Emergency Application — Nancy Landry, Secretary of State of Louisiana, et al., Applicants v. Phillip Callais, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 10, 2024
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No. 24A_____
In the Supreme Court of the United States
NANCY LANDRY, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
LOUISIANA SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,
BY AND THROUGH ELIZABETH MURRILL,
v.
Applicants,
PHILLIP CALLAIS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
ADDENDUM
ELIZABETH B. MURRILL
Attorney General
J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MORGAN BRUNGARD
Deputy Solicitor General
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1885 N. Third St.
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 506-3746
AguinagaB@ag.louisiana.gov
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The State of Louisiana’s and Secretary of State’s Amended Notice
Of Appeal (May 7, 2024) .........................................................................Add. 1
The State of Louisiana’s and the Secretary of State’s Joint Motion for
Stay Pending Appeal (May 8, 2024) .......................................................Add. 5
District Court Ruling and Order Denying Joint Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal (May 9, 2024)................................................................................Add. 21
Galmon Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Robinson v. Ardoin (June 6, 2022) ....................Add. 23
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA—MONROE DIVISION
PHILLIP CALLAIS, LLOYD PRICE,
BRUCE ODELL, ELIZABETH ERSOFF,
ALBERT CAISSIE, DANIEL WEIR,
JOYCE LACOUR, CANDY CARROLL
PEAVY, TANYA WHITNEY, MIKE
JOHNSON, GROVER JOSEPH REES,
ROLFE MCCOLLISTER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NANCY LANDRY, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS LOUISIANA
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:24-cv-00122
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA’S AND SECRETARY OF STATE’S
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that the State of Louisiana, by and through Elizabeth
Murrill, the Attorney General of Louisiana, and Nancy Landry, in her official capacity
as Louisiana Secretary of State, hereby appeal this Court’s April 30, 2024 order
granting a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 198, as well as orders relating to that
injunction (including ECF No. 219), to the United States Supreme Court. This appeal
is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
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Respectfully submitted,
Dated: May 7, 2024
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Phillip J. Strach
Phillip J. Strach*
Lead Counsel
Thomas A. Farr*
John E. Branch, III*
Alyssa M. Riggins*
Cassie A. Holt*
NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH LLP
301 Hillsborough Street, Suite 1400
Raleigh, North Carolina 27603
Ph: (919) 329-3800
phil.strach@nelsonmullins.com
tom.farr@nelsonmullins.com
john.branch@nelsonmullins.com
alyssa.riggins@nelsonmullins.com
cassie.holt@nelsonmullins.com
/s/ Morgan Brungard
Morgan Brungard (LSBA No. 40298)
Deputy Solicitor General
Carey Tom Jones (LSBA No. 07474)
Office of the Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
1885 N. Third St.
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 326-6000 phone
(225) 326-6098 fax
BrungardM@ag.louisiana.gov
JonesCar@ag.louisiana.gov
/s/ John C. Walsh
John C. Walsh, (LSBA No. 24903)
John C. Conine, Jr., (LSBA No. 36834)
SHOWS, CALL & WALSH, L.L.P.
628 St. Louis St. (70802)
P.O. Box 4425
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
Ph: (225) 346-1461
Fax: (225) 346-1467
john@scwllp.com
coninej@scwllp.com
Counsel for Defendant NANCY
LANDRY, in her official capacity as
Secretary of State of Louisiana
Jason B. Torchinsky (DC No. 976033)*
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN
TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK, PLLC
2300 N Street, NW
Suite 643A
Washington, DC 20037
Tel: 202-737-8808
Email: jtorchinsky@holtzmanvogel.com
Phillip M. Gordon (VA No. 95621)*
Zachary D. Henson (NY No. 5907340)*
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN
TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK, PLLC
15405 John Marshall Hwy.
Haymarket, VA 20169
Telephone: (540) 341-8808
Facsimile: (540) 341-8809
Email: pgordon@holtzmanvogel.com
zhenson@holtzmanvogel.com
Add. 2
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Drew C. Ensign (DC No. 976571)*
Brennan A.R. Bowen (AZ No. 036639)*
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN
TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK, PLLC
2575 East Camelback Rd, Ste 860
Phoenix, AZ 85016
602-388-1262
Email: densign@holtzmanvogel.com
bbowen@holtzmanvogel.com
*admitted pro hac vice
Counsel for Intervenor-Defendant State
of Louisiana
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I served the foregoing document on counsel for all parties
via email on May 7, 2024.
/s/ Morgan Brungard
Morgan Brungard
4
Add. 4
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA—MONROE DIVISION
PHILLIP CALLAIS, LLOYD PRICE,
BRUCE ODELL, ELIZABETH ERSOFF,
ALBERT CAISSIE, DANIEL WEIR,
JOYCE LACOUR, CANDY CARROLL
PEAVY, TANYA WHITNEY, MIKE
JOHNSON, GROVER JOSEPH REES,
ROLFE MCCOLLISTER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NANCY LANDRY, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS LOUISIANA
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:24-cv-00122
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA’S AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S
JOINT MOTION FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL
The State of Louisiana, by and through Elizabeth Murrill, the Attorney
General of Louisiana, joined by the Louisiana Secretary of State, moves this Court
for a stay pending appeal of the April 30, 2024 injunction, ECF No. 198, as
implemented by the Court’s subsequent scheduling order, ECF No. 219. The bases for
the motion are set forth in the accompanying memorandum of law, which is
incorporated herein by reference. For the reasons stated in that memorandum, this
motion should be granted.
The State and the Secretary respectfully request a ruling on this motion by
12:00 p.m. Central Time on May 9 to permit the State and the Secretary to file an
application for a stay in the Supreme Court that evening if this Court denies this
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motion. If this Court does not rule on this motion by noon on May 9, the State will
file a motion for a stay pending appeal by the end of that day.
Dated: May 8, 2024
Respectfully Submitted,
Jason B. Torchinsky (DC No. 976033)*
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN
TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK, PLLC
2300 N Street, NW
Suite 643A
Washington, DC 20037
Tel: 202-737-8808
Email: jtorchinsky@holtzmanvogel.com
/s/ Morgan Brungard
Morgan Brungard (LSBA No. 40298)
Deputy Solicitor General
Phillip M. Gordon (VA No. 95621)*
Zachary D. Henson (NY No. 5907340)*
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN
TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK, PLLC
15405 John Marshall Hwy.
Haymarket, VA 20169
Telephone: (540) 341-8808
Facsimile: (540) 341-8809
Email: pgordon@holtzmanvogel.com
zhenson@holtzmanvogel.com
Carey Tom Jones (LSBA No. 07474)
Office of the Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
1885 N. Third St.
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 326-6000 phone
(225) 326-6098 fax
BrungardM@ag.louisiana.gov
JonesCar@ag.louisiana.gov
Counsel for Intervenor-Defendant State
of Louisiana
Brennan A.R. Bowen (AZ No. 036639)*
Drew C. Ensign (DC No. 976571)*
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN
TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK, PLLC
2575 East Camelback Rd, Ste 860
Phoenix, AZ 85016
602-388-1262
Email: bbowen@holtzmanvogel.com
*admitted pro hac vice
Counsel for Intervenor-Defendant State of
Louisiana
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/s/ Phillip J. Strach
Phillip J. Strach
phillip.strach@nelsonmullins.com
Alyssa M. Riggins*
alyssa.riggins@nelsonmullins.com
Cassie A. Holt*
cassie.holt@nelsonmullins.com
NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH LLP
4140 Parklake Avenue, Suite 200
Raleigh, NC 27612
Telephone: (919) 329-3800
Facsimile: (919) 329-3799
/s/ John C. Walsh
John C. Walsh (Louisiana Bar Roll No.
24903)
john@scwllp.com
SHOWS, CALI & WALSH, L.L.P.
P.O. Box 4046
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
Telephone: (225) 346-1461
Facsimile: (225) 346-5561
Counsel for Defendant Nancy Landry
admitted pro hac vice*
Add. 7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on May 8, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send
notification of such filing to all CM/ECF participating attorneys.
/s/ Morgan Brungard
Morgan Brungard
Add. 8
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA—MONROE DIVISION
PHILLIP CALLAIS, LLOYD PRICE,
BRUCE ODELL, ELIZABETH ERSOFF,
ALBERT CAISSIE, DANIEL WEIR,
JOYCE LACOUR, CANDY CARROLL
PEAVY, TANYA WHITNEY, MIKE
JOHNSON, GROVER JOSEPH REES,
ROLFE MCCOLLISTER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NANCY LANDRY, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS LOUISIANA
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:24-cv-00122
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA’S AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR JOINT MOTION
FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL
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INTRODUCTION
The State of Louisiana and the Secretary of State1 respectfully move for a stay
pending appeal of this Court’s April 30, 2024 injunction, ECF No. 198, as
implemented by the Court’s subsequent scheduling order, ECF No. 219. As the
Secretary of State explained in her brief and supporting declaration regarding
internal and external election deadlines (including May 15), see ECF No. 217, the only
maps that could feasibly be used for the 2024 election cycle at this stage are (1) SB8
if the injunction is stayed by May 15, (2) any other map ordered by the court by May
15, and (3) HB1. And if the State is not permitted or ordered to use any of those maps
by May 15, election chaos will ensue. See id. Given the Court’s scheduling order,
however, Louisiana will not have a congressional map in place until June—and even
then, the order suggests that some map other than SB8 or HB1 will be ordered, which
the Secretary has made clear is not feasible. A stay is thus necessary to avoid further
election chaos.
The State and the Secretary have a right to appeal this Court’s injunction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. And the Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated the point
that “federal courts ordinarily should not enjoin a state’s election laws in the period
close to an election.” Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring), vacated, 143 S. Ct. 2607 (2023). The Supreme Court “often stay[s] lower
1 The Secretary of State joins the State in seeking a stay of the injunction pending appeal because the
May 15, 2024 deadline is a firm and immovable deadline. As the Secretary of State, it is this Office’s
position that it will follow the orders of this Court and the Supreme Court. Any order to change the
map currently programmed in the system must be received by the Secretary’s Office by May 15, 2024.
HB1 is the map currently programmed and would cause the least election-administration disruption.
But if the Secretary is going to be permitted or ordered to implement any map other than HB1, it must
have an order to do so by May 15—full stop.
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federal court injunctions that contravene[] that principle.” See id. (citing Merrill v.
People First, 141 S. Ct. 25, 25 (2020); Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 9 (2020);
Merrill v. People First, 141 S. Ct. 190, 190 (2020); Clarno v. People Not Politicians
Or., 141 S. Ct. 206, 206 (2020); Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616, 2616 (2020);
RNC v. DNC, 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam); DNC v. Wis. State. Legis., 141 S.
Ct. 28, 28 (2020)).
This motion provides this Court an opportunity to prevent the irreparable
harm to the State, the Secretary, and all Louisiana citizens that will result from this
Court’s injunction, as currently issued, and the likelihood that it will require
implementation of a map that cannot practically be used for the 2024 elections. This
request for a stay is limited to the 2024 elections because there is adequate time to
prepare for additional maps for subsequent congressional elections and because any
appeal is likely to be resolved in time for the resulting map to be used for the 2026
election cycle.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(1)(A) generally requires a party
seeking a stay pending appeal to seek such relief in the district court first. That Rule
“fairly contemplate[s]” that “tribunals may properly stay their own orders when they
have ruled on an admittedly difficult legal question and when the equities of the case
suggest that the status quo should be maintained.” Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844–45 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Because of the exigencies presented here, the State and the Secretary
respectfully request that this Court resolve this issue expeditiously. The State and
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the Secretary respectfully request a ruling by 12:00 p.m. Central Time on Thursday,
May 9, to permit them to file an application with the Supreme Court, if necessary,
later that day. Absent a decision by this Court by that time, the State and the
Secretary plan to file an emergency application for a stay pending appeal in the
Supreme Court by the end of that day.
ARGUMENT
Under the “traditional” standard for a stay pending appeal, a court considers
four factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other
parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (citation omitted). These factors are not to be applied
“in a rigid or mechanical fashion.” Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 773 F.3d 55, 57
(5th Cir. 2014) (alterations accepted). A movant “need only present a substantial case
on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show that the balance of
equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay.” United States v. Baylor Univ.
Med. Ctr., 711 F.2d 38, 39 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
As the Supreme Court “has often indicated, however, that traditional test for
a stay does not apply (at least not in the same way) in election cases when a lower
court has issued an injunction of a state’s election law in the period close to an
election.” Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 880 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). “That principle—
known as the Purcell principle—reflects a bedrock tenet of election law: When an
election is close at hand, the rules of the road must be clear and settled. Id. at 880–
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81. There is also an arguable “relaxed” interpretation of the rule, requiring “a plaintiff
[to] establish[] at least the following: (i) the underlying merits are entirely clearcut
in favor of the plaintiff; (ii) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm absent the
injunction; (iii) the plaintiff has not unduly delayed bringing the complaint to court;
and (iv) the changes in question are at least feasible before the election without
significant cost, confusion, or hardship.” Id. (emphasis added). A stay is warranted
under these standards.
I.
THE STATE AND THE SECRETARY WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT
A STAY PENDING APPEAL AND SUCH A STAY IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
This Court’s injunction imposes irreparable harm per se by enjoining a duly
enacted State law. See Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.,
in chambers). Enjoining a “State from conducting [its] elections pursuant to a statute
enacted by the Legislature . . . seriously and irreparably harm[s] the State.” Abbott
v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). “If the district court judgment is ultimately
reversed, the State cannot run the election over again, this time applying” the plan
enacted by the Louisiana legislature. Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir.
2014) (issuing stay pending appeal). This is per se a harm to the public interest. See,
e.g., Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx, 157 F. Supp. 3d 573, 605 (E.D. La. 2016),
aff’d sub nom. Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Chao, 678 F. App’x 250 (5th Cir.
2017).
The Purcell principle establishes here that the State and the Secretary do not
have enough time to formulate and implement another congressional map this late
in the game. It is a bedrock principle of election law that federal courts should not
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muddy the electoral waters when an election is in close proximity. See Merrill, 142 S.
Ct. at 880–81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Louisiana “indisputably has a compelling
interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549
U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (citation omitted). And “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral
process is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” Id.
When considering whether to issue injunctive relief close to an election, courts
are “required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or
nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own
institutional procedures.” Id. at 4. This is because “[c]ourt orders affecting elections .
. . can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away
from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Id. at 4–5
(emphasis added).
The Secretary of State stated in her brief that “she needed an approved
congressional plan no later than May 15, 2024, in order to have sufficient time and
resources needed to administer the 2024 elections pursuant to federal and state law.”
ECF No. 217 at 6; see also Veasey, 769 F.3d at 893 (explaining that federal courts
have emphasized the need to consider the mechanics and complexities of
administering state election law). At this point, only HB1 is entered into the election
system and is the only map that could presently be used. ECF No. 217-1 at 4. SB8 or
some other map ordered by the court could alternatively be used so long as the
Secretary could begin entering it into the election systems by May 15—but this
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Court’s injunction prevents her from doing so. Id. at 5. Indeed, after May 15, HB1 is
the only map that feasibly could be used. See id. at 4–5. No other maps are feasible.
In issuing its remedial scheduling order, ECF No. 219, this Court seems to
have ignored that the May 15, 2024 date is predicated on the fact that the Secretary
must implement not one, but two, statewide redistricting plans before the June 19,
2024 deadline for would-be candidates to qualify by petition to run in the Fall 2024
elections. See ECF No. 217 at 3. On May 1, 2024—just seven days ago—a new
statewide map for Louisiana Supreme Court voting districts became law, which
requires the Secretary to move over two million Louisianans (approximately fortythree percent of Louisiana’s population) into new districts for the Fall 2024 elections.
Notably, the Louisiana Supreme Court redistricting bill (SB 255) was not introduced
in the Legislature until March 1, 2024, and was not signed into law until May 1,
2024. 2 Thus, any previous representation made during the October 2023 Robinson
oral argument before the Fifth Circuit about an end-of-May-2024 deadline for new
Congressional maps did not, and could not, take into account the current reality that
the Secretary also now must implement significant, statewide changes to an entirely
different map—the voting districts for the Louisiana Supreme Court. 3
2 The legislative history of SB 255 can be found here: https://legiscan.com/LA/bill/SB255/2024. The
Court may take judicial notice of the legislative history, including the date the bill was filed and signed
into law. See Territory of Alaska v. Am. Can Co., 358 U.S. 224, 227 (1959).
3 Moreover, the comment made by Jason Torchinsky (counsel for the State in both Robinson and here)
during the October 2023 Robinson oral argument in the Fifth Circuit was made in the last few minutes
of rebuttal time, in response to a direct question from Judge Elrod. A recording of that argument can
be found here: ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/22/22-30333_10-6-2023.mp3 (at 1:20:59-1:21:29).
No staff member from the Secretary’s Office was available for consult in the last few minutes of
argument. Nor, as mentioned above, was the prospect of implementing a new statewide map for
Louisiana Supreme Court voting districts, especially one that moves such a significant amount of
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As the Secretary of State has emphasized, “[r]ushing the voter assignment and
ballot printing process creates an unacceptable risk of error that can lead to flawed
elections.” See ECF No. 217 at 5. Simply put, the truncated process that would result
from trying to implement a completely new congressional map before the 2024
election would result in potential errors, negatively impacting the electoral process
and voters’ trust in that process.
In addition, the Court’s injunction, ECF No. 198, and scheduling order, ECF
No. 219, do not allow the State a fair and reasonable opportunity to fulfill its
constitutional duty and enact a remedial map. “Redistricting is primarily the duty
and responsibility of the state and federal-court review of districting legislation
represents a serious intrusion on the most vital of local functions.” Abbott, 138 S. Ct.
at 2324 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). And the State is entitled to
a reasonable opportunity to adopt a remedial map instead of the federal court
devising its own plan. See In re Landry, 83 F.4th 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Wise
v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978)). The State must be given a non-illusory
amount of time to accomplish this. See id. at 306 (stating that five legislative days
was “an impossibly short timetable for [remedial] state legislative action” and noting
that, in an Alabama redistricting case, a three-judge panel granted that state
legislature six weeks to propose a new map).
As explained by the State, the Legislature does not feasibly have time to adopt
a new map by May 15. See ECF No. 218. Yet this Court’s scheduling order does not
Louisiana’s population, on anyone’s mind in October 2023—five months prior to the introduction of SB
255.
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allow for any remedial map to be in place until June 4—well after the May 15
deadline. See ECF No. 219 at 3. Accordingly, the State and the Secretary jointly seek
a stay pending appeal for purposes of the 2024 elections.
II.
THE STATE AND THE SECRETARY ARE LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON APPEAL.
As explained above, the Court’s injunction leaves the Secretary with no map to
implement by May 15, which creates grave risks of electoral confusion, chaos, and
errors. Because that injunction runs afoul of the Purcell doctrine and well-established
principles of equity, the State and the Secretary are likely to prevail on appeal. The
current scheduling order indicates that this Court will impose a map on June 4, 2024,
see ECF No. 219 at 3, which is 154 days before the November 5, 2024 election. In
Robinson, the Supreme Court stayed the order enjoining the use of HB 1 that the
Middle District issued on June 6, 2022, which was 155 days before the November 8,
2022 elections. The same result would likely follow here.
Additionally, for the reasons already articulated by the State in its post-trial
brief and opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the State is
likely to prevail on the underlying constitutional merits. See ECF No. 86; ECF No.
192.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant a stay pending appeal.
Dated: May 8, 2024
Respectfully Submitted,
Jason B. Torchinsky (DC No. 976033)*
/s/ Morgan Brungard
Morgan Brungard (LSBA No. 40298)
Deputy Solicitor General
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#: 5237
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN
TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK, PLLC
2300 N Street, NW
Suite 643A
Washington, DC 20037
Tel: 202-737-8808
Email: jtorchinsky@holtzmanvogel.com
Phillip M. Gordon (VA No. 95621)*
Zachary D. Henson (NY No. 5907340)*
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN
TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK, PLLC
15405 John Marshall Hwy.
Haymarket, VA 20169
Telephone: (540) 341-8808
Facsimile: (540) 341-8809
Email: pgordon@holtzmanvogel.com
zhenson@holtzmanvogel.com
Carey Tom Jones (LSBA No. 07474)
Office of the Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
1885 N. Third St.
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 326-6000 phone
(225) 326-6098 fax
BrungardM@ag.louisiana.gov
JonesCar@ag.louisiana.gov
Counsel for Intervenor-Defendant State
of Louisiana
Drew C. Ensign (DC No. 976571)*
Brennan A.R. Bowen (AZ No. 036639)*
HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN
TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK, PLLC
2575 East Camelback Rd, Ste 860
Phoenix, AZ 85016
602-388-1262
Email: densign@holtzmanvogel.com
bbowen@holtzmanvogel.com
*admitted pro hac vice
Counsel for Intervenor-Defendant State of
Louisiana
/s/ Phillip J. Strach
Phillip J. Strach
phillip.strach@nelsonmullins.com
Alyssa M. Riggins*
alyssa.riggins@nelsonmullins.com
Cassie A. Holt*
cassie.holt@nelsonmullins.com
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#: 5238
NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH LLP
4140 Parklake Avenue, Suite 200
Raleigh, NC 27612
Telephone: (919) 329-3800
Facsimile: (919) 329-3799
/s/ John C. Walsh
John C. Walsh (Louisiana Bar Roll No.
24903)
john@scwllp.com
SHOWS, CALI & WALSH, L.L.P.
P.O. Box 4046
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
Telephone: (225) 346-1461
Facsimile: (225) 346-5561
Counsel for Defendant Nancy Landry
admitted pro hac vice*
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#: 5239
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on May 8, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send
notification of such filing to all CM/ECF participating attorneys.
/s/ Morgan Brungard
Morgan Brungard
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5240
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
PHILLIP CALLAIS ET AL
CASE NO.
RRS
3:24-CV-00122-DCJ-CES-
VERSUS
THREE-JUDGE COURT
NANCY LANDRY
ORDER
The present matter before the Court is The State of Louisiana’s and The
Secretary of State’s Joint Motion for Stay Pending Appeal [Doc. 222]. Movants ask
the Court to stay its April 30, 2024 Injunction and Reasons for Judgment [Doc. 198]
which enjoins Louisiana’s enacted congressional map, SB8, pending appellate
proceedings in the United States Supreme Court. Rule 62(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that:
While an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final
judgment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or refuses
to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may suspend, modify,
restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that
secure the opposing party's rights.
The rule, however, goes on to state that:
If the judgment appealed from is rendered by a statutory three-judge
district court, the order must be made either:
(1) by that court sitting in open session; or
(2) by the assent of all its judges, as evidenced by their signatures.
Having polled the three members of the panel, all of the members of the panel
do not assent to a stay of the court's judgment pending appeal. Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED THAT The State of Louisiana’s and The Secretary of State’s
Joint Motion for Stay Pending Appeal [Doc. 222] is DENIED.
THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in chambers on this 9th day of May, 2024.
_____________________________________
DAVID C. JOSEPH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PRESS ROBINSON, EDGAR CAGE,
DOROTHY NAIRNE, EDWIN RENÉ SOULÉ,
ALICE WASHINGTON, CLEE EARNEST
LOWE, DAVANTE LEWIS, MARTHA DAVIS,
AMBROSE SIMS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE (“NAACP”) LOUISIANA STATE
CONFERENCE, and POWER COALITION FOR
EQUITY AND JUSTICE,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00211-SDD-SDJ c/w
Plaintiffs,
v.
KYLE ARDOIN, in his official capacity as
Secretary of State for Louisiana,
Defendant.
EDWARD GALMON, SR., CIARA HART,
NORRIS HENDERSON, and TRAMELLE
HOWARD,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00214-SDD-SDJ
v.
R. KYLE ARDOIN, in his official capacity as
Louisiana Secretary of State,
Defendant.
GALMON PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2
LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5
I.
Plaintiffs are substantially likely to prove that HB 1 violates Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. .................................................................................................. 5
A.
Gingles One: A second compact, majority-Black district can be drawn in
Louisiana. .................................................................................................... 6
B.
Gingles Two: Black Louisianians are politically cohesive. ........................ 7
C.
Gingles Three: White Louisianians engage in bloc voting to defeat Blackpreferred candidates. ................................................................................... 8
D.
Under the totality of circumstances, HB 1 denies Black voters equal
opportunity to elect their preferred candidates to Congress. ...................... 9
1.
Senate Factor One: Louisiana has an ongoing history of official,
voting-related discrimination. ....................................................... 10
2.
Senate Factor Two: Louisiana voters are racially polarized. ........ 12
3.
Senate Factor Three: Louisiana’s voting practices enhance the
opportunity for discrimination. ..................................................... 13
4.
Senate Factor Four: Louisiana has no history of candidate slating
for congressional elections. ........................................................... 14
5.
Senate Factor Five: Louisiana’s discrimination has produced
severe socioeconomic disparities that impair Black Louisianians’
participation in the political process. ............................................ 14
6.
Senate Factor Six: Both overt and subtle racial appeals are
prevalent in Louisiana’s political campaigns. ............................... 15
7.
Senate Factor Seven: Black Louisianians are historically
underrepresented in elected office. ............................................... 17
8.
Senate Factor Eight: Louisiana has not been responsive to its Black
community. ................................................................................... 18
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9.
Senate Factor Nine: The justification for the new congressional
map is tenuous............................................................................... 19
10.
Black Louisianians are significantly underrepresented—and white
Louisianians are significantly overrepresented—under HB 1. ..... 20
II.
Plaintiffs and other Black Louisianians will suffer irreparable harm absent a
preliminary injunction........................................................................................... 21
III.
The balance of equities and the public interest favor injunctive relief. ................ 21
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 24
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INTRODUCTION
Consider at the outset two critical facts: Louisiana has six congressional districts and a
Black population of over 33%—one-third of the state’s population. Given this demographic
reality, it is unsurprising that voices across Louisiana called for the creation of a second Blackopportunity congressional district during the latest round of redistricting. This chorus, which
shared the simple belief that the state’s congressional delegation ought to reflect its population,
came from all quarters. Activists, community leaders, and ordinary Louisianians petitioned
lawmakers. Legislators introduced multiple maps that included a second majority-Black district.
And Governor John Bel Edwards pledged to veto any new map that failed to comply with the
requirements of federal law. Governor Edwards was correct: The creation of a second district in
which Black voters have the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice is not only the fairest
result for the people of Louisiana—it is required by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Despite the mandates of federal law and the entreaties of citizens and government officials
alike, the Louisiana State Legislature enacted House Bill 1 (“HB 1”), drawing a new congressional
map that dilutes the votes of the state’s Black citizens. Louisiana has a Black population
sufficiently large and geographically compact to create a second majority-Black congressional
district that includes the Baton Rouge area and the delta parishes along the Mississippi border.
Rather than draw this district as required by federal law, the Legislature engaged in textbook
examples of “packing” and “cracking”: The new plan packs Black voters into the Second
Congressional District and cracks the rest among the state’s remaining, predominantly white
districts. Consequently, Louisiana’s new congressional map—combined with the state’s racially
polarized voting, the severe socioeconomic disparities between Black and white Louisianians, and
the ongoing effects of a tragic history of discrimination and racial appeals in campaigns—denies
the state’s Black voters equal access to the political process in violation of Section 2.
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This case calls for a straightforward application of settled Voting Rights Act precedent—
no more, no less. Without this Court’s intervention prior to the 2022 elections, Louisiana will
subject its Black citizens, including Plaintiffs, to an unlawful congressional districting plan and
irreparably violate their fundamental right to vote. Plaintiffs are highly likely to succeed on the
merits of their Section 2 claim, and given Louisiana’s late election calendar, there is more than
enough time to feasibly draw and implement a remedial plan. Plaintiffs therefore request that the
Court preliminarily enjoin implementation of Louisiana’s enacted congressional map and ensure
the creation of an additional congressional district in which Black voters have the opportunity to
elect their candidates of choice.
BACKGROUND
Over the past decade, Louisiana’s population grew by more than 120,000 people. See Ex. 1
¶ 13. 1 The entirety of this growth is attributable to the state’s minority population. Id. While the
state’s Black population increased by 3.8% overall between 2010 and 2020, its white population
decreased by 5.1%. Id. By 2020, Louisiana’s Black residents comprised 33.13% of the state’s
population. Id.
Throughout the redistricting process that followed the 2020 census, Black Louisianians
and civil rights groups called for the enactment of a second congressional district where minority
voters would have a realistic opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. For example, at a
public meeting of the Legislature’s joint redistricting committee in Baton Rouge on November 16,
2021, residents pointed out that while Black Louisianians make up one-third of the state’s
population, only one of Louisiana’s six congressional districts is majority Black. Representative
Ted James, chair of the Legislative Black Caucus, emphasized this imbalance during his five-
1
All exhibits are attached to the Declaration of Darrel J. Papillion, filed concurrently with this motion.
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minute speech, repeating, “One third of six is two.” Ex. 10. However, as representatives of the
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana concluded, the Legislature “disregarded many of the
public comments and much of the hours of testimony they received and fell into age-old patterns
of protecting incumbent officials, political parties and personal allies.” Ex. 11. They noted in
particular that “[l]awmakers rejected overwhelming calls from people who attended hearings
around the state and at the Louisiana Capitol to expand the number of majority-minority districts
across several of the maps. It’s not clear the Legislature made any significant changes to district
lines, big or small, based on citizen input.” Id.
As the Legislature deliberated, Senator Cleo Fields—who observed that “[i]t would be
unconscionable for [the Legislature] to pass a plan with a single Black district”—introduced three
maps that included two majority-Black districts. Ex. 12. Similar proposals were offered by
Senators Karen Carter Peterson, Gary Smith, Gerald Boudreaux, Jay Luneau, and Joseph Bouie,
Jr., many of which included a new Fifth Congressional District that would afford Black voters the
opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. Id. But none of these maps was adopted by the
Legislature. Instead, during an extraordinary legislative session that commenced on February 2,
2022, the House passed HB 1, which established a map that largely mirrors the 2011 congressional
plan and preserves Louisiana’s lone majority-Black congressional district. Ex. 13. The Senate in
turn passed its own map, Senate Bill 5 (“SB 5”), which also included only a single minorityopportunity district. Ex. 14. Notwithstanding objections that the failure to draw a second majorityBlack congressional district dilutes the votes of Louisiana’s minority communities, the Legislature
sent HB 1 and SB 5 to Governor Edwards’s desk following final votes on February 18. Ex. 15.
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Consistent with his earlier pledge to veto any congressional map that “suffer[s] from
defects in terms of basic fairness,” Ex. 16, Governor Edwards vetoed the proposed maps on March
9, 2022. In his accompanying message, he explained that he
vetoed the proposed congressional map drawn by Louisiana’s Legislature because
it does not include a second majority African American district, despite Black
voters making up almost a third of Louisianans per the latest U.S. Census data. This
map is simply not fair to the people of Louisiana and does not meet the standards
set forth in the federal Voting Rights Act. The Legislature should immediately
begin the work of drawing a map that ensures Black voices can be properly heard
in the voting booth. It can be done and it should be done.
Ex. 17; see also Ex. 18. Rather than heed this advice and draw a new congressional plan that
complies with Section 2, the Legislature overrode Governor Edwards’s veto of HB 1 on March 30,
2022. Ex. 19.
Louisiana’s new congressional map packs Black voters into the state’s only majority-Black
district and cracks other Black voters among districts that extend into predominantly white
communities in the southern, western, and northern reaches of the state. Consequently, the Second
Congressional District, a serpentine district that snakes through New Orleans and Baton Rouge to
collect minority voters, has a Black voting-age population of 58.67%, Ex. 1 ¶ 40—far more than
is needed for Black voters to elect their candidates of choice in the district. Meanwhile, three of
the state’s five parishes with the highest Black populations—East Carroll Parish (70.7%), Madison
Parish (63.5%), and Tensas Parish (55.8%)—are located in the predominantly white Fifth
Congressional District. Ex. 1, Ex. C-1.
LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction “should issue” when a plaintiff shows
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of
irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the
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injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted,
and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Speaks v. Kruse, 445 F.3d 396, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2006).
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs readily satisfy the four required elements for issuance of a preliminary injunction.
I.
Plaintiffs are substantially likely to prove that HB 1 violates Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits any “standard, practice, or procedure” that
“results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). This includes the
manipulation of district lines [to] dilute the voting strength of politically cohesive
minority group members, whether by fragmenting the minority voters among
several districts where a bloc-voting majority can routinely outvote them, or by
packing them into one or a small number of districts to minimize their influence in
the districts next door.
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1007 (1994).
To prevail on their Section 2 claim, Plaintiffs must show that (1) the minority group is
“sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district”; (2) the minority group “is politically cohesive”; and (3) “the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). Once Plaintiffs make this threshold showing,
the Court must examine “the totality of circumstances”—including the nine factors identified in
the Senate report that accompanied the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act—to determine
whether “the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation” by members of the minority group. 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(b); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43–45; Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of
Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991).
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Significantly, “[n]o one of the factors is dispositive; the plaintiffs need not prove a majority
of them; [and] other factors may be relevant.” Westwego Citizens, 946 F.2d at 1120; see also
NAACP v. Fordice, 252 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that Section 2 requires “a
flexible, fact-intensive inquiry predicated on ‘an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact
of the contested electoral mechanisms,’” “a searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present
reality,’” and a “‘functional’ view of political life” (first quoting Magnolia Bar Ass’n v. Lee, 994
F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993); and then quoting LULAC, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999
F.2d 831, 860 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc))).
A.
Gingles One: A second compact, majority-Black district can be drawn in
Louisiana.
Plaintiffs satisfy the first Gingles precondition because it is possible to “creat[e] more than
the existing number of reasonably compact districts with a sufficiently large minority population
to elect candidates of its choice.” LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 430 (2006) (plurality opinion)
(quoting De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1008). The numerosity requirement of this precondition involves
a “straightforward,” “objective, numerical test: Do minorities make up more than 50 percent of the
voting-age population in the relevant geographic area?” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 18
(2009) (plurality opinion).
Expert demographer William Cooper has offered three illustrative plans that unequivocally
satisfy the first Gingles precondition. See, e.g., Terrebonne Par. Branch NAACP v. Edwards, 399
F. Supp. 3d 608, 611 (M.D. La. 2019) (first Gingles precondition satisfied based on illustrative
maps). Mr. Cooper’s illustrative maps demonstrate that Louisiana’s Black community is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to comprise more than 50% of the voting-age
population in a second congressional district that connects the Baton Rouge area and St. Landry
Parish with the delta parishes along the Mississippi border. See Ex. 1 ¶¶ 47, 60, 66, 71. Notably,
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Mr. Cooper’s illustrative maps are nearly as or even more compact than the new plan drawn by
HB 1. Id. ¶¶ 72–77. They also comply with other traditional districting principles, including
population equality, contiguity, maintaining political boundaries, and avoiding pairing of
incumbents, see id. ¶¶ 52–56—all of which were guidelines adopted by the Legislature during this
past redistricting cycle. See Ex. 20.
As described in the declarations of Christopher Tyson and Charles Cravins, a congressional
district that includes the Baton Rouge area, St. Landry Parish, and the delta parishes along the
Mississippi border would unite Louisianians with shared historical, familial, and economic
interests. See Exs. 4–5. Baton Rouge has long served as the urban anchor for the delta parishes,
providing educational and economic opportunities that link the state capital with communities to
the north along the Mississippi River. Ex. 4 ¶¶ 6–11. And Baton Rouge and St. Landry Parish
similarly possess strong economic and educational ties. Ex. 5 ¶¶ 3–6.
Moreover, Dr. Maxwell Palmer confirmed that Black voters would be able to elect their
preferred candidates in each of Mr. Cooper’s illustrative majority-Black districts. Under all three
maps, Black-preferred candidates would have won at least 14 of 18 analyzed elections in the new
majority-Black districts, with an average of at least 55% of the vote. See Ex. 2 ¶¶ 25–26. Plaintiffs
therefore satisfy the first Gingles precondition. See Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1425 (11th
Cir. 1998) (first Gingles factor requires “an electoral district, consistent with traditional districting
principles, in which minority voters could successfully elect a minority candidate”).
B.
Gingles Two: Black Louisianians are politically cohesive.
Plaintiffs also satisfy the second Gingles precondition because Louisiana’s Black voters
are politically cohesive. See 478 U.S. at 49. “Bloc voting by blacks tends to prove that the black
community is politically cohesive, that is, it shows that blacks prefer certain candidates whom they
could elect in a single-member, black majority district.” Id. at 68.
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Dr. Palmer analyzed political cohesion and racially polarized voting across the state and in
each individual congressional district. See Ex. 2 ¶ 6. To perform his analysis, Dr. Palmer used
official election data from 2012 to 2020 and a widely accepted methodology called ecological
inference analysis. See id. ¶¶ 9–11; see also, e.g., Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections &
Registration, 301 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1305 (M.D. Ga. 2018) (recognizing ecological inference as
“the ‘gold standard’ for use in racial bloc voting analyses”), aff’d, 979 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2020).
Dr. Palmer found “a clear pattern of racially polarized voting” statewide and in each
individual congressional district. Ex. 2 ¶¶ 21–22. His analysis shows that Black Louisianians voted
cohesively in most elections over a decade span. Id. ¶ 17. In 18 of the 22 elections he analyzed,
Black voters had clearly identifiable preferred candidates and voted as a bloc for these candidates
with an average of 91.4% of the vote. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. These results more than satisfy the legal
threshold of cohesive voting, and Plaintiffs therefore satisfy the second Gingles precondition. See
478 U.S. at 56 (“A showing that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for
the same candidates is one way of proving the political cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution
claim.”).
C.
Gingles Three: White Louisianians engage in bloc voting to defeat Blackpreferred candidates.
Finally, Plaintiffs satisfy the third Gingles precondition because, in the area where Mr.
Cooper proposes a new majority-Black district, “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.” 478 U.S. at 51.
Dr. Palmer found high levels of white bloc voting in opposition to the candidates whom
Black voters cohesively supported. In 17 of the 18 elections where Black voters had a preferred
candidate, the white majority voted as a bloc against the Black-preferred candidate with an average
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of 82.9% of the vote. Ex. 2 ¶¶ 18–19. Dr. Palmer found similar results exist in each individual
congressional district. Id. ¶ 22.
The effect of this bloc voting is unmistakable: The candidates preferred by white voters
won 18 of the 20 elections analyzed, while Black-preferred candidates prevailed only twice across
the same elections. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. In short, Black Louisianians’ candidates of choice are
consistently defeated by white bloc voting statewide and in each of the state’s congressional
districts, except where Black voters make up a majority of eligible voters—thus satisfying the third
Gingles precondition. See 478 U.S. at 68 (“Bloc voting by a white majority tends to prove that
blacks will generally be unable to elect representatives of their choice.”).
D.
Under the totality of circumstances, HB 1 denies Black voters equal
opportunity to elect their preferred candidates to Congress.
Considering the “totality of circumstances,” HB 1 denies Black Louisianians an equal
opportunity to elect their preferred congressional representatives. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). Notably,
“it will be only the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of the three
Gingles [preconditions] but still have failed to establish a violation of § 2 under the totality of
circumstances.” Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1342
(11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1135
(3d Cir. 1993)). This is not an unusual case.
The factors outlined in the Senate Judiciary Committee report accompanying the 1982
Voting Rights Act amendments—the “Senate Factors”—are “typically relevant to a § 2 claim” and
guide this analysis. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37 (listing Senate
Factors). They are not exclusive, and “there is no requirement that any particular number of factors
be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (quoting
S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982)); see also Westwego Citizens, 946 F.2d at 1120.
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Senate Factor One: Louisiana has an ongoing history of official, votingrelated discrimination.
As courts have recognized—and as explored in the expert report of Dr. Allan Lichtman,
see Ex. 3—Louisiana’s history of voting-related discrimination is so deeply ingrained that “it
would take a multi-volumed treatise to properly describe the persistent, and often violent,
intimidation visited by white citizens upon black efforts to participate in Louisiana’s political
process.” Citizens for Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (E.D. La. 1986),
aff’d, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 363
(E.D. La. 1963) (three-judge court) (extensively cataloging Louisiana’s “historic policy and the
dominant white citizens’ firm determination to maintain white supremacy in state and local
government by denying to [Black citizens] the right to vote”), aff’d, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). These
discriminatory actions have evolved over the years, but they have persisted. As a result of the
centuries-long effort to marginalize and disenfranchise Black Louisianians, they still lack equal
access to the state’s political processes today.
In 1898, Louisiana called a constitutional convention for the sole purpose of “establish[ing]
the supremacy of the white race.” Ex. 3 at 9 (alteration in original). One tactic the State employed
was imposition of educational and property requirements for voter registration on residents whose
fathers or grandfathers were not registered to vote prior to January 1, 1867—the “Grandfather
Clause.” Id. The convention’s president made the intent of the Grandfather Clause evident, asking,
“Doesn’t it let the white man vote, and doesn’t it stop the negro from voting, and isn’t that what
we came here for?” Id. at 9–10. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915), ultimately struck down the Grandfather Clause, finding that while it was race
neutral, it was also designed to protect the voting rights of illiterate white voters while
disenfranchising Black voters. Ex. 3 at 10.
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The Supreme Court’s intervention did not deter state officials, who subsequently
introduced a number of measures to discourage and prevent Black voting in Louisiana. Id. These
racially discriminatory measures included the all-white primary and a type of literacy test made
possible by the “Understanding Clause,” which was put in place during the state’s 1921
constitutional convention. Id. This clause required voters to give a “reasonable interpretation” of
a section of the state’s constitution, and if that interpretation was incorrect under a registrar’s
unfettered discretion, then the applicant’s registration application was rejected. Id. This and other
discriminatory measures were so effective that, by the advent of the Voting Rights Act, only about
one-third of Louisiana’s Black voting-age population was registered to vote, compared with the
overwhelming majority of the white voting-age population. Id. at 10–11. The Understanding
Clause remained in force until 1965, when the U.S. Supreme Court struck it down in Louisiana v.
United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
That same year, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which sparked a
widespread increase in Black voter registration—and just as it did following ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment, the State of Louisiana retaliated. In July 1968, Louisiana enacted new laws
authorizing at-large elections for police juries and parish school boards, which were previously
prohibited. Ex. 3 at 11. In 1969, the U.S. Department of Justice objected to this new system, finding
that the at-large electoral system would discriminate against Black voters if implemented. Id.
Indeed, since the late 1960s, the Department of Justice has filed nearly 150 objections to proposed
laws in Louisiana that would discriminate against Black voters. Id.
Louisiana’s discrimination against Black voters is not confined to history books; instead,
it has persisted well into the 21st century. In June 2018, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
found that geographical areas within the state with more Black residents have fewer polling places
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per voter. Id. at 14. On average, Louisiana’s Black voters must therefore travel farther than white
voters to access polling locations. Id. at 14–15. The commission also found that polling places
were inadequate for early voting, with only four early voting locations in each of the three most
populated—and most diverse—parishes of East Baton Rouge, Jefferson, and Orleans. Id. at 15.
And Caddo Parish in the northwestern corner of the state, which has a 53% minority population,
has only one early voting location for its 260,000 residents. Id. Louisiana’s racial discrimination
in voting persists in indirect ways as well: The State overincarcerates, and consequently
disenfranchises, its Black citizens. Id. at 17–23.
Louisiana’s centuries-long efforts to discriminate against Black voters continue to this day.
This factor thus weighs decidedly in Plaintiffs’ favor.
2.
Senate Factor Two: Louisiana voters are racially polarized.
“Evidence of racially polarized voting is at the root of a racial vote dilution claim because
it demonstrates that racial considerations predominate in elections and cause the defeat of minority
candidates or candidates identified with minority interests.” Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F.
Supp. at 1133 (quoting Johnson v. Halifax County, 594 F. Supp. 161, 170 (E.D.N.C. 1984)). Courts
have found that voting in Louisiana is racially polarized. 2 These findings were confirmed by Dr.
Palmer’s analysis discussed above, see supra Sections I.B–C, which found “a clear pattern of
See, e.g., Terrebonne Par. Branch NAACP v. Jindal, 274 F. Supp. 3d 395, 436–37 (M.D. La. 2017)
(recognizing racially polarized voting in Terrebonne Parish), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Fusilier
v. Landry, 963 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2020); St. Bernard Citizens for Better Gov’t v. St. Bernard Par. Sch. Bd.,
No. CIV.A. 02-2209, 2002 WL 2022589, at *9 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2002) (recognizing racially polarized
voting in St. Bernard Parish); Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 298–99 (M.D. La. 1988) (concluding
that “across Louisiana and in each of the family court and district court judicial districts as well as in each
of the court of appeal districts, there is consistent racial polarization in voting”), vacated on other grounds,
750 F. Supp. 200 (M.D. La. 1990); Citizens for Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at 1124–31 (recognizing racially
polarized voting in City of Gretna); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 337–39 (E.D. La. 1983) (three-judge
court) (recognizing racial polarization in Orleans Parish).
2
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racially polarized voting” statewide and in each of the state’s six congressional district. Ex. 2
¶¶ 21–22. This factor thus supports a finding of vote dilution.
3.
Senate Factor Three: Louisiana’s voting practices enhance the
opportunity for discrimination.
As discussed above, Louisiana has historically employed a variety of voting practices that
have discriminated against Black voters. See supra Section 1.D.1; Ex. 3. Even today, the state
employs a unique open primary system that negatively impacts minority voters. See City of Port
Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167 (1982) (describing how such circumstances
“permanently foreclose a black candidate from being elected”).
Louisiana’s open primary system effectively imposes a majority-vote requirement; that is,
a candidate prevails if they win an outright majority in the open primary, but if no candidate
receives a majority, then only the top two candidates proceed to the general election. Ex. 3 at 33–
34. The same rules apply to elections where there are multiple seats to be filled. Id. Consequently,
even if a Black or Black-preferred candidate were to win a plurality of the vote in a predominantly
white jurisdiction because the white vote is divided among multiple candidates, that candidate
would be defeated by white bloc voting in the subsequent general election. See id. at 34.
This phenomenon has been repeatedly illustrated in statewide elections. In the 2015 race
for lieutenant governor, Black Democrat Melvin Holden won 33% of the vote compared to his
nearest competitor, white Republican Billy Nungesser, who earned only 30%. Id. In the general
runoff election, Nungesser decisively won 55% of the vote to Holden’s 45%. Id. Similarly, in the
2017 race for state treasurer, Black Democrat Derrick Edwards won 31% of the primary vote while
his nearest competitor, white Republican John Schroeder, finished with only 24%. Id. In the
general election, Schroeder defeated Edwards, 56% to 44%. Id.
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Ultimately, Louisiana’s open primary system serves to reduce the opportunity of Black
voters to elect their preferred candidates to office. See City of Port Arthur, 459 U.S. at 171. This
factor thus weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.
4.
Senate Factor Four: Louisiana has no history of candidate slating for
congressional elections.
Because Louisiana’s congressional elections do not use a slating process, see Ex. 3 at 2,
this factor is not relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim.
5.
Senate Factor Five: Louisiana’s discrimination has produced severe
socioeconomic disparities that impair Black Louisianians’
participation in the political process.
Louisiana’s Black community continues to suffer as a result of the state’s history of
discrimination.
Black per-capita income ($19,381) is barely half of white per-capita income ($34,690),
while the Black child poverty rate (42.7%) is nearly triple the white child poverty rate (15.0%).
Ex. 1 ¶ 84. White Louisianians are more likely than Black Louisianians to have finished high
school, much more likely to have obtained a bachelor’s degree, more likely to be employed, and
much more likely to be employed in management or professional occupations. Id. Fewer than half
of Black Louisianians live in houses they own, compared to 76.6% of white residents, and the
average white-owned home is worth above $50,000 more than the average Black-owned home. Id.
The inequities extend to vehicle access (16.4% of Black households in Louisiana lack access to a
vehicle, compared to only 4.7% of white households), computer access (84.3% of Black
households have a computer, compared to 91.6% of white households), and internet access (72.6%
of Black households enjoy broadband internet connections, compared to 84.3% of white
households). Id.
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These striking data points only confirm the findings of previous courts as to the stark
socioeconomic disparities between Black and white Louisianians. See, e.g., Major v. Treen, 574
F. Supp. 325, 340–41 (E.D. La. 1983) (three-judge court) (finding that “Blacks in contemporary
Louisiana have less education, subsist under poorer living conditions and in general occupy a lower
socio-economic status than whites”; that “[t]hese factors are the legacy of historical discrimination
in the areas of education, employment and housing”; and that “[a] sense of futility engendered by
the pervasiveness of prior discrimination, both public and private, is perceived as discouraging
blacks from entering into the governmental process”).
As Dr. Lichtman documents, these persistent inequities significantly hinder Black
Louisianians’ ability to participate in the political process. Ex. 3 at 36–39. For example, lack of
vehicle access makes it more challenging to travel to polling places; the transience that results
from lack of home ownership results in changing polling locations; and lower levels of education
and internet access make it more difficult to learn and navigate voting procedures. Id. Ultimately,
“[p]erpetuated and solidified racial segregation, which is evident in Louisiana, magnifies the
effects of discrimination on the socioeconomic standing of minorities, which impacts their ability
to participate fully in the political process and elect candidates of their choice.” Id. at 37. This
factor thus supports a finding of unlawful vote dilution.
6.
Senate Factor Six: Both overt and subtle racial appeals are prevalent
in Louisiana’s political campaigns.
As explored in detail in Dr. Lichtman’s report, see Ex. 3 at 39–46, racial appeals have been
a mainstay in Louisiana politics over the past four decades.
Most infamously, David Duke—former Grand Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan—made several runs for statewide political office, including a successful 1989 run for the
Louisiana House of Representatives. See id. at 39; Ex. 21. In the 1991 Louisiana gubernatorial
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race, Duke finished second to former Governor Edwin Edwards. Ex. 3 at 39. During the campaign,
Duke compared affirmative action in the United States to the Holocaust, stating, “The closest thing
that I know to the policies of Germany in this country is the so-called affirmative action or quota
systems.” Id. Duke also stoked fears of a rapidly diversifying America, stating to loud applause at
a rally on the shore of Lake Pontchartrain, “If you are white these days you are a second-class
citizen in your own country.” Ex. 22. Although Duke lost the election, he still amassed more than
670,000 votes—nearly 40%—and declared a symbolic victory: “Perhaps the messenger was
rejected in this state of Louisiana, but the message wasn’t. The people believe in what I believe.
The polls all show that.” Ex. 23.
While David Duke might be the most overt and salacious purveyor of racial appeals in
Louisiana’s modern political history, other examples abound. In the 1995 gubernatorial race, the
successful Republican candidate—who defeated then-Congressman Cleo Fields, the first Black
Louisiana gubernatorial candidate in more than a century—noted that the predominantly white
Jefferson Parish “is right next to the jungle in New Orleans and it has a very low crime rate.” Ex.
3 at 39–40. Scholars later observed that “symbolic racism was an important determinant of vote
choice in the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election, even after controlling for partisanship and
ideology.” Id. at 40. In 2011, lieutenant governor candidate Billy Nungesser ran an ad called
“Sleepless in Louisiana,” in which he attacked his opponent for failing to protect Louisianians
from having their jobs stolen by illegal immigrants. Id. at 41. And in 2014, a Louisiana
congressman—the U.S. House Republican whip—admitted that, while serving as a Louisiana state
representative in 2002, he had addressed a white supremacist group founded by David Duke. Id.
Racial appeals were also featured in Louisiana’s two most recent gubernatorial elections.
In 2015, Republican gubernatorial candidate David Vitter released a campaign ad that, as Dr.
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Lichtman observes, was “reminiscent of the notoriously racist Willie Horton ad.” Id. at 42. The ad
pictured now-Governor Edwards alongside former President Barack Obama and warned that
“Edwards joined Obama” in promising to release “[f]ifty-five hundred dangerous thugs, drug
dealers, back into our streets.” Id. Four years later, Governor Edwards’s Republican opponent
released a campaign ad promising to “end taxpayer benefits for illegal immigrants,” despite noncitizens being ineligible for such benefits. Id. In a different campaign ad, the Republican candidate
falsely claimed that New Orleans was a sanctuary city for immigrants. Id. at 42–43.
In short, Louisiana’s history of racial appeals in campaigns continues to this day. This
factor also weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.
7.
Senate Factor Seven: Black
underrepresented in elected office.
Louisianians
are
historically
As a consequence of Louisiana’s history of voter suppression and racially polarized voting,
Black Louisianians have struggled to win election to public office. Not a single Black candidate
has been elected to statewide office in Louisiana since Reconstruction. Ex. 3 at 46–47. Since 1991,
only four Black Louisianians have represented the state in Congress, and only once—from 1993
to 1997—have two Black Louisianians served in Congress at the same time. Id. at 47. And no
Black Louisianian has been elected to Congress from a non-majority-Black district. Id.
Since 1990, the percentage of Black members of the Legislature has remained relatively
constant. Id. Despite comprising one-third of the state’s population, Black legislators constitute
only 23.1% of the Louisiana State Senate and 22.9% of the Louisiana House of Representatives.
Id. Currently, all Black members of the Legislature were elected from majority-Black districts. Id.
at 47–48.
Black Louisianians are also underrepresented in the state’s judiciary. Id. at 48. According
to a 2018 study by researchers at the Newcomb College Institute of Tulane University, Black
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Louisianians comprised just 23.4% of the state’s judges. Id. And only one Black justice sits on the
Louisiana Supreme Court. Id. at 48–49. This factor thus supports a finding of vote dilution.
8.
Senate Factor Eight: Louisiana has not been responsive to its Black
community.
Louisiana is largely unresponsive to the needs of its Black citizens in virtually every metric
of general well-being: education, healthcare, economic opportunity, criminal justice, and
environmental quality. The socioeconomic inequities created by this nonresponsiveness foreclose
Black citizens’ political participation, see supra Section I.D.5, and overall diminishes their quality
of life.
In his report, Dr. Lichtman describes the vast disparities between Black and white
Louisianians and how government nonresponsiveness has exacerbated this inequality. For
example, Louisiana’s public school system is majority-minority and consistently ranks near the
bottom of state educational systems nationwide on measures for elementary and secondary
schooling. Ex. 3 at 50–51. As for higher education, a study by the University of Southern California
Race and Equity Center ranked Louisiana last on its higher education racial equity score for public
institutions. Id. at 52. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, Louisiana slashed its spending on
higher education by 44.9% from 2008 to 2017—the second-highest cut among all states. Id.
In the area of criminal justice, Louisiana has chronically underfunded its public defender
system. Id. at 54–56. In January 2019, the Louisiana Public Defender Board found that the system
is understaffed and only has the capacity to handle 21% of its workload—that is, the current
workload for Louisiana public defenders is five times what it should be. Id. at 55.
Perhaps the most egregious instances of the state’s nonresponsiveness to the Black
community concern the environment and pollution. A stretch of petrochemical plants and
refineries along the Mississippi River known as “Cancer Alley” or “Death Alley” is primarily
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situated near impoverished Black neighborhoods. Id. at 56–57. A 2017 study by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency reported six census tracks in this strip of land that fall within
the 95th and 99th percentiles for air-toxic cancer risks. Id. at 57. A March 2021 report by the
United Nations Human Rights Commission noted that “human rights experts today raised serious
concerns about further industrialization of the so-called Cancer Alley in the southern U.S. state of
Louisiana, saying the development of petrochemical complexes is a form of environmental
racism.” Id. A 2020 academic study found that exposure to particulate-matter pollution was highly
correlated with concentrations of Black population in Louisiana. Id. at 57–58. The study
additionally found that exposure to pollutants was correlated with COVID-19 deaths: Of the 10
Louisiana parishes with the highest death rates as of July 17, 2020, six were in, and two were
adjacent to, “Cancer Alley.” Id. at 58. Reports by academics and activists have tied the
disproportionate impact of pollution on Louisiana’s Black residents to government inaction. Id. at
58–60.
Ultimately, the stark socioeconomic disparities between Black and white Louisianians not
only discourage political participation in the state’s Black community—they are also exacerbated
by government disregard and official nonresponsiveness. This factor also weighs in Plaintiffs’
favor.
9.
Senate Factor Nine: The justification for the new congressional map is
tenuous.
Finally, no legitimate government interest justifies denying Black Louisianians the ability
to elect candidates of their choice to Congress. HB 1 was met with resounding opposition from
Black voters and legislators across the state, and Governor Edwards vetoed the new map because
it fails to comply with the Voting Rights Act. See Exs. 12–18. Although lawmakers were on notice
of HB 1’s legal infirmities—and despite having before them various proposed congressional plans
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that included a second minority-opportunity congressional district—they nevertheless chose not
to draw one. See id. Although the Legislature touted preservation of past district boundaries as a
rationale for HB 1, see Ex. 13, this is insufficient: A desire to keep things the same simply does
not justify the continued dilution of Black voting strength—or, for that matter, excuse the
requirements of federal law.
10.
Black Louisianians are significantly underrepresented—and white
Louisianians are significantly overrepresented—under HB 1.
Although not one of the enumerated Senate Factors, proportionality “provides some
evidence of whether ‘the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation’” by Black Louisianians. LULAC, 548
U.S. at 437 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)); cf. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1012 (noting that
“proportionality . . . is obviously an indication that minority voters have an equal opportunity, in
spite of racial polarization, ‘to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.’” (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b))).
HB 1’s disproportionality is readily apparent. Black Louisianians make up 33.13% of the
state’s total population and 31.25% of its voting-age population. Ex. 1 ¶¶ 14, 18. But under the
new congressional plan, Black Louisianians will be able to elect their candidates of choice in less
than 17% of the state’s congressional districts. By contrast, white Louisianians comprise 55.75%
of the state’s total population and 58.31% of its voting-age population, id.—and yet will be able
to elect their candidates of choice in more than 83% of the state’s congressional districts. There is
no justification for this strikingly disparate treatment.
The creation of a second congressional district in which Black voters will be able to elect
their preferred candidates—as otherwise required by Section 2—would bring Louisiana much
closer to proportionality. Under Mr. Cooper’s illustrative plans, Black Louisianians would be able
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to elect their preferred candidates in one-third of the state’s districts—roughly equal to their share
of the population. White Louisianians, in turn, would be able to elect their preferred candidates in
the remaining two-thirds of districts—still more than 10 percentage points higher than their share
of the state’s population.
II.
Plaintiffs and other Black Louisianians will suffer irreparable harm absent a
preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief. The candidate
qualification period for the 2022 congressional elections is scheduled to begin on July 20, 2022,
with the state’s open primary election following on November 8. See Ex. 24. If this deadline and
the elections that follow occur under HB 1’s unlawful congressional map, then Black Louisianians’
voting rights will be unlawfully diluted—a violation of their fundamental rights for which there is
no adequate remedy. “[O]nce the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress” for
citizens whose voting rights were violated. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina,
769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, “[c]ourts routinely deem restrictions on
fundamental voting rights irreparable injury.” Id. (citing Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423,
436 (6th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Salerno, 792 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1986)).
III.
The balance of equities and the public interest favor injunctive relief.
The balance of the equities and the public interest, which “merge when the Government is
the opposing party,” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009), also strongly favor injunctive
relief. As courts have recognized, the “cautious protection of . . . franchise-related rights is without
question in the public interest.” Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1355
(11th Cir. 2005); accord Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 118 F. Supp.
3d 1338, 1348–49 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“[T]he public interest is best served by ensuring not simply
that more voters have a chance to vote but ensuring that all citizens . . . have an equal opportunity
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to elect the representatives of their choice.”). Moreover, “[i]t is clear that it would not be equitable
or in the public’s interest to allow the state . . . to violate the requirements of federal law, especially
when there are no adequate remedies available.” Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1029
(9th Cir. 2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 366
(9th Cir. 2011)); see also Bank One, Utah v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he
public interest will perforce be served by enjoining the enforcement of the invalid provisions of
state law.”). Accordingly, the public interest would most assuredly be served by enjoining
implementation of a congressional districting scheme that violates Section 2.
Significantly, enjoining HB 1—and implementing a remedial congressional plan—would
be more than feasible at this time. Courts must weigh the benefits and import of injunctive relief
in the voting rights context against the confusion it might cause, particularly “[a]s an election
draws closer.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam); see also Merrill v.
Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 879–80 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (cautioning against enjoining
congressional maps when beginning of election is “imminent”). But here, the qualifying period for
Louisiana’s congressional candidates does not begin until July 20—more than three months from
now. Ex. 24. And given the state’s unique jungle primary, the open congressional primary election
will not occur until November 8, with early voting commencing on October 25. Id.; cf. Merrill,
142 S. Ct. at 879 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (staying preliminary injunction of congressional map
issued on January 24 where early voting for primary election purportedly began on March 30);
Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (2022) (per curiam) (vacating
court-ordered maps and remanding for adoption of new maps on March 23 where early voting for
primary election is scheduled to begin on July 26).
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Indeed, the feasibility of implementing a remedial map in this case was underscored by
Defendant himself in previous state court litigation. In objecting to a state court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over redistricting claims as premature, Defendant argued that the Legislature could
override Governor Edwards’s veto of another plan passed during its regular session “in a veto
session[] before [the] fall elections.” Declinatory, Dilatory, & Peremptory Exceptions on Behalf
of the Secretary of State to Plaintiffs’ Petition for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 3, Bullman v.
Ardoin, No. C-716690 (La. 19th Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 16, 2022) (attached as Ex. 26); see also
Declinatory, Dilatory, & Peremptory Exceptions on Behalf of Clay Schexnayder, in His Official
Capacity as Speaker of the Louisiana House of Representatives, and Patrick Page Cortez, in His
Official Capacity as President of the Louisiana Senate at 4, Bullman v. Ardoin, No. C-716690 (La.
19th Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 29, 2022) (attached as Ex. 27) (“Even if the Governor vetoes a
congressional redistricting bill from the 2022 Regular Session, the Legislature has an opportunity
to override the veto in a veto session, or to call into session another Extraordinary Session, before
the fall elections.”). 3 The Legislature’s regular session is scheduled to end on June 6, 2022, Ex.
25; accordingly, Defendant represented to the state court that a new map could be passed and
implemented after June 6 of this year—nearly two months from now. Defendant’s view confirms
that there is ample time for this Court to consider Plaintiffs’ motion and order the adoption of a
remedial congressional map that complies with Section 2 ahead of the 2022 elections. 4
Defendant repeated this argument in a motion for a stay of the state court proceedings. See Motion for
Stay to Be Taken up After Exception Hearing, If Exceptions Are Denied by the District Court at 3, Bullman
v. Ardoin, No. C-716690 (La. 19th Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 24, 2022) (attached as Ex. 28).
3
Notably, if the Court were to give the Legislature an opportunity to craft a remedial congressional plan in
the first instance, then it would need to allow only a brief period to craft a new map—especially given that
Louisiana contains only six congressional districts, and the availability of alternative maps introduced
during the legislative process and by Mr. Cooper in this litigation. See, e.g., Harper v. Hall, 867 S.E.2d
554, 558 (N.C. 2022) (providing 14 days for legislature to adopt new congressional and state legislative
plans); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm’n, Nos. 2021-1193, 2021-1198, 20214
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have readily demonstrated that HB 1 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
and the equities weigh strongly in favor of immediate relief to safeguard the fundamental voting
rights of Black Louisianians. Plaintiffs therefore request that the Court preliminarily enjoin
implementation of HB 1 and ensure the creation of a second congressional district in which Black
voters have the opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. Plaintiffs further request that the
Court expedite its consideration of this motion to ensure that necessary remedies are timely
adopted and a lawful congressional map is in place well in advance of this year’s midterm
elections.
[SIGNATURE BLOCK ON NEXT PAGE]
1210, 2022 WL 110261, at *28 (Ohio Jan. 12, 2022) (providing 10 days for redistricting body to adopt new
state legislative plans).
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Dated: April 15, 2022
Respectfully submitted,
By s/Darrel J. Papillion
Darrel J. Papillion (Bar Roll No. 23243)
Renee C. Crasto (Bar Roll No. 31657)
Jennifer Wise Moroux (Bar Roll No. 31368)
WALTERS, PAPILLION,
THOMAS, CULLENS, LLC
12345 Perkins Road, Building One
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70810
Phone: (225) 236-3636
Fax: (225) 236-3650
Email: papillion@lawbr.net
Email: crasto@lawbr.net
Email: jmoroux@lawbr.net
Abha Khanna*
Jonathan P. Hawley*
ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2100
Seattle, Washington 98101
Phone: (206) 656-0177
Facsimile: (206) 656-0180
Email: akhanna@elias.law
Email: jhawley@elias.law
Lalitha D. Madduri**
Olivia N. Sedwick*
Jacob D. Shelly*
ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
10 G Street NE, Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: (202) 968-4490
Facsimile: (202) 968-4498
Email: lmadduri@elias.law
Email: osedwick@elias.law
Email: jshelly@elias.law
Counsel for Plaintiffs
*Admitted pro hac vice
**Pro hac vice application pending
Add. 50
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.