Amicus Curiae Brief — Louisiana, Appellant v. Phillip Callais, et al.

Nos. 24-109, 24-110

IN THE

Supreme Court

of the United States

_________

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Appellant,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

_________

PRESS ROBINSON, et al.,

Appellant,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

_________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Western District of Louisiana

_________

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE MILLIGAN PLAINTIFFS IN

SUPPORT OF THE ROBINSON APPELLANTS

_________

KAYLA D. FISHER

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

1735 Market St.

Floor 23

Philadelphia, PA 19103

JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH

Counsel of Record

JO-ANN TAMILA SAGAR

ERICA J. SHULER

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 637-5600

jessica.ellsworth@hoganlovells.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST .................................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

THE ARGUMENT ................................................. 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4

I.

ALLEN V. MILLIGAN ANSWERS

THE QUESTION PRESENTED ...................... 4

II.

STARE DECISIS REQUIRES

ADHERENCE TO ALLEN V.

MILLIGAN IN THIS CASE ........................... 10

A. The Five-Justice Majoriy Opinion In

Milligan Was Well-Reasoned ......................... 11

B. This Case Is Functionally Identical To

Milligan........................................................... 13

C. Nothing Has Changed In The Two Years

Since Milligan Was Decided .......................... 17

D. The Remaining Stare Decisis Factors Also

Counsel In Favor Of Adhering To

Milligan........................................................... 23

CONCLUSION ....................................................... 25

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

Ala. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Allen,

No. 21-cv-1531, 2025 WL 2451166 (N.D.

Ala. Aug. 22, 2025) ............................................... 25

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023) ......................2-5, 8-11, 16, 19, 24

Apodaca v. Oregon,

406 U.S. 404 (1972) .............................................. 12

Arizona v. Rumsey,

467 U.S. 203 (1984) .............................................. 23

Bush v. Vera,

517 U.S. 952 (1996) ................................................ 7

Callais v. Landry,

732 F. Supp.3d 574 (W.D. La. 2024) ................... 16

Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n,

558 U.S. 310 (2010) .............................................. 22

City of Mobile v. Bolden,

446 U.S. 55 (1980) .................................................. 8

Clark v. Martinez,

543 U.S. 371 (2005) .............................................. 15

Davis v. Bandemer,

478 U.S. 109 (1986) .............................................. 12

Dickerson v. United States,

530 U.S. 428 (2000) .............................................. 15

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health

Organization,

597 U.S. 215 (2022) .............................................. 12

Evenwel v. Abbott,

578 U.S. 54 (2016) ................................................ 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v.

Florida Nursing Home Ass’n,

450 U.S. 147 (1981) .............................................. 22

Gamble v. United States,

587 U.S. 678 (2019) .............................................. 22

Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm’n,

502 U.S. 197 (1991) .............................................. 23

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United

States,

552 U.S. 130 (2008) .............................................. 19

Johnson v. Louisiana,

406 U.S. 366 (1972) .............................................. 12

June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo,

591 U.S. 299 (2020) .................. 3, 13, 14, 17, 22, 23

Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC,

576 U.S. 446 (2015) ...................................... 3, 4, 10

Kisor v. Wilkie,

588 U.S. 558 (2019) .............................................. 18

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.

Perry,

548 U.S. 399 (2006) .............................................. 24

Merrill v. Milligan,

142 S. Ct. 879 (2002) ............................................ 24

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty.,

572 U.S. 782 (2014) ................................................ 3

Miller v. Johnson,

515 U.S. 900 (1995) ................................................ 7

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966) .............................................. 15

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,

416 U.S. 600 (1974) .............................................. 22

Moore v. Texas,

581 U.S. 1 (2017) .................................................. 14

Moore v. Texas,

586 U.S. 133 (2019) ........................................ 14, 23

Nichols v. United States,

511 U.S. 738 (1994) .............................................. 13

Orozco v. Texas,

394 U.S. 324 (1969) .............................................. 15

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,

491 U.S. 164 (1989) .............................................. 21

Payne v. Tennessee,

501 U.S. 808 (1991) .................................... 3, 21, 23

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern

Pennsylvania v. Casey,

505 U.S. 833 (1992) .............................................. 12

Ramos v. Louisiana,

590 U.S. 83 (2020) ................................... 3, 7-13, 19

Regents of University of California v. Bakke,

438 U.S. 265 (1978) .............................................. 12

Rucho v. Common Cause,

588 U.S. 684 (2019) .............................................. 12

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44 (1996) ................................................ 13

Shaw v. Hunt,

517 U.S. 899 (1996) .............................................. 18

Shaw v. Reno,

509 U.S. 630 (1993) ................................................ 7

(iv)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

Shelby County v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013) .............................................. 20

Students for Fair Admissions v. President

and Fellows of Harvard College,

600 U.S. 181 (2023) ........................................ 12, 18

Thornburg v. Gingles,

478 U.S. 30 (1986) ................................................ 11

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,

422 U.S. 151 (1975) .............................................. 23

Vasquez v. Hillery,

474 U.S. 254 (1986) ........................................ 23, 24

Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,

579 U.S. 582 (2016) .............................................. 14

Withrow v. Williams,

507 U.S. 680 (1993) .............................................. 15

Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678 (2001) .............................................. 15

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

2024 Election Results, AP News,

https://apnews.com/projects/electionresults-2024/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2025) ............. 21

Kadia Goba et al., Led by Trump,

Republicans push to redraw election

maps in multiple states, The Washington

Post (Aug. 7, 2025),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics

/2025/08/07/trump-republicansredistricting-texas-indiana/ ................................. 21

(v)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT’D)

Page(s)

The Federalist No. 78 (H. Lodge ed. 1888)

(A. Hamilton)........................................................ 22

Wall St. J., The Gerrymander Race to the

Bottom (Aug. 21, 2025),

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/partisangerrymandering-texas-california-gopdemocrats-donald-trump-gavin-newsom7ee26118?st=hAna4B&reflink=desktopw

ebshare_permalink .............................................. 21

(vi)

IN THE

Supreme Court

of the United States

_________

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Appellant,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

_________

PRESS ROBINSON, et al.,

Appellant,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

_________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Western District of Louisiana

_________

STATEMENT OF INTEREST1

Two years ago, Amici Evan Milligan, Shalela

Dowdy, Letetia Jackson, and Greater Birmingham

Ministries, were before this Court as appellees in Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023). They are Alabama

residents who have worked to protect and secure their

own rights under the Voting Rights Act and the rights

of their neighbors. By virtue of their recent experience

with Voting Rights Act litigation, including litigating

and prevailing in this Court in Milligan, Amici are intimately familiar with this Court’s decision in Milligan, the constitutional and statutory provisions that

1

No party or counsel for a party authored this brief in whole

or in part. No party, counsel for a party, or person other than

amici curiae or their counsel made any monetary contribution

intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

the Court construed in that case, and the developments since that decision. Additionally, Amici can

speak firsthand to the workability and efficacy of existing Section 2 doctrine in both the trial and appellate courts.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court set re-argument to consider “[w]hether

the State’s intentional creation of a second majorityminority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution.” Order, Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109 (August 1, 2025). But the Court answered that question

just two years ago. See generally Allen v. Milligan, 599

U.S. 1 (2023). It said the answer is no. Nothing of relevance has changed since then.

When Amici were last before this Court, “Alabama

assert[ed] that § 2, as construed by Gingles,” “require[s] race-based redistricting in certain circumstances,” and “exceeds Congress’s remedial or preventive authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 45 (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring). And “[a]s the Court explain[ed], the

constitutional argument presented by Alabama is not

persuasive in light of the Court’s precedents.” Id. Five

members of this Court—speaking with one voice—explicitly “reject[ed]” the “argument that § 2 as applied

to redistricting is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment,” or pushes states to unlawful “racial gerrymanders in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” 599 U.S. at 28, 41 (opinion of Roberts,

C.J., for the Court).

“The legal doctrine of stare decisis requires” this

Court “to treat like cases alike.” June Med. Servs.

3

L.L.C. v. Russo, 591 U.S. 299, 345 (2020) (Roberts,

C.J., concurring). Adherence to precedent is “a foundation stone of the rule of law.” Michigan v. Bay Mills

Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014). “[I]t promotes

the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501

U.S. 808, 827 (1991). For those reasons, this Court

should virtually never overrule a statutory precedent.

Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015).

“[T]he Court’s precedents on precedent,” Ramos v.

Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 120 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in part), permit the Court to override this

“superpowered form of stare decisis,” where there is “a

superspecial justification to warrant reversing” the

statutory precedent. Kimble, 576 U.S. at 458. There is

no such justification here.

Milligan’s interpretation of § 2, and its conclusion

that this interpretation is consistent with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, represents a statutory holding, such that the Constitution requires this

Court to retain the precedent in deference to Congress’s legislative function. See Milligan, 599 U.S. at

39 n.10; see also Ramos, 590 U.S. at 119-120 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). Milligan presented

precisely the same question that this Court addresses

on re-argument. Milligan answered that question

clearly, persuasively, and speaking with one voice for

a majority of this Court. Milligan’s recency belies any

argument that circumstances have changed since the

decision was issued. And Milligan is workable and has

engendered reliance interests. Those factors favor

leaving Milligan undisturbed.

4

“Overruling precedent is never a small matter.”

Kimble, 576 U.S. at 455. But it has never been bigger

than in this case. The Court has announced its openness to reconsidering a statutory precedent that this

Court reaffirmed just two years ago, that Congress

has acknowledged and relied upon for decades, and

that touches upon a topic that the President has

pushed into the headlines of every major newspaper

for the past month. If the time has come for § 2 of the

Voting Rights Act to be re-written, this Court should

leave that task to the political branches—lest the

Court become one of them.

ARGUMENT

I.

ALLEN V. MILLIGAN ANSWERS THE

QUESTION PRESENTED.

The State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district to remedy an identified § 2 violation does not violate the Fourteenth or

Fifteenth Amendments. This Court held as much in

Milligan. There, this Court explicitly “reject[ed]” the

“argument that § 2 as applied to redistricting is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment,” or

pushes states to unlawful “racial gerrymanders in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 599 U.S. at

28, 41.

1. In Milligan, the Court addressed a challenge to

an Alabama districting map that produced “only one

district in which black voters constituted a majority of

the voting age population.” Id. at 16. A three-judge

district court found that the map likely violated § 2

and preliminarily enjoined Alabama from using the

map in future elections. Id. This Court affirmed that

decision. Id. at 19.

5

As the Court explained, the extensive record in the

case supported the district court’s conclusion that the

plaintiffs’ § 2 claim was likely to succeed under Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See Milligan, 599

U.S. at 23. The district court “correctly found that

black voters could constitute a majority in a second

district that was ‘reasonably configured’” under the

first Gingles precondition. Id. at 19. And there was “no

serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor that the challenged districts’ white majority

votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate” under the second and third

preconditions, respectively. Id. at 22 (quotation omitted). The Court also credited the district court’s “careful factual findings” at the totality of circumstances

stage, including its findings that “elections in Alabama were racially polarized” and that “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant racial and voting-related

discrimination is undeniable and well documented.”

Id. at 22-23 (quotation omitted).

None of that is remarkable. The Court did not write

a lengthy opinion in Milligan “to disturb the District

Court’s careful factual findings, which are subject to

clear error review and have gone unchallenged by Alabama in any event.” Id. at 23. Nor was the Court’s

exposition necessary “to upset the District Court’s legal conclusions,” which “faithfully applied our precedents and correctly determined that, under existing

law, HB1 violated § 2.” Id. In other words, the controversy in that case was “not about the law as it exists”;

it was “about Alabama’s attempt to remake our § 2 jurisprudence anew.” Id.

2. Alabama brought the Milligan case to the Court

to ask for a “new approach to § 2,” based on arguments

6

that a State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 24. But this

Court rebuffed that request. A five-Justice majority

“reject[ed]” the “argument that § 2 as applied to redistricting is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth

Amendment,” or pushes states to unlawful “racial gerrymanders in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 28, 41.

a. The Milligan Court grounded its decision in precedent.

As the Court acknowledged, “we held over 40 years

ago that, even if § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress may not, pursuant to § 2 of the Fifteenth

Amendment outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.” Id. at 41 (alterations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, “for the last four decades, this Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly applied the effects test of § 2 as interpreted

in Gingles and, under certain circumstances, have authorized race-based redistricting as a remedy for state

districting maps that violate § 2.” Id. “In light of that

precedent,” the Court declined to hold that “§ 2 as interpreted in Gingles exceeds the remedial authority of

Congress.” Id. at 41.

The Court held that its precedent likewise illustrated that § 2 claims are fully consistent with the

Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court explained, “the

Gingles framework itself imposes meaningful constraints on proportionality,” such that a faithful application of § 2 yields only results that are also consistent

with the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 26. “[I]n case

7

after case,” this Court has “rejected districting plans

that would bring States closer to proportionality when

those plans violate traditional districting criteria.” Id.

at 29 & n.4; see also id. at 27-29 (discussing Shaw v.

Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.

900 (1995); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996)).

“Though the districts” at issue in those cases may

have “brought the State closer to proportional representation, we nevertheless held that they constituted

racial gerrymanders in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Id. at 28. Those cases illustrate that

“[f]orcing proportional representation is unlawful and

inconsistent with this Court’s approach to implementing § 2.” Id. at 28; see also id. at 43 (“As the Court’s

precedents make clear, Gingles does not mandate a

proportional number of majority-minority districts.”)

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

b. The Milligan Court also explained why adherence

to precedent was required.

First, the Court reaffirmed that its § 2 precedent offered the best reading of the text of the statute. C.f.,

e.g., Ramos, 590 U.S. at 121 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (explaining that a “prior decision” must

be “not just wrong, but grievously or egregiously

wrong” to justify departure from it).

The Court explained that it has long “understood the

language of § 2 against the background of the hardfought compromise that Congress struck.” Milligan,

599 U.S. at 25. In 1982, Congress undertook amending § 2 in order to legislatively overrule this Court’s

decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55

(1980), which had held that a districting plan did not

violate § 2 where it was discriminatory only in effect.

Milligan, 599 U.S. at 11-13. Senator Dole, taking note

8

of the “avalanche of criticism” that Bolden produced,

recommended amending the statute in a way that

“would allow courts to consider effects but avoid proportionality.” Id. at 13. Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of striking that balance, see id. at 14,

and the statutory language incorporating that compromise has remained unchanged since 1982.

Second, the Court reaffirmed that its § 2 precedent

has proven workable. C.f., e.g., Ramos, 590 U.S. at 121

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (explaining that

this Court evaluates “the workability of the precedent” in considering whether to adhere to the rule of

stare decisis).

This Court, for its part, has “applied Gingles in one

§ 2 case after another, to different kinds of electoral

systems and to different jurisdictions in States all

over the country.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 19 (collecting

cases). In Milligan itself, for example, five members of

the Court had no problem concluding that “a faithful

application of our precedents and a fair reading of the

record before us d[id] not bear” out Alabama’s “concern that § 2 may impermissibly elevate race in the

allocation of political power within the States.” Id. at

41; see also, e.g., id. at 43 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)

(rejecting “conten[tion] that Gingles inevitably requires a proportional number of majority-minority

districts, which in turn contravenes the proportionality disclaimer in § 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act” and

collecting additional cases holding as much).

Third, the Court recognized that Congress and the

President’s decision to leave Gingles undisturbed—especially when viewed against the background of their

swift move to overrule Bolden—is a decision that demands this Court’s respect. C.f., e.g., Ramos, 590 U.S.

9

at 118 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (“In statutory cases, stare decisis is comparatively strict, as history shows and the Court has often stated.”).

“Unlike with constitutional precedents, Congress

and the President may enact new legislation to alter

statutory precedents such as Gingles.” Milligan, 599

U.S. at 42 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). And because

the political branches have the power to legislatively

overrule this Court’s interpretation of statutes, “the

stare decisis standard for this Court to overrule a statutory precedent, as distinct from a constitutional precedent, is comparatively strict.” Id. at 42 (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring). “In the past 37 years, however, Congress and the President have not disturbed Gingles,

even as they have made other changes to the Voting

Rights Act.” Id. at 42 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The

Court therefore concluded that “statutory stare decisis

counsels strongly in favor of not undoing the compromise that was reached between the House and Senate

when § 2 was amended in 1982.” Id. at 39 n.10 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

***

Milligan directly answers the question that this

Court has set for re-argument here. There, this Court

explicitly “reject[ed]” the “argument that § 2 as applied to redistricting is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment,” or pushes states to unlawful “racial gerrymanders in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” 599 U.S. at 28, 41. And for several reasons—precedent, text, workability, and statutory

stare decisis—the Milligan Court “declin[ed] to adopt

an interpretation of § 2 that would ‘revise and reformulate’” the Court’s “§ 2 jurisprudence.” Id. at 24.

10

II. STARE DECISIS REQUIRES ADHERENCE

TO ALLEN V. MILLIGAN IN THIS CASE.

The weight of stare decisis depends on the interpretive task before the Court. See Ramos, 590 U.S. at

119 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). As to judicial

precedents interpreting statutes, this Court has made

clear that “stare decisis carries enhanced force.” Kimble, 576 U.S. at 456. In this “superpowered form of

stare decisis,” the Court has required “a superspecial

justification to warrant reversing” the statutory precedent. Id. at 458.

Milligan’s construction of § 2 is entitled to that

special deference. Milligan, 599 U.S. at 39 & n.10; see

also id. at 42 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (characterizing “Gingles” as “a statutory precedent”). And there

is no “superspecial justification” that warrants this

Court’s departure from Milligan. To the contrary, the

balance of the factors that this Court weighs in response to every request to depart from precedent tilts

decisively toward adhering to Milligan.

The Five-Justice Majority Opinion In

Milligan Was Well-Reasoned.

As an initial matter, the quality of Milligan’s reasoning is too strong to warrant overturning that decision. That is so not just because the question of § 2’s

consistency with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments was pressed by the parties and passed

upon by this Court (though it was, see supra at 6-7);

and not just because the opinion is well-reasoned and

well-written (though it is, see supra at 7-9); but also

because Milligan is fundamentally different from the

fractured decisions that this Court has recently overruled.

11

Milligan’s holding and the bulk of its reasoning commanded the votes of five Justices of this Court. See

Milligan, 599 U.S. at 1-30, 33-42. In so doing, Milligan

reaffirmed Gingles, a decision that was similarly endorsed by a clear majority of this Court. See Gingles,

478 U.S. at 34-61, 74-76, 77-80. That fact—the congruence between the number of votes necessary to

force a particular result, and the number of votes supporting the reasoning in the opinion announcing the

Court’s judgment—sets Milligan apart from other recent decisions overturning precedent.

Take, for example, Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83

(2020), in which this Court overruled Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Apodaca was a badly split

decision, in which four Justices concluded that the

Sixth Amendment did not require jury unanimity at

all, while the fifth vote in support of the judgment

came from Justice Powell, who concluded that the

Sixth Amendment did require unanimity; it simply

was not a fundamental element of jury trials binding

on the States. 406 U.S. at 406; see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 369-380 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in that case and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.

404 (1972)). Apodaca was so fractured that, in Ramos,

three Justices agreed that Apodaca supplied no governing precedent at all. Ramos, 590 U.S. at 101-103.

Indeed, as the Court noted in Ramos, “five Justices in

Apodaca said” that “the Sixth Amendment does require unanimity.” Id. at 96.

Many other recently overruled cases fit this pattern.

There is Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), in which this Court overruled Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), a decision in which

12

“the Court split three ways” with “[t]wo Justices express[ing] no desire to change Roe in any way,” “[f]our

others want[ing] to overrule the decision in its entirety,” “[a]nd the three remaining Justices, who

jointly signed the controlling opinion, t[aking] a third

position.” Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 229. Another such case

is Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (SFFA),

in which this Court overruled Justice Powell’s opinion, “written for himself alone,” but controlling for

lower courts, id. at 208, in Regents of University of

California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.,

announcing the judgment of the Court). And Rucho v.

Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684, 702 (2019), in which the

Court overruled the “splintered” decision in Davis v.

Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), is similar.

These cases reflect the rule that where a precedent

“has created confusion among the lower courts that

have sought to understand and apply [a] deeply fractured decision,” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517

U.S. 44, 64 (1996), overruling may be appropriate. See

also, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746

(1994) (“[C]onfusion following a splintered decision

* * * is itself a reason for reexamining that decision.”).

The opposite is also true. Where, as here, clear and

consistent majorities of this Court adopt and apply a

rule, stare decisis prohibits this Court from disavowing that rule. A “precedent’s consistency and coherence” is a reason to retain it. Ramos, 590 U.S. at 121

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).

This Case Is Functionally Identical To

Milligan.

1. Stare decisis requires fidelity to the Court’s precedent—not to the individual views expressed by each

13

Justice in deciding any given case. Stare decisis therefore prohibits individual Justices from elevating their

own individual jurisprudence above the Court’s own

jurisprudence. Even where a jurist had “joined the

dissent” in a prior case, and “continue[s] to believe

that the case was wrongly decided,” that jurist has an

obligation to “adhere to” the majority’s holding in deciding an identical case. June Medical, 591 U.S. at 344

(C.J., Roberts, concurring). Regardless of whether a

particular decision is “right or wrong”—“stare decisis

requires” this Court “to treat like cases alike.” Id. at

344-345.

Consider, for example, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring vote in June Medical. There, the Chief Justice

joined four other Justices of this Court in invalidating

a Louisiana law that was identical, in every relevant

way, to a Texas law that the Court had invalidated

four years earlier in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582 (2016). The Chief Justice cast a

vote to invalidate the Louisiana law, even though the

Chief Justice had “joined the dissent in Whole

Woman’s Health,” and he “continue[d] to believe that

[Whole Woman’s Health] was wrongly decided.” June

Medical, 591 U.S. at 344 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

The Chief Justice nevertheless cast a vote to invalidate the Louisiana law because, in June Medical, the

question before the Court was “not whether Whole

Woman’s Health was right or wrong, but whether to

adhere to it in deciding the present case.” Id. Answering that question, he reasoned that “[u]nder principles

of stare decisis,” he had to “agree with the plurality

that the determination in Whole Woman’s Health that

Texas’s law imposed a substantial obstacle requires

the same determination about Louisiana’s law.” Id. at

354.

14

Or take Moore v. Texas, 586 U.S. 133 (2019) (“Moore

II”), where six Justices voted to summarily reverse the

court below, in an application of a two-year-old decision that had commanded only a five-Justice majority,

see Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017) (“Moore I”). In

Moore I, this Court had vacated a decision of the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals regarding an intellectual

disability claim in a capital case because of the analytical framework applied by the Texas court. Id. at 5.

Two years later, after Texas reinstated the very capital sentence Moore I had vacated, this Court granted

certiorari and summarily reversed, observing that the

opinion on remand simply “repeat[ed] the analysis”

Moore I had “found wanting.” Moore II, 586 U.S. at

139 (per curiam). Because of this overlap, the Chief

Justice joined Moore II’s majority, despite having authored the Moore I dissent. Id. at 143 (Roberts, C.J.,

concurring). Even if he had dissented “two years ago,”

he could not ignore that the Texas court’s decision on

remand had “repeated the same errors” that a majority of this Court had “previously condemned.” Id.

Justices Kennedy and Scalia made the same move

in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). Clark involved an alien detained in the United States for a

long period of time pending removal. Four years earlier, in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), a fiveJustice majority of the Court had concluded that the

government could not detain an alien indefinitely

without violating the Due Process Clause. Id. at 690.

When Clark came before the Court, and required the

Court to address involving a different category of aliens, but the same statute, a seven-Justice majority

reached a result consistent with Zadvydas. Although

they had dissented in Zadvydas, Justices Kennedy

and Scalia voted with the Clark majority. Justice

15

Scalia explained his vote as follows: if Zadvydas had

erred its interpretation of the statute, “Congress can

attend to it,” but “for this Court to sanction” a contradictory reading of the same statute “would establish

within our jurisprudence, beyond the power of Congress to remedy, the dangerous principle that judges

can give the same statutory text different meanings in

different cases.” Clark, 543 U.S. at 386.2

2. Milligan similarly binds this Court—the whole

Court—to hold here that the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district does not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth

Amendments to the U. S. Constitution. Although individual Justices expressed doubts about Milligan’s

holding, see 599 U.S. at 46 (Thomas, J., dissenting);

id. at 95 (Alito, J., dissenting), a clear majority of this

Court “reject[ed]” the “argument that § 2 as applied to

redistricting is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth

Amendment,” or pushes states to unlawful “racial gerrymanders in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 28, 41.

And the overlap between Milligan and this case is

widely acknowledged. In his dissent from the Court’s

order setting this case for re-argument, Justice

Thomas noted that Milligan involved the same interpretive question at issue here. See Louisiana v. Callais, re-argument ordered, 145 S. Ct. 2608, 2609-10

(June 27, 2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that

2

We could go on. Compare, e.g., Chief Justice Rehnquist’s position in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), and

Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993); Justice Harlan’s position in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

16

this case “highlight[s] the intractable conflict between

this Court’s interpretation of [§ 2] and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and

that Milligan “placed the VRA in direct conflict with

the Constitution”). The district court and the parties

have acknowledged the same. See, e.g., Callais v.

Landry, 732 F. Supp.3d 574, 609-613 (W.D. La. 2024);

Brief for Appellant Louisiana at *2, 28, 36, 44, 47-48,

Louisiana v. Callais, Nos. 24-109, 24-110 (2025); Brief

for Appellants Press Robinson, et al. at *21, 27-28, 43,

Louisiana v. Callais, Nos. 24-109, 24-110 (2025); Brief

for Appellees at *37-38, 40-41, 48, 52, Louisiana v.

Callais, Nos. 24-109, 24-110 (2025). “The result in this

case is” therefore “controlled by” Milligan and this

Court’s obligation to “treat like cases alike.” June

Medical, 591 U.S. at 358 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

Nothing Has Changed In The Two Years

Since Milligan Was Decided.

Milligan was decided just two years ago. In the two

years that have elapsed since this Court decided Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, nothing of relevance has changed.

No legal developments have undermined Milligan’s

doctrinal foundation. No changes in the facts on the

ground have rendered Milligan’s holding obsolete.

Any other development cited by the parties is inherently political in nature and must be disregarded by

this Court. The recency of Milligan therefore provides

a third, equally compelling reason to adhere to its

holding that a State’s intentional creation of a second

majority-minority congressional district does not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the

U. S. Constitution. That was true two years ago. It remains true today.

17

1. There have been no legal developments. Congress

has not altered the text of § 2 in a way that would require reconsidering this Court’s Voting Rights Act

precedent. To the contrary, as the Court recognized in

Milligan, decades of dialogue between this Court and

Congress support the conclusion that the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district does not violate the Fourteenth or

Fifteenth Amendments. See supra at 8-9.

Nor has this Court issued any decision since Milligan that would call Milligan’s reasoning in doubt.

Contrary to the Appellee’s claims in Brief for Appellees at *36–38, Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109, 24110 (2025), the Court’s decision in Students for Fair

Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard

College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023), is fully consistent with

this Court’s § 2 jurisprudence.

In SFFA, the Court reaffirmed that “remediating

specific, identified instances of past discrimination

that violated the Constitution or a statute” remains a

“compelling interest[] that permit[s] resort to racebased government action.” See SFFA, 600 U.S. at 207.

In support of that statement, the SFFA opinion cited

Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), one of this Court’s

cases interpreting and applying § 2 of the Voting

Rights Act. See SFFA, 600 U.S. at 207 (citing Shaw,

517 U.S. at 909-910).3 In other words, the Court anticipated and rejected the argument that the SFFA

3

As the cross-referenced section of Shaw explains, a “State’s interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination may * * * justify a government’s use of racial distinctions,”

particularly where the state’s action targets “identified discrimination” and the state has “a ‘strong basis in evidence’ to conclude

that remedial action was necessary.” Shaw, 517 U.S. at 909-910.

18

decision would undermine Milligan, explicitly distinguishing the Court’s § 2 jurisprudence from the

Court’s admissions cases.

Even if SFFA signals a change in how the Court

views constitutional avoidance when related to a

Fourteenth Amendment claim, that would not justify

a retreat from Milligan here. “[D]ecisions construing

particular statutes continue to command respect even

when the interpretive methods that led to those constructions fall out of favor.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S.

558, 630 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); see also, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.

United States, 552 U.S. 130, 137, 139 (2008) (noting

new presumption with respect to tolling of statutes of

limitations but refusing to overturn prior interpretation). Thus, to the extent that § 2 is in need of revision

because it relies on an outmoded method of analysis,

this Court should leave “the updating or correction

* * * to the legislative process,” Ramos, 590 U.S. at

119 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).

Finally, and fundamentally, the claim that SFFA

and Milligan are, in some manner, inconsistent is too

cute by half. A case that was decided by the same

Court, in the same term, and within weeks of Milligan

cannot fairly be said to have “changed [the] law since”

Milligan was decided. Id. at 121; see also id. at 122

(explaining that this Court considers “the age of the

precedent” in deciding whether to retain it). Nor is it

credible to argue that those two decisions—which

were authored by the same jurist and featured overlapping majorities—reflect inconsistent understandings of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

2. There have been no factual developments. That is,

no changes in the facts on the ground have rendered

19

Milligan’s holding obsolete. Appellees argue (at 38)

that “litigation before single-judge district courts has

proliferated and expanded racial gerrymanders.” But

Appellees do not cite anything to support that assertion. Nor is it plausible that any evidence supports the

view that, in the two years since Milligan acknowledged that Ҥ 2 litigation in recent years has rarely

been successful,” 599 U.S. at 29, there has been some

explosion in § 2 suits.

But even if that were true, it would not be a change

that warrants overruling Milligan. Indeed, to the extent that there has been any increase in § 2 litigation,

that is likely the result of this Court’s own jurisprudence. Prior to this Court’s decision in Shelby County

v. Holder, Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act

worked in tandem to provide mechanisms for challenging enacted discriminatory election practices nationwide and, in jurisdictions with a history of discrimination, for preventing certain discriminatory

measures before enactment, respectively.

In Shelby County, this Court invalidated § 5 with

the understanding that the continued availability of

§ 2 would prevent continued voter discrimination.

This position was advanced by one of the parties at

oral argument and ultimately reflected in the Court’s

opinion. Counsel for Shelby County assured the Court

that § 2 was an “effective remedy” against discriminatory practices such that the pre-clearance provisions

were no longer necessary. Shelby County Oral Arg. Tr.

26. And this Court ultimately agreed, observing that

“[b]oth the Federal Government and individuals have

sued to enforce § 2, and injunctive relief is available

in appropriate cases to block voting laws from going

into effect,” Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529,

20

537 (2013) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, the

Court emphasized that “Section 2 is permanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case.” Id.

Thus, any increase in § 2 litigation is an increase

that this Court anticipated—or even, invited—years

ago.

3. Nor are there any other developments that could

serve as a hook for a re-evaluation of Milligan. To be

sure, things have happened in the past two years. We

have inaugurated a new President. 4 There are new

members in both chambers of Congress.5 Some states

have announced an intention to engage in redistricting without new census data.6 But those changes are

not cognizable in this Court.

The Court is, by design, a fundamentally apolitical

institution. The judiciary is primarily concerned with

the “evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. Stare

decisis thus functions as “a basic self-governing

4

See Kadia Goba et al., Led by Trump, Republicans push to redraw election maps in multiple states, The Washington Post

(Aug. 7, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025

/08/07/trump-republicans-redistricting-texas-indiana/.

5

See 2024 Election Results, AP News, https://apnews.com/projects/election-results-2024/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2025).

6

See Wall St. J., The Gerrymander Race to the Bottom (Aug. 21,

2025), https://www.wsj.com/opinion/partisan-gerrymanderingtexas-california-gop-democrats-donald-trump-gavin-newsom7ee26118?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgf7FeZw9bklZmbRtpausFQ3ITIsxQ8ymucb3B5RsF4YPcgT5FdxrUNjl0N70%3D&gaa_ts=68b7b50f&gaa_sig=Z

58KfKzw1L5dHD6zdtg7S6zsEOmqrEu_AcagxgR1MjkiP3kKla

wU1_GezUbGyCYEApeEvnEXMy7rh0qR69DUPg%3D%3D (explaining that “geographic sorting” of Republican and Democratic

voters “has made it easier for both parties to gerrymander”).

21

principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is

not based upon ‘an arbitrary discretion.’” Patterson v.

McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting The Federalist No. 78, p. 490 (H. Lodge ed. 1888)

(A. Hamilton)).

Justice Stewart once opined that “[n]o misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to

the system of law which it is our abiding mission to

serve,” than the “misconception” that this Court—at

times—overturns precedent based solely on “a change

in [the Court’s] membership.” Mitchell v. W. T. Grant

Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting);

see also Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v.

Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 153 (1981)

(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting “the potential damage to the legal system that may be caused by frequent

or sudden reversals of direction that may appear to

have been occasioned by nothing more significant

than a change in the identity of this Court’s personnel”).

He was wrong. There is a misconception that could

do more harm. And that is the misconception that this

Court would change position based on changes within

the political branches. Stare decisis’ “greatest purpose

is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.

310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The

Court’s respect for stare decisis is what “distinguishes

the judicial ‘method and philosophy from those of the

political and legislative process.’” June Medical, 591

U.S. at 346 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). And by abiding by former

22

precedents in the face of political changes, the Court

“contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of

the judicial process.”’ Gamble v. United States, 587

U.S. 678, 691 (2019) (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827).

That is why this Court must adhere to Milligan here.

The Remaining Stare Decisis Factors Also

Counsel In Favor Of Adhering To Milligan.

1. Although Milligan was issued too recently to

have engendered significant reliance interests itself,

Gingles—which Milligan reaffirmed and reapplied—

has long been the backbone of § 2 litigation. Districting lines have been shaped by it. And courts have endorsed remedies dictated by it. But most importantly,

Congress has long “acted in reliance” on this Court’s

decisions interpreting § 2, Hilton v. South Carolina

Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991), suggesting that those decisions should not be disturbed by the

judiciary. See supra at 8-9.

Moreover, Milligan’s recency is itself a reason that

this Court must adhere to that decision. Stare decisis

carries added persuasive force when the precedent at

issue was recently adopted or recently applied. See,

e.g., June Medical, 591 U.S. at 344 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in Court’s refusal to overrule a case decided

“four years ago”); Moore II, 586 U.S. at 143 (Roberts,

C.J., concurring in Court’s refusal to overrule a case

decided “two years ago”).7 Overruling a recent precedent tends to undermine public confidence that the

7

See also, e.g., Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (declining to overrule a case “decided only three years ago”); Vasquez

v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261 (1986) (declining to overrule a case

decided “[o]nly six years ago”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.

Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 165 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring in

Court’s refusal to overrule a case decided “[s]even years ago”).

23

Court’s decisions “are founded in the law rather than

in the proclivities of individuals.” Vasquez, 474 U.S. at

265-266. Preserving that confidence “contributes to

the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.” Id.

2. This Court should also adhere to Milligan because it is workable. To be sure, the “general terms of

the statutory standard” in § 2 “require judicial interpretation,” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.

Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 426 (2006), and some lower courts

have at times exhibited “uncertainty regarding the

nature and contours of a vote dilution claim,” Merrill

v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 883 (2002) (Roberts, C.J.,

dissenting from grant of stays).

But as Milligan itself illustrates, lower courts are

able to “properly appl[y] existing law * * * with no apparent errors for our correction.” Id. at 882. Indeed,

the Milligan majority responded to the “principal dissent” and its “complain[t] that ‘what the District

Court did here is essentially no different from what

many courts have done for decades under this Court’s

superintendence,’” with the note that “[t]hat is not

such a bad definition of stare decisis.” 599 U.S. at 26

n.3 (quoting id. at 90-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

And if the Court had any concern that lower courts

have sometimes failed to heed the limitations incorporated into the Gingles framework, the answer would

be to reinforce those limitations, not to jettison Gingles, Milligan, and the many decisions that came between them in that line of precedent. Cf., e.g., Evenwel

v. Abbott, 578 U.S. 54, 63-75 (2016) (reaffirming the

one-person, one-vote rule while clarifying its contours). The lower courts are capable of following this

Court’s lead. See, e.g., Ala. State Conf. of the NAACP

24

v. Allen, No. 21-cv-1531, 2025 WL 2451166 at *61

(N.D. Ala. Aug. 22, 2025) (rejecting a proposed district

because, in the court’s view, it did “not serve traditional districting principles”). And the alternative—

the Court striking down a long-standing statutory

precedent—would be to legislate, not adjudicate.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those in Robinson Appellants’ brief, the judgment of the district

court should be reversed, and the case should be remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the

State of Louisiana and Appellants.

Respectfully submitted,

KAYLA D. FISHER

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

1735 Market St.

Floor 23

Philadelphia, PA 19103

JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH

Counsel of Record

JO-ANN TAMILA SAGAR

ERICA J. SHULER

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 637-5600

jessica.ellsworth@hoganlovells.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

SEPTEMBER 2025