Amicus Curiae Brief — Ivan Antonyuk, et al., Petitioners v. Steven G. James, In His Official Capacity as Acting Superintendent of New York State Police, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 25, 2024
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No. 23-910
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
──────────────────────────
IVAN ANTONYUK, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
STEVEN G. JAMES,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SUPERINTENDENT
OF THE NEW YORK STATE POLICE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
──────────────────────────
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
──────────────────────────
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF PROJECT 21 IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
──────────────────────────
David C. Tryon
Counsel of Record for Amicus Curiae
Alex M. Certo
The Buckeye Institute
88 East Broad Street
Suite 1300
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 224-4422
D.Tryon@BuckeyeInstitute.org
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the proper historical time period for
ascertaining the Second Amendment’s original
meaning is 1791, rather than 1868.
2. Whether “the people” must convince government
officials of their “good moral character” before
exercising their Second Amendment right to bear
arms in public.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iv
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 3
I. Racially tainted historical analogs cannot
justify current laws ............................................. 3
II. “All [firearms owners] are equal, but some
[owners] are more equal than others.” George
Owell, Animal Farm ............................................ 5
A. Firearms regulations have been used to
disarm and oppress minorities for
generations .................................................. 5
B. During Reconstruction (1865–1877),
black Americans’ right to bear arms
continued to be denied through passage
of the black codes ......................................... 8
C. During Jim Crow (1877–1964), states
used facially neutral laws and blatant
prohibitions to prevent black Americans
and Native Americans from exercising
their right to bear arms............................. 10
D. New York’s Race and Minority-Targeting
Sullivan Law .............................................. 14
III.Meet the new Hochul Law, worse than the old
Sullivan Law ...................................................... 15
iii
IV. The Hochul Law deprives minorities and
other disadvantaged people from protecting
themselves in the locations where they need
it the most .......................................................... 20
V. The Court should grant the petition to
reaffirm the proper standard for applying
history in Second Amendment cases ................ 24
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 25
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Arizona v. Gant,
556 12 U.S. 332 (2009) ........................................... 18
Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) .......................................... 15, 18
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,
486 U.S. 750 (1988) ................................... 17, 18, 24
Cooper v. Savannah,
4 Ga. 72 (1848).......................................................... 6
Cox v. State of Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965) ................................................ 18
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008) ............................................ 5, 24
Harman v. Forssenius,
380 U.S. 528 (1965) ................................................ 20
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) ................................................ 20
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307 (1978) ................................................ 18
McDonald v. City of Chicago Ill.,
561 U.S. 742 (2010) ............................................ 9, 10
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen,
142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) .............................................. 2
v
Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948) ................................................ 18
State v. Newsom,
27 N.C. 250 (1844) ................................................ 6, 8
State v. Nieto,
130 N.E. 663 (1920) .................................................. 4
Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) .............................................. 4
United States v. Bullock, No. 3:18-CR-165-CWRFKB, 2023 WL 4232309 (S.D. Miss. June 28,
2023) .......................................................................24
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259 (1990) ................................................ 24
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc.
v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150 (2002) ................................................ 18
Watson v. Stone,
184 Fla. 516 (1941) ................................................. 13
Statutes
14 Stat. 173 (1866)..................................................... 10
14 Stat. 27 (1866)....................................................... 10
17 Stat. 457 (1873)..................................................... 13
1865 Fla. Laws 23 ........................................................ 8
vi
1911 N.Y. Laws, ch. 195 ............................................ 14
1913 N.Y. Laws, ch. 608 ............................................ 14
2022 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 371.............................. 16, 17
Act of Dec. 17, 1792, reprinted in 1 The Statutes at
Large of Virginia (Shepherd ed. 1835) .................... 7
Act of Feb. 4, 1806, reprinted in 3 The Statutes at
Large of Virginia (Shepherd ed. 1836) .................... 7
Act of Jan. 6, 1639, reprinted in 1 The Statutes at
Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of
Virginia, From the First Session of the
Legislature, in the Year 1619 (Hening ed. 1823) ..... 6
Act of June 7, 1712, reprinted in 7 Statutes at Large
of South Carolina (McCord ed. 1840) ...................... 7
Act of Oct. 1, 1804, reprinted in The Laws of the
Territory of Louisiana (Charles ed. 1808) ............... 7
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e ........................................ 21
Other Authorities
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. (1871) .......... 11
Conor Friedersdorf, Thugs and Terrorists Have
Attacked Black Churches for Generations, The
Atlantic
(June
18,
2015),
https://tinyurl.com/AtlanticChurches. ................... 21
vii
David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the
Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1359
(1998) ...................................................................... 11
David L. Sloss, The Right of State Governments to
Defy the Supreme Court, Markkula Center for
Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University (Jul. 6,
2022), https://www.scu.edu/ethics-spotlight/theethics-of-guns/the-right-of-state-governments-todefy-the-supreme-court/ ......................................... 25
Ellen Moynihan et al., MTA train conductor slashed
in random Brooklyn subway attack: ‘I was doing
my job,’ he tells News, Daily News (Feb. 29, 2024),
https://www.nydailynews.com/2024/02/29/mtatrain-conductor-slashed-in-neck-in-brooklynsubway-stop-random-attack/ ................................. 23
Evan Simko-Bednarski et al., Hochul sends 750
National Guard troops to NYC subways following
spate of violence, Daily News (Mar. 6, 2024),
https://www.nydailynews.com/2024/03/06/hochul
-to-dispatch-750-national-guard-troops-to-nycsubways-following-spate-of-violence/..................... 23
Fola Akinnibi, NYC’s Subway Police Surge Fails to
Dent Transit Crime, Bloomberg (Nov. 4, 2022),
https://tinyurl.com/SubwayCrime.......................... 23
Frank Heinz, ‘Good Guy With a Gun’ Who Stopped
Church Gunman Receives Texas’ Highest Honor,
NBCDFW
(Jan.
14,
2020),
https://tinyurl.com/GoodGuyChurch ..................... 22
viii
Frederick Douglas, Address delivered in New York
City, May 10, 1865, in 4 The Frederick Douglas
Papers (1991) ............................................................ 9
J. Baxter Stegall, The Curse of Ham: Disarmament
Through Discrimination - the Necessity of
Applying Strict Scrutiny to Second Amendment
Issues in Order to Prevent Racial Discrimination
by States and Localities Through Gun Control
Laws, 11 Liberty U.L. Rev. 271 (2016) .......... 8, 9, 10
James Anderson & Lee Kennett, The Gun in
America: The Origins of a National Dilemma
(1975) ...................................................................... 14
Jason Crosby, Targeting Black Churches Isn’t Stuff
of Distant History, Courier Journal (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/CourierChurches..................... 22
Kimmy Yam, Subway cellist says attack ‘hurt like
hell,’ and now wants more protection for
performers, NBC News (Feb. 21, 2024),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asianamerica/subway-cellist-attacked-34th-streetprotections-rcna139678 .......................................... 23
Marcia Kramer & Dick Brennan, Fresh off primary
win, Gov. Kathy Hochul dives right into guns-who can get them and where they can take them,
CBS
New
York
(June
29,
2022),
https://tinyurl.com/SomeNYStreets. ...................... 21
Myles Miller et al., Metal pipe beating adds to
growing list of violent NYC subway attacks, NBC
N.Y.
(Feb.
19,
2024),
ix
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/metalpipe-beating-adds-to-growing-list-of-violent-nycsubway-attacks/5150631/ ....................................... 23
N.Y. Governor’s Press Office, Governor Hochul
Announces New Concealed Carry Laws Passed in
Response to Reckless Supreme Court Decision
Take Effect September 1, 2022, New York State
(Aug.
31,
2022),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorhochul-announces-new-concealed-carry-lawspassed-response-reckless-supreme-court .............. 19
Renee Lettow Lerner, The Second Amendment and
the Spirit of the People, 43 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol.
319 (2019) ................................................................. 5
Repository of Historical Gun Laws, Duke Center for
Firearms
Laws,
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/repository-ofhistorical-gun-laws/advanced-search ...................... 2
Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never
Intended to Be Applied to the White Population”:
Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity - the
Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National
Jurisprudence?, 70 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 1307
(1995) ................................................................ 15, 16
Sherri L. Burr, The Free Blacks of Virginia: A
Personal Narrative, A Legal Construct, 19 J. of
Gender, Race & Justice 1 (2016).............................. 6
Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2
Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 67 (1991) ....... 12, 13, 14, 20
x
Stephen P. Halbrook, Securing Civil Rights:
Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Right to Bear Arms (2010) ....................................... 9
Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms: A
Constitutional right of the People or a Privilege of
the Ruling Class (2021) ...... 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 20
Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms: For
Me, But Not For Thee?, 43 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol.
331 (2019) ............................................................... 11
The Colonial Laws Of New York From The Year
1664 To The Revolution, Duke Center for
Firearms
Law,
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/the-coloniallaws-of-new-york-from-the-year-1664-to-therevolution-including-the-charters-to-the-duke-ofyork-the-commissions-and-instructions-tocolonial-governors-the-dukes-laws-the-laws-ofthe ............................................................................. 5
The
Freedmen,
Library
of
Congress,
https://tinyurl.com/LoCFreedmen ........................... 6
The State of Black New York, New York Urban
League, https://tinyurl.com/BlackNY .................... 16
Transcript of Oral Argument, Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 211
(No. 20-843) ............................................................ 15
William Tonso, Gun Control: White Man’s Law,
Reason Magazine (1985) ........................................ 11
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Amicus curiae Project 21, the national network
of black political, civic, and business leaders, is an
initiative of the National Center for Public Policy
Research to promote the views of black Americans
whose entrepreneurial spirit, dedication to family, and
commitment to individual responsibility have not
traditionally been echoed by the nation’s civil-rights
establishment. The National Center for Public Policy
Research is a communications and research
foundation supportive of the view that the principles
of a free market, individual liberty, and personal
responsibility provide the greatest hope for meeting
the challenges facing America in the 21st century.
Project 21 has regularly participated as amicus
curiae in cases before the U.S. Supreme Court
involving criminal justice and social policy issues that
particularly impact black Americans. This case raises
vital questions about the pernicious effects firearms
regulations have had on black Americans and
presents the opportunity to vindicate the U.S.
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection of the
right to bear arms by eliminating restrictions with
race-based histories and current disproportionate
effects.
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, no counsel for any party
authored this brief in whole or in part and no entity or person,
aside from amicus curiae, made any monetary contribution toward
the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel provided the
notice required by Rule 37.2.
2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The right to own and carry a firearm is a right
of all law-abiding citizens. Current restrictions on the
right to own and carry a firearm that rely on historical
regulations enacted with racial animus, however,
cannot stand.
For decades, black Americans and other racial
minorities were the target of firearms regulations that
prevented them from exercising their right to bear
arms. According to the Duke Center for Firearms Law,
from 1639 to 1901, at least 52 race and slavery-based
laws had been passed in the colonies and states. See
Repository of Historical Gun Laws, Duke Center for
Firearms Laws.2 This does not include the
contemporaneous and subsequent facially neutral—
but racially motivated—laws.
Arguably, laws targeting minorities continue
today, perhaps not explicitly, but effectively. Under
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142
S. Ct. 2111 (2022), laws restricting the right to bear
arms pass constitutional muster only if they are
consistent with legitimate historical firearms
regulations. Advocates of firearms regulations seek to
justify the imposition of these regulations by relying
on old laws born of racial animosity or distrust of
minorities and other disfavored groups. These
historical deprivations of constitutional rights were
gravely wrong and cannot justify current regulations.
New York’s new firearms carry laws are similar
2 https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/repository-of-historical-gun-
laws/advanced-search (last visited Mar. 1, 2024).
3
to the discriminatory laws of the past. Indeed, they
are little more than a continuation of the laws New
York passed at the turn of the 19th century to restrict
firearms possession or usage by another disfavored
minority group—immigrants. Like those past
discriminatory laws, New York’s new law facilitates
arbitrary denial of constitutional rights simply
because a state employee does not believe the
applicant has the “essential character” to be trusted
with a weapon. That was the hallmark of many
facially neutral—but discriminatory—Jim Crow era
laws. The Court has always been juberous of laws
restricting the exercise of constitutional rights with
arbitrary permissive schemes.
ARGUMENT
I.
Racially tainted historical analogs cannot
justify current laws.
From Heller through Bruen, the Court has
relied heavily on historical practice to interpret the
Second Amendment. “Whether it came to defining the
character of the right (individual or militia
dependent), suggesting the outer limits of the right, or
assessing the constitutionality of a particular
regulation,” history has been vital to Second
Amendment analysis. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2129. In
keeping with this requirement, the Court has held
“that when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers
an
individual’s
conduct,
the
Constitution
presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. at 2126.
“And because many people face a serious risk of lethal
violence when they venture outside their homes, the
Second Amendment was understood at the time of
adoption to apply under those circumstances.” Id. at
4
2157 (Alito, J., concurring). As such, for a regulation
on the carrying of a firearm outside of the home to be
upheld, “the government must demonstrate that the
regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 2126.
Because carrying firearms outside of the home
is presumptively protected, courts must give
“unqualified deference” to citizens’ right to bear arms.
Id. at 2131. Despite the policy preferences of the
legislature for passing firearms regulations, “the
government may not simply posit that the regulation
promotes an important interest,” but must
affirmatively prove that the regulation is consistent
with the historical regulations. Id. at 2126.
But mere consistency with historical practice is
not enough. The historical firearms regulations reliedon must also be legitimate ones. Historical regulations
designed to oppress racial minorities or show distrust
or animus towards “disfavored” groups cannot be the
basis for infringing on the right to bear arms. Cases
affirming laws where race “has extremely intensified
a decisive purpose to entirely disarm” a disfavored
class have no precedential value. Stephen P.
Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms: A Constitutional
right of the People or a Privilege of the Ruling Class
299 (2021) (“Privilege of the Ruling Class”) (quoting
State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 667 (1920) (Wanamaker,
J., dissenting)). See also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2448 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“By blindly
accepting the Government’s misguided invitation to
sanction a discriminatory policy motivated by
animosity toward a disfavored group, … the Court
redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying
5
Korematsu and merely replaces one ‘gravely wrong’
decision with another.”).
II.
“All [firearms owners] are equal, but some
[owners] are more equal than others.”
George Orwell, Animal Farm.
A. Firearms regulations have been used to
disarm and oppress minorities for
generations.
As long as firearms restrictions have existed,
they have been used to disarm and oppress
“disfavored” groups. In 1689, the English Bill of Rights
limited the right to arms to upper-class Protestants.
Renee Lettow Lerner, The Second Amendment and the
Spirit of the People, 43 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 319, 324
(2019). This allowed the English to disarm and
oppress Catholics—a suspect and disfavored group—
and other servants and laborers. Id. at 324–325. To
protect citizens from such oppression, the United
States ratified the Second Amendment. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593–595 (2008).
But in the American Colonies—including New
York—black Americans’ right to bear arms was
determined by their social status. The Colonial Laws
Of New York From The Year 1664 To The Revolution,
Duke Center for Firearms Law3 (making it unlawful
for a slave “to have or use any gun, pistol … or any
other kind of weapon whatsoever, but in the presence
3 https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/laws/the-colonial-laws-of-new-
york-from-the-year-1664-to-the-revolution-including-the-chartersto-the-duke-of-york-the-commissions-and-instructions-to-colonialgovernors-the-dukes-laws-the-laws-of-the (last visited Mar. 1,
2024).
6
or by the direction of his … Master … and in their own
ground …”). Slaves were forbidden to own or possess
firearms—unless
there
were
exceptional
circumstances and local authorities granted a license.
Later, some freedmen4 were allowed to possess
firearms but only with a license approved by the state.
In other states, even freedmen were denied the right
to bear arms. Many times—though free—the courts
denied the freedmen their rights as they did not
consider them to be citizens. State v. Newsom, 27 N.C.
250, 207 (1844); Cooper v. Savannah, 4 Ga. 72 (1848).
The unfortunate history in Colonial America of
denying firearm possession to disfavored minorities
began in the 1600s. The first colonial law prohibiting
black Americans from being “provided with arms and
am[m]unition” was passed in Virginia in 1640. Act of
Jan. 6, 1639, § 10, reprinted in 1 The Statutes at Large;
Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, From
the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619
224–226 (Hening ed. 1823). In 1792, Virginia made
clear that “[n]o negro or mulatto whatsoever shall
keep or carry any gun, powder, shot, club, or other
weapon whatsoever, offensive or defensive.” Act of
Dec. 17, 1792, ch. 41, §§ 8 and 9, reprinted in 1 The
Statutes at Large of Virginia 122–123 (Shepherd ed.
4 Freedmen is generally used to refer to former slaves who gained
their freedom after the Emancipation Proclamation or—for most—
after the Thirteenth Amendment. The Freedmen, Library of
Congress, https://tinyurl.com/LoCFreedmen (last visited Feb. 24,
2023). In contrast, “free negroes” or “free blacks” were black
Americans who were not enslaved prior to the Civil War. Sherri L.
Burr, The Free Blacks of Virginia: A Personal Narrative, A Legal
Construct, 19 J. of Gender, Race & Justice 1, 3 (2016).
7
1835). In 1806, Virginia amended the law to allow
firearm ownership by freedmen; however, Virginia
restricted ownership by requiring freedmen to obtain
a permit issued by state authorities. Act of Feb. 4,
1806, ch. 94, § 1, reprinted in 3 The Statutes at Large
of Virginia 274–275 (Shepherd ed. 1836). After Nat
Turner’s slave revolt in 1831, Virginia repealed the
law—once again preventing freedmen from owning or
possessing firearms. Privilege of the Ruling Class,
supra, at 257.
In Louisiana, “no slave or mulatto whatsoever,
[could] keep or carry any gun, powder, shot, club, or
other weapon whatsoever, offensive or defensive; but
all and every gun, weapon and ammunition found in
the possession or custody of any negro or mulatto,
[could] be seized by any person ….” Act of Oct. 1, 1804,
§ 4, reprinted in The Laws of the Territory of Louisiana
13–14 (Charles ed. 1808).
In South Carolina it was the same: “[N]o negro
or slave shall carry out of the limits of his master’s
plantation any sort of gun or firearms, without his
master, or some other white person by his order, is
present with him, or without a certificate from his
master, mistress or overseer, for the same.” Act of
June 7, 1712, § 5, reprinted in 7 Statutes at Large of
South Carolina 353–354 (McCord ed. 1840) (emphasis
added).
At least twelve other states or territories—
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New
Mexico, North Carolina, and Tennessee—had similar
pre-civil war oppressive laws preventing “negro[s]
mulato[s] or Indian[s]” from keeping or carrying guns
8
unless given specific permission. See Duke Center for
Firearms Laws, supra. In Florida, a “negro, mulatto,
or other person of color” was only given permission
“upon the recommendation of two respectable citizens
of the county.” 1865 Fla. Laws 23. Like the modern day
justifications for firearms licensing, courts upheld the
restrictions on freedmen because the laws did “not
deprive the free man of color of the right to carry arms
about his person, but subjects it to the control of the
County Court, giving them the power to say, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, who, of this class of
persons, shall have a right to the licence [sic], or
whether any shall.” Newsom, 27 N.C. at 254.
B. During
Reconstruction
(1865–1877),
black Americans’ right to bear arms
continued to be denied through passage
of the black codes.
Even after the end of the Civil War and the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865,
Southern States continued to treat freedmen as
second-class citizens. J. Baxter Stegall, The Curse of
Ham: Disarmament Through Discrimination - the
Necessity of Applying Strict Scrutiny to Second
Amendment Issues in Order to Prevent Racial
Discrimination by States and Localities Through Gun
Control Laws, 11 Liberty U.L. Rev. 271, 283 (2016).
The States—and some localities—passed black codes,5
5 The black codes were laws “designed to replace the social controls
of slavery that had been removed by the Emancipation
Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.”
Black
Code,
Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/black-code (last visited Feb. 24,
2023). The black codes, though varying between states, “were all
9
which explicitly targeted freedmen by preventing
them from owning or carrying firearms. Id. at 284–
287; McDonald v. City of Chicago Ill., 561 U.S. 742,
771–772 (2010). The black codes were not just words
on paper. Because the black codes were reenactments
of the slave codes, “the black man [ ] never had the
right either to keep or bear arms.” Privilege of the
Ruling Class, supra, at 264 (quoting Frederick
Douglas, Address delivered in New York City, May 10,
1865, in 4 The Frederick Douglas Papers 84 (1991)).
State officials used the black codes as justification for
abusive conduct, including robbery, searching of
freedmen’s homes and person, and seizure of their
firearms. Stegall, supra, at 284–287. The black codes
allowed outlaws to “make brutal attacks and raids
upon the freedmen, who are defenseless, for the civil
law-officers disarm the colored man and hand him
over to armed marauders.” Stephen P. Halbrook,
Securing Civil Rights: Freedmen, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms 31 (2010)
(“Securing Civil Rights”). See also McDonald, 561 U.S.
at 845–846 (Thomas, J., concurring) (gathering
sources).
After hearing from officials at the Freedmen’s
Bureaus of the abuse being committed in the Southern
States, Congress passed the Second Freedman’s
Bureau Act with the explicit intent of negating the
intended to secure a steady supply of cheap labour, and all
continued to assume the inferiority of the freed slaves.” Id.
10
black codes. Stegall, supra, at 289. The Act stated that
full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings concerning personal liberty,
personal security, and the acquisition,
enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real
and
personal,
including
the
constitutional right to bear arms, shall be
secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens
of such State or district without respect
to race or color, or previous condition of
slavery.
14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866) (emphasis added). At the
same time, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1866—guaranteeing “full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 14 Stat. 27
(1866). However, Southern states continued to deny
black American’s the right to bear arms by holding the
Civil Rights Act to be unconstitutional. McDonald,
561 U.S. at 775 n.24. One court did so “in the course of
upholding the conviction of an African–American man
for violating Mississippi’s law against firearm
possession by freedmen” without the required license.
Id.; see also Privilege of the Ruling Class, supra, at
269.
C. During Jim Crow (1877–1964), states
used facially neutral laws and blatant
prohibitions to prevent black Americans
and Native Americans from exercising
their right to bear arms.
Immediately following the Civil War, “most
Northern states did not restrict an individual’s right
11
or ability to carry a firearm in public, whether it be
concealed or openly, as long as they carried the
weapon peaceably.” Privilege of the Ruling Class,
supra, at 273. In 1868 the United States ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment, which “incorporated the first
eight amendments against states, so a citizen ‘had
secured to him the right to keep and bear arms in his
defense.’” David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in
the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1359,
1453 (1998) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
app. 475 (1871)). “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to invalidate [ ] the Mississippi Black Code
from 1865, which provided that no African American,
no freeman, no freed slave could carry a firearm
without some kind of permit from the authorities.”
Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms: For Me,
But Not For Thee?, 43 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 331, 333
(2019).
Southern states, however, continued their
efforts to disarm black Americans. Small pistols
selling for as little as 50 or 60 cents became available
in the 1870’s and 1880’s. William Tonso, Gun Control:
White Man’s Law, Reason Magazine (1985). Because
black Americans and poor whites could afford these
cheap arms, several states passed what are today
called “Saturday Night Special” laws banning these
small, inexpensive handguns. Id. Instead of formal
legislation, states like Mississippi and Florida “simply
continued to enforce the pre-emancipation statutes
forbidding Blacks to possess arms, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun
Control and Racism, 2 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 67, 74
12
(1991).
Further, during the Jim Crow era, “exorbitant
business or transaction taxes were imposed in order to
price handguns out of the reach of blacks and poor
[w]hites.” Id. at 74–75. These laws—while facially
neutral—were passed “to ensure that African
Americans could not carry firearms, effectively in the
same way that poll taxes were instituted to deny them
the right to vote.” Privilege of the Ruling Class, supra,
at 287. For example, in 1893, Florida made it a crime
for a person “to carry around with him, or
to have in his manual possession” a
“Winchester rifle or other repeating rifle”
without a license, which “may” be
granted after posting a $100 bond. That
would be equivalent to $2,922 in 2021.
The average monthly wage for [a black]
farm labor[er] in Florida in 1890 was
$19.35. In 1901, the law was amended to
add pistols to the list.
Id. at 298. The Florida Supreme Court noted that the
law
“was passed when there was a great
influx of negro laborers in th[e] State,”
and it was “for the purpose of disarming
the negro laborers. … The statute was
never intended to be applied to the white
population. … Moreover, it was
estimated that “80% of the white men
living in the rural sections of Florida
have violated this statute,” “not more
than 5% of the men in Florida who own
13
pistols and repeating rifles have ever
applied” for a license, and that “there had
never been … any effort to enforce the
provisions of th[e] statute as to white
people, because it has been generally
conceded to be in contravention of the
Constitution and non-enforceable if
contested.”
Tahmassebi, supra, at 74 (quoting Watson v. Stone,
184 Fla. 516, 524 (1941) (Buford, J., concurring)).
Similarly, Mississippi in 1906 enacted the first
registration law for retailers, requiring retailers to
maintain records of all pistol and pistol ammunition
sales, and to make such available for inspection on
demand. Id. at 75. In other Southern States, retailers
would often report to local authorities whenever black
Americans purchased firearms or ammunition. Id.
“The sheriff would then arrest the purchaser and
confiscate the firearm which would either be destroyed
or turned over to the local Klan or a white militia.” Id.
But even as the U.S. government and the states
pretended to remedy their past oppression of former
slaves, they increased their oppression against other
disfavored minority groups, such as Native
Americans. In 1873, the federal government enacted a
law that “prohibited the sale of arms and munitions to
‘hostile’ Indians.” Id. at 79 (citing 17 Stat. 457 (1873)).
“Usually the disarmament of Indians was quickly
followed by the imposition of oppressive measures or
even murder and wholesale massacres.” Id.
Shockingly, those restrictions were not abolished until
14
1979. Id.
D. New York’s Race and Minority-Targeting
Sullivan Law.
Though a Northern state, in 1911 New York
enacted the Sullivan law, a firearms restriction
targeting “undesirables,” such as black Americans and
foreign-born residents. It was “the first law in any
state (other than the black codes) to require a permit
for keeping a pistol or other concealable firearm in the
home.” Privilege of the Ruling Class, supra, at 303
(emphasis added); 1911 N.Y. Laws, ch. 195, § 1. The
Sullivan law “expanded the State’s criminal
prohibition to the possession of all handguns—
concealed or otherwise—without a government-issued
license.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2122.
Violation of the law—even in one’s own
residence—was a felony. And the licensing procedure
was totally discretionary; the applicant had to prove
to a licensing agent who had absolute discretion to
determine if the applicant had “good moral character”
and “proper cause.” 1913 N.Y. Laws, ch. 608, § 1897.
It was even harder for “aliens” and “noncitizens” to get
a license—they needed a judicial order supported by
“persons certifying the good moral character” of the
person. Id. Scholars have concluded that “[t]he
Sullivan law was designed to ‘strike hardest at the
foreign-born element.’” Tahmassebi, supra, at 77
(quoting James Anderson & Lee Kennett, The Gun in
America: The Origins of a National Dilemma 177–178
(1975)). “[T]here are those who argue … that a major
reason for the enactment of the Sullivan Law was the
belief that certain disfavored groups, members of labor
unions, Blacks and Italians, were carrying guns and
15
they were dangerous people and they wanted them
disarmed.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 103–104,
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 211 (No. 20-843).6
So, the very people targeted by this law were
required to disprove the apparent presumption that
they did not have good moral character. Robert J.
Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to Be
Applied to the White Population”: Firearms Regulation
and Racial Disparity - the Redeemed South’s Legacy to
a National Jurisprudence?, 70 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 1307,
1334 (1995).
In Bruen, the Court struck down the Sullivan
law. 142 S. Ct. at 2122. In addressing the “may-issue”
aspects of the Sullivan law, the Court looked askance
at how the law required the “appraisal of facts, the
exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion,”
to determine if an applicant would be given a license.
Id. at 2138 n.9 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 305 (1940)). Indeed, the constitutional right
to bear arms deserves as much protection from
arbitrary restrictions as other fundamental rights. “A
statute authorizing previous restraint upon the
exercise of the guaranteed freedom,” such as the
Sullivan law, is “obnoxious to the Constitution ….”
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306.
III. Meet the new Hochul Law, worse than the
old Sullivan Law.
New York learned nothing from Bruen. New
York Governor Hochul doubled down on the State’s
6https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transc
ripts/2021/20-843_f2q3.pdf.
16
discriminatory history by enacting a “new” gun control
law. Of course, the law was framed to address the
societal goal of public safety. But “[i]f safety concerns
must be conceded, it should be recognized as well that
local governments have sought to ban firearms from
what is frequently considered one of today’s
untrustworthy and suspect classes, the urban poor.”
Cottrol & Diamond, supra, at 1334–335. And the
urban poor are often minorities. The State of Black
New York 9, New York Urban League.7 New York’s
new law turns a constitutionally guaranteed right for
all into a privilege enjoyed only by a select few—not
the urban poor. Under the Hochul Law, to obtain a
concealed carry permit in New York, an applicant
must prove his or her moral character by:
providing at least four character references;
submitting a list of former and current social
media accounts for the last three years;
disclosing the applicant’s spouse or domestic
partner and any other adults residing in the
applicant’s home;
providing any additional information
licensing officers deem appropriate; and
submitting to an in-person interview with the
licensing officer or designee.
the
2022 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 371, § 400.
Like the old “may issue” regime, licensing
officers seem to have complete discretion to determine
if the applicant’s character references are adequate, if
7 https://tinyurl.com/BlackNY (last visited Feb. 24, 2023).
17
the social media accounts disqualify the applicant, if
the applicant’s associates disqualify the applicant,
what is asked in the interview, and what other
information is requested. The licensing officer then—
apparently unilaterally—determines if the applicant
is “of good moral character.” Id.
The Court should reject any regime which
purports to “license” constitutionally protected
activity but relies on discretionary authority to
determine who may engage in that activity. If this case
were not about firearms, there would be no doubt that
New York could not treat constitutional rights this
way. Surely New York could not require a resident to
prove with references and pre-speech interviews that
he or she had the proper “moral character” before
being allowed to speak in public. Nor could a state
require a license before an individual could travel
outside of his or her home, subject always to a
licensing agent’s approval of the applicant’s moral
character. Yet that is what has happened to the right
to bear arms in New York.
The Court has been rightly skeptical of allowing
broad discretion to governmental officials to regulate
individual constitutional rights. For example, in City
of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S.
750 (1988), the Court held unconstitutional a city
ordinance giving a government official broad authority
to grant or deny applications for permits for
publishers to place their news racks on public
property. The Court emphasized that a law or policy
protecting the rights “for some but not for others”
raises the specter of unconstitutional censorship and
viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 763. Indeed, the Court
18
found that the danger of unconstitutionality “is at its
zenith when the determination of who may speak and
who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of a
government official.” Id. (emphasis added).
Over many decades the Court has repeatedly
found broad governmental discretion to be
constitutionally suspect. E.g., Watchtower Bible &
Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 162–164 (2002) (discussing cases
challenging speech permits); Cox v. State of Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (“allowing unfettered
discretion in local officials” is an abridgement of First
Amendment rights); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,
562 (1948) (holding an ordinance unconstitutional
where it gave broad licensing discretion to a
government official, and concluding such a regime
“sanctions a device for suppression” of people’s rights);
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308 (ordinance requiring
persons to obtain a license before soliciting door-todoor was invalid because the “executive and judicial
branches [had] too wide a discretion in its
application”); Arizona v. Gant, 556 12 U.S. 332, 345
(2009) (“central concern underlying the Fourth
Amendment” is that law enforcement officers would
otherwise have “unbridled discretion” to perform
searches); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
323 (1978) (holding a portion of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act unconstitutional where the
statute gave “almost unbridled discretion [to]
executive and administrative officers” to perform
warrantless searches).
The same constitutional infirmity is apparent
here. New York’s discrimination against individuals
19
in the enjoyment of their Second Amendment right to
carry is a feature—not a glitch—of the challenged law.
New York’s law was designed to treat certain persons
differently, depriving them of rights guaranteed to
“the whole people.”
Even if an applicant has the means and
patience to navigate the maze of procedural steps and
persuade an unnamed, unelected—and likely
unreceptive8—bureaucrat to issue a permit, that
permit must be renewed or recertified every three to
five years. And, if a permit holder does not renew or
recertify the permit, any future application will be
denied.
The cost in time and money could easily exceed
one-thousand dollars, a cost which would be a struggle
for many low-income minorities. In New York, 66% of
black adults experienced material hardship for at
least one year because they could not afford basic
necessities, and nearly one in four black adults in New
York City live in poverty. The State of Black New York,
supra, at 9. Hence, the law lands squarely on New
York’s low income black-Americans. The Hochul law
8 It is apparent from Governor Hochul’s press conference that she
and her administration are highly skeptical of allowing anyone to
carry firearms. N.Y. Governor’s Press Office, Governor Hochul
Announces New Concealed Carry Laws Passed in Response to
Reckless Supreme Court Decision Take Effect September 1, 2022,
New
York
State
(Aug.
31,
2022),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announcesnew-concealed-carry-laws-passed-response-reckless-supremecourt. Indeed, the entire process is manifestly designed to
discourage anyone from even applying, let alone completing the
entire application process.
20
is eerily similar to an 1893 Florida Jim Crow law,
enacted “for the purpose of disarming the negro
laborers” by requiring those persons to post a $100
bond in order to possess a firearm. Tahmassebi, supra,
at 74; see also Privilege of the Ruling Class, supra, at
298. And it carries echoes of the now-illegal poll taxes
which were also designed to repress black-American
voters. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966); Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 543 (1965).
That the politicians who passed the Hochul Law
presumably would deny any racist intent is of little
moment
to
those
individuals—including
disproportionately minority individuals—whose right
to bear arms for self-defense is violated by the Hochul
Law.
IV. The Hochul Law deprives minorities and
other
disadvantaged
people
from
protecting themselves in the locations
where they need it the most.
Finally, even if a permit is granted, the law
drastically restricts the places where a firearm can be
carried. The law prohibits even a licensed individual
from carrying a firearm in “sensitive places,” which is
pretty much anywhere. These “sensitive places”
include—to mention only a few,
places of worship or religious observation;
libraries, public playgrounds, public parks, and
zoos;
homeless shelters, family shelters, shelters for
21
adults, and domestic violence shelters;
any building or grounds, owned or leased, of any
educational institutions;
public transportation;
theaters, stadiums, racetracks, museums,
amusement parks, conference centers, banquet
halls;
any gathering of individuals to collectively
express their constitutional rights to protest or
assemble; and
Times Square.
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e. When asked in what public
places a permit holder could carry a firearm, New
York Governor Hochul replied, “probably some
streets.” Marcia Kramer & Dick Brennan, Fresh off
primary win, Gov. Kathy Hochul dives right into guns-who can get them and where they can take them, CBS
New York (June 29, 2022).9
Many of these “sensitive places” are precisely
the places where people may be most concerned about
protecting themselves from lawless armed criminals.
For example, black American churches have
historically been—and shockingly still are—targeted
by those seeking to harm black Americans. Conor
Friedersdorf, Thugs and Terrorists Have Attacked
Black Churches for Generations, The Atlantic (June
18, 2015)10; Jason Crosby, Targeting Black Churches
Isn’t Stuff of Distant History, Courier Journal (Nov. 1,
9 https://tinyurl.com/SomeNYStreets.
10 https://tinyurl.com/AtlanticChurches.
22
2018)11. And there is no question that a good guy with
a firearm in a church can prevent a tragedy. Frank
Heinz, ‘Good Guy With a Gun’ Who Stopped Church
Gunman Receives Texas’ Highest Honor, NBCDFW
(Jan. 14, 2020).12
Indeed, those who attend church services have
both First Amendment rights to the “free exercise of
religion” and the right to bear arms for their protection
during that worship. People who are most targeted at
church have the greatest need to protect themselves
by bearing arms. The Hochul law takes away that
ability for self-protection.
Further, many minorities and other low-income
inner-city residents rely on places like public
playgrounds and city parks for recreational activities
for their children. These places are sadly not immune
from urban violence, but the Hochul law prohibits
parent-permit holders from carrying firearms in these
areas—even though they would have been fully vetted
through the extensive and discriminatory—
permitting process.
The law bans the possession of a firearm on
public transportation. For many urban poor living in
New
York
City—often
minorities—public
transportation is the only option. Despite rampant
crime on New York City public transportation, these
individuals are unable to exercise their constitutional
right to defend themselves. See Fola Akinnibi, NYC’s
Subway Police Surge Fails to Dent Transit Crime,
11 https://tinyurl.com/CourierChurches.
12 https://tinyurl.com/GoodGuyChurch.
23
Bloomberg (Nov. 4, 2022).13 And violent crime on the
New York City subway continues despite the Second
Circuit upholding the Hochul law. Myles Miller et al.,
Metal pipe beating adds to growing list of violent NYC
subway attacks, NBC N.Y. (Feb. 19, 2024)14; Kimmy
Yam, Subway cellist says attack ‘hurt like hell,’ and
now wants more protection for performers, NBC News
(Feb. 21, 2024)15; Ellen Moynihan et al., MTA train
conductor slashed in random Brooklyn subway attack:
‘I was doing my job,’ he tells News, Daily News (Feb.
29, 2024)16. The violence on the New York City subway
has become so bad that Governor Hochul has deployed
the national guard. Evan Simko-Bednarski et al.,
Hochul sends 750 National Guard troops to NYC
subways following spate of violence, Daily News (Mar.
6, 2024)17 (“The NYPD is fighting a 15.5% jump in
felony assaults at city subway stops and trains.”).
These are the very scenarios that the Bruen decision
anticipates: protecting oneself in a public setting
where armed criminals—who ignore the Hochul Law’s
prohibitions—are likely to prowl.
The Bill of Rights exists to protect individual
13 https://tinyurl.com/SubwayCrime.
14 https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/metal-pipe-beating-
adds-to-growing-list-of-violent-nyc-subway-attacks/5150631/.
15 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/subway-cellist-
attacked-34th-street-protections-rcna139678.
16 https://www.nydailynews.com/2024/02/29/mta-train-conductor-
slashed-in-neck-in-brooklyn-subway-stop-random-attack/.
17 https://www.nydailynews.com/2024/03/06/hochul-to-dispatch-
750-national-guard-troops-to-nyc-subways-following-spate-ofviolence/.
24
rights against government interference. It cannot be
left to the discretion of a government official to
determine who may enjoy those rights—who may
defend him or herself and who may not. See Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. at 763. The
Constitution does not abide such selective application
of fundamental rights. The Court was clear in Heller
that when the Constitution protects the rights of “the
people,” it “unambiguously refers to all members of the
political community, not an unspecified subset.” 554
U.S. at 580; see also United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). The Second
Amendment is not limited to the wealthy or wellconnected, or those who demonstrate the “essential
character” to bear arms, or to any other category that
the state deems fit.
V.
The Court should grant the petition to
reaffirm the proper standard for applying
history in Second Amendment cases.
Governments and lower courts are either
reluctant to follow the Court’s Bruen historical
analysis
requirement
or—perhaps—they
are
confused. Almost immediately after the Court
announced Bruen, New York passed a new law just as
egregious as the one Bruen struck down. The Second
Circuit found a way to justify the new law, relying—in
part—on racist analogs from the reconstruction era.
And despite history playing a role in Second
Amendment analysis as far back as Heller, some lower
courts have claimed that Bruen’s historical analysis
requirement is too confusing to apply. See, e.g., United
States v. Bullock, No. 3:18-CR-165-CWR-FKB, 2023
WL 4232309, at *4 (S.D. Miss. June 28, 2023) (“After
25
reviewing the briefs and Bruen, this Court grew
concerned. Judges are not historians.”). One
commentator even advocated that “state legislatures
and state attorney generals should defy the Court’s
decision in Bruen ….” David L. Sloss, The Right of
State Governments to Defy the Supreme Court,
Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara
University (Jul. 6, 2022).18 In any event, it is
important that this Court reiterate that it means what
it says.
Further, this case is a good vehicle to clarify
that courts should disregard historical laws “from
Reconstruction regarding the scope of the right to bear
arms,” Pet. App. at 68 n.27, at least as far as those
laws were designed to prevent certain disfavored
individuals from exercising their right to keep and
bear arms. Indeed, courts should disregard any such
discriminatory laws from any era in their analysis of
the Second Amendment.
Finally, this case is a clean vehicle to admonish
governments that individuals do not need to prove
“good moral character” before they may exercise their
constitutional rights. The Court has rejected attempts
by the government to condition a constitutional right
on the discretion of an enforcing officer, and it should
grant the petition to do so here as well.
CONCLUSION
In Bruen, the Court held “that a State may not
enforce a law, like New York’s Sullivan Law, that
18 https://www.scu.edu/ethics-spotlight/the-ethics-of-guns/the-
right-of-state-governments-to-defy-the-supreme-court/.
26
effectively prevents its law-abiding residents from
carrying a gun ….” 142 S. Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J.,
concurring). As with the history of firearms
regulations, the Hochul Law restricts the
fundamental right to keep and bear arms for the
urban poor and facilitates discriminatory enforcement
by state officials. For the reasons stated in this amicus
brief, the Court should grant the petition for writ of
certiorari and reverse the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
David C. Tryon
Counsel of Record for Amicus Curiae
Alex M. Certo
The Buckeye Institute
88 East Broad Street
Suite 1300
Columbus, OH 43215
(614) 224-4422
D.Tryon@BuckeyeInstitute.org
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.