Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Michelle Smith, Petitioner v. Peter B. Krupp, Judge, Superior Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk County, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 16, 2023

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FILED

NOV 1 6 2023

I'HZI

No. 23-

QFFICE OFrTH^ERCLEF^<

In The

eme Court of tfje fHntteb States!

Michelle Smith,

v.

Petitioner,

PETER B. Krupp, Judge, Norfolk Superior Court,

THOMAS Connors, Judge, Norfolk Superior Court,

PETER J. Rubin, Justice, MA Appeals Court,

JOSEPH M. Ditkoff, Justice, MA Appeals Court,

ERIC Neyman, Justice, MA Appeals Court,

Kimberly Suzanne Budd, Chief Justice,

Ann M. Pinheiro, Counsel, NICHOLAS FRENCH,

Personal Representative for the Estate of

Martin French, Massasoit Community College,

& Karen Bigley,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Michelle J. Smith

Pro se

11872 Arbor Trace Drive

Fort Myers, FL 33913

(781) 422-1045

mjsmith0304@hotmail.com

January 23, 2024

Wilson-Epes Printing Co., Inc. - (202)789-0096 - Washington, D.C. 20002

RECEIVED

JAN 2 5 2024

WmMSM.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Rooker Feldman Doctrine was

intended to shield Defendants; in a Title 42

section 1983 claim, in immunity for their

actions of fraudulently initiating and harmfully

conducting State Court proceedings with a Want

of Jurisdiction and Usurpation of Power?

2. Whether the Rooker Feldman Doctrine applies to

cases where the Petitioner alleged that a “Fraud

of the Court” was perpetrated on the court, by

Respondents French, Pinheiro, and Bigley?

3. Whether the Rooker Feldman Doctrine applies to

this independent claim in Federal Court where

the Petitioner seeks redress, not for a State

Court Judgment that has been paid, but rather

for the injuries inflicted by the MA State Court

Proceedings that constituted Want of Juris­

diction and a Subversion of Congress / State?

(i)

11

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner Michelle Smith was the Plaintiff /

Appellant in the proceedings below.

Respondents, Peter B. Krupp, Judge, Norfolk

Superior Court, THOMAS CONNORS, Judge, Norfolk

Superior Court, Peter J. Rubin, Justice, MA Appeals

Court, Joseph M. Ditkoff, Justice, MA Appeals

Court, ERIC Neyman, Justice, MA Appeals Court,

Kimberly Suzanne Budd, Chief Justice, Ann M.

Pinheiro, Counsel, Nicholas French, Personal

Representative for the Estate of Martin French,

Massasoit Community College, & Karen Bigley

were Defendants / Appellees below.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED............

1

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

IV

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

1

OPINIONS BELOW

1

JURISDICTION

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A. Proceedings Below

3

B. Other Related Cases

5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

8

CONCLUSION

15

APPENDIX

(iii)

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Bank Markazi v. Peterson,

578 U.S. (2016).........................................

7

Corey v. Piphus,

435 U.S. 247, 266(1978).........................

10

Crawford-El v. Britton,

523 U.S. 574, 592, 1185, S.Ct. 1584,

140 L.Ed. 2d 759(1998)..........................

4

Dandar v. Church of Scientology

Flag Seru. Org., Inc.,

924 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337

(M.D. Fla. 2013).......................................

11, 13

Dennis v. Sparks,

449 U.S. 24, 25(1980).............................

12

Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass’n

ofAmerica,

768 F. Supp. 618 (S.D. Ohio 1991).......

7

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).........................

10

Gitlow v. New York,

268 U.S. 652 (1925)..................................

4

Graham v. U.S. Anti- Doping Agency,

No. 5:10-CV-194-F, 2011 WL 1261321,

at *5 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011).............

7

Great Western Mining & Minerals

v. Fox Rothschild,

615 F.3d 159, 161 (3rd Cir. 2010),

cert, denied, 563 U.S. 904 (2011).... 9, 10, 11, 13

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford

Empire Co.,

322 U.S. 238, 246(1944).......................

13

Kimes, supra,

84 F.3d at 1128.......................................

13

Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,

359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004)..............

4

Malachowski v. City of Keene,

787 F.2d 704, 710 (1st Cir. 1986).......

3

Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390(1923)................................

4

Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm.,

741 F.2d 155, 159....................................

7

Nesses v. Shepard,

68 F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir. 1995)....

10,11

Palmore v United States,

411 U.S. 389, 401(1973).......................

4

Patchak v. Zinke,

583 U.S. (2018)........................................

7

Pliuskaitis v. USA Swimming, Inc.,

243 F. Supp. 3d 1217 (D. Utah 2017).

7

Smith v French,

142 S.Ct. 432 (2021)...............................

3

Standard Oil of Cal. v. U.S.,

429 U.S. 17, 18(1976)............................

13

Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

717 F.3d 377, 384-385 (5th Cir. 2013)

11

VI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— Continued

Page(s)

Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home

Lenders, Inc.,

773 F.3d 423, 427, 428 fn. 2

(2nd Cir. 2014)........... '..........

11

STATUTES AND RULES

Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution

2

Article III of the United States Constitution. 2, 3, 7

The Protecting Young Victims from Sexual

Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization Act

36 U.S.C sec. 220541(d)(l)(2)(3)(F)(G)

2, 3, 4, 5, 15

The Empowering Olympic, Paralympic),

and Amateur Athlete Act of 2020,

36 U.S.C. sec. 220542(3)(A)...................... 2, 15

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

At issue in this case, which was dismissed based on

the Rooker Feldman Doctrine, is nothing less than the

erosion of the Rule of Law in the United States.

Doctrines such as the Rooker Feldman Doctrine, are

being erroneously applied as a guise, in order to

wrongly shield perpetrators of injurious actions

with immunity. Article III, sec. 2 of the United States

Constitution mandates that this instant case should

not have been excluded from Federal Court Jurisdic­

tion based on the Rooker Feldman Doctrine.

Petitioner Michelle J. Smith is respectfully asking

the Honorable Supreme Court of the United States

to grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The

underlying case is a crucial Certiorari candidate that

calls upon the Supreme Court to restore the sanctity

of the Rule of Law in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit - Case # 23-1004 dismissing

Petitioner’s case due to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine,

entered on August 21, 2023, and is reproduced at

App. A.

United States District Court-District of Massachu­

setts Order of Dismissal - Case # l:22-cv-10576-NMG

is reproduced at App. B.

United States District Court-District of MA Memo­

randum and Order dismissing Petitioner’s case due

to the Rooker Feldman Doctrine, is reproduced at

App. C.

2

JURISDICTION

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the First Circuit - Case # 23-1004, entered on August

21, 2023, App. A.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C

sec. 1254(1); 28 U.S.C sec.1257; 28 U.S.C sec.1331; The

Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. II, 1 stat. 78; 1948 Judicial

Code and Judiciary Act, 62 stat. 930; 28 U.S.C. sec.

1332.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

28 U.S.C sec. 1254(1); 28 U.S.C sec.1257; 28 U.S.C

sec.1331; The Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. II, 1 stat. 78;

1948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 62 stat. 930; 28

U.S.C. sec. 1332.

The First, Fifth, Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution.

The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 / The Ted Stevens

Act.

The Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse

and Safe Sport Authorization Act.

Empowering Olympic, Paralympic, and Amateur

Athlete Act of 2020.

The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.

Article III of the United States Constitution.

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu­

tion.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Proceedings Below

The United States Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit’s affirmation of the MA District Court Judge’s

dismissal of Petitioner’s Federal Case due to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is wrong for the following

reasons:

1) Petitioner is not attempting to utilize the

Federal Courts for appellate review of a final state

court judgement, as Petitioner paid the State Court

judgment under duress, while receiving a court order

of dismissal and satisfaction of judgment, signed, and

received from Respondent Pinheiro on June 7, 2022.

2) Petitioner sought proper appellate review of

the State Court judgment from the United States

Supreme Court via a Writ of Certiorari, entitled

“Smith v. French” 142 S.Ct. 432 (2021), cert, denied.

3) Petitioner alleged “fraud on the court” in her

complaint which triggers the fraud on the Court

exemption to the Rooker Feldman doctrine.

4) The independent action that Petitioner brought

in Federal Court is to receive redress for injuries

suffered and justice for being unlawfully and uncon­

stitutionally subjected to the overall State Court

Proceedings that were Want of Jurisdiction due to the

State Court Judges’ subversion of Congress’ will, as

prescribed in the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, The

Safe Sport Act, and the Administrative Procedures Act

of 1946, Malachowski u. City of Keene, 787 F. 2d 704,

710 (1st Cir. 1986).

Under Article III of the United States Constitution,

Congress was invested with vast jurisdiction to bestow

or not to bestow on the Courts. In the underlying MA

i

4

State Court Proceedings, jurisdiction was absent due

to Congress stripping the state courts of jurisdiction,

pursuant to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, when a

claim is based on a parental complaint to a National

Governing Body of Sport, Palmore v. United States, 411

U.S. 389, 401 (1973). Furthermore, in illustrating the

District Court Judge’s error in relying on The RookerFeldman doctrine to shield Respondents from liability;

Petitioner cites the case of Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,

359 F. 3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004). The Circuit Court of

Appeals held that the losing party in a state civil

action could bring a subsequent action in federal court

against an adverse party when the state judgment had

been obtained by extrinsic fraud and the adverse party

had fraudulently induced the state court proceedings.

Decedent French’s failure to exhaust his adminis­

trative remedies in violation of The Amateur Sports

Act of 1978 and The Safe Sport Act of 2017, barred him

from any state court action, yet he deliberately chose

to; retaliate against Petitioner for her constitutionally

protected complaint sent to Massasoit Community

College and USA Softball about his misconduct,

Crawford-El u. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592, 1185, S.Ct.

1584,140L.Ed. 2d 759 (1998), and fraudulently induce

the MA State Court proceedings. Decedent Martin

French’s and his attorneys; Respondents Ann

Pinheiro, and Karen Bigley, fraudulent actions, and

The MA State Court’s unconstitutional exercise of

jurisdiction in his case, served to violate Plaintiffs 1st,

5th, and 14th Amendment rights. Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1923), Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.

652 (1925) (The Supreme Court held that the

First Amendment right to free speech is applicable

against the States via the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment”). Therefore, PlaintiffAppellant / Petitioner deserves the right to pursue her

5

independent Federal Claims under Title 42 section

1983, instead of being deprived of justice by the

Federal Courts due to their erroneous invocation of the

Rooker Feldman doctrine.

B. Other Related Cases

The underlying MA State Court Proceedings: that

were fraudulently instituted and allowed to proceed

throughout the MA State Trial system with a Want

of Jurisdiction resulting from the MA State Courts

subverting the will of Congress as prescribed in

The Amateur Sports Act of 1978, The Safe Sport

Authorization Act and The Administrative Procedure

Act of 1946, form the basis for Petitioner’s

Independent Federal claims. The MA State Court

proceedings are as follows:

1. The Supreme Judicial Court for the Common­

wealth of MA order without an opinion, denying

Further Appellate Review (FAR # 28148).

2. The Notice of Entry for Direct Appellate

Review (without opinion) (DAR # 27185).

3. The Memorandum and Order of The Common­

wealth of Massachusetts Appeals Court (case # 2019 P

133, and 2019 P 1572 consolidated) is a summary

decision pursuant to M.A.C Rule 23.

4. The original complaint, opinions, and orders of

the MA Superior Courts in Suffolk (case# SUCV201303032) and Norfolk (case# 1482CV00639) Counties;

Petitioner’s motions to dismiss for Improper Venue,

Anti-Slapp, JNOV, and 60(b), and unpublished orders.

6

The First Amendment to the United States Con­

stitution provides in relevant part:

Protection for freedom of speech, the press,

assembly, and the right to petition the Gov­

ernment for a redress of grievances.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides in relevant part:

No person shall be ... . deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of

law..

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, section 1, provides in relevant part:

No state shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities

of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

Respondent French and his attorneys conspired to

perpetrate fraud on the state court. The conspiracy

denied Petitioner’s impartial justice; and it trans­

gressed her constitutional rights to procedural due

process. Therefore, fraud on the court existed in the

MA State Court Proceedings, and the Rooker-Feldman

exemption for “fraud on the court”, should apply to

Petitioner’s Independent Federal claims.

C. Petitioner requests for the Supreme Court to

review this as a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec.1652. This Federal Statu­

tory law mandates: The laws of several states, except

where The Constitution or Acts of Congress

otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as

7

rules of decision in civil actions. Since, The MA State

Court system exercised jurisdiction by subverting the

will of Congress, the Judicial Respondents violated

Petitioner’s Constitutional rights of due process caus­

ing immeasurable harm. Because Congress has the

Constitutional authority under Article III of The

United States Constitution to enact a piece of legisla­

tion such as: “The Amateur Sports Act of 1978,

“The Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse /

The Safe Sport Authorization Act”, “The Empowering

Olympic, Paralympic, and Amateur Athlete Act of

2020”, and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,

it automatically has the authority to pre-empt all state

law actions; like the MA State Court Proceedings,

that conflict with this legislation, Patchak v. Zinke,

583 U.S. (2018), Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S.

(2016). Respondent French’s failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies, should have served to bar

his State Court Proceedings, (APP 18-20), Pliuskaitis

v. USA Swimming, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1217 (D. Utah

2017) (“dismissing the plaintiffs state-law claims for,

inter alia, breach of contract and the duty of good faith

and fair dealing, as the claims went “to the heart of his

eligibility to coach and [were] thus preempted by the

[Amateur] Sports Act.”), affd sub nom. Pliuskaitis v.

USA Swimming, 720 F. App’x 481 (10th Cir. 2018);

Graham v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, No. 5:10-CV-194F, 2011 WL 1261321, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011)

(“concluding the plaintiffs claims, styled as claims

for constitutional violations and Courts examining

the legislative history of the Act have determined

that Congress explicitly rejected the creation of a

private cause of action, ‘See Michels v. U.S. Olympic

Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159’”); Deuereaux v. Amateur

Softball Ass’n ofAmerica, 768 F. Supp. 618 (S.D. Ohio

1991).

8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. This Court should grant certiorari to establish

that a federal court cannot deny jurisdiction for claims

brought by an aggrieved person against litigation

opponents who conspired to fraudulently institute,

and conduct with a want of jurisdiction, the MA State

Court Proceedings that were injurious to Petitioner

and to the privileges and freedoms of our Constitu­

tional Republic of the United States. The aggrieved

person is entitled to Jurisdiction of the Court, an

impartial judge, and opportunity to seek discovery in

matters of state judiciary wrongdoing where the

person’s procedural due process rights under the 1st,

5th and 14th amendments are at stake. The First

Circuit disallowed federal remedy by incorrectly hold­

ing that Rooker-Feldman bars federal jurisdiction.

State court and federal courts have refused to allow

the Petitioner due process discovery on the issue of the

State Court proceedings being Want of Jurisdiction,

that stripped Petitioner of her procedural due process

rights and property. Petitioner is entitled to her day in

court to discover the facts of how; the MA State trial

judges and system subverted the will of Congress

resulting in a “Want of Jurisdiction”, happened and

was utilized to take her freedoms, privileges and

property. The misuse of Rooker-Feldman as a device

to ignore and trample fundamental federal procedural

due process rights is an abuse ofjudicial authority that

will impair public confidence in the courts.

II. Supreme Court Rule 10(a) and (c) call for

answers to the questions presented. Rule 10 states: (a)

a United States court of appeals has entered a decision

in conflict with the decision of another United States

court of appeals on the same important matter;.... or

has so far departed from the accepted and usual course

9

ofjudicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure

by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this

Court’s supervisory power; (b) - [omitted] - (c) a state

court or a United States court of appeals has decided

an important question of federal law that has not been,

but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an

important federal question in a way that conflicts with

relevant decisions of this Court. The decision was on a

federal law question that should be settled. It conflicts

with other courts of appeal, and with this Court’s

relevant decisions. Allowing Rooker Feldman to block

federal court claims for state court proceedings that

were “Want of Jurisdiction”, a “Usurpation of Power”

and “fraudulently induced”, is a denial of due process

that will promote judge misconduct, and irretrievably

blemish public perception of the judiciary, inflicting

loss of public confidence in the courts.

III. FIRST CIRCUIT CONTRADICTS OTHER

CIRCUITS

This case has a similar defendant group as a Third

Circuit case where defendants were the opposing

litigants, their lawyers, state court judicial officers,

and members of an “alternative dispute resolution”

(“ADR”) company. Great Western Mining & Minerals

v. Fox Rothschild, 615 F.3d 159, 161 (3rd Cir. 2010),

cert, denied, 563 U.S. 904 (2011) The court described

the conspiracy: Great Western alleges that its statecourt losses were the result of a corrupt conspiracy

between the named defendants and certain members

of the Pennsylvania state judiciary to exchange

favorable rulings for future employment as arbitrators

with ADR Options, Inc., an alternative dispute resolu­

tion entity. In Great Western, the ADR company

conspirator was a large ADR vendor. (615 F. 3d 161).

The Third Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit in

10

Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir. 1995)

where the plaintiff sued “alleging] a massive,

tentacular conspiracy among the lawyers and judges

to engineer Nesses’ defeat.” The Third Circuit held

that a conspiracy between litigants, state judiciary

and ADR company was not subject to Rooker Feldman,

as it was within the “fraud on the court” exception

because procedural due process had been denied.

The court stated: As a threshold matter, we address

Defendants’ contention that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine precludes the exercise of subject matter

jurisdiction over this action. We disagree, as Great

Western is not “complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

284 (2005). Rather, Great Western asserts an inde­

pendent constitutional claim that the alleged conspir­

acy violated its right to be heard in an impartial

forum. (Emphasis added, 615 F. 3d 161; see also, 164172). The First Circuit erred by failing to afford

the instant case the same consideration as “Great

Western”, despite the fact patterns being similar. The

Seventh Circuit raised this Court’s pronouncement

that violation of procedural due process is an

independent injury. Great Western, supra, 615 F.3d at

171. In Corey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) this

Court held that the right to procedural due process is

“absolute” because “it does not depend upon the merits

of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of

the importance to organized society that procedural

due process be observed (citations omitted).” ‘State

court judicial wrongful conduct can cause breach of

procedural due process; it is an independent injury’.

The First Circuit decision in the instant case conflicts

11

with the Third and Seventh Circuits, that have

followed Great Western. Therefore, the Supreme

Court is needed to harmonize these conflicting

decisions in the Federal Circuit Courts. Great Western

has been applied by many other Circuit Courts to

find Rooker Feldman not applicable, with one court

stating: “while Great Western’s claim for damages

may require review of state-court judgments and even

a conclusion that they were erroneous, those 25

judgments would not have to be rejected or overruled

for Great Western to prevail”. (56 F. Supp. 3d at 1140).

The second and fifth circuits follow Nesses and Great

Western. See, Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders,

Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427, 428 fn. 2 (2nd Cir. 2014);

Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 384-385

(5th Cir. 2013). In the Eleventh Circuit, Dandar

v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., 924

F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2013), adopted the

“Third Circuit’s explanation in Great Western,” that

vindication for violation of an independent right is not

Rooker Feldman barred, and invoking Nesses, that

it is not about a state court judgment, but that

the “people involved in the decision violated some

independent right,” Nesses, supra, 68 F.3d at 1005.

The Florida District Court made a point to quote Great

Western to warn that “if Rooker-Feldman barred

jurisdiction, there would be no federal remedy for a

violation of federal rights whenever the violator so far

succeeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to

obtain a favorable judgment.” Great Western, 615 F.3d

at 172 (emphasis added); Dandar, 924 F.Supp. 2d at

1337. The First Circuit decision in the instant case

conflicts with at least Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh,

and Eleventh Circuits, that have followed Great

Western. Therefore, the Supreme Court is needed to

12

harmonize The First Circuit’s conflicting decisions

with other Federal Circuit Courts.

IV. “FRAUD ON THE COURT” EXEMPTION

TO ROOKER FELDMAN

The First Circuit panel failed to recognize that

due to Petitioner’s allegation of “fraud on the court” in

regard to Respondents French, Pinheiro, and Bigley,

the Rooker Feldman Doctrine does not apply to

deprive Petitioner of Federal Jurisdiction. It should be

settled federal law that claims of state judiciary

wrongdoing, such as Want of Jurisdiction and Usurpa­

tion of Power are violations of due process, and when

it has been alleged that some or all opposing Respond­

ents have fraudulently induced proceedings, this con­

stitutes a “fraud on the court” to have been committed,

and that “fraud on the court” takes the case out of a

Rooker-Feldman jurisdiction bar, because there has

been a denial of procedural due process.

V. EXERCISE OF SUPERVISORY POWER ESTABLISH FEDERAL REMEDY FOR

STATE JUDICIARY WRONGDOING

Rule 10(a) applies because the First Circuit and

state courts, on application of federal law to state

judiciary malfeasance and wrongdoing, have “departed

from., the usual course” such that there can be “call

for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power.”

In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 25 (1980), the

Court affirmed the importance of “providing a remedy

against those private persons who participate in

subverting the judicial process and in so doing inflict

injury on other the administration of justice in the

manner indisputably shown here involves far more

than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against

the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the

13

public, institutions in which fraud cannot com­

placently be tolerated consistently with the good

order of society, institutions in which fraud cannot

complacently be tolerated consistently with the good

order of society.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford

Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246, (1944), overruled on

other grounds, Standard Oil of Cal. v. U.S., 429 U.S.

17, 18 (1976) 29 persons.” In Kimes, supra, 84 F.3d at

1128, the court stated the “common law did not

provide immunity to private attorneys conspiring with

a judge to deprive someone of their constitutional

rights.” Respondents sought and obtained a court

ruling that Rooker-Feldman shields them from the

consequences of their actions in federal court. The

First Circuits ruling serves to chill the Constitutional

rights of Petitioner and should be rectified. To quote

Great Western, supra, 615 F.3d at 172, the Florida

District Court in Dander, supra, 924 F. Supp. at 1337

noted such danger, that “if Rooker-Feldman barred

jurisdiction, there would be no federal remedy for a

violation of federal rights whenever the violator so far

succeeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to

obtain a favorable judgment.”

VI. ETHICS AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN

JUDICIARY AT STAKE

•j

In the 2021 Year End Report, Chief Justice Roberts

highlighted the importance of federal court adherence

to the highest ethics. A federal judge should not sit on

a case where the named or implicated local state court

judges are personally known to the federal judge or in

contact through local bar and judicial activities. The

facts of the state court disregard for Jurisdiction,

Usurpation of Power, and Fraud on the Court, which

the federal courts upheld, will not pass muster with

the public.

14

VII. RULE 10(c) SUPPORTS THE PETITION

Rule 10(c) applies because the First Circuit has

denied and undermined the availability of federal

remedy to persons damaged by state court mal­

feasance. If Respondent state court judicial officers

and others, cannot be sued in federal court because of

Rooker Feldman, there will be no federal remedy for

State judiciary wrongdoing and harm, and violation of

constitutional rights. The public will lose confidence in

the Rule of Law and the Judicial System to provide

justice.

VIII. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE

VITAL TO THE PRESERVATION OF

PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS

In the instant case there is actual and appearance of

state court system litigant fraud on the court, and

judicial want of jurisdiction and usurpation of power,

for which there must be due process redress and right

to inquiry. Petitioner Michelle J. Smith deserves her

day in court.

15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Michelle J.

Smith is respectfully asking this Honorable Court to

grant this Writ of Certiorari, due to the statutory

protections that Petitioner is entitled to pursuant to

the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, The Safe Sport

Authorization Act, The Empowering Olympic, Para­

lympic, and Amateur Athletes Act of 2020, The

Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, and The United

States Laws and Constitution specifically the First,

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Respectfully submitted,

Michelle J. Smith

Pro se

11872 Arbor Trace Drive

Fort Myers, FL 33913

(781) 422-1045

mj smith0304@hotmail. com

January 23, 2024

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