Amicus Curiae Brief — Louisiana, Appellant v. Phillip Callais, et al.

Nos. 24-109, 24-110

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________________________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Appellant,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

__________________________________

PRESS ROBINSON, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, et al.,

Appellees.

__________________________________

On Appeals from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Louisiana

__________________________________

BRIEF FOR EDWARD GALMON, SR., CIERRA

HART, NORRIS HENDERSON, TRAMELLE

HOWARD, AND ROSS WILLIAMS (“GALMON

AMICI”) AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

APPELLANTS

__________________________________

LALITHA D. MADDURI

JACOB D. SHELLY

DANIEL COHEN

QIZHOU GE

ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP

Counsel for Galmon Amici

ABHA KHANNA

Counsel of Record

ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP

1700 Seventh Ave

Suite 2100

Seattle, Washington 98101

(202) 656-0177

AKhanna@elias.law

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT ...............................................................2

BACKGROUND ..........................................................4

I.

Federal courts determined that Section 2

likely requires two Black-opportunity

congressional districts in Louisiana. ...............4

A.

The Middle District of Louisiana

preliminarily enjoined H.B. 1......................... 4

B.

Louisiana failed to rebut the district court’s

findings and conclusions. .............................. 10

II.

Louisiana enacted a remedial map reflecting

political priorities. ..........................................15

III. Callais Plaintiffs collaterally attack the

Section 2 remedy. ...........................................23

ARGUMENT .............................................................25

I.

II.

Politics, rather than race, was the

predominant motivation for CD-6’s shape.....25

A.

Louisiana’s political leaders were motivated

to protect favored incumbents...................... 26

B.

Plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption of

good faith owed to the Legislature. ............. 29

The Louisiana Legislature had a strong basis

to believe that Section 2 requires a second

ii

Black-opportunity congressional district in

Louisiana. .......................................................31

CONCLUSION ..........................................................34

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the

NAACP,

602 U.S. 1 (2024) ................ 3, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 34

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023) ................................ 12, 13, 27, 34

Ardoin v. Robinson,

142 S. Ct. 2892, 2022 WL 2441061

(June 17, 2022) ............................................... 11, 12

Ardoin v. Robinson,

143 S. Ct. 2654 (2023) .............................. 12, 13, 32

Bush v. Vera,

517 U.S. 952 (1996) .............................................. 34

Callais v. Landry,

No. 3:24-cv-00122, 2024 WL 1903930

(W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2024) ................................ 28, 34

Caster v. Merrill,

No. 2:21-CV-1536-AMM, 2022 WL 264819

(N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022), aff’d sub nom.

Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023) .................... 12

Cooper v. Harris,

581 U.S. 285 (2017) ............................ 25, 31, 33, 34

iv

Easley v. Cromartie,

532 U.S. 234 (2001) .............................................. 26

Hays v. Louisiana,

839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993),

vacated sub nom. Louisiana v. Hays,

512 U.S. 1230 (1994) .............................................. 9

Hays v. Louisiana,

936 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996) ......................... 9

Karcher v. Daggett,

462 U.S. 725 (1983) .............................................. 30

In re Landry,

83 F.4th 300 (5th Cir. 2023) .......................... 14, 32

Robinson v. Ardoin,

37 F.4th 208 (5th Cir. 2022) .......................... 11, 32

Robinson v. Ardoin,

605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022),

preliminary injunction vacated,

86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023) ...................... 4–10, 32

Robinson v. Ardoin,

86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023), reh’g en

banc denied Order Robinson v. Ardoin,

No. 22-30333 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2023),

ECF No. 363-2 .................................... 14, 15, 30, 32

Robinson v. Ardoin,

No. 3:22-cv-00211-SDD-SDJ (M.D.

La. June 9, 2022), ECF No. 182 .......................... 10

v

Robinson v. Callais,

144 S. Ct. 1171 (2024) .......................................... 25

Rucho v. Common Cause,

588 U.S. 684 (2019) .......................................... 3, 34

Theriot v. Par. of Jefferson,

185 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 1999) ................................ 28

Thornburg v. Gingles,

478 U.S. 30 (1986) .............................................. 8, 9

Statutes and Legislative Materials

2 U.S.C. § 2c............................................................... 30

La. J.R. 21(C) ............................................................. 30

Other Authorities

Greg Larose, In Governor’s Race, We’ll See if

‘Wags’ Can Tail Top Dog Landry, LA.

ILLUMINATOR (Mar. 8, 2023),

https://lailluminator.com/2023/03/08/ingovernors-race-well-see-if-wags-can-tailtop-doglandry/ ...................................................... 18

Governor Jeff Landry Assumes Office, OFF.

OF THE GOVERNOR (Jan. 8, 2024),

https://gov.louisiana.gov/news/governorjeff-landry-assumes-office .............................. 16, 33

vi

Greg Larose, In Governor’s Race, We’ll See if

‘Wags’ Can Tail Top Dog Landry, LA.

ILLUMINATOR (Mar. 8, 2023),

https://lailluminator.com/2023/03/08/ingovernors-race-well-see-if-wags-can-tailtop-doglandry/ ...................................................... 18

Mark Ballard, How Did Steve Scalise’s

Dream for Speaker Get Squashed?

Hardball Politics Are to Blame, BATON

ROUGE ADVOCATE (Oct. 23, 2023),

https://www.nola.com/news/politics/stevescalise-dream-to-be-speaker-and-byhardballpolitics/article_19431f68-6f8511ee-ba5d-73611afd20e7.html............................. 18

Ryan Lizza, What Steve Scalise Won’t Forget,

POLITICO (Dec. 1, 2023),

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/01

/what-steve-scalise-wontforget-00129546 ........... 18

Tyler Bridges, Garret Graves Endorses

Stephen Waguespack in Louisiana

Governor’s Race, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE

(June 7, 2023),

https://www.nola.com/news/politics/garret

-graves-endorses-stephen-waguespack-ingovernorsrace/article_fa443074-055911ee-af08-27e4fcb098fe.html ............................... 18

vii

Tyler Bridges, Rep. Garrett Graves Was on

Top. Now He’s Fighting For His Political

Life. What Happened?, BATON ROUGE

ADVOCATE (Jan. 20, 2024),

https://www.nola.com/news/politics/repgarret-graves-sees-fortunesfallsteeply/article_c4592922-b721-11eebba8-c3fe4cd6a7ad.html ...................................... 17

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Edward Galmon, Sr., Cierra Hart, Norris

Henderson, Tramelle Howard, and Ross Williams

(“Galmon Amici”) have been deeply invested in this

litigation from the start. Mr. Galmon, Ms. Hart, Mr.

Henderson, and Mr. Howard are Black Louisiana

voters whose successful litigation under Section 2 of

the Voting Rights Act resulted in the enactment of

S.B. 8, the congressional districting map challenged

below. They have an interest in defending the victory

they achieved in closely related litigation, such that

the federal voting rights they vindicated in one court

are not permanently revoked by another court.

Further, because S.B. 8 directly secures Dr.

Williams’s, Mr. Henderson’s, and Mr. Howard’s right

to an undiluted vote, those amici have an additional

interest in defending the current configuration by

reversing the injunction entered below.

1 In accordance with Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored

this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a

monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief. The National Redistricting Foundation

made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation and

submission of this brief.

2

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT

The district court majority radically departed

from decades of this Court’s racial gerrymandering

precedent when it enjoined a legislatively enacted

districting map that sought to both (1) ensure the

reelection of favored Republican incumbents, and

(2) comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

According to the district court’s logic, the U.S.

Constitution requires Louisiana’s Legislature to

choose between these two goals—protecting

incumbents would have to come at the expense of the

second Black-opportunity district that Section 2

requires, and compliance with Section 2 would

preclude incumbent protection. That is bad law:

Legislatures may pursue political interests once they

satisfy federal prerequisites, even where, as here, the

political interests require a nontraditional district

shape.

The Legislature enacted S.B. 8, the map

enjoined below, during a special legislative session in

a court-ordered window to remedy the prior map’s

likely violation of Section 2. That Section 2 litigation

made clear that, one way or another, Louisiana’s 2024

congressional map would feature the two Blackopportunity districts mandated by federal law. Either

the Legislature could enact a Section 2-compliant map

that pursued its own explicitly political objectives, or

the district court would choose a Section 2-compliant

map with conventionally compact districts and

maximal adherence to other traditional criteria. The

Legislature chose the former option and crafted the

3

necessary second Section 2 district in a manner that—

unlike alternatives with more compact districts—

preserved the Republican majority in Congressional

District (“CD”) 5. This cascade of political decisions—

preempting a court-drawn remedial map, prioritizing

the reelection of the CD-5 incumbent without

jeopardizing seats held by other allies, and

configuring district boundaries accordingly in a

manner that maintained other communities of

interest—is emphatically within the Legislature’s

prerogative. See Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the

NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 6 (2024) (holding maps drawn to

achieve political objectives are not racial

gerrymanders); Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S.

684, 709 (2019) (holding maps drawn to achieve

political

objectives

are

not

otherwise

unconstitutional). Notably, Appellees (plaintiffs

below) never produced an alternative map that would

have achieved these political goals: Their proposal

lacked the requisite second Black-opportunity

district, and so it would have been quickly replaced

with a compact, Section 2-compliant, court-ordered

map chosen without regard for the Legislature’s

desired partisan goals.

The district court held that the Legislature’s

expressed intent to comply with its Section 2

obligations

necessarily

resulted

in

racial

gerrymandering because the new Black-opportunity

district is non-compact. That holding cannot be

squared with the clear evidentiary record—the noncompact shape was necessary to achieve political, not

racial, objectives. It also flouts a generation of binding

precedent—a districting plan is not a racial

4

gerrymander simply because map-drawers intend to

comply with Section 2’s requirements, especially

where, as here, those requirements have already been

elucidated by a unanimous ensemble of federal judges.

This Court should reverse.

BACKGROUND

I.

Federal courts determined that Section 2

likely requires two Black-opportunity

congressional districts in Louisiana.

Following publication of the 2020 census

results, Louisiana’s Legislature enacted H.B. 1, a new

congressional districting plan with only one district

(CD-2) where Black voters had an opportunity to elect

their preferred candidates. See Robinson v. Ardoin,

605 F. Supp. 3d 759, 768 (M.D. La. 2022), preliminary

injunction vacated, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023).

Litigation successfully challenging H.B. 1 as a

violation of Section 2 persuaded the Legislature that

any congressional map with fewer than two Blackopportunity districts would forfeit the Legislature’s

prerogative to enact a map that reflected its political

priorities.

A.

The Middle District of Louisiana

preliminarily enjoined H.B. 1.

The same day H.B. 1 was enacted, Mr. Galmon,

Ms. Hart, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Howard sued

Louisiana’s Secretary of State in the Middle District

of Louisiana, challenging the new plan as a violation

of Section 2 because it failed to include a second

5

district in which Black voters would have an

opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. Id.

That action was joined with a parallel suit brought by

other Black voters and civic organizations (“Robinson

Appellants” here), and the consolidated plaintiffs

moved for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 769. The

Legislature’s presiding officers and the State of

Louisiana, represented by then-Attorney General Jeff

Landry, intervened to defend the map. Id. at 768–69.

During the five-day preliminary injunction

hearing held in May 2022, the consolidated plaintiffs

introduced seven illustrative maps and the testimony

of two expert map-drawers (Mr. Bill Cooper and Mr.

Anthony Fairfax) demonstrating that Black voters in

Baton Rouge could be unpacked from the New

Orleans-based CD-2, where they were assigned by

H.B. 1, and grouped into a newly configured CD-5

with a sufficiently large and geographically compact

Black community bounded to the west by St. Landry

Parish and to the north by delta parishes along the

Mississippi River. Id. at 778–85. Plaintiffs also offered

testimony from two experts (Dr. Max Palmer and Dr.

Lisa Handley) demonstrating that voting in Louisiana

is racially polarized, that White voters regularly

defeated Black voters’ preferred candidates outside of

majority-Black CD-2, and that Black voters would

have an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice

in the illustrative maps’ CD-5. Id. at 797–804.

Plaintiffs offered two fact witnesses (Mr. Chris Tyson

and Mr. Charles Cravins) who testified that the

illustrative CD-5 configurations protected critical

communities of interest. Id. at 789–91. And plaintiffs

offered six other witnesses (expert witnesses Dr. Traci

6

Burch, Dr. Allan Lichtman, and Dr. Blakeslee Gilpin,

and fact witnesses Mr. Mike McClanahan, Dr.

Dorothy Nairne, and Ms. Ashley Shelton) who

testified that factors considered in the totality-ofcircumstances inquiry supported a finding that H.B. 1

violated Section 2. Id. at 806–15.

The district court credited this extensive

testimony. Id. at 826–27 (finding Mr. Cooper’s reports

“clear, substantiated by unrefuted empirical and

statistical data, methodologically sound, and

therefore reliable,” and his testimony “candid,

forthright

and

indicative

of

an

in-depth

comprehension of redistricting, demographics, and

census data”); id. at 827 (“[Mr.] Fairfax’s thirty years

of experience in preparing redistricting plans make

him well-qualified, [] and his report and supplemental

reports are extremely thorough and methodologically

sound.”); id. at 841 (“The Court credits Dr. Palmer’s

opinions and conclusions, finding that his methods

were sound and reliable. His testimony was clear and

straightforward, raising no issues that would cause

the Court to question his credibility.”); id. (“Dr.

Handley’s extensive expertise in the area of

redistricting and voting rights is reflected in her CV

and was apparent from her testimony, which was

thorough, careful, well-supported by data, facts and

soundly reasoned.”); id. at 829 (finding testimony of

Mr. Tyson and Mr. Cravins “contributed meaningfully

to an understanding of communities of interest”); id.

at 844–51 (reviewing testimony and concluding “the

totality of the circumstances weighs in favor of

Plaintiffs’ request for relief”).

7

The three sets of defendants collectively offered

seven expert witnesses to dispute elements of

plaintiffs’ claims—two of whom had no experience in

the analysis they offered at trial, two of whom had

been previously discredited in redistricting cases, and

two whose opinions were otherwise found

unsupported and unreliable. Mr. Thomas Bryan

challenged the numerosity and compactness of the

Black population identified by plaintiffs, id. at 791–

94; Dr. Christopher Blunt testified that any

congressional map in Louisiana containing a second

Black-opportunity district would necessarily require

racial gerrymandering, id. at 794–95; Dr. M.V. Hood

III testified that H.B. 1 deviated less than plaintiffs’

illustrative maps from Louisiana’s previous

congressional districting plan, id. at 795–97; Dr. Alan

Murray testified that Black and White voters are not

“similarly geospatially distributed” in Louisiana, id.

at 797; Dr. Jeffrey Lewis testified that hypothetical

congressional districts with less than 50% Black

voting-age population could provide Black voters an

opportunity to elect their candidate of choice, id. at

805–06; Dr. Tumulesh Solanky testified that East

Baton Rouge Parish votes more strongly than other

parishes for minority-preferred candidates, id. at 806;

and Dr. John Alford testified that polarized voting in

Louisiana is attributable to partisanship, not race, id.

at 840. 2

2 Defendants also offered expert reports from Dr. Jeff Sadow and

Mr. Mike Hefner but chose not to present testimony from either

expert at the hearing. See Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 815.

8

The district court did not find any of this

testimony persuasive. Id. at 824 (finding “[Mr.]

Bryan’s conclusions are unsupported by the facts and

data in this case and thus wholly unreliable”); id. at

825 (finding Dr. Blunt “has no experience, skill,

training or specialized knowledge in the simulation

analysis he employed to reach his conclusions” and

failed to “incorporate the traditional principles of

redistricting required by law”); id. (finding Dr. Hood’s

testimony “unilluminating” due to the limited

importance of core retention as a traditional

redistricting principle); id. at 826 (finding Dr.

Murray’s testimony “untethered to the specific facts of

this case and the law applicable to it”); id. at 843

(finding Dr. Lewis’s testimony “simply unsupported

by sufficient data and . . . accordingly unreliable”); id.

at 841 (finding “there is little, if any, connection

between [Dr. Solanky’s] expertise and his opinions,”

which are “unhelpful and do not inform the Court’s

analysis” due to his lack of “experience in analyzing

racially polarized voting patterns” and use of “an

admittedly narrow data set as the basis for his

conclusions”); id. at 840 (finding “Dr. Alford’s opinions

border on ipse dixit”).

On this robust record, the court concluded that

the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that

H.B. 1 violated Section 2. Id. at 851. Reviewing the

three preconditions for a Section 2 claim that this

Court identified in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30

(1986), the district court found that (1) Louisiana’s

Black population is sufficiently large and compact to

constitute a majority in a second congressional

district, Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 820–21; (2)

9

Black voters in Louisiana are politically cohesive, id.

at 839–41; and (3) White voters vote sufficiently as a

bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred

candidates, id. at 841–44. The court reviewed factors

relevant to the totality-of-circumstances analysis and

found that the two factors Gingles deemed most

important—the extent of racially polarized voting and

the extent to which Black candidates have been

elected to public office, see 478 U.S. at 48 n.15—weigh

“heavily in favor of Plaintiffs,” Robinson, 605 F. Supp.

3d at 845–46. Of the remaining factors, the court

found three favored plaintiffs, one favored defendants,

and four were neutral or inapplicable. Id. at 846–51.

Considering all of these factors together, the court

concluded that the totality of circumstances weighed

in favor of plaintiffs’ request for relief. Id. at 851.

The district court also devoted extensive

analysis to defendants’ argument that racial

considerations would necessarily predominate in a

Louisiana congressional map that included a second

Black-opportunity district. See id. at 831–39. The

court reviewed the 1990s Hays litigation, where

Louisiana congressional plans then in effect were

found to be unconstitutional racial gerrymanders, see

Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993)

(“Hays I”), vacated sub nom. Louisiana v. Hays, 512

U.S. 1230 (1994); Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360

(W.D. La. 1996) (“Hays II”), and rejected the notion

“that because a map with two majority-Black districts

was previously invalidated by a court, there can never

be an acceptable map with two Black districts.”

Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 832. The court

recognized that Louisiana’s population “has increased

10

significantly since the 1990 census that informed the

Hays map[s],” and thus “Hays, decided on census data

and demographics 30 years ago, is not a magical

incantation with the power to freeze Louisiana’s

congressional maps in perpetuity.” Id. at 834. And,

citing Supreme Court precedent, the court recognized

that some consideration of race by map-drawers is

necessary to comply with the VRA, and efforts to

comply with the VRA “may justify the consideration of

race in a way that would not otherwise be allowed.”

Id. at 835 (quoting Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 587

(2018)). The court concluded that race did not

predominate in the drawing of plaintiffs’ illustrative

maps, which “outperformed the enacted plan on every

relevant [traditional redistricting] criteria.” Id. at

839.

Having found the equitable balance also

favored plaintiffs, the court preliminarily enjoined

H.B. 1 and offered the Legislature “an opportunity to

enact a new map that is compliant with Section 2 of

the Voting Rights Act.” Id. at 852–58. The court

denied defendants’ request for a stay. Ruling at 2,

Robinson v. Ardoin, No. 3:22-cv-00211-SDD-SDJ

(M.D. La. June 9, 2022), ECF No. 182. The

Legislature, however, took no meaningful steps to

enact a new map.

B.

Louisiana failed to rebut the district

court’s findings and conclusions.

The defendants appealed the district court’s

order but could not persuade any judge that the

Section 2 holding was likely in error.

11

First, a Fifth Circuit motions panel

unanimously declined to stay the injunction, finding

that “[n]one of the defendants’ merits challenges to

the district court’s order carries the day.” Robinson v.

Ardoin, 37 F.4th 208, 227 (5th Cir. 2022). The panel

specifically rejected the argument that plaintiffs’

illustrative maps “prioritized race so highly as to

commit racial gerrymandering, or that complying

with the district court’s order would require the

Legislature to adopt a predominant racial purpose.”

Id. at 222.

The State defendants then sought relief in this

Court, insisting that the pending appeal out of

Alabama warranted a stay of the injunction because

it presented “an identical issue to the one [in

Louisiana]—i.e., when does Section 2 of the Voting

Rights Act command the creation of additional

majority-minority districts,” Emergency Appl. for

Admin. Stay, Stay Pending Appeal, & Pet. for Writ of

Cert. Before J., Ardoin v. Robinson, 142 S. Ct. 2892,

2022 WL 2441061, at *30 (June 17, 2022). State

defendants argued that the Louisiana litigation was

“materially identical” to the Alabama case, offered no

“daylight” from the “factual findings” and “legal

errors” of the Alabama case, and presented the

“precise legal issues” addressed in the Alabama case—

including “how to distinguish between racial

‘predominance’ and racial ‘awareness’ for purposes of

navigating between the Equal Protection Clause and

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” Id.; Reply Br. in

Supp. of Emergency Appl. for Admin. Stay, Stay

Pending Appeal, & Pet. for Writ of Cert. Before J.,

Ardoin, 142 S. Ct. 2892, 2022 WL 2441067, at *2. This

12

Court granted the motion to stay, holding the

Louisiana injunction in abeyance for a full year while

it adjudicated the Alabama dispute. See Ardoin v.

Robinson, 142 S. Ct. 2892 (2022) (mem.) (granting

stay); Ardoin v. Robinson, 143 S. Ct. 2654 (2023)

(mem.) (vacating stay).

On June 8, 2023, this Court affirmed the

preliminary injunction issued in the Alabama case,

rejecting Alabama’s contention that drawing a second

Black-opportunity district would constitute a racial

gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 41–42 (2023).

This Court declined to “disturb the District Court’s

careful factual findings,” id. at 23, including its

credibility determinations of several of the same

experts who testified in the Louisiana case, see Caster

v. Merrill, No. 2:21-CV-1536-AMM, 2022 WL 264819,

at *35, 38, 57, 83 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022), aff’d sub

nom. Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023) (finding Mr.

Cooper and Dr. Palmer’s testimony “highly credible”

and questioning the credibility of defendants’ expert

Mr. Bryan). This Court also specifically rejected the

defendants’ contention that “mapmakers must be

entirely ‘blind’ to race” to avoid running afoul of the

Fourteenth Amendment, 599 U.S. at 33, noting that

while “Section 2 itself ‘demands consideration of

race,’” that alone does not amount to a predominant

13

racial motivation. Allen, 599 U.S. at 30 (plurality op.)

(quoting Abbott, 585 U. S. 579, 587 (2018)). 3

After the Allen decision came down, the State

Defendants here asked this Court to set the Louisiana

appeal for merits briefing and oral argument,

previewing various alleged errors in the district

court’s legal reasoning. See Pet’rs’ Letter, Ardoin v.

Robinson, No. 21A814, to Hon. Scott Harris, Clerk of

the Supreme Court of the United States (June 8,

2023). This Court declined. Ardoin, 143 S. Ct. at 2654.

Again, the Legislature did not take any steps to enact

a new map during this period.

After the stay lifted and remedial proceedings

resumed in the district court, Attorney General

Landry petitioned the Fifth Circuit to issue a writ of

mandamus requiring the district court to advance

proceedings to trial on the merits because, he argued,

the preliminary injunction was substantively and

procedurally flawed. See Pet., In re Landry, No. 2330642 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2023), Doc. 2. The Fifth

Circuit issued the writ—but not for the reasons the

Attorney General enumerated, and not to provide the

3 On remand, the district court in Allen afforded the legislature

an opportunity to draw a remedial map to address the likely

Section 2 violation. But instead, the Alabama legislature chose

to enact a new map that failed to include an additional Black

opportunity district. Inj., Order, & Court-Ordered Remedial Map

at 5, Caster v. Allen, No. 2:21-cv-1536-AMM (N.D. Ala. Oct. 5,

2023), ECF No. 253 (“Allen Remedy”). The court enjoined the new

map—a ruling this Court declined to stay, Appl. Denied, Allen v.

Milligan, No. 23A231 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2023)—and imposed a plan

for Alabama’s congressional districts drawn by a Special Master.

Allen Remedy at 5–7.

14

relief the Attorney General requested. See In re

Landry, 83 F.4th 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2023). Instead, the

court determined the Legislature deserved a further

opportunity “to comply with” the district court’s ruling

that the VRA requires a second Black-opportunity

congressional district in Louisiana, and, to provide the

Legislature additional time to exercise that

prerogative, the court vacated an approaching

preliminary injunction remedial-phase hearing in the

district court. Id. at 307–08.

Shortly thereafter, a different Fifth Circuit

panel hearing defendants’ appeal of the preliminary

injunction unanimously determined that the “district

court did not clearly err in its necessary fact-findings

nor commit legal error in its conclusions that the

Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that

there was a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights

Act.” Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574, 583 (5th Cir.

2023), reh’g en banc denied Order, Robinson v. Ardoin,

No. 22-30333 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2023), ECF No. 363-2.

The court found that the “preliminary injunction []

was valid when it was issued” and reasoned that it

was appropriate for illustrative plans to focus on

different, overlapping communities of interest than

the one the Legislature prioritized. Id. at 592–99.

Rejecting the State’s racial gerrymandering

argument, the court emphasized that designing maps

to establish “two majority-black districts . . . does not

automatically constitute racial predominance” and

that “race was properly considered by the Plaintiff

experts when drawing their several illustrative

maps.” Id. at 594–95.

15

But because the next congressional elections

were no longer imminent, the Fifth Circuit concluded

that the urgency of adopting a new map had lifted. Id.

at 600–01. The court vacated the preliminary

injunction and remanded to the district court with

instructions to provide the Legislature additional

time to enact a new remedial congressional districting

plan. Id. at 601–02. The district court invited the

Legislature to remedy the VRA violation by January

30, 2024; should it do so, the court said, “a trial on the

merits” of any challenges to that new map “shall be

held commencing on March 25, 2024.” Minute Entry,

Robinson, ECF No. 315.

In short, both the district court and the Fifth

Circuit made clear that Section 2 likely requires a

second Black-opportunity district in Louisiana, and

that a new map would have to be drawn either by the

Legislature or by the federal court.

II.

Louisiana enacted a remedial

reflecting political priorities.

map

Rather than appealing the Fifth Circuit’s

ruling, Governor-elect Landry and other state leaders

opted to take advantage of the opportunity to redraw

Louisiana’s congressional map in a way that would

advance their own political objectives.

On January 8, 2024, Governor Landry assumed

office and immediately issued a “court[-]required call

16

for a redistricting special session.” 4 At the start of the

special session, he explained that he had done

everything he could to “dispose of [the] litigation” in

the Middle District, including several appeals to the

Fifth Circuit and to the U.S. Supreme Court, and

acknowledged there was no reasonable likelihood that

H.B. 1’s creation of only a single Black-opportunity

district could be shown to satisfy Section 2. J.A. at 98.

His office had “exhausted ALL legal remedies,”

Governor Landry explained, “and we have labored

with this issue for far–too–long.” Id. at 99. He called

upon the legislature to adopt a new redistricting map

that would “satisfy the Court and ensure that the

congressional districts of our State are made right

here in the Legislature and not” by a federal judge. Id.

at 98 (cleaned up). Warning that the federal court was

likely to adopt a new map itself if the Legislature

failed to act, he urged the Legislature to “heed the

instructions of the Court, take the pen out of the hand

of non-elected Judges and place it in your hand.” Id.

at 99.

Legislators introduced several different

mapping configurations during the special session,

but Louisiana’s political powers quickly coalesced

around S.B. 8, a proposed map sponsored by Senator

Glen Womack, which met their specific political

objectives of protecting favored congressional

incumbents and ousting Congressman Garret Graves,

while adhering to all other redistricting requirements,

4 Governor Jeff Landry Assumes Office, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR

(Jan. 8, 2024), https://gov.louisiana.gov/news/governor-jefflandry-assumes-office.

17

including Section 2 by making CD-6 a second Blackopportunity district.

Senator Womack frequently reiterated that

S.B. 8 was “the product of a long, detailed process

[and] achieves several goals” as he and

Representative Gerald Beaullieu advocated for the

plan in committee and on the Senate and House floor.

Robinson App. at 392a. The “first” goal was the

protection of Congresswoman Julia Letlow’s seat in

the congressional district comprising northeastern

Louisiana—a seat that would likely ensure that

Congresswoman Letlow “remains both unpaired with

any other incumbents, and in a congressional district

that should continue to elect a Republican to Congress

for the remainder of this decade.” Id. at 420a. By

saving Congresswoman Letlow’s seat, Republicans

could instead sacrifice the seat held by Congressman

Graves, who had antagonized Louisiana’s key political

powerbrokers, including now-Governor Landry and

Majority Leader Steve Scalise, by endorsing their

rivals in 2023. 5 Congressman Graves first provoked

Governor Landry when he chose to back the

5 Tyler Bridges, Rep. Garrett Graves Was on Top. Now He’s

Fighting For His Political Life. What Happened?, BATON ROUGE

ADVOCATE (Jan. 20, 2024),

https://www.nola.com/news/politics/rep-garret-graves-seesfortunes-fallsteeply/article_c4592922-b721-11ee-bba8c3fe4cd6a7ad.html.

18

gubernatorial bid of rival Stephen Waguespack. 6

Then, during Majority Leader Scalise’s bid for

Speaker of the House, Graves praised rival Jim

Jordan and undercut Scalise, allegedly spreading

disparaging information about Scalise’s cancer

diagnosis and surfacing controversial comments

Scalise had made in the past. 7 By drawing

Congressman Graves, rather than Congresswoman

Letlow, into the new Black-opportunity district,

Louisiana’s Republican leadership found in S.B. 8 a

mechanism to protect an ally and oust an enemy.

S.B. 8’s “second” goal was preserving four “safe

Republican seats.” J. Ex. 31 at 4, Callais v. Landry,

6 Tyler Bridges, Garret Graves Endorses Stephen Waguespack in

Louisiana Governor’s Race, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE (June 7,

2023),

https://www.nola.com/news/politics/garret-gravesendorses-stephen-waguespack-ingovernorsrace/article_fa443074-0559-11ee-af0827e4fcb098fe.html; Greg Larose, In Governor’s Race, We’ll See if

‘Wags’ Can Tail Top Dog Landry, LA. ILLUMINATOR (Mar. 8,

2023), https://lailluminator.com/2023/03/08/in-governors-racewell-see-if-wags-can-tail-top-doglandry/.

7 Ryan Lizza, What Steve Scalise Won’t Forget, POLITICO (Dec. 1,

2023),

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/01/what-stevescalise-wontforget-00129546; Gordon Russell, ‘I Know What Was

Being Said’: Steve Scalise Suggests Garret Graves Undercut

Speaker Bid, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE (Dec. 1, 2023),

https://www.nola.com/news/politics/i-know-what-was-beingsaid-steve-scalise-suggestsgarret-graves-undercut-speakerbid/article_c8fb3590-905e-11ee-86ce-4319bdb3475d.html; Mark

Ballard, How Did Steve Scalise’s Dream for Speaker Get

Squashed? Hardball Politics Are to Blame, BATON ROUGE

ADVOCATE (Oct. 23, 2023),

https://www.nola.com/news/politics/steve-scalise-dream-to-bespeaker-and-by-hardballpolitics/article_19431f68-6f85-11eeba5d-73611afd20e7.html.

19

No. 3:24-cv00122-DCJ-CES-RRS (W.D. La. Apr. 10,

2024), ECF No. 181-4. Senator Womack emphasized

that “Louisiana’s Republican presence in the United

States Congress has contributed tremendously to the

national discourse, and I’m very proud that both

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Mike

Johnson and U.S. House Majority Leader Steve

Scalise are both from our great state.” Id. S.B. 8 was

crafted to ensure that both Speaker Johnson and

Majority Leader Scalise “will have solidly Republican

districts at home so they can focus on the national

leadership that we need in Washington, D.C.” Id.

Extolling S.B. 8’s national political benefits, Senator

Womack explained that the new map ensured that

“the conservative principles retained by the majority

of those in Louisiana will continue to extend past our

boundaries to our nation’s capital.” Id.

Third, Senator Womack explained that he gave

careful consideration to protecting communities of

interest when drawing S.B. 8’s new minorityopportunity district, CD-6. This district, he explained,

is a commerce district: it is comprised of a corridor

that “runs up Red River, which is barge traffic,

commerce,” and traces “I-49, which . . . goes from

Lafayette to Shreveport, which is also a corridor for

our state that is very important to our commerce.” J.

Ex. 30 at 3, Callais, ECF No. 181-3. He also touted

collegiate ties along the corridor, as well as industrial

connections, including agriculture, row crop, and

cattle, along the Red River. Id. at 4; J. Ex. 31 at 4,

Callais, ECF No. 181-4. Representative Ed Larvadain

III identified—and Senator Womack agreed—that

Rapides and Natchitoches Parishes, both in CD-6,

20

share a community of interest involving the Creole

Nation and Northwestern State University, where

students from surrounding parishes attend. Robinson

App. at 453a. CD-6 also protects lumber and timber

interests by linking De Soto and Caddo Parishes,

where this work is prominent, with a major plant in

Natchitoches and corporate offices in Alexandria. Id.

at 453a–54a. And CD-6 protects a healthcare-related

community of interest, as many residents of the new

district rely on the same hospitals in Alexandria or St.

Landry for their medical needs. J. Ex. 31 at 7, Callais,

ECF No. 181-4. Senator Womack also considered

communities of interest in crafting S.B. 8’s other

districts. Robinson App. at 403a. In CD-4, for

example, his plan kept together major military

installations. Id.

Senator Womack’s “fourth” objective was to

ensure that S.B. 8 “respond[s] appropriately to the

ongoing federal Voting Rights Act case in the Middle

District of Louisiana.” Robinson App. at 393a. Senator

Womack cited the prolonged litigation in the Middle

District, highlighting the preliminary injunction

order finding a likely Section 2 violation and the fact

that none of the State’s subsequent appeals had been

successful. Id. at 394a. He explained to his fellow

legislators that “we are here now because of the

federal court’s order that we . . . have a first

opportunity to act [and the] court’s order that we must

have two majority black voting age population

districts.” Id.

Senator Womack noted that he had selected

S.B. 8’s design after “carefully consider[ing] a number

21

of different map options” because it was “the only map

I reviewed that accomplished the political goals I

believe are important for my district, for Louisiana,

and for my country.” Id. at 394a; see also J. Ex. 31 at

4, Callais, ECF No. 181-4. All of the illustrative plans

submitted by plaintiffs in the Middle District

litigation and many of the alternatives proposed

during the special session—including S.B. 4 by

Senator Ed Price, H.B. 5 by Representative Denise

Marcelle, and H.B. 2 by Representative Wilford

Carter—created districts that were more compact and

split fewer parishes than S.B. 8. Crucially, however,

none of these other configurations would accomplish

the goals of “protecting Congresswoman Letlow’s seat,

maintaining strong districts for Speaker Johnson and

Majority Leader Scalise, [and] ensuring four

Republican districts,” as Senator Womack had

prioritized. Robinson App. at 394a.

Senator Womack was clear throughout the

legislative process that his primary objective in

crafting S.B. 8 and rejecting alternatives was political.

When asked why he chose his configuration instead of

the more compact S.B. 4, for example, Senator

Womack answered, “It was strictly politics [that] drove

this map.” Id. at 398a (emphasis added) (cleaned up);

see also id. at 423a (“This map was strictly drawn from

the political aspect.”); id. at 457a (Senator Womack

agreeing that “this is more of a political map” than the

alternative maps introduced during the special

session and that the “primary driver” was protection

of

the

Republican

delegation,

specifically

Congressmembers Johnson, Scalise, Letlow, and

Higgins). When asked specifically whether race was

22

the predominant factor in CD-6’s configuration,

Senator Womack replied, “No, it’s not the

predominant

factor”;

instead,

CD-6

was

“predominantly” driven by the desire to protect two

top-ranking members of the U.S. House of

Representatives and Congresswoman Letlow’s role on

the House Committees for Agriculture and

Appropriations, all of which represented “a lot of []

muscle” for the state of Louisiana. Id. at 396a.

Other legislators echoed the importance of the

political priorities presented by Senator Womack. On

the Senate floor, for example, Senator Jeremy Stine

remarked that the map “safeguards the positions of

pivotal figures, the United States Speaker of the

House, the Majority Leader, and notably, the sole

female member of our congressional delegation. Her

role is not merely symbolic. She’s a linchpin in the

Appropriations [and] Education and [the] Workforce

Committees, which are vital to the prosperity and

well-being of our state.” Id. at 428a–29a. He also

stressed that it was crucial for the Legislature to pass

the map to prevent a court-imposed map that would

ignore these political objectives. Id. 8

During the drafting phase, an early iteration of S.B. 8 was

amended for exclusively political reasons. Senator Heather

Cloud, speaking in support of an amendment adopted in the

Senate committee, explained that the amendment “further

protects Congresswoman Julia Letlow,” and “politically, this

map does a great job protecting Speaker Johnson and

Congresswoman Julia Letlow as well as Majority Leader

Scalise.” Id. at 401a; see also id. at 402a (agreeing that her

motivations were to protect specific incumbents).

8

23

Ultimately, Senator Womack explained, S.B. 8

was “politically drawn to protect our members of

Congress” and to comply with the federal court’s

Section 2 findings. Id. at 445a. The Governor and

other legislators agreed with Senator Womack’s

stated political objectives, which could be

accomplished only by enacting a new map before the

court commenced its own, necessarily apolitical,

remedial process. The Legislature passed S.B. 8 on

January 19, 2024, and the Governor signed it into law

on January 22. See J.A. at 51.

III.

Callais Plaintiffs collaterally attack the

Section 2 remedy.

Shortly after S.B. 8’s enactment, twelve “nonAfrican American voters” (“Callais Plaintiffs”)

challenged the new map in the Western District of

Louisiana as a racial gerrymander. By agreement of

Callais Plaintiffs and Defendant Secretary of State—

who had spent the previous two years seeking to delay

litigation in the Middle District—the proceedings

advanced at lightning speed. See Unopposed Mot. for

Case Mgmt. Conf. & Expedited Scheduling, Callais,

ECF No. 43 (requesting expedited schedule); Elec.

Order Granting Mot. to Set Expedited Br. Schedule,

Callais, ECF No. 62 (granting expedited schedule).

The complaint was filed on January 31 and served on

February 9. See J.A. at 22–67; Executed Summons,

Callais, ECF No. 29. As liability proceedings raced

toward the trial date, discovery was significantly

truncated despite the heavily fact-intensive nature of

Callais Plaintiffs’ racial gerrymandering claim. See

24

Robinson Stay Appl. App. at 271–72 (recounting

minimal depositions and expert preparation). On

April 8—exactly 60 days after the complaint had been

filed—the three-judge district court commenced a 2.5day preliminary injunction hearing consolidated with

trial on the merits. J.A. at 144–47.

On April 30, 2024, the district court determined

by a 2-1 vote that S.B. 8 is an unconstitutional racial

gerrymander and permanently enjoined its use.

Robinson App. 128a. The majority found that race

predominated in the drawing of CD-6 because that

district has an “unusual shape,” includes many of

Louisiana’s “heavily concentrated Black population

neighborhoods,” and was drawn by legislators

motivated to comply with rulings in the Middle

District litigation. Id. at 169a–70a. The majority held

that the Legislature’s consideration of race to comply

with Section 2 could not survive strict scrutiny

because S.B. 8 would not have satisfied the Gingles

test ordinarily imposed on illustrative maps

submitted by litigants challenging an enacted map as

violating Section 2. Id. at 178a. In dissent, Judge

Stewart noted that CD-6’s shape was readily

explainable by political motivations and that the

Legislature’s consideration of race to avoid violating

Section 2 was consistent with constitutional

requirements. Id. at 192a.

This Court subsequently stayed the injunction

pending resolution of appeals brought by Robinson

25

Intervenors and the State. See Robinson v. Callais,

144 S. Ct. 1171 (2024) (mem.).

ARGUMENT

In its rush to permanently enjoin S.B. 8, the

district court made significant errors in its legal

analysis and factual findings. Counter to this Court’s

long-standing

and

recently

affirmed

racial

gerrymandering precedent, the district court failed to

credit the political motivations that predominated in

CD-6’s shape from racial motivations, failed to

presume the Legislature’s good faith as required—

particularly where, as here, the plaintiffs failed to

produce an adequate alternative map—and failed to

afford the necessary breathing room owed to

legislatures when they seek to comply with Section 2.

See Alexander, 602 U.S. at 6; Cooper v. Harris, 581

U.S. 285, 293 (2017). These errors—independently

and collectively—require reversal.

I.

Politics, rather than race, was the

predominant motivation for CD-6’s shape.

In Alexander, this Court explained the two

related propositions that must guide the racial

gerrymandering analysis when the legislature

defends its map on political grounds: “First, a party

challenging

a

map’s

constitutionality

must

disentangle race and politics if it wishes to prove that

the legislature was motivated by race as opposed to

partisanship. Second, in assessing a legislature’s

work, we start with a presumption that the legislature

acted in good faith.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 6. The

district court did not adequately account for the

26

Legislature’s political motives, and it altogether failed

to presume good faith.

A.

Louisiana’s political leaders were

motivated

to

protect

favored

incumbents.

Legislatures “must have discretion to exercise

the political judgment necessary to balance competing

interests,” and courts must “exercise extraordinary

caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn

district lines on the basis of race.” Easley v. Cromartie,

532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (cleaned up). Caution is

“especially appropriate . . . where the State has

articulated a legitimate political explanation for its

districting decision.” Id. (reversing district court’s

finding that race rather than politics was

predominant factor in state’s congressional

redistricting plan). “If either politics or race could

explain a district’s contours, the plaintiff has not

cleared its bar.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 9).

The legislative record is clear that politics—not

race—ultimately determined S.B. 8’s district lines and

resulted in its enactment. Senator Womack’s

recitation of his core objectives—protecting the seats

of Congresswoman Letlow, Speaker Johnson, and

Majority Leader Scalise—were echoed by other bill

supporters and were consistent across committee

testimony and floor debates. See Robinson App. 232a–

234a, 393a. Even though other legislators introduced

other bills with two Black-opportunity districts and

amendments seeking to improve compactness and

parish splits, Senator Womack and the Legislature

27

coalesced around S.B. 8 because it was the “only

map . . . that accomplished the political goals I believe

are important for my district, for Louisiana, and for

my country.” Id. at 394a; see also id. at 395a (“It was

strictly politics [that] drove this map.”); id. at 423a

(“This map was strictly drawn from the political

aspect.”). When asked specifically whether race was

the predominant factor in his configuration of CD-6,

Senator Womack replied, “No. It’s not the

predominant factor.” Id. at 395a. Cf. Allen, 599 U.S.

at 31 (“[W]hen asked squarely whether race

predominated in his development of the illustrative

plans, Cooper responded: ‘No. It was a consideration.

This is a Section 2 lawsuit, after all. But it did not

predominate or dominate.’”). Other legislators echoed

the same assertion. See, e.g., id. at 402a (Senator

Cloud, who backed an amendment to S.B. 8, agreeing

that the predominant reason for the amendment was

not race but the protection of specific incumbent

members of Congress); id. at 414a (Chairman Cleo

Fields reminding members of the Senate &

Governmental Affairs Committee of their obligation to

pass a map where “race is not the predominant

reason”).

In fact, Senator Womack considered the

minority population of CD-2 and CD-6 only to

evaluate whether the “performance of it appears to be

positive for the minority district.” Id. at 396a. But, as

he noted, his performance analysis of the districts

focused on whether a Democratic candidate would

likely win, irrespective of the voters’ or candidate’s

28

race: “Our analysis,” he made explicit, “is on party, not

race.” Id. at 399a. 9

While race is “inherently a consideration

where, as here, a governing body must respond to

violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,” that

consideration was “plainly subordinate to the

[Legislature’s]

preoccupation

with

protecting

incumbency and maintaining other political

advantages,” and therefore did not run afoul of the

Constitution. Theriot v. Par. of Jefferson, 185 F.3d

477, 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1999). Indeed, the Legislature’s

consideration of race was necessitated by its political

goals. If the Legislature had failed to draw the second

Black-opportunity district that the Middle District

and Fifth Circuit deemed necessary to avoid a trial

and court-chosen remedial map, then political leaders

would have forfeited their prerogative to prioritize the

reelection of favored allies. Faced with the choice

between a remedial map selected through the

apolitical judicial process and the opportunity to

exercise its own political discretion, the Legislature

took the map-drawing pen specifically to ensure that

9 The circumstantial evidence that the district court relied upon

did not show that racial considerations predominated. The court

cited a heat map provided by Plaintiffs’ expert that shows CD-6

includes areas populated by Black adults. Callais v. Landry, No.

3:24-CV-00122 DCJ-CES-RRS, 2024 WL 1903930, at *16 (W.D.

La. Apr. 30, 2024). But the analysis did not disentangle racial

considerations from political considerations. See Alexander, 602

U.S. at 22 (noting that the evidence could “also support the

inference that politics drove the mapmaking process”); id. at 9

(noting that partisan and racial gerrymanders “are capable of

yielding similar oddities in a district's boundaries.”

29

key Republican members of Congress maintained safe

seats. This decision to retain “the primary

responsibility” for the “inescapably political

enterprise” of redistricting is not only consistent with

but expected by the U.S. Constitution. Alexander, 602

U.S. at 6.

B.

Plaintiffs failed to rebut the

presumption of good faith owed to

the Legislature.

Judicial review of an enacted map must begin

“with a presumption that the legislature acted in good

faith.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 6. This presumption

“reflects the Federal Judiciary’s due respect for the

judgment of state legislators,” minimizes the “hurl[ing

of tawdry] accusations at the political branches,” and

undermines attempts to “transform federal courts into

‘weapons of political warfare.’” Id. at 11 (quoting

Cooper, 581 U.S. at 335 (Alito, J., concurring in part

and

dissenting

in

part)).

Where

racial

gerrymandering plaintiffs fail to submit a proposed

map that would “achieve[]” the State’s legitimate

political objectives while producing significantly

greater racial balance, “it is difficult for plaintiffs to

defeat [the] starting presumption that the legislature

acted in good faith.” Alexander, 602 U.S. at 10, 34–35.

Callais Plaintiffs failed to produce such a map, and

the district court neglected to draw the necessary

adverse inference or otherwise presume the

Legislature’s good faith in the manner that this Court

has required.

30

Callais Plaintiffs’ proposed map would not have

achieved the Legislature’s goal of ensuring the

reelection of key incumbents because it would not

have survived the Middle District’s review for

compliance with Section 2. The Legislature enacted

S.B. 8 after the Fifth Circuit afforded it “an

opportunity to consider a new map now that we have

affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the

[Section 2 plaintiffs] have a likelihood of success on

the merits.” Robinson, 86 F.4th at 601. At the time of

S.B. 8’s enactment, the Middle District had already

scheduled deadlines for discovery, briefing, and trial

(if necessary) on any remedial map’s compliance with

Section 2. See Robinson, ECF No. 330 at 3. Thus,

because Callais Plaintiffs’ proposed map failed to

create the second Black-opportunity district that

Section 2 requires, it would have been quickly

enjoined and replaced by a court-chosen alternative.

Just as a map that purports to protect incumbents

with safe districts will not, in fact, achieve that

protection if the map features districts that are noncontiguous, malapportioned, or multi-member, see La.

J.R. 21(C) (requiring contiguous districts); Karcher v.

Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983) (requiring equally

populated congressional districts); 2 U.S.C. § 2c

(requiring single-member districts), a map will fail to

achieve political goals—or any goals—if it fails to

comply with Section 2.

Because Callais Plaintiffs failed to produce an

alternative map that would have protected the

reelection prospects of Republican incumbents while

satisfying all other legal prerequisites—including

compliance with Section 2—the district court should

31

have interpreted this failure “as an implicit

concession that the plaintiff[s] cannot draw a map

that undermines the legislature’s defense.” Alexander,

602 U.S. at 35.

II.

The Louisiana Legislature had a strong

basis to believe that Section 2 requires a

second Black-opportunity congressional

district in Louisiana.

To the extent the Legislature did consider race

in enacting SB 8, it had good reason to do so—a federal

court determined that Section 2 requires a second

Black-opportunity district in Louisiana, and the

State’s repeated efforts to disturb that finding on

appeal all failed.

Notably, states need not prove that Section 2

actually required the minority-opportunity district

before adopting it. Rather, to satisfy strict scrutiny’s

narrow tailoring requirement, the state must

establish only “that it had ‘good reasons’ to think that

it would transgress the Act if it did not draw racebased district lines.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 293 (quoting

Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254,

278 (2015)). This standard “gives states ‘breathing

room’ to adopt reasonable compliance measures that

may prove, in perfect hindsight, not to have been

needed.” Id. (quoting Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of

Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 196 (2017)).

The Middle District litigation provided those

good reasons here. The parties, including Jeff Landry

and the Legislature’s presiding officers in their official

capacities, extensively litigated the State’s Section 2

32

responsibilities. In a week-long trial-like hearing

before the district court, twenty different witnesses

testified about the merits, and the court issued 152

pages of meticulous findings of fact and conclusions of

law, ultimately holding that H.B. 1’s inclusion of only

a single Black-opportunity district likely violated

Section 2. See Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 766–858;

Robinson, 37 F.4th at 215.

The case was not close—the district court

credited the testimony of every plaintiff witness and

identified significant flaws in the testimony of every

defense witness. Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 820–51.

And the court focused considerable attention on the

primary complaint lodged in this litigation—that a

congressional map with two Black-opportunity

districts could not be drawn without racial

gerrymandering—and methodically refuted the

argument. Id. at 834–39. Over the next 18 months, the

State exhausted every avenue for appeal, pressing its

racial gerrymandering arguments before this Court

and before Fifth Circuit motions, merits, mandamus,

and en banc panels—but not a single judge or justice

indicated that the Section 2 holding was likely in

error. See Robinson, 37 F.4th at 227; In re Landry, 83

F.4th at 305; Robinson, 86 F.4th at 583; Ardoin, 143

S. Ct. at 2654.

Thus, by January 2024 the Legislature had

good reason to believe that Louisiana’s congressional

map would need to create a second Black-opportunity

district to withstand Section 2 review. The creation of

this district was therefore permissible, even if it may

have proved, “in perfect hindsight, not to have been

33

needed.” Cooper, 581 U.S. at 293. Because race-based

districting is justified wherever there is “a strong

basis in evidence” for concluding that Section 2

requires a minority-opportunity district, id. at 292

(quoting Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 575 U.S. at 278), it

is tautological that such evidence is present where a

court of appeals confirms a district court’s

comprehensive findings that the evidence indicates

that Section 2 plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the

merits of their claims.

Louisiana’s political leaders left no doubt about

their understanding that a congressional map lacking

a second Black-opportunity district would be enjoined

for violating Section 2. When Governor Landry issued

the “court[-]required call for a redistricting special

session” on the day he took office, he explained that he

was doing so because of the Section 2 litigation. J.A.

98. 10 Having tested plaintiffs’ evidence in every way

he could as Attorney General—and having failed to

identify any significant gaps in that evidence or flaws

in the courts’ legal reasoning—Governor Landry

announced that he had “exhausted ALL legal

remedies” and it was time to “heed the instructions of

the Court” and “make the Adjustments necessary” to

the congressional map. Id. at 99. S.B. 8’s sponsors and

supporters shared this understanding. See Robinson

App. 352a, 393a, 539a. The district court’s failure to

credit this extensive evidence was reversible error.

10 Governor Jeff Landry Assumes Office, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR

(Jan. 8, 2024), https://gov.louisiana.gov/news/governor-jefflandry-assumes-office.

34

CONCLUSION

By enjoining the Legislature’s remedial map,

the district court’s ruling effectively precludes states

from attempting to remedy a Section 2 violation.

Redistricting’s inherently political nature ordinarily

provides political actors an opportunity to pursue

political ends. See Alexander, 602 U.S. at 6. According

to the district court’s logic, however, if legislators

intend to comply with Section 2—which inherently

requires a certain quantum of race consciousness that

this Court has long permitted, see Allen, 599 U.S. at

30, Cooper, 581 U.S. at 292–93; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.

952, 976–77 (1996) (plurality op.); id. at 990–92

(O’Connor, J., concurring)—then they cannot also

seek the political goals that will regularly require

departures from maximum compactness, minimal

subdivision splits, or other traditional districting

criteria, see Callais v. Landry, No. 3:24-cv-00122,

2024 WL 1903930, at *19 (W.D. La. Apr. 30, 2024)

(holding map challenged as racial gerrymander must

satisfy Gingles’s examination of politically neutral

redistricting criteria). To avoid the trap laid by the

majority below, legislators will have no choice but to

accede to the choices of district courts tasked with

adopting remedial maps in Section 2 cases, for only

those maps will forsake political goals in service of

aesthetics. That inversion would “essentially

countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust

districting to political entities.” Rucho, 588 U.S. at

701.

The Court should reverse.

35

Respectfully submitted,

Lalitha D. Madduri

Jacob D. Shelly

Daniel Cohen

Qizhou Ge

ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP

250 Massachusetts

Ave, NW

Suite 400

Washington, D.C.

20001

(202) 968-4490

/s/ Abha Khanna

Abha Khanna

Counsel of Record

ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP

1700 Seventh Avenue,

Suite 2100

Seattle, Washington

98101

(206) 656-0177

AKhanna@elias.law

Counsel for Galmon

Amici