Amicus Curiae Brief — Louisiana, Appellant v. Phillip Callais, et al.

No. 24-109, 24-110

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

LOUISIANA,

Appellant,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

PRESS ROBINSON, et al.,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

Appellants,

Appellees.

On Reargument of Appeals from the United States

District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE FORMER

REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN

SUPPORT OF THE ROBINSON APPELLANTS

K aren L. Dunn

Jeannie S. Rhee

Agbeko C. Petty

E. John Paredes**

Jenifer N. Hartley**

Dunn Isaacson Rhee LLP

401 Ninth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20004

A mit Agarwal*

Protect Democracy Project

2020 Pennsylvania Avenue NW,

#163

Washington, DC 20006

amit.agarwal@

protectdemocracy.org

(202) 579-4582

**Admitted in NY only.

Practice supervised by

D.C. Bar members.

Beau Tremitiere

Lauren Groth

Protect Democracy Project

300 Center Drive,

Suite G-251

Superior, CO 80027

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Amici Curiae

131471

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I N T RODUC T ION A N D SU M M A RY OF

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

I.

THE

RECONSTRUCTION

A MENDMENTS AND ELECTIONS

CL AUSE EM P OW ER CONGRES S

TO SECURE EQUA L POLITICA L

OPPORTUNIT Y, A ND SECTION 2

I S A VA L I D E X E R C I S E O F

THAT POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

II. CONGRESS DESIGNED SECTION 2

AS A PERMANENT, SELF-LIMITING

REMEDY TARGETING CURRENT,

LOCALIZED VOTE DILUTION . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A. Section 2’s “Results Test” Safeguards

Equal Opportunity, Not Proportional

Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

B. Section 2’s Design Ensures Remedies

Address Only Current, Localized Vote

Dilution, Eliminating Any Need for

a Judicial Sunset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

ii

Table of Contents

Page

C. Imposing a Judicial Sunset on Section

2 Would Usurp Congress’s Role and

Create an Unprincipled Limitation . . . . . . 15

III. Section 2’s Remedies Are Fully Reconcilable

with the Equal Protection Clause Under

Settled Strict-Scrutiny Principles . . . . . . . . . . 18

A. Race-Predominant Districting Triggers

Strict Scrutiny, But Compliance with

the Voting Rights Act Is a Compelling

Interest That Can Justify Opportunity

Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

B. The “Strong-Basis-in-Ev idence”

Standard Affords States Necessary

Br e at h i ng R o om a nd Avoid s a

Constitutional Catch-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

C. Remedies for Vote Dilution A re

Fundamentally Different from Racial

Preferences in University Admissions . . . 21

IV. P R I N C I P L E S O F J U D I C I A L

RESTRAINT AND STARE DECISIS

SUPPORT UPHOLDING SECTION 2’S

ENFORCEMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS . . . 23

A. Congress’s Judgment in Enacting

Section 2 Is Entitled to Deference . . . . . . . 23

iii

Table of Contents

Page

B. Nullifying Section 2 Would Leave the

Statute Without Effect and Betray the

Fifteenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

C. Overturning Section 2’s Framework

Would Disrupt Decades of Reliance by

States, Courts, and Voters, Destabilizing

a Cornerstone of American Election Law . . 26

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

iv

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,

515 U.S. 200 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023) . . . . . . . . . 5, 7, 9, 12-14, 17, 20, 26, 27

Bartlett v. Strickland,

556 U.S. 1 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Bethune-Hill v.

Virginia State Board of Elections,

580 U.S. 178 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee,

594 U.S. 647 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Bush v. Vera,

517 U.S. 952 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 19

CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd.,

145 S. Ct. 1572 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

City of Boerne v. Flores,

521 U.S. 507 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 8

City of Mobile v. Bolden,

446 U.S. 55 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9

City of Rome v. United States,

446 U.S. 156 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 9, 23, 24

Cooper v. Harris,

581 U.S. 285 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 12, 19, 20

v

Cited Authorities

Page

Cunningham v. Cornell University,

145 S. Ct. 1020 (2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Ex parte Virginia,

100 U.S. 339 (1879) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7, 15, 17

Growe v. Emison,

507 U.S. 25 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,

582 U.S. 79 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Johnson v. De Grandy,

512 U.S. 997 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Katzenbach v. Morgan,

384 U.S. 641 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7, 15, 24

Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC,

576 U.S. 446 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 27

Lopez v. Monterey County,

525 U.S. 266 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Miller v. Johnson,

515 U.S. 900 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

Nairne v. Landry,

No. 24-30115, __ F. 4th __, 2025 WL 2355524

(5th Cir. Aug. 14, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Rostker v. Goldberg,

453 U.S. 57 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 24

Rucho v. Common Cause,

588 U.S. 684 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Shaw v. Reno,

509 U.S. 630 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 21

Shelby County v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 14

South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

383 U.S. 301 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7, 8, 23

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President

& Fellows of Harvard College,

600 U.S. 181 (2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 21, 22

Tennessee v. Lane,

541 U.S. 509 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 24

Thornburg v. Gingles,

478 U.S. 30 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7, 9, 13, 17, 19, 22, 26, 27

vii

Cited Authorities

Page

Wilkie v. Robbins,

551 U.S. 537 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 15

U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9

U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 15

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 10

Statutes

52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 12

52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Other Authorities

1 Voting Rights Act: Evidence of Continued

Need, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the

Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

109th Cong. 1592 (Mar. 8, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

128 Cong. Rec. 14337 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

128 Cong. Rec. 23205 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

152 Cong. Rec. H5207 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

152 Cong. Rec. S8012 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Debo P. Adegbile,

Voting Rights in Louisiana: 1982-2006,

17:2 RLSJ, S. Cal. Rev. of L. and Soc.

Justice 413 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

H.R. Rep. No. 109-478 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, President

Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Reauthorization

and Amendments Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006),

https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.

gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727.html . . . . . 15, 16

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum,

Remarks at the Swearing-in Ceremony for

William H. Rehnquist as Chief Justice and

Antonin Scalia as Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 26,

1986), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/

speech/remarks-swearing-ceremony-william-hrehnquist-chief-justice-and-antonin-scalia . . . . . . . 24

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum,

Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights

A c t A m e n d m e n t s o f 19 8 2 (J u n e 2 9 ,

19 8 2), ht t p s: // w w w. r e a g a n l ibr a r y.gov/

archives/speech/remarks-signing-votingrights-act-amendments-1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

S. Rep. No. 109-295 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9, 13

1

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici are former Republican members of the United

States Congress Representative Charles Boustany, Jr.

(LA, 2005-2017), Representative Tom Coleman (MO,

1976-1993), Representative David Emery (ME, 19751983), Representative Wayne Gilchrest (MD, 1991-2009),

Representative Steve Gunderson (WI, 1981-1997),

Senator Chuck Hagel (NE, 1997-2009), Representative

Bob Inglis (SC, 1993-1999, 2005-2011), Representative

John LeBoutillier (NY, 1981-1983), Representative

Connie Morella (MD, 1987-2003), Representative

Tom Petri (WI, 1979-2015), Representative Claudine

Schneider (RI, 1981-1991), Representative Christopher

Shays (CT, 1987-2009), and Representative Jim Walsh

(NY, 1989-2009), who share a strong commitment to

the constitutional structure, the separation of powers,

and the integrity of Congress’s enforcement authority

under the Reconstruction Amendments. Amici served in

Congress for a combined 201 years, representing districts

across the United States. Between them, amici voted to

enact the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act,

voted to extend the Voting Rights Act’s language access

provisions in 1992, co-sponsored the 2006 reauthorization

of the Voting Rights Act, and voted to enact that 2006

reauthorization. As former elected legislators serving

at the time that Congress amended and/or reauthorized

the Voting Rights Act, amici are uniquely positioned to

address Congress’s powers to investigate, legislate, and

1. In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici affirm

that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,

and that no person other than amici or their counsel made a

monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

2

create durable remedies to secure the fundamental right

to vote. Amici have a vital interest in ensuring that the

judiciary respects the separation of powers by deferring to

Congress’s legislative judgments and upholding statutory

frameworks, like Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, that

have been reexamined, reauthorized, and relied upon

by all branches of government for decades. This brief

brings to the Court’s attention a legislative perspective on

Congress’s constitutional role in enforcing the Elections

Clause and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

It further addresses the severe institutional consequences

that would follow the nullification of Section 2 of the Voting

Rights Act.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

“[T]he right to vote is the crown jewel of American

liberties.” 2 These are the words of President Ronald

Reagan, spoken as he signed the 1982 amendments of the

Voting Rights Act into law. For decades, protecting this

fundamental right has not been a partisan cause, but a

shared, national commitment. The 1982 amendments that

President Reagan signed into law earned overwhelming

support from both parties in Congress, securing, after

dozens of hearings, 389 of 413 votes cast in the House

and 85 of 93 votes cast in the Senate. Ten years later,

President George H.W. Bush signed into law an extension

of the Voting Rights Act’s language access requirements

2. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, Remarks

on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 (June 29,

1982), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarkssigning-voting-rights-act-amendments-1982.

3

after that law also passed Congress with large bipartisan

majorities. Our country’s commitment to voting rights

continued to transcend party lines when it was time to

reauthorize the Voting Rights Act in 2006: 390 of 423

present representatives and all 98 present senators

voted in favor of the Act before President George W.

Bush signed it into law. Section 2 of the Voting Rights

Act, which protects against the denial or abridgement of

the right to vote on account of race or color, has been a

durable centerpiece of the bipartisan legislation passed to

make real our shared, national commitment. It stands as a

monument to Congress’s ability to act as the Constitution’s

Framers intended: to identify a national problem, to

amass an extensive factual record, and to forge a lasting

legislative solution.

The Constitution entrusts Congress with the primary

responsibility for securing equal political opportunity

for all citizens of the United States. The Enforcement

Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments

are a “positive grant of legislative power,” authorizing

Congress to enact “appropriate legislation” to eradicate

racial discrimination in voting. See Katzenbach v. Morgan,

384 U.S. 641, 650–51 (1966); U.S. Const. amends. XIV, § 5;

XV, § 2. Consistent with that design, this Court has long

recognized that Congress’s enforcement authority is broad

and prophylactic, permitting it to enact remedies that

reach beyond direct constitutional violations to address

lingering, structural barriers to equal participation.

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966);

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–20 (1997);

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879). The

Constitution grants Congress the power to legislate to

protect the right to vote through the Elections Clause,

4

too, as it provides “Congress may at any time by Law

make or alter” regulations for the “Times, Places and

Manner” of congressional elections. U.S. Const. art.

I, § 4, cl. 1. Though Congress of course only needs one

source of constitutional authority to lawfully enact new

legislation, each of the Fourteenth Amendment, Fifteenth

Amendment, and Elections Clause provided Congress

with the power to pass a law providing that citizens of

all races must have an equal opportunity to participate

in Louisiana’s U.S. House of Representatives electoral

process at issue here.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a direct exercise

of Congress’s three sources of constitutional authority

to legislate against discrimination in voting rights, as

it bars any voting practice or procedure that denies or

abridges the right to vote on account of race or color. In

1982, Congress amended Section 2 to supersede City of

Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion),

which had imposed a discriminatory intent requirement

ill-suited to modern vote dilution. After compiling an

extensive record, Congress adopted a results-based

standard tailored to “second generation” barriers that

continued to deny equal electoral opportunity. S. Rep.

No. 97-417, at 27–29 (1982). The amendments adopting

this standard passed both chambers with overwhelming

bipartisan support—securing 389 of 413 votes cast in

the House and 85 of 93 votes cast in the Senate3 —before

3. Amici Representatives Tom Coleman, David Emery, Steve

Gunderson, John LeBoutillier, Tom Petri, and Claudine Schneider

were joined by then-present and future Republican congressional

leaders Speaker Newt Gingrich; Senate Majority Leader Howard

Baker, Jr.; and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole in voting in

favor of the 1982 amendments. See 128 Cong. Rec. 23205 (1981)

5

they were signed into law by President Reagan. This

Court unanimously operationalized Section 2’s amended

standard in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986),

and reaffirmed the framework in Allen v. Milligan, 599

U.S. 1 (2023).

Contrary to Appellees’ claims, Section 2 is neither a

relic nor a racial entitlement. It was designed to be presentfocused and self-limiting: the results test applies only

when plaintiffs satisfy the rigorous Gingles preconditions

with current, localized evidence and prevail under the

totality of circumstances, demonstrating that minority

voters today lack an equal opportunity to participate in

the political process. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44–51, 79; Allen,

599 U.S. at 18–19, 28–29. Where conditions improve,

Section 2 claims fail—obviating any need for a judicial

sunset. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557

(2013) (distinguishing Section 2’s “permanent, nationwide

ban on racial discrimination” from Section 4(b)’s coverage

formula for Section 5).

Nor does Section 2 conflict with the Equal Protection

Clause. Race-predominant districting triggers strict

scrutiny under this Court’s holding in Shaw v. Reno,

509 U.S. 630, 642–46, 649 (1993), but compliance with

Section 2 is a compelling interest when supported by a

strong basis in evidence, and narrow tailoring ensures

alignment with equal protection principles. Bush v. Vera,

517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (plurality opinion); id. at 990–92

(O’Connor, J., concurring); Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285,

292–93 (2017). Unlike the affirmative action programs this

(recording House vote); 128 Cong. Rec. 14337 (1982) (recording

Senate vote).

6

Court invalidated in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.

v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181

(2023) (“SFFA”), Section 2 remedies redress a proven legal

wrong, establish no suspect racial preferences, and are

self-expiring through the Gingles predicates and totality

of circumstances analysis. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512

U.S. 997, 1017–21 (1994).

Finally, principles of judicial restraint and stare

decisis compel reaffirming Section 2’s constitutionality.

Congress compiled exhaustive records—in 1982 and

again in 2006—documenting persistent vote dilution.

As in 1982, the congressional record in 2006 convinced

an overwhelming majority of elected legislators from

both parties that the Voting Rights Act needed to be

reauthorized, with 390 representatives and all present

senators voting in favor of reauthorization before

President George W. Bush signed the Act into law. 4

Congress could have, but did not, enact any time limit

on Section 2. Congress’s considered judgment merits

substantial deference. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.

57, 64 (1981). For nearly forty years, states, courts, and

voters have relied on this Court’s application of Section

4. Amici Representatives Charles Boustany, Wayne

Gilchrest, Bob Inglis, Tom Petri, Chritopher Shays, and Jim

Walsh, and Senator Chuck Hagel were joined by then-future Vice

President Mike Pence (who co-sponsored the reauthorization);

then-future Attorney General Jeff Sessions; and then-present and

future Republican congressional leaders Speaker John Boehner,

Senate Majority Leader William Frist, Senate Majority Leader

Mitch McConnell, and Senate Majority Leader John Thune in

voting in favor of the 2006 reauthorization. See 152 Cong. Rec.

H5207 (2006) (recording House vote); 152 Cong. Rec. S8012 (2006)

(recording Senate vote).

7

2 in Gingles to structure elections. Overturning that

settled framework would destabilize election law and

disregard the Constitution’s allocation of enforcement

power to Congress. In Allen, this Court rejected the

very arguments Appellees now repeat, emphasizing that

“statutory stare decisis counsels [the Court’s] staying the

course” until and unless Congress acts. 599 U.S. at 39.

The Court’s assessment in Allen continues to hold true.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE RECONSTRUCTION A MEN DMEN TS

A N D E L E C T IO N S C L AU S E E M P OW E R

CONGRESS TO SECURE EQUAL POLITICAL

OPPORTUNITY, AND SECTION 2 IS A VALID

EXERCISE OF THAT POWER.

Fidelity to the Constitution requi res robust

enforcement of the right to vote. The Reconstruction

A mendments were not merely aspirational; they

fundamentally changed the structure of our federal

system, granting Congress the affirmative power and

duty to enforce their guarantees through appropriate

legislation. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650–51; Ex parte Virginia,

100 U.S. at 345–46 (the Reconstruction Amendments are

“limitations on the power of the States and enlargements

of the power of Congres[s]”). That enforcement authority

under the Fifteenth Amendment, in particular, is broad

and remedial: “As against the reserved powers of the

States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate

the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in

voting.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324;

see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177

(1980) (“[W]e hold that the [Voting Rights] Act’s ban on

8

electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an

appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the

Fifteenth Amendment, even if it is assumed that § 1 of

the Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination

in voting.”); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 269

(1999) (“Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act under

its authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s

proscription against voting discrimination.”). 5 When

acting under the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court

has held that Congress must have “wide latitude” in

determining what measures will “remedy or prevent

unconstitutional actions” and that Congress may enact

prophylactic laws so long as there is “congruence and

proportionality” between the injury and the remedy. See

City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518–20.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a paradigmatic

exercise of this authority under both the Fourteenth

and Fifteenth Amendments, as it prohibits any “voting

qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,

practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or

abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States

to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).

5. Louisiana assumes, w ithout explanation, that the

“congruence and proportionality” test that this Court announced to

govern Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority

in City of Boerne also applies to the Fifteenth Amendment. See,

e.g., La.’s Suppl. Br. 42. This Court has never so held, and the

“any rational means” standard announced in South Carolina

v. Katzenbach remains the applicable standard for Congress’s

Fifteenth Amendment authority. See, e.g., Lopez, 525 U.S. at 283

(applying South Carolina v. Katzenbach to uphold provision of

Voting Rights Act as exercise of Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment

authority after City of Boerne).

9

By mirroring the language of the Fifteenth Amendment,

Section 2 provides the necessary statutory tools to make

the Constitution’s promise of equal suffrage a reality

for all Americans. When the Court required proof of

discriminatory intent—a standard nearly impossible to

meet—Congress acted decisively to amend Section 2. The

1982 amendment, superseding Bolden’s intent standard

for vote dilution claims, adopted an effects-based “results

test” precisely to make the Fifteenth Amendment’s

promise that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to

vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or

by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition

of servitude,” U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1, effective against

modern structural discrimination. S. Rep. No. 97-417,

at 27–29; see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43–45 (explaining the

statutory standard). Section 2’s near-matching of the

Fifteenth Amendment’s language is certainly a “rational

means” of enforcing the Constitution’s promise, as well as a

“congruen[t] and proportional[]” mechanism for ensuring

equal protection and preventing abridgment of the right

to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress, of

course, was enacting this language just two years after

this Court had ruled in City of Rome that “under the

Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may prohibit voting

practices that have only a discriminatory effect.” 446 U.S.

at 175. And just two years ago in Allen, this Court flatly

dismissed the contention that the Fifteenth Amendment

“does not authorize race-based redistricting as a remedy

for § 2 violations,” explaining that a district that is drawn

for the purpose of remedying a Section 2 violation is not

a racial gerrymander simply because it is race-conscious.

599 U.S. at 24, 41; id. at 30–31 (plurality opinion).

Moreover, for federal elections like the U.S. House

of Representatives elections that the redistricting at

10

issue here will govern, Congress’s authority to enact

Section 2 was not limited to its enforcement powers

under the Reconstruction Amendments. The Constitution

itself, in Article I, provides an independent and even

more sweeping source of power. The Elections Clause

authorizes Congress to “at any time by Law make or

alter” the regulations governing the “Times, Places and

Manner” of congressional elections. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4,

cl. 1. For those committed to the Constitution’s text and

original structure, this is not a suggestion; it is a plenary

grant of authority. This power over the mechanics of

House elections is comprehensive, and, as this Court has

recognized, was granted to Congress by the Framers of

the Constitution to empower Congress to “counter state

legislatures set on undermining fair representation,

including through malapportionment.” Rucho v. Common

Cause, 588 U.S. 684, 697–98 (2019). Louisiana now

stresses its purported power to draw districts however

it pleases, Louisiana’s Supplemental Brief 13, without

ever acknowledging that the Elections Clause expressly

subrogates the states’ power to prescribe the manner of

congressional elections to Congress’s power to “at any

time by Law make or alter such Regulations,” U.S. Const.

art. I, § 4, cl. 1. In fact, Louisiana does not acknowledge

the Elections Clause at all, even as it argues that Section

2 is unconstitutional under Louisiana’s interpretation

of a “unified constitutional scheme.” La.’s Suppl. Br.

36 – 37. Louisiana is incorrect that the Fourteenth

Amendment prohibits the Fifteenth Amendment from

authorizing Section 2, see supra 7-9, but, even more

fundamentally, it is not possible to draw any conclusion

about what a “unified constitutional scheme” permitted

Congress to do while ignoring an applicable grant of

authority right within Article I. Section 2’s prohibition

11

of discriminatory results in congressional districting

falls squarely within the Elections Clause’s broad,

affirmative grant of constitutional authority to Congress,

representing the Framers’ vision for a functional and fair

national government. Section 2 is accordingly on sound

constitutional ground pursuant to Congress’s Fourteenth

Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, or Elections Clause

authority.

II. CONGRES S DESIGNED SECTION 2 AS A

PERMA NENT, SELF-LIMITING REMEDY

TARGETING CURRENT, LOCALIZED VOTE

DILUTION.

From the perspective of former legislators tasked

with crafting durable solutions to protect constitutional

rights, Section 2 is a model of sound governance. Contrary

to the Appellees’ claim, Section 2 is neither a relic of the

past nor a perpetual racial entitlement. From its inception,

Congress meticulously designed Section 2 to operate as

an enduring, nationwide safeguard against discriminatory

voting practices whose reach is determined by current,

localized evidence. Unlike backward-looking measures

tethered to historic conditions, Section 2 is inherently

self-limiting: it applies only where plaintiffs can prove

that present electoral structures deny minority voters

an equal opportunity to participate in the political

process. This built-in, case-by-case framework ensures

that Section 2 remains tightly focused on remedying

actual, ongoing vote dilution—obviating any need for a

judicially imposed expiration date. This tailored scope

of Section 2 speaks to the broad bipartisan support that

the Voting Rights Act won in both chambers of Congress

in 1982, 1992, and 2006: no member of Congress should

12

want to see some of his or her constituents shut out or

denied equal access to the electoral process. This Court

should respect the separation of powers and refrain from

disturbing Congress’s considered judgment that Section

2 is an appropriate ongoing measure to enforce the

Constitution’s promise that the right to vote shall not be

denied or abridged on account of race or color.

A.

Section 2’s “Results Test” Safeguards Equal

Opportunity, Not Proportional Representation.

Section 2 prohibits voting practices that “result[] in a

denial or abridgement of the right *** to vote on account

of race,” evaluated under “the totality of circumstances”

to determine whether minorities have “less opportunity

than other members of the electorate to participate ***

and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(a)–(b). The usual remedy for abridgment of the

right to vote through vote dilution is an “opportunity

district”—a single-member district that affords minority

voters an equal chance to elect preferred candidates.

See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 301–02 (describing remedy for a

Section 2 violation); Allen, 599 U.S. at 41 (reaffirming that

race-conscious redistricting can be a permissible remedy).

The 1982 amendment to Section 2, led by Republican

Senator Bob Dole, was a masterclass in pragmatic

legislating. It created a workable standard to address realworld discriminatory results while explicitly guarding

against the creation of a system of racial quotas. The

statute itself declares: “[N]othing in [Section 2] establishes

a right to have members of a protected class elected in

numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” 52

U.S.C. § 10301(b). This provision is a crucial guardrail. It

ensures that Section 2 is a tool for equalizing opportunity,

not guaranteeing electoral outcomes.

13

B. Section 2’s Design Ensures Remedies Address

Only Current, Localized Vote Dilution,

Eliminating Any Need for a Judicial Sunset.

Fa r f rom being a rov ing mandate for racial

proportionality, Congress drafted Section 2 to operate

through an “intensely local appraisal” and a “searching

practical evaluation of the past and present reality,”

ensuring that any remedy responds to current conditions.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79 (internal quotations omitted);

Allen, 599 U.S. at 19 (quoting Gingles). Gingles set forth

the now-familiar preconditions that cabin Section 2 votedilution claims. A plaintiff must prove: (1) the minority

group is sufficiently large and geographically compact

to form a majority in a single-member district, (2) the

minority group is politically cohesive, and (3) the majority

votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the minority’s

preferred candidates. Gingles, at 50–51; see Growe v.

Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 39–41 (1993) (applying Gingles to

single-member district claims); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556

U.S. 1, 13–15 (2009) (plurality opinion) (minority group

must be able to form a majority in a reasonably compact

district).

These predicates require contemporary demographic

and electoral evidence; historical discrimination alone

is insufficient. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50–51; Allen,

599 U.S. at 18–19, 29. And even once the preconditions

are met, plaintiffs must still prove, under the totality of

circumstances (including factors set forth in the Senate

Report for the 1982 amendments), that minority voters

presently lack equal electoral opportunity. Gingles,

478 U.S. at 44–45, 79; see S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28–29

(listing the “typical factors” to be considered, such as

14

the extent of racially polarized voting; socioeconomic

disparities in areas like education, employment, and

health that hinder political participation; the use of racial

appeals in campaigns; and whether the policy underlying

the challenged practice is tenuous). This totality of the

circumstances inquiry applies on a non-partisan basis to

states of all political leanings. As the Robinson Appellants

describe in their Supplemental Brief, successful Section

2 claims have required the redrawing of maps created by

Democrat-controlled legislative bodies as well as those

created by Republican-controlled legislative bodies like

Louisiana’s. Robinson Appellants’ Suppl. Br. 35 n.2.

Because Section 2 applies only where current

conditions warrant, it is inherently self-limiting. As

this Court explained in Shelby County, invalidating the

Voting Rights Act’s Section 4(b) coverage formula “in no

way affect[ed] the permanent, nationwide ban on racial

discrimination in voting found in § 2,” which addresses

present day discrimination. 570 U.S. at 557. When

polarization subsides or minority populations disperse,

Section 2 claims fail. Allen, 599 U.S. at 28–29. In this way,

Section 2 carries its own sunset: it lies dormant wherever

and whenever racial discrimination no longer hinders a

minority community’s opportunity to participate in the

political process. This is exactly as its bipartisan authors

intended it to operate. If it foreclosed Section 2 from

applying where plaintiffs have the ability to prove a claim,

this Court would be protecting racially discriminatory

conditions for congressional elections despite the clear

command of legislation enacted by multiple generations

of legislators, including amici, that such discriminatory

conditions should be eliminated.

15

C.

Imposing a Judicial Sunset on Section 2

Would Usurp Congress’s Role and Create an

Unprincipled Limitation.

Appellees ask the Court to declare Section 2

effectively expired, engrafting a time limit on Congress’s

enforcement power. Appellees’ Br. 37–38. The Court must

decline this invitation to usurp the role of the legislature.

The Reconstruction Amendments assign to Congress—

not the courts—the judgment of whether and what

legislation is “appropriate” to enforce their guarantees.

U.S. Const. amends. XIV, § 5; XV, § 2; Ex parte Virginia,

100 U.S. at 345–46 (“It is the power of Congress which

has been enlarged.”). Nothing in the Constitution or

this Court’s precedents licenses the judiciary to impose

expiration dates on concededly “appropriate” legislation

that Congress has left in place. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at

650–51. For the Court to impose an expiration date on a

law Congress designed to be permanent is not judicial

review, it is an unprincipled rewriting of the statute. The

judicial role is to “apply, not amend, the work of the People’s

representatives.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA

Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 89–90 (2017).

Nor is there any principled standard to decide when

Section 2 has become too old. As President George W. Bush

noted in signing the 2006 reauthorization and committing

to enforce the Voting Rights Act and defend it in court,

“[i]n four decades since the Voting Rights Act was first

passed, we’ve made progress toward equality, yet the work

for a more perfect union is never ending.”6 Just a few years

6. Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, President Bush

Signs Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act

16

ago, in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, the

Court underscored that “Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

provides vital protection against discriminatory voting

rules, and no one suggests that discrimination in voting

has been extirpated.” 594 U.S. 647, 678 (2021). Appellees

have provided no evidence to suggest that discrimination

in voting has been eliminated in the intervening years (nor

could they). And, the Court has imposed no re-justification

requirement on other long-standing statutes. Just this

Term, for example, the Court interpreted provisions of

both the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

1974 and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976

without questioning their constitutionality based on

their age. See Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145

S. Ct. 1020, 1024 (2025); CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v.

Antrix Corp. Ltd., 145 S. Ct. 1572, 1576 (2025). This is

the correct approach: it is for Congress, not the courts,

to determine if and when a statute needs to be amended

or reauthorized. As the Fifth Circuit recently explained

in a related case, Appellees’ theory lacks any “limiting

principle” and “would impose a limitless obligation on

Congress to continually refresh its legislative record for

any statute enacted under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth

Amendments—including laws like the Family and Medical

Leave Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities

Act, and the Fair Housing Act.” Nairne v. Landry, No.

24-30115, __ F. 4th __, 2025 WL 2355524, at *23 (5th Cir.

Aug. 14, 2025).7

of 2006 (July 27, 2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.

gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727.html.

7. Invalidating Section 2 absent periodic reenactment

would also invite the very destabilizing, perpetual litigation this

Court has cautioned against, as litigants would be encouraged

17

As amici know from their combined 201 years

serving in Congress, this kind of continual record refresh

requirement is unworkable given the resources required

to build such a comprehensive record as supported the

1982 amendments and 2006 reauthorization of the Voting

Rights Act, and Congress’s competing legislative priorities

each session. Such a requirement would also leave

Congress in a state of perpetual uncertainty as to what

this Court would require to uphold Congress’s exercises

of its constitutional authority, and render it unable to

craft the durable remedies necessary to address enduring

constitutional violations. Imposing such a burden on a

coequal branch would undermine the very “enlarge[ment]”

of the “power of Congress” that the Reconstruction

Amendments granted. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345.

Moreover, basic separation-of-powers principles

counsel judicial restraint. As Justice Scalia cautioned, the

Court is “ill advised to adopt or adhere to constitutional

rules that bring [it] into constant conflict with a coequal

branch of Government.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.

509, 558 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This Court has

consistently avoided creating such conflict with respect to

Section 2 in recent years. Just two Terms ago, in Allen,

the Court reaffirmed the Gingles framework against

arguments that it was outdated, concluding that the

proper judicial role was to “stay[] the course” and leave

any changes to Congress. 599 U.S. at 39. Congress has

chosen not to disturb Section 2 since, and this Court should

not now usurp its power to do so.

to challenge and re-challenge the constitutionality of other civil

rights statutes enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561 (2007).

18

III. Section 2’s Remedies Are Fully Reconcilable with

the Equal Protection Clause Under Settled StrictScrutiny Principles.

Appellees argue that Section 2’s results test compels

race-conscious redistricting and thus violates the

Equal Protection Clause. But that claim misreads both

constitutional doctrine and the structure of Section 2

itself. The Equal Protection Clause is a shield against

racial subjugation, not a sword to strike down remedies

for proven discrimination. For decades, this Court’s

precedents have provided a clear, workable framework that

harmonizes the two. Under that framework, complying

with the Voting Rights Act is a compelling interest that

can be satisfied through a narrowly tailored remedy, fully

consistent with a principled application of strict scrutiny.

A.

Race-Predominant Districting Triggers Strict

Scrutiny, But Compliance with the Voting

Rights Act Is a Compelling Interest That Can

Justify Opportunity Districts.

The Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional racial

gerrymandering, but it does not forbid all consideration

of race in redistricting. This Court’s precedents draw a

crucial distinction between racial classifications that lack

justification and those employed to remedy constitutional

or statutory violations. When a state’s redistricting

“subordinate[s] traditional race-neutral districting

principles *** to racial considerations,” this Court has

held that strict scrutiny is triggered. Miller v. Johnson,

515 U.S. 900, 916, 920 (1995). However, strict scrutiny’s

purpose is to distinguish illegitimate uses of race from

permissible ones; it is not an automatic death knell.

19

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237

(1995) (“strict scrutiny” is not “strict in theory, but fatal

in fact”).

In the context of voting rights, this Court has long

assumed that a state’s effort to comply with Section 2

of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling interest that,

if pursued in a narrowly tailored way, satisfies strict

scrutiny. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 977 (plurality

opinion) (recognizing that a “creat[ing] majority-minority

districts *** satisfies strict scrutiny” when needed to

remedy a potential Section 2 violation); Cooper, 581 U.S.

at 301–02. Gingles and its progeny have proceeded on the

premise that Section 2’s mandate to create an opportunity

district in certain circumstances is fully compatible with

the Constitution, so long as the districting is done to

remedy identified vote dilution rather than to impose

racial proportionality for its own sake. This harmony

between the Voting Rights Act and Equal Protection rests

on the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment

does not condemn legislative actions taken to break

down discriminatory voting procedures and ensure racial

equality. See Cooper, 581 U.S. at 292–93 (“When a State

invokes the VRA to justify race-based districting, it

must show *** that it had ‘a strong basis in evidence’ for

concluding that the statute required its action.”).

S ec t ion 2 ’s de sig n i n herent ly re sp ec t s t h i s

constitutional line. By requiring proof of persistent

racial bloc voting and minority political cohesion, Section

2 remedies are tied strictly to eliminating barriers that

prevent minority voters from enjoying the same political

opportunity as others. A court-ordered or legislatively

enacted majority-minority district under Section 2 is not

20

a racial preference; it is a tailored cure prescribed by

Congress for a specific, diagnosed injury to our democratic

process.

Notably, in Allen, the Court again rejected the

assertion that Section 2 cannot be squared with the

Fourteenth Amendment, noting “nearly forty years” of

consistent application. 599 U.S. at 26. Viewed together,

Equal Protection and Section 2 are complementary: the

Voting Rights Act helps realize the Equal Protection

Clause’s guarantee of equal political opportunity, and

strict scrutiny ensures that Voting Rights Act-driven

districts do not stray beyond what is necessary to secure

that opportunity.

B. The “Strong-Basis-in-Evidence” Standard

Affords States Necessary Breathing Room and

Avoids a Constitutional Catch-22.

This Court has recognized that states need not await

a judicial decree before acting to comply with Section

2. Instead, they may adopt race-conscious remedies

when they have a “strong basis in evidence”—or “good

reasons”—to believe Section 2 requires such action. See,

e.g., Cooper, 581 U.S. at 292–93. This standard is crucial

for harmonizing Section 2 and the Equal Protection

Clause, as it gives legislatures the necessary breathing

room to avoid an impossible dilemma—risk liability under

Section 2 if they do not remedy vote dilution, or risk an

Equal Protection violation if they do.

By giving state legislatures “breathing room” to

act on evidence before protracted litigation begins, the

“strong basis” standard provides a workable equilibrium.

21

Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 580 U.S.

178, 196 (2017). To eliminate this flexibility, as Appellees

urge, would force states into a Hobson’s choice: violate the

Voting Rights Act or violate the Constitution. This Court

has repeatedly refused to endorse such a chaotic result,

instead promoting a standard that fosters responsible

self-governance.

C.

Remedies for Vote Dilution Are Fundamentally

Different from Racial Preferences in University

Admissions.

Appellees and the State of Louisiana strain to liken

Section 2 remedies to the affirmative action programs

struck down in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.

President and Fellows of Harvard College (“SFFA”), 600

U.S. 181 (2023). That analogy is fundamentally flawed. 8

There is a categorical legal and factual difference between

remedying governmental discrimination in the electoral

system under a statutory scheme enacted by Congress

and using race as a plus-factor in college admissions. The

principles that this Court determined rendered racial

preferences in university admissions unconstitutional are

the same principles that affirm the validity of Section 2.

8. Louisiana repeatedly quotes Justice Sotomayor’s dissent

in SFFA to argue that Section 2’s remedy for vote dilution is

“[j]ust like” the affirmative action programs that were held to

be unconstitutional in SFFA. See, e.g., La.’s Suppl. Br. 3, 18, 24.

Despite its extensive reliance on Shaw, Louisiana omits that,

in the sentence it repeatedly quotes, Justice Sotomayor was

citing that case for its holding that “race consciousness does not

inevitably lead to impermissible race discrimination,” and arguing

that Shaw’s conclusion should apply to the admissions context as

it does in the redistricting context. SFFA, 600 U.S. at 361, n.34

(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646).

22

First, a Section 2 remedy addresses a group-level

harm by restoring equal access to the political process,

whereas the policies in SFFA involved individualized racial

preferences. Id. at 218, 220. A remedial district does not

guarantee any individual a seat or deprive any individual

of a defined opportunity; it simply ensures that voters in

a community denied equal access to the electoral process

have an equal chance “to elect their preferred candidates.”

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48.

Second, a Section 2 remedy is, by definition, a response

to a proven legal wrong for which overwhelming majorities

in Congress have repeatedly recognized the need for

an actionable remedy. The admissions policies in SFFA

were untethered to any specific, legally cognizable act of

discrimination by the universities. See SFFA, 600 U.S. at

216, 228. By contrast, Section 2 remedies are available only

after a judicial finding—or a state’s determination that

there is a “strong basis in evidence”—that vote dilution

has occurred. The rigorous Gingles framework ensures

that such remedies are grounded in current, real-world

evidence of a legally cognizable harm.

Finally, Section 2 contains the “logical end point” that

the SFFA Court found lacking in university admissions. Id.

at 221. A Section 2 remedy is not arbitrary or permanent; its

application is strictly constrained by the three evidentiary

preconditions: a minority group must be sufficiently large

and compact, politically cohesive, and face a majority

bloc vote that usually defeats its preferred candidates.

Because these are contemporary, factual predicates, the

remedy is available only as long as they are satisfied. This

carefully cabined statutory scheme is a valid exercise of

Congress’s enforcement authority under the Fifteenth

23

Amendment—designed not to award preferences, but to

restore the equal opportunity that a discriminatory map

has denied. See South Carlina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.

at 308–09 (describing Congress’s authority to employ

“sterner and more elaborate measures” to “banish the

blight of racial discrimination in voting”); City of Rome,

446 U.S. at 173–78.

IV. PRINCIPLES OF JU DICI A L RESTRA IN T

AND STARE DECISIS SUPPORT UPHOLDING

SECTION 2’S ENFORCEMENT OF VOTING

RIGHTS.

For nearly four decades, this Court has interpreted

Section 2 to permit narrowly tailored, race-conscious

remedies for proven vote dilution—and Congress has

repeatedly ratified that interpretation with strong,

bipartisan support. All this time, legislatures, courts,

and voters have relied on that interpretation in drawing

district lines. To detonate a forty-year-old legal standard

relied upon by every state in the Union is the opposite of

judicial conservatism; it is radical disruption. Where both

branches have spoken with such consistency for so long,

principles of judicial deference, separation of powers, and

stare decisis all weigh overwhelmingly against upending

the established legal framework.

A.

Congress’s Judgment in Enacting Section 2 Is

Entitled to Deference.

As President Reagan described in presiding over

the swearing-in ceremony of Chief Justice Rehnquist

and Justice Scalia, the Framers “settled on a judiciary

that would be independent and strong, but one whose

24

power would also, they believed, be confined within the

boundaries of a written Constitution and laws. *** The

judicial branch interprets the laws, while the power to

make and execute those laws is balanced in the two elected

branches. And this was one thing that Americans of all

persuasions supported.” 9 This Court accordingly affords

“great weight to the decisions of Congress” when assessing

the constitutionality of federal statutes, recognizing that

“Congress is a coequal branch of government whose

Members take the same oath [the Justices] do to uphold

the Constitution of the United States.” Rostker, 453 U.S.

at 64. Deference is at its apex for legislation enacted

under the Reconstruction Amendments, which empower

Congress—the branch best equipped to amass evidence

and make national policy judgments—to enforce equality

guarantees nationwide. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650–51;

City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177–78; Lane, 541 U.S. at 519–33.

In both 1982 and again in 2006, Congress compiled

an extraordinary evidentiary record that justifies the

statute’s results test. The 2006 reauthorization alone

was based on over 15,000 pages of testimony and

reports documenting the persistence of subtle, “secondgeneration” barriers to voting. H.R. Rep. No. 109-478,

at 2–3, 5, 11–12 (2006); S. Rep. No. 109-295, at 2–4, 15

(2006).10 Based on this massive record, Congress made

9. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, Remarks

at the Swearing-in Ceremony for William H. Rehnquist as

Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia as Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 26, 1986), https://www.

reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-swearing-ceremonywilliam-h-rehnquist-chief-justice-and-antonin-scalia.

10. For a salient example of the evidence before Congress

of barriers to voting, see Debo P. Adegbile, Voting Rights in

Louisiana: 1982-2006, 17:2 RLSJ, S. Cal. Rev. of L. and Soc.

25

the empirical judgment that Section 2 remained necessary

to combat racial vote dilution. Congress chose not to

impose an expiration date on that provision of law. In

an astounding show of congressional consensus, more

than 93% of congressmembers voting in 2006 supported

reauthorization and therefore reaffirmed Section 2 as a

permanent, nationwide bar on racial discrimination that

infringes upon voting rights. When Congress acts with

near unanimity to enforce a Reconstruction Amendment,

the judiciary’s role is to respect that judgment, not secondguess it. Appellees now improperly ask this Court to

re-weigh the legislative facts that led Congress to that

decision—a task for which Congress, not the courts,

is institutionally suited. The Court should decline that

request.

B. Nullifying Section 2 Would Leave the Statute

Without Effect and Betray the Fifteenth

Amendment.

The Fifteenth Amendment was not a suggestion;

it was a command, and Congress provided remedies to

enforce it. Appellees ask this Court to foreclose the key

remedy Congress designed, contending that a state that

draws a majority-minority district to cure vote dilution

violates Equal Protection. For this Court to nullify the key

remedy Congress created would be to arrogate a power

the Constitution commits to the legislature, betraying

Justice 413, 433– 35, 441– 42 (2008). That report was fully

incorporated into the Congressional Record. See 1 Voting Rights

Act: Evidence of Continued Need, Hearing Before the Subcomm.

on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.

1592 (Mar. 8, 2006) (Adegbile report attached as appendix to the

Statement of Wade Henderson).

26

the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee that citizens of

all races have their votes count equally—an outcome this

Court has long rejected. If plaintiffs who have prevailed

on their Section 2 claim cannot get a remedial map that

elevates minority voters from token influence to real

opportunity, then Section 2 would be reduced to a purely

declaratory statute. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,

163 (1803). This, of course, is not the law that amici and

their congressional colleagues enacted.

The Court’s precedents confirm that race-conscious

redistricting is the proper remedy for a proven Section

2 violation. See, e.g., Allen, 599 U.S. at 41 (“[F]or the last

four decades, this Court and the lower federal courts ***

have authorized race-based redistricting as a remedy for

state districting maps that violate § 2.”). Undercutting

that remedy now would be an abrupt break with this

unbroken line of authority, effectively overruling Gingles

and decades of cases applying it. Such a move defies

stare decisis principles, which have “enhanced force” in

statutory cases where Congress remains free to amend

the law but has chosen not to. See Kimble v. Marvel

Entertainment LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015).

C.

Overturning Section 2’s Framework Would

Disrupt Decades of Reliance by States, Courts,

and Voters, Destabilizing a Cornerstone of

American Election Law.

The Gingles framework is not merely doctrinally

sound; it is woven into the fabric of our electoral system.

For nearly forty years and across four redistricting

cycles, legislatures, courts, and voters have relied on the

Gingles framework to structure elections. Likewise, local

27

jurisdictions and federal courts have invested enormous

resources applying the well-known Gingles criteria. To

abandon or drastically rework the framework now would

shatter these profound reliance interests and flout the

doctrine of stare decisis, which applies with special force

here. Kimble, 576 U.S. at 456.

Reversing course now would invite the very electoral

chaos this Court has long cautioned against and sought

to avoid: widespread confusion, a flood of litigation, and

destabilized elections nationwide. See Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam). That caution is

especially warranted here, where the Court is being

asked not merely to adjust precedent, but to upend a

core mechanism of one of the most important civil rights

statutes in American history. As former members of

Congress elected in orderly federal elections, amici urge

this Court to reject Appellees’ invitation to disrupt our

national election system, especially as the 2026 midterm

elections rapidly approach. The Court applied this exact

principle of promoting stability two years ago in Allen.

Presented with the same arguments Appellees make

today, the Court decisively rejected them, providing a

textbook reaffirmation of statutory stare decisis: “[C]

ongress is undoubtedly aware of our construing § 2 to

apply to districting challenges. It can change that if it

likes. But until and unless it does, statutory stare decisis

counsels our staying the course.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 39.

Appellees offer no special justification to support their

request for such a stark departure from recent precedent.

The answer today should be the same as it was in Allen:

“stay the course” and avoid invalidating or weakening a

statute that Congress had three sources of constitutional

authority to enact.

28

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court should be reversed.

Dated: September 3, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

K aren L. Dunn

A mit Agarwal*

Jeannie S. Rhee

Protect Democracy Project

Agbeko C. Petty

2020 Pennsylvania Avenue NW,

E. John Paredes**

#163

Jenifer N. Hartley**

Washington, DC 20006

Dunn Isaacson Rhee LLP amit.agarwal@

401 Ninth Street, NW

protectdemocracy.org

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 579-4582

**Admitted in NY only.

Practice supervised by

D.C. Bar members.

Beau Tremitiere

Lauren Groth

Protect Democracy Project

300 Center Drive,

Suite G-251

Superior, CO 80027

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Amici Curiae