Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Sara Ann Edmondson, Petitioner

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No.

-1053

In title

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

P!|Ii

filed

MAR 1 5 2025

°Upt?EEMEFcni^PTL,^K

hi re Sara Ann Edmondson, Petitioner

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE

COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Sara Ann Edmondson, Pro Se

71 Rainbow Trail

Pittsgrove, NJ 08318

609.501.2249

I*

*

't-5

I

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether this Court will exercise the power enumerated

and entitled in Insurance Company v. Comstock to issue a

writ of mandamus on the Third Circuit to reinstate the

improperly removed Article in Section 2 claims of the one

case controversy for appropriate adjudication under the

established standard of review and remand.

Whether this Court will exercise its authority to direct

investigations into possible conspiracy, color of law and

bank fraud violations.

£

Tfc

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Sara Ann Edmondson, Petitioner in

(plaintiff-appellee in the court of appeals)

this

Court

Respondents in this matter United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit; Judge Patty Shwartz in her

capacity as Circuit Judge; Judge Cheryl Krause, in her

capacity as Circuit Judge; Judge Richard Nygaard in his

capacity as Circuit Judge; Judge Tameka

Montgomery-Reeves in her capacity as Circuit Judge;

Judge Thomas Hardiman in his capacity as Circuit Judge;

Judge L. Felipe Restrepo in his capacity as Circuit Judge;

Judge Paul Matey in his capacity as Circuit Judge; Judge

Cindy Chung in her capacity as Circuit Judge.

*

STATMMNT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The following proceedings are directly related to the case

in this Court within the meaning of Rule 14.1(b)(iii): U.S.

District Court of New Jersey No. 13-cv-7704; U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit, No. 17-1991; U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit, No. 18-2203; U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit, No. 23-2938.

/

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented for Review

i

Parties to the Proceeding

ii

Statement of Related Proceedings

11

Table of Contents

m

Concise Statement of Jurisdiction

iv

Table of Authorities

v

Petition For A Writ of Mandamus

1

Opinions Below

1

Jurisdiction

1

.*

i

Constitutional and Statutes Provisions Involved 2

Statement of the Case

Existence of Live Controversy

2

7

;

28 use 1651 & 28 use 2106

12

IV

Reasons for Granting the Petition

13

No Other Adequate Means To Obtain Relief

16

Clear and Indisputable

16

Conclusion

17

Appendix Table of Contents

19

A

CONCISE STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioner’s Petition for a writ of mandamus has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

.

V

TABLE OP AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Arabian Motors Grp. W.L.L. v. Ford Motor Co., 19 F.4th 938

(6th Cir. 2021)

4,11,

Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81

(2004) ........................................................

14,17

* V, /

!

1

:

I

Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty

Co., 393 U.S. 145,139 S.Ct. 337, 340, 21 L.Ed.2d 301 (1968)

16

Delgrosso v. Spang and Co., 903 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1990)

.............................................................................. 1, 3, 7,

8

ExParte Crane, 5 Pet. 190,192, SL. Ed. 92,94 (1832) .. 12

Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240,256

(3d Cir. 2013)

11

j

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183,190 (2010) .... 14

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623. 625, 99

L.Ed. 942 (1955)

13

Insurance Company v. Comstock, 83 U.S. 258 (1872)

........................................................................ 6, 15, 16,

17

Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003) ..... 3,4

>

VI

Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,

523 U. S. 26,35 (1998)

16

Morton Intern., Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 470

(3d Cir. 2006)

9

Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 265

(3d Cir. 2013)

3,8

Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S.__ (2024)

15

Thermtron Products, Inc., v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336,

352 (1976)

12,15

United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715

(1966)

3,11

Statutes

18 U.S. Code § 1344

28 U.S. Code § 1651

28 U.S. Code § 2106

Constitution

Article HI Section 2 Clause 1.11.6

12,13

9,12

9,13

2,3,17

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Petitioner petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to

I reinstate the improperly removed claims under Article HI

: Section 2 for appropriate standard of review established

by the Circuit under Delgrosso v. Sprang and subsequently

remand to the State Tribunal for adjudication without

! entitlement to the benefit of res judicata. Insurance

Company v. Comstock

OPINIONS BELOW

The District Court Memorandum Order administratively

: terminating Article m Section 2 claims appears in

Petitioner’s Appendix A. There is no corresponding Third

Circuit Court of Appeals written opinion or adjudication

in this matter that meets its own appropriate, established

standard of review of administratively terminated Article

HI Section 2 claims under Delgrosso v. Spang & Co.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under the All Writs Act of 28

U.S.C. 1651 encapsulated under Insurance Company v.

Comstock.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides: “The

Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of

Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in

aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the

usages and principles of law.”

Article ID Section 2 covers Supplemental Jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

“One Constitutional Case”

This case requires the supervisory power of the Court to

reinstate an improperly removed cause under Article III

Section 2 of the Constitution as a result of the Third

Circuit’s resistance to exercise its supervisory power over

the district court. The memorandum order attached at

Appendix A summarizes the history of the matter and

documents the contract, breach and fraud issues that ■

were

presented

and

subsequently

removed.

The

3

administrative termination of “the pending motion”

speaks to that which was removed from the docket and

that which required standard procedural review under the

Third Circuit’s Delgrosso v. Spang. In the event an

improperly removed Article III Section 2 claim is neither

reviewed nor an appropriate determination made by the

Circuit, then the matter remains a live controversy under

the Third Circuit’s definition in Papotto, which defines an

administrative termination as “judicially removed ...

without making any final adjudication”, as well as under

the Supreme Court’s United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs and Jinks v. Richland County. (“Title 28 U. S. C. §

1367 determines whether a federal district court with

jurisdiction over a civil action may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over other claims forming part of the same

Article III "case or controversy." If the court declines to

;

4

exercise such jurisdiction, the claims will be dismissed

and must be refiled in state court.” Jinks v. Richland

County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003)) The standard bearer Sixth

Circuit in its Arabian Motors ruling gives further clarity on

the issue at hand and the appropriate supervision thereof:

How, one might ask, could a live controversy exist

over a dispute that has been arbitrated and in

which our court has already confirmed the

arbitration award? It is a fair question, one of

several oddities of this long-running dispute. The

lingering complication arises from the reality that

Arabian Motors withdrew some of its claims-the

contract and fraud elaims-from the arbitration. One

possibility is that those claims were withdrawn

with prejudice, confirming that this dispute is

indeed over - and moot through and through.

Another possibility is that the rules of the

arbitration tribunal allow a party to remove claims

from the dispute resolution without prejudice - and

renew them later. Because the latter possibility

remains a realistic possibility, a live question

remains about whether Arabian Motors’ common

law claims will go to arbitration. Recall that.

. Arabian Motors brought breach of contract arid

fraud claims in its federal court complaint. In the

last trip to our circuit, we held that the district

5

court had not yet ruled on these claims, but that we •

could review them when it did. Arabian Motors

Grp., 775 F. App’x at 217 n.l. That confirms that the

arbitration award did not resolve whether these

counterclaims must be arbitrated.

While it is worth noting that the federal court complaint

here also brought breach and fraud claims, the lingering

complication here arises from the reality that the District

Court removed via administrative termination some of the

claims - the contract and fraud claims - from the docket.

See

Appendix

A.

Judicial

admissions

of

misrepresentations in the essential terms of the contract,

breach and fraud were placed on the record through the

memorandum order. Additionally, while the memorandum

order states the oral argument was to select an arbitrator,

the docket sheet reveals that it was a summary judgment

hearing to address contract claims making that entire

process a bait and switch. See Appendix B, Docket No. 71.

6

“Power to issue the writ of mandamus to the

circuit courts is exercised by this Court to compel

the circuit court to proceed to a final judgment or

decree in a cause, in order that this Court may

exercise the jurisdiction of review given by law;

and in the case of Ex Parte Bradstreet, [Footnote

9] this Court decided, Marshall, C.J., giving the

opinion of the court, that every party has a right to

the judgment of this Court in a suit brought by him

in one of the inferior courts of the United States,

provided the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or

value of two thousand dollars, and that the court in

such case will issue the writ to a circuit court or a

district court exercising circuit court powers, in a

case where the subordinate court had improperly

dismissed the case, requiring the court to reinstate

the case and to proceed to try and adjudge the

issues between the parties.” Insurance Company v.

Comstock, 83 U.S. 258 (1872)

The

focus

of this

case is encapsulated in the

aforementioned Insurance Company v. Comstock, the

refusal of the Circuit to adjudicate pursuant to the

accepted procedural standard of review has caused willful

and intentional 5th and 14th Amendment violations to the

Petitioner’s Constitutional rights. Additionally, it leaves a

. f

7

live controversy. As a result, the matter before this Court

embarks on a solicitation for a writ of mandamus

obligating the exercise of procedural due process

pursuant to the standard of review well established by the

Third

Circuit

on

matters

involving

judicial

administratively terminated Article in Section 2 claims,

which along with the federal claims comprise but one

constitutional "case".

THE EXISTENCE OF AUVE CONTROVERSY

The Third Circuit itself acknowledges its supervisory

position in matters of “administrative termination” and

has an extensive record of issuing Writs of Mandamus. In

its Delgrosso ruling:

Similarly, the order in this case permits

reinstatement and contemplates the possibility of

future proceedings. The order does not purport to

end litigation on the merits and the parties agree

that it does not determine any issues or resolve the

8

entire case. We recognize that the conduct of the

district court raises the question whether the order

effectively, if not expressly, brings the case to a

close. On balance, however, we believe that the

order is not final for purposes of § 1291 and that

the Participants' allegations regarding the conduct

of the district court are properly addressed through

a petition for a writ of mandamus. Delgrosso v.

Spang and Co., 903 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1990)

V

According to the Third Circuit Court’s Papotto ruling, an

outright administrative termination of a claim under

Article HI Section 2 of the Constitution is one that has

been judicially “removed ... without making any final

adjudication”. Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins.

Co., 731 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013). In its supervisory role, the

Third Circuit has had an established legal and standard

mode

of procedure

for

reviewing district court

administrative terminations under Local Civil Rule 41.1.

In Patten Securities Com, v. Diamond Greyhound

& Genetics. Inc.. 819 F.2d 400 f.3d Cir. 19871. we

considered the appealability of an order that

9

denied cross motions to dismiss, "administratively

terminated" the action pending arbitration, and

authorized reinstatement upon motion by either

party. We held that the order was not a final

judgment because it permitted reinstatement and

clearly contemplated the possibility of further

proceedings. Id. at 403.m

In Morton InternInc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 470

(3d Cir. 2006), the Third Circuit is very clear on how it

reviews administrative termination orders.

In its Prunerica Holdings ruling, not only is a writ

issued but the case is also reassigned:

In light of these unfortunate circumstances, we will

grant the petition for mandamus. We must also

exercise our authority to direct the Chief Judge of

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to reassign the

case to another district court judge on remand. See

Alexander v. Primerica Holdings. Inc... 10 F.3d 155.

167 f3d Cir. 19931 ("We are authorized to order the

reassignment of this case to another district court

judge pursuant either to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1661(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 2106."). Although we

recognize that "[t]he decision to remove a judge

from an ongoing trial should be considered

10

seriously and made only rarely," Huber v. Tavlor.

532 F.3d 237. 251 f3d Cir.2008). the district court's

troubling actions in this case leave us with no

alternative.

Because public confidence in the judicial system

mandates, at a minimum, the appearance of

neutrality and impartiality in the administration of

justice, we will issue a writ of mandamus, in the

exercise of our supervision over the district court,

see Haines v. Liggett Group Inc.. 975 F.2d 81. 97-98

f3d Cir, 19921. directing: (1) no further proceedings

in this case take place before Judge Lechner; and

(2) that the Chief Judge order the Clerk of the

District Court of the District of New Jersey to

reassign this case to another district court judge.

Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F. 3d 155 Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 1993.

“On the basis only of the record”, this Court will note the

language in the District Court Memorandum Order

removing the Article 111 Section 2 claims without

authorizing reinstatement or contemplating further

proceedings. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F. 2d 81 Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 1992. See Appendix A.

11

Like Arabian Motors and Gibbs, removed contract.

claims in this matter are still left to be submitted before

the state tribunal without the entitlement to the benefit of

raising res judicata. Like Alexander, this matter should

also be reassigned due to the Circuit’s “troubling actions”.

The Third Circuit engaged in a profound assault on

this Citizen’s rights in an attempt to circumvent the

following,

In general, an innocent party can void a contract

induced by fraud. See In Re Allegheny Inti,954 F.2d

167, 178 (3d Cir.1992). This doctrine applies with

equal force to arbitration agreements—the

defrauded party can void the agreement and

pursue its claims in court. See Rent-A-Center v.

Jackson,----U.S.

130 S.Ct 2772, 2776, 2778,

177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010) (“Like other contracts,

[arbitration agreements] may be invalidated by

generally applicable contract defenses, such as

fraud, duress, or unconseionability.” (citation and

question marks omitted)). Freeman v. Pittsburgh

Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 256 (3d Cir. 2013)

12

The only viable solution for this problem is the writ of

mandamus as "[i]t issues to the judges of any inferior

court commanding them to do justice according to the

powers of their office whenever the same is delayed.'

ExParte Crane, 5 Pet. 190, 192, 8L. Ed. 92, 94(1832).

Continued delay and refusal to conduct a review

according to procedural standard established by the Third

Circuit means Petitioner's ‘right of redress is being

severely impaired". Thermtron, supra, 423 U.S. at 3419 46

L. Ed. 2d 542, 96 S. Ct. 584. Further, the unwarranted and

intentional Writs of Execution on Petitioner’s property as

a result of 28 USC 241 and 28 USC 242 incur claims of 18

USC 1344.

28 USC 1651fal & 28 USC 2106

The All Writs Act (28 U.S. Code § 1651) gave the "Supreme

Court and all courts established by Act of Congress" the

!

13

authority to issue writs of mandamus "in aid of their

respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and

principles of law."

28 USC § 2106 instructs, “The Supreme Court or

any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm,

modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree,

or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review,

and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such

appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such

further proceedings to be had as may be just under the

circumstances.”

Those proceedings should include

investigations under 18 USC 1344, 28 USC 241 and 28 USC

242.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

14

The issuance of a writ of mandamus to a lower

court is warranted when a party establishes that “(1) ‘no

other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he

desires,’ (2) the party’s ‘right to issuance of the writ is

“clear and indisputable,”’ and (3) ‘the writ is appropriate

under the circumstances.’” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558

U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Cheney v.

United States Dist Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004))

(brackets in original). Mandamus is reserved for

“exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial

‘usurpation of power.’” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (citation

omitted).

A "traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate

jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts

has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise

of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its

15

authority when it is its duty to do so." Roche v.

Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); Ex parte

Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584 (1943); Bankers Life Cas. Co. v.

Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953). "Repeated decisions of

this Court have established the rule . .. that the writ will

lie in a proper case to direct a subordinate Federal court

to decide a pending cause," Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 16

Wall. 258, 270 (1873), or to require "a Federal court of

inferior jurisdiction to reinstate a case, and to proceed to

try and abdicate the same." McClellan v. Carland, 217

U.S., at 280. Thermtron Products, Inc., v. Hermansdorfer,

423 U.S. 336, 352 (1976)

This Court furthers in Smith v. Spizzirri that words

matter and words including “will”, “must” and “shall”

“create an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”

.

16

Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,

623 U. S. 26, 35 (1998)

“The right to trial by an impartial judge ‘is a basic

requirement of due process.”’ In re Murchison, 349

U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623,625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955).

Additionally, “Impartiality and the appearance of

impartiality in a judicial officer are the sine qua non

of the American legal system.” In Commonwealth

Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393

U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct. 337, 340, 21 L.Ed.2d 301 (1968),

the United States Supreme Court stated: ”[A]ny

tribunal permitted by law to try cases and

controversies not only must be unbiased but also

must avoid even the appearance of bias."

NO OTHER ADEQUATE MF.ANS TO OBTAIN RELIEF1

Insurance Company v. Comstock guarantees and provides

the means necessary to rectify an improperly dismissed or

removed cause requiring reinstatement and appropriate

adjudication. There is no other means of relief.

CLEAR AND INDISPUTABLE

17

It is clear and indisputable that Insurance Company v.

Comstock creates an obligation “impervious to judicial

discretion”.

CONCLUSION

While the Circuit has repeatedly refused to exercise its

supervisory role and in August 2024 denied a motion to

file a certified question under Rule 19 with the Supreme

Court for instructions and directives, Insurance Company

v. Comstock provides a clear mandate for a writ of

mandamus in matters of the improper removal of Article

m Section 2 claims. Mandamus is reserved for

“exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial

‘usurpation of power.’” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (citation

omitted). At no time during Petitioner’s visits to the Third

Circuit did the Appellate Court see fit to follow the

18

prescribed

procedures

to

review

administratively

terminated Article IE Section 2 claims, which is a clear

usurpation of power that now requires this Court’s

intervention.

7s/ Sara Ann Edmondson

Sara Ann Edmondson, Pro Se