN ZILE

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JUDITH N. VALE

Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREA W. TRENTO

Assistant Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL FOR THE STATE

OF NEW YORK

28 Liberty Street

New York, NY 10005

(212) 416-8020

barbara.underwood@ag.ny.gov

September 2025

ASHWIN P. PHATAK

Principal Deputy

Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

400 6th Street, NW,

Suite 8100

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 724-6609

caroline.vanzile@dc.gov

32

On behalf of:

KRIS MAYES

Attorney General

State of Arizona

ROB BONTA

Attorney General

State of California

PHILIP J. WEISER

Attorney General

State of Colorado

WILLIAM TONG

Attorney General

State of Connecticut

KATHLEEN JENNINGS

Attorney General

State of Delaware

ANNE E. LOPEZ

Attorney General

State of Hawaii

KWAME RAOUL

Attorney General

State of Illinois

AARON M. FREY

Attorney General

State of Maine

ANTHONY G. BROWN

Attorney General

State of Maryland

ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL

Attorney General

Commonwealth of

Massachusetts

DANA NESSEL

Attorney General

State of Michigan

KEITH ELLISON

Attorney General

State of Minnesota

AARON D. FORD

Attorney General

State of Nevada

MATTHEW J. PLATKIN

Attorney General

State of New Jersey

RAÚL TORREZ

Attorney General

State of New Mexico

JEFF JACKSON

Attorney General

State of North Carolina

DAN RAYFIELD

Attorney General

State of Oregon

PETER F. NERONHA

Attorney General

State of Rhode Island

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CHARITY R. CLARK

Attorney General

State of Vermont

JOSHUA L. KAUL

Attorney General

State of Wisconsin

NICHOLAS W. BROWN

Attorney General

State of Washington