Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Michelle Smith, Petitioner v. Peter B. Krupp, Judge, Superior Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk County, et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 16, 2023
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FILED
NOV 1 6 2023
I'HZI
No. 23-
QFFICE OFrTH^ERCLEF^<
In The
eme Court of tfje fHntteb States!
Michelle Smith,
v.
Petitioner,
PETER B. Krupp, Judge, Norfolk Superior Court,
THOMAS Connors, Judge, Norfolk Superior Court,
PETER J. Rubin, Justice, MA Appeals Court,
JOSEPH M. Ditkoff, Justice, MA Appeals Court,
ERIC Neyman, Justice, MA Appeals Court,
Kimberly Suzanne Budd, Chief Justice,
Ann M. Pinheiro, Counsel, NICHOLAS FRENCH,
Personal Representative for the Estate of
Martin French, Massasoit Community College,
& Karen Bigley,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Michelle J. Smith
Pro se
11872 Arbor Trace Drive
Fort Myers, FL 33913
(781) 422-1045
mjsmith0304@hotmail.com
January 23, 2024
Wilson-Epes Printing Co., Inc. - (202)789-0096 - Washington, D.C. 20002
RECEIVED
JAN 2 5 2024
WmMSM.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Rooker Feldman Doctrine was
intended to shield Defendants; in a Title 42
section 1983 claim, in immunity for their
actions of fraudulently initiating and harmfully
conducting State Court proceedings with a Want
of Jurisdiction and Usurpation of Power?
2. Whether the Rooker Feldman Doctrine applies to
cases where the Petitioner alleged that a “Fraud
of the Court” was perpetrated on the court, by
Respondents French, Pinheiro, and Bigley?
3. Whether the Rooker Feldman Doctrine applies to
this independent claim in Federal Court where
the Petitioner seeks redress, not for a State
Court Judgment that has been paid, but rather
for the injuries inflicted by the MA State Court
Proceedings that constituted Want of Juris
diction and a Subversion of Congress / State?
(i)
11
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner Michelle Smith was the Plaintiff /
Appellant in the proceedings below.
Respondents, Peter B. Krupp, Judge, Norfolk
Superior Court, THOMAS CONNORS, Judge, Norfolk
Superior Court, Peter J. Rubin, Justice, MA Appeals
Court, Joseph M. Ditkoff, Justice, MA Appeals
Court, ERIC Neyman, Justice, MA Appeals Court,
Kimberly Suzanne Budd, Chief Justice, Ann M.
Pinheiro, Counsel, Nicholas French, Personal
Representative for the Estate of Martin French,
Massasoit Community College, & Karen Bigley
were Defendants / Appellees below.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED............
1
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
11
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
IV
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
1
OPINIONS BELOW
1
JURISDICTION
2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
3
A. Proceedings Below
3
B. Other Related Cases
5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
8
CONCLUSION
15
APPENDIX
(iii)
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Bank Markazi v. Peterson,
578 U.S. (2016).........................................
7
Corey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 266(1978).........................
10
Crawford-El v. Britton,
523 U.S. 574, 592, 1185, S.Ct. 1584,
140 L.Ed. 2d 759(1998)..........................
4
Dandar v. Church of Scientology
Flag Seru. Org., Inc.,
924 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337
(M.D. Fla. 2013).......................................
11, 13
Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24, 25(1980).............................
12
Devereaux v. Amateur Softball Ass’n
ofAmerica,
768 F. Supp. 618 (S.D. Ohio 1991).......
7
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).........................
10
Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925)..................................
4
Graham v. U.S. Anti- Doping Agency,
No. 5:10-CV-194-F, 2011 WL 1261321,
at *5 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011).............
7
Great Western Mining & Minerals
v. Fox Rothschild,
615 F.3d 159, 161 (3rd Cir. 2010),
cert, denied, 563 U.S. 904 (2011).... 9, 10, 11, 13
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford
Empire Co.,
322 U.S. 238, 246(1944).......................
13
Kimes, supra,
84 F.3d at 1128.......................................
13
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,
359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004)..............
4
Malachowski v. City of Keene,
787 F.2d 704, 710 (1st Cir. 1986).......
3
Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390(1923)................................
4
Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm.,
741 F.2d 155, 159....................................
7
Nesses v. Shepard,
68 F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir. 1995)....
10,11
Palmore v United States,
411 U.S. 389, 401(1973).......................
4
Patchak v. Zinke,
583 U.S. (2018)........................................
7
Pliuskaitis v. USA Swimming, Inc.,
243 F. Supp. 3d 1217 (D. Utah 2017).
7
Smith v French,
142 S.Ct. 432 (2021)...............................
3
Standard Oil of Cal. v. U.S.,
429 U.S. 17, 18(1976)............................
13
Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
717 F.3d 377, 384-385 (5th Cir. 2013)
11
VI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— Continued
Page(s)
Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc.,
773 F.3d 423, 427, 428 fn. 2
(2nd Cir. 2014)........... '..........
11
STATUTES AND RULES
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
2
Article III of the United States Constitution. 2, 3, 7
The Protecting Young Victims from Sexual
Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization Act
36 U.S.C sec. 220541(d)(l)(2)(3)(F)(G)
2, 3, 4, 5, 15
The Empowering Olympic, Paralympic),
and Amateur Athlete Act of 2020,
36 U.S.C. sec. 220542(3)(A)...................... 2, 15
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
At issue in this case, which was dismissed based on
the Rooker Feldman Doctrine, is nothing less than the
erosion of the Rule of Law in the United States.
Doctrines such as the Rooker Feldman Doctrine, are
being erroneously applied as a guise, in order to
wrongly shield perpetrators of injurious actions
with immunity. Article III, sec. 2 of the United States
Constitution mandates that this instant case should
not have been excluded from Federal Court Jurisdic
tion based on the Rooker Feldman Doctrine.
Petitioner Michelle J. Smith is respectfully asking
the Honorable Supreme Court of the United States
to grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The
underlying case is a crucial Certiorari candidate that
calls upon the Supreme Court to restore the sanctity
of the Rule of Law in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit - Case # 23-1004 dismissing
Petitioner’s case due to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine,
entered on August 21, 2023, and is reproduced at
App. A.
United States District Court-District of Massachu
setts Order of Dismissal - Case # l:22-cv-10576-NMG
is reproduced at App. B.
United States District Court-District of MA Memo
randum and Order dismissing Petitioner’s case due
to the Rooker Feldman Doctrine, is reproduced at
App. C.
2
JURISDICTION
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit - Case # 23-1004, entered on August
21, 2023, App. A.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C
sec. 1254(1); 28 U.S.C sec.1257; 28 U.S.C sec.1331; The
Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. II, 1 stat. 78; 1948 Judicial
Code and Judiciary Act, 62 stat. 930; 28 U.S.C. sec.
1332.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
28 U.S.C sec. 1254(1); 28 U.S.C sec.1257; 28 U.S.C
sec.1331; The Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. II, 1 stat. 78;
1948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 62 stat. 930; 28
U.S.C. sec. 1332.
The First, Fifth, Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 / The Ted Stevens
Act.
The Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse
and Safe Sport Authorization Act.
Empowering Olympic, Paralympic, and Amateur
Athlete Act of 2020.
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
Article III of the United States Constitution.
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu
tion.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Proceedings Below
The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit’s affirmation of the MA District Court Judge’s
dismissal of Petitioner’s Federal Case due to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is wrong for the following
reasons:
1) Petitioner is not attempting to utilize the
Federal Courts for appellate review of a final state
court judgement, as Petitioner paid the State Court
judgment under duress, while receiving a court order
of dismissal and satisfaction of judgment, signed, and
received from Respondent Pinheiro on June 7, 2022.
2) Petitioner sought proper appellate review of
the State Court judgment from the United States
Supreme Court via a Writ of Certiorari, entitled
“Smith v. French” 142 S.Ct. 432 (2021), cert, denied.
3) Petitioner alleged “fraud on the court” in her
complaint which triggers the fraud on the Court
exemption to the Rooker Feldman doctrine.
4) The independent action that Petitioner brought
in Federal Court is to receive redress for injuries
suffered and justice for being unlawfully and uncon
stitutionally subjected to the overall State Court
Proceedings that were Want of Jurisdiction due to the
State Court Judges’ subversion of Congress’ will, as
prescribed in the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, The
Safe Sport Act, and the Administrative Procedures Act
of 1946, Malachowski u. City of Keene, 787 F. 2d 704,
710 (1st Cir. 1986).
Under Article III of the United States Constitution,
Congress was invested with vast jurisdiction to bestow
or not to bestow on the Courts. In the underlying MA
i
4
State Court Proceedings, jurisdiction was absent due
to Congress stripping the state courts of jurisdiction,
pursuant to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, when a
claim is based on a parental complaint to a National
Governing Body of Sport, Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389, 401 (1973). Furthermore, in illustrating the
District Court Judge’s error in relying on The RookerFeldman doctrine to shield Respondents from liability;
Petitioner cites the case of Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,
359 F. 3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004). The Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the losing party in a state civil
action could bring a subsequent action in federal court
against an adverse party when the state judgment had
been obtained by extrinsic fraud and the adverse party
had fraudulently induced the state court proceedings.
Decedent French’s failure to exhaust his adminis
trative remedies in violation of The Amateur Sports
Act of 1978 and The Safe Sport Act of 2017, barred him
from any state court action, yet he deliberately chose
to; retaliate against Petitioner for her constitutionally
protected complaint sent to Massasoit Community
College and USA Softball about his misconduct,
Crawford-El u. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592, 1185, S.Ct.
1584,140L.Ed. 2d 759 (1998), and fraudulently induce
the MA State Court proceedings. Decedent Martin
French’s and his attorneys; Respondents Ann
Pinheiro, and Karen Bigley, fraudulent actions, and
The MA State Court’s unconstitutional exercise of
jurisdiction in his case, served to violate Plaintiffs 1st,
5th, and 14th Amendment rights. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) (The Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment right to free speech is applicable
against the States via the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment”). Therefore, PlaintiffAppellant / Petitioner deserves the right to pursue her
5
independent Federal Claims under Title 42 section
1983, instead of being deprived of justice by the
Federal Courts due to their erroneous invocation of the
Rooker Feldman doctrine.
B. Other Related Cases
The underlying MA State Court Proceedings: that
were fraudulently instituted and allowed to proceed
throughout the MA State Trial system with a Want
of Jurisdiction resulting from the MA State Courts
subverting the will of Congress as prescribed in
The Amateur Sports Act of 1978, The Safe Sport
Authorization Act and The Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946, form the basis for Petitioner’s
Independent Federal claims. The MA State Court
proceedings are as follows:
1. The Supreme Judicial Court for the Common
wealth of MA order without an opinion, denying
Further Appellate Review (FAR # 28148).
2. The Notice of Entry for Direct Appellate
Review (without opinion) (DAR # 27185).
3. The Memorandum and Order of The Common
wealth of Massachusetts Appeals Court (case # 2019 P
133, and 2019 P 1572 consolidated) is a summary
decision pursuant to M.A.C Rule 23.
4. The original complaint, opinions, and orders of
the MA Superior Courts in Suffolk (case# SUCV201303032) and Norfolk (case# 1482CV00639) Counties;
Petitioner’s motions to dismiss for Improper Venue,
Anti-Slapp, JNOV, and 60(b), and unpublished orders.
6
The First Amendment to the United States Con
stitution provides in relevant part:
Protection for freedom of speech, the press,
assembly, and the right to petition the Gov
ernment for a redress of grievances.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in relevant part:
No person shall be ... . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law..
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, section 1, provides in relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Respondent French and his attorneys conspired to
perpetrate fraud on the state court. The conspiracy
denied Petitioner’s impartial justice; and it trans
gressed her constitutional rights to procedural due
process. Therefore, fraud on the court existed in the
MA State Court Proceedings, and the Rooker-Feldman
exemption for “fraud on the court”, should apply to
Petitioner’s Independent Federal claims.
C. Petitioner requests for the Supreme Court to
review this as a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec.1652. This Federal Statu
tory law mandates: The laws of several states, except
where The Constitution or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
7
rules of decision in civil actions. Since, The MA State
Court system exercised jurisdiction by subverting the
will of Congress, the Judicial Respondents violated
Petitioner’s Constitutional rights of due process caus
ing immeasurable harm. Because Congress has the
Constitutional authority under Article III of The
United States Constitution to enact a piece of legisla
tion such as: “The Amateur Sports Act of 1978,
“The Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse /
The Safe Sport Authorization Act”, “The Empowering
Olympic, Paralympic, and Amateur Athlete Act of
2020”, and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,
it automatically has the authority to pre-empt all state
law actions; like the MA State Court Proceedings,
that conflict with this legislation, Patchak v. Zinke,
583 U.S. (2018), Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S.
(2016). Respondent French’s failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies, should have served to bar
his State Court Proceedings, (APP 18-20), Pliuskaitis
v. USA Swimming, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1217 (D. Utah
2017) (“dismissing the plaintiffs state-law claims for,
inter alia, breach of contract and the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, as the claims went “to the heart of his
eligibility to coach and [were] thus preempted by the
[Amateur] Sports Act.”), affd sub nom. Pliuskaitis v.
USA Swimming, 720 F. App’x 481 (10th Cir. 2018);
Graham v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, No. 5:10-CV-194F, 2011 WL 1261321, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011)
(“concluding the plaintiffs claims, styled as claims
for constitutional violations and Courts examining
the legislative history of the Act have determined
that Congress explicitly rejected the creation of a
private cause of action, ‘See Michels v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159’”); Deuereaux v. Amateur
Softball Ass’n ofAmerica, 768 F. Supp. 618 (S.D. Ohio
1991).
8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. This Court should grant certiorari to establish
that a federal court cannot deny jurisdiction for claims
brought by an aggrieved person against litigation
opponents who conspired to fraudulently institute,
and conduct with a want of jurisdiction, the MA State
Court Proceedings that were injurious to Petitioner
and to the privileges and freedoms of our Constitu
tional Republic of the United States. The aggrieved
person is entitled to Jurisdiction of the Court, an
impartial judge, and opportunity to seek discovery in
matters of state judiciary wrongdoing where the
person’s procedural due process rights under the 1st,
5th and 14th amendments are at stake. The First
Circuit disallowed federal remedy by incorrectly hold
ing that Rooker-Feldman bars federal jurisdiction.
State court and federal courts have refused to allow
the Petitioner due process discovery on the issue of the
State Court proceedings being Want of Jurisdiction,
that stripped Petitioner of her procedural due process
rights and property. Petitioner is entitled to her day in
court to discover the facts of how; the MA State trial
judges and system subverted the will of Congress
resulting in a “Want of Jurisdiction”, happened and
was utilized to take her freedoms, privileges and
property. The misuse of Rooker-Feldman as a device
to ignore and trample fundamental federal procedural
due process rights is an abuse ofjudicial authority that
will impair public confidence in the courts.
II. Supreme Court Rule 10(a) and (c) call for
answers to the questions presented. Rule 10 states: (a)
a United States court of appeals has entered a decision
in conflict with the decision of another United States
court of appeals on the same important matter;.... or
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
9
ofjudicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure
by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
Court’s supervisory power; (b) - [omitted] - (c) a state
court or a United States court of appeals has decided
an important question of federal law that has not been,
but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with
relevant decisions of this Court. The decision was on a
federal law question that should be settled. It conflicts
with other courts of appeal, and with this Court’s
relevant decisions. Allowing Rooker Feldman to block
federal court claims for state court proceedings that
were “Want of Jurisdiction”, a “Usurpation of Power”
and “fraudulently induced”, is a denial of due process
that will promote judge misconduct, and irretrievably
blemish public perception of the judiciary, inflicting
loss of public confidence in the courts.
III. FIRST CIRCUIT CONTRADICTS OTHER
CIRCUITS
This case has a similar defendant group as a Third
Circuit case where defendants were the opposing
litigants, their lawyers, state court judicial officers,
and members of an “alternative dispute resolution”
(“ADR”) company. Great Western Mining & Minerals
v. Fox Rothschild, 615 F.3d 159, 161 (3rd Cir. 2010),
cert, denied, 563 U.S. 904 (2011) The court described
the conspiracy: Great Western alleges that its statecourt losses were the result of a corrupt conspiracy
between the named defendants and certain members
of the Pennsylvania state judiciary to exchange
favorable rulings for future employment as arbitrators
with ADR Options, Inc., an alternative dispute resolu
tion entity. In Great Western, the ADR company
conspirator was a large ADR vendor. (615 F. 3d 161).
The Third Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit in
10
Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir. 1995)
where the plaintiff sued “alleging] a massive,
tentacular conspiracy among the lawyers and judges
to engineer Nesses’ defeat.” The Third Circuit held
that a conspiracy between litigants, state judiciary
and ADR company was not subject to Rooker Feldman,
as it was within the “fraud on the court” exception
because procedural due process had been denied.
The court stated: As a threshold matter, we address
Defendants’ contention that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine precludes the exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction over this action. We disagree, as Great
Western is not “complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005). Rather, Great Western asserts an inde
pendent constitutional claim that the alleged conspir
acy violated its right to be heard in an impartial
forum. (Emphasis added, 615 F. 3d 161; see also, 164172). The First Circuit erred by failing to afford
the instant case the same consideration as “Great
Western”, despite the fact patterns being similar. The
Seventh Circuit raised this Court’s pronouncement
that violation of procedural due process is an
independent injury. Great Western, supra, 615 F.3d at
171. In Corey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) this
Court held that the right to procedural due process is
“absolute” because “it does not depend upon the merits
of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of
the importance to organized society that procedural
due process be observed (citations omitted).” ‘State
court judicial wrongful conduct can cause breach of
procedural due process; it is an independent injury’.
The First Circuit decision in the instant case conflicts
11
with the Third and Seventh Circuits, that have
followed Great Western. Therefore, the Supreme
Court is needed to harmonize these conflicting
decisions in the Federal Circuit Courts. Great Western
has been applied by many other Circuit Courts to
find Rooker Feldman not applicable, with one court
stating: “while Great Western’s claim for damages
may require review of state-court judgments and even
a conclusion that they were erroneous, those 25
judgments would not have to be rejected or overruled
for Great Western to prevail”. (56 F. Supp. 3d at 1140).
The second and fifth circuits follow Nesses and Great
Western. See, Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders,
Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427, 428 fn. 2 (2nd Cir. 2014);
Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 384-385
(5th Cir. 2013). In the Eleventh Circuit, Dandar
v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., 924
F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2013), adopted the
“Third Circuit’s explanation in Great Western,” that
vindication for violation of an independent right is not
Rooker Feldman barred, and invoking Nesses, that
it is not about a state court judgment, but that
the “people involved in the decision violated some
independent right,” Nesses, supra, 68 F.3d at 1005.
The Florida District Court made a point to quote Great
Western to warn that “if Rooker-Feldman barred
jurisdiction, there would be no federal remedy for a
violation of federal rights whenever the violator so far
succeeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to
obtain a favorable judgment.” Great Western, 615 F.3d
at 172 (emphasis added); Dandar, 924 F.Supp. 2d at
1337. The First Circuit decision in the instant case
conflicts with at least Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits, that have followed Great
Western. Therefore, the Supreme Court is needed to
12
harmonize The First Circuit’s conflicting decisions
with other Federal Circuit Courts.
IV. “FRAUD ON THE COURT” EXEMPTION
TO ROOKER FELDMAN
The First Circuit panel failed to recognize that
due to Petitioner’s allegation of “fraud on the court” in
regard to Respondents French, Pinheiro, and Bigley,
the Rooker Feldman Doctrine does not apply to
deprive Petitioner of Federal Jurisdiction. It should be
settled federal law that claims of state judiciary
wrongdoing, such as Want of Jurisdiction and Usurpa
tion of Power are violations of due process, and when
it has been alleged that some or all opposing Respond
ents have fraudulently induced proceedings, this con
stitutes a “fraud on the court” to have been committed,
and that “fraud on the court” takes the case out of a
Rooker-Feldman jurisdiction bar, because there has
been a denial of procedural due process.
V. EXERCISE OF SUPERVISORY POWER ESTABLISH FEDERAL REMEDY FOR
STATE JUDICIARY WRONGDOING
Rule 10(a) applies because the First Circuit and
state courts, on application of federal law to state
judiciary malfeasance and wrongdoing, have “departed
from., the usual course” such that there can be “call
for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power.”
In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 25 (1980), the
Court affirmed the importance of “providing a remedy
against those private persons who participate in
subverting the judicial process and in so doing inflict
injury on other the administration of justice in the
manner indisputably shown here involves far more
than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against
the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the
13
public, institutions in which fraud cannot com
placently be tolerated consistently with the good
order of society, institutions in which fraud cannot
complacently be tolerated consistently with the good
order of society.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246, (1944), overruled on
other grounds, Standard Oil of Cal. v. U.S., 429 U.S.
17, 18 (1976) 29 persons.” In Kimes, supra, 84 F.3d at
1128, the court stated the “common law did not
provide immunity to private attorneys conspiring with
a judge to deprive someone of their constitutional
rights.” Respondents sought and obtained a court
ruling that Rooker-Feldman shields them from the
consequences of their actions in federal court. The
First Circuits ruling serves to chill the Constitutional
rights of Petitioner and should be rectified. To quote
Great Western, supra, 615 F.3d at 172, the Florida
District Court in Dander, supra, 924 F. Supp. at 1337
noted such danger, that “if Rooker-Feldman barred
jurisdiction, there would be no federal remedy for a
violation of federal rights whenever the violator so far
succeeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to
obtain a favorable judgment.”
VI. ETHICS AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN
JUDICIARY AT STAKE
•j
In the 2021 Year End Report, Chief Justice Roberts
highlighted the importance of federal court adherence
to the highest ethics. A federal judge should not sit on
a case where the named or implicated local state court
judges are personally known to the federal judge or in
contact through local bar and judicial activities. The
facts of the state court disregard for Jurisdiction,
Usurpation of Power, and Fraud on the Court, which
the federal courts upheld, will not pass muster with
the public.
14
VII. RULE 10(c) SUPPORTS THE PETITION
Rule 10(c) applies because the First Circuit has
denied and undermined the availability of federal
remedy to persons damaged by state court mal
feasance. If Respondent state court judicial officers
and others, cannot be sued in federal court because of
Rooker Feldman, there will be no federal remedy for
State judiciary wrongdoing and harm, and violation of
constitutional rights. The public will lose confidence in
the Rule of Law and the Judicial System to provide
justice.
VIII. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE
VITAL TO THE PRESERVATION OF
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS
In the instant case there is actual and appearance of
state court system litigant fraud on the court, and
judicial want of jurisdiction and usurpation of power,
for which there must be due process redress and right
to inquiry. Petitioner Michelle J. Smith deserves her
day in court.
15
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Michelle J.
Smith is respectfully asking this Honorable Court to
grant this Writ of Certiorari, due to the statutory
protections that Petitioner is entitled to pursuant to
the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, The Safe Sport
Authorization Act, The Empowering Olympic, Para
lympic, and Amateur Athletes Act of 2020, The
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, and The United
States Laws and Constitution specifically the First,
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Respectfully submitted,
Michelle J. Smith
Pro se
11872 Arbor Trace Drive
Fort Myers, FL 33913
(781) 422-1045
mj smith0304@hotmail. com
January 23, 2024
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