Reply Brief — Cedric Galette, Petitioner v. New Jersey Transit Corporation

Supreme Court briefDec 12, 2025

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Nos. 24-1021, 24-1113

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

CEDRIC GALETTE, PETITIONER

NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION

————

NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

JEFFREY COLT AND BETSY TSAI

————

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA AND THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK

————

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE NEW JERSEY

TRANSIT PETITIONERS

————

MATTHEW J. PLATKIN

Attorney General

JEAN P. REILLY

JEREMY M. FEIGENBAUM*

DANIEL M. VANNELLA

Solicitor General

Assistant Attorneys General MICHAEL L. ZUCKERMAN

Deputy Solicitor General

KATHERINE L. PRINGLE

FFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY

SCOTT H. HENNEY

ENERAL

OF NEW JERSEY

FRIEDMAN KAPLAN SEILER

25 Market Street, Box 080

ADELMAN & ROBBINS LLP

Trenton, NJ 08625

7 Times Square

(862) 350-5800

New York, NY 10036

jeremy.feigenbaum@njoag.gov

Counsel for Petitioners

December 12, 2025

* Counsel of Record

[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED ON INSIDE COVER]

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

NATHANIEL F. RUBIN

AMY CHUNG

MARIE CEPEDA MEKOSH

BRETT HAROLDSON

JONATHAN L. WANG

JONATHAN W. ALLEN

BETHANNE PRUGH

LEVI KLINGER-CHRISTIANSEN

Deputy Attorneys General

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

INTRODUCTION ................................................

ARGUMENT ........................................................

I. Plaintiffs’ Novel Tests Fail .......................

II. The Arm-Of-The-State Test Applies

Straightforwardly To NJ Transit ..............

A. Textual And Structural Intent............

B. State Control .......................................

C. Financial Integration ..........................

D. “Traditional” Function ........................

CONCLUSION ....................................................

(i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Arkansas v. Texas,

346 U.S. 368 (1953) ...................................

Auer v. Robbins,

519 U.S. 452 (1997) ...................................

Bank of Ky. v. Wister,

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 318 (1829) ........................

Bank of U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia,

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824)...................

Biden v. Nebraska,

600 U.S. 477 (2023) ......................... 7, 14, 16, 17

Briscoe v. Bank of Ky.,

36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837) ......................

Cherry Cotton Mills v. United States,

327 U.S. 536 (1946) ...................................

Chisholm v. Georgia,

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) ........................

Cummings v. Missouri,

71 U.S. 277 (1866) .....................................

Dartmouth College v. Woodward,

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)...................

Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s,

575 U.S. 43 (2015) ........................... 7, 14, 16, 20

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,

597 U.S. 215 (2022) ...................................

Edelman v. Jordan,

415 U.S. 651 (1974) ................................... 18, 19

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Ex parte New York,

256 U.S. 490 (1921) ...................................

Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy,

295 U.S. 229 (1935) ...................................

Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports

Auth.,

535 U.S. 743 (2002) ................................... 18, 19

First Iowa Hydro-Elec. v. Fed. Power

Comm’n,

328 U.S. 152 (1946) ...................................

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,

587 U.S. 230 (2019) ....................... 10, 16, 18, 22

Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark,

236 A.3d 965 (N.J. 2020) ..........................

Garcia v. San Antonia Metro. Transit

Auth.,

469 U.S. 528 (1985) ...................................

Governor v. Madrazo,

26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828) ........................

Haaland v. Brackeen,

599 U.S. 255 (2023) ...................................

Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,

513 U.S. 30 (1994) ............... 1, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20

Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. Coll. of S.C.,

221 U.S. 636 (1911) ...................................

In re Ambroise,

318 A.3d 75 (N.J. 2024) ............................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin.

Corp.,

306 U.S. 381 (1939) ...................................

Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc.,

606 U.S. 748 (2025) ...................................

Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t,

576 U.S. 446 (2015) ...................................

Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan.

Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) ..................... 1, 11

Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,

513 U.S. 374 (1995) ........................... 3, 7, 14, 16

Lewis v. Clarke,

581 U.S. 155 (2017) ...................................

Lincoln County v. Luning,

133 U.S. 529 (1890) ...................................

Marshall v. Klebanov,

902 A.2d 873 (N.J. 2006) ..........................

McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages &

Tobacco,

496 U.S. 18 (1990) .....................................

Missouri v. Illinois,

180 U.S. 208 (1901) ................................... 5, 14

Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda,

411 U.S. 693 (1973) ...................................

Morris v. WMATA,

781 F.2d 218 (CADC 1986) ....................... 20, 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

Doyle,

429 U.S. 274 (1977) ................................. 2, 7, 12

Nabob of Arcot v. E. India Co.

[1793] 29 Eng. Rep. 841 (Ch.) ...................

New York v. New Jersey,

256 U.S. 296 (1921) ...................................

Osborn v. Bank of the United States,

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)...................

P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n,

531 F.3d 868 (CADC 2008) ............... 2, 3, 18, 19

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman,

465 U.S. 89 (1984) .....................................

Porto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo.

227 U.S. 270 (1913) ...................................

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe,

519 U.S. 425 (1997) ............................... 1, 17, 18

Sec’y of State v. Sahaba,

[1859] 15 Eng. Rep. 9 (PC) .......................

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44 (1996) .....................................

Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Shipping

Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.,

258 U.S. 549 (1922) ...................................

Springboards to Educ. v. McAllen Indep.

Sch. Dist.,

62 F.4th 174 (CA5 2023) ...........................

3, 4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

State Highway Commission v. Utah

Construction Co.,

278 U.S. 194 (1929) ...................................

6, 7

Thacker v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,

587 U.S. 218 (2019) ...................................

United States v. Arthrex, Inc.,

594 U.S. 1 (2021) ....................................... 14, 15

United States v. New Mexico,

455 U.S. 720 (1982) ...................................

United States v. Peters,

9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) ....................

VOPA v. Stewart,

563 U.S. 247 (2011). .................................. 8, 18

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. art. I, §10 ...................................

U.S. Const. amend. XI ..................................

N.J. Const. art. V, §4, ¶1 ..............................

N.J. Const. art. VIII, §2, ¶3 .........................

STATUTES

20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3805/20..................

Minn. Stat. Ann. §462A.14...........................

1903 N.J. Laws p.780 ...................................

2013 N.J. Laws ch.76 ...................................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:158A-3 ..........................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §11A:2-1 ..............................

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-2 ......................... 13, 16, 20

N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-4(a)...........................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-4.1(b)(1) ...................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-5(z) ...........................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-15 .............................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-16 .............................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-24.2 ..........................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §39:2A-4(a) ..........................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §39:2A-36(a) ........................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §40:14B-20 ..........................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §40A:14-152 ........................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §48:2-1(a).............................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §52:13D-13(a) ......................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §52:14-7(a)...........................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §52:32-40 .............................

N.J. Stat. Ann. §55:14K-5.3 .........................

Tex. Gov’t Code §2306.071(c) .......................

COURT FILINGS

Baude & Sachs Br., Franchise Tax Bd. of

Cal. v. Hyatt, No. 17-1299, 2018 WL

4583702 (Sept. 18, 2018) ..........................

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Corporator, Noah Webster, Am. Dictionary

of the English Language (1828) ...............

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787

(M. Farrand ed., 1911) ..............................

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE NEW JERSEY

TRANSIT PETITIONERS

————

INTRODUCTION

Overwhelming evidence shows that NJ Transit is an

arm of New Jersey, and Plaintiffs cannot dispute most

of it. Plaintiffs cannot dispute that the New Jersey

Legislature intended NJ Transit to be a State arm

in form and substance—placing it in the Executive

Branch, subjecting it to myriad restrictions applicable

only to state agencies, commanding it to waive

sovereign immunity as to certain federal claims, and

more. Nor can they seriously dispute the Governor

exercises control over NJ Transit, not just by

appointing its voting members (some removable at

will), but by holding veto power over all their actions.

And Plaintiffs cannot dispute that the Legislature

structured NJ Transit to be financially dependent on

the State, limiting its abilities to increase revenue, cut

costs, or issue debt. As the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court recognized, NJ Transit is an arm of the State

under established law.

That result makes sense. States have discretion in

creating an arm—i.e., an entity sufficiently connected

to the State to be eligible for its immunity. So to decide

whether a State sought to and objectively did create a

state entity, rather than a private or municipal one,

courts consider “the relationship between the State

and the entity,” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519

U.S. 425, 429 (1997)—as revealed by textual and

structural evidence of intent, sovereign political

control, and financial integration, see id., at 429-431;

Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,

44-46 (1994); Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg’l

Plan. Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401-402 (1979); Mt.

Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.

274, 280 (1977); P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n,

531 F.3d 868, 873-874 (CADC 2008) (PRPA). In that

light, NJ Transit is like other state agencies, and

unlike any municipality or private company. Allowing

a sister-state court, misunderstanding New Jersey

law, to tell New Jersey it failed to share its sovereignty

flouts basic interstate-immunity principles.

Perhaps mindful that settled law dismantles their

case, Plaintiffs demand this Court discard a staggering amount of precedent. But even as Plaintiffs attack

decades of jurisprudence, they cannot agree on a

replacement, whether a magic-words test turning on

corporate status, formal financial separation, and/or

“traditional government functions.” For good reason:

none of their theories accord with original understanding or first principles, and all would disrupt

longstanding practice on the ground. Much more is

needed to justify that upheaval, and Plaintiffs’

multifarious theories cannot come close.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs’ Novel Tests Fail.

Plaintiffs’ efforts to avoid the result of this Court’s

precedents by overturning them all fall short. Rather

than consider an entity’s substance—by assessing

text and structure, sovereign control, and financial

integration—Plaintiffs advocate for a mélange of

wooden replacement rules. But see Cummings v.

Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325 (1866) (“The Constitution

deals with substance, not shadows.”). Some amici treat

separate personhood (via corporate or sue-and-be-sued

status) as dispositive. See Baude.Br.2-26. Colt relies

on corporate status but only if a corporation is formally

liable for its own debts. Br.24. And Galette asks

whether the entity has “(1) sole responsibility for

paying judgments entered against it and (2) operational independence from its state creator, including

sue-and-be-sued authority.” Br.12; compare Colt.Br.26

(arguing “sue-and-be-sued clauses aren’t dispositive,”

but “corporate form is”). But none of these variegated

tests work, because the premise is wrong: the view

that government corporations always lack sovereignty

contravenes history and precedent, upending settled

sovereign expectations and producing chaos alike.

1. A government entity’s corporate status has

never been dispositive.

The Founding Generation did not view corporate

status that way. Plaintiffs’ argument rests principally

not on primary sources, but on two single-judge

concurrences. See Springboards to Educ. v. McAllen

Indep. Sch. Dist., 62 F.4th 174, 187-199 (CA5 2023)

(Oldham, J., concurring); PRPA, 531 F.3d, at 881-884

(Williams, J., concurring). The Founding-Era sources,

by contrast, recognized that although corporations

were often inferior to the sovereign, special public

corporations—essentially, corporations created “by

special law, for the furtherance of governmental

objectives,” Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513

U.S. 374, 399 (1995)—could be sovereign.

To start, pre-modern sources described the sovereign itself as a special corporation. NJT.Br.44 n.14.

Sovereign-affiliated trading corporations like the

British East India Company enjoyed some measure of

sovereign immunity in England and, more saliently,

abroad. See Sec’y of State v. Sahaba, [1859] 15 Eng.

Rep. 9, 29 (PC) (citing, e.g., Nabob of Arcot v. E. India

Co. [1793] 29 Eng. Rep. 841 (Ch.)). As for the

Founding-Era debate about States’ corporate status,

the key distinction was not between corporations

and non-corporations, but between special, sovereign

entities and “mere Corporations,” “corporations for

local purposes,” or “corporations dependent on the

Genl. Legislature,” with “only corporate rights.” See 1

Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 263, 287,

357, 474 (M. Farrand ed., 1911) (emphases added); see

also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447-448

(1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (distinguishing States

from “subordinate corporations” with more “limited”

powers). So while all agree that a “mere corporation[]”

is less than sovereign, see Springboards, 62 F.4th, at

191-193 (Oldham, J., concurring) (citing examples), it

does not follow that the bare term “corporation” does

identical work.

This Court’s early cases thus rejected a rule that

corporate status created categorical separation from

a sovereign. While not on sovereign immunity,

Dartmouth College v. Woodward observed corporate

status “neither gives nor prevents” governmental

status. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 638 (1819) (Marshall,

C.J.). Justice Story’s concurrence acknowledged the

existence of truly “public” corporations, in which “the

government have the sole right … to regulate,

control, and direct the corporation,” and where “its

whole interests and franchises are the exclusive

property and domain of the government itself”—

presaging the factors this Court assesses today. Id., at

671-672 (Story, J., concurring). And Osborn v. Bank of

the United States held the Bank partook of

U.S. sovereignty despite its corporate form for

intergovernmental-tax-immunity purposes, 22 U.S.

(9 Wheat.) 738, 862-863 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)—a

holding relevant here, since tax immunity asks if the

entity is “so closely connected to the Government that

the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate,”

United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982).

This Court’s eighteenth-century rulings regarding

state-connected banks are not to the contrary. There

was an obvious reason why States were not imbuing

banks with their sovereignty: States are not allowed

to issue bills of credit, U.S. Const. art. I, §10, and

courts assume legislative bodies intend to follow the

Constitution. E.g., Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 36 U.S.

(11 Pet.) 257, 326-327 (1837); Bank of Ky. v. Wister,

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 318, 324 (1829). And the case Plaintiffs

invoke most, Bank of the United States v. Planters’

Bank of Georgia, involved a state-chartered bank for

which the State’s role was “merely as a corporator,”

with private trading “partner[s]” and “no other power

in the management of the affairs of the corporation.”

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907-908 (1824). But

“corporator” just meant a “member of a corporation.”

Corporator, Noah Webster, Am. Dictionary of the

English Language (1828)—having an “interest” by

holding “shares” alongside other shareholders. 22

U.S., at 907-908. That fails any arm-of-the-State test.

History and tradition remained contrary to Plaintiffs’ theory as the years passed. In 1901, this Court

held that Illinois was a proper defendant for originaljurisdiction purposes in a suit against “the Sanitary

District of Chicago,” even as the District was a “public

corporation”: it was “an agency of the state … whose

existence and operations are wholly within the control

of the State.” Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 242

(1901); see also New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296,

302 (1921) (state-created sewerage district was “such

a statutory, corporate agency of the state that

[commissioners’] action … must be treated as that of

the state itself”); 1903 N.J. Laws p.780, 787 (corporate

status, “separate account” and “indebtedness” for

sewerage district); cf. Baude.Br.24 (tying sovereign

immunity to original jurisdiction). Nor did Lincoln

County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), suggest that

corporate status was dispositive, see Colt.Br.20-21; it

simply recognized that localities cannot partake of

States’ immunity, because they are “part of the state

only in that remote sense in which any city, town,

or other municipal corporation may be said to be.”

133 U.S., at 530; see NJT.Br.44-46 (explaining why

localities’ ineligibility turns not on corporate status

but distinct territorial and political characteristics).

So too for sue-and-be-sued clauses. See Colt.Br.2627; Galette.Br.27-29. Porto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo

confirmed Puerto Rico enjoyed sovereign immunity

despite such a clause, finding the “grant of corporate

existence, private or public” could not resolve the

sovereign-immunity question, and instead considering

“the nature and character of the government” and

drafter’s “inten[t].” 227 U.S. 270, 274-275, 277 (1913).

State Highway Commission v. Utah Construction Co.

followed, assessing a sue-and-be-sued entity and

finding a suit against it “in effect” “against the state”

and thus barred. 278 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1929); see also

NJT.Br.42-43, 46-47. Plaintiffs offer no answer.

Substance, rather than formal corporate status,

remained the rule as efficiency-minded governments

began experimenting more with the corporate form

in the 1900s. NJT.Br.41-42; e.g., Sloan Shipyards

Corp. v. U.S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258

U.S. 549, 564, 567 (1922) (“it cannot matter that the

agent is a corporation” when determining whether it

“embodie[d] the United States”); Fed. Land Bank of

St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935) (whether

U.S. instrumentalities enjoy sovereign immunity is

“a question of []congressional intent”); Keifer & Keifer

v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 389 (1939)

(similar); Cherry Cotton Mills v. United States, 327

U.S. 536, 539 (1946). Compare Colt.Br.21-22 & n.4.

That remains the approach, in contexts beyond immunity too. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 491

(2023); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S.

43, 54-55 (2015) (AAR); Lebron, 513 U.S., at 397. So

Mt. Healthy followed from a long tradition of assessing

sovereign entities’ substance rather than corporate

form, and that tradition has continued unbroken.

2. Plaintiffs have not offered history nearly strong

enough to upend precedent and produce disruption

across the States. Despite expressly seeking to

overrule precedent, Plaintiffs never establish that

Mount Healthy, State Highway Commission, or their

predecessors are “egregiously wrong” or unworkable.

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215,

268 (2022). Instead, stare decisis is particularly

powerful because these cases were the backdrop

against which sovereigns were “especially likely to

rely” in “ordering their affairs,” cf. Kimble v. Marvel

Entm’t, 576 U.S. 446, 455-457 (2015)—with States

experimenting with corporate status without thinking

they were sacrificing sovereignty. Myriad agencies

were thus enacted as government corporations—from

state Departments of Corrections and Departments of

Transportation to the Louisiana Cabinet—despite the

obvious intent that they be sovereign. NJT.Br.42; see

Baude.Br.11 (recognizing their rule “might no longer”

reflect real-world practice).

Nor has Colt identified a solution to this profound

problem. Colt invents a rule to deprive of immunity

any corporation with its own bank account. Br.16-17,

23-24. But that rule—gerrymandered to capture NJ

Transit but to exclude some (though not all1) agencies

like the Louisiana Cabinet—is groundless. It does not

come from historical evidence, which even on Colt’s

telling is about corporate status. Br.18-23. Nor does it

make sense; even leaving aside that States could draft

around this rule, it authorizes damages claims against

even an entity financially dependent on its creator like

NJ Transit, and whose creator owns its property and

controls its actions.

There is a bigger problem still: to support this test,

Plaintiffs rely on a distinct real-party-in-interest

doctrine about judgments, not entities. E.g., Hopkins v.

Clemson Agric. Coll. of S.C., 221 U.S. 636, 646-649

(1911). Sovereign immunity doctrine establishes that

even actions against non-State entities (such as

Ex parte Young defendants) are still barred if,

inter alia, a damages order is “enforceable against the

State.” Colt.Br.23-24; VOPA v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247,

255 (2011). But that guards against only particular

judgments—it does not make an entity immune

generally, which is why it works in Ex parte Young

suits. VOPA, 563 U.S., at 255. So on Colt’s approach,

federal and sister state courts remain free to issue

injunctions against the Louisiana Cabinet and myriad

other agencies, NJT.Br.42—because the entities have

“corporate status” and the judgments do not run to the

Colt never grapples with entities that still fail its rule, like

the Illinois Housing Development Authority, 20 Ill. Comp. Stat.

Ann. 3805/20; Minnesota Housing Finance Agency, Minn. Stat.

Ann. §462A.14; or Texas Department of Housing and Community

Affairs, Tex. Gov’t Code §2306.071(c), which operate under

statutes separating their debts, or even the federal TVA or FDIC,

see Thacker v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 587 U.S. 218, 220-225 (2019)

(absent sue-and-be-sued clause, TVA “would have enjoyed

sovereign immunity from suit”).

state treasury. Forget about having to fit Ex parte

Young—even a “Doe v. Florida Department of

Transportation” would be fine. So, too, for state-law

claims: federal judges in now-allowed diversity suits

against distinct-legal-person agencies,2 Moor v. Cnty.

of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698 (1973)—not to mention

sister-state court judges—could award prospective

relief for state-law violations, contra Pennhurst State

School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-106

(1984), because these would no longer (in their telling)

be suits against States at all.

Although Plaintiffs contend this Court must accept

that chaos because States sought the benefits of

corporate status, that is wrong, and they do not really

mean it. Plaintiffs and amici argue that by using the

corporate form, States circumvent their own state

constitutional limitations, civil-service requirements,

and preclusion doctrines, thereby requiring them to

take “the bitter with the sweet” and forfeit sovereign

immunity too. Baude.Br.26; Colt.Br.4-5, 13. But

States can use different formalities (such as “Division

of NJ Transit”) while still exempting these entities

from whatever state law they wish—they control their

own law.3 So (in Plaintiffs’ telling) an agency exempt

Amici note NJ Transit once invoked diversity jurisdiction in

a single matter twenty years ago. See Baude.Br.24. Assuming

this Court confirms NJ Transit is an arm of New Jersey, NJ

Transit agrees it could not do so—and it does not now.

Preclusion is a perfect example, contra Baude.Br.17-21;

States regularly allow agencies to avoid precluding each other

without divesting them of sovereignty—as frequently occurs

with New Jersey’s Public Defender and its Attorney General,

or when the Department of Corrections appeals the Civil Service

Commission’s determination in a personnel matter. In re

Ambroise, 318 A.3d 75 (N.J. 2024). The sole state-court decision

amici cite confirms New Jersey agencies can all avoid preclusion

from civil-service requirements has immunity, but

one created as a corporation and thus exempt from

the same does not. That is no bitter-with-the-sweet

regime; it just converts federal arm-of-the-State

jurisprudence into a penalty for States that use the

mechanism of corporate status to achieve these same

goals. That is especially untenable where States were

operating for (at least) decades under this Court’s

precedents permitting that choice.

II. The

Arm-Of-The-State

Test

Applies

Straightforwardly To NJ Transit.

The traditional arm-of-the-State backdrop against

which States have long operated amply encompasses

NJ Transit, such that these suits offend New Jersey’s

“equal dignity and sovereignty,” Franchise Tax Bd. of

Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230, 245 (2019) (Hyatt III), by

haling its entities into court, whether for monetary or

injunctive relief, absent consent. So while no party

disputes Plaintiffs could have sued NJ Transit in New

Jersey, NJ Transit remains free from coercive process

in New York and Pennsylvania.4

in one context—not some special carveout for “corporate” entities.

See Baude.Br.17-18 (overlooking NJDOT’s presence in consolidated case); see also id., at 20-21 (citing two complaints involving

pro-forma notices to agencies with unpaid-tax interests). The

State Constitution’s debt-limitation regime, which includes

public corporations like NJ Transit (but not municipalities), N.J.

Const. art. VIII, §2, ¶3(a)-(b), is an equally good example of how

the State treats NJ Transit as an arm rather than a private

company or municipality, and of a fundamentally internal choice,

not a freestanding marker of sovereignty.

Colt’s complaint that NJ Transit must “answer to New York’s

citizens in New York’s courts” given the latter’s dignity, Br.2,

simply relitigates Hyatt III. That result is inherent in the nature

A. Textual And Structural Intent.

While the arm-of-the-State inquiry is a question of

federal law, state-law evidence drives this analysis of

what the State created under its own law. Overwhelming support exists here. NJ Transit sits in the State’s

Executive Branch; runs a public-transit system to

serve “an essential public purpose”; issues rules

with force of law, under administrative-law provisions

applicable exclusively to state agencies; adjudicates

disputes in fora reserved for state agencies; is suable

in contract under a state-law regime that covers only

state agencies; enjoys statewide law-enforcement

and eminent-domain powers; possesses only state

property, and on and on. NJT.Br.7-10. That plainly

looks nothing like Greyhound.

Plaintiffs are thus primarily forced to argue that all

this renders NJ Transit akin to a municipality, e.g.,

Galette.Br.25-36; Colt.Br.33-34; but cf. Colt.Br.16-46

(analogizing NJ Transit to private or municipal

entities but never settling on either), but to no avail.

Initially, that some of NJ Transit’s statewide powers

overlap with municipalities’ makes no difference; what

matters is their scope. NJ Transit (like the State

Police) operates a law-enforcement agency statewide;

Newark’s police force operates only “within [its]

territorial limits.” N.J. Stat. Ann. §40A:14-152; see

Lake Country, 440 U.S., at 401 (assessing whether

entity exercises only “slice of state power”). Besides,

much of the state-law evidence does not apply to

localities; Newark fits nowhere in the Executive

Branch, or within the administrative and adjudicative

regimes for state agencies. Not only does NJ Transit

of interstate immunity—the contract States agreed to in forming

the Union. See 587 U.S., at 239-247.

walk, talk, and squawk like a state agency rather than

a municipality, but the Legislature made plain its

intent: it declared NJ Transit “an instrumentality of

the State,” N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-4(a),5 and delineated

federal claims for which it could not assert immunity,

id. §27:25-24.2—showing it believed it gave NJ Transit federal immunity to waive (something municipalities obviously lack).

Plaintiffs’ smorgasbord of responses falters. Plaintiffs cannot seriously challenge the state-law evidence

of New Jersey’s intent, NJT.Br.21-23; Galette instead

attacks the notion that express characterizations ever

matter, Br.13, 29-32; but see Colt.Br.35 (recognizing

this “Court has looked to state-law characterizations,”

citing Hess). But Galette misunderstands the test: no

one claims that say-so is sufficient, or that New Jersey

could make Prudential its arm simply by affixing a

label. Instead, text matters, not only because it can

weed out “impostors,” NJT.Br.20, but because it

helps contextualize these state-law authorities and

structures—especially given Galette’s argument that

a state agency and locality sometimes exercise similar

functions. Put otherwise, when a New York court

assesses “the nature of the entity created by [New

Jersey] law,” Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S., at 280, it must

Colt’s lone counterexample, Br.36-37, does not use this

phrase, but instead reflects that political subdivisions can

also have their own “instrumentalit[ies],” see N.J. Stat. Ann.

§40:14B-20 (municipal water/sewer authorities). Compare, e.g.,

N.J. Const. art. V, §4, ¶1 (requiring “[a]ll executive and

administrative offices, departments, and instrumentalities of the

State government” to sit within 20 or fewer “principal

departments”); N.J. Stat. Ann. §52:13D-13(a) (“State agency”

includes “instrumentalit[ies],” and a “county or municipality

shall not be deemed an agency or instrumentality of the State.”);

id. §52:32-40 (same).

interpret those choices with sensitivity to how

New Jersey law works, NJT.Br.18-20; Marshall v.

Klebanov, 902 A.2d 873, 881 (N.J. 2006). Only then

can a court assess what federal answer follows from

those choices—causing no small indignity if it gets

that answer wrong.

Plaintiffs’ other responses fail too. Galette cites NJ

Transit’s independence from the State’s Department

of Transportation, Br.26-27, but independence from

another specific agency is not independence from the

sovereign, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:158A-3 (Public

Defender); id. §11A:2-1 (Civil Service Commission); id.

§39:2A-4(a) (Motor Vehicle Commission); id. §48:2-1(a)

(Board of Public Utilities); NJT.Br.32 (discussing

state constitutional limit on number of executive

departments). Plaintiffs note NJ Transit can choose to

hire outside counsel, but see infra at 14 (discussing

gubernatorial control), disregarding the Legislature’s

decision that NJ Transit can demand Attorney

General representation, N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-5(z),

which no non-State agency can. It also matters little

that NJ Transit is free of some civil-service mandates;

the Legislature can exempt agencies from such rules

to experiment with efficiency, see id. §27:25-2(a)-(b),

and NJ Transit remains subject to personnel mandates no private company faces, see id. §27:25-15

(reporting); id. §52:14-7(a) (in-state-residency). And

finally, Colt is just wrong to deny the State could “raid

[NJ Transit’s] coffers,” Br.32: NJ Transit’s property

is state property, N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:25-16, and

the Legislature has plenary power to claw back its

appropriations, e.g., 2013 N.J. Laws ch.76, at 3

(de-appropriating $5 million), and sweep NJ Transit’s

revenues into its General Fund, cf. N.J. Stat. Ann.

§39:2A-36(a) (Motor Vehicle Commission); id. §55:14K5.3 (Housing & Mortgage Finance Agency).

B. State Control.

Control also supplies especially powerful evidence.

See AAR, 575 U.S., at 54-55 (treating control as

significant); Lebron, 513 U.S., at 397-398; Nebraska,

600 U.S., at 490-493; Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,

456 n.1 (1997); Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368, 370

(1953); Missouri, 180 U.S., at 242. For good reason: if

a State controls an entity, it remains democratically

accountable for (and thus bound to) that entity, unlike

with a locality or private enterprise. E.g., NJT.Br.29;

United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2021).

And evidence of control here is overwhelming—more

than the Federal Government enjoys over Amtrak, or

Missouri over MOHELA. As Plaintiffs cannot refute,

the Governor appoints every voting NJ Transit Board

member and can remove them for cause—and ex officio

members at will. Nebraska, 600 U.S., at 490 (appointment plus for-cause removal, no discussion of veto);

Lebron, 513 U.S., at 399 (appointment of majority).

Most notably, the Governor can veto any actions the

NJ Transit Board proposes. NJT.Br.7-9. So it is easy

to see why New Jerseyans would hold the Governor to

account for NJ Transit’s performance, but not the

Paramus Mayor’s.

Neither of Plaintiffs’ responses—that the Governor

has insufficient control, or that control matters little—

succeeds. Plaintiffs downplay the impact of this

appointment-plus-removal-plus-veto regime, but cannot cite a single private or municipal entity subject to

such exhaustive gubernatorial controls. Galette cites

outlier cases in which a Governor could appoint some

outside monitor or exercise removal in extreme cases,

or an “episodic” veto for narrow, situation-specific

actions in other States. Br.13, 35-36. But Plaintiffs cite

nothing subjecting local or private entities to a plenary

appointment, removal, or veto power, let alone all

taken together. Bostonians would find it unimaginable

if their city’s actions took no effect for 10 days to enable

the Massachusetts Governor to veto whichever she

saw fit—and New Jersey certainly does not treat its

localities that way. See Fraternal Order of Police v.

City of Newark, 236 A.3d 965, 974-975 (N.J. 2020).

Plaintiffs’ remaining responses collapse. The claim

that the Governor lacks statutory ability to “affirmatively direct NJ Transit … to take any particular

action,” Colt.Br.38, is misguided: the ability to veto all

Board actions, especially combined with his appointment and removal powers, is wholly sufficient.

Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc., 606 U.S. 748, 773774 (2025); see also First Iowa Hydro-Elec. v. Fed.

Power Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 164 (1946) (state veto

over federal project would allow State to affirmatively

control federal planning). Colt’s passing citation

(Br.39-40) to Arthrex does not help; the problem there

was that no Senate-confirmed official could reverse

PTAB decisions, 594 U.S., at 14-15.6

Nor does it matter that the Board members

“exercise independent judgment.” Colt.Br.38. This

Court held this very phrase consistent with political

control, in a recent case Plaintiffs do not even mention.

Braidwood, 606 U.S., at 773-774. Plus, the law actually

says Board members must “apply independent judgment in the best interest of the corporation, its

mission, and the public,” N.J. Stat. Ann. §27:254.1(b)(1). That simply confirms NJ Transit must serve

And while this Court is currently assessing whether and

when for-cause removal is permissible for federal agencies, no one

disputes that agencies like the FTC still fall within the Federal

Government’s sovereign scope regardless.

statewide public goals—i.e., to provide effective,

efficient public-transit services statewide, see id.

§27:25-2—rather than private or parochial ones.

Plaintiffs thus have to challenge the importance

of control, but their positions (again contrary to

precedent) are unavailing. Hess does not say control

gets the “least weight.” Colt.Br.37. Hess dealt with the

Port Authority, a bistate entity created by “three

discrete sovereigns.” 513 U.S., at 40. In such a “trigovernmental arrangement,” id., at 42, no one State

controls the entity, so “[g]auging actual control” can be

“uncertain and unreliable,” id., at 47. That hardly

vitiates more recent precedent dealing with singleState entities, especially given this Court’s repeated

recognition of the tie between executive control,

democratic accountability, and sovereign power.

That this Court’s statements about control arose in

“other areas of law,” Colt.Br.30, does not diminish

their relevance. Understanding how government control works is trans-substantive. E.g., AAR, 575 U.S.,

at 54-55 (treating Lebron as “necessary instruction” in

that nondelegation case despite Lebron involving freespeech constraints); Nebraska, 600 U.S., at 492-493

(looking to AAR and Lebron despite neither being

about standing); cf. Hyatt III, 587 U.S., at 237-240,

243-248 (citing other immunities). Nebraska does not

“caution[] against this mixing of doctrine,” Colt.Br.30;

it instead sensibly observed that entities “can count as

part of the State for some but not other purposes,”

600 U.S., at 493 n.3 (cleaned up); accord NJT.Br.24

(explaining why Legislature calling NJ Transit a

“public entity” under NJTCA is not probative for

sovereign-immunity purposes). Nor was Nebraska

about “parens patriae standing,” Colt.Br.30, which

was unavailable in that lawsuit against the Federal

Government, Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 294295 (2023). It instead reflected a recognition that

injury to MOHELA’s pocketbook was injury to

Missouri’s pocketbook, even as Missouri gave

MOHELA corporate status and disclaimed its debts,

Nebraska, 600 U.S., at 489-491; id., at 526-527

(Kagan, J., dissenting), focusing on other evidence of

their relationship—like control.

C. Financial Integration.

Financial considerations also support NJ Transit.

Recall that the basic goal is to evaluate “the

relationship between the State and its creation,”

Regents, 519 U.S., at 431, which includes assessing

their financial relationship “legally and practically,”

Hess, 513 U.S., at 51—with extensive entanglement

indicating the kind of close relationship a State has

with sovereign arms, not private entities. That fits

NJ Transit arm-in-sleeve: NJ Transit is financially

dependent on New Jersey, having always operated

at a sizable deficit, and its statute presupposes that

financial dependence. See NJT.Br.34-36. Galette

responds that NJ Transit has some revenue-raising

authority, Br.20, but it faces major state-imposed

limits—unlike standard localities or private entities—

for issuing debt or negotiating financing, and must

rely almost completely on the Legislature or other

state entities for financing and to meet inevitable

shortfalls. NJ Transit cannot even raise fares or cut

services absent serious hurdles, including gubernatorial assent. NJT.Br.34-36.

Plaintiffs’ responses are confused. Plaintiffs primarily claim the financial factor asks only whether a

sovereign has formal financial liability for the entity’s

judgments and debts. Galette.Br.20-24; Colt.Br.41-46.

But they conflate two immunity doctrines. If a private

party sues a putative non-State entity, immunity

might attach (1) if the entity itself is a sovereign arm,

or (2) if a judgment against a non-State entity, such as

an Ex parte Young defendant, nevertheless injures

the sovereign. See supra at 8-9. Because the latter

category necessarily involves no sovereign entity, the

primary concern in such cases is the state fisc, and

courts ask whether the judgment against this nonState entity formally “expend[s] itself on the public

treasury.” VOPA, 563 U.S., at 255; see Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974) (equitable, Ex parte

Young relief unavailable where funds demanded must

“inevitably come from” state fisc).

The arm-of-the-State analysis is different. This

inquiry asks if an entity is sufficiently tied to the

sovereign such that litigation would impact the

“primary function of sovereign immunity”: not the

treasury, but “the dignity and respect due sovereign

entities.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,

535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) (FMC).7 That test—trying to

determine the overall sovereign-entity relationship,

Regents, 519 U.S., at 431—turns on a substantive

assessment of the entity, not just a formal financial

firewall. Indeed, arm-of-the-State status “does not

change from one case to the next,” PRPA, 531 F.3d, at

873, and cannot depend on whether a plaintiff seeks

monetary or equitable relief, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996). So just as an entity’s

susceptibility to an injunction cannot sensibly turn

on/off based only on formal financial liability, formal

Plaintiffs criticize NJ Transit’s focus on dignity, e.g.,

Colt.Br.1, but that reflects this Court’s emphasis in cases like

FMC and Hyatt III, which build on ample originalist evidence.

Because “the Framers worried about the indignity of haling a

State into court,” Colt.Br.2, precedent does too.

liability can be a “sufficient condition” for immunity

(when a judgment impacts the treasury) but not a

“necessary” one (because it cannot dictate an entity’s

overall arm-of-the-State status). PRPA, 531 F.3d, at

879

That makes quick work of Plaintiffs’ precedents,

which each turn on assessing the impact of judgments

in suits against non-State actors. United States v.

Peters held a suit enforcing a judgment as to private

property for which Pennsylvania’s interest had already

been “extinguished” was not against Pennsylvania.

9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 140-141 (1809). Governor v.

Madrazo found a lawsuit against the (non-sovereignarm) Governor impermissible where it directed

equitable relief at the treasury, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110,

123-124 (1828)—the same judgment-related concerns

in Edelman. And Lewis v. Clarke involved employees

sued individually, and made clear indemnification

cannot transform judgments against those employees

into involuntary judgments against the sovereign. 581

U.S. 155, 165-166 & n.4 (2017) (distinguishing from

separate question whether entity “was a state

agency”).

Arm-of-the-state precedents, by contrast, consider

the overall sovereign-entity relationship both “legally

and practically.” Hess, 513 U.S., at 51. Hess itself

emphasized its ruling was “compatible” with arm-ofthe-State status for separately-incorporated transit

entities “that place heavy fiscal tolls on their founding

States.” 513 U.S., at 49-50 & n.20. Hess cited as

examples “a thinly capitalized railroad that depends

for its existence on a state-provided ‘financial safety

net,’” id., at 49, or WMATA—with shortfalls “anticipated from the start” and “constantly dependent” on

state funds “to meet its sizable operating deficits,” id.,

at 49-50; Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218, 225 (CADC

1986) (Bork, J., joined by Skelly Wright and Scalia,

JJ.) (the “practical result of a judgment against

WMATA here would be payment from the treasuries

of Maryland and Virginia”). That simply did not apply

to Port Authority, which was flush for decades. 513

U.S., at 45.

Plaintiffs also err in resisting this real-world

analysis on the grounds that NJ Transit’s annual

funding may fluctuate. Galette.Br.23; Colt.Br.45.

First, this conflicts with the contrast Hess draws

between “heavy fiscal toll” agencies and the deeppocketed Port Authority. 513 U.S., at 49; see also AAR,

575 U.S., at 53 (discussing Amtrak’s dependence on

federal dollars). Second, no one claims the margins

here are too close, and Plaintiffs’ logic would require

ignoring even 90% subsidies for decades. Third,

Plaintiffs misunderstand the point, which turns not

just on bare amounts of funding, but on the structural

choices the Legislature made to leave NJ Transit

financially dependent—a mark of a close relationship,

not an arms-length private company. And here,

statutory limits on NJ Transit’s fiscal powers reflect

the Legislature’s understanding that NJ Transit

serves “an essential public purpose,” N.J. Stat. Ann.

§27:25-2(a), on the Legislature’s dime—as it always

has, NJT.Br.9-10, 34-36.8 Practically and legally, NJ

Transit is an arm of New Jersey.

D. “Traditional” Function.

Galette closes with an untenable position: that this

Court resolve “lingering doubt” based on whether NJ

Galette also observes the State could alter this funding

situation, Br.23-24, but the State could change any of NJ

Transit’s state-law features. So that cannot be probative.

Transit’s functions are “traditional” enough. Br.36-40;

Colt.Br.32-33. No doubt does linger, but this proposed

fourth criterion would be inappropriate regardless,

because it lacks historical evidence and runs squarely

into precedent, which long-ago “abandoned” a “traditional governmental function” test as “unsound in

principle and unworkable in practice.” Garcia v. San

Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 542, 546

(1985). For good reason: “States cannot serve as

laboratories … if they must pay an added price when

they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by

taking up functions that an earlier day and a different

society left in private hands,” id., at 546-548, and it

beckons endless confusion about what function(s) were

public for long enough, and what level of granularity

to ask. See Galette.Br.39 (trying to distinguish

facilitating transportation by building transportation

infrastructure from facilitating transportation by

moving passengers on that infrastructure).9

Regardless, this test does not assist Plaintiffs here:

facilitating public transportation is neither new nor

intrinsically private. See NJT.Br.25-26 (collecting

examples); e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500501 (1921) (immunity extended to admiralty action

against state-chartered tugboat). Though Galette claims

stagecoaches and ferries were originally private, he

concedes colonial Rhode Island had a ferry for

passengers for two years. Br.36-38 & n.3. And while

Colt says private companies “engage in the business of

transit,” Br.33, none takes on the capital-intensive,

That does not mean function is always irrelevant: as

explained above and illustrated by the state-bank cases, that an

entity engages in work constitutionally forbidden to States is

strong evidence its Legislature did not mean to create an

unconstitutional sovereign body. See supra at 5.

unprofitable work of ensuring broad public access to

transit (try getting to Trenton via Greyhound), see

Commuter.Br.23-26. Indeed, that Galette baldly

compares NJ Transit “fare-paying” to “ride-shar[ing]”

on Uber makes the difference evident. Br.38-39;

compare NJT.Br.36 (explaining NJ Transit must offer

reduced fares to some riders).

That leaves Galette’s misguided argument that NJ

Transit’s immunity frustrates Pennsylvania’s ability

to regulate transportation within its borders. Br.4042. But this is simply untrue: transit agencies

(including NJ Transit)—not to mention other entities

operating across state lines—have been sovereign

arms for years under circuit precedents with no such

result. E.g., Morris, 781 F.2d, at 226-228. Regardless,

this argument is mismatched to Plaintiffs’ actual

theory: Pennsylvania’s regulatory interests would

remain unchanged whether NJ Transit stayed as is

or was renamed the “Division of NJ Transit” and

formally backed by the general treasury. So notwithstanding Galette’s concern for Pennsylvania’s dignity,

it is unsurprising that Pennsylvania instead supports

New Jersey. See Texas.Br.1.10

Assuming this Court agrees NJ Transit is immune, it need

not tarry on Colt’s last-ditch, heads-I-win-tails-you-lose

argument—that this Court has jurisdiction under the Eleventh

Amendment to hold NJ Transit is not a sovereign arm, but no

jurisdiction to say it is. Br.46-49. Colt rightly did not press this in

opposing certiorari, as this Court has long rejected it. See

McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,

28-31 (1990) (finding it “inherent in the constitutional plan” that

this Court can review such decisions from state high courts).

Were the rule otherwise, the majority and dissent in Hyatt III

would have both been wrong, as this Court would have lacked

jurisdiction over that case too—as one of Plaintiffs’ amici urged.

Baude & Sachs Br., Hyatt III, 2018 WL 4583702, at *27-34 (Sept.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the judgment of the New

York Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

KATHERINE L. PRINGLE

SCOTT H. HENNEY

FRIEDMAN KAPLAN SEILER

ADELMAN & ROBBINS LLP

7 Times Square

New York, NY 10036

MATTHEW J. PLATKIN

Attorney General

JEREMY M. FEIGENBAUM*

Solicitor General

MICHAEL L. ZUCKERMAN

Deputy Solicitor General

JEAN P. REILLY

DANIEL M. VANNELLA

Assistant Attorneys General

NATHANIEL F. RUBIN

AMY CHUNG

MARIE CEPEDA MEKOSH

BRETT HAROLDSON

JONATHAN L. WANG

JONATHAN W. ALLEN

BETHANNE PRUGH

LEVI KLINGER-CHRISTIANSEN

Deputy Attorneys General

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY

25 Market Street, Box 080

Trenton, NJ 08625

(862) 350-5800

jeremy.feigenbaum@njoag.gov

Counsel for Petitioners

December 12, 2025

* Counsel of Record

18, 2018). Indeed, under Colt’s view, the New York courts could

permit “Smith v. New Jersey” to proceed, and this Court would be

powerless to intervene—a perverse result for an Amendment

confirming States’ protection from involuntary suits.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.