Opposition Brief — John Doe, et al., Petitioners v. Kathy Hochul, Governor of New York, et al.

No. 24-1015

In the Supreme Court of the United States

JOHN DOES 1-2, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

KATHY HOCHUL, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

FOR THE HEALTH-CARE RESPONDENTS

JACQUELINE PHIPPS POLITO

ERIN M. TRAIN

LITTLER MENDELSON P.C.

375 Woodcliff Drive,

Suite 2D

Fairport, NY 14450

MICHAEL J. KEANE

MARC A. SITTENREICH

GARFUNKEL WILD, P.C.

111 Great Neck Road

Great Neck, NY 11021

LIZA M. VELAZQUEZ

Counsel of Record

EMILY A. VANCE

KATHLEEN H. PIERRE

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

(212) 373-3000

lvelazquez@paulweiss.com

ANNA M. STAPLETON

RUSSELL A.S. WIRTH

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

535 Mission Street, 25th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires an

employer to accommodate the religious practices of its

employees unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C.

2000e(j). The questions presented are:

1. Whether providing a complete exemption from an

employment practice requested by an employee on religious grounds would impose an “undue hardship” on an

employer where state law mandates the practice; imposes

significant penalties for noncompliance; and prohibits

complete religious exemptions but still leaves available

other accommodations for religious objections.

2. Whether such a state law is consistent with, and

thus not preempted by, Title VII.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioners are John Doe 2, Jane Does 1-3, Jack Does

1-750, and Joan Does 1-750.* Respondents are Kathleen

C. Hochul, in her official capacity as Governor of New

York; James V. McDonald, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health;

New York-Presbyterian Healthcare System, Inc.; Trinity

Health, Inc.; and Westchester Medical Center Advanced

Physician Services, P.C. This brief is filed on behalf of all

respondents except Governor Hochul and Commissioner

McDonald.

New York-Presbyterian Healthcare System, Inc., has

no parent corporation, and no publicly held company

holds 10% or more of its stock.

Trinity Health, Inc., has no parent corporation, and no

publicly held company holds 10% or more of its stock.

Westchester Medical Center Advanced Physician Services, P.C., has no parent corporation, and no publicly held

company holds 10% or more of its stock.

*

John Doe 1, who was not employed by any of the health-care respondents, has no live claims remaining in the suit. See Pet. App. 19a

n.12.

(II)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below ................................................................................ 1

Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 1

Statement ......................................................................................... 1

A. Background ........................................................................ 3

B. Facts and procedural history ........................................... 6

Argument ......................................................................................... 9

A. This case does not present the questions

identified in the petition ................................................. 10

B. The decision below does not conflict with

any decision of this Court or any federal

court of appeals ................................................................ 12

C. This case would be a poor vehicle for addressing

the questions identified in the petition ......................... 17

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook,

479 U.S. 60 (1986) ...................................................... 3, 4, 16

Barber ex rel. Barber v. Colorado Department

of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2009) ................... 16

Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,

734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) ........................................... 14

Bradshaw v. School Board of Broward County,

486 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2007) ......................................... 17

Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte,

248 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2001) ................................................ 17

California Federal Savings & Loan Association

v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) ..................................... 4, 17

Campbell v. Universal City Development

Partners, 72 F.4th 1245 (11th Cir. 2023)........................ 16

Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019) ........... 4, 17

(III)

IV

Page

Cases—continued:

Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023) ................................. 3, 13

Guardians Association of the New York City

Police Department, Inc. v. Civil Service

Commission, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981) ..................................... 15

Lowe v. Mills, 68 F.4th 706 (1st Cir.),

cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 345 (2023) ............................. 12, 13

Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Retirement

System, 707 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013) ............................... 16

Melino v. Boston Medical Center,

127 F.4th 391 (1st Cir. 2025) ............................................ 18

National Federation of the Blind v. Lamone,

813 F.3d 494 (4th Cir. 2016) ............................................. 16

Palmer v. General Mills Inc.,

513 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1975) ........................................... 15

Quinones v. City of Evanston,

58 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1995) ............................................... 16

Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,

444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) ........................................... 15

Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,

432 U.S. 63 (1977) .............................................................. 13

United States v. Board of Education,

911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) ........................................ 13, 14

We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul,

17 F.4th 266 (2d Cir.),

opinion clarified, 17 F.4th 368 (2021),

cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2569 (2022) ............................. 7, 10

Williams v. General Foods Corp.,

492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974) ............................................. 15

Wise v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center

of Akron, No. 24-3674, 2025 WL 1392209

(6th Cir. May 14, 2025) ..................................................... 18

Statutes and rule:

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VII,

42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. ........................................... 2-4, 6-17

V

Page

Statutes and rule—continued:

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) ....................................................... 3

42 U.S.C. 2000e-7 ................................................................ 4

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) .......................................................... 16

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) .......................................................... 16

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k).......................................................... 16

42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) ................................................................ 3

N.Y. Pub. Health Law:

§ 12 .................................................................................. 5, 11

§ 2806(1) .......................................................................... 5, 11

N.Y. A.P.A. Law § 202(6)(b) ................................................... 6

N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. (Aug. 26, 2021):

§ 2.61 ................................................................... 5-12, 17, 18

§ 2.61(a)(1) ............................................................................ 5

§ 2.61(a)(2) ....................................................................... 5, 6

§ 2.61(c) ................................................................................. 5

§ 2.61(d) ................................................................................ 5

28 U.S.C. 1254(1) ...................................................................... 1

Sup. Ct. R. 10 .......................................................................... 17

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 24-1015

JOHN DOES 1-2, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

KATHY HOCHUL, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

FOR THE HEALTH-CARE RESPONDENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

The summary order of the court of appeals (Pet. App.

1a-12a) is unreported but available at 2024 WL 5182675.

The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 13a-62a) is reported at 632 F. Supp. 3d 120.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

December 20, 2024. The petition for a writ of certiorari

was filed on March 20, 2025. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

This case presents two questions concerning Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: first, whether providing a

complete exemption from an employment practice requested by an employees on religious grounds would impose an “undue hardship” on an employer where state law

mandates the practice; imposes significant penalties for

noncompliance; and prohibits complete religious exemptions but still leaves available other accommodations for

religious objections; and second, whether such a state law

is consistent with, and thus not preempted by, Title VII.

Respondents are two New York state officials and

three health-care provider organizations that allegedly

employed petitioners in New York during the COVID-19

pandemic. In 2021, the New York Department of Health

adopted a rule requiring licensed health-care provider organizations to ensure that certain employees were fully

vaccinated against COVID-19. That rule permitted covered organizations to accommodate the religious objections of employees in certain ways but did not permit complete exemptions from the vaccination requirement.

Each petitioner asked his or her respective employer

to be exempted and, when the employers refused, filed

suit in federal district court. As is relevant here, petitioners asserted that the employers’ refusal to grant exemptions violated Title VII and that the state’s vaccination

mandate was preempted by Title VII. The district court

dismissed petitioners’ Title VII claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and on the merits, and the

court of appeals affirmed.

Petitioners now seek this Court’s review, but both

questions they present are premised on the erroneous assertion that state law forbade the employers from providing any religious accommodation whatsoever. It did not.

Rather, state law did not allow complete exemptions on

3

religious grounds. Because state law did not prohibit employers from providing other reasonable accommodations

to employees with religious objections, the court of appeals correctly held that state law did not conflict with Title VII and that requiring employers to violate the requirement would impose an undue hardship for purposes

of Title VII. There is no conflict on the questions this case

actually presents. In any event, this case would be an exceedingly poor vehicle for resolving the questions asserted in the petition, because petitioners did not exhaust

their administrative remedies, as required by Title VII,

and reversing the judgment below would not fully resolve

the case. The petition for a writ of certiorari should therefore be denied.

A. Background

1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employers to “discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s * * * religion.” 42 U.S.C.

2000e-2(a)(1). The statute defines “religion” as those “aspects of religious observance and practice” that an employer is able to “reasonably accommodate * * * without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j). Title VII thus does not require

employers to accommodate the religious beliefs or practices of their employees when “doing so would impose an

‘undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.’ ” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 453-454 (2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j)).

Whether or not a plaintiff has established a prima facie

claim for religious discrimination, a defendant employer

may prevail by showing that it “has done everything that

would be required of [it] if the plaintiff had properly made

4

out a prima facie case.” Ansonia Board of Education v.

Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67-69 (1986). To satisfy that requirement, the employer need not “choose any particular

reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 68. Rather, if any reasonable accommodation is available, Title VII is satisfied.

See ibid.

As a precondition to filing a Title VII claim in federal

court, a complainant must first timely file a charge with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC). See Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541,

543-544 (2019). Only when the EEOC has dismissed the

charge and issued the complainant a “right-to-sue” letter

may the complainant “commence a civil action against the

allegedly offending employer.” Id. at 545. Although not

jurisdictional, exhaustion of that administrative remedy is

mandatory, meaning that courts must enforce the requirement as long as it is timely raised. See id. at 551.

Title VII contains an express preemption clause. It

provides that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be

deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability,

duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or

future law of any State or political subdivision of a State,

other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C.

2000e-7. As this Court has explained, that provision has a

“narrow scope,” such that Title VII preempts a state law

only if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and

execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”

California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.

Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281-283 (1987) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

2. Like many States, New York requires hospitals

and other health-care provider organizations to obtain

and maintain a license for operation. Licensed hospitals

5

and other providers are obligated to comply with applicable regulations of the New York Department of Health.

See N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 12, 2806(1). Failure to comply can result in significant penalties, including suspension or loss of an entity’s license to operate. See id.

§ 2806(1)(a).

On August 26, 2021, the Department of Health

adopted an emergency rule requiring specified types of licensed health-care facilities to ensure that certain personnel were vaccinated against COVID-19. See 10 N.Y.

Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 2.61 (Aug. 26, 2021). Rule 2.61

defined “covered entities” to include hospitals, home

health programs, hospices, and adult care facilities. Id.

§ 2.61(a)(1)(i)-(iv). And it defined “personnel” to include

“all persons employed or affiliated with a covered entity,

whether paid or unpaid, including but not limited to employees, members of the medical and nursing staff, contract staff, students, and volunteers, who engage in activities such that if they were infected with COVID-19, they

could potentially expose other covered personnel, patients

or residents to the disease.” Id. § 2.61(a)(2).

Rule 2.61 mandated that all covered entities “continuously require personnel to be fully vaccinated against

COVID-19, with the first dose for current personnel received by September 27, 2021 for general hospitals and

nursing homes, and by October 7, 2021 for all other covered entities absent receipt of an exemption as allowed below.” 10 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 2.61(c) (Aug. 26,

2021). The rule provided an exemption where “any licensed physician or certified nurse practitioner certifies

that immunization with COVID-19 vaccine is detrimental

to the [employee’s] health.” Id. § 2.61(d). Otherwise, employees who wished to avoid vaccination would need to

cease all “activities such that if they were infected with

COVID-19, they could potentially expose other covered

6

personnel, patients or residents to the disease,” thereby

removing them from the category of covered personnel.

Id. § 2.61(a)(2). That could have potentially been achieved

by switching from in-person work to remote work. See

Pet. App. 60a n.30.

By operation of state law, emergency rules such as

Section 2.61 are effective for no more than 90 days unless

renewed. See N.Y. A.P.A. Law § 202(6)(b). Rule 2.61 was

renewed three times before being adopted as a permanent

rule. It was ultimately repealed effective October 4, 2023.

See Pet. App. 6a.

B. Facts And Procedural History

1. Respondents are New York Governor Kathy

Hochul and Department of Health Commissioner James

McDonald (the state respondents), together with three

nonprofit corporations that operate health-care facilities

in New York and are covered entities under Rule 2.61:

New York-Presbyterian Healthcare System, Inc.; Trinity

Health, Inc.; and Westchester Medical Center Advanced

Physician Services, P.C. (the health-care respondents).

Petitioners are four individual health-care workers identified anonymously. Each of the four petitioners alleged

that they were formerly employed by the health-care respondents. Each petitioner sought an exemption from

Rule 2.61’s vaccination requirement on religious grounds

and was denied. See Pet. App. 4a, 15a-16a, 25a.

On September 10, 2021, petitioners filed suit in the

federal district court for the Eastern District of New York

asserting, as relevant here, violations of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Supremacy Clause. Petitioners did not submit a complaint to the EEOC and did

not receive a “right-to-sue” letter before filing their civil

complaint. See Pet. App. 25a. Petitioners sought reme-

7

dies in the form of injunctive relief barring the state respondents from enforcing Rule 2.61 against petitioners;

injunctive relief requiring the health-care respondents to

grant religious exemptions from their vaccination requirements; a declaratory judgment that Rule 2.61 was

unconstitutional both facially and as applied to petitioners; and damages for any adverse employment action arising from enforcement of Rule 2.61. See Pet. App. 113a117a.

2. Petitioners filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The district court

denied the motion as moot following the Second Circuit’s

unanimous decision in We The Patriots USA, Inc. v.

Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, opinion clarified, 17 F.4th 368

(2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2569 (2022), which affirmed

the denial of a temporary restraining order and vacated a

preliminary injunction in a case presenting materially

similar claims challenging Rule 2.61. See Pet. App. 27a28a, 30a.

3. Respondents subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. Pet. App.

13a-62a.

With respect to petitioners’ claims under Title VII,

the district court determined that petitioners had failed to

plead facts showing that they had administratively exhausted their claims—an independently sufficient basis

for dismissal. See Pet. App. 54a-55a. Even absent that

failure, however, the district court concluded that it would

have dismissed petitioners’ Title VII claim on the merits.

See id. at 55a-56a. As the court explained, petitioners’

claim was based on the health-care respondents’ denial of

the “sole ‘accommodation’ [petitioners sought]—a religious exemption from the vaccine requirement.” Id. at

55a. But, the district court continued, that requested accommodation would impose an undue hardship on health-

8

care respondents in two ways: first, it would require them

to violate state law, see ibid., and second, it would “expose

vulnerable patients and nursing home residents, as well

as other healthcare workers, to the COVID-19 virus,” id.

at 56a.

The district court also rejected petitioners’ assertion

that Title VII preempted Rule 2.61 because the two are in

conflict. See Pet. App. 56a-60a. As the court explained, in

order to prevail on that argument, petitioners would have

needed to show that “[it] is impossible for employers to

comply with Title VII and Section 2.61 or that Section

[2.61] is an obstacle to the achievement of federal objectives as expressed in Title VII.” Pet. App. 58a (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioners asserted that the “absence of a religious exemption in Section 2.61 is the equivalent of denying them a religious accommodation under Title VII.” Id. at 59a. But “to avoid

Title VII liability,” the court reasoned, “an employer is

not required to offer the accommodation the employee

prefers. ” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The court determined that Rule 2.61’s prohibition on complete religious exemptions “does not prevent

employees from seeking a religious accommodation allowing them to continue working consistent with the Rule,

while avoiding the vaccination requirement.” Id. at 60a

(citation omitted). Because the rule did not foreclose employees’ opportunity to obtain reasonable accommodations for their religious beliefs, Title VII did not preempt

the rule. See ibid.

4. In a summary order, the court of appeals dismissed

petitioners’ appeal in part, affirmed in part, and remanded to the district court. Pet. App. 1a-12a.

The court of appeals first held that the repeal of Rule

2.61 had mooted petitioners’ claims against the state respondents. See Pet. App. 6a. The court held, however,

9

that petitioners’ Title VII claims for damages against the

health-care respondents remained live. See id. at 6a, 9a.

With respect to those claims, the court of appeals affirmed their dismissal on the merits. See Pet. App. 11a.

Recognizing that this Court had recently clarified that the

undue hardship faced by an employer “must be ‘substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business,’ ” id.

at 10a (quoting Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468 (2023)),

the court concluded that the health-care respondents’

need to violate Rule 2.61 in order to grant petitioners’ requested exemption would impose such a hardship. See

Pet. App. 11a. The court reasoned that, even assuming

that petitioners had “plausibly alleged a prima facie case

of Title VII religious discrimination,” id. at 10a, “the risk

of [the] potential penalties” that the health-care respondents would face for that violation “more than suffices to

demonstrate that the [health-care respondents] were subject to such hardships here,” id. at 11a. That outcome, the

court recognized, was consistent with its previous decisions, as well as those of other courts of appeals. See ibid.

ARGUMENT

In the decision below, the court of appeals held that

petitioners’ requested exemption from a COVID-19 vaccination requirement would impose an “undue hardship”

on the health-care respondents because New York’s Rule

2.61 mandated the requirement and permitted only religious accommodations short of a complete exemption. Because Rule 2.61 did not prohibit all religious accommodations, this case does not present, nor did the court of appeals decide, either of the questions presented by the petition. There is no conflict among the courts of appeals on

the questions actually presented by the decision below.

And even if this case did raise the questions identified in

10

the petition, it would be a poor vehicle for this Court’s review for several reasons, including that alternative

grounds supported the dismissal of petitioners’ claims.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

A. This Case Does Not Present The Questions Identified

In The Petition

Petitioners frame the questions presented in this case

as, first, “[w]hether compliance with state laws directly

contrary to Title VII’s requirement to provide a reasonable accommodation for religious beliefs may serve as an

undue hardship,” and second, “[w]hether a state law that

requires employers to deny without any consideration all

requests by employees for a religious accommodation

* * * is preempted by Title VII.” Pet. i, ii. Neither

question is properly presented here.

Both questions assume that New York Rule 2.61 forbids any religious accommodations whatsoever and is

therefore “directly contrary” to Title VII. But as the

court of appeals explained in an earlier challenge to Rule

2.61, the rule does not “bar an employer from providing

an employee with a reasonable accommodation that removes the individual from the scope of the [r]ule.” We The

Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 292, opinion

clarified, 17 F.4th 368 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.

Ct. 2569 (2022). Rather, it merely “bars an employer from

granting a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement” while permitting employees to “seek[] a religious accommodation allowing them to continue working

consistent with the [r]ule, while avoiding the vaccination

requirement.” Ibid. The court of appeals determined that

such a rule does not directly conflict with Title VII, because it does not “foreclose all opportunity” for employees

to obtain a reasonable religious accommodation, and Title

11

VII requires an employer only to offer a “reasonable accommodation,” not “the accommodation the employee

prefers.” Ibid. (citation omitted).

So considered, Rule 2.61 did not prohibit the healthcare respondents from granting any accommodation

whatsoever to petitioners. It merely prohibited the particular accommodation on which petitioners insisted:

namely, a complete exemption. For that reason, the relevant question below was whether granting petitioners’

“sole request for a religious exemption” would impose an

undue hardship on the health-care respondents, because

the requested exemption “would have required [them] to

violate the state regulation,” which would have then subjected them to “financial penalties or a suspension or revocation of their operating licenses.” Pet. App. 11a; see

N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 12, 2806(1)(a). The court of appeals concluded only that granting the exemption under

those circumstances—as opposed to granting some other

possible accommodation—would give rise to an undue

hardship. See Pet. App. 11a.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, therefore, the

court of appeals did not address whether a state law that

prohibits all religious accommodations can give rise to an

undue hardship or whether Title VII would preempt such

a state law. The court of appeals instead held that a state

law that prohibits one particular accommodation can give

rise to an undue hardship with respect to a request for

that particular accommodation. As a result, the only questions properly presented here are whether that kind of

state law can give rise to an undue hardship or is

preempted as directly conflicting with Title VII. This case

thus provides the Court with no occasion to address the

questions petitioner identifies.

12

B. The Decision Below Does Not Conflict With Any Decision Of This Court Or Any Federal Court Of Appeals

There is no conflict on the questions actually presented here. To the contrary, the court of appeals’ decision is consistent with decisions of other courts of appeals

analyzing the interaction between similar state laws and

Title VII. Because the court of appeals did not address a

state law that forbid all reasonable religious accommodations or that otherwise directly conflicted with Title VII,

the decision below does not conflict with any of the cases

petitioner cites. Further review is unwarranted.

1. Four courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit in the decision below, have held that a requested religious accommodation can impose an undue hardship on an

employer where granting the accommodation would require the employer to violate a valid state law.

a. In Lowe v. Mills, 68 F.4th 706, cert. denied, 144 S.

Ct. 345 (2023), the First Circuit addressed Title VII religious-accommodation claims asserted by health-care

workers challenging the denial of their requested exemptions from a Maine law requiring vaccination against

COVID-19 for covered health-care employees. Like Rule

2.61, the Maine law did not allow exemptions for religious

reasons. Id. at 709. Health-care employers who failed to

comply with the law would “risk[] onerous penalties, including license suspension.” Id. at 719.

The First Circuit held that granting the plaintiffs’ requested exemption from the vaccination requirement

would have imposed an undue hardship on their employers. See 68 F.4th at 719. As the court explained, the plaintiffs had made clear that they “would accept only one accommodation: a religious exemption allowing them to

continue in their roles without receiving vaccination while

observing other precautions, such as masking and testing.” Ibid. But the complaint also “acknowledge[d] the

13

threat to the [employers’] licenses” if they “fail[ed] to

mandate that all employees receive the COVID-19 vaccine.” Id. at 720. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’

sole requested accommodation would impose an undue

hardship insofar as it was “difficult to imagine a penalty

that would cause a healthcare provider more significant

difficulty ‘[i]n the conduct of [its] business’ than license

suspension.” Id. at 721 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j)). And

although the First Circuit decided the case before this

Court had issued its decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S.

447 (2023), clarifying the standard for assessing whether

a requested religious accommodation imposed an “undue

hardship,” the First Circuit explained that “the plaintiffs’

requested accommodation would have constituted an undue hardship under any plausible interpretation of the

statutory text.” 68 F.4th at 721.

b. The Third Circuit has likewise held that a valid

state law may create an undue hardship for an employer.

In United States v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882

(1990), the court addressed a Title VII challenge to a

Pennsylvania criminal statute prohibiting public school

teachers from wearing religious garb while teaching. See

id. at 885. The law imposed penalties, including fines and

potential removal from office, on administrators who

failed to enforce its requirements. See ibid. The United

States, suing on behalf of an individual teacher, did not

seek “alternative means of accommodation” other than

permitting the teacher to wear clothing in accordance

with her religious beliefs. Id. at 887.

The Third Circuit held that requiring the employing

school board to exempt the teacher from the otherwisevalid state law against religious garb would have imposed

an undue hardship on the school board. See 911 F.2d at

891. In so doing, the court invoked this Court’s decision

in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977),

14

which held that a requested accommodation that would

require an employer to violate its collective bargaining

agreement would constitute undue hardship. See 911

F.2d at 891. It “follow[ed] a fortiori,” the Third Circuit

reasoned, that it would likewise “be an undue hardship to

require a school board to violate an apparently valid criminal statute, thereby exposing its administrators to criminal prosecution and the possible consequences thereof.”

Ibid.

c. In Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382

(1984) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit similarly confirmed

that a requested religious accommodation that would require an employer to violate a valid state law could impose

an undue hardship on the employer. That case addressed

a newly promulgated California safety standard requiring

employees whose work might expose them to toxic gases

to wear a mask with a gas-tight face seal, something that

was not possible for individuals with beards. See id. at

1383. After the defendant employer imposed a policy requiring all of its machinists to shave their beards, an employee whose religious faith forbade cutting or shaving of

any body hair challenged his termination under Title VII.

See ibid.

The Ninth Circuit rejected the employee’s Title VII

claim. See 734 F.2d at 1384. It held that the employer

had “established that if it were to retain [the plaintiff] as

a machinist * * * it would risk liability for violating California Occupational Safety and Health Administration

standards.” Ibid. After considering and rejecting other

potential accommodations as unduly burdensome under

the facts of the case, the court affirmed summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff ’s Title VII claim.

See ibid.

2. Petitioners argue (Pet. 17-41) that the decision below conflicts with decisions from this Court and other

15

courts of appeals in two ways: first, by holding that “compliance with state laws directly contrary to Title VII’s requirement to provide a reasonable accommodation for religious beliefs may serve as an undue hardship”; and second, by holding that Title VII does not preempt a state

law that “requires employers to deny * * * all requests

by employees for a religious accommodation.” Pet. i, ii.

Because the court of appeals did not so hold, see pp. 1011, supra, the conflicts identified by the petition are illusory.

a. With respect to the first question presented, petitioners cite cases (Pet. 20-25) in which courts of appeals

have refused to excuse race-based or sex-based discrimination in violation of Title VII on the ground that state law

required the alleged discrimination. For example, the

Second Circuit has held that, where rank-ordering job

candidates based on exam scores creates a disparate impact on members of a racial minority, any state law that

“purports to require or permit” rank-ordering is preempted and thus cannot excuse continued use of such

practices. Guardians Association of the New York City

Police Department, Inc. v. Civil Service Commission, 630

F.2d 79, 104-105 (1980) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 452

U.S. 940 (1981). Other courts of appeals addressing analogous schemes have reached the same conclusion. See,

e.g., Palmer v. General Mills Inc., 513 F.2d 1040, 10421044 (6th Cir. 1975) (state laws requiring the categorical

exclusion of women from certain workplaces); Williams v.

General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 1974)

(sex-based overtime policies); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225-1226 (9th Cir. 1971) (the exclusion of female employees from certain workplace

tasks).

None of those cases addresses Title VII’s provisions

regarding religious discrimination, which require only

16

reasonable accommodations and do not mandate that employers grant employees’ preferred accommodations. See

Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60,

67-69 (1986). Title VII’s provisions concerning racial and

sexual discrimination impose materially different obligations on employers. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), (e), (k).

This case thus presents a unique question that arises in

the context of alleged religious discrimination: namely,

whether a state law that prohibits an employee’s preferred religious accommodation, but creates room for

other reasonable accommodations, directly conflicts with

Title VII. The cases cited by petitioners holding that a

state law conflicted directly with Title VII’s provisions regarding racial and sexual discrimination do not address

that issue.

Petitioners separately contend (Pet. 25-31) that the

decision below conflicts with decisions from other courts

of appeals involving federal antidiscrimination laws other

than Title VII. But again, in each of those cases, the court

of appeals concluded that the state law in question must

conflict directly with the relevant federal statute to be

preempted, and addressed a federal statute with substantive requirements different from Title VII’s religious-discrimination provisions. See Campbell v. Universal City

Development Partners, 72 F.4th 1245 (11th Cir. 2023)

(Americans with Disabilities Act); National Federation of

the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494 (4th Cir. 2016) (same);

Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Retirement System, 707

F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); Barber ex rel. Barber v.

Colorado Department of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222 (10th

Cir. 2009) (Rehabilitation Act); Quinones v. City of Evanston, 58 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1995) (Age Discrimination in

Employment Act). Because none of those cases addressed the question whether the need to violate state law

in order to grant a particular religious accommodation

17

created an “undue hardship” for purposes of Title VII,

those cases do not create a conflict within the meaning of

this Court’s certiorari criteria. See Sup. Ct. R. 10.

b. As to the second question presented: petitioners

argue (Pet. 32-41) that the decision below conflicts with

decisions from this Court and other courts of appeals

holding that Title VII preempts directly conflicting state

laws. Again, because the Second Circuit did not address

that issue here, the decision below does not conflict with

petitioners’ cited decisions, each of which simply applied

ordinary rules of conflict preemption. See California

Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S.

272, 281 (1987); Bradshaw v. School Board of Broward

County, 486 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2007); Bridgeport

Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, 248 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir.

2001).

C. This Case Would Be A Poor Vehicle For Addressing

The Questions Identified In The Petition

Even if this case did present the questions identified

in the petition, this case would provide a remarkably poor

vehicle for addressing them. As a threshold matter, the

district court determined that petitioners did not exhaust

their administrative remedies, and thus never received a

right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, after the health-care

respondents timely raised the issue in their motion to dismiss. See Pet. App. 53a-55a. Although the court of appeals did not address the exhaustion issue (and petitioners have been conspicuously silent about it here), petitioners’ failure to exhaust requires dismissal of their claims.

See Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 551 (2019).

In addition, resolution of the questions presented in

petitioners’ favor would not fully resolve the merits of

their Title VII claims. Separately from its decision on the

question of whether New York Rule 2.61 creates an undue

18

hardship here, the district court determined that exempting petitioners from Rule 2.61 entirely “would expose vulnerable patients and nursing home residents, as well as

other healthcare workers, to the COVID-19 virus, which

is obviously a significant hardship.” Pet. App. 55a-56a &

n.28; accord Melino v. Boston Medical Center, 127 F.4th

391 (1st Cir. 2025); Wise v. Children’s Hospital Medical

Center of Akron, No. 24-3674, 2025 WL 1392209, at *4 (6th

Cir. May 14, 2025). Accordingly, even if petitioners were

to prevail on the questions identified in the petition, the

result would merely be a remand for the court of appeals

to consider whether the district court correctly dismissed

petitioners’ claims on that independent basis.

Finally, the state law at issue is no longer in effect.

Rule 2.61 was repealed effective October 4, 2023, in response to changed conditions surrounding the COVID-19

pandemic, including the termination of the federal government’s own vaccination requirements and of the national state of emergency. See Pet. App. 7a. Although the

repeal did not moot petitioners’ claims for damages

against the health-care respondents, it significantly diminishes the importance of any decision by this Court.

Because there are independent bases to support the

judgment below and the challenged state law has been repealed, any decision by this Court on the questions presented in the petition would have little practical effect.

Given that this case does not actually present those questions, and that the decision below does not implicate any

circuit conflict, further review is unwarranted.

19

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

JACQUELINE PHIPPS POLITO

ERIN M. TRAIN

LITTLER MENDELSON P.C.

375 Woodcliff Drive,

Suite 2D

Fairport, NY 14450

Counsel for Respondent

Trinity Health, Inc.

MICHAEL J. KEANE

MARC A. SITTENREICH

GARFUNKEL WILD, P.C.

111 Great Neck Road

Great Neck, NY 11021

Counsel for Respondent

Westchester Medical Center

Advanced Physician Services,

P.C.

JULY 2025

LIZA M. VELAZQUEZ

EMILY A. VANCE

KATHLEEN H. PIERRE

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

(212) 373-3000

lvelazquez@paulweiss.com

ANNA M. STAPLETON

RUSSELL A.S. WIRTH

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

535 Mission Street, 25th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105

Counsel for Respondent

New York-Presbyterian

Healthcare System, Inc.