Amicus Curiae Brief — Louisiana, Appellant v. Phillip Callais, et al.

Nos. 24-109, 24-110

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Appellant,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

__________________________________

PRESS ROBINSON, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

__________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Louisiana

__________________________________

BRIEF FOR EDWARD GALMON, SR., CIERRA

HART, NORRIS HENDERSON, TRAMELLE

HOWARD, AND ROSS WILLIAMS AS AMICI

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF ROBINSON

APPELLANTS

__________________________________

LALITHA D. MADDURI

JACOB D. SHELLY

QIZHOU GE

ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP

Counsel for Amici

ABHA KHANNA

Counsel of Record

ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP

1700 Seventh Ave

Suite 2100

Seattle, Washington 98101

(202) 656-0177

AKhanna@elias.law

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ...............................................................2

ARGUMENT ...............................................................5

I.

Section 2’s application in Louisiana is not

before this Court. ..............................................5

A.

The Section 2 record is closed. ......................8

B.

The Constitution does not require states to

agree with Section 2 injunctions before

complying. ................................................... 10

II.

Section 2 is constitutional. ............................. 12

A.

Section 2 enforces the Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments. ............................. 12

B.

Section 2 does not require illicit “race-based

districting.” ................................................. 17

C.

Section 2 is clear. ........................................ 22

D. Section 2’s protections have not expired. ... 25

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 31

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Ala. State Fed’n of Lab. v. McAdory,

325 U.S. 450 (1945) ......................................... 8

Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP,

602 U.S. 1 (2024) ................................. 9, 16, 22

Allen v. Milligan,

144 S. Ct. 476 (2023) ..................................... 11

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023) ......................... 17, 18, 26–29

Ardoin v. Robinson,

No. 21-1596 (U.S. June 26, 2023) ............... 7, 8

Bartlett v. Strickland,

556 U.S. 1 (2009) ..................................... 23, 31

Callais v. Landry,

No. 3:24-CV-00122-DCJ-CES-RRS,

2024 WL 1237058 (W.D. La. Feb. 26, 2024) ... 8

Callais v. Landry,

No. 24-30177, 2025 WL 928839

(5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025)................................... 8

Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,

514 U.S. 300 (1995) ....................................... 11

iii

City of Boerne v. Flores,

521 U.S. 507 (1997) ................................. 13, 14

City of Rome v. United States,

446 U.S. 156 (1980) ....................................... 13

Coal. For Econ. Equity v. Wilson,

122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) ......................... 20

Cooper v. Harris,

581 U.S. 285 (2017) ..................................... 7, 9

Cummings v. Missouri,

71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) ...................... 4, 16

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

547 U.S. 332 (2006) ......................................... 3

Galmon v. Callais,

145 S. Ct. 369 (2024) ....................................... 8

GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,

Inc.,

445 U.S. 375 (1980) ....................................... 11

Ham v. South Carolina,

409 U.S. 524 (1973) ....................................... 14

Johnson v. De Grandy,

512 U.S. 997 (1994) ....................................... 15

Lane v. Wilson,

307 U.S. 268 (1939) ....................................... 14

iv

LULAC v. Perry,

548 U.S. 399 (2006) ......................................... 4

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803) ........................................... 27

Miller v. Johnson,

515 U.S. 900 (1995) ....................................... 22

Nipper v. Smith,

39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) ....................... 15

Oregon v. Mitchell,

400 U.S. 112 (1970) ....................................... 13

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.

Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701 (2007) ..................... 17

Robinson v. Ardoin,

37 F.4th 208 (5th Cir. 2022)............................ 7

Robinson v. Ardoin,

86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023).................. 2, 7, 12

Robinson v. Ardoin,

605 F. Supp. 3d 759

(M.D. La. 2022) .......................... 2, 6, 23, 28, 29

Rogers v. Lodge,

458 U.S. 613 (1982) ....................................... 16

Rucho v. Common Cause,

588 U.S. 684 (2019) ......................................... 3

v

Sanchez v. Colorado,

97 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 1996) ....................... 20

Schuette v. BAMN,

572 U.S. 291 (2014) ....................................... 20

Shelby County v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013 ............................ 13, 25–27

Singleton v. Allen,

690 F. Supp. 3d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 2023) ... 11, 28

South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

383 U.S. 301 (1966) ........................... 13, 14, 17

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President &

Fellows of Harvard Coll.,

600 U.S. 181 (2023) ................. 4, 16, 27, 27, 30

Thornburg v. Gingles,

478 U.S. 30 (1986) ....................... 14, 18, 27, 28

Trump v. Anderson,

601 U.S. 100 (2024) ....................................... 13

United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm’n,

731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984) ..................... 20

Walker v. City of Birmingham,

388 U.S. 307 (1967) ....................................... 11

White v. Regester,

412 U.S. 755 (1973) ................................. 14, 15

vi

Wis. Leg. v. Wis. Elections Comm’n,

595 U.S. 398 (2022) ....................................... 17

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ................................. 13

U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2 ............................. 13, 17

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1253 .................................................... 24

28 U.S.C. § 2284 .................................................... 24

52 U.S.C. § 10301 ...................................... 19, 20, 30

FEDERAL RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 ..................................................... 8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.

(May 23, 1866) ............................................... 13

S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982) .......................... 14, 15, 24

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

Edward Galmon, Sr., Cierra Hart, Norris

Henderson, Tramelle Howard, and Ross Williams are

Black Louisiana voters who successfully challenged

the prior congressional map under Section 2 of the

Voting Rights Act, which resulted in the enactment of

S.B. 8, the congressional districting map challenged

below. They are interested in defending their Section

2 victory and in ensuring that the federal voting rights

they vindicated in one court are not permanently

revoked by another court. Further, Dr. Williams, Mr.

Henderson, and Mr. Howard have an interest in

protecting their right to an undiluted vote, which S.B.

8 ensures.

1 In accordance with Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored

this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a

monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief. The National Redistricting Foundation

made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation and

submission of this brief.

2

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the portion of their briefing highlighted for

supplemental argument, the Callais Plaintiffs

challenge Louisiana’s congressional map by arguing

that the legislature’s 2024 effort to comply with

federal prohibitions against racial discrimination

violated

federal

prohibitions

against

racial

discrimination. That up-is-down logic is foreclosed

twice over. Plaintiffs’ bid to pit the Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments against Section 2 of the Voting

Rights Act (1) fights factual findings from a different

case that is not presently before this Court and (2)

mangles the relevant law.

First, Plaintiffs question whether Louisiana’s 2021

congressional map was, in fact, suffused with the

indicia of racial discrimination that establish a

Section 2 violation. See Appellee Br. at 38. But that

evidence is not subject to review in this litigation over

the 2024 map. In a separate action, the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

found on a full record that the State’s 2021 map likely

violated Section 2. See Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F.

Supp. 3d 759, 851 (M.D. La. 2022), vacated on other

grounds, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023). Those findings

were appealed by defendants, affirmed in relevant

part by the Fifth Circuit, and accepted by the parties.

See Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574, 583 (5th Cir.

2023). The validity of those facts is therefore a settled

matter immune from second-guessing here. As this

Court has oft repeated, “[i]f a dispute is not a proper

case or controversy, the courts have no business

3

deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of

doing so.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.

332, 341 (2006).

The present inquiry is not whether this Court

would have found the same facts in the same way as

the Middle District, or even whether it agrees that

those facts are sufficient to establish a Section 2

violation. Nor is the question whether Louisiana’s

political leaders were subjectively persuaded by the

district court’s evaluation of the Section 2 record when

they enacted the 2024 remedy. Instead, the relevant

factual predicate here is that Louisiana accepted the

judgment of Article III courts, and it did so in a

manner tailored to achieving Republican leaders’

political goals. Neither element of that sequence

violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. To

the contrary, political branches are affirmatively

obligated to comply with judicial decrees, and this

Court has forbidden any scrutiny of mapdrawers’

political motivations. See Rucho v. Common Cause,

588 U.S. 684, 718 (2019).

Second, Plaintiffs manufacture a false conflict

between the constitutional and statutory prohibitions

against racial vote dilution. Together, the legal

protections against discrimination in voting reflect a

consistent, harmonized regime aimed at thoroughly

disinfecting our electoral processes of all racial

machinations. Recognizing that the repugnant stain

of racial discrimination must be expunged completely

from our electoral system, the Fourteenth

Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, and Voting

Rights Act all scrub in the same direction. The

4

Constitution prohibits states from diluting the right

to vote on account of race, and Section 2 enforces that

prohibition by ensuring it reaches subtle and covert

instances of discrimination—that is, the forms of

discrimination most likely to be enacted by modern

legislatures. The Constitution’s “prohibition against

racial discrimination,” after all, is “‘levelled at the

thing, not the name.’” Students for Fair Admissions,

Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S.

181, 230 (2023) (“SFFA”) (quoting Cummings v.

Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1867)).

Plaintiffs would mandate an ahistorical, head-inthe-sand naivete—really, a willful gullibility—about

the ways in which racial discrimination replicates and

metastasizes in our society. As with any vice, this

formalized ignorance would be broadly understood as

tacit encouragement. Make no mistake: If this Court

delivers the judicial weakening of Section 2 that

Plaintiffs invite, it will lead to more rather than less

racial discrimination, and will prolong immeasurably

the day when the “sordid business” of “divvying us up

by race” is no more. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399,

511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part,

concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in

part).

5

Plaintiffs’ invitation to obliterate established

redistricting law, demolish Congress’s assigned

enforcement power, and renege on the historic

promise ratified in the Reconstruction Amendments is

nothing short of an invitation to launch a new era of

racialized redistricting. Wherever mapdrawers can

craft districts that are relatively compact while

concealing their aims in euphemism, they will be free

to exploit racial tension to aggrandize the majority

race’s power by systematically incinerating electoral

opportunities for minority voters. The Constitution

does not require surrender to that evil.

ARGUMENT

Louisiana did not violate the U.S. Constitution

when it replaced a map that discriminated on the

basis of race with a map that ceases to discriminate.

Plaintiffs’ contrary arguments require de novo review

of the record in a different case and a general amnesty

for most contemporary efforts to dilute citizens’ voting

power on account of race. They are entitled to neither.

The relevant Section 2 facts were adjudicated in sinceconcluded Section 2 litigation, and the relevant

Section 2 law operates hand-in-glove with the

constitutional prohibitions against racial vote

dilution.

I. Section 2’s application in Louisiana is not

before this Court.

In

2021, Louisiana

enacted a racially

discriminatory congressional districting plan that

packed Black voters from New Orleans to Baton

6

Rouge into one district, while cracking Black voters

throughout the rest of the state into districts where

they were deprived of any meaningful opportunity to

elect their preferred representatives. Those facts are

not up for debate here.

How do we know the 2021 configuration was

discriminatory? Because Louisiana capped Black

representation well below Black voters’ share of the

statewide population despite the state’s political

geography, which would naturally accommodate an

additional majority-Black district. See Robinson, 605

F. Supp. 3d at 820–39. It did so in the context of stark

racially polarized voting—a polarization likely both to

reflect discrimination (as Black voters developed

shared policy needs that are consistently vetoed by

the White majority) and incentivize discrimination (as

White officeholders recognize they can exploit the

polarization to maintain power without any need to

appeal to Black constituents for support). Id. at 839–

44. And it did so in a thoroughly racialized political

context, where the totality of circumstances confirmed

that Louisiana’s electoral process was not equally

open to minority voters. Id. at 844–51.

How do we know that all these indicia of

discrimination were present? The same way we know

any facts to be true in our system of adversarial

litigation. Injured voters (including the individual

amici here) presented evidence in federal court that

was tested by three sets of sophisticated defendants—

Louisiana’s

Secretary

of

State,

Louisiana’s

legislature, and the State of Louisiana, collectively

represented by 21 lawyers at four law firms and the

7

Louisiana Attorney General’s Office—and an

impartial factfinder memorialized her determinations

in a formal opinion that was approved in all relevant

respects in multiple rounds of appellate review. See

Robinson v. Ardoin, 37 F.4th 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2022)

(unanimous motions panel denying stay of

injunction); Ardoin v. Robinson, No. 21-1596 (U.S.

June 26, 2023) (vacating stay of injunction and

“allow[ing] the matter to proceed before the Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review in the ordinary

course”); Robinson, 86 F.4th at 583 (unanimous

merits panel concluding “[t]he district court did not

clearly err in its necessary fact-findings nor commit

legal error in its conclusions that the Plaintiffs were

likely to succeed on their claim that there was a

violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the

Legislature’s planned redistricting”).2

The Middle District’s finding of a likely Section 2

violation, and the defendants’ decision to accept that

finding after years of litigation, are bad facts for

Plaintiffs here. This Court has had no trouble

assuming (for good reason, as discussed below) that

states have a compelling interest in complying with

the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 581

U.S. 285, 292 (2017). As a result, Plaintiffs are left

grasping for evidence that Section 2 cannot be violated

in Louisiana, or that the legislature was not

subjectively convinced that there was a Section 2

The State quibbles with totality-of-circumstances findings

made after S.B. 8 was enacted in altogether different litigation

challenging Louisiana’s state legislative maps. See State Suppl.

Br. at 27–28. This appeal is not the time or place to parse the

record from that action.

2

8

violation that required a remedy. This effort has them

bushwhacking far afield of the racial gerrymandering

claim they purport to be pursuing, and still they can

find no support.

A.

The Section 2 record is closed.

Plaintiffs complain that the record below lacks

evidence to support a finding that Louisiana’s prior

map, enjoined for violating Section 2, did, in fact,

violate Section 2. See Appellee Br. at 38. But the

reason for that is obvious—the 2021 map (like the

1996 map that Plaintiffs are fond of referencing) is not

at issue here. This Court declined the invitation to

review the injunction of the 2021 map, see Ardoin v.

Robinson, No. 21-1596 (U.S. June 26, 2023)), and

Plaintiffs chose to sit out that litigation entirely. Any

decision now about the application of Section 2 to

hypothetical maps not in effect would be purely

advisory, and thus beyond the judicial power. See, e.g.,

Ala. State Fed’n of Lab. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461

(1945).3

3 Renewed scrutiny of the Middle District record now would be

particularly inequitable given that half the litigants responsible

for obtaining the Section 2 injunction (the individual amici here)

were arbitrarily excluded from this action. See Callais v. Landry,

No. 3:24-CV-00122-DCJ-CES-RRS, 2024 WL 1237058, at *3

(W.D. La. Feb. 26, 2024) (denying intervention based on

purported adequate representation by later-moving intervenors,

9

To be sure, a full rehash below of the Section 2

evidence would have been sufficient to defeat liability

on Plaintiffs’ claims—indeed, Robinson Intervenors

and the State attempted to introduce precisely this

evidence in the trial below. But see J. App’x Vol. I

(“J.A.”) at 283–89 (excluding evidence). But in no

sense was that necessary. A state justifies its map

whenever it shows it had “good reasons” to believe

that it would violate Section 2 if it diluted the voting

power of minority voters. Cooper, 581 U.S. at 293. And

it is difficult to imagine a better reason to believe that

a map would be enjoined as a violation of Section 2

than an actual court order, ink still wet, affirming a

finding that the state failed to provide sufficient

electoral opportunities for minority voters. The record

is replete with evidence that just such an order

motivated the legislature’s enactment of the operative

map. See, e.g., J.A. 98–89; Robinson App. 352a, 393a,

539a.4

notwithstanding text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24);

Galmon v. Callais, 145 S. Ct. 369 (2024) (Mem.) (dismissing

appeal because Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction); Callais v.

Landry, No. 24-30177, 2025 WL 928839, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 27,

2025) (dismissing appeal because Supreme Court had exclusive

jurisdiction).

4 The true crux of Plaintiffs’ opposition to the congressional map

is the non-compact shape of CD-6, see Appellee Br. at 23, but the

record makes clear that the legislature’s motivation for rejecting

10

B.

The Constitution does not require

states to agree with Section 2

injunctions before complying.

To parry the unassailable evidence that the Middle

District litigation provided the State good reasons to

believe Section 2 required a less vote-dilutive map,

Plaintiffs propose that Louisiana’s legislature, in its

proverbial heart, was not truly persuaded by the

courts’ Section 2 analysis. See Appellee Br. at 36–37.

If that made any difference, however, then the most

discriminatory legislatures would be most immune

from Section 2’s commands—the very fact that they

do not agree with Section 2 would effectively prevent

them from complying with Section 2, as otherwise

they would be liable under Plaintiffs’ theory of racial

gerrymandering.

Federal voting rights law is not so easily defeated.

To establish the requisite “good reasons” to conclude

that Section 2 requires a new map, the legislature

that previously passed a discriminatory map need not

air an open-court confession replete with public

repentance. A law’s validity never turns on the

endorsement of defendants charged with violating it,

and tasking injured voters with persuading their

more compact configurations (including those presented by amici

in the course of their Section 2 litigation before the Middle

District) was to jeopardize the reelection of Congressman Graves

instead of Congresswoman Letlow. See, e.g., Robinson App.

232a–235a, 393a, 399a, 402a, 423a. This Court has consistently

rejected efforts to hold legislatures liable for racial

gerrymandering when they pursue political goals. See, e.g.,

Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 6 (2024).

11

legislative antagonists before obtaining a remedy

would be an especially perverse assignment here,

given that the essence of a Section 2 violation is that

the political process is broken and nonresponsive.

The true audience for Section 2 claims is the

impartial judicial factfinder. When a commissioned

Article III judge enjoins a state from enforcing a map,

that state does not merely have a good reason to create

an additional opportunity district for minority voters;

it has no other choice but to add that opportunity in

any new map it chooses to enact. “[P]ersons subject to

an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction

are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or

reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to

the order.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300,

306 (1995) (quoting GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers

Union of U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980)); see also

Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314

(1967) (recognizing a party’s failure to obey even an

erroneous injunction is punishable by contempt); see

also Singleton v. Allen, 690 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1238

(N.D. Ala. 2023) (enjoining purported remedial map

where Alabama conceded that “notwithstanding our

order and the Supreme Court’s affirmance,” the

legislature’s map “does not include an additional

opportunity district”), stay denied sub nom., Allen v.

Milligan, 144 S. Ct. 476 (2023) (Mem.); id. at 1239

(“We are not aware of any other case in which a state

legislature—faced with a federal court order declaring

that its electoral plan unlawfully dilutes minority

votes and requiring a plan that provides an additional

opportunity district—responded with a plan that the

state concedes does not provide that district.”).

12

Plaintiffs challenge the legislature’s motivation for

drawing a second majority-minority district, but they

accept—indeed, they affirmatively argue—that the

legislature’s motivation was to comply with the orders

in the Section 2 litigation so as to avoid forfeiting its

mapdrawing prerogative. See Appellee Br. at 39.

Complying with court orders is always, definitionally,

lawful.5

II. Section 2 is constitutional.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ accusation, Section 2 has

always been consistent with the U.S. Constitution.

The statute was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth

and Fifteenth Amendments’ explicit grant of

authority to Congress to enforce the Amendments’

protections. It advances those Amendments’ aim of

eradicating state practices that discriminate against

voters because of their race. And its test is neatly

tailored to the evolving salience of race in local

politics.

A.

Section 2 enforces the Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments.

Section 2 falls well within Congress’s authority to

enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,

which were designed to provide members of minority

5 The Fifth Circuit eventually vacated the preliminary injunction

only because of the timing in the election cycle; it affirmed the

district court’s finding that the legislature would likely violate

Section 2 if it maintained the dilutive map. Robinson, 86 F.4th

at 583.

13

racial groups equal access to the political process by

prohibiting discrimination. See Oregon v. Mitchell,

400 U.S. 112, 127 (1970). Congress’s power to enforce

these amendments by “appropriate” legislation is

explicit from the constitutional text, U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2, and that power

is broad. Indeed, this Court’s decisions “foreclose any

argument that Congress may not, pursuant to [the

Fifteenth Amendment], outlaw voting practices that

are discriminatory in effect.” City of Rome v. United

States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980); see also Trump v.

Anderson, 601 U.S. 100, 110 (2024) (recognizing that

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment “casts upon

Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the

future, that all the sections of the amendment are

carried out in good faith”) (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th

Cong., 1st Sess., at 2768 (May 23, 1866)).

While legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s

authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment must

exhibit “congruence and proportionality” between

injury and remedy, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.

507, 520 (1997), Congress’s enforcement of the

Fifteenth Amendment—which guarantees that the

right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged

“by any State on account of race,” U.S. Const., amend.

XV, § 1—need only provide a “rational means [of]

effectuat[ing]” the Amendment. South Carolina v.

Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966); see City of

Rome, 446 U.S. at 177; Shelby County v. Holder, 570

U.S. 529, 550–51 (2013). This differing limitation on

Congress’s enforcement authority stems from the

“blight of racial discrimination in voting,” the

“ingenious” ways jurisdictions have violated minority

14

voting rights, Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308–09, and

how “inordinately difficult” it is to prove intentional

discrimination in the voting context, Thornburg v.

Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (quoting S. Rep. No.

97-417 (1982) (“S. Rep.”) at 36).

Even if this Court were to take the unsupported

step of extending City of Boerne’s standard to the

Fifteenth Amendment, Section 2 is a congruent and

proportional

mechanism

for

enforcing

both

amendments’ broad mandates. The Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments were enacted to end all

political systems that discriminate against racial

minorities. Cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275

(1939) (“The [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies

sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of

discrimination.”); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S.

524, 526–27 (1973) (recognizing “a principal purpose

of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to

prohibit the States from invidiously discriminating on

the basis of race”). As the Court has explained, vote

dilution that results in the “political processes leading

to nomination and election” not being “equally open to

participation by the group in question”—precisely the

scheme that Section 2 forbids—is “invidiously

discriminatory” and unconstitutional. White v.

Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 756, 766–69 (1973).

Moreover, “[l]egislation which deters or remedies

constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of

Congress’ enforcement power.” City of Boerne, 521

U.S. at 518. Section 2 accomplishes just that, serving

as an effective antidote to the intentional

discrimination that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

15

Amendments prohibit. When applying Section 2,

courts “distinguish[] between situations in which

racial politics play an excessive role in the electoral

process, and communities in which they do not.”

S. Rep. at 33. This test considers a range of evidence

that identifies political systems that invidiously deny

minority voters the opportunity to “pull, haul, and

trade to find common political ground.” Johnson v. De

Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994). “The presence or

absence of each [Gingles and Senate] factor therefore

serves as a piece of evidence pointing either towards

or away from an ultimate conclusion that an electoral

system is or is not operating to dilute a minority

group’s voting strength on account of race.” Nipper v.

Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1526 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)

(op. of Tjoflat, C.J.). Congress was entitled to codify

consideration of these elements as a means of

enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

In amending Section 2 in 1982, Congress

eliminated the “inordinately difficult” evidentiary

burden to demonstrate intentional discrimination.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 (quoting S. Rep. at 36). But

even without an intent requirement, Section 2

plaintiffs must prove the existence of circumstances

where minority voters have “less opportunity than

d[o] other residents” to “participate in the political

processes and to elect legislators of their choice.”

White, 412 U.S. at 766. By requiring plaintiffs to prove

pervasive racially polarized voting, contemporary

effects of discrimination, barriers to minoritycandidate success, and other factors indicative of

racially exclusionary political systems, Section 2

remains closely tethered to the constitutional

16

prohibitions it enforces. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.

613, 623 (1982) (recognizing Section 2’s focus on

“[e]vidence of bloc voting along racial lines” and a lack

of minority success “bear[s] heavily on the issue of

purposeful discrimination”). Indeed, this Court

recently emphasized courts’ solemn obligation to

ensure that the Constitution’s ban on racial

discrimination is not compromised by subtle

workarounds: “‘[W]hat cannot be done directly cannot

be done indirectly. The Constitution deals with

substance, not shadows,’ and the prohibition against

racial discrimination is ‘levelled at the thing, not the

name.’” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 230 (quoting Cummings, 71

U.S. (4 Wall.) at 325). Precisely because

“discriminators may go to great lengths to hide and

perpetuate their unlawful conduct,” id. at 257

(Thomas, J., concurring), Section 2’s redistrictingcentric approach to identifying circumstantial

evidence of intentional discrimination is perfectly

constitutional.6

When White voters systemically elect favored

officials over the objections of Black voters, and then

those officials artificially inflate the electoral power of

White voters, and all of this occurs in a time and a

place rife with racial antagonism, the Constitution

does not require congressional naivete about the

dynamics at play. Quite the opposite, it assigns

Justice Thomas has identified another route to affirm the

constitutionality of Section 2 against claims like Plaintiffs’ by

recognizing that congressional redistricting “is textually

committed to a coordinate political department, Congress.”

Alexander, 602 U.S. at 42 (Thomas, J., concurring).

6

17

Congress the solemn power to banish the blight of

racial discrimination in voting. See U.S. Const.

amend. XV, § 2; cf. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.

Section 2 does precisely that.

B.

Section 2 does not require illicit “racebased districting.”

Plaintiffs contrive a tension between Constitution

and statute by interpreting Section 2 to require racebased districting. Appellee Br. at 36. But Section 2

does the opposite—minority voters are unable to

prove violations in contexts where the districting is

genuinely race-neutral. Thus, the way for states to

avoid liability for “discrimination on the basis of race

is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Parents

Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551

U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality op.). A map that is

drawn free from discriminatory intent should

apportion electoral opportunities in a manner that

does not systematically dilute the votes of racial

minorities. It is only when that dilution is present—

along with a full battery of other supporting

evidence—that Section 2 liability attaches.

Consider again the many elements that Section 2

plaintiffs must prove to establish a violation, each of

which corroborates a finding that districting in a

jurisdiction is already race-based. First, the “minority

group must be sufficiently large and geographically

compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably

configured district” that the mapdrawer chose not to

create. Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 18 (2023)

(alteration adopted) (quoting Wis. Leg. v. Wis.

18

Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S. 398, 402 (2022) (per

curiam)). In other words, there must be substantial

residential segregation (alarm bell number one of a

racialized social context) where the minority

population was cracked or packed by district lines

(alarm bell number two). In a colorblind society that

has overcome its legacy of racial discrimination, this

sort of residential sorting should not occur, as families

do not generally self-select into neighborhoods based

on traits that lack social salience.

“Second, the minority group must be able to show

that it is politically cohesive.” Id. (quoting Gingles,

478 U.S. at 51). In other words, the minority voters

must consistently prefer the same political

candidates—alarm bell number three. In a post-racial

society, policy needs should not be highly correlated

with race.

“Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate

that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to

enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred

candidate.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. In other words,

members of the majority race must also vote

cohesively (alarm bell number four), and they must

systematically oppose and defeat the minority group’s

preferences (alarm bell number five). Together, these

circumstances create a strong inference that the

political context is shot through with racial difference,

racial tension, and racial bias. Far from stereotyping

the political preferences of voters according to their

race, Section 2 requires proof of a systematic,

insidious pattern. When a siloed minority converges

on the same political pleas, and no amount of

19

organizing can obtain any traction in translating

those pleas into policy because mapdrawers have

artificially cracked or packed the minority group

within districts so that their efforts are reflexively

rejected by the dominant group, the social strife is

manifest. And when the fault line of antagonism is

race, the crisis is especially dire.

Even still, Section 2 requires more. After

establishing each of the Gingles preconditions, Section

2 plaintiffs must further ring alarm bell number six

by showing that the totality of circumstances reveals

that “the political processes leading to nomination or

election . . . are not equally open to participation by

members of a [protected class] in that its members

have less opportunity than other members of the

electorate to participate in the political process and to

elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(b). To conduct this inquiry, courts examine

factors from the Senate report accompanying Section

2’s 1982 amendments. See Gingles, 478 at 44.

Relevant factors include the history of voting-related

discrimination in the jurisdiction; the extent to which

the jurisdiction has used voting practices or

procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for

discrimination against the minority group; the extent

to which minority group members bear the effects of

past discrimination in areas such as education,

employment, and health, which hinder their ability to

participate effectively in the political process; the use

of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns;

and the extent to which members of the minority

group have been elected to public office in the

jurisdiction. Id. at 44–45. In other words, even where

20

residential segregation, voting patterns, and district

lines interact in a way that walks like racial

discrimination and quacks like racial discrimination,

plaintiffs are still required to confirm the feathers and

the nest and the pond.

Plaintiffs’ charge that Section 2 somehow

exacerbates race-based districting is thus confused.

See Appellee Br. at 37. Just as fire alarms do not

introduce or otherwise aggravate smoke—they simply

reflect its presence—Section 2’s evidentiary test is

calibrated to confirm the existence of a toxic dynamic

once it is already pervasive. As other courts have

recognized, the purpose of Section 2 is to remedy

“race-conscious politics,” and “[t]he surest indication

of race-conscious politics is a pattern of racially

polarized voting.” United States v. Marengo Cnty.

Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1567 (11th Cir. 1984); see also

Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir.

1996) (recognizing the presence of the Gingles

preconditions “creates the inference the challenged

practice is discriminatory”). And crucially, Section 2

does not merely recognize discriminatory districting;

it affirmatively prohibits it. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).

“[A] law that prohibits the State from classifying

individuals by race a fortiori does not classify

individuals by race.” Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U.S. 291,

331 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration adopted)

(quoting Coal. For Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d

692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997)).

When a Section 2 violation has been proven—that

is, when the inference of racial discrimination has

been strongly corroborated by extensive evidence—

21

courts have two options. They can either 1) tolerate

the discrimination by doing nothing, or 2) require a

new map. The first option would not be neutral as to

discrimination—it would affirmatively permit,

facilitate, and aggravate discrimination. The second

option accomplishes the opposite; the remedy excises

the discrimination. If an enacted map artificially

restricts electoral opportunities for Black voters, then

the remedial map must provide additional electoral

opportunities for Black voters. That is elementary

arithmetic; a deficit cannot be negated without an

offsetting sum.

Race-conscious correction of a race-based harm is

not the same thing as race-based infliction of that

harm. Eradicating racial discrimination in a

districting map cannot be “race-blind” any more than

treating a snake bite can be “venom-blind” or effective

oncology can be “tumor-blind.” The problem is that the

discrimination (or venom or cancer) is already present,

which demands an intentional response. Precisely

because courts cannot enjoin legislators’ private

motivations, the Section 2 remedy is tailored to the

output (prohibiting any map resembling what we

would expect if the legislature intended to

22

discriminate) rather than the input (requiring

legislators to purge any bias from their hearts).7

The finding of likely Section 2 liability in

Louisiana indicated that a legislature harboring an

unspoken desire to dilute Black votes would likely

enact a plan without two Black-opportunity districts,

while an unbiased legislature would likely enact a

plan with two Black-opportunity districts. By

requiring a two-opportunity-district map, the court is

not requiring the legislature to be any more raceconscious than it otherwise would have been—we

know legislatures will “almost always be aware of

racial demographics” when redistricting. Alexander,

602 U.S. at 22 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.

900, 916 (1995)). It simply ensures that the

legislature’s race-consciousness is not used to harm

vulnerable minorities in precisely the way that the

Constitution forbids.

C.

Section 2 is clear.

Notwithstanding its flip-flop on S.B. 8’s

compliance with federal law, the thrust of the State’s

position remains a plea for “clarity” that will spare it

7 The State extolls statistics indicating that Black registration

and turnout rates have increased in Louisiana, see State. Suppl.

Br. at 27, but 1) the statistics are not drawn from the record in

this case, and 2) this argument only underscores the uniquely

insidious nature of discriminatory redistricting maps. A map

that artificially limits Black voting opportunity to a single

district inflicts the same injury regardless of the extent to which

Black residents register and vote. Section 2’s application in the

redistricting context is so essential precisely because vote

dilution cannot be overcome by increased voter mobilization.

23

from endless litigation and undesirable accusations of

racism. See State Suppl. Br. at 5, 11–12, 40, 47. This

Court can fulfill both those requests by reversing the

decision below.

Few legal tests are as clear as the Gingles inquiry.

Each

precondition

is

based

on

objective

measurements of quantifiable data about where

people live and how they tend to vote, providing states

with bright-line benchmarks that they can monitor to

assess—and prevent—potential Section 2 liability. Cf.

Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 18 (2009)

(recognizing Gingles “provides straightforward

guidance to courts and to those officials charged with

drawing district lines to comply with § 2”). Thus, to

neutralize the threat of successful Section 2 litigation,

Louisiana knows exactly what it must avoid: the

adoption of a map that dilutes a compact and cohesive

group of minority voters whose electoral preferences

are consistently vetoed by another racial group. That

is not a difficult task. Plaintiffs in the Middle District

litigation, including amici here, introduced seven

illustrative maps that would have indisputably

avoided Section 2 liability, see Robinson, 605 F. Supp.

3d at 781–85, and the State proved perfectly capable

of identifying an additional configuration—S.B. 8—on

its own.

The Hobson’s choice that the State bemoans exists

only insofar as states face potential liability, as here,

for remedying racial discrimination established in

Section 2 litigation. This purported dilemma,

however, is easily resolved. By confirming once and

for all that states have a compelling interest in

24

Section 2 compliance, and by expressly permitting

states to remove the discriminatory effect from their

enacted maps, this Court can alleviate Louisiana’s

professed anxiety and put an end to spurious racial

gerrymandering claims like the one below.8

The State’s interest in avoiding public criticism is

more utopian, as every piece of major legislation will

be seen as too much by some voters and too little by

others, and “someone always will claim that their ox

was gored.” State Suppl. Br. at 12. Federal law does

not require—or otherwise guarantee—an end to

political disagreement. But by focusing on a

districting map’s effects rather than on legislators’

intent, Section 2’s test mitigates the very accusations

of racism that the State professes to find so hurtful.

Indeed, one reason that Congress gave for repudiating

the intent test when it amended Section 2 was its

recognition that “it is ‘unnecessarily divisive [to

require] charges of racism on the part of individual

officials or entire communities.’” Gingles, 478 U.S. at

43 (citing S. Rep. at 36). Unlike Plaintiffs’ racial

gerrymandering allegations, Section 2 claims do not

8 This clarity will also have the salutary effect of unclogging the

Court’s mandatory docket by reducing the number of

constitutional challenges that increasingly follow every Section

2 action. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2284(a). Affirming the decision

below, by contrast, will have the opposite effect, as every district

in the country—congressional, state, or municipal—where

minority voters can elect their candidates of choice will be

vulnerable to a constitutional challenge by a non-minority voter

seeking to aggrandize their electoral clout, with a right to an

automatic appeal to this Court.

25

require a pleaded accusation or formal finding that

the state discriminated intentionally.

In this respect, the Court should give the State

what it wants: confirmation that Section 2 compliance

will not subject it to colorable racial gerrymandering

claims, and assurance that Section 2 claims do not

require any aspersions about lawmakers’ character.

D.

Section 2’s

expired.

protections

have

not

Plaintiffs are further wrong to propose that

Section 2 is subject to “time limits.” Appellee Br. at 37

(citing SFFA); see also State Suppl. Br. at 13, 27–28,

43 (citing Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 536, 543–48). In

Shelby County, this Court addressed federalism

concerns unique to a statutory regime that singled out

targeted jurisdictions for preclearance obligations,

and in SFFA it addressed university admissions

programs in a decision that alluded to redistricting

only in passing to endorse Section 2’s requirements.

Neither case casts doubt on Section 2’s

constitutionality.

Contrary to the State’s suggestion, Shelby County

cannot stand for the proposition that every statute

becomes invalid unless Congress has recently

reenacted or amended it with fresh findings. Contra

State Suppl. Br. at 43. If that were the case,

monopolists would be free to ignore the venerable

Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, and mobsters facing

federal charges could complain that the statutes

criminalizing their conduct were legislated too long

ago. That is plainly not how the law works. When

26

Congress exercises its constitutional authority to

proscribe conduct that it deems harmful—as Allen

confirmed Congress did in enacting Section 2, 599

U.S. at 41—that conduct remains unlawful until the

political process produces a contrary policy judgment

through amendment or repeal.

Shelby County’s caveat to this elementary

principle reflected a highly unusual (perhaps even

unique) circumstance. The statutory provision at

issue was several steps removed from proscribing

harmful conduct—the Court reviewed a coverage

formula that singled out particular jurisdictions,

based on historical data, that had to obtain federal

permission before enacting any law related to voting.

See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 534–35. This regime

required states that may have done nothing wrong for

decades to obtain preclearance before enacting new

laws, “however innocuous,” that would be valid in any

other state. Id. at 544. Congress may single out

jurisdictions for such strong medicine, the Court held,

only where the prescription is justified by present-day

symptoms of discrimination and disenfranchisement.

Id. at 535, 553.

Section 2 is different in every way—as Shelby

County itself recognized. See id. at 537. Where the

coverage formula at issue in Shelby County

discriminated against disfavored states, Section 2’s

commands apply “nationwide,” id., in equal force from

Arizona to Maine, from Shreveport to Seattle. Where

the coverage formula subjected states to preclearance

“based on decades-old data and eradicated

practices . . . having no logical relation to the present

27

day,” id. at 551, 554, Section 2 applies only upon “a

searching practical evaluation of the past and present

reality” and “intensely local appraisal,” Gingles, 478

U.S. at 79 (cleaned up), and the statute’s application

will naturally fall into desuetude “as residential

segregation decreases—as it has ‘sharply’ done since

the 1970s,” Allen, 599 U.S. at 28–29. Where the

coverage formula required states to proactively

beseech federal officials, hat in hand, for permission

to enact voting regulations, Section 2 guarantees

victims of discrimination a remedy for violations that

have been proven in court. In short, nothing about

Section 2’s routine scheme is “extraordinary,”

“drastic,” “unprecedented,” or in any way

unconstitutional. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 534–35.9

In SFFA, meanwhile, this Court reiterated that

“race-based government action” is permissible to

“remediat[e] specific, identified instances of past

discrimination that violated the Constitution or a

statute.” 600 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added) (citing

redistricting example). In other words, SFFA

expressly accounts for and endorses the principle that

requires a state to remedy a “specific,” proven

instance of discriminatory vote dilution in a prior map

“that violated” Section 2 by enacting a new map that

corrects the identified racial discrimination. Id.

9 The State’s apoplexy about “a de facto postclearance regime in

which federal courts” review legislative enactments for

compliance with federal law, State Suppl. Br. at 13, betrays a

fundamental ignorance about the nature of judicial review in our

constitutional system. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177

(1803).

28

University admissions, as the Court explained, are

altogether different from the redistricting context.

Evaluating the constitutionality of admissions

standards employed by Harvard College and the

University of North Carolina, the Court rejected the

interests that those institutions offered in defense of

race-conscious admissions programs as “not

sufficiently coherent for purposes of strict scrutiny.”

Id. at 214. It found the “racial categories” used by the

universities to be “opaque.” Id. at 217. It was

persuaded by evidence that universities used race to

stereotype. Id. at 220. And it emphasized the

universities’ concession that there was no conceivable

circumstance whereby their system of racial

preferences would no longer be necessary. Id. at 220–

25.

Again, Section 2’s application differs in every

respect. First, this Court has found interests in

remedying unlawful vote dilution to be concrete and

compelling. See Allen, 599 U.S. at 41 (“[W]e are not

persuaded by Alabama’s arguments that [Section] 2

as interpreted in Gingles exceeds the remedial

authority of Congress.”); see also Singleton, 690 F.

Supp. 3d at 1318 (noting faulty affirmative-action

analogy “would fly in the face of forty years of

Supreme Court precedent—including precedent in

this case”). Second, Black Louisianians plainly

comprise a discrete racial minority. See Robinson, 605

F. Supp. 3d at 820 (finding the “Any Part Black

definition is deeply rooted in Louisiana history”).

Third, Gingles requires cohesive racial voting to be

proved rather than assumed. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at

51; cf. Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 841 (finding that

29

“Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Black voters in

Louisiana are politically cohesive”). And fourth,

Section 2’s functional expiration date for vote-dilution

claims, as Allen explains, is built directly into the

Gingles test: Precisely because plaintiffs must prove

that minority groups are geographically compact,

their task will grow increasingly difficult “as

residential segregation decreases—as it has ‘sharply’

done since the 1970s.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 28–29

(recognizing Ҥ 2 litigation in recent years has rarely

been successful for just that reason”);10 cf. Robinson,

605 F. Supp. 3d at 784 (recognizing “well-known and

easily demonstrable fact” of “historical housing

segregation” in Louisiana, “which still prevails in the

current day”). Same for the other corroborating

evidence that plaintiffs must produce. As voting

becomes less racially polarized and evidence of votingrelated discrimination recedes in the rearview mirror,

Section 2 claims will grow ever-more-difficult to

The State contests this finding by noting that, across the

country, there have been five successful Section 2 actions this

decade. See State Suppl. Br. at 26. That statistic hardly

contradicts this Court’s statement or the amicus brief that it was

derived from; if anything, the State’s tally corroborates the

enduring need for Section 2 to remedy rare-but-persisting

violations.

10

30

prove.11 Thus, regardless of whether this Court would

have made each of these Louisiana findings in the

same way as the Middle District (not the present

task), it is readily apparent that the Section 2 inquiry

cleanly addresses SFFA’s concerns.

In SFFA, the Court pledged to “vindicate the

Constitution’s pledge of racial equality” and

emphasized that “[e]liminating racial discrimination

means eliminating all of it.” 600 U.S. at 205–06. It is

Section 2 plaintiffs who seek to secure the promise of

this aspirational rhetoric. Louisiana’s 2021

congressional map resulted in vote dilution “on

account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). In

response, Black Louisiana voters, including amici

here, petitioned a federal court to enjoin this unlawful

racial discrimination—to eliminate all of it. The

district court’s preliminary injunction was thus a first

step toward vindicating the U.S. Constitution’s

essential pledge. After appellate review of those

findings confirmed (several times over) that they were

not found in error, the legislature responded

accordingly and enacted a new map that discontinued

the discrimination against Black voters. We cannot

settle for any less.

11 The State, for whatever reason, highlights that Hispanic and

Asian American voters did not vote cohesively at the national

level in the 2024 presidential election. See State Suppl. Br. at 20.

All that demonstrates is that the current Section 2 test would

effectively weed out any hypothetical nationwide claims on

behalf of those groups, precisely because it is responsive to

modern conditions. It tells us nothing about the viability of

Section 2 claims on behalf of Black voters in Louisiana.

31

CONCLUSION

As

this

Court

has

recognized,

“racial

discrimination and racially polarized voting are not

ancient history. Much remains to be done to ensure

that citizens of all races have equal opportunity to

share and participate in our democratic processes and

traditions; and § 2 must be interpreted to ensure that

continued progress.” Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 25. Because

the Constitution does not forbid states from replacing

districting maps in response to judicial findings that

the map discriminates on the basis of race, the Court

should reverse the judgment below.

32

Respectfully submitted,

Lalitha D. Madduri

Jacob D. Shelly

Qizhou Ge

ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP

250 Massachusetts

Ave, NW

Suite 400

Washington, D.C.

20001

(202) 968-4490

/s/ Abha Khanna

Abha Khanna

Counsel of Record

ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP

1700 Seventh Avenue,

Suite 2100

Seattle, Washington

98101

(206) 656-0177

AKhanna@elias.law

Counsel for Amici