Amicus Curiae Brief — Brandon Michael Council, Petitioner v. United States

No. 23-953

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_______________________

BRANDON MICHAEL COUNCIL,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

_______________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit

_______________________

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS

AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF FOR AMICUS

CURIAE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR

PUBLIC DEFENSE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONER

_______________________

EMILY HUGHES

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE

7310 Ritchie Highway

Suite 200 #1091

Glen Burnie, MD 21061

KATHRYN ALI

Counsel of Record

MEGHAN PALMER

ALI & LOCKWOOD LLP

300 New Jersey Avenue NW,

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 651-2475

katie.ali@alilockwood.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS

CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Pursuant to Rule 21.2(b), the National Association

for Public Defense (NAPD) respectfully requests leave

to submit a brief as amicus curiae in support of the

petition for writ of certiorari filed by Brandon Michael

Council.

Rule 37.2 requires that amici notify all parties’

counsel of their intent to file an amicus brief in

support of a petition for certiorari at least ten days

before the due date, and further that the due date is

thirty days after the case is placed on the docket. The

case was placed on the docket on March 1, 2024,

making the due date April 1. On March 27, the

government requested an extension of its time to

respond until May 1.

Counsel for amicus was only very recently retained

to prepare this brief, and notified the parties of its

intent to file on March 25, 2024, seven days before the

April 1 deadline for amicus briefs in support of the

Petition. Given the government’s request for an

extension of time to respond, however, this will not

prejudice any party, as the government will have

ample time to respond to any point raised herein.

NAPD writes in support of Petitioner here because

the questions presented raise significant issues

concerning vital constitutional rights of criminal

defendants. In this proposed brief, NAPD draws on

the extensive experience of its more than 25,000

members, who are practitioners and experts in public

defense, to explain the function, structure, and

importance of competency hearings, in order to help

inform the Court’s consideration of the Petition.

(1)

2

Accordingly, NAPD respectfully asks the Court to

grant it leave to file this amicus brief.

Respectfully submitted,

EMILY HUGHES

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE

7310 Ritchie Highway

Suite 200 #1091

Glen Burnie, MD 21061

APRIL 2024

KATHRYN ALI

Counsel of Record

MEGHAN PALMER

ALI & LOCKWOOD LLP

300 New Jersey Avenue NW,

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 651-2475

katie.ali@alilockwood.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER ................... 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................ 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................ 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

The Trial Court Abdicated Its Duty to Conduct a

Meaningful Competency Hearing and Safeguard a

Critical Constitutional Protection. ............................. 3

A. The So-Called “Hearing” In This Case

Fell Far Short of a Typical and Adequate

Competency Hearing. ............................ 3

B. The History and Tradition of the

Competency Right Confirms the Need for

Robust Procedures. ................................ 9

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 13

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Battle v. United States,

419 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2005)................................ 7

Cooper v. Oklahoma,

517 U.S. 348 (1996)...................................... 9, 11, 12

Crocker v. State,

60 Wis. 553 (1884).................................................. 10

Drope v. Missouri,

420 U.S. 162 (1975).................................................. 8

Ford v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 399 (1986)................................................ 11

Godinez v. Moran,

509 U.S. 389 (1993).................................................. 8

Jacob v. New York City,

315 U.S. 752 (1942)................................................ 12

King v. Frith,

22 How. St. Tr. 307 (1790) ............................... 10, 12

Medina v. California,

505 U.S. 437 (1992).................................... 3, 7, 9, 11

Nobles v. Georgia,

168 U.S. 398 (1897)................................................ 10

Pate v. Robinson,

383 U.S. 375 (1966).................................................. 1

iii

Queen v. Goode,

7 Ad. & E. 536, 112 Eng. Rep. 572 (K.B.1837) ..... 12

Regina v. Southey,

4 Fos. & Fin. 864 (N.P.1865) ................................... 9

Solesbee v. Balkcom,

339 U.S. 9 (1950).................................................... 10

State v. Reed,

41 La. Ann. 581 (1889)........................................... 10

Thompson v. Keohane,

516 U.S. 99 (1995).................................................... 4

Underwood v. People,

32 Mich. 1 (1875).................................................... 10

United States v. Arenburg,

605 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2010) ..................................... 8

United States v. Bumagin,

98 F. Supp. 3d 597 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ........................ 4

United States v. David,

511 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1975) .................................. 5

United States v. Diehl Armstrong,

No. 1:07-cr-26, 2008 WL 2963056

(W.D. Pa. July 29, 2008) .......................................... 5

United States v. Haywood,

155 F.3d 674 (3d Cir. 1998) ..................................... 3

United States v. Merriweather,

921 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (N.D. Ala. 2013)............ 3, 4, 7

iv

United States v. Mitchell,

706 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (D. Utah 2010)...................... 5

United States v. Roof,

10 F.4th 314 (4th Cir. 2021) ........................ 5, 6, 7, 8

United States v. Talbot,

No. 21-111, 2023 WL 8090857

(E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2023) .......................................... 4

United States v. Weston,

36 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999) ................................ 5

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) ...................................................... 3

Other Authorities

ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Mental Health,

Standard 7-4.9(b) (2016) .......................................... 4

JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,

COMMENTARIES ON LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(2d ed. 1872) ........................................................... 10

John Hawles, Remarks on Mr. Bateman's Tryal,

Remarks upon the Tryals (1689), reprinted in

11 How. St. Tr. 473 (1811) ..................................... 10

MATTHEW HALE,

THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN

(1736) ................................................................ 10, 11

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a)..................................................... 4

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

The National Association for Public Defense

(NAPD) is an organization of more than 25,000

practitioners and experts in public defense that span

fifty states and three U.S. territories. Formed in 2013,

NAPD works to ensure that criminal defendants

receive a fair trial, as mandated by the Due Process

Clause of the Constitution. See Pate v. Robinson, 383

U.S. 375, 378 (1966). NAPD does so by (among other

things) advocating for changes in law and policy

related to public defense, training public defenders on

criminal-law practice and procedure, and improving

the systems through which public defense is delivered.

A crucial element of the right to a fair trial that

NAPD helps to deliver is the right to not be tried or

convicted while incompetent to stand trial. NAPD and

its members, who represent indigent defendants at

trial throughout the country, routinely observe the

importance of adequate competency proceedings. And

while the competency inquiry is often complex and is

sometimes fluid, it is an indispensable prerequisite to

ensuring fair trials and criminal defendants’ ability to

fully exercise their other constitutional rights, such as

the right to counsel. As a result, NAPD has an interest

in safeguarding a defendant’s right to an adequate

competency hearing, once competency is judged to be

in doubt.

1 No party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no one

other than amicus and its counsel have paid for the preparation

or submission of this brief. Counsel of record for the parties

received notice of amicus’ intent to file this brief 7 days prior to

its due date.

(1)

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Fourth Circuit incorrectly determined that the

trial court fulfilled its weighty responsibility of

ensuring Mr. Council was competent to stand trial—

and face the death penalty—when, rather than

conducting a proceeding even remotely resembling a

competency hearing, it deferred to an expert opinion

expressed in a two-paragraph letter.

Trial courts have a duty to make an independent,

evidence-based determination of competency. To that

end, competency hearings should—and generally do—

involve a thorough examination of psychiatric

evidence, including live testimony and questioning by

expert witnesses, a colloquy with the defendant, and

other procedures, to probe and supplement the factual

bases of experts’ competency determinations.

This standard practice, of a robust judicial inquiry

into a defendant’s mental state once competency is

judged to be in doubt, is mandatory, regardless of

defense counsel’s position on the matter. And that

makes good sense, considering that competency is a

crucial right enshrined in our constitutional tradition.

The trial court in this case failed to safeguard this

right.

3

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court Abdicated Its Duty to Conduct

a Meaningful Competency Hearing and

Safeguard a Critical Constitutional Protection.

A. The So-Called “Hearing” In This Case

Fell Far Short of a Typical and

Adequate Competency Hearing.

The purpose of a competency hearing—mandatory

under Section 4241 whenever a court has “reasonable

cause to believe” a defendant may be incompetent—is

to enable the court to arrive at its own legal conclusion

about the defendant’s mental competency. 18 U.S.C. §

4241(a). To that end, as the Supreme Court has

recognized, a competency hearing is a proceeding in

which “psychiatric evidence is brought to bear on the

question of the defendant’s mental condition[.]”

Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992). A

court may not simply defer to the determination in an

expert report; it must hold a hearing and reach an

independent, “record-based judicial determination of

competence[.]” See United States v. Haywood, 155

F.3d 674, 680–81 (3d Cir. 1998); see also United States

v. Merriweather, 921 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1303 n.57

(N.D. Ala. 2013) (noting competency is a mixed

question of law and fact that “must be resolved by the

courts and not expert witnesses”).

To ensure the court has a sufficient basis to make

that determination, competency hearings typically

involve extensive live witness testimony and

questioning. The starting point for any hearing is at

least one—and often several—robust competency

reports from experts who have evaluated the

defendant. These experts also generally review

4

medical records and administer psychiatric tests to

the defendant, and these records and test results add

to the body of documentary evidence before the court.

Those experts then testify at the hearing, and are

subject to questioning by counsel and by the court to

probe the bases of their conclusions and fill in gaps.

See, e.g., United States v. Bumagin, 98 F. Supp. 3d

597, 597–98 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing “three separate

competency evaluations” and testimony from several

experts at two-day competency hearing). ABA

Guidelines confirm that at a competency hearing, “the

evaluators . . . should be subject to examination.” ABA

Criminal Justice Standards on Mental Health § 74.9(b) (2016). Live testimony and questioning are

particularly important given that competency experts

administer specialized tests, synthesize a wide array

of information, and rely on technical expertise to reach

their conclusions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) advisory

committee’s note to 1996 amendment (“The

importance of presenting live testimony in court

cannot be forgotten.”); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.

99, 111 (1995) (recognizing competency is a fact issue

that “depends heavily on the trial court’s appraisal of

witness credibility and demeanor”).

In addition to expert witnesses, lay witnesses also

regularly participate and provide additional insight

into a defendant’s psychiatric and medical history.

This may include family members, corrections

officers, or attorneys who have interacted with the

defendant. See, e.g., Merriweather, 921 F. Supp. 2d at

1276, 1296–97 (discussing competency hearing

testimony of corrections officers as well as defendant’s

sister and former girlfriend); United States v. Talbot,

No. 21-111, 2023 WL 8090857, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 21,

5

2023) (similar); United States v. Diehl Armstrong, No.

1:07-cr-26, 2008 WL 2963056, at *18–25 (W.D. Pa.

July 29, 2008) (similar). Hearing from a broad tableau

of witnesses with different vantage points into the

defendant’s competence provides the foundation for

the court to make an informed determination.

Finally, a key part of a competency hearing is often

the testimony of the defendant and/or a colloquy

between the court and defendant. Through direct

questioning and observation of the defendant, the

court can probe the defendant’s understanding of the

proceedings, as well as their relationship with and

ability to assist their counsel, in order to gain further

insight into their mental competence. Indeed, courts

assessing competency often rely on direct assessments

of the defendant’s demeanor, answers to questions,

and interactions with counsel in reaching their

conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th

314, 338, 340 (4th Cir. 2021) (relying on defendant’s

answers to questioning and demeanor during the

competency hearing); United States v. Mitchell, 706 F.

Supp. 2d 1148, 1223–24 (D. Utah 2010) (noting

defendant “showed the capacity to cooperate with

counsel” in interactions during competency hearing);

see also United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 360

(D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting the trial judge “would . . . have

been well-advised . . . to conduct further inquiry of

defense counsel and of [the defendant] himself”).

In a capital case, these robust procedures are

particularly important. See United States v. Weston,

36 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting the court

would be “especially cautious in assessing” the

competency issue given that government could seek

the death penalty). Accordingly, competency hearings

6

in cases where the defendant faces the possibility of a

death sentence must be particularly thorough.

The competency hearings during the capital

murder trial in Roof, for example, included many of

the features outlined above. Before the hearing, a

court-appointed psychiatrist evaluated the defendant

over the course of a cumulative eight hours of

interviews, in addition to speaking with the defense

team at length. 10 F.4th at 335. The expert submitted

a lengthy report on the defendant’s competence, and

then also testified at the hearing. Four experts

testified, and three additional experts submitted

affidavits to the court. Id. at 335–36. Each testifying

witness discussed their opinions on the defendant’s

mental health, and answered questions addressing

gaps in their reports. Id. at 335–37. Several disagreed

about the defendant’s competency to stand trial and

mental health diagnoses. Id.

In addition to the experts, the defendant testified.

Id. at 337. The court asked him a series of questions,

including his understanding of the possibility that he

would be executed, as well as his communication with

his lawyers. Id. at 337–38. The competency hearing

stretched over two days. In its final decision on

competency, the court relied on the expert reports,

testimony at the hearing, and the defendant’s

statements and demeanor at the hearing. Id. at 338.

The court found the defendant competent to stand

trial. Id. Later in the proceedings, however, after the

trial was already underway and the guilt phase had

concluded, the issue of defendant’s competency arose

again. Id. at 338–39. Despite the fact that the court

had already held a robust competency hearing earlier

in the case, the court ordered a second psychiatric

7

evaluation and second hearing. Id. Several witnesses

gave live testimony at the second hearing, including

the court-appointed psychiatrist, additional experts,

and a lay witness. Id. Again, the defendant testified

and was questioned by the court. Id. at 340.

Competency hearings in other capital cases follow

a similar template: extensive live testimony from

several experts, often with differing viewpoints, along

with other witnesses and defendant testimony. See,

e.g., Merriweather, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1276

(competency hearing involved testimony from at least

15 witnesses, including mental health experts, nurses,

corrections officers, and family members); Battle v.

United States, 419 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005)

(noting capital defendant received a “fair and

thorough” competency hearing that “lasted about

twelve days and involved many witnesses, five of

whom were either psychiatrists or psychologists who

had evaluated” the defendant).

The proceedings in Mr. Council’s case were

profoundly deficient in comparison to these standard

competency hearing procedures, and particularly in

comparison to other capital cases. At the so-called

“hearing,” which took up a single transcript page,

there were no witnesses, no experts testifying, no

colloquy with Mr. Council, and no colloquy with his

counsel beyond them representing that Mr. Council

was competent. This was not a proceeding where

“psychiatric evidence [wa]s brought to bear on the

question of the defendant’s mental condition,” see

Medina, 505 U.S. at 450; rather, it amounted to a

rubber-stamping of a cursory expert report. Worse

still, the expert report was unusually thin and

conclusory, comprising a two-paragraph letter that

8

asserted Mr. Council was competent without

providing any specific bases for that conclusion. See

Pet. App. 58a. Live testimony therefore would have

been particularly important for the court to learn the

medical bases for the expert opinion—the only

possible way it could have obtained sufficient

information to make an independent, informed

decision on Mr. Council’s mental competency. As the

comparison to other capital case competency hearings

shows, that falls far short of both the norm and the

constitutional floor.

That questions about Mr. Council’s competency

arose most forcefully while his trial was already

underway should have no bearing on the requirement

that he receive a meaningful competency hearing. The

competency standard “is applicable from the time of

arraignment through the return of a verdict.” See

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 403 (1993) (Kennedy,

J., concurring); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181

(1975) (noting court must “always be alert to

circumstances suggesting a change that would render

the accused unable to meet the standards of

competence to stand trial”). Courts have a “statutory

obligation to be vigilant” for issues of incompetence

through the entire course of a criminal proceeding.

United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 170–71 (2d

Cir. 2010) (court’s failure to hold competency hearing

mid-trial was reversible error in light of court’s

ongoing “statutory obligation to be vigilant” for signs

of incompetence throughout entire proceedings). So

even where the issue arises mid-trial, courts have the

same duty to diligently address it—indeed, that was

the posture of Roof. Nor does it matter that defense

counsel apparently changed their position on Mr.

Council’s mental competency—the court’s duty, once

9

competency is judged to be in doubt, is absolute, and

independent of counsel’s position, particularly where

counsel does not adequately explain the factual basis

for their reversal. And any apparent concern about

disruption must yield to the bedrock constitutional

principle that an incompetent criminal defendant may

not face trial.

B. The History and Tradition of the

Competency Right Confirms the Need

for Robust Procedures.

The history and tradition of the competency right

in our legal system also confirms that any judicial

competency inquiry must be meaningful and robust:

common-law authorities emphasize that factfinders

must “diligently inquire” into mental competency. See

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356–57 (1996)

(collecting sources).

“The rule that a criminal defendant who is

incompetent should not be required to stand trial has

deep roots in our common-law heritage.” Medina, 505

U.S. at 446. Indeed, “[t]he prohibition against trying

the incompetent defendant was well established by

the time Hale and Blackstone wrote their famous

commentaries.” Cooper, 517 U.S. at 356. See also

Medina, 505 U.S. at 446 (citing and discussing

Blackstone and Hale on the issue). 2 Over a century

See also Regina v. Southey, 4 Fos. & Fin. 864, 872, n. a

(N.P.1865) (“Assuming the prisoner to be insane at the time of

arraignment, he cannot be tried at all . . . as he cannot

understand the evidence, nor the proceedings, and so is unable

to instruct counsel, or to withdraw his authority if he acts

improperly . . .”); id. at 877, n. a (“[I]f [the defendant] be so insane

as not to understand the nature of the proceedings, he cannot

plead”); John Hawles, Remarks on Mr. Bateman's Tryal, in

2

10

ago, this Court cited Blackstone’s position along with

Hale’s as indicative of the common-law rule on

incompetence. See Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398,

406–07 (1897).

These

authorities

agreed

that

criminal

proceedings at every stage—from arraignment to

execution date, and every point in between—should be

halted if the accused is incompetent. See, e.g., King v.

Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. 307, 311 (1790) (“[S]uch is the

humanity of the law of England, that in all stages both

when the act is committed, at the time when the

prisoner makes his defence, and even at the day of

execution, it is important to settle what his state of

mind is[.]”); Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1, 3 (1875)

(“[I]nsanity, when discovered, was held at common

law to bar any further steps against a prisoner, at

whatever stage of the proceedings”). In the same vein,

Justice Frankfurter, dissenting from the Court’s

rejection of a due process claim by an allegedly

incompetent individual set to be executed, see Solesbee

Remarks upon the Tryals (1689), reprinted in 11 How. St. Tr.

473, 476 (1811) (“[N]othing is more certain law, than that a

person who falls mad after a crime supposed to be committed,

shall not be tried for it . . .”); 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF

THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 35 (Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1736)

(“[I]f [a] person after his plea, and before his trial, become of non

sane memory, he shall not be tried . . .”).

Early American cases and other authority discuss the right in

similar terms. See, e.g., Crocker v. State, 60 Wis. 553, 556 (1884)

(similar); State v. Reed, 41 La. Ann. 581, 582 (1889) (“It is

elementary that a man cannot plead, or be tried, or convicted, or

sentenced, while in a state of insanity”). See also 2 J. BISHOP,

COMMENTARIES ON LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 664, 667 (2d

ed. 1872) (“[A] prisoner cannot be tried, sentenced, or punished”

unless he is “mentally competent to make a rational defense”).

11

v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), abrogated by Ford v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), referred to the

principle that “one under sentence of death ought not,

by becoming non compos, be denied the means to

‘allege somewhat’ that might free him” as “the

unbroken command of English law for centuries

preceding the separation of the Colonies.” 339 U.S. at

19–20 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting 1

MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE

CROWN 35 (Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1736)).

The force of this rule has not lessened with time.

In recent years, this Court has “repeatedly and

consistently recognized that ‘the criminal trial of an

incompetent defendant violates due process.’” Cooper,

517 U.S. at 354 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 453).

This makes sense; competence is the gatekeeper for a

host of other constitutional rights: “Competence to

stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the

main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair

trial, including the right to effective assistance of

counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to

cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on

one’s own behalf or to remain silent without penalty

for doing so.” Cooper, 517 U.S. at 354 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). See also id. at

364 (“For the defendant, the consequences of an

erroneous determination of competence are dire.

Because he lacks the ability to communicate

effectively with counsel, he may be unable to exercise

other ‘rights deemed essential to a fair trial.’”)

(citation omitted).

But this fundamental right is rendered an empty

one in the absence of adequate process and safeguards

for assessing competency. That is no doubt why the

12

requirement that the competency inquiry be a

meaningful one also finds support in the common law;

early British cases routinely instructed juries that

they had to “diligently inquire” into a defendant’s

competency. King v. Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. 307 (1790)

(emphasis added); Queen v. Goode, 7 Ad. & E. 536, 112

Eng. Rep. 572 (K.B.1837).

As discussed above and by Petitioner, no such

inquiry occurred here. A “hearing” without any live

testimony from experts, lay witnesses, or the

accused—indeed, without even a colloquy with the

accused—and without any probing of the bases for the

rushed expert opinion offered as to competency hardly

amounts to an inquiry at all, much less the diligent

one required by centuries of authority and confirmed

by this Court’s more recent precedent. Likewise, a

competency determination that rests on a twoparagraph written statement from defense counsel

falls far short of the court’s duty to “‘jealously guard[]”

“an incompetent criminal defendant’s fundamental

right not to stand trial.” Cooper, 517 U.S. at 363

(quoting Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752–

53 (1942)).

13

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those in the

petitioner’s brief, the Court should grant the petition

for a writ of certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s

erroneous decision, which failed to adequately protect

the crucial competency right.

Respectfully submitted,

EMILY HUGHES

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE

7310 Ritchie Highway

Suite 200 #1091

Glen Burnie, MD 21061

KATHRYN ALI

MEGHAN PALMER

ALI & LOCKWOOD LLP

300 New Jersey Avenue NW,

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 651-2475

katie.ali@alilockwood.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

APRIL 2024