Amicus Curiae Brief — Pamela Bondi, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners v. Jennifer VanDerStok, et al.

No. 23-852

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

JENNIFER VANDERSTOK, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

CENTER AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

ELIZABETH B. WYDRA

BRIANNE J. GOROD*

MIRIAM BECKER-COHEN

NINA HENRY

CONSTITUTIONAL

ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER

1200 18th Street NW, Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-6889

brianne@theusconstitution.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

July 1, 2024

* Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ......................

1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT................................................

1

ARGUMENT .........................................................

6

I.

ATF’s Rule Is Lawful Under the

Ordinary Public Meaning of the

Definition of “Firearm” in the Gun

Control Act ................................................

6

A. Weapon Parts Kits ..........................

6

B. Partially Complete or

Nonfunctional Frames or

Receivers ..........................................

16

ATF’s Rule Is Consistent with the

History of the Gun Control Act ............

21

A. Congress Passed the Gun Control

Act to End Licensing-Requirement

Loopholes that Allowed

Disqualified Individuals to

Purchase Firearms ..........................

21

B. The Gun Control Act’s “Firearm”

Definition Was Broadly Worded to

Cover Parts Kits and Incomplete

or Nonfunctional Major Firearm

Parts .................................................

24

CONCLUSION......................................................

28

II.

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Abramski v. United States,

573 U.S. 169 (2014) .....................................

1

Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC,

601 U.S. 246 (2024) .....................................

19

Bostock v. Clayton County,

590 U.S. 644 (2020) ................................. 14-16, 20

Caraco Pharm. Lab’ys, Ltd. v. Novo

Nordisk A/S,

566 U.S. 399 (2012) .....................................

15

Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249 (1992) .....................................

16

EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,

575 U.S. 768 (2015) .....................................

19

Guy v. United States,

336 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1964) .......................

9, 10

INS v. Chadha,

462 U.S. 919 (1983) .....................................

7

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

144 S. Ct. 967 (2024) ...................................

19

New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira,

586 U.S. 105 (2019) .....................................

7, 20

Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey,

524 U.S. 206 (1998) .....................................

20

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — cont’d

Page(s)

People v. Edgett,

197 N.W.2d 525 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) .......

10

Perrin v. United States,

444 U.S. 37 (1979) ....................................... 3, 6, 17

Rubin v. United States,

449 U.S. 424 (1981) .....................................

16

Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp.,

571 U.S. 220 (2014) .....................................

7

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,

473 U.S. 479 (1985) .....................................

20

Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd.,

566 U.S. 560 (2012) .....................................

6

Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States,

585 U.S. 274 (2018) .....................................

3, 17

Statutes and Legislative Materials

114 Cong. Rec. (1968) ............................ 5, 22, 23, 28

Federal Firearms Act of 1938,

Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 ..............

14

Gun Control Act of 1968,

Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 .....................

23

H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577 (1968) .................... 22, 24, 27

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — cont’d

Page(s)

Interstate Shipment of Firearms: Hearings on

S. 1975 and S. 2345 Before the S. Comm. on

Com., 88th Cong. (1964) ...................... 5, 21, 22, 25

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act

of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 .........

23

S. Rep. No. 89-1866 (1966)............................

26, 27

S. Rep. No. 90-1501 (1968)............................

24, 26

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A) ….. 2, 3, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(B) .................... 2, 16, 17, 19, 25

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4)(C) ................................

15

18 U.S.C. § 922 ..............................................

1

18 U.S.C. § 923 ..............................................

1

Other Authorities

The American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language (1969) ........................... 7, 8, 10

27 C.F.R. § 478.11 .............................. 2, 6, 13, 14, 16

27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c) .....................................

2, 16

Convert, Merriam-Webster.com Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/convert (June 4, 2024) ..............

11

GST-9, 80% Arms, https://www.80percentarms.com/gst-9/ .........................................

18

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — cont’d

Page(s)

Wayne King, Congress Expected to Hold Gun

Curb to ‘Saturday Night Specials,’ N.Y.

Times (Sept. 28, 1975) ................................

23

2 The Oxford English Dictionary (1st ed.

1933)............................................................

3, 9

Pistol Frame and Jigs, Polymer80, https://polymer80.com/pistols/frameandjig/ ...............

18

The Random House Dictionary of

the English Language (1966) ...... 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 17

Tex. Educ. Agency, Bull. No. 522, Texas

Veteran Farm Shop (1951) .........................

9

Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (7th ed.

1963)............................................................

8

Webster’s New World Dictionary of the

American Language (1st college ed.

1953)............................................................

8, 9

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

of the English Language Unabridged

(1966) ........................................... 3, 4, 7-13, 17, 18

A.M. Zarem et al., Introduction to the

Utilization of Solar Energy (1963) .............

4, 9

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC) is a

think tank and public interest law firm dedicated to

fulfilling the progressive promise of the Constitution’s

text and history. CAC works in our courts, through

our government, and with legal scholars to improve

understanding of the Constitution and preserve the

rights and freedoms it guarantees. CAC has a strong

interest in ensuring that important federal statutes,

like the Gun Control Act of 1968, are interpreted in

accordance with their text and history, and accordingly has an interest in this case.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Galvanized by a string of high-profile assassinations committed by individuals who never should have

had firearms in the first place, Congress passed the

Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) “to keep guns out of

the hands of criminals and others who should not have

them, and to assist law enforcement authorities in investigating serious crimes.” Abramski v. United

States, 573 U.S. 169, 180 (2014). Among other things,

the law requires those who manufacture and deal in

“firearms” to procure a federal firearms license, maintain records of the acquisition and transfer of firearms,

conduct background checks, and mark every firearm

with a serial number. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922-23. These

commonplace rules are familiar to all lawful gun

1 Under Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court, amicus states that

no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and

no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to

fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other

than amicus or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its

preparation or submission.

2

owners in this country. They are obstacles only to

criminals, minors, and other individuals who are legally disqualified from possessing firearms.

The question in this case is whether certain

“weapon parts kit[s]” that are “designed to or may

readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an

explosive,” 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, and “partially complete,

disassembled, or nonfunctional frame[s] or receiver[s],” id. § 478.12(c), covered by a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives rule (“the 2022

Rule” or “ATF’s Rule”), should be subject to the GCA’s

basic “firearm” regulations. To be clear, the kits and

devices at issue in this case are not mere hunks of

metal; they come with names like “Buy Build Shoot,”

and “80 Percent Arms,” and they can be ordered online

and assembled at home, often in less than an hour, by

anyone with access to a computer and basic tools.

Once assembled, they function no differently than any

other firearm.

The Act’s plain text compels treating them as firearms. Congress in 1968 was just as aware as it is today of the demand for untraceable firearms by unqualified or unscrupulous individuals, and of the willingness of weapons manufacturers to engage in innovations to meet that demand and turn a profit. It thus

defined the term “firearm” broadly, so that the statutory definition would encompass not only the types of

firearms known to Congress at the time, but also future efforts to exploit loopholes in federal law. Specifically, that definition covers “any weapon (including a

starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily

be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an

explosive,” and “the frame or receiver of any such

weapon.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A), (B).

3

The key phrase of that definition is “designed to or

may readily be converted.” And the key words of that

phrase are “readily” and “converted.” Because the

GCA does not provide statutory definitions of those

terms, they should be “interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted

the statute.” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S.

274, 284 (2018) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444

U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).

Overwhelmingly, dictionaries from the 1960s defined “readily” to mean “with fairly quick efficiency,”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the

English Language Unabridged 1889 (1966) (“Webster’s

Third”), or “promptly; quickly; easily,” The Random

House Dictionary of the English Language 1195 (1966)

(“Random House”). And they defined “convert” chiefly

as “to change or turn from one state to another” or to

“transform” or “transmute.” Webster’s Third 499. Under these definitions, when an amateur working at

home transforms a weapon parts kit from an unfinished, disassembled state into a finished state with

fairly quick efficiency and a fair degree of ease, that

person “readily . . . convert[s]” the kit into a weapon

that “expel[s] a projectile by the action of an explosive”

within the meaning of the GCA.

18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(3)(A).

Contrary to Respondents’ assertions, the 1960s

definitions of “convert” were not limited to swapping

out an existing function in a finished product for another, but instead included the act of creating, manufacturing, completing, or adding functionality in the

first place: “sheepskins are converted into parchment,”

Webster’s Third 499, “[t]he [tree] trunk is often converted into canoes,” 2 The Oxford English Dictionary

944 (1st ed. 1933). Other contemporaneous sources

used “convert” in a similar fashion: for example,

4

“[e]ight or ten hours of hand labor on the part of the

buyer will convert this kit into a workable stove,” A.M.

Zarem et al., Introduction to the Utilization of Solar

Energy 224 (1963) (emphasis added). In contrast, the

narrower and less common definition of “convert” that

Respondents urge this Court to adopt—“exchange for

an equivalent”—was exclusively used by 1960s dictionaries to describe conversions of currency in the valuative or financial, as opposed to physical, sense.

Respondents’ attempts to ascribe a narrow meaning to the terms “frame” and “receiver” in the GCA fare

no better. Dictionaries from the 1960s with firearmspecific definitions for “frame” and “receiver” consistently defined those terms as “the basic unit of a handgun which serves as a mounting for the barrel and operating parts of the arm,” Webster’s Third 902 (defining “frame”), or “the metal frame in which the action

of a firearm is fitted and to which the breech end of the

barrel is attached,” id. at 1894 (defining “receiver”).

These definitions say nothing about the “completeness” of a “frame” or “receiver,” nor do they require it

to be ready-to-use. They plainly would have encompassed a frame or receiver that was missing just a few

drill holes, or that required the removal of just a few

plastic tabs, or that could be readily assembled from a

kit containing all the key parts. Indeed, the definitions

focus on the purpose that the “frame” or “receiver”

serves and the manner in which it is used: as the basic

skeleton of a firearm to which other parts are attached

to create a functional machine.

The history of the GCA confirms what its text

makes clear: the Act applies to the weapon parts kits

and frames and receivers described in ATF’s Rule. The

Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed to address the

growing problem of unregulated access to mail-order

guns. After a mail-order gun was used to assassinate

5

President John F. Kennedy, Congress held hearings on

these weapons and called for an end to the “interstate

mail-order traffic in murderous weapons” and the “no

questions asked” approach that allowed disqualified

purchasers to obtain firearms anonymously without

complying with any kind of licensing requirements.

Interstate Shipment of Firearms: Hearings on S. 1975

and S. 2345 Before the S. Comm. on Com., 88th Cong.

11, 26 (1964). After the subsequent assassinations of

the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert F. Kennedy in 1968, Congress finally updated the definition of “firearm” to close what President Lyndon B. Johnson called “the brutal loopholes in

our laws” that permitted disqualified purchasers to engage in “mail-order murder.” 114 Cong. Rec. at 16301

(1968).

Three aspects of the amendment of this definition

deserve special attention. First, when Congress defined the term “firearm” to include “starter guns,” it

used the term “starter gun” in a capacious sense, understanding that major parts of starter guns could be

turned into deadly weapons even when shipped separately from the rest of the pistol, and that myriad

methods could be used to convert such parts into functional firearms. Second, as long as the device or set of

parts was “designed to or [could] readily be converted”

into a firearm, Congress did not care about the precise

method of conversion or what the item looked like prior

to the conversion; rather, Congress used broad language to capture future innovations in firearm technology and attempts to evade regulation. Third, although Congress replaced the language “any part or

parts” of a firearm with “the frame or receiver of any

such weapon” in the GCA, that change was not an attempt to narrow federal firearms laws or exclude vital

parts of firearms from regulation. Instead, seeking to

6

balance the practicalities of enforcement with the need

for broad language to prevent the abuse of loopholes,

Congress chose to target the major parts of firearms.

Ultimately, when properly viewed in the context of

the GCA’s text and history, it is clear that the 1968

update to the definition of “firearm” was part of a

larger scheme designed to crack down on gun manufacturers who seek to cash in on the benefits of selling

firearms while evading regulation. This Court should

respect the scheme Congress put in place by applying

the plain text of the law Congress passed.

ARGUMENT

I.

ATF’s Rule Is Lawful Under the Ordinary

Public Meaning of the Definition of

“Firearm” in the Gun Control Act.

A. Weapon Parts Kits

Enacted in 1968, the GCA defines a “firearm” as

“any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is

designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(3)(A). If the “weapon parts kit[s]” covered by

ATF’s regulation, 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, are “designed to

or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the

action of an explosive” within the meaning of the GCA,

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A), the rule must be upheld as

consistent with the authorizing statute.

1. Because the words “readily” and “converted”

are “undefined in [the] statute,” they should be given

their “ordinary meaning” at the time of the statute’s

enactment. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566

U.S. 560, 566 (2012). This “fundamental canon of statutory construction,” Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42, avoids judicial amendment of legislation “outside the ‘single,

finely wrought and exhaustively considered,

7

procedure’ the Constitution commands.” New Prime

Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105, 113 (2019) (quoting INS

v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)). And to identify

the ordinary public meaning of a statutory term or

phrase, this Court typically begins with “[d]ictionaries

from the era of [the statute]’s enactment.” Sandifer v.

U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2014).

In this case, leading dictionaries from the relevant

period uniformly defined “readily” to mean “with fairly

quick efficiency : without needless loss of time : reasonably fast : speedily,” and “with a fair degree of

ease : without much difficulty : with facility : easily.”

Webster’s Third 1889; see also, e.g., Random House

1195 (“promptly; quickly; easily”); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1085 (1969)

(“American Heritage”) (“[p]romptly,” “[e]asily”). None

of these definitions specify that an act must be completed within a particular timeframe to be “readily”

performed; they merely emphasize that some degree of

quickness and ease, as compared to other lengthier or

more involved processes, must be involved.

For instance, one contemporaneous dictionary provided the example, “information can when needed be

readily acquired by consulting appropriate books.”

Webster’s Third 1889. Of course, the act of consulting

appropriate books for information requires tracking

down the appropriate books and synthesizing their

content—it may be a quick process, but it is not instantaneous. Still, according to Webster’s, information is

“readily” acquired if any person with basic research

and reading comprehension skills can obtain it in this

fashion—that is, without expending significant time

and effort.

Meanwhile, leading dictionaries from the relevant

period chiefly defined “convert” as “to change or turn

from one state to another : alter in form, substance, or

8

quality : transform, transmute.” Webster’s Third 499.

Dictionary after dictionary provided some iteration of

this definition first for “convert” (except those that

started with the concept of converting from one religion to another—obviously irrelevant here). See, e.g.,

Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language 323 (1st college ed. 1953) (“Webster’s New

World”) (“to change; transform; turn; transmute: as,

convert grain into flour”); Random House 320 (“to

change (something) into something of a different form

or properties; transmute; transform); American Heritage 291 (“[t]o change into another form, substance,

state, or product; transform; transmute”). These

sources establish that the most common usage of “convert” in the 1960s was to describe the act of changing

something or turning it from one state to another—including from an incomplete state to a complete state.

Indeed, the contemporary meaning of “convert”

was not limited to swapping out an existing function

in a finished product for another, but instead included

the act of creating, manufacturing, completing, or adding functionality in the first place. While this notion

is plainly encompassed by the expansive concepts of

“changing,” “transforming,” or “transmuting,” several

dictionaries from the 1960s also included language in

their entries for “convert” that made it even more explicit: “to turn to . . . a particular use or purpose,” Random House 320, or “to alter for more effective utilization,” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 183 (7th ed.

1963).

Many dictionaries also included concrete examples

illustrating that a “conversion” occurs when an unfinished product is transformed into a finished product or

provided with new functionality. For instance, “sheepskins are converted into parchment,” or one may “convert paper into envelopes or paperboard into cartons.”

9

Webster’s Third 499; see also Webster’s New World 323

(“convert grain into flour”); 2 The Oxford English Dictionary 944 (1st ed. 1933) (“[t]he [tree] trunk is often

converted into canoes” (emphasis added)).

Other contemporaneous sources similarly used the

term “convert” to describe the transformation from one

state to another through the act of completing or assembling. A 1963 textbook on emerging solar energy

technologies described a “simple do-it-yourself kit with

all the essential parts for a [solar] stove,” noting that

“[e]ight or ten hours of hand labor on the part of the

buyer will convert this kit into a workable stove.” A.M.

Zarem et al., Introduction to the Utilization of Solar

Energy 224 (1963) (emphasis added). A vocational bulletin for farmers put out by the state of Texas in the

years leading up to the GCA’s enactment explained

how “odds and ends from an automobile junk heap”

were collected by farmers, allowing them to “convert

these parts into a post hole digger” for constructing

fences. Tex. Educ. Agency, Bull. No. 522, Texas Veteran Farm Shop 7 (1951) (emphasis added).

Judicial decisions from around 1968 also underscore that the word “convert” applies to the act of

transforming an unfinished product into a finished

state or otherwise assembling a set of parts. In one

case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that a partially disassembled illegal still (a device used for making hard

alcohol) with hot mash in it was properly considered a

“still.” The court of appeals explained that “[t]he [district] court found, rightly, that the fact that certain

necessary parts had been temporarily removed and

hidden nearby did not convert the apparatus from a

still to something else.” Guy v. United States, 336 F.2d

595, 597 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (emphasis

added). In other words, notwithstanding the state of

disassembly, the still was “readily capable of being set

10

up in an operating state,” and thus it was still appropriately deemed a “still” within the meaning of the governing statute. Id. at 596. Other cases from around

the time of the GCA’s enactment used the term “convert” in a similar fashion. For instance, one judge considered during a sentencing hearing the fact that the

defendant had disassembled a mop, concealed it in his

prison cell, and “worked upon [it] in such fashion as to

convert the pieces to a weapon.” People v. Edgett, 197

N.W.2d 525, 527 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (emphasis

added).

Considered together, these sources make clear

that when one “converts” something or a set of things

into something else, that item or set of items undergoes a transformation. See, e.g., Webster’s Third 499

(using “transform” in the leading definition of “convert”); Random House 320 (same); American Heritage

291 (same). Thus, under the ordinary, contemporaneous meanings of “readily” and “convert,” when an amateur working at home transforms a weapon parts kit

from an unfinished, disassembled state into a finished

state with fairly quick efficiency and a fair degree of

ease, that person “readily . . . convert[s]” the kit into a

“firearm” within the meaning of the GCA. 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(3)(A). Indeed, those “80 percent finished”

parts kits (among others) contemplated by ATF’s Rule

are much further along in their “conver[sion]” process—that is, closer to being usable “firearms”—than

sheepskins are to being parchment, or trees are to being canoes, or disassembled mop parts are to being

weapons.

2. In their briefs in support of certiorari, Respondents do not engage with the definition of “readily,” nor

do they dispute that “‘[c]onvert’ can refer to manufacturing.” VanDerStok Br. in Support of Cert. 17. Instead, they urge this court to eschew the leading (and

11

broad) definition of “convert” for a narrower one that

better suits their purposes: to “exchange for an equivalent.” Id. (quoting Convert, Merriam-Webster.com

Online Dictionary, https://bit.ly/47FxhYm (last visited

Mar. 4, 2024)). According to this definition, they say,

“convert” is limited to the act of exchanging “one finished product to another.” Id.; see also id. at 16 (arguing that the GCA only “captures nonfunctional but

complete firearms” such as “malfunctioning,” “intentionally disabled,” or “temporarily disassembled” firearms”).

Dictionaries from the 1960s belie this assertion:

while they do include the concept of “exchang[ing] for

an equivalent” (typically as the fifth, sixth, or even seventh-listed definition of “convert”), they consistently

provide examples for this definition that limit it to conversions of the financial or valuative sense, as opposed

to the physical sense. For instance, Webster’s Third

states: “to exchange for a specified equivalent (convert

stock holdings into cash).” Id. at 499 (emphasis

added). Random House provides “to exchange for an

equivalent: to convert bank notes into gold.” Id. at 320.

Even the modern online dictionary cited by Respondents contains two examples along these lines: “convert

foreign currency into dollars” and “convert a bond.”

Convert, Merriam-Webster.com Online Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/convert

(June 4, 2024).

The act of constructing a firearm from a buildyour-own-gun kit is certainly more akin to turning

sheepskin into parchment than exchanging pesos for

dollars—it is a physical, not a valuative, conversion

that the kit undergoes. In fact, even the statutory example of a “starter gun” that Respondents invoke does

not fit the mold of “exchanging for an equivalent.” After all, the act of converting a starter gun into a pistol

12

that shoots live ammunition is more akin to assembly

or restoration than trading something in for an equivalent item. See infra part II.B. Respondents’ attempt

to rely on a narrower and less common definition of

“convert” is thus belied by both ordinary usage and

statutory text.

In a similar line of argument, Respondents also assert that because “convert” modifies the term “weapon”

in the GCA, see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A), an item must

be “already a weapon that can be ‘converted’ into a firearm” to qualify as a firearm under the statute.

VanDerStok Br. in Support of Cert. 23. But again, the

“starter gun” example provided in the statutory text

belies this assertion. Before it undergoes a conversion,

a starter gun is simply a device for signaling the beginning of a race—not an “an instrument of offensive

or defensive combat” or “something to fight with,” Webster’s Third 2589 (defining “weapon”). An unmodified

starter gun is no more a “weapon” than any other piece

of metal—a spoon or a fork. Thus, Respondents’ interpretation of the GCA excludes from the statute’s scope

the sole concrete example of a “firearm” provided by

Congress. That cannot possibly be.

3. The court below, for its part, did not engage

with the ordinary public meaning of “readily” or “convert” in the GCA at all. Instead, it looked at the verbs

included alongside “convert” in ATF’s 2022 regulation—“completed,” “assembled,” and “restored”—and

decided that those terms do not cover the “full transformation actually required by these parts kits.” Pet.

App. 25a. Then, “[r]eading ‘converted’ in conjunction

with the other listed verbs,” the court decided that

“convert,” as used in the GCA, necessarily must “contemplate[] less drastic measures” than the Government ascribes to it. Id.

13

This is a misguided approach to statutory interpretation on multiple levels. First, the court below

misunderstood the task before it: its job was simply to

decide whether the acts of “complet[ing],” “assembl[ing],” and “restor[ing]” the “weapon parts kit[s]”

covered by ATF’s Rule, 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, are consistent with the act of “convert[ing]” covered by the

GCA, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A). They are. Each of

these terms fits comfortably within the ordinary

meaning of “convert” because they describe a “change”

from one “state” or “form” “to another.” Webster’s

Third 499; see also Pet. Br. 20 (citing dictionary definitions for “complete,” “assemble,” and “restore”).

That should have been the end of the court’s inquiry. In the context of a facial challenge, the court

below should not have engaged in speculation about

whether the parts kits that it viewed ATF’s Rule as

targeting in fact require a more “full transformation”

than that covered by the regulation. Pet. App. 25a. As

Petitioners point out, “[i]f ATF ever sought to apply the

Rule to a parts kit that could not readily be converted

into a functional firearm, the affected parties would be

free to challenge that action as beyond ATF’s statutory

authority.” Pet. Br. 27.

Second, the court’s exercise of reading additional

verbs that appear in the regulation—but not the statute—to limit the meaning of the term “convert” as used

in the statute is completely divorced from standard

principles of statutory interpretation. Compare 27

C.F.R. § 478.11 (the term “firearm” “shall include a

weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be

completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive”), with 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A) (“the term firearm

means . . . any weapon (including a starter gun) which

will or is designed to or may readily be converted to

14

expel a projectile”). “Convert” in the GCA should

simply take its ordinary public meaning, and that ordinary public meaning is broad enough to cover the

verbs (including the verb “convert” itself) used in

ATF’s Rule.

4. The court below also erred by focusing its analysis on other statutory provisions that do not appear

in the relevant provision of the GCA, rather than engaging in a straightforward analysis of the ordinary

public meaning of the phrase “readily be converted” at

the time the GCA was enacted. Cf. Bostock v. Clayton

County, 590 U.S. 644, 674 (2020) (“[W]hen the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is at an

end.”). The court emphasized that the GCA’s predecessor statute included the phrase “any part or parts

of” a firearm—language Congress removed in 1968,

and that ATF was not authorized to reinsert fifty years

later. Pet. App. 20a (quoting Federal Firearms Act of

1938, Ch. 850, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250, 1250

(repealed 1968)). That is not wrong, but it is irrelevant

to this case: ATF’s 2022 rule does not regulate “minute

weapon parts” like the predecessor statute did, id. at

27a; rather, it regulates “weapon parts kit[s],” i.e., the

aggregation of separate parts that are designed to or

may be readily assembled “to expel a projectile by the

action of an explosive,” 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. In other

words, ATF’s 2022 rule regulates weapon parts kits—

a narrower class than that of all individual weapon

parts regulated by the predecessor statute.

Similarly, the court below concluded that the use

of alternative language in other sections of federal firearms laws suggests that Congress did not mean what

it said in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A)’s definition of “firearm.” Citing, among other provisions, the definition of

“destructive device,” the court decided that Congress

“knows how to regulate ‘parts’ of weapons when it so

15

chooses.”

Pet. App. 21a (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(4)(C), which defines “destructive device” to include “any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any destructive device . . . and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled”).

But that comparison is inapt. First, Congress

chose different language for the definitions of “destructive device” and “firearm” because the definitions have

different scopes: Congress defined “destructive devices” to include parts used to convert an item into a

“destructive device” even if the part is not ultimately

integrated into the device, whereas the definition of

“firearms” includes only those weapons, including

parts kits, that are themselves integrated into the final

product. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A). ATF’s 2022 rule

regulating “weapon parts kit[s]” is consistent with the

definition of “firearm”—it in no way attempts to sweep

in devices that only are used to effectuate the conversion as the statutory definition of “destructive device”

does.

Second, even assuming that Congress did use distinct language to describe something analogous to

weapon parts kits in another statutory section, that

does not give this Court license to alter or narrow the

plain meaning of “readily be converted.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(3)(A). As this Court has explained, “the mere

possibility of clearer phrasing cannot defeat the most

natural reading of a statute; if it could (with all due

respect to Congress), we would interpret a great many

statutes differently than we do.” Caraco Pharm.

Lab’ys, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 416

(2012); compare Bostock, 590 U.S. at 674 (majority

opinion) (refusing to derive meaning from the absence

of express language covering “sexual orientation” in

Title VII where the plain meaning of the statutory

16

language was broad enough to cover “sexual orientation” discrimination), with id. at 791 & n.5 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“when Congress wants to

prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in addition

to sex discrimination, Congress explicitly refers to sexual orientation discrimination”). Indeed, because the

definition of “firearm” already covers combinations of

parts that “may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(3)(A), it would have been redundant to add

that “combination of parts” language used elsewhere

to the statutory definition.

Accordingly, the ordinary public meaning of the

GCA’s definition of firearm unambiguously covers

“weapon parts kit[s]” that are “designed to or may

readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an

explosive.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. And “[w]hen the words

of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is

also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” Conn.

Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).

B. Partially Complete or Nonfunctional

Frames or Receivers

The GCA also defines a firearm’s “frame or receiver” as a “firearm” itself subject to federal requirements. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(B). ATF’s rule properly

construes the term “frame or receiver” as covering “a

partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional

frame or receiver, including a frame or receiver parts

kit, that is designed to or may readily be completed,

assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c).

Again, a straightforward analysis of the ordinary

meaning of the terms “frame” and “receiver” at the

time of the GCA’s enactment compels this conclusion.

17

1. The words “frame” and “receiver” in 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(3)(B) do not include a statutory definition, and

thus should be construed “as taking their ordinary,

contemporary, common meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.’” Wis. Cent. Ltd., 585 U.S.

at 284 (quoting Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42). Under the ordinary meaning of the terms “frame” and “receiver” at

the time of the statute’s enactment, those terms

plainly would have encompassed a frame or receiver

that was missing just a few holes, or one that required

the removal of just a few plastic tabs, or one that could

be readily assembled from a kit containing all the necessary parts.

Minor aspects of incompletion do not render a

frame or receiver covered by ATF’s rule any less a

“frame” or “receiver” under the ordinary meaning of

these terms. Consistently, dictionaries from the 1960s

with firearm-specific definitions for “frame” and “receiver” defined those terms as “the basic unit of a

handgun which serves as a mounting for the barrel

and operating parts of the arm,” Webster’s Third 902

(defining “frame”), or “the metal frame in which the

action of a firearm is fitted and to which the breech end

of the barrel is attached,” id. at 1894 (defining “receiver”); see also, e.g., Random House 1198 (defining

“receiver” as “the basic metal unit housing the action

and to which the barrel and other components are attached”).

None of these definitions says anything about the

“completeness” of a “frame” or “receiver” or requires a

“frame” or “receiver” to be ready-to-use without any

further assembly or modification. Instead, the definitions focus on the purpose that the “frame” or “receiver” serves and the manner in which it is used: as

the basic skeleton of a firearm to which other parts are

attached to create a functional machine.

18

Other contemporaneous and analogous definitions

of “frame” reinforce this point. For instance, one leading 1960s dictionary defined a “frame” as “the constructional system that gives shape or strength (as to

a building),” providing the example “the frame of the

roof had begun to sag.” Webster’s Third 902. When

walking past a construction site containing most of a

house’s roof frame, it would be perfectly natural to refer to that structure as the “frame,” even if it was still

missing one or two rafters, or even if certain rafters

required further trimming for proper alignment to

support the roof boards. So too for Respondents’ frame

and receiver kits. In fact, Respondents’ own websites

refer to their frame and receiver kits as “80% frames”

or “80% receivers,” or even just “frames” and “receivers.” See, e.g., Pistol Frame and Jigs, Polymer80,

https://polymer80.com/pistols/frameandjig/ (last visited June 12, 2024); GST-9, 80% Arms,

https://www.80percentarms.com/gst-9/ (last visited

June 12, 2024).

2. In arguing otherwise, Respondents repeatedly

cite the statement by the court below that “a part cannot be both not yet a receiver and a receiver at the same

time.” See, e.g., VanDerStok Br. in Support of Cert. 13

(quoting Pet. App. 18a). That may be true, but it misunderstands how the 2022 Rule operates: the Rule

simply defines the point in the manufacturing process

at which something that is not yet a receiver becomes

a receiver. It may define that point earlier than Respondents would like, but because it does so in a manner consistent with the contemporary, ordinary meaning of the terms “frame” and “receiver,” it is entirely

consistent with the GCA.

And because the ordinary meaning of the terms

“frame” and “receiver” is broad enough to include those

frame and receiver parts kits and partially complete,

19

disassembled, or nonfunctional frames and receivers

covered by ATF’s rule, Respondents are wrong to focus

on what the court below deemed the more “flexible language” in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A) (defining “firearm”

to include weapons that are “designed to or may readily be converted” into firearms) that is absent from 18

U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(B) (defining “firearm” as a “frame or

receiver”). Congress simply did not have to add that

“flexible language” to subsection (B) because the ordinary meaning of “frame” and “receiver” was already

broad enough to cover the frames and receivers encompassed by ATF’s regulation.

What Respondents really want is for this Court to

narrow the text Congress enacted by reading some unwritten phrase like “fully operational” into it. Time

and again, this Court has rejected invitations of this

sort. See, e.g., Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St.,

LLC, 601 U.S. 246, 256 (2024) (refusing to read a narrowing “transportation industry” requirement into the

statutory text of the FAA’s transportation worker exemption); Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 144 S. Ct. 967,

976 (2024) (“[W]e will not ‘add words to the law’ to

achieve what some employers might think ‘a desirable

result.’” (quoting EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores,

Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 774 (2015)). Respondents are stuck

with the ordinary public meaning of “frame” or “receiver” in 1968, and that meaning plainly covers those

disassembled or partially complete frames and receivers and kits covered by the 2022 Rule.

3. The court below paid lip service to the importance of hewing to the contemporaneous, ordinary

public meaning of the GCA, but it made a hash of that

analysis as applied to the terms “frame” and “receiver.”

Invoking the well-established rule that

“[w]ords generally should be interpreted as taking

their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted

20

the statute,” Pet. App. 16a (quoting New Prime, 586

U.S. at 113), the court accused ATF of “purport[ing] to

expand the terms ‘frame’ and ‘receiver,’ as they were

understood in 1968, to include changes in firearms in

modern times,” id.

That gets the analysis exactly backwards: what

matters is not that the “partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver[s]” covered by

ATF’s rule did not exist in 1968; what matters is that

the ordinary meaning of the term “frame or receiver”

in 1968 was broad enough that it would have covered

them had they existed then. That is precisely the

teaching of this Court’s decision in Bostock. There the

Court held that Title VII’s prohibition on certain employment actions “because of ‘sex’” covered actions

taken on the basis of peoples’ sexual orientations or

gender identities. Bostock, 590 U.S. at 683-84. That

Congress may not have expressly contemplated such

coverage at the time it enacted Title VII was irrelevant. As this Court explained, “’the fact that [a statute] has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress’ does not demonstrate ambiguity;

instead, it simply ‘demonstrates [the] breadth’ of a legislative command.” Id. at 674 (quoting Sedima,

S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)); see

also Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212

(1998) (“[I]n the context of an unambiguous statutory

text,” the fact “that Congress did not ‘envisio[n] that

the ADA would be applied to state prisoners’” is “irrelevant.”). The same logic applies here: though Congress might not have contemplated the sophisticated

modern parts kits at issue in this case when it passed

the GCA in 1968, it chose language whose ordinary

meaning then (and now) is broad enough to extend to

those products. That is enough to resolve this case.

* * *

21

In sum, the ordinary public meaning of the relevant terms of the GCA in 1968 compels the conclusion

that ATF’s 2022 Rule is consistent with the authorizing statute. And, as the next section explains, the history of the GCA only confirms what the text of the law

makes clear.

II. ATF’s Rule Is Consistent with the History of

the Gun Control Act.

A.

Congress Passed the Gun Control Act to

End Licensing-Requirement Loopholes

that Allowed Disqualified Individuals

to Purchase Firearms.

The Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed in response to one central issue: unregulated access to

mail-order guns. After it was revealed that Lee Harvey Oswald had bought the gun used to assassinate

President Kennedy through a mail-order catalogue using a fake name and P.O. Box address, with no review

of his qualifications to purchase a firearm, the public

was outraged. In response to this public outrage at the

fact that mail-order catalogues could be used to circumvent requirements for firearm purchasers, Congress called multiple hearings specifically on the issue

of mail-order guns. Interstate Shipment of Firearms:

Hearings on S. 1975 and S. 2345 Before the S. Comm.

on Com., 88th Cong. (1964).

During those hearings, Senator Thomas J. Dodd,

who would become the chief architect of the GCA,

noted that Oswald’s use of a fake name and P.O. Box

address was typical of a broader epidemic of potentially disqualified persons anonymously obtaining firearms through the mail. He explained that “[d]uring

1963, approximately 1 million dangerous weapons

were ordered through the mails and . . . delivered to

persons with criminal records.” Id. at 10. In fact,

22

“[t]wenty-five percent of all recipients of mail-order

guns [in the District of Columbia] had criminal records,” a staggering figure that showed the extent to

which mail-order guns could be used to evade federal

firearms laws. Id. at 11.

Thus, the “question before [the] nation,” was

“whether this interstate mail-order traffic in murderous weapons should continue completely uncontrolled,

or whether reasonable controls should be instituted.”

Id. Congress chose “reasonable controls” that would

end the “no questions asked” approach that allowed

disqualified purchasers to obtain weapons without any

kind of checks or licensing requirements. Id. at 26

(statement of Senator Birch Bayh). This idea was the

germ of the GCA—the non-negotiable point on which

“[a] Nation aroused and demanding effective control

because of the tragic event of the recent past” called

for action. Id. at 9 (statement of Sen. Magnuson); see

H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577, at 20 (1968) (letter from Attorney General Ramsey Clark citing the 1963-1964 Committee on Commerce hearings as part of the “extensive

background” of factual findings informing the GCA).

A few years later, two more national tragedies finally spurred Congress to pass the GCA. After Dr.

Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated, Senator

Dodd exclaimed that “[a]gainst the background of the

recent assassination of Dr. King,” he “fail[ed] to understand how any one can rationalize or justify an omission which makes possible the sale of a gun to a felon.”

114 Cong. Rec. at 13323 (1968). And, weeks later,

mere hours after Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s death

at the hands of an assassin who was legally disqualified from purchasing a firearm yet used a gun privately purchased and “normally sold through the

mail,” the House convened to discuss the urgent need

for gun control legislation. Wayne King, Congress

23

Expected to Hold Gun Curb to ‘Saturday Night Specials,’ N.Y. Times (Sept. 28, 1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/09/28/archives/congress-expected-tohold-gun-curb-to-saturday-night-specials.html.

These tragic circumventions of law—three assassinations committed by people who Members of Congress argued should never have been sold a gun in the

first place and whose credentials to purchase a gun

were never examined—became the driving theme of

the debate. The morning after Senator Kennedy’s

shooting, Representative Boland spoke at length about

the three assassinations, emphasizing how all three

might have been prevented with stronger gun-control

laws. 114 Cong. Rec. at 16292. He concluded that the

circumstances of these assassinations “make clear how

easy it is for anyone—a lunatic, a confirmed criminal,

a heroin addict, a mental defective—to buy and use

firearms in the United States.” Id. Finally, President

Lyndon B. Johnson submitted a written statement to

be read into the Congressional Record calling for the

closure of “the brutal loopholes in our laws” that permitted disqualified purchasers to engage in “mail-order murder.” Id. at 16301. The legislation defining

the term “firearm” that would be incorporated into the

GCA passed in the House that same day.2

The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the final language of the GCA further emphasized the need

2 The GCA’s final definition of “firearm” was initially passed as

a part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,

Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 227, but before the Omnibus took

effect, the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213,

imported the Omnibus’s definition of “firearm.” See H.R. Rep. No.

90-1577, at 10. The GCA was deliberately scheduled to take effect

at the same time as the Crime Omnibus so that the Crime Omnibus’s provisions would be seamlessly incorporated into the

GCA. See S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 21 (1968).

24

for broadly worded legislation to prevent the circumvention of gun laws by disqualified purchasers. The

Report explained that traffic in untraceable mail-order

guns “affords circumvention and contravention of

State and local laws governing the acquisition of firearms.” S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 23 (1968). The “ready

availability, minimal cost and anonymity of purchase”

typical of mail-order firearms, it continued, have led to

“an ever-increasing abuse of this source of firearms by

juveniles, minors, and adult criminals.” Id. Therefore,

the GCA was written to curb practices that allowed

these individuals to “thwart the effectiveness” of existing gun laws. Id. at 27. As the House Judiciary Committee Report on the GCA explained, the law “responds to widespread national concern that existing

Federal control over the sale and shipment of firearms

[across] State lines is grossly inadequate.” H.R. Rep.

No. 90-1577, at 7.

B.

The Gun Control Act’s “Firearm”

Definition Was Broadly Worded to

Cover Parts Kits and Incomplete or

Nonfunctional Major Firearm Parts.

In passing the GCA, Congress also sought to prevent circumvention of the law through the sale of isolated major parts and other forms of incomplete firearms that were nonetheless readily converted into

functional weapons.

From the start of the debates, Congress was concerned about sellers and purchasers evading licensing

requirements by selling firearms that were carefully

altered just enough to avoid the statutory definition of

“firearm.” For instance, in the 1963-1964 hearings on

mail-order firearms, Senator Bayh spoke at length

about the troubling issue of “shrewd” vendors who

“bring these weapons into the country and tranship

many of them as junk.” Interstate Shipment of

25

Firearms: Hearings on S. 1975 and S. 2345 Before the

S. Comm. on Com., 88th Cong. 33 (1964). “[O]n some

occasions,” the Senator explained, “the barrel of these

weapons would have a small weld or a small bead of

weld in them that for all intents and purposes, according to the national firearms law, it enables them to circumvent the provisions of it,” and then, upon chiseling,

reassembly, or combination with other parts, “you

have a lethal weapon.” Id.

Congress thus amended the statutory definition of

“firearm,” using broad language that brought weapon

parts kits, incomplete firearms, and nonfunctional

frames and receivers under the sweep of existing law.

The language Congress ultimately landed on, codified

at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) today, defined the term “firearm” to include “any weapon (including a starter gun)

which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projective by the action of an explosive” or “the frame or receiver of any such weapon.”

Three aspects of Congress’s revision of this definition

deserve special attention.

First, Congress used the term “starter gun” (traditionally, pistols that fire blanks to signify the start of

a track event) in a capacious sense. Repeatedly, Members of Congress used the term in discussing sets of

parts that required various amounts of work to be converted into functional firearms. For instance, the 1966

Senate Judiciary Committee Report on an earlier proposed version of the GCA described one type of “starter

pistol,” which “was imported into New York with a

plugged barrel,” and then “[s]eparate shipments of rifled barrels followed which were used to replace the

plugged barrels” and create a deadly weapon. S. Rep.

26

No. 89-1866, at 65 (1966).3 Though neither a plugged

barrel nor a detached barrel is a weapon in and of itself, the authors of the GCA emphasized that these independently innocuous major parts could be converted

into a firearm, and sought to classify such shipments

as “starter guns.”

Second, despite the unique challenges posed by

starter guns, Congress recognized that the problem of

innovation around gun-control laws extended beyond

starter guns and might take new forms in the future.

It thus chose broad language—“is designed to or may

readily be converted”—when it amended the definition

of “firearm,” rather than merely adding the term

“starter gun” to the statutory definition. This broad

language would sweep in any kind of “converting.” Indeed, Congress described how starter pistols themselves could be converted into deadly weapons through

a variety of different methods. See id. at 73 (“boring a

hole through an obstruction in the barrel,” “substitution of a barrel which will permit the firing of a projectile,” or “other[]” means of altering the device). At bottom, Congress did not care about the precise method of

conversion or what the converted firearm looked like

prior to the conversion. What mattered was preventing the evasion of legal requirements.

3 The bill proposed in 1966 contained a definition of “firearm”

that was nearly identical to the one ultimately enacted: “any

weapon . . . which will, or is designed to, or which may be readily

converted to, expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an

explosive . . . or the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” See S.

Rep. No. 89-1866, at 24. While that particular bill never passed,

the Senate Judiciary Report on the final version of the Gun Control Act of 1968 cited the 1966 Report as containing the relevant

factual findings motivating the GCA. See S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at

23, 28 (1968).

27

Third, although Congress replaced the language

“any part or parts” of a firearm with “the frame or receiver of any such weapon,” that change was not an

attempt to exclude vital parts of guns from regulation.

Rather, in enacting the GCA, Congress sought to balance the practicalities of enforcement with the need for

broad language to prevent the abuse of loopholes. See

H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577, at 10 (“It was found impractical

to have controls over each small part of a firearm.

Thus, this definition includes only the major parts of

the firearm, that is, the frame or receiver.” (emphasis

added)). As discussed above, see supra part I.B, Congress did not specify “complete,” “intact,” or “functional” frames or receivers—to do so would have been

contrary to Congress’s plan to cut off such loophole

abuse.

Indeed, as the 1966 Report states, the “readily be

converted” language in the definition of “firearm” was

first proposed to tighten the law “to prevent circumvention of the purposes of the act.” S. Rep. No. 891866, at 73. Claiming, as Respondents do, that this

definitional update expanded gun manufacturers’ ability to sell near-complete frames and receivers with no

regulation or oversight whatsoever is diametrically opposed to the repeatedly stated objectives of the GCA,

as reflected in its text.

* * *

Congress’s concern about the trade in weapon

components and convertible firearms was entwined

with its concern about mail-order firearms—both practices threatened the GCA’s goal of closing deadly loopholes in preexisting law. As Senator Dodd observed,

precisely because the manufacturers of such weapons

argued that their products were not regulated under

existing law, “fly-by-nighters” sold them with

28

impunity to disqualified purchasers. 114 Cong. Rec. at

27464.

This is precisely the business model of Industry

Respondents. They sell a kit that requires conversion

to render it a functional firearm, or a frame or receiver

that is nearly complete, and then claim that they are

not subject to any regulation of firearms, not even the

requirement that purchasers use their real name.

Congress passed the GCA to prevent this sort of evasion of firearm laws—and that is exactly what its plain

text does.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment of the court below.

Respectfully submitted,

ELIZABETH B. WYDRA

BRIANNE J. GOROD*

MIRIAM BECKER-COHEN

NINA HENRY

CONSTITUTIONAL

ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER

1200 18th Street NW, Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 296-6889

brianne@theusconstitution.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

July 1, 2024

* Counsel of Record