Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Lyle R. Harrison, Petitioner

Supreme Court briefJun 26, 2024

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A -1

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

200 East Capitol Avenue

SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701-1721

CYNTHIA A. GRANT

Clerk of the Court

(217) 782-2035

TDD: (217) 524-8132

April 26, 2024

FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE

160 North LaSalle Street, 20th Floor

Chicago, IL 60601-3103

(312) 793-1332

TDD: (312) 793-6185

Lyle Roger Harrison

1223 Allen Street

Manitowoc, Wl 54220

In re:

Harrison v. Broch

123568

Today the following order was entered in the captioned case:

Motion by Petitioner, pro se, to reconsider denial of motion for leave to file

a petition for an original writ of mandamus. Denied.

Order entered by the Court.

Holder White, J., took no part.

Very truly yours

It*

Clerk of the Supreme Court

cc:

Attorney General of Illinois - Civil Division

Charles R. Zalar

Christa S. Helmuth

Craig William Runyon

Evan Gregg Safran Siegel

Jane Marie May

Jon Lucas McNeill

APPENDIX B - 2

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

200 East Capitol Avenue

SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701-1721

CAROLYN TAFT GROSBOLL

Clerk of the Court

May 30,2018

(217) 782-2035

TDD: (217) 524-8132

FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE

160 North LaSalle Street, 20th Floor

Chicago, IL 60601-3103

(312) 793-1332

TDD: (312) 793-6185

Lyle Roger Harrison

1223 Allen Street

Manitowoc, Wl 54220

In re:

Harrison v. Broch

123568

Today the following order was entered in the captioned case:

Motion by Petitioner, pro se, for leave to file a petition for an original writ of

mandamus. Denied.

Order entered by the Court.

Very truly yours,

Clerk of the Supreme Court

cc:

Attorney General of Illinois - Civil Division

Craig William Runyon

Cynthia J. Braden

Evan Gregg Safran Siegel

Jane Marie May

Jon Lucas McNeill

4/17/24,6:06 PM

Thunderbird Lifetime Email Mail - FOIA Request for un redacted, certified police report for 13CF47

APPENDIX C - 3

PSJ THUNDERBIRD

LIFETIME EMAIL

Lyle Harrison <lharrison@global.t-bird.edu>

FOIA Request for un redacted, certified police report for 13CF47

3 messages

Wed, May 10, 2023 at 10:17AM

Lyle Harrison <lharrison@global.t-bird.edu>

To: tweaver@moultrieco.org, "moultriefoia@gmail.com" <moultriefoia@gmail.com>

Cc: Heather Griffin <hg9250@gmail.com>

Bcc: Lux Harrison <luxandrebecca@sbcglobal.net>, Pete Harrison <pbialum05@yahoo.com>, Roger Harrison

<rlhpastor@gmail.com>, Andrew Harrison <andrewharrison2023@gmail.com>

Hello Ms. Tracy Weaver,

This is a follow up email to see if you received my 2nd FOIA request sent on or about

April 21,2023? If you did not receive it, please see my attached 2nd FOIA request for

an Unredacted, and Certified copy of all police reports for Mr. Lyle Harrison for nioultrie

case 13CF47, including police reports, in the possession of the Illinois Appellate

Prosecutors Office as Special Prosecutor(Charles Zalar) who was appointed to handle

this matter. I attached my 2nd FOIA request as the first request was completed but it

was not certified and an unredacted police report, which is what I really need. If I have

left out anything necessary to obtain a certified, unredacted police report, please let me

know.

Your help is greatly appreciated and I am very thankful for all the help you have given

me so far!

Truly you are a wonderful and kind woman!

Kindest Regards

Lyle Harrison

920.629.0771

a UNREDACTED_2_FOIA_MoultrieCountySheriff.pdf

259K

Tracy Weaver <tweaver@moultrieco.org>

To: Lyle Harrison <lharrison@global.t-bird.edu>

Cc: Heather Griffin <hg9250@gmail.com>

Wed, May 17, 2023 at 10:19 PM

Mr. Harrison,

By law, a public body is allowed to withhold (redact) personal information contained in public records.

Under my signature line below, I have cited the statute as well as opinions from the Illinois Attorney General

that set forth this proposition. As such, any reports distributed under FOI A will be subject to redaction if they

contain personal information.

Further, Moultrie bounty is not in possession of records retained by the I llinois Appellate Prosecutor. To

obtain those records, you will need to submit a FOIA directly to that public body.

https://mail. google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=a6604and4&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-a:r5254383023433760851&simpl=msg-a:r5262645439517181491&simpl...

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4/17/24, 6:06 PM

Thunderbird Lifetime Email Mail - FOIA Request for un redacted, certified police report for 13CF47

APPENDIX C-4

I am again attaching the reports that are in Moultrie County’s possession, with the allowable redactions, in

response to your FOIA request.

You have the right to have the denial of your request (for unredacted records as well as it relates to records

not in possession of Moultrie County) reviewed by the Public Access Counselor (PAC) at the Office of the

Illinois Attorney General. 5 ILCS 140/9.5(a). You can file your Request for Review with the PAC by writing

to the following:

Public Access Counselor

Office of the Attorney General

500 South 2nd Street

Springfield, Illinois 62706

Fax:217-782-1396

Email: publicaccess@atg.state.il.us

You also have the right to seek judicial review of your denial by filing a lawsuit in the State circuit court. 5

ILCS 140/11.

If you choose to file a Request for Review with the PAC, you must do so within 60 calendar days of the date

of this denial. 5 ILCS 140/9.5(a). Please note that you must include a copy of your original FOIA request and

this denial letter when filing a Request for Review with the PAC.

Tracy Weaver

State’s Attomey/FOIA Officer

Moultrie County State’s Attorney’s Office

10 S. Main Street, Suite 13

Sullivan, IL 61951

(P) 217-728-4353

(F) 217-728-4231

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=a6604alld4&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thrcad-a:r5254383023433760851&simpl=msg-a:r5262645439517181491 &simpl...

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4/17/24,6:06 PM

Thunderbird Lifetime Email Mail - FOLA Request for un redacted, certified police report for 13

&£PENDIX C - 5

Section 7(l)(c) of FOIA (5ILCS 140/7(l)(c) allows a public body to withhold "[pjersonal information

contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion

ofpersonal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the

information." The exemption defines "unwarranted invasion ofprivacy" as "the disclosure of

information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject 's

right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information. The disclosure of

information that bears on the public duties ofpublic employees and officials shall not be considered an

invasion ofpersonal privacy."

The Attorney General or the PAC has determined that disclosure of the following information is a clearly

unwarranted invasion ofpersonal privacy, and therefore that a public body may withhold (redact) this

information under section 7(l)(c):

• Date ofBirth: The PAC has consistently determined that the disclosure of a date of birth

would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion ofpersonal privacy under section

7(l)(c). See, e.g., III. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16-009, issued November 7, 2016, at

12.

• Race: See, e.g., Ill Att 'y Gen. PACReq. Rev. Ltr. 32361, issued September 1, 2015, at

• Graphic photographs and descriptions of offenses: See, e.g., III. Att'y Gen. PAC Req.

Rev. Ltr. 23394, issued March 5, 2014, at 5. Note that when the requester is the victim or

the person who otherwise has the greatest privacy interest in the record (such as the

spouse of a decedent), the disclosure of that record to the requester is not considered an

invasion ofpersonal privacy under section 7(l)(c).

• Graphic autopsy photographs of decedent: See III. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 10-003,

issued October 22, 2010, at 11; but see III Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16-002, issued

February 10, 2016, at 6 (such photographs are not exempt from disclosure to the executor

of the decedent's estate or to the individual who otherwise has the greatest privacy

interest in those materials, i.e. the decedent's spouse).

• Victims' names and their identifying information: See, e.g., III. Att'y Gen. PAC Req.

Rev. Ltr. 37628, issued April 25, 2016, at 3. Note that when the requester is the victim at

issue, the disclosure of that information to the requester is not considered an invasion of

personal privacy intersection 7(l)(c).

• Names of individuals whose photos were used in police line-ups in connection with

crimes for which they were not arrested or cjtayged: See, e.g., III. Att'y Gen. PAC Req.

Rev. Ltr. 12784, issued April 23, 2012, at 2.

https://mail.google.com/mai l/u/0/?ik=a6604alld4&view=pt&search=alI&permthid=thread-a:r5254383023433760851&simpl=msg-a:r5262645439517181491&simpl...

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APPENDIX D - 6

Moultrie County Sheriff Dept

Case Number:

Reporting Officer

216 - Carroll, Gary D.

13-09-0193

Current Status

Case Category

Description THEFT / TRESPASSING

Offenses

0810 Theft Over $300

1330 Criminal Trespass to Land

Location

Occurred

Reported

Arrived

Completed

720 ILCS 5/16-1

720 ILCS 5/21-3

700E SOUTH OF IL RT 32

09/29/2013 Sun

14:45

DOB

lainant

Age

Sex

DLN

Hair

Complex

Cell

Wt 0

Race White

Eyes

Home

DOB

- Complainant

Sex

DLN

Hair

Complex

Home

Pege1/4

Age

Wt 0

Race White

Eyes

APPENDIX D - 7

Case Number:

Moultrie County Sheriff Dept

- PERSON INVOLVED

DOB

Age

DOB

Eyes

Age

OR INVOLVED

Wt 0

Sex

DLN

Hair

Complex

Race

Eyes

Age

DOB

Wt 0

Sex

Race

DLN

Hair

Complex

Eyes

ome

DOB

Home

Page 2/4

Age

Wt 0

Sex

DLN

Hair

Complex

Cell

Race

Home

- GRAIN ELEVATOR INVOLVED

Cell

Wt 0

Sex

DLN

Hair

Complex

Cell

13-09-0193

Race

Eyes

APPENDIX D - 8

Moultrie County Sheriff Dept

Case Number.

DOB

Age

Wt 0

Sex

DLN

Hair

Complex

Cell

13-09>0193

Race

Eyes

Home

LYLE R. HARRISON - Suspect

DOB

Age 40

Wt 0

Sex

DLN

Hair

Complex

Cell

Home

Initial Report THEFT I TRESPASSING

On Sunday, September 29,2013 at around 2:45pm I, Deputy Sergeant Gary Carroll, spoke with

mH|by phone.__ advised me he farms ground on 7.00E south of Illinois Route 32 and

personas) without his authority harvested the com he had planted. __ did not have any Idea who

had harvested the com.^Hestim2!g£Lthere wou|d have been approximately 6000 bushels of com

harvested from the field. I askedMBifhe owned the ground.

Istated he formed for

am familiar with theflHHIHname from conversations with Lyle Harrison. Harrison

stated he filed a deed for ground in Moultrie County and had intentions of harvesting the

crop on the field.

from Okaw Farmer Coop, Lovington^l

At approximately 3:00pm I spoke with

about who might have harvested the grain for Harrison._____ Istated she knewl^H

|^^^^Warmed for Hardware State Bank, who managed the form fo^amson Farm Management.

^^KKrided me a phone number foifHH^HHW contactedj^^and spoke with him by

■■■was cooperative and told me he was hired by Lyle Hamson to harvest the field in

questionllHBadvised he took 2 loads of grain to Topflight Elevator in La Place, IL and 4 loads of

grain to CargHMn Tuscola, IL. H^ltold me he signed a form from Lyle Harrison releasing him from

liability from harvesting the grain.

At 3:19pm I spoke ^■^■■^^■rom Cargill lnc.^^Mstated Cargill had received com for

the Roger Lyle Harrisor^r^rusHccount. [j^Jstated Cargill received 3741.43 Gross Bushels

and 3235.99 Net BushelsJJ(Hfaxqd me a copy of the Shipment List for the Roger Lyle Harrison

Sr. Trust account. ^■■fetete^h^irain closing price for com was $4.39/busheL

__ advised me

At 3:23pm I spql^^o^BP(JBBBBpBfronri Topflight Grain Cooperative.

advised me the

Topflight had received arajn ffpm RogferlLyle Harrison Revocable Trust

stated

the closing

Gross Bushel^ totaled 17^.?“) and tf|e pet Bushels totaled 1453.00. |

Page 3/4

APPENDIX D - 9

Moultrie County Sheriff Dept

Case Number:

13-09-0193

Business

price for com was $437/bushel. At 4:40pm i received a call

Development ManagerJHHadvised me I would not be receiving the information r had requested

BBjstate^t was against the policy of Topflight Grain Cooperative to release this

from

type of information. ■■ stated she would need a subpoena to do so. I asked m who the

subpoena should b^airected to and she stated

General Manager.

also stated the subpoena should identify records as, "grain

Information is included in this report

sales, delivery and settlement."

■ IHI^^^^^Ftated he owned the property that had been

i spoke wi

Sdlh^nl^ersorMwho has permission to be on the property or to

harvested.

farm the property isi

stated he has the deed to the property stating he

is the owner.

On Monday, September 30. 2013 at 12:03pm I spoke with Cindy Kidwell, Chief County Assessment

Officer for Moultrie County. Cindy stated a deed was filed by the Harrisons requesting transfer of

property. Cindy advised me she had sent a certified with return receipt letter to

stating she was not able to transfer the property as requested due to the grope ^^efn^wnec^v

is Co-Trustees under the

ind

Declaration of Trust dated September 18, TWr^Cina^requested

aocumentatior^howlng otherwise to be presented so it could be reviewed by her and the States

Attorney on September 12, 2013. Cindy has yet to receive such documents.

On Monday. September 30, 2013 Chief Deputy Chris Sims at approximatel^2j15pm advised

■^^^■■jSBjhe was not allowe^o^he property and not to return. If HH|cdid return he

^mw^^^^Sted for trespassing.^^^^Hhad returned to th^^^^^ to narvesHhe rest of the

com which was left in the field^^^roximately 10 acres.

did this even after my

conversation with him stating there were concerns of the legal ownership of the land. I had advised

he should check with the Moultrie County Assessment Office to verify ownership,

j advised Chief Deputy Sims he had been advised it would be in his best interest to check

did not do this.

deeds of ownership.

Citizens Abstract

I also received a letter and documentation prepared b

HHlThe letter

Company. The letter was addressed to_______________ [am

states land parcels, 02-02-19-000-203 and 02-02-20-000-101 are owned by______________ and

Additional documentation shows research outlining who the property would be

T^l^^ffcRa^ompleted by

Sgt. Gary Carroll #216

Attached:

Fax of shipment list from Cargill Inc.Deed filings from Harrison’sLetter and return receipt from

Cynthia S Kidwell, Chief County Assessment Officer, Moultrie CountyLetter and other documentation

Citizen Abstract Company

prepared by

Pago 4/4

APPENDIX E -10

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Office of the Clerk

Phone: (312) 435-5850

www.ca7.uscourts.gov

Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse

Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street

Chicago, Illinois 60604

FINAL JUDGMENT

May 20, 2019

Before: *

MICHAEL S. KA’NNEr Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

|LYLE R. HARRISON,

Plaintiff - Appellant

No. 18-3694

MOULTRIE COUNTY ILLINOIS, et al.„

[Defendants - Appellees

Originating Case Information:

District Court No: 2:18-cv-00957-LA

Eastern District of Wisconsin

District Judge Lynn Adelman

We VACATE the judgment and REMAND the case with instructions to stay the federal

claims stemming from the criminal prosecution. Otherwise, we AFFIRM.

The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date.

form name: c7_FinalJudgment(form ID: 132)

App. E -11

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Untteh States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 17, 2019'

Decided May 20, 2019

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 18-3694

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

LYLE R. HARRISON,

Plaintiff-Appellan t,

No. 18-C-0957

MOULTRIE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

ORDER

Lyle Harrison has been entangled in two land disputes that have spawned

several civil and criminal proceedings in Illinois state courts. He brought this suit in the

Eastern District of Wisconsin, alleging a conspiracy among farm owners, several Illinois

state-court judges, and others to deprive him of his property. The district court

dismissed Harrison's suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a

* The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not

participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument

because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral

argument y/quld not significantly §id the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

App. E -12

No. 18-3694

Page 2

claim. We vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand with instructions to stay some of

Harrison's claims.

As best as we can tell, Harrison's legal troubles can be traced to two state-court

actions against him. The first involved a farm co-owned by Harrison's father and

distant relatives ("Harrison Family Farm"). The families formed a partnership in 1983 to

oversee the farm's management. But the partnership started to unravel in 2011 when

Harrison's father unilaterally gave Harrison full management responsibilities over the

farm. For the next few years, Harrison and his immediate family collected substantial

profits without accounting for the farm's proceeds. The co-owners brought a civil suit,

and ultimately an Illinois state court entered a substantial judgment against Harrison.

Meanwhile, in 2012, Harrison sent a demand letter to some other relatives,

claiming that he owned their plot of land ("Willoughby Farm"), too. In fact, he did not

own the land, but that did not stop him from harvesting its corn without permission.

He was convicted of theft, but on appeal his case was reversed and remanded because

he had been denied the right to proceed pro se. According to Harrison, the case is still

pending in state court.

Harrison then filed this federal suit, alleging several causes of action related to

his state civil and criminal proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint at

screening, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), finding that most of Harrison's claims fall under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the rest fail to state a plausible claim for relief.

We agree with the district court that some of Harrison's claims—specifically

those related to his rights in the Harrison Family Farm—are barred under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker

v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Harrison is an unsuccessful litigant who believes that

the state judgment against him should be expunged and the disputed land, along with

its profits and federal subsidies, should be awarded to him alone. But "cases brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments" are not

reviewable in federal court. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284 (2005). The state courts already adjudicated Harrison's interest in the family

farm, and we cannot entertain his invitation to modify the judgment to his liking.

Harrison also asserts, as he cjid in state court, that the judge presiding over his

state civil cas? had a conflict of interest because he owned stock in a bank that assumed

managerial responsibilities over the family farm. To the extent that Harrison has

App. E -13

No. 18-3694

Page 3

preserved this judicial-bias argument on appeal, it is barred by issue preclusion. A

federal suit "to obtain damages for the unlawful conduct that misled the [state] court

into issuing the judgment" falls outside the purview of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

See Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings,

LLC, 748 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2014)). But state preclusion laws still apply and may bar

further consideration of the claim. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 292-93; GASH Assocs. v. Village

ofRosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993).

Harrison already argued judicial bias in state court, and the Illinois Appellate

Court twice concluded that the presiding circuit-court judge did not have a conflict of

interest. See Huggins v. Harrison, 2017 Ill. App. (4th) 170026-U, 1 54 (Aug. 18, 2017).

Because Harrison had "a full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue in state court,

see American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Savickas, 739 N.E.2d 445, 451 (Ill. 2000),

he is barred from rehashing the same argument in federal court. See Du Page Forklift

Sew., Inc. v. Material Handling Sews., Inc., 744 N.E.2d 845, 849 (Ill. 2001).

But the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar Harrison's claims regarding the

Willoughby Farm—the subject of the state criminal proceeding—because the state court

has not issued a final judgment. See Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669,675 (7th Cir.

2017) (prohibiting challenges to "state-court judgments" (emphasis added)). According

to Harrison, the theft conviction was vacated and he is awaiting a retrial. Thus,

Harrison's claims of malicious prosecution, obstruction of justice, and violations of his

speedy-trial rights fall outside the purview of Rooker-Feldman.

But those claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. See Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). Federal courts must abstain from disturbing ongoing

state litigation unless extraordinary circumstances warrant an intervention. See Pennzoil

Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). Here, there is no compelling reason to disrupt

Harrison's criminal prosecution in Illinois; he can challenge the fairness of the

proceedings and raise speedy-trial issues,1 if any, in his ongoing state-court case.

1 A well-founded claim that a petitioner's right to a speedy trial has been

violated can be an exceptional circumstance requiring immediate federal intervention.

See Sweeney v. Bartow, 612 F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 2010). But here, Harrison has not

meaningfully developed any argument that his Sixth Amendment rights are being

violated. See Parker v. Wingo, 407 U.S- 514, 530-33 (1972) (setting forth factors relevant to

whether a dejay violates a defendants constitutional rights).

App. E -14

No. 18-3694

Page 4

See Gakuba v. O'Brien, 711 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2013). We note, however, that the

proper disposition of the federal claims relating to the criminal prosecution would have

been a stay, not a dismissal, so we must vacate the judgment. See id. Harrison may

pursue these claims, if any remain, after the criminal case ends (although we do not

opine on whether they are viable).

We VACATE the judgment and REMAND the case with instructions to stay the

federal claims stemming from the criminal prosecution. Otherwise, we AFFIRM.

Appendix F -15

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

WASHINGTON, DC 20543-0001

July 19, 2019

Roger L. Harrison

Lyle R. Harrison

1223 Allen Street

Manitowoc, WI 54220

RE: Harrison v. Peters, et al.

Dear Mr. Harrison:

The above-entitled petition for writ of certiorari was received July 17, 2019. The papers

are returned for the following reason(s):

The appendix to the petition does not contain the following documents required by

Rule 14.1 (i):

The lower court opinion(s) must be appended.

It is impossible to determine the timeliness of the petition without the lower court

opinions.

Please correct and resubmit as soon as possible. Unless the petition is submitted to

this Office in corrected form within 60 days of the date of this letter, the petition will

notbe filed. Rule 14.5.

A copy of the corrected petition must be served on opposing counsel.

When making the required corrections to a petition, no change to the substance of the

petition may be made.

Sincerely,

Scott S. Harris, Clerk

By:

Clayton R. Higgins,Qr.

(202) 479-3019

Enclosures

Appendix G -16

STATE OF ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT

At a Term of the Supreme Court, begun and held in Springfield, on Monday, the 12th day of

November, 2018.

Present: Lloyd A. Karmeier, Chief Justice

Justice Thomas L. Kilbride

Justice Robert R. Thomas

Justice Anne M. Burke

Justice Rita B. Garman

Justice P. Scott Neville, Jr.

Justice Mary Jane Theis

On the 16th day of November, 2018, the Supreme Court entered the following judgment:

No. 124090

Petition for Leave to

Appeal from

Appellate Court

Fourth District

4-18-0254

11CH27

Charlotte Harrison Huggins, Cynthia H. Peters, and

Shirley H. Cooper f/k/a Shirley A. Huggins,

Respondents

Roger Lyle Harrison, Sr., Clara Harrison Karbine, Janey

Harrison Crome, Roger Harrison, Jr., Johanna Harrison

Fickett, Lyle Roger Harrison, Lux Harry Harrison, Andrew

Lux Harrison, Beth Johanna Harrison, Peter Andrew

Harrison, and Unknown Owners

# # # # #

Roger Harrison, Jr., and Lyle Roger Harrison,

Petitioners

Motion by petitioners, pro se, for reconsideration of orders denying applications for waiver

of court fees. Denied. Failure to pay the $50 filing fee within seven days from the date of

this order will result in dismissal of this cause without further notice

As Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois and keeper of the records, files and

Seal thereof, I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the final order entered in this case.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto

subscribed my name and affixed the seal

of said Court, this 16th day of November,

2018.

»!

IllV ^

Clerk,

Supreme Cour*. of the State of Illinois

41\ STATE OF ILLINOIS ,/.

AtIG. 26,1818 -V]

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Appendix H -17

FEB 26 Mii

"1,

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS

MOULTRIE COUNTY, SULLIVAN, ILLINOIS

CHARLOTTE HARRISON HUGGINS,

CYNTHIA H. PETERS, and SHIRLEY H.

COOPER, fflc/a SHIRLEY A. HUGGINS,

Plaintiffs,

)

FILED

SIXTH JUOtCML CIRCUIT

FEB 20 2018

)

) No.2011-CH-27

vs.

)

ROGER LYLE HARRISON, JR., as

Administrator of the ESTATE OF ROGER

)

LYLE HARRISON, SR., deceased, ROGER ) .

LYLE HARRISOJN, JR., LYLE ROGER

)

HARRISON, LUX HARRY HARRISON,

)

ANDREW LUX HARRISON, and PETER

)

ANDREW HARRISON, as Trustees of the

)

ROGER LYLE HARRISON, SENIOR

REVOCABLE TRUST dated My 10,2012, )

)

IOY CLAIRE HARRISON, CLARA

HARRISON KARBINE, JANET HARRISON )

CROME, ROGER LYLE HARRISON, JR.,

)

JOHANNA HARRISON FICKBTT, LYLE

)

ROGER HARRISON, LUX HARRY

HARRISON, ANDREW LUX HARRISON, )

BBTH JOHANNA HARRISON, PETER

)

ANDREW HARRISON, HARRISON FARM )

MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Illinois limited

)

liability company, and UNKNOWN

)

OWNERS, if any,—

rr'

Defendants.

)

ORDER APPROVING ACCOUNTING AND

DISCHARGING FARM MANAGER

On presentation of the FINAL ACCOUNTING of the Court-appointed Farm Manager,

FIRST COMMUNITY BANK OF MOULTRIE COUNTY, by and through its attorneys, Tapdla

& Ebetspacher LLC, the Court having reviewed the Final Accounting submitted by the Farm

App. 18

Manager on December 11,2017, due notice having been given to all the parties, and the Court

otherwise being fully advised on die premises, the Court hereby finds that

That the Final Accounting of the Farm Managers is approved; and

All expenses and Court costs have been paid and the remaining estate has been

distributed to die persons entitled thereto.

IT IS ORDERED that the FINAL ACCOUNTING of the Farm Manager is approved and

FIRST COMMUNITY BANK OF MOULTRIE COUNTY is discharged as Farm Manager; and

its BOND, if any, is canceled.

ENTERED this

~Z-° ~ day of

Honorable:

This instrument prepared by:

JACOB N. SMALLHORN

TAPELLA & EBERSPACHER LLC

P.O.Box 627

Mattoon, Illinois 61938

. T: (217) 639-7800..

F: (217)639-7810

,20 '9

Appendix 1-19

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MOULTRIE COUNTY, ILLINOIS - IN CHANCERY

CHARLOTTE HARRISON HUGGINS,

CYNTHIA H. PETERS, and

SHIRLEY H. COOPER tfk/a SHIRLEY A. HUGGINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

)

FILED

*»*TM JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

DEC 09 2016

TIRCUIT COUKT _

MOULTOE COUNTY. ILLINOIS

No. 1 l-CH-27

ROGER LYLE HARRISON, JR., as Administrator of the )

ESTATE OF ROGER LYLE HARRISON, SR., deceased, )

ROGER LYLE HARRISON, JR., LYLE ROGER

)

HARRISON, LUX HARRY HARRISON, ANDREW

)

LUX HARRISON, and PETER ANDREW HARRISON, )

as Trustees of the ROGER LYLE HARRISON SENIOR )

REVOCABLE TRUST dated July 10, 2012;

)

JOY CLAIRE HARRISON; CLARA HARRISON

)

KARBINE; JANET HARRISON CROME; ROGER

)

LYLE HARRISON, JR.; JOHANNA HARRISON

)

FICKETT; LYLE ROGER HARRISON; LUX HARRY )

HARRISON, ANDREW LUX HARRISON; BETH

)

JOHANNA HARRISON; PETER ANDREW

HARRISON; HARRISON FARM MANAGEMENT,

)

LLC, an Illinois limited liability company; and

)

UNKNOWN OWNERS, if any,

)

Defendants.

)

JUDGMENT ORDER

THIS CAUSE coming to be heard on December 7, 2016 on Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Issuance of Partition Deeds, Determination of Monetary Damages, and Award of Attorneys’

Fees and Expenses and Supporting Memorandum (the “Motion”) and Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Disbursement of Funds Held by Hardware State Bank, both filed October 20, 2016, and

following the earlier entry of an Order of Default against all Defendants herein on October 26,

2015, with Plaintiffs appearing by their counsel, Craig W. Runyon of Samuels, Miller,

Schroeder, Jackson & Sly, LLP, and 3|1 Defendants failing to appear. The Court, having

App. 20

considered the Motion; the earlier Order of Default; Defendant Lyle R. Harrison’s Verified

Objection to the Motion filed December 6, 2016; the Court-appointed partition Commissioner’s

Summary Appraisal Report and Farm Partition Report filed May 3, 2016 (the “Commissioner’s

Report”); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Disbursement of Funds Held by Hardware State Bank; and

having heard and considered the testimony, evidence, and the representations and arguments of

counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

1.-10. The Court hereby adopts and incorporates as findings of fact paragraphs 1 through

10 of the Order of Default entered in this cause on October 26, 2016 as and for paragraphs 1

through 10 of the Court’s findings of fact of this Judgment Order by reference thereto and

incorporation herein as though fully set forth.

11.

Due notice of this December 7,2016 hearing was given to all Defendants.

12.

Based on the Commissioner’s Report, the Property described in the Second

Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) is subject to division without manifest prejudice to the

rights of the parties.

13.

The Property can be partitioned into two separate but equal groups of tracts

without harm to the value as a whole.

14.

The following division of the Property is fair and equitable: (a) Group 1

consisting of Tracts 1, 3.1, and 5, as such tracts are identified in the Commissioner’s Report

(identified in the Complaint as Tracts 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9); and (b) Group 2 consisting of Tracts 2,

3.2, 4, and 6, as such tracts are identified in the Commissioner’s Report (identified in the

Complaint as Tracts 1,2, 6, and 8).

App. 21

15. - Based on the Commissioner’s Report, the above groupings create a difference in

value of only $544.00, and that difference can be satisfied by an owelty payment from the Group

2 owners to the Group 1 owners in the amount of $272.00.

16.

Plaintiffs’ Motion requested that Plaintiffs receive the Group 1 Tracts and that

Defendants receive the Group 2 Tracts and, there being no specific objection to Plaintiffs’

request interposed by Defendants, Plaintiffs’ request should be granted.

17.

Under Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiffs have proven damages of $7,751.54 for

the 2010 crop year for improper disbursements, transfers and withdrawals during 2010.

18.

Further, Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest on their 2010 crop year

damages at a rate of 5.00% per annum from July 18, 2011 through December 7, 2016, which

computes to $2,090.79.

19.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have proven total damages for the 2010 crop year, inclusive

of prejudgment interest, in the amount of $9,842.33.

20.

Under Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiffs have proven damages of $114,100.92

for the 2011 crop year including: (a) $8,124.45 for funds that were turned over to Harrison Farms

Partnership by Hertz Farm Management, Inc. but which was never accounted for by Defendants;

(b) $3,182.93 for 465 bushels of soybeans that were lost during 2011; (c) $12,471.16 for funds

improperly spent by Defendants to pay for their own attorneys’ fees and legal expenses; (d)

$54,656.98 for improper disbursements, transfers and withdrawals during 2011; and (e)

$35,665.40 for the erection of a grain bin on the Property without the consent of Plaintiffs.

App. 22

21.

Further, Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest on their 2011 crop year

damages at a rate of 5.00% per annum from March 1, 2012 through December 7, 2016, which

computes to $27,227.92.

22.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have proven total damages for the 2011 crop year, inclusive

of prejudgment interest, in the amount of $ 141,328.84.

23.

Under Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiffs have proven damages of $125,767.99

for the 2012 crop year including: (a) $59,567.01 for their share of 2012 grain sale proceeds that

were not turned over to Court-appointed farm manager Hardware State Bank and which were

never accounted for by Defendants; (b) $5,536.00 for funds improperly spent by Defendants to

pay for their own attorneys’ fees and legal expenses; and (c) $60,664.98 for improper

disbursements, transfers and withdrawals during 2012.

24.

Further, Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest on their 2012 crop year

damages at a rate of 5.00% per annum from March 1, 2013 through December 7, 2016, which

computes to $23,723.63.

25.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have proven total damages for the 2012 crop year, inclusive

of prejudgment interest, in the amount of $149,491.62.

26.

Under Count V of the Complaint, Plaintiffs have proven damages in the amount

of $18,144.62 on account of the waste committed by Defendants in allowing the nutrient levels

of the Property’s soil to be depleted to unreasonable levels by failing to implement and follow

reasonable standards of husbandry while in control of the farm operation.

App. 23

27.

Further, Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest on the damages awarded for

the waste committed by Defendants at a rate of 5.00% per annum from October 7, 2014 through

December 7, 2016, which computes to $1,968.57.

28.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have proven total damages on account of the waste

committed by the Defendants, inclusive of prejudgment interest, in the amount of $20,113.19

29.

Altogether, Plaintiffs have proven total damages under Counts II and V of the

Complaint, inclusive of prejudgment interest, in the amount of $320,775.98.

30.

The equities of this case are with Plaintiffs who, due to the blatant dilatory tactics

of Defendants, were caused to engage in long and costly litigation to defeat baseless claims and

assertions completely devoid of factual or legal merit.

31.

As a result, Plaintiffs have incurred and paid attorneys’ fees and expenses in

connection with this case in the amount of $277,731.01, and have further incurred unbilled

attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $9,971.70, which taken together totals

$287,702.71 in attorneys’ fees and expenses.

32.

The Court heard the testimony of attorney Craig W. Runyon, managing partner

with Samuels, Miller, Schroeder, Jackson & Sly, LLP of Decatur, Illinois, the law firm that has

represented Plaintiffs continuously since the inception of this litigation.

33.

Mr. Runyon testified that the hourly rates charged by the firm’s attorneys’ for this

matter were those attorneys’ standard hourly rates which ranged from $160.00 per hour to

$240.00 per hour depending on the attorney and the year in which the work was performed, and

the Court finds those hourly rates to be imminently reasonable.

App. 24

34.

The Court further finds that the attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by Plaintiffs

herein were both reasonable and necessary given the nature, circumstances, and complexities of

this litigation and the above-mentioned dilatory tactics and conduct by Defendants.

35.

Given the foregoing, the Plaintiffs’ request that this Court order Defendants to

pay all of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred herein, specifically the amount of

$287,702.71, should be allowed pursuant to §17-125 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (as

to one-half of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses) and under the broad discretion afforded

this Court in equity (as to the other one-half of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses).

36.

Pursuant to prior order of Court, the Court-appointed farm manager, Hardware

State Bank, now has on deposit approximately $1,105,223.58 consisting of farm proceeds from

the Property.

37.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Disbursement of Funds Held by Hardware State Bank

should be allowed, and Court-appointed farm manager Hardware State Bank should be ordered

to disburse said funds as requested in said Motion, with so much or all of the one-half of said

funds that would otherwise have been distributed to Defendants to be distributed to Plaintiffs so

as to fully satisfy the award of monetary damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and

expenses entered as part of this Judgment Order.

38.

Court-appointed farm manager Hardware State Bank has already contracted with

Heritage Family Farms to serve as farm tenant and executed a cash rent farm lease for the 2017

crop year, and the first of three cash rent installments has been paid by the farm tenant.

39.

As the 2017 farm lease has already been executed and the remaining two cash rent

payments of $67,093.33 and $67,093.34 do not come due until April 1, 2017 and October 1,

App. 25

2017, respectively, this Court’s appointment of Hardware State Bank as farm manager should be

extended through November 1, 2017 solely for the purpose of collecting the remaining 2017 cash

rent payments, paying the Property’s 2016 real estate taxes coming due in 2017 as well as any

other regular and customary expenses coming due, and, finally, distributing the remaining cash

rent proceeds in accordance with the provisions of this Judgment Order.

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

In accordance with the Commissioner’s Report, the Property shall be partitioned

and divided into two groups of tracts, with Plaintiffs receiving Group 1 (Tracts 1, 3.1, and 5

identified in the Commissioner’s Report, alternately identified in the Complaint as Tracts 3, 4, 5,

7, and 9) and Defendants receiving Group 2 (Tracts 2, 3.2, 4, and 6 identified in the

Commissioner’s Report, alternately identified in the Complaint as Tracts 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9), and in

conjunction with this Judgment Order, the Court is executing a series of eight Judicial Deeds of

Partition which are incorporated herein by reference, according to the parties respective rights

and interests in the Property, and Plaintiffs’ counsel shall execute the real estate tax exemption

Documentary Stamp on each Judicial Deed and promptly record said Judicial Deeds with the

Office of the Moultrie County Recorder.

Defendants shall make payment of $141.00 to Plaintiffs to reimburse them for the

cost of recording the three Judicial Deeds required to convey the Group 2 Tracts to Defendants

and that amount is added to the total judgment amount stated in paragraph E. below.

As a result of Defendants receiving the slightly more valuable Group 2 Tracts,

Defendants shall make an owelty payment of $272.00 to Plaintiffs and that amount is added to

the total judgment amount stated in paragraph E. below.

App. 26

Any outstanding liens or levies against any or all of the Defendants shall attach

only to the Group 2 Tracts apportioned to Defendants and not to the Group 1 Tracts apportioned

to Plaintiffs.

Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants, jointly and

severally, in the amount of $608,891.69, inclusive of the partition owelty payment, the Judicial

Deed recording fees, the proven damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, court costs, and

other legal expenses, all as further detailed above in this Court’s findings of fact.

From the farm proceeds held on deposit, Court-appointed farm manager

Hardware State Bank shall first make payment of any of its outstanding fees for its service as

farm manager in this case and for any other outstanding expenses.

Court-appointed farm manager Hardware State Bank shall then disburse one-half

of the remaining funds to Plaintiffs, to be split among the three Plaintiffs in accordance with their

respective ownership interests in their one-half of the Property, specifically:

Charlotte Harrison Huggins: 92.64%,

ii.

Cynthia H. Peters: 3.68%, and

iii.

Shirley H. Cooper: 3.68%.

From the remaining funds, Court-appointed farm manager Hardware State Bank

shall then disburse so much or all of said funds to Plaintiffs, again in accordance with their

respective ownership interests in the Property stated in paragraph G. above, as needed to fully

satisfy the monetary judgment of $608,891.69 entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against

Defendants as part of this Judgment Order, although if such disbursement would entirely deplete

the funds held on deposit, the farm manager shall be allowed to retain on hand such amount as it

App. 27

reasonably deems necessary to keep a deposit account open and to pay any expected future

expenses coming due during the farm manager’s extended appointment detailed in paragraph I.

below.

This Court’s appointment of Hardware State Bank as farm manager shall be

extended through November 1,2017 solely for the purpose of collecting the remaining 2017 cash

rent payments, paying the Property’s 2016 real estate taxes coming due in 2017 as well as any

other regular and customary expenses coming due, and making final distribution of the

remaining cash rent proceeds in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs J., K., and L.

below.

The Property’s 2017 farm tenant, Heritage Family Farms, shall pay the final two

cash rent payments, due April 1, 2017 and October 1, 2017, to Court-appointed farm manager

Hardware State Bank rather than directly to Plaintiffs or Defendants.

From the final two 2017 cash rent payments collected, Court-appointed farm

manager Hardware State Bank shall first make payment of any of its outstanding fees for its

service as farm manager in this case and for any other outstanding expenses.

Court-appointed farm manager Hardware State Bank shall then disburse one-half

of the remaining funds from the final two 2017 cash rent payments collected to Plaintiffs, to be

split among the three Plaintiffs in accordance with their respective ownership interests in their

one-half of the Property stated in paragraph G. above.

Court-appointed farm manager Hardware State Bank shall then disburse so much

or all of the remaining funds from the final two 2017 cash rent payments collected to Plaintiffs,

again in accordance with their respective ownership interests in the Property stated in paragraph

App. 28

G. above, as needed to fully satisfy the monetary judgment of $608,891.69 entered in favor of

Plaintiffs and against Defendants as part of this Judgment Order.

The funds remaining after payment of Plaintiffs’ monetary judgment, if any, shall

be distributed to Defendants, to be split among Defendants in accordance with their respective

ownership interests in their one-half of the Property, specifically:

Estate of Roger L. Harrison, Sr., deceased: 60.21%;

ii.

Roger Lyle Harrison Senior Revocable Trust: 8.38%;

iii.

Johanna Harrison Fickett: 3.49%;

iv.

Clara Harrison Karbine: 3.49%;

Lux Harry Harrison: 3.49%;

vi.

Peter Andrew Harrison: 3.49%;

vii.

Janet Harrison Crome: 3.49%;

viii.

Andrew Lux Harrison: 3.49%;

ix.

Beth Johanna Harrison: 3.49%;

Roger Lyle Harrison, Jr.: 3.49%; and

xi.

Lyle Roger Harrison: 3.49%.

Court-appointed farm manager Hardware State Bank shall file a final report of its

acts as farm manager on or before December 1,2017.

This Court shall retain jurisdiction of the subject matter of this cause and the

parties to this cause for the purpose of enforcing the terms of this Judgment Order.

There is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of this final Judgment

Order.

App. 29

ENTERED:

December

£ ,2016.

JUDGE

Prepared by:

CRAIG W. RUNYON

SAMUELS, MILLER, SCHROEDER,

JACKSON & SLY, LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

225 N. Water St., Suite 301

P.O. Box 1400

Decatur, IL 62525-1400

Telephone: 217.429.4325

Fax: 217.425.6313

runyon@samuelsmiller.com

Appendix J - 30

State of Illinois

In the Circuit Court of Judicial Circuit #6

Moultrie County

501

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

HARRISON, ROGER L SR

000 }

}

001 >.

Case number:

2013-P -000026

Notice to:

HARRISON, ROGER L JR

1223 ALLEN ST

RUNYON, CRAIG W

225 N WATER ST SUITE 301

MANITOWOC, Wl 54220-0000

(delivery via email)

DECATUR, IL 62523-0000

Take notice that the following entry was made on Monday, December 18, 2017

RLB

Due to lack of action of record in this cause for a period

of twelve months, this cause is hereby dismissed pursuant

to Section 3.4(a) of the Rules of Practice of the Sixth

Judicial Circuit. Clerk to give notice to attorneys of record and

all pro se parties, if any, within fourteen days and make proof.

/s/Cynthia J Braden, Circuit Clerk (KAW)

Circuit Clerk,

Cynthia J Braden

This notice mailed on Monday, December 18, 2017.

Deputy

HARRISON, ROGfER L JR

1223 ALLEN ST .'

MANITOWOC; W| 54220-0000

KAW

Appendix K - 31

State of Illinois

In the Circuit Court of Judicial Circuit #6

Moultrie County

PEOPLE

VS.

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

P 001

Case number: 2013-CF-000047

D 001

Notice to:

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

1223 ALLEN STREET

MANITOWOC, Wl 54220-0000

Take notice that the following entries were made on the above-titled case:

JJR

12/03/2020 On the Court’s own motion, cause allotted for hearing on the Motion

to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum on January 5, 2021,1:30 p.m. Clerk to

send notice to the Defendant.

/s/Christa S Hejmuth, Circuit Clerk (CSH)

Circuit Clerk, Christa S Helmuth

This notice mailed on Friday, December 4, 2020.

Deputy

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

1223 ALLEN STREET

MANITOWOC, Wl 54£20r0000

CSH

Appendix L - 32

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

MOULTRIE COUNTY

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

A Man,

)

Lyle Roger Harrison,

FILED

Sixth Judicial Circuit

12/14/2020 4:24 PM

Christa Helmuth

Circuit Court

Moultrie County, Illinois

No. I3-CF-47

SUBPOENA - ALL POLICE REPORTS REGARDING MOULTRIE COUNTY.

ILLINOIS CASE # 13-CF-47

To: Moultrie Countv. Illinois Sheriff. Mr. Chris Sims

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to file in the case and turn over all police

reports regarding Moultrie Case # 13-CF-47 to the MAN, Lyle R. Harrison.

YOUR FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THIS SUBPOENA BY FILING ALL

POLICE REPORTS WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THIS

SUBPOENA WILL Sl^JECT YOU TO PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF

THIS COURT.

11/10/2020

WITNESS,

,2020

SI,

#r* |||

S„ UjJbrnjJtk-

■Jsw'_______

(Clerk of the Circuit Court)

I served this subpoena'**^$Jij»lj853?opy to; Moultrie County, Illinois Sheriff. Mr. Chris Sims

on November \ .2020. 1 paidthe witness $_

for witness and mileage fees.

DeaOnbec

Signed and sworn to before me

^ ,2020

NOTARY PUBLIC

Name: Lyle Roger Harrison

Attorney For: Pro Se______

Address: 1223 Allen Street

City:

Manitowoc. WI 542^0

Telephor^p: 920.629.0771

A a - a __ a

Process ServSr

ROBIN BARTON

' '

d NOTARY £

OFFICIAL SEAL

1 1 PUBLIC F

< (STATE Of I Notary PubHc-state of Illinois

My Commission Expires

May 04. ?n?a

FILED

Sixth Judicial Circuit

11/19/2020 2:37 PM

-Christa Helmuth

Circuit Court

Moultrie County, Illinois

Appendix M - 33

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIALDISTRICT

MOULTRIE COUNTY

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

A Man,

)

Lyle Roger Harrison,

No. 13-CF-47

SUBPOENA - ALL POLICE REPORTS REGARDING MOULTRIE COUNTY.

ILLINOIS CASE # 13-CF-47

To: Sangam^TT Countv. Appellate Prosecutor. Mr. Charles R. Zalar

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to file in the case and turn over all police

reports regarding Moultrie Case # 13-CF-47 to the MAN, Lyle R. Harrison.

YOUR FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THIS SUBPOENA BY FILING ALT.

POLICE REPORTS WITHIN 80 DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THIS

SUBPOENA WILL SUBJECT YOU TO PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF

THIS COURT.

11/10/2020

I served this subpoena eg

on November )/.2020. I

Jmi^ppy to: Sangamon County. Appellate Prosecutor. Ch arlesB. Zalar

lane witness %

for witness and mileage fees.

Signed and sworn to before me November /^.202f)

Process Serro?—

PAMELA J. CRAVENS

NOTARY PUBLIC

Name: Lvle Roger Harrison

Attorney For: ProSe________

Address; 1223 Allen Street

City:

Manitowoc. WI54220

Telephone: 920.629.0771

551^

FILED

Sixth Judicial Circuit

11/19/2020 2:33 PM

Christa Helmuth

Circuit Court

Moultrie County, Illinois

Appendix N - 34

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

MOULTRIE COUh TY

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff,

)

va.

)

A Man,

)

Lyle Roger Harrison,

No. 13-CF-47

SUBPOENA - ALL POLICE REPORTS REGARDING MOULTRIE COUNTY.

ILLINOIS CASE# 13-CF-47

To: Sangamon, Countv. Illinois AttornRV fiaruvraL Mr. Kwatwe Raoul

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to file in tlie case and trim over all pnlina

reports regarding Moultrie Case # 13-CF-47 to the MAN, Lyle R. Harrison.

YOUR FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THIS SUBPOENA BY FILING ALL

POLICE REPORTS WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THIS

SUBPOENA WILL SUBJECT YOU TO PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF

THIS COURT.

11/10/2020

WITNES^,____________________ ,2020

//~l'erk of the Circuit Court)

1 served this subpoen&VM**ii S5Kopy to; The IPinoiB Atti rnev General. Mr. Kwh me Repul

on November l lO .2020. 1 paK ib witness &

for wit less and mileage fees.

{

Signed and sworn to before me November

NOTARY PUBLIC

Name: Lvle Roger Harrison

Attorney For: Pro Se _____

Address: 1223 Allen Street

City:

Manitowoc. WI 54220

Telephone: 920.629.0771 j

.2020

m ♦

PAMEOA J. CRAVENS

ICIALSEAL

(

Sssaasu—

S'5M73

Process Server

12/14/2020

Thunderbird Lifetime Email Mail - Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11477521 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER f...

Appendix 0-35

THUNDERBIRD

Lyle Harrison <lharrison@global.t-bird.edu>

LIFETIME EMAIL

Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11477521 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS.

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER for filing Subpoena (to Issue)

1 message

Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 9:16 PM

no-reply@tylerhost.net <no-reply@tylerhost. net>

To: lharrison@global.t-bird.edu

ODYSSEY

Filing Returned

Envelope Number: 11477521

Case Number: 2013CF47

Case Style: PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

The filing below has been reviewed and has been returned for further action. Please refile with the corrections outlined

below. Please, contact the appropriate court help center for further information.

Return Reason(s) from Clerk's Office

Court

File & Serve

Returned Reason

Rejected

Returned Comments

Rejected pending further order of the court.

Document Details

Case Number

2013CF47

Case Style

PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

Date/Time Submitted

12/14/2020 10:58 AM CST

Filing Type

EFileAndServe

Filing Description

Subpoena to Moultrie County Sheriffs Office(Record keeping) in Moultrie County

Illinois 1505 West Hagerman Street, Sullivan Illinois

Activity Requested

Subpoena (to Issue)

Filed By

Lyle Harrison

Filing Attorney

https ://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ik=a6604alld4&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-f%3A1686082308979598095&simpl=msg-f%3A1686082308979598095

l/i

Appendix P - 36

State of Illinois

In the Circuit Court of Judicial Circuit #6

Moultrie County

Partition

HUGGINS, CHARLOTTE HARRISON ET AL

VS.

HARRISON, ROGER LYLE SR ET AL

001

}

Case number:

2011-CH-000027

Notice to:

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

1007 ASHLAND AVE

RUNYON, CRAIG W

225 N WATER ST SUITE 301

WOOD, STEVEN K

200 WEST HARRISON

EVANSTON, IL 60202-0000

(delivery via email)

DECATUR, IL 62523-0000

SULLIVAN, IL 61951-0000

Take notice that the following entry was made on Wednesday, October 26,2016

DLF

Defendant Lyle Roger Harrison's Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and •

Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer Third Party Claims and

Counterclaims on file. The Court has had the opportunity to review

Defendant Lyle Roger Harrison's motion to vacate and motion for leave

to file and finds that said motions are nonsensical and must be

stricken. The Clerk advises that on October 25, 2016, the clerk was

in receipt of a mailing containing voluminous proposed attachments to

the motion to vacate filed October 24, 2016. The Court directs the

clerk to reject said proposed attachments and to make same available

for the Defendant's physical pick up from the office of the circuit

clerk. Because of the voluminous nature of the exhibits and the

attendant cost of return to Defendant by mail, the Clerk is relieved

from said duty. Clerk directed to provide a copy of this entry to

counsel of record and Defendant Lyle Roger Harrison.

/s/Cynthia J Braden, Circuit Clerk (CSH)

Circuit Clerk,

This notice mailed on Wednesday, October 26, 2016.

Cynthia J Braden

(llvu/Lfc^ Ih&yrurfJ,;

Deputy

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

1007 ASHLAND AVE

EVANSTON, (L pp202-0000

CSH

12/23/2020

Thunderbird Lifetime Email Mail -Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11567423 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER f...

Appendix Q - 37

THUNDERBIRD

Lyle Harrison <lharrison@global.t-bird.edu>

LIFETIME EMAIL

Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11567423 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS.

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER for filing Subpoena (to Issue)

1 message

Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 7:17 PM

no-reply@tylerhost.net <no-reply@tylerhost.net>

To: lharrison@global.t-bird.edu

ODYSSEY

Filing Returned

eFilelL

Envelope Number: 11567423

Case Number: 2013CF47

Case Style: PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

The filing below has been reviewed and has been returned for further action. Please refile with the corrections outlined

below. Please, contact the appropriate court help center for further information.

Return Reason(s) from Clerk's Office

Court

File & Serve

Returned Reason

Rejected

Returned Comments

No rejection comment was provided. Please contact the court into which you are

filing for more information.

Document Details

Case Number

2013CF47

Case Style

PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

Date/Time Submitted

12/19/2020 3:48 AM CST

Filing Type

EFileAndServe

Filing Description

subpoena: Judge Richard L. Broch as a trial witness.

Activity Requested

Subpoena (to Issue)

Filed By

Lyle Harrison

Filing Attorney

https ://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ik=a6604a lld4&view=pt&search=all&permth!d=thrcad-f%3A 1686799616658878549&simpl—msg-f%3A 1686799616658878549

1/1

12/22/2020

Thunderbird Lifetime Email Mail - Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11567424 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER f...

Appendix R - 38

■|| THUNDERBIRD

Lyle Harrison <lharrison@global.t-bird.edu>

LIFETIME EMAIL

Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11567424 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS.

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER for filing Subpoena (to Issue)

1 message

Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 7:17 PM

no-reply@tylerhost.net <no-reply@tylerhost.net>

To: lharrison@global.t-bird.edu

Filing Returned

ODYSSEY

eFilelL

Envelope Number: 11567424

Case Number: 2013CF47

Case Style: PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

The filing below has been reviewed and has been returned for further action. Please refile with the corrections outlined

below. Please, contact the appropriate court help center for further information.

Return Reason(s) from Clerk's Office

Court

File & Serve

Returned Reason

Rejected

Returned Comments

No rejection comment was provided. Please contact the court into which you are

filing for more information.

Document Details

Case Number

2013CF47

Case Style

PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

Date/Time Submitted

12/19/2020 3:51 AM CST

Filing Type

EFileAndServe

Filing Description

Subpoena Judge Jeremy Richey as a Witness in Criminal Case 13CF47

Activity Requested

Subpoena (to Issue)

Filed By

Lyle Harrison

Filing Attorney

https://mail.google.com/maiI/u/0?ik=a6604alld4&vie\v=pt&search=all&permthid=thrcad-f%3A 1686799625115602252&simpI=msg-f%3A 1686799625115602252

i/i

12/22/2020

Thunderbird Lifetime Email Mail - Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11567425 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER f...

Appendix S - 39

THUNDERBIRD

Lyle Harrison <lharrison@global.t-bird.edu>

LIFETIME EMAIL

Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11567425 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS.

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER for filing Subpoena (to Issue)

1 message

Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 7:18 PM

no-reply@tylerhost.net <no-reply@tylerhost.net>

To: lharrison@global.t-bird.edu

ODYSSEY

Filing Returned

eFilelL

Envelope Number: 11567425

Case Number: 2013CF47

Case Style: PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

The filing below has been reviewed and has been returned for further action. Please refile with the corrections outlined

below. Please, contact the appropriate court help center for further information.

Return Reason(s) from Clerk's Office

Court

File & Serve

Returned Reason

Rejected

Returned Comments

No rejection comment was provided. Please contact the court into which you are

filing for more information.

__________________

Document Details

Case Number

2013CF47

Case Style

PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

Date/Time Submitted

12/19/2020 4:03 AM CST

Filing Type

EFileAndServe

Filing Description

Subpoena Prosecutor Charles R. Zalar as a Witness in Criminal Case 13CF47

Activity Requested

Subpoena (to Issue)

Filed By

Lyle Harrison

Filing Attorney

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ik=a6604alld4&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-f%3A1686799645655613885&simpl=msg-f%3Al 686799645655613885

l/i

12/22/2020

Thunderbird Lifetime Email Mail - Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11567426 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER f...

Appendix T - 40

THUNDERBIRD

Lyle Harrison <lharrison@global.t-bird.edu>

LIFETIME EMAIL

Filing Returned for Envelope Number: 11567426 in Case: 2013CF47, PEOPLE VS.

HARRISON, LYLE ROGER for filing Subpoena (to Issue)

1 message

Tue, Dec 22,2020 at 7:18 PM

no-reply@tylerhost.net <no-reply@tylerhost.net>

To: lharrison@global.t-bird.edu

Filing Returned

ODYSSEY

Envelope Number: 11567426

Case Number: 2013CF47

Case Style: PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

The filing below has been reviewed and has been returned for further action. Please refile with the corrections outlined

below. Please, contact the appropriate court help center for further information.

Return Reason(s) from Clerk's Office

Court

File & Serve

Returned Reason

Rejected

Returned Comments

No rejection comment was provided. Please contact the court into which you are

filing for more information.

Document Details

Case Number

2013CF47

Case Style

PEOPLE VS. HARRISON, LYLE ROGER

Date/Time Submitted

12/19/2020 4:21 AM CST

Filing Type

EFileAndServe

Filing Description

Subpoena to Public Defender Attorney Twila Jeannine Garrett to testify as a

witness in Criminal Case 13CF47

Activity Requested

Subpoena (to Issue)

Filed By

Lyle Harrison

Filing Attorney

https://mail. google.com/mail/u/0?ik=a6604alld4&view=pt&search=alI&permthid=thread-f%3A1686799647230891780&simpl=msg-f%3A1686799647230891780

1/1

Appendix U -41

No. 123568

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

Lyle Roger Harrison,

)

Complainant,

vs.

RICHARD L. BROCH, in his Individual

) APPEAL FROM MOULTRIE

Capacity and in his Office Capacity as Chief ) CASES 11CH27,13P26, & 13CF4747

Judge of the 6th Judicial Circuit, JEREMY

)

RICHEY in his Individual Capacity and in his )

Official Capacity as Moultrie States Attorney, )

JOHN LUCAS MCNEILL in his Individual

) MOTION FOR COMPLAINT

Capacity and in his Official Capacity as

) FOR MANDAMUS

Appellate Prosecutor, and CYNTHIA J.

)

BRADEN, in her Individual Capacity and in )

Her Official Capacity as Moultrie County

)

Circuit Clerk,

)

Respondents.

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

A COMPLAINT FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

NOW COMES the Respondent, Jeremy Richey, by his attorneys, O'Halloran,

Kosoff, Geitner & Cook, LLC, and for his objection to Petitioner's Motion for Leave to

File a Complaint for Writ of Mandamus, states as follows:

Petitioner, Lyle Roger Harrison, has filed a Motion for Leave to File a

Petition for Writ of Mandamus pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 381(a) against

Respondent, Moultrie County State's Attorney, Jeremy Richey (hereinafter "Richey"),

among others. The motion should bp cjenied as Petitioner has utterly failed to

SUBMITTED -1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/2018 11:08 AM

E-FILED

5/18/201811:08 AM

Carolyn Taft Grosboll

SUPREME COURT CLERK

App. 42

demonstrate an entitlement to this extraordinary relief, the issues about which he

complains can be addressed, or could have been addressed, in the underlying matters,

and plaintiff is attempting to usurp the normal appellate process.

Supreme Court Rule 381(a) provides that:

Proceedings in the supreme court in original actions in cases relating to

revenue, mandamus, prohibition, or habeas corpus, and as may be

necessary to the complete determination of any case on review, shall be

instituted by filing a motion, supported by explanatory suggestions, for

leave to file a complaint seeking appropriate relief. Only issues of law will

be considered. The proposed complaint shall be sworn to and shall

contain or have attached to it the lower court records or other pertinent

material that will fully present the issues of law.

III. Sup. Ct. Rule 281(a).

A writ of mandamus is issued as an exercise of judicial discretion only

when the plaintiff can demonstrate a clear right to this extraordinary relief. White v.

Board of Appeals of Cook County, 45111.2d 378,381-82,259 N.E.2d 51,53 (1970). The court

on an action for mandamus will consider only questions of law. Therefore, if factual

questions are present, mandamus is inappropriate. Touhy v. State Bd. of Elections, 62

IU.2d 303, 312,342 N.E.2d 364, 369 (1976). The petitioner in a mandamus action has the

burden of establishing every material fact necessary to show the plain duty of the

respondent before a court will interfere. Machinis v. Board of Election Commissioners for

City of Chicago, 164 Ill.App.3d 763,767,518 N.E.2d 270,273 (1st Dist. 1987). Mandamus

is not to be used as a substitute for appeal, nor can it be used to circumvent the normal

appellate process. Int'l Harvester Co. v. Goldenhersh, 86111.2d 366,369,427 N.E.2d 158,

159 (1981). Mandamus may not issqe (o compel action that is discretionary. People v.

SUBMITTED -1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/2018 11:08 AM

123568

App. 43

Schyoe, 112 Ill.App.3d 777,780,445 N.E.2d 1260,1263-64 (1st Dist. 1983). It may not be

used to direct or alter the manner in which discretion is to be exercised. To do so would

be to substitute a court's judgment for that of the public official, and that is not

permitted. Freeman v. Lane, 129 Ill.App.3d 1061,1063, 473 N.E.2d 584,586 (3d Dist.

1985). Mandamus does not lie to correct an act involving the exercise of judgment or

discretion, even if erroneous. Daley v. Hett, 113111.2d 75,80,495 N.E.2d 513,515-16

(1986).

Petitioner's motion should be denied. Petitioner utterly fails to establish

that he is entitled to the extraordinary relief of mandamus. Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that only questions of law are involved, and he has failed to establish

every material fact necessary to show that Richey has a clear duty to take the actions

requested in the petition. Petitioner is also improperly using mandamus as a vehicle to

usurp the normal appellate process and to compel discretionary actions of a public

official.

The proposed petition as to Richey requests that he be compelled to: (1)

Dismiss criminal case 13-CF-47, pending in Moultrie County; (2) Award sanctions of

$109,000 to Petitioner for having to file an appeal; (3)"[R]etum a Stolen Trust check of

+$17,300;" (4) Arrest Amy and Floyd Willoughby for trust theft; (5) Arrest attorney

Robert V. Elder and begin criminal trial; (6) Arrest Judge Dan L. Flannell and begin

criminal trial; (7) Arrest Judge Richard Broch and begin criminal trial; (8) Arrest

Moultrie Treasurer, Marci Thompson, "for knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately

changing the names on Trust farml^pd from dead people paying no taxes;" and (9)

SUBMITTED -1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/2018 11:08 AM

123568 App. 44

Remove the Willoughby's farmer from all Trust property." (Proposed Petition, pp. 4647).

The request for leave to file a writ should be denied. The proposed

petition seeks to mandate actions which are within the discretion of the State's

Attorney. The proposed petition involves questions of fact and is an attempt to usurp

the appellate process. Moreover, Richey is not even prosecuting the criminal case about

which plaintiff complains. Attached to this objection is a motion which was filed by

Richey requesting the appointment of a Special Prosecutor in case number 2013-CF-47

as well as the order of the court appointing a Special Prosecutor. (See Exhibit "A").

Richey cannot be ordered to dismiss case number 2013-CF-47 when he is not

prosecuting said case. Any request for sanctions against Richey and requests for

directives against him relating to the prosecution of the criminal case are not only

improper attempts to circumvent proper appellate procedure and compel discretionary

acts, but would be ineffectual as Richey is not prosecuting the case. Further, Petitioner

has had ample opportunity to address issues relating to the criminal case before the trial

and appellate courts. His conviction in the criminal matter was recently overturned by

the appellate court on the basis that plaintiff was denied the opportunity to represent

himself, but the court allowed retrial because the record contained sufficient evidence to

support the convictions. A petition for leave to appeal to this court was denied. People

v. Harrision, 2017II App (4th) 170100-U, petition for leave to appeal denied, 95 N.E.2d 481

(2018)(table). Petitioner is also requesting that Richey be directed to arrest and

criminally prosecute various persons. These are improper requests for relief under Rule

SUBMITTED -1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/2018 11:08 AM

123568

App. 45

381 as the Court cannot order discretionary acts, and the petitioner has failed to

establish that he has any right to such extraordinary relief.

In sum, Petitioner's motion should be denied. He has failed to establish

that he is entitled to any relief under Supreme Court Rule 381.

WHEREFORE, Respondent, Jeremy Richey, respectfully requests that this

Honorable Court deny the Motion for Leave to File a Complaint for Writ of Mandamus.

RESPONDENT, JEREMY RICHEY

By: s/lane M. May______________ „

One of Respondent's Attorneys

Jane M. May, #6207760

O'Halloran Kosoff Geitner & Cook, LLC

650 Dundee Road, Suite 475

Northbrook, Illinois 60062

Telephone: (847) 291-0200

Facsimile: (847) 291-9230

Email: jmay@okgc.com

SUBMITTED -1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/2018 11:08 AM

123568 App. 46

No. 123568

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

Lyle Roger Harrison,

)

Complainant,

vs.

RICHARD L. BROCH, in his Individual

) APPEAL FROM MOULTRIE

Capacity and in his Office Capacity as Chief ) CASES 11CH27,13P26, & 13CF4747

Judge of the 6th Judicial Circuit, JEREMY

)

RICHEY in his Individual Capacity and in his )

Official Capacity as Moultrie States Attorney, )

) MOTION FOR COMPLAINT

JOI*J LUCAS MCNEILL in his Individual

) FOR MANDAMUS

Capacity and in his Official Capacity as

)

Appellate Prosecutor, and CYNTHIA J.

BRADEN, in her Individual Capacity and in )

Her Official Capacity as Moultrie County

)

Circuit Clerk,

)

Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this

instrument are true and correct.

On May 18,2018,1 electronically filed Jeremy Richey's Objection to Motion for

Leave to File a Complaint for Writ of Mandamus with the Clerk of Court of the above

named Court and served copies of same to the following party(ies) of record:

See attached service list

SUBMITTED -1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/2018 11:08 AM

123568

App. 47

via U.S. mail by placing true and correct copies of the same in envelopes addressed as

set forth on the attached service list with sufficient postage, and by placing said

envelopes in the U.S. mail on May 18,2018 at 650 Dundee Road in Northbrook, Illinois

at or about the hour of 5:00 p.m.

RESPONDENT, JEREMY RICHEY

By: s/Jane M. May

One of Their Attorneys

JaneM. May, #6207760

O'Halloran Kosoff Geitner & Cook, LLC

650 Dundee Road, Suite 475

Northbrook, Illinois 60062

Telephone: (847) 291-0200

Facsimile: (847) 291-9230

Email: jmay@okgc.com

E-FILED

5/18/2018 11:08 AM

Carolyn Taft Grosboll

SUPREME COURT CLERK

SUBMITTED -1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/2018 11:08 AM

123568

App. 48

SERVICE LIST

Lyle Roger Harrison

1223 Allen Street

Manitowoc, WI54220

Appellate Prosecutor Jon Lucas McNeill

725 S. Second Street

Springfield, Illinois 62704

lmcneill@ilsaap.org

217/782-8076

The Honoralbe Judge Richard L. Broch

Douglas County Courthouse

401S. Center Street

Tuscola, Illinois 61953

rbroch@illinoiscourts.gov

217/253-4121

Cynthia J. Braden, Moultrie County Courthouse

10 S. Main Street

Sullivan, Illinois 61951

cbraden@circuit-clerk.moultrie.il.us

217/782-2586

Attorney Craig Runyon

Samuels, Miller, Jackson & Sly LLP

225 N. Water Street, Suite 301

P.O. Box 1400

Decatur, Illinois 62525

runvon@samuelsmiller.com

217/425-6313

SUBMITTED • 1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/201811:08 AM

123568

App. 49

COPY

;

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH___ JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MOULTRIE

COUNTY, ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

-vs-

;

Lyle R. Harrison

Defendant

FILED

)

SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

)

OCT 17 Wb

No, 2013-CF-47

•

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

;

COMES NOW Moultrie

___ County State's Attorney, Jeremy Richey

and '

pursuant to the provisions of 55ILCS 5/3-9008 moves for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor in this

;

case. The prosecution of die defendant by the State’s Attorney’s Office could be a conflict of interest for

;

the office, or alternatively, could create the appearance of an impropriety. It is in the interest ofjustice that

;

a Special Prosecutor be appointed to avoid any such appearance. In this particular case the reason for

requesting the appointment of a Special Prosecutor is:

Defendant states he is preparing a federal lawsnit against this prosecutor. See 10/8/14 filing In I3-L-7,

WHEREFORE, die People pray for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor.

;

10/17/2014

Date

^Sjsnature

Aeft/v -t fcX*

State's Attorney

Exhibit A

SUBMITTED - 1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/2018 11:08 AM

123568

App. 50

COPY

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE Sixth

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Moultrie

COUNTY, ILLINOIS

FILED

SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

)

-vs-

Lyle R. Harrison

Defendant.

OCT 27 2014

No. 13-CF-47

ORDER APPOINTING SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

This cause comes on for heating on the Motion of die State’s Attorney for die appointment of a

Special Prosecutor, and the Court having examined the Motion, and being hilly advised in the premises,

FINDS pursuant to the provisions of 55ILCS S/3-9008 that the interest ofjustice requires the appointment

of a Special Prosecutor. The Court further finds that the subject matter of this case involves the offenses

of Theft (Three Counts1)________ __________________________________________ .

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: That the State’s Attorney’s Motion for the Appointment of a

Special Prosecutor is GRANTED.

The Court hereby requests the Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor

to accept the appointment of Special Prosecutor in this cause. Further, if accepted,

the Court further requests that the Director of the Office of die State’s Attorneys

Appellate Prosecutor designate an attorney or attorneys employed by the agency to

serve as Special Prosecutors) for this cause. Such designated attorney or attorneys

shall file their entry of appearance(s) in this cause by filing their oath(s) of office

with the Circuit Clerk of this Court.

In further accordance with die statute, the filing ofthe oath ofoffice shall constitute

a recognition and acknowledgment that service as die Special Prosecutor is at die

pleasure of the Illinois Attorney General, who may substitute hex office as Special

Prosecutor as provided by law.

The State’s Attorney’s Office of Moultrie____County is directed to deliver to the

Special Prosecutor all documents, reports or other information related to this case.

DATE:

Dt)k 3?,

ENTER:

JUDGE

Exhibit A

SUBMITTED -1082654 - Jane May - 5/18/2018 11:08 AM

Appendix V - 51 51

Okaw Farmer's COOP, Inc.

P.O.Box 51

101 N. Al Best Drive

Lovington, Illinois 61937-0031

Ph.217-873-4301

January 16.2013

Lyle Harrison

1007Ashland Avenue

Evanston, Illinois 60202

Lyle,

•l•|

:v\^v;;V

i After hearing the opinion of an attorney and talking to the Assistant Stales Attorney about the

•! check Okaw Farmers issued to the Hardware State Bank on behalf of Roger Lyle Harrison

^BpwRevoc. Trust, Okaw Farmersfollowed the court order dated December 11,2012 and signed by

• \ • Judge Dan Flannel. If youfeel this was done in error, have your attorney contact the Hardware

•" • * •; State Bank.

}

►

ii.

Gary P. Smith

Okaw Farmers Coop.

■

s 156

;•

;

• c

----- -laasretom

Mil :!

{

>■'• ’■ :A7 f

CduU

- > TY*n*octiooService***.■■>

Okaw Farmer’s Cooperative, lr»c/

.■Provided

by WichOvi* B*nk. N.A. • %

(tocta. Q»d»w>. UxtaQon. OiMfcnifc, O^pt Dwtoi) .

67-1/532 ■ •" . "

M..1,BckU7

VRMnOOOfMCy Altar,

matt 61811

jf®KAw\

r I

(

PAY

**«•««?. C.GS DGi

TO THE

ORDER OF

:=_•>

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31/83/13

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check •; :

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(

OKAW FARMER’S COOPERATIVE, INC.

]

I I'M1 i

(

, C

App. 53

OKAW FARMER'S COOP,

GR464

INC.

BOX 32 LOVINGTON, IL 61937

DATE 01/03/1!

GRAIN SETTLEMENT OF CORN

TIME 11:32:3:

CUSTOMER # 369420

ROGER LYLE HARRISON REVOC TRST

HARDWARE STATE BANK

1007 ASHLAND AVENUE

EVANSTON, IL. 60202

ORG SHARE

BUSHEL'

REC^DATE - -TICKET tf- --GROSS” --SHRINK- - - - NET----TEST WEIGHT - - MOISTURE............. F.M. - -- REG. DAMAGE HEAT DAMAGE --FARM ID-- OF TICKET

11/05/12

552965.01

493.21

9.67

483.55

56.0

0,00

15.9

0.80

0.0

0.00

0.0

0.00

0.0

0.00

100.0000% AVER

ll/OS/12

552967.01

1098.21

10.76

1087.45

56.0

0.00

IS.2

0.00

0.0

0.00

0.0

0.00

0.0

0.00

100.0000% AVER

0.00

0.0

0.00

100.0000% AVER

11/05/12

552972.01

1121.79

14 .13

1107.65

56.0

0.00

IS.4

0.00

0.0

0,00

0.0

11/06/12

S529B8.01

21.62

0.27

21.35

56.0

0.00

IS.4

0.00

0.0

0.00

0.0

0.00

0.0

0.00

100.0000% AVER

11/06/12

552988.02

1 .24

0.02

1.22

56.0

0.00

15.4

0.00

0.0

0.00

0.0

0.00

0.0

0.00

100.0000% AVER

AVERAGE

TICKET if

PL/CON #

BUSHEL

-PRICE-

DISCOUNT

56.0

15.4

STORAGE

-NBT/BU

0.0

--GROSS-

--FEE-•

DISCOUNT

TOTAL-

STORAGE

-NET AMT

SS2965.01

013873

483.55

6.6100

0.0000

0.1800

6.4300

3196.25

3.02

0.00

87.04

3106.19 LOV

552967,01

013873

1087.45

6.6100

0.0000

0.1800

6.4300

7188.06

6.80

0.00

19S.74

698S.52 LOV

552972.01

013873

1107.65

6.6100

0.0000

0.1800

6.4300

7321.57

6.92

0.00

199.36

7115.27 LOV

552988.01

013873

21.35

6.6100

0.0000

0.1799

6.4301

141.12

0.13

0.00

3.84

137.15 LOV

1.22

6.9300

0.0000

0.1804

6.7496

8.45

0.01

0.00

0.22

S52988.02

CUSTOMER ACCOUNT

TOTALS

178SS.45

2701.22

16.88

0.00

SETTLEMENT # 9956

CHECK #

8.22 LOV

-87.09

COPY

PRICE PER BUSHEL

SPOT SALE

CONTRACT# 13873

1.22 bUSfcelfi 9 5 6.9300

2,700.00 bushels 9 $ 6.6100

486.22

817265.26

App. 5454

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MOULTRJE COUNTY. ILLINOIS

CHARLOTTE HARRJSON HUGGINS,

CYNTHIA H. PETERS,

SHIRLEY H. COOPER

f/k/a SHIRLEY A. HUGGINS.

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ROGER LYLE HARRISON, SR.

CLARA HARRISON KARBINE.

JANET HARRISON CROME,

ROGER HARRISON. JR.,

JOHANNA HARRISON FICKETT,

LYLE ROGER HARRISON,

LUX HARRY HARRISON,

ANDREW LUX HARRISON,

BETH JOHANNA HARRISON.

PETER ANDREW HARRISON, and

UNKNOWN OWNERS, if any,

(

Defendants.

)

filed

DEC 112012

SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

No. 1 l-CH-27

MOU.1

UMOa

sr.

• *,

!•f

ORDER REQUIRING TURNOVER OF 2012 CROP

AND FARM ACCOUNTS TO HARDWARE STATE RAN

□§

THIS MATTER came forbearing on November 29,2012 on Plaintiffs’ MotioriibVfutnover

of 2012 Crop and Farm Accounts to Hardware State Bank. Due notice was given to all parties in

-;:; °Pcn comt at Prior proceedings conducted on Novemoer 15,2012. Tne Plaintiffs appeared by their

legal counsel, Craig W. Runyon of Samuels, Miller, Schroeder, Jackson & Sly, LLP. Defendants

did not appear in court personally, nor did they appear through legal counsel. The Court, having

reviewed the Motion, heard the statement of Plaintiffs’ counsel, noting that no objections to the

Motion have been interposed, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, finds that the entry

of this Order is necessary, warranted, and just.

;

S 158

;

C42»9

-f

;

■

App. 5555

-2!

WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAI Defendants or any entities controlled by any of the-

j|'

Defendants, individually or collectively, shall immediately turn over to the Hardware State Bank.

in its edacity as farm manager and receiver:

■

*. *; • X

All of the 2012 crop in whatever form it presently exists;

Any and all deposit accounts and monies held in connection with the farmland subject

to the case at bar; and

All records of the amount of grain harvested for the 2012 crop.

ENTER; December // . 2012

JUDGE

;

(

■:

S 159

C4210

;

Appendix W - 56

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MOULTRIE COUNTY

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

)

-vs-

LYLE ROGER HARRISON,

(DOB 06/20/73, W/M)

Defendant.

13- CF- ^ 7

FILED

SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

OCT 03 2013

INFORMATION

xwcurr court

mouuwe county, UJNOtS

The State’s Attorney of Moultrie County charges:

That

in Moultrie County, Illinois

on or about September 28.2013

Committed the offense of

LYLE ROGER HARRISON

THEFT

in that the said Defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally accountable,

knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over property of Floyd M. Willoughby and

Amy Lou Willoughby (as Co-Trustees under The Floyd M. Willoughby and Amy Lou

Willoughby Declaration of Trust dated September 18,1997), said property being com grain,

having a total value in excess of $10,000.00 but less than $100,000, intending to deprive said

owners permanently of the use or benefit of the property,

in violation of SECTION 16-lfa¥l¥Al of AQT5_, of CHAPTER 720, Illinois Compiled

Statutes of said State.

Class 2 Felony

/flBRENSiaSSr

(jMoultrie County State’s Attorney

STATE OF ILLINOIS

)

)SS

COUNTY OF MOULTRIE )

The undersigned, on oath, states that the facts set forth in the foregoing Information are

true in substance according to the best of hi! information and belief.

State’s

, 2013.

SWORN TObff<

Notary Public

ie}

“OFFICIAL SEAL"

KAREN J REED

NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OP ILUNOS

MOULTRie COUNTY

HY COMMISSION EXPIRES CMI-I017

Appendix X - 57

PSO1/2000

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MOULTRIE COUNTY

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

vs.

No.

13-CF-

4*7

LYLE ROGEr ciARUlbON

(Defendant)

1007 X hi. nd Av •J «

Evanston, IL 60.n.Q.T_

WARRANT OF ARREST

TO ALL PEACE OFFICERS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:

LjT: no?,ei- l.'.rrlncn

06-20-1973 and bring said person

(Name)

(SexM/F) (Date of Birth)

without unnecessary delay before the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Moultrie

County, in the courtroom usually occupied by him in the Moultrie County Courthouse in the City of Sullivan, or if he is absent or

unable to act, before the nearest or most accessible court in said County, to answer a charge made against said person for the offense

T lnF T________________________________________________________________________________________________ _

You are hereby commanded to arrest

and hold said person to bail.

To be marked by issuing judge.

Limitations on Warrant:

'{^] No geographical limits;

'[ ] Geographical limits apply.

( 1 Any jurisdiction within the State of Illinois;

I ] All areas in Illinois south of 1-80 and north of 1-64.

The amount of bail is S__ '

ISSUED AT MOULTRIE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, this

j'.

day of

(Judge)

D^.n L. Flannel1

State of Illinois, County of Moultrie

RETURN OF SERVICE

I have executed the within Warrant by arresting the within-named defendant. In accordance with the provisions of 725 1LCS 5/110-9, defendant

, with security:

released on bail in Sum of S

(Description of Security)

(Surety:

(Address)

(Name)

.M.

day of

, at

,_____ , to appear in court on the

day of

this

FEES: Service and Return S

; Mileage (.

_ mi. @__

; TOTAL: S

tizi i

'H/

ature) _

/ >-

(Official Capacit^)

COURT COPY-WhUe

PEACE OFFICER’S COPY- Canary

;

DEFENDANT’S COPY-Pink

Appendix Y - 5858

PSO1/2000

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MOULTRIE COUNTY

;

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

vs.

13-CF-47

No.

;

Lyle Roger Harrison

ORIGINAL RETURN TO

MOULTRIE COUNTY CIRCUIT CLERK

AFTER SERVICE

(Defendant)

1007 Ashland Ave

Evanston, IL 60202

1223 Allen Street

Manitowoc, WI 54220

WARRANT OF ARREST

TO ALL PEACE OFFICERS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS:

You are hereby commanded to arrest

Lyle Roger Harrison_____

06/20/1973 and bring said person

(Sex M/F)

(Name)

(Date of Birth)

without unnecessary delay before the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Moultrie

County, in the courtroom usually occupied by him in the Moultrie County Courthouse in the City of Sullivan, or if he is absent or

unable to act, before the nearest or most accessible court in said County, to answer a charge made against said person for the offense

FTA - Sentencing

Tneft in excess or $10,000 but less than $100,000

;

and hold said person to bail.

To be marked by issuing judge.

Limitations on Warrant:

PI No geographical limits;

| j Geographical limits apply.

( ] Any jurisdiction within the State of Illinois:

{ j All areas in Illinois south of 1-80 and north of 1-64.

The amount of bail is S

500,000_________.

ISSUED AT MOULTRIE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, this

;■

2nd

day of

February

2017

Hon. Richard L. <ferlfth, presiding

;

State of Illinois, County of Moultrie

RETURN OF SERVICE

1 have executed the within Warrant by arresting the within-named defendant. In accordance with the provisions of 725 ILCS 5/110-9, defendant

, with security:

released on bail in Sum of S

(Description of Security)

(Surety:

this ___ day of

__ , to appear in court on the

(Address)

day of.

FEES: Service and Return S

; Mileage (______ mi. @__

(Name)

■:

, at

.M.

; TOTAL: S

(Signature)

(Official Capacity)

C1010

COURT COPY-Whlte

PEACE OFFICER’S COPY- Canary

DEFENDANT’S COPY-Pilk

;

App. 5959

OMGINAL-RETURN TO

M( ULTWE COUNTY CIRCUIT CLERK

AF fER SERVICE

STATE OF ILLINOIS

■

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MOULTRIE COUNTY

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

;

vs.

Lyle R. Harrison

No. 13-CF-47

(DOB: 06-20-1973)

Defendant

;

MITTIMUS ON SENTENCE TO JAIL

TO THE SHERIFF OF MOULTRIE COUNTY:

Whereas.

Lyle R. Harrison

has been convicted of the offense of

Theft In excess of $10,000 but less than $100,000

as set forth in the charge on file in this cause, and it further appearing that said defendant has been sentenced to

!•

imprisonment in the County Jail of Moultrie County for the period of 180 days with credit for 2 days

previously served; 50 days to be served lnstanter with 130 days held In

abeyance subject to later date remission hearing on October 10, 2019 at 9:00 a.m.

or until discharged by due process of law,

You are hereby commanded forthwith to take said defendant from the bar of this Court to the County Jail

of Moultrie County, and you as warden of said jail are hereby commanded to take the body of said defendant and

confine him in said County Jail in safe and secure custody until discharged by due process of law.

ISSUED AT Sullivan, Moultrie County, Illinois, on

February 2, 2017

(Date)

;

(Signature)

Hon. Richard L. Broch, presiding

(Official Capacity)

C10U

Appendix Z - 60

We the jury, find the defendant, Lyle Roger Harrison, guilty of Theft of Property, of the

Floyd M. Willoughby and Amy Lou Willoughby (as Co-Trustees under the Floyd M.

Willoughby and Amy Lou Willoughby Declaration of Trust dated September 18,1997) and

Donald Cochran, said property being com grain, having a total value in excess of $10,000.00 but

less than $100,000.00, intending to deprive said owners permanently of the use or benefit of the

property.

P (LAjiTlAj

%»..■. ?n\ OwL^

(XuUny-

C883

App. 61

We the jury, find the defendant, Lyle Roger Harrison, guilty of Theft of Property, by

knowingly obtaining and exerting unauthorized control property of Donald Cochran, said

property being com grain, having a total value in excess of $500.00 but less than $10,000.00,

intending to deprive said owners permanently of the useor berf^fit of the property.

Foreperson

HaJP/egj

QaJUL

c. V

>nz/AjlAl

C884

Appendix AA - 62

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS

MOULTRIE COUNTY, SULLIVAN, ILLINOIS

FLOYD M. WILLOUGHBY and AMY LOU

WILLOUGHBY, Co-Trustees

Plaintiffs,

vs.

LYLE ROGER HARRISON, ROGER LYLE

HARRISON, ANDREW LUX HARRISON,

LUX HARRY HARRISON, and PETER

ANDREW HARRISON,

Defendants.

)

No. 13-L-7

)

MOTION OF ROBERT V. ELDER TO QUASH SUBPOENA

Now comes ROBERT V. ELDER, by undersigned counsel, and having received

service of a “Subpoena - General” under the above caption, calling for his appearance

before the Honorable Richard Broch for a hearing in Sullivan, Illinois, on November

21, 2014 at DOO p.m., moves to quash said Subpoena, and in support, states:

1. The only matters scheduled for hearing before Judge Broch on November 21,

2014 at 1^00 p.m. are Motions for Summary Judgment; (b) Motions to Dismiss with

regard to certain Counterclaims, and (c) Rules to Show Cause.

2. A hearing on a Motion for Summary Judgment does not contemplate the

taking of evidence or the production of documents since the Code of Civil Procedure

specifically directs the Court to base its decision on “ . . . the pleadings, depositions,

and admissions on file, together with the Affidavits, if any . . .” As Justice Jones has

stated: “Summary judgment procedure is not designed to try an issue of fact but

App. 63

rather to determine whether one exists.” Fletcher v. Boxx, 10 Ill. App. 3d 928, 929

(5th Dist., 1973.)

The opinion of Justice Nash in Glen Ellyn Savings & Loan

Association vs. State Bank of Geneva, 65 Ill. App. 3d 916, 924 (2nd Dist., 1978) notes'

“Nor is there any merit to Nilles’ contention that it should have been

permitted to present evidence by the examination of witnesses and

introduction of documents at the hearing of the motion for summary

judgment. It is well established that the purpose of summary judgment

is not to try a disputed issue of fact but to determine whether genuine

issue as to material in fact exist... and the summary judgment process

provided by (the Code of Civil Procedure)... does not contemplate a trial

in the traditional sense,”

3. Motions to dismiss directed to pleadings do not ever contemplate the taking

of evidence or the presentation of testimony at a hearing on the motion, which must

stand or fall based on the fundamental principle that the facts to be considered by the

Court in ruling on a motion to dismiss are established by the pleading being attacked:

because the Court must accept as true all well pleaded facts in that pleading, and the

Court cannot consider Affidavits, depositions or exhibits, let alone live testimony,

when considering a motion to dismiss. Johnson v. Nationwide Business Forms, Inc.,

41 Ill. App. 3d 128, (1st Dist., 1977).

4. Mr. Elder cannot plausibly have any testimony to offer that could bear on

or somehow be relevant to the Rules to Show Cause.

App. 64

5. The service of the Subpoena was not accompanied by a witness fee. The

witness fee is mandatory under statute (705 ILCS 35/4.3(a)) and Rule 237 and

contempt proceedings cannot be pursued for the failure of a subpoenaed person to

appear in response to a subpoena issued in a civil case where the statutory fee has

not been paid. People vHealey 139 Ill. App. 363,364-365 (2nd Dist., 1908).

6. The subpoena was, based on the face of it, issued at the request of Defendant

LYLE R. HARRISON, as it bears his signature as having effected service by certified

mail, and no other person appears to have been involved in its issuance or service

other than the ministerial participation by the Circuit Clerk whose signature and

seal appear as part of the issuance of this Court’s process in the form of the subpoena.

Defendant LYLE R. HARRISON’s conduct is no less than criminal contempt of this

Court.

“When the contempt consists of something done or omitted in

the presence of the court, tending to impede or interrupt its

proceedings or lesson its dignity or, out of its presence, in disregard

or abuse of its process, or in doing some act injurious to a parts7

protected by the order of the court, which has been forbidden by its

order, the contempt proceeding which follows is punitive and the

fine or imprisonment inflicted is by way of punishment for the wrong

act and to vindicate the authority and dignity of the People as

represented in and by their judicial tribunals.” Eastman v. Dole, 213

Ill. App. 364, 367-368 (1st Dist., 1919)

“In a civil contempt proceeding, the party litigant alone is

interested in enforcement and as said litigant is satisfied, the

contempt proceeding comes to ^n end. . . .

Although the formulation of the distinction between the two

types of pontempt is reasonafyty well established in the decisions, the

App. 65

application of the particular distinction to a given set of facts is often

indistinct and most imperceptible, (cite omitted). Indeed, it has

been stated that the distinction can be found by looking at the

purpose of the punishment imposed and if that purpose is purely

punitive and imprisonment is for a definite term, then we have a

criminal contempt. Whereas, when the punishment is remedial or

coercive and one is committed to jail until compliance, it is a civil

contempt. American Cyanamid Co. vRogers 21 Ill. App. 3d 152, 154

(4th Dist., 1974).”

Abuse of process is the misuse of legal process to accomplish

some purpose outside the scope of the process itself. Bonnev v. King,

201 Ill. 47, 50-51, 66 N.E. 377 (1903). The two distinct elements of

an abuse of process claim are: (l) the existence of an ulterior purpose

or motive and (2) some act in the use of process that is not proper in

the regular course of proceedings. Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Scott, 4 Ill.

App. 3d 962, 966 (1st Dist., 1972). Pleading must be distinguished

from process. Pleadings are created and filed by the litigants.

Process is issued by the court, under its official seal. 4 Ill. App. 3d

at 968.

7. There is no possible legitimate basis in fact or in law for the issuance of the

subpoena; it is wrongful; it is abuse of this Court’s process, and it is therefore in

indirect criminal contempt of this Court and should be punished with immediate

imprisonment of Defendant LYLE R. HARRISON should he fail to articulate a legally

sufficient reason why he caused the issuance and service of the subpoena, because

that failure will demonstrate (a) the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive, and

(b) the use of the process - causing the issuance and service of the subpoena when

there is no reason to believe Mr. Elder might be properly called to give testimony in

support of or in opposition to anj1- matter before the Court on the date set f#rth of

App. 66

November 21. 2014 - is indubitably not proper in the regular course of the

proceedings to be heard on said date.

8. Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of the relevant subpoena.

WHEREFORE. Robert Elder, prays the Court will quash the subpoena issued

at the instance of Defendant LYLE R. HARRISON and served upon Robert Elder by

Defendant LYLE R. HARRISON calling upon Mr. Elder to appear to give testimony

before this Court- on November 21, 2014, and further prays the Court will forthwith

proceed to call upon Defendant LYLE R. HARRISON to show cause, if anj? he has,

why he should not be held in indirect criminal contempt of this Court for abuse of

process, and should Defendant LYLE R. HARRISON fail to do so, Movant prays the

that Defendant LYLE R. HARRISON will be imprisoned in the Moultrie County jail

for an adequate period of time to properly punish him, taking account of any similar

conduct by him in this cause, and to fine him such amount as will generously

compensate the Moultrie County Sheriff and the taxpayers of Moultrie County for the

cost and inconvenience of his incarceration.

ROBERT V. ELDER

By.

Gregory C. Ray

Craig & Craig, LLC

1807 Broadway Avenue

P.O. Box 689

Mattoon, IL 61938-0689

Telephone: 217/234-6481

Facsimile: 217/234-6486

Email: acr@craialaw.net

App. 67

VERIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to §1-109 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, it is herebj' certified that the original of this document was sent to the

Circuit Clerk and a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document was sent in

envelopes securely sealed, legibly addressed and with the proper postage affixed

thereto and deposited in the United States Mail at the United States Post Office in

Mattoon, Illinois to:

Mr. David Y. Eberspacher

Tapella & Eberspacher, LLC

P.O. Box 627

Mattoon, IL 61938*0627

Mr. Brian M. Smith

Heyl. Royster. Voelker & Allen

P.O. Box 129

Urbana, IL 61803*0129

Mr. Heath Uppencamp

Heller, Holmes & Associates, P.C.

1101 Broadway Avenue

P.O. Box 889

Mattoon, IL 61938*0889

Mr. Mike W. Bartolacci

Thompson Coburn LLP

One US Bank Plaza

St. Louis, MO 63101*1693

Mr. Ljde R. Harrison

1007 Ashland

Evanston, IL 60202

Mr. Lux H. Harrison

1105 Manilla Street

Manitowoc, WI 54220

Mr. Peter A. Harrison

214 Mirabelle Circle

Pensacola, FL 32514

Mr. Andrew L. Harrison

1007 Ashland

Evanston, IL 60202

Mr. Roger L. Harrison

1223 Allen Street

Manitowoc, WI 54220

DATED this 10th day of November, 2014.

Appendix BB - 68

Attorney Robert V. Elder Suspension

Filed March 26, 2015

In re Robert Vernon Elder

Attorney-Respondent Commission No. 2014PR00019

Synopsis of Hearing Board Report and Recommendation

(March 2015)

This matter arises out of the Administrator's one-count Complaint that alleged Respondent had a conflict of

interest in representing the administrator of a probate estate in the sale of real estate based upon his

relationship with the purchasers; engaged in dishonesty and deceit; and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice.

The Hearing Board found that all of the charges of misconduct were proved, and recommended that

Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of ninety (90) days.

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY

COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

Commission No. 2014PR00019

ROBERT VERNON ELDER,

Attorney-Respondent,

No. 728985.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE HEARING BOARD

INTRODUCTION

The hearing in this matter was held on August 28, 2014, at the Springfield offices of the Attorney Registration

and Disciplinary Commission, before a Panel of the Hearing Board consisting of Sonni C. Williams, Chair,

Elizabeth N. Carrion, and Pamela Hammond-McDavid. Denise Church appeared on behalf of the Administrator.

The Respondent appeared in person and was represented by J. Randall Cox.

PLEADINGS

Complaint

On March 3, 2014, the Administrator filed a one-count Complaint against the Respondent. The Complaint

alleged that Respondent, while representing the administrator of a probate estate, engaged in a conflict of

interest by assisting the administrator in selling the decedent's residence to a friend of Respondent. It was

further alleged that Respondent did not tell the administrator the name of the friend; that the friend owed

Respondent money; that the friend and Respondent had been business associates; that the funds used to

purchase the property came from the bank account of Respondent's wife; or that Respondent and his wife

would hold a

PAGE 2:

mortgage on the property. Additionally, the probate estate has remained open because of the Respondent's

misconduct.

Answer

On April 3, 2014, the Respondent filed an Answer to the Complaint, in which he admitted some of the factual

allegations, denied others, and denied all of the charges of misconduct.

ALLEGED MISCONDUCT

The Administrator alleged that Respondent committed the following misconduct: engaged in a conflict of

interest by representing a client when the representation was materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities

to another client or third party, or by the lawyer's own interests; engaged in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty,

deceit, or misrepresentation; and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of

Rules 1.7(b), 8.4(a)(4) and 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

EVIDENCE

The Administrator presented the testimony of Judge Danny L. Flannell and Pamela Sue Baskette.

Administrator's Exhibits 1 through 28 were received into evidence. (Tr. 14). Respondent testified on his own

behalf and presented the testimony of Paul Hrvol, Lynn Elder, and Tom Hargis. Respondent's Exhibits 1

through 9 were received into evidence. (Tr.14).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In attorney disciplinary proceedings, the Administrator has the burden of proving the charges of misconduct by

clear and convincing evidence. See Supreme Court Rule 753(c)(6); In re Thomas, 2012 IL 113035, ? 56. This

standard of proof requires a high level of certaiqty, which is greater than a preponderance of the evidence (i.e.,

more probably true than not true) but not as

PAGE 3:

great as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 III. 2d 207, 213, 647 N.E.2d 273 (1995); In re

Kakac 07 SH 86, |VLR. 23785 (May 18, 2010) (Review Bd. at 9). In determining whether the burden of proof has

App. 69

been satisfied, the Hearing Panel is to assess the credibility and believability of the witnesses, weigh conflicting

testimony, draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and make factual findings based upon all of the

evidence. In re Howard, 188 III. 2d 423, 435, 721 N.E.2d 1126 (1999); In re Timpone, 208 III. 2d 371, 380, 804

N.E.2d 560 (2004).

An admission in a pleading is a formal judicial admission that is binding on the party making it, may not be

contradicted, has the effect of withdrawing the fact admitted from issue, and dispenses with the need for any

proof of that fact. Thus, when a respondent in a disciplinary matter admits in his or her answer some or all of

the facts alleged in a complaint, it is unnecessary for the Administrator to present evidence to prove the facts

so admitted. See In re Bulger, 02 CH 40, M.R. 19550 (Sept. 27, 2004) (Review Bd. at 6-11); In re Scholz,

2011PR00114, M.R. 26086 (Sept. 25, 2013) (Hearing Bd. at 3-4).

I. Respondent is charged with engaging in a conflict of interest by representing a client when the

representation was materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or third party or by the

interests of the lawyer, which is a violation of Rule 1.7(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

A. Evidence Considered

We considered the testimony of Judge Danny L. Flannell, Pamela Sue Baskette, and Respondent. We also

considered Administrator's Exhibits 1 through 28 and Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 9.

Judge Danny L. Flannell

Judge Flannell testified that he became licensed to practice law in 1977. He had a private practice, primarily in

the areas of real estate and probate, until he was elected circuit court judge

PAGE 4:

in 1988. He is the presiding judge in Moultrie County and the Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit. (Tr. 1416,24, 44).

The Respondent and the law firm of Rau, Elder and Associates represented the administrator, Pam Baskette,

of the Estate of Lenora Sefried, in which the petition for letters of administration was filed in October 2012.

(Resp. Ex. 1). Judge Flannell said the Sefried estate was "extremely small" as to the value and number of

assets. (Tr. 18, 22).

In the summer of 2013, Respondent's partner, Mr. Rau, came to the judge's office. Rau expressed concern

about Respondent's handling of the Sefried Estate, in that Respondent had arranged for the sale of the estate's

real property to Ron Houchin. Houchin and Respondent were friends. Judge Flannell suggested that Rau have

Baskette, the administrator of the estate, prepare a letter containing her concerns. Subsequently, the judge

received a letter, dated July 18, 2013 (from Baskette. (Tr. 23-24; Resp. Ex. 3).

After learning that there had been a "significant decrease in the real estate tax bill" for the property sold to

Houchin, Judge Flannell went to the county Treasurer's office and found that Respondent had arranged for the

reduction of those taxes. Judge Flannell explained that reducing the tax bill "normally would be something that

you would do for the buyer. You wouldn't do that for your client, the seller." He added that the tax issue was a

"major concern" as to Respondent's conduct. In the sale of the property the buyer, Houchin, received a credit of

$612 for the taxes; however, this did not benefit the estate. (Tr. 24-27, 36). Judge Flannell also pointed out that

the Respondent's wife was the mortgage holder on the property because she allegedly loaned Houchin the

money to purchase the property. (Tr. 26).

A court hearing was held in August 2013. (Adm. Ex. 26). During the hearing, Judge Flannell asked Respondent

for whose benefit he took the step to reduce the taxes on the subject

PAGE 5:

property, and Respondent replied "I was helping him [Houchin]." The Judge noted that having the real estate

taxes reduce is not inappropriate, but "it should have been accounted for in the transaction within the estate to

the seller's benefit." Following the hearing, Judge Flannell converted the Sefried estate from independent

administration to supervised administration by the court. He also ordered that the estate funds being held in

Respondent's trust account be deposited with the circuit clerk's office. Respondent complied with the orders.

(Tr. 24, 27-30). Additionally, Judge Flannell has not allowed Respondent to handle any probate estate by way

of independent administration, Respondent has filed three estates, and they are under supervised

administration by the court. (Tr. 29, 37).

Another hearing in the Sefried Estate was held in May 2014. (Adm. Ex. 28). By that time, the Rau and Elder law

firm had withdrawn from the case, and attorney Elizabeth Nohren was representing Baskette. Nohren filed a

motion to allow the Sefried Estate to reacquire the property sold to Houchin for $6,000. Although Houchin had

purchased the property for $5,000, the highep re-purchasing price reflected expenditures Houchin had made as

to the property. There was a representation qt the hearing that someone was willing to purchase the property

for $8,000. The potion was allowed and the property became an asset of the estate. (Tr. 30-32, 39, 43).

At the time the Sefried Estate wanted to re-pprcpase the above property, it did not have sufficient funds to do

so. However, Res pondent contributed about $2,500, to the estate, out of his own funds, so that the re

purchases of the property could be complete^. <|Tr. 32-33, 37-38). The Sefried Estate is still open. The potential

App. 70

buyer of the pertinent property changed his mind and the property is still in the estate. (Tr. 33).

Judge Flannell was asked what effect Respondent's conduct had on the Sefried Estate and he said it

"extended greatly the amount of time that the case has been pending" and "complicated

PAGE 6:

it beyond belief." He went to say that this is a "serious matter" and "one of the most concerning things I have

witnessed in my time, in my 26 years on the bench." (Tr. 33-34). Finally, Judge Flannell said that a letter

Respondent prepared for Houchin and sent to Respondent's client, Baskette, also "caused me grave concern."

(Tr. 34-35).

Pamela Sue Baskette

Baskette testified that she is 53 years of age and resides in Sullivan. She has worked in home health care for

the Illinois Department of Rehabilitative Services for over 25 years. She has a Bachelor's degree in Speech

and Communications from Millikin University. She also has two Associate degrees from Richland Community

College. She also provides a taxi service for Amish people who do not drive. (Tr. 47-48. 87-88).

Baskette is the daughter of Lenora Sefried, who died in October 2011. Sefried owned a house on Magill Street

in Sullivan, which had remained vacant for the five years before her death, while Sefried lived with Baskette.

Sefried was a hoarder and, while the house was "livable," it needed "an excessive cleaning." (Tr. 49-50).

Respondent lived nearby Sefried's house. After Sefried's death, Baskette asked Respondent if he was

interested in purchasing her house, and he said he was not. This was before he became her lawyer. (Tr. 50,

92)I

Baskette was the administrator of Sefried's intestate estate and, sometime in 2012, Respondent began

representing her in that capacity. Baskette understood that Respondent agreed to represent her for a flat fee of

$3,000, which included costs. She did not pay him anything up front, but his fee was to come out of the

proceeds of the sale of the house. Respondent agreed to help her sell Sefried's house. There was no written

fee agreement. Baskette paid Sefried's

PAGE 7:

funeral bills from funds that Sefried had in two bank accounts, and also used some of her own funds. (Tr. 5053, 93).

The assets of the Sefried Estate consisted of the house and some personal property. Baskette had a garage

sale and made about $500 from the sale of the personal property. Baskette signed the Petition for Letters of

Administration for the Sefried Estate, which listed the value of the real property at $5,000 and the value of the

personal property at $500. (Resp. Ex. 1). She said that she obtained those figures from Respondent. (Tr. 5455,95-96,113).

Shortly after Sefried's death, Baskette contacted a man named Eric Crouse, who had previously shown an

interest in purchasing Sefried's house. Crouse told her that he was interested and intended to use it as rental

property. Crouse asked her how much she wanted for the property, and she told him $10,000. She said that

Crouse "didn't seem to think that was an unfair amount." However, Crouse never made an offer on the house.

(Tr. 57-58).

Subsequently, about October 2012, Respondent told Baskette that he had a buyer for Sefried's house. He did

not tell her the buyer's name, but said he was "an old college buddy, a hunting buddy, a friend." Respondent

did not tell her that the friend owed him several thousand dollars or that Respondent and the friend had some

business interests. She later learned that the friend was named Houchin. Prior to selling the house to Houchin

on December 6, 2012, Baskette told Respondent she had "a buyer for $10,000." She acknowledged during her

testimony that Crouse was the only potential buyer. She explained that Crouse had not objected to the price of

$10,000 and that she was "under the assumption that when the property became available and had a clear title

that [Crouse] would want to purchase it for $10,000." Respondent told Baskette it was "foolish" to try to sell the

property for $10,000. Baskette said that after talking with

PAGE 8:

Respondent she "thought it was not in her financial best interest to pursue this potential buyer, Eric Crouse."

(Tr. 56-61,66, 94, 99-101).

Baskette said Respondent never mentioned to her that he had any kind of conflict of interest and she never

waived any conflict of interest he may have had. (Tr. 62-63)

Baskette told Respondent that she thought she deserved some compensation for her time and effort in getting

the house in shape to be sold. Respondent told her she was entitled to a fee as administrator of the estate.

Respondent mentioned the amount of $1,00Q to be given to her "under the table." Respondent gave Baskette a

check for $500 in:December2012. (Tr. 63-6£j, 84-85, 106).

Baskette said shp did not read the contract fqr t(ie sale of Sefried's house to Houchin. (Adm. Ex. 8). She

explained that Respondent just called her aqjj s'pid he had papers for her to sign. She was not aware that, in

the contract, the $efried Estate agreed to survey the property. She did not know there had been a survey until

she had a conversation with Respondent in Jpnpary 2013. Respondent told Baskette that the real estate taxes

App. 71

on the property had to be paid. When the house was sold, she agreed that Houchin would get a credit for

paying the 2012 taxes. She also explained that there was some refuge in the yard of the property and that she

had agreed to get rid of it. (Tr. 66-69, 102-103).

Baskette was referred to an affidavit of Respondent, in which he said he discussed real estate taxes with

Baskette on several occasions. Specifically, he said he told her he would apply for reduction of taxes when he

had sufficient information. He also said he told her that when the property was sold without the assessed value

being reduced, the settlement for the taxes at closing would be based on the current assessed value and tax

rate. (Resp. Ex. 9). Baskette

PAGE 9:

testified that she did not believe the above discussion occurred. She also said Respondent never told her he

was going to try to get the taxes reduced. (Tr. 70-72,104-105)

Baskette said that Respondent never told her that his wife, Geraldine Elder, was going to finance Houchin's

purchase of Sefried's house or that Geraldine was going to have a mortgage on the property. Baskette was not

aware at closing that Geraldine was paying for the house. (Tr. 72-73).

In January 2013, Baskette thought there was about $5,000 in the estate after the sale of the house. She

contacted Respondent and asked him about the "rest of the money." He replied that there was not a lot of

money left. Respondent "kind of went down a list" with her. At one point he said his fees were $4,000. She then

told him he said his fee would be $3,000. Ultimately he told her there was about $63.46 in the estate account.

He offered her a check, which she did not look at but assumed it was for the $63.46. She refused the check.

She told him she wanted the title to the house back. He replied that that was not going to happen. Baskette

then told him she would see him in court. (Tr. 73-76. 84, 107-108; Adm. Ex. 18).

In June 2013, while the Sefried Estate was still open, she received a letter signed by Houchin. (Adm. Ex. 19).

She now knows that the letter was drafted by Respondent. In the letter, she was requested to remove the trash

and debris from the property by June 8. The letter also stated that if she did not have the trash and debris

removed "I [Houchin] will hire someone to remove them and bill the Estate and ask that you [Baskette] be

removed as the administrator for failure to perform your duties." After receiving the letter, Baskette called

Respondent. He told her that Houchin had the right to give her a certain amount of time to clean up the

property. Baskette then paid someone $150 to remove the items on the property. When she gave the receipt to

Respondent, he gave her $150 from his wallet. (Tr. 76-79, 105).

PAGE 10:

Baskette received a telephone call from Mr. Rau, Respondent's partner. Rau told her she owed about $6,000 to

the firm and asked her to come to his office and discuss the matter. She did so. Subsequently, at Rau's

suggestion, she wrote a letter to Judge Flannell about this matter. (Tr. 80-81). Rau has released any claim

against Baskette and the estate. (Tr. 83).

Mr. Crouse is no longer interested in purchasing the house. The house is back as an asset of the Sefried

Estate and she is attempting to sell it. Baskette is now represented by attorney Elizabeth Nohren. Baskette said

she owes about $5,000 in attorney fees to Nohren and hopes to pay her from the proceeds of the sale of the

house. (Tr. 81-82, 111-12, 115-16).

Respondent

Respondent testified that he was licensed to practice law in 1964 and is 73 years of age. His practice has been

primarily in the areas of real estate, probate, and tax. He has resided in Sullivan, Moultrie County, for about 60

years. He and his wife have been married for about 50 years. (Tr. 122-24, 186).

Respondent testified that Lenora Sefried died in October 2011. Shortly thereafter, Sefried's daughter, Pamela

Baskette, spoke with Respondent. She inquired about whether Respondent was in possession of a will or any

records regarding Sefried's real estate. Respondent told Baskette that he did not any documents pertaining to

Sefried, but would check real estate records for her. He later found that Sefried owned the property on Magill

Street where she previously resided. Respondent denied that Baskette asked him if he was interested in

purchasing that property. Respondent did not charge Baskette for looking into the ownership of the property.

He continued to have conversations with Baskette, and give her advice regarding her mother's estate during

the summer of 2012. However, he had no attorney-client relationship with Baskette at that time and did not

charge her any fee. (Tr. 125-31).

PAGE 11:

In the fall of 2012, Baskette met with Respondent. She told him she had talked with other attorneys about

representing her as administrator of her mother's estate and they all wanted fees in excess of $3,000.

Respondent told Baskette he would represent her as administrator for a flat fee of $3,000 plus costs. Baskette

agreed. There was no written fee agreement. (Tr.131-33, 197-98).

Respondent prepared various documents for th^ Sefried Estate that were filed with the court. (Resp. Ex.1). He

said he discussed all the documents "in deta||" vyith Baskette. The Petition for Letters of Administration listed

the value of tl^e real property at $5,000. Respondent said he believed that was "realistic figure" for the property.

App. 72

(Tr. 137-39). After the estate was opened, Respondent told Baskette that she needed to find a buyer for the

Sefried property. She told him she would work on it. As winter approached, Respondent suggested that they

have the house on the property winterized. Baskette agreed. Respondent hired a man named Birt to winterize

the house. Birt submitted a bill for $50, and it was paid by the estate. (Adm. Ex. 17). About a month after

Baskette said she would try to find a buyer, she had not done so. Respondent then offered to help find a buyer,

and Baskette agreed. He asked her if she would sell the property for $5,000 if he could find a buyer at that

price, and Baskette said yes. Thereafter, Respondent talked with Ron Houchin about buying the Sefried

property for use as a "garden site." Houchin liked to garden, but did not have space to do so where he lived.

Respondent told Houchin that Respondent's wife would loan him the money to buy the property. Respondent

had previously loaned Houchin $7,000,which Houchin still owed. Also, Respondent had a prior business

relationship with Houchin. Houchin agreed to purchase the Sefried property for $5,000. (Tr. 137-43,186-88).

PAGE 12:

Houchin went to look at the property with Respondent. While doing so, Houchin voiced concern about the

location of the lot lines because there were "no definitive markers ... particularly on the west side." Houchin

asked how he could find out where the lot lines were located, and Respondent replied that the property could

be surveyed. Houchin was also concerned about the junk or debris on the property, and wanted it removed.

(Tr. 144-45).

Respondent informed Baskette that a friend of his would buy the Sefried property for $5,000. Baskette never

mentioned that anyone had offered $10,000 for the property or that she had any prospective buyer. Baskette

"hoped to get more" for the property, but she agreed to sell the property for $5,000. Respondent said he

discussed an appraisal of the property with Baskette. However, they decided not to have an appraisal because

of the possible cost, $300 to $500, and "because of the condition of the house, the lot size and so forth ... it

would be extremely difficult to find any reasonable comparables to compare the property." Respondent said he

also told Baskette that the buyer wants to know where the lot lines are located and is "going to insist that we

have a survey done." Respondent also told her that "you don't have to agree to this" and n[i]f you don't want the

contract just tell him that you don't want to sell the house to him and that's it." She then "agreed to go ahead.”

Respondent explained that normally the seller pays for a survey, but that it is a "negotiable item." He said he

had a similar discussion with Baskette as to the removal of trash or debris from the property. (Tr. 143,145-51,

201-202).

Respondent drafted the contract for the sale of the Sefried property to Houchin. (Adm. Ex. 8). He said he went

over every paragraph of the contract "in detail" with Baskette. He also testified that he tries to draft a contract

that is fair and acceptable to both parties. He acknowledged that he put "terms that Houchin wanted in the

contract and Baskette did not have any objections to those terms." (Tr. 149-51, 177,195-96).

PAGE 13:

Respondent explained the matter of the real estate taxes for the Sefried property. For the year 2010, the tax

was paid in 201 land Mrs. Sefried received a Homestead Exemption and an Elderly Exemption. As a result,

there was no tax due. For the year 2011, there had been no request for any exemption and the real estate tax

was "six hundred and some dollars" and paid in 2012. For the year 2012, tax to be paid in 2013, no exemptions

were applicable because Mrs. Sefried was deceased. Prior to drafting the contract for the sale of the Sefried

property, Respondent called the township assessor and asked if the assessment on the Sefried property could

be reduced. He received a call back, informing him that he had to file such a request to reduce the tax

assessment with the Supervisor of Assessments. Respondent knew from experience that the Supervisor of

Assessments would not change the assessment without an appraisal or a deed showing the property was sold

at a lower price. (Tr. 151-53).

At the closing for the sale of the Sefried property on December 6, 2012, real estate taxes on the property were

prorated based upon the number of days the Sefried Estate owned the property and the number of days

Houchin owned it. As a result, Houchin received a credit of $612.16 at the closing. (Tr. 154-56; Adm. Exs. 12,

17). Subsequent to the sale of the property, Respondent took the deed that showed the selling price of $5,000

to the Supervisor of Assessments in order to obtain a reduction of the assessed value. He request was

processed "fairly promptly" and the assessed value of the property was reduced for the year 2012. As a result,

Houchin, or Respondent's wife who financed the purchase of the property, would have paid real estate taxes of

about $247 for the year 2012. (Tr. 154-56,161, 191-93).

There was a survey of the Sefried property after the sale to Houchin. Respondent said he thought it cost

between $500 and $600. The cost of the survey was paid in part by Respondent's wife and in part by the Rau

and Elder law firm. Subsequently, as part of the settlement for the

PAGE 14:

Sefried Estate to reacquire the property in 2Q14 (Resp. Ex. 6), the law firm was reimbursed $360. (Tr. 158-60;

172, 203-204; Rasp. Exs. 6, 7).

In June 2013, Hoychin asked Respondent wjiat pould be done about having the trash or debris removed from

App. 73

the former Sefried property. Respondent suggested Houchin write Baskette a letter. Respondent then prepared

two letters that Houchin signed and sent to Baskette. (Adm. Exs. 19, 21). Respondent testified that he

anticipated that Houchin would rewrite the letters, but instead, Houchin just signed and sent them. (Tr. 166-68).

In 2014 attorney Elizabeth Nohren represented Baskette as administrator of the Sefreid Estate. A settlement

was reached, and an agreed order was entered by Judge Flannell allowing the Estate to re-purchase the

Sefried property for $6,000. The Estate did not have sufficient funds to re-purchase the property, and

Respondent provided $2,500 for the re-purchase. (Tr. 169-72; Resp. Exs. 4-7).

Respondent acknowledged that he had a conflict of interest in his representation of Pamela Baskette in regard

to the sale of the Sefried Estate property to Ron Houchin. Respondent also acknowledged he did not inform

Baskette that: he had a conflict of interest; he had a prior business relationship with Houchin; Houchin owed

Respondent $7,000 on a loan; or Respondent's wife was going to loan Houchin the $5,000 to purchase the

property. He further acknowledged he engaged in a conflict of interest by drafting letters for Houchin that were

sent to Baskette. (Tr. 143-44, 173-74, 176-77). Finally, Respondent testified that he intended to amend

paragraphs, 23, 24, 25, and 32, of his Answer and to admit "violating several rules." (Tr. 179; Resp. Ex. 9).

PAGE 15:

Stipulation Regarding Eric Crouse

There was a stipulation regarding the testimony of Eric Crouse. (Adm. Ex. 28). It was stipulated that Pamela

Baskette contacted Crouse in the fall or winter of 2012 in regard to the Sefried property on Magill Street in

Sullivan. Crouse "had some interest" in buying the property. After viewing the property, Crouse telephoned

Baskette and told her the property was "only worth $7,000 to $8,000 to him." Crouse did not make an offer to

purchase the property because it was an asset of a probate estate.

B. Analysis and Conclusions

An attorney has a fiduciary relationship with each person he or she represents, which requires "undivided

fidelity" and "a duty to avoid conflicts of interest." In re Winship, 219 III. 2d 526, 543-44, 848 N.E.2d 961(2006);

In re O'Donnell, 04 CH 115, M.R. 22181 (Mar. 17, 2008) (Hearing Bd. at 10). A conflict of interest exists

whenever an attorney's independent judgment on behalf of a client may be affected by a loyalty to another

client, a third party, or by the attorney's own interests. It is not necessary to prove that the attorney's

professional judgment was actually compromised in order to establish a conflict of interest. See In re La Pinska,

72 III. 2d 461,469, 381 N.E.2d 700 (1978); In re Rosin, 118 III. 2d 365, 381, 515 N.E.2d 85 (1987); In re

Hildebrand, 04 SH 52, M.R. 20754 (Mar. 20, 2006) (Review Bd. at 10); In re Marshall, 2010PR00129, M.R.

26312 (Jan. 17, 2014) (Review Bd. at 6).

It is well established that an attorney has a conflict of interest by representing a client in a real estate or other

financial transaction while, at the same time, having a loyalty to another party or the attorney's own interest in

the transaction. For example, in In re Twohey, 191 III. 2d 74, 89, 727 N.E.2d 1028 (2000), the attorney had a

conflict of interest when he suggested to a client (Week) that she loan money to a certain company (FRM), and

he prepared the promissory note

PAGE 16:

for the loan, when the attorney had a financial interest in that company. He did not inform Week of his conflict of

interest and did not advise her to seek independent counsel or advice. Even though the attorney's conduct did

not involve fraud or deliberate misrepresentations, he had a conflict of interest.

The attorneys in the following cases were also found to have had a conflict of interest.

In In re Chernoff, 91 ll.2d 316, 320, 323-24, 438 N.E.2d 168 (1983), the respondent told his clients that he had

a friend who was would buy their property through a trust. However, respondent and his friend each had a 50%

beneficial interest in the trust that purchased the property, which was not disclosed to the clients.

In In re Jones, 07 SH 18, M.R. 23856 (Sept. 20, 2010), the respondent represented a woman and her niece in

the sale of farmland and, at the same time had a personal, financial and professional relationship with the

buyer. Respondent and the buyer, Griffth, had a romantic relationship for several years, they were co-owners of

a business, and respondent prepared tax returns for Griffith. Additionally, shortly after the sale, respondent,

acting on behalf of Griffith, faxed financial information to a bank regarding Griffith's application for a mortgage

on the farmland she purchased from respondent's clients. (Hearing Bd. at 31-32).

In Marshall, 2010PR00129, the respondent represented the seller of certain property and respondent's wife

was the real estate agent for the sale. The Review Board stated: "[wjhen a lawyer represents a seller and his or

her spouse is the real estate broker due to receive a commission form the sale, a conflict of interest exists. The

lawyer in such a situation has a direct financial interest in the successful completion of the sale." (Review Bd. at

6).

In In re Biaginj, 07 SH 13, M.R. 23136 (Sept. 2?, 2009), respondent represented two clients, the Hummell

brothers, and prepared a contract for their sa|e gf property to a person

named Breheny. preheny was a business pqrtnpr of respondent in real estate ventures, and the funds used by

App. 74

Breheny in the transaction with the Hummells came from his business relationship with respondent. See also In

re Gearhart, 05 SH 19, M.R. 21335 (Mar. 19, 2007) (Respondent represented both the seller and the purchaser

of a house); O'Donnell, 04 CH 115 (Mar. 17, 2008) (Respondent represented both parties in a real estate sale);

In re Jeffers, 08 CH 103, M.R. 23537 (Jan. 21, 2010) (Respondent represented both the buyer and seller of a

house).

The Respondent's conduct in the case before us clearly establishes that he had a loyalty to another person or

persons involved in the purchase of property while he was representing Pamela Baskette, the administrator of

the Sefried Estate and seller of the property. Respondent informed Baskette that he had a buyer for the Sefried

Estate property on Magill Street in Sullivan, where the deceased had maintained her residence. Respondent

merely told Baskette that the buyer was a friend. Respondent did not disclose the name of the buyer, Ron

Houchin, or the extent of Respondent's relationship with the buyer. Specifically, Respondent did not disclose

"how good of a friend" the buyer was to Respondent; that Houchin owed Respondent $7,000 on a loan; or that

Respondent and Houchin had a prior business relationship. (Tr. 143-44, 177; Resp. Ex. 9 at par. 4). As

discussed below, Respondent selected the selling price of $5,000 for the property without any reasonable basis

for doing so. In order to effectuate the sale, Respondent told Houchin that Respondent's wife would loan him

the entire purchase price of $5,000. Respondent did not disclose to Baskette that Respondent's wife loaned

Houchin the $5,000 or that Respondent's wife would have a mortgage on the property. (Tr. 143-44).

The real estate contract prepared by Respondent required the seller, his client, to obtain a survey without any

attempt to negotiate the matter with Houchin. Respondent and his wife lived near the Sefried Estate property,

with the corners of the lots touching, and Respondent's wife

PAGE 18:

owned property, on which she had a garden, that bordered the Sefried Estate property. Respondent had an

interest in getting the Sefried Estate property "cleaned up" to eliminate "blight on the neighborhood." (Resp. Ex.

9 at par. 3). On the day of the closing, December 6, 2012, Respondent wrote and endorsed a check for $5,000

from his wife's account made payable to Houchin and the Sefried Estate to purchase the property. (Adm. Ex.

11; Compl. and Ans. at par. 19). On the day of the closing, Respondent prepared an agreement whereby

Houchin agreed to pay Respondent's wife $612.16, which was the amount of credit Houchin received for the

2102 real estate taxes on the property purchased. (Adm. Ex. 9). On the day of the closing, Respondent

prepared an assignment of mortgage on the property from Houchin to Respondent's wife, which was

subsequently recorded. (Adm. Ex. 13). On the day following the closing, Respondent went to the County

Treasurer's Office and filed papers to have the real estate taxes on the property reduced. The obvious purpose

for Respondent seeking to get the taxes reduced was to benefit either Houchin or Respondent's wife. (Tr. 15657, 191-92; Adm. Exs. 16 at 12-13, 27 at 14).

In June 2013, while Respondent was still representing Baskette, he drafted two letters for Houchin, which

Houchin signed and sent to Baskette. The Respondent intended that the letters, or the substance thereof, be

sent to Baskette. One of the letters requested that Baskette remove trash and debris from the property by June

15, 2013. The letter also stated that if the items were not removed by that date Houchin "will hire someone to

remove them and bill the Estate and ask that you [Baskette] be removed as administrator for failure to perform

your duties." (Adm. Ex. 19). The second letter also requested Baskette to remove all trash and debris from the

property by a certain date. (Tr. 167-68). Clearly, by drafting the foregoing letters pertaining to the

PAGE 19:

property, Respondent was working on behalf of Houchin and against the interests of his client Baskette.

The Administrator specifically charged that the Respondent engaged in a conflict of interest in two respects.

First, the Administrator charged that Respondent arranged for the sale of the Sefried Estate property to Don

Houchin and/or to Respondent's wife, Geraldine, for a price substantially lower than the Sefried Estate could

have obtained from another buyer and by requesting the Estate to pay for surveying costs when the property

was sold "as is." (Compl. at par. 38(a)).

In Jones, 07 SH 18, the Hearing Board stated the following, with which we Agree:

The conflicting interests of a buyer and seller are obvious. It is in the seller's interest to sell the property at the

highest possible price, and it is in the buyer's interest to purchase the property at the lowest possible price.

Consequently, there are frequently negotiations during the process of the sale of real estate.

(Hearing Bd. at 32).

The evidence, including Respondent's testimony, showed that Respondent was the first, and only, person to

recommend a selling price of $5,000 for the $ef|ied Estate property. Additionally, Respondent initiated the sale

of the property to Ron Houchin for that price, without any negotiation, and he even told Houchin that

Respondent's wif^ would loan him the entire $5 p00 to purchase the property. Respondent provided no

objective basis or reasonable explanation for th? $5,000 selling price. When asked why he placed a $5,000

value on the pfopprty in Petition for Letters qf Administration (Resp. Ex 1 at 1), he merely said he believed that

was "realistic fjgufe" for the property. (Tr. 137-39). Respondent spoke with Pamela Baskette, his client and

App. 75

administrator of the Sefried Estate, about an appraisal of the property. However, Respondent told Baskette that

an appraisal would cost $300 to $500; that "it's a very difficult property to appraise;" and "because of the

condition of the house, the lot size and so

PAGE 20:

forth ... it would be extremely difficult to find any reasonable comparables to compare the property." (Tr. 14748). The Respondent did not indicate that he explained any possible benefit of an appraisal to Baskette.

Thereafter, Baskette decided not to obtain an appraisal. Contrary to what Respondent told Baskette, an

appraisal of the property was obtained in 2014, by an investigator for the ARDC, and comparable properties

were found and discussed in the appraisal. (Adm. Ex. 24). It is apparent that Respondent intentionally and

successfully sought to convince Baskette not to obtain an appraisal of the property. Respondent then arranged

for the sale of the property to his friend Houchin for $5,000, without any attempt to negotiate a higher selling

price to benefit his client.

Based upon the evidence, the $5,000 selling price was less than the fair market value of the property. The

2014 appraisal concluded that the property has a value of $6,500. (Adm. Ex. 24 at 4, 10). Additionally, the

stipulated testimony of Eric Crouse showed he told Baskette in 2012 that he was interested in the property and

that it was worth "$7,000 to $8,000 to him." (Adm. Ex. 28). We find it impossible to believe, as claimed by

Respondent, that after Respondent suggested to Baskette that the property be sold to Houchin for $5,000,

Baskette did not mention Eric Crouse being interested in the property at a higher price. Respondent, however,

made no inquiry into Crouse's possible interest. Consequently, Respondent made no effort to act in the best

interest of his client.

The evidence, including Respondent's testimony, also showed that he told Baskette that the buyer of the

property is "going to insist that we have a survey done." Even though Respondent acknowledged that the cost

of a survey is a "negotiable item," he did not inform his client that it was negotiable and he made no attempt to

negotiate with the buyer about paying a portion of the cost of a survey. (Tr. 150-51, 201-292). Instead,

Respondent simply drafted the

PAGE 21:

Agreement for Sale of Real Estate with a provision stating that the "Seller agrees to have the real estate

surveyed." (Adm. Ex. 8 at 4). Consequently, Respondent made no effort to act in the best interest of his client

in regard to a survey.

Secondly, the Administrator charged that Respondent had a conflict of interest by covertly assisting Houchin

and/or Respondent's wife against the Sefried Estate in requiring the Estate to clean the property, six months

after the closing. Compl. at par. 38(b).

As mentioned above, in June 2013, while Respondent was still representing Pamela Baskette as administrator

of the Sefried Estate, he drafted two letters for Houchin. One of the letters requested Baskette to remove trash

and debris from the property Houchin purchased by a certain date and went on to say that if the items were not

removed by that date Houchin "will hire someone to remove them and bill the Estate and ask that you be

removed as administrator for failure to perform your duties." (Adm. Ex. 19). The second letter also requested

Baskette to remove all trash and debris from the property by a certain date. Respondent intended for Houchin

to send the letters, or the substance of what Respondent had drafted, to Baskette. Respondent did not inform

Baskette that he drafted the letters. By drafting the letters, Respondent had a conflict of interest because he

was clearly acting in Houchin's interest and against Baskette's interest. Respondent testified that he anticipated

that Houchin would rewrite the letters, but instead, Houchin just signed and sent them. (Tr. 166-68). We find

noting mitigating in the foregoing testimony. There is no doubt that Respondent intended for the substance of

what he drafted to be sent to Baskette, and the substance was contrary to Baskette's interest.

A client may effectively waive a conflict of interest on the part of his or her attorney based upon "informed

consent." See Rule 1.7(b)(4). Comment [18] to Rule 1.7 states that informed consent requires "each affected

client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the

PAGE 22:

material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse affects on the interests of that

client." In In Demuth, 126 III. 2d 1, 10-11, 533 N.E.2d 867 (1988), the respondent had a conflict of interest by

representing both the lender and borrower in a loan transaction. The Supreme Court held that there was no

waiver of the conflict by the clients. The Court stated that, although the clients agreed to the transaction, "this

consent was not given after full disclosure by respondent. Respondent failed to advise his clients of the conflict

or that they had a right to retain independent counsel."

In Twohey, 191 III. 2d at 89, the attorney had a conflict of interest when he suggested to a client that she loan

money to a certain company in which he had a financial interest and did not inform the client of his conflict of

interest and did not advise her to see independent counsel or advice. In In re Cook, 2010PR00106, M.R. 26581

(May 16, 2014), tfiere was no informed consent and waiver where the respondent failed to disclose his financial

interest in the transaction. Cook, 2010PR00 |P6 (Review Bd. at 26). In Biagini, 07 SH 13, there was no

App. 76

informed consent or waiver where the respondent did not disclose to his clients that the other party to the real

estate transaction was his "business partner and the funds being used to buy the property were from that

arrangement and that the transaction benefited not only a business partner, but also a relative to his wife."

(Review Bd. at 9-10). Jones, 07 SH 18, the respondent represented the sellers in the sale of a farm and failed

to disclose that the buyer was a personal friend (Griffith) with whom respondent had a financial relationship. In

fact, shortly after the sale, respondent, acting on behalf of Griffith, faxed financial information to a bank

regarding Griffith's application for a mortgage on the farm she purchased from respondent's clients. (Hearing

Bd. at 31-32).

PAGE 23:

In the case before us, Respondent failed to make sufficient disclosures to Baskette in order for her to

understand that Respondent had a conflict of interest and the reasons for his conflict. Respondent admitted he

failed to make adequate disclosures to Baskette. (Tr. 174; Resp. Ex. 9 at par. 2). Respondent, while

representing Baskette as administrator of the Sefried Estate for the sale of the Estate's real property, failed to

disclose that he, in fact, had a conflict of interest and that she should obtain independent counsel or advice. (Tr.

176-78; Resp. Ex. 9 at par. 2) When the Respondent informed Baskette that he had a buyer for the property,

he disclosed that the buyer was a "friend." However, he did not disclose the name of the buyer, Ron Houchin,

"how good of a friend he was" or the "extent of [Respondent's] relationship with Ron." (Tr. 177; Resp. Ex. 9 at

par. 4). For example, Respondent did not disclose that he had a prior business relationship with Houchin or that

Houchin owed Respondent $7,000 on a loan. (Tr. 144,176).

Also, Respondent did not inform Baskette that Respondent's wife loaned Houchin the entire amount of the

purchase price for the property or that his wife would have a mortgage on the property. He did not disclose the

fact that, because he lived near the subject property, he had an interest in having the Sefreid Estate property

"cleaned up and a blight on the neighborhood eliminated." (Resp. Ex. 9 at par. 3). Respondent did not inform

Baskette that he was going to perform legal work on behalf of Houchin or Respondent's wife, which included

preparing, on the day of the closing, an agreement whereby Houchin was to pay Respondent's wife the amount

of credit Houchin received for the 2012 real estate taxes and preparing an assignment of mortgage. (Adm. Exs.

9, 13). Respondent did not inform Baskette that he was going to seek a reduction in real estate taxes for the

benefit of Houchin. Respondent did not disclose to Baskette that he

PAGE 24:

drafted two letters for Houchin to send to Baskette and which made demands on Baskette to remove trash and

debris from the property by certain dates. ((Tr. 167; Adm. Ex. 9 at par. 7).

Therefore, we find that Pamela Baskette did not waive the Respondent's conflict of interest while he was

representing her as the administrator of the Lenora Sefried estate.

Based upon the above, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent

engaged in a conflict of interest by representing a client when the representation was materially limited by the

lawyer's responsibilities to another client, to a third party, or by the lawyer's own interests, in violation of Rule

I.7(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

II. Respondent is charged with engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,

which is a violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

A. Admitted Facts

We considered the same admitted facts and evidence as in Section I, above.

B. Analysis and Conclusions

The Administrator charged that Respondent engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation "by

covertly assisting" Houchin and/or Respondent's wife against the Sefried Estate by requesting that Baskette

clean the property after it had been sold. (Compl. at par. 38(c)).

As discussed in Section I, above, Respondent represented Pamela Baskette as administrator of the Lenora

Sefried Probate Estate. In that capacity, Respondent initiated and completed the sale of Estate property to his

friend Ron Houchin on December 6, 2012. Respondent's wife loaned Houchin the full amount of the purchase

price and she then had a mortgage on the property. In June 2013, Respondent was still representing Baskette.

PAGE 25:

Respondent testified that in June 2013 Houchin asked him what could be done about having the trash or debris

removed from the property he purchased from the Sefried estate. Respondent suggested that Houchin write

Baskette a letter. Respondent then prepared two letters that Houchin signed and sent to Baskette. (Adm. Exs.

19, 21). The first letter, dated June 3, 2013, stated that the contract to purchase the property "provided that you

would remove the trash and rubbish" from the property, and requested Baskette to "immediately remove the

rest of the trash and debris and any items you want by June 15, 2013." The letter further stated; "[i]f there is

any trash or other items left after then, I will tjire someone to remove them and bill the Estate and ask that you

[Baskette] be ]'err|oved as administrator for failure to perform your duties." (Adm. Ex. 19). The second letter,

dated June 2j, 2013, requested that Baskette "please remove the items remaining in the house, wet storage

App. 77

shed and the vinyl siding in the yard by July 6, 2013. (Adm. Ex. 21).

Respondent admitted that he did not disclose to his client Baskette that he drafted the foregoing letters for

Houchin. (Compl. and Ans. at par. 33). After receiving the first letter, Baskette telephoned Respondent for

advice. He told her that "Houchin had the right to give [her] a certain amount of time to clean up the property,

and that she "had to clean up the property." (Tr. 76-79, 105).

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle that dishonesty and deceit in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4),

now Rule 8.4(c), "is broadly construed to include anything calculated to deceive, including the suppression of

truth and the suggestion of falsity." In re Edmonds, 2014 IL 117696, ? 53. Based upon the evidence,

Respondent's admission and the overall circumstances, it is clear that Respondent intentionally hid from

Baskette the fact that he drafted the letters for Houchin to send to Baskette. After Baskette received the letters,

and believing they

PAGE 26:

were written by Houchin, she sought advice from Respondent. When a client seeks advice about a matter from

his or her attorney, it is critical for the client to know whether the attorney is affirmatively working on behalf of

another person in the same matter, and that person's interest is directly contrary to interest of the client. This

would seem to be a basic requirement of the attorney-client relationship and the attorney's duty of undivided

loyalty to the client. However, Respondent gave Baskette advice without informing her that he had written the

letter or letters about which she was inquiring.

In re Ring, 141 III. 2d 128, 140,143, 565 N.E.2d 983 (1990), the Supreme Court found that the respondent’s

failure to disclose to his client that the respondent was not going to file an appellate brief and that the client's

appeal had been dismissed constituted conduct involving dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation. In reaching

its decision, the Court stated:

When a client places his or her trust in an attorney to pursue a legal matter on the client's behalf, it is essential

that the attorney keep the client reasonably informed about the progress of the matter. In this way, the client

can make an intelligent decision to proceed with the matter, to terminate pursuit of the matter, or to exercise

some other option such as seeking the advice of other counsel.

Ring, 141 III. 2d 128

In In re Ducey, 03 SH123, M.R. 23053 (May 18, 2009), the respondent was found to have engaged in

dishonesty by filing pleadings on behalf of an estate after he had been discharged as counsel for the estate.

The respondent argued that he did not act dishonestly because he "did not withhold any information that [the

clients] specifically requested." In rejecting the respondent's argument, the Review Board cited the decision in

Ring, and stated: "an attorney has an obligation not only to respond truthfully to a client’s inquiries, but to

disclose information about the status of the case. It should go without saying that a client would want to know

that a lawsuit has been filed on the client's behalf." (Review Bd. at 16-17)

PAGE 27:

In the case before us, Baskette placed her trust in Respondent. As in Ducey, it should go without saying that

Baskette would want to know if Respondent is working against her interest so that, as stated in Ring, she could

make an intelligent decision about options, including whether to seek advice from independent counsel. It is

clear that, by failing to disclose the critical fact that he wrote the letters for Houchin, Respondent purposefully

and intentionally engaged in conduct calculated to deceive Pamela Baskette. See In re Thomas, 2012 IL

113035, ?? 89-90.

Based upon the above, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent

engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the

Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

III. Respondent is charged with engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, which is

a violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010).

A. Evidence Considered

We considered the same evidence as discussed in Section I, above.

B. Analysis and Conclusions

The Complaint charged that Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice

because his misconduct delayed the closing of the Lenora Sefried Estate.

An attorney's misconduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice if it has an adverse impact on the

representation of a client or on a judicial proceeding. See In re Storment, 203 III. 2d 378, 399, 786 N.E.2d 963

(2002). In In re Smith, 168 III. 2d 269, 283-84, 659 N.E.2d 896 (1995), the Court pointed out that dilatory

practices bring thp administration of justice into disrepute." In In re Cutright, 233 III. 2d 474, 910 N.E.2d 581

(2009), the respondent was found

PAGE 28:

to have engaged jn conduct prejudicial to the acjpninistration of justice by allowing a probate estate to remain

open for numqroijs years. In In re Shoemakq[, 2011PR00090, M.R. 25623 (Jan. 18, 2013), the attorney's

App. 78

misconduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice where it delayed the closing of a probate estate for

several years. (Hearing Bd. at 18). In In re McAvoy, 03 CH 8, M.R. 20463 (Jan. 13, 2006), the attorney's

misconduct was prejudicial to administration of justice "by delaying the matter, and wasting] the court's time

and resources." (Review Bd. at 15).

As a result of the Respondent's misconduct additional court proceedings were held in the Lenora Sefried

Estate case. (Adm. Exs. 26, 27). Additionally, the property sold to Respondent's friend was later reacquired by

the Estate (Resp. Exs. 5, 6). Judge Danny Flannell, who is the presiding judge in the Sefried probate case,

testified that Respondent's conduct "extended greatly the amount of time that the case has been pending" and

"it complicated it beyond belief." (Tr. 33-34).

Based on the above, we find the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent

engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of

Professional Conduct (2010).

EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION

Respondent was licensed to practice law in 1964 (Tr. 123) and it was stipulated that he has not been previously

disciplined. (Tr. 227).

Respondent testified that, although he did not initially recognize he had a conflict of interest while representing

Pamela Baskette, he now realizes he did have a conflict of interest and that he did not make adequate

disclosures to Baskette. (Tr.172-74).

PAGE 29:

Respondent also testified about his charitable and community activities. He has been involved with the Sullivan

preschool, which is a not-for-profit organization that operates a preschool and day care facility. He is on the

organization's board of directors and has handled the legal work for the organization on a pro bono basis. In

the past year he donated about $2,500 to the preschool. Respondent has also been active with the First

Christian Church. He also served on a planning board to build a new church and did all the legal work involved

in the construction on a pro bono basis. He currently is a trustee on the church board. He said he also makes

contributions to the church, the University of Illinois, and a local theater. (Tr. 180-84).

Three character witnesses testified on behalf of the Respondent. Paul Hrvol testified about Respondent's

involvement with the Sullivan preschool, and said that Respondent's reputation for truth and veracity is very

good. (Tr. 205-209). Lynn Elder testified about Respondent's involvement with the First Christian Church and

the Lions Club, and said Respondent's reputation for truth and veracity is very high. (Tr. 210-14). Tom Hargis

testified that he has had a business and personal relationship with Respondent for many years, and said

Respondent's reputation for truth and veracity is excellent. (Tr. 216-19).

In aggravation, Respondent denied that when he sought to have the 2012 real estate taxes reduced on the

property the day after it was purchased by Ron Houchin on December 6, 2012, that he did it for Houchin's

benefit. (Tr. 193). There is no doubt, however, that a reduction of the real estate tax would only benefit the

purchaser of the real estate, not the seller. At a court proceeding on August 2, 2013, he was questioned by

Judge Flannell and gave the following answers.

THE COURT: Your petition for administration alleges the real estate is worth $5,000. Who made the request

to reduce the taxes?

MR. ELDER:

I did.

PAGE 30:

THE COURT: After the transaction?

MR. ELDER:

I think I did.

THE COURT: Why would you do that if Mr. Houchin is unrepresented in the real estate transaction, Mr.

Elder?

MR. ELDER:

I was helping him.

(Adm. Ex. 26 at 12)

Additionally, in the Respondent's affidavit, dated July 10, 2014, Respondent stated that the "application to the

Supervisor of Assessments for redetermination of the taxes after closing was for the benefit of the buyer,

Ronald Houchin, and any subsequent owners." (Resp. Ex. 9 at par. 6). At the time Respondent sought the

reduction of taxes he had no reason to believe that the Sefried Estate would ever reacquire that property. Thus,

contrary to Respondent's testimony his successful effort to reduce the real estate taxes on the property was for

the benefit of Houchin and not for the benefit of the Sefried Estate.

The affidavit of Respondent (Resp. Ex. 9) contained two false statements. First, Respondent said "I explained

my interest in getting the property cleaned up to Pamela Baskette and she agreed that she would waive any

such conflict." (Resp. Ex. 9 at par. 3). Respondent testified that he told Baskette he had an interest in getting

the property c|eaned up, but that he "didn't t<j|l hjpr it was a conflict" and "didn't ask her to waive it." (Tr. 175-76).

In his affidavit, Respondent also said "[ajfter fevjewing the contract terms, Pamela Baskette indicated she was

willing to accept tjiem and waive any conflict yvitfi the sale to Ron Houchin." Respondent has maintained

App. 79

throughout this proceeding that he did not realize he had a conflict of interest at the time of the sale of the

property. Thus, there would be no reason for him to mention a conflict or for Baskette to waive a conflict at that

time. Further, we found Pamela Baskette to be credible

PAGE 31:

when she testified that Respondent never mentioned to her any kind of conflict of interest and that she never

waived any conflict of interest. (Tr. 62-63).

RECOMMENDATION

In determining the appropriate sanction, we consider the purposes of the attorney disciplinary system. The goal

is not to punish the attorney for the misconduct, but rather "to protect the public, maintain the integrity of the

legal profession, and protect the administration of justice from reproach." In re Outright, 233 III. 2d 474, 491,

910 N.E.2d 581 (2009). We also consider the deterrent value of the sanction, that is the "need to impress upon

others the seriousness of the misconduct at issue," and whether the sanction will "help preserve public

confidence in the legal profession." In re Twohey, 191 III. 2d 75, 85, 727 N.E.2d 1028 (2000); In re Gorecki, 208

III. 2d 350, 361,802 N.E.2d 1194 (2003). Additionally, we must consider the nature and seriousness of the

misconduct, and any aggravating and mitigating circumstances shown by the evidence. Gorecki, 208 III. 2d at

360-61.

In this case, the Administrator requested the sanction of suspension for at 90 days. (Tr. 227). Respondent

argued that, if discipline is appropriate, it should be a censure. (Tr. 242).

The misconduct charged and proved in this case was very serious. The Respondent represented a client when

he had a clear conflict of interest in doing so. The Respondent, an experienced practitioner, should have been

aware of his conflict of interest and either withdraw or make sufficient disclosure so that his client could make

an informed waiver of the conflict. He also acted in a deceitful and dishonest manner toward his client by

deliberately failing to inform his client that he drafted letters for a person with an opposing interest to send to his

client. Respondent failed to give "undivided fidelity" to his client and such a failure can only bring the legal

profession into disrepute.

PAGE 32:

In mitigation, the Respondent has been practicing law since 1964 and has not been previously disciplined.

Three character witnesses testified favorably as to Respondent's reputation for truth and veracity, as well as

about his community and charitable activities. The Respondent testified, without contradiction, about his

community and charitable activities and his pro bono work. Although belatedly, Respondent has now

recognized that he had a conflict of interest and has admitted the misconduct charged in the Complaint. (Resp.

Ex. 9 at par. 9).

In aggravation, Respondent denied that he was acting for the benefit of the purchaser, rather than his client,

the seller, by seeking to get the real estate taxes reduced Contrary to Respondent's testimony, we found clear

and convincing evidence that he was acting for the benefit of the purchaser. Additionally, Respondent made

two false statements in his affidavit (Resp. Ex. 9) regarding his client, Pamela Baskette, waiving the conflict of

interest. Also in aggravation, because of Respondent's misconduct, Baskette found it necessary to retain other

counsel to represent the Sefried Estate and has incurred additional legal fees of about $5,000. (Tr. 81). See In

re Stark, 2013PR00027, M.R. 27037 (Jan. 16, 2015) (Hearing Bd. at 27-28); In re German, 09 SH 06, M.R.

23520 (Mae. 16, 2010) (Hearing Bd. at 19-20).

After considering the cases cited by the Administrator and Respondent, we found the following cases to be

instructive as to the appropriate sanction.

In Twohey, 191 III. 2d 75, respondent had an attorney-client relationship with both a person named Week and a

business called FRM. Twohey advised Week to make loans to FRM without informing Week of his conflict of

interest and without advising Week to consult independent counsel. Twohey also prepared the promissory note

for the loan. At the time of the loan, Twohey was being paid by FRM and did substantial legal work on its

behalf. The Court noted, however, that the attorney was not a shareholder in FRM and "did not receive any

PAGE 33:

additional compensation as a result of the transaction with Week." Id. at 90. In addition, "Week was generally

aware of the risks involved in investing in FRM." There was a specific finding that the attorney’s conduct "did

not involve fraud or deliberate misrepresentations." However, the Court described the misconduct as "serious"

and said that Twohey's "failure to recognize such a clear conflict of interest reveals a lack of understanding of

his ethical obligations as an attorney." Id. at 90. He had practiced law for 30 years without prior discipline. A

suspension of six months was imposed.

In In re Kent, 08 CH 121, M.R.23292 (Sept. 22, 2009), respondent had a conflict of interest when he

represented the buyer in a real estate transaction and, at the same time, had an ongoing referral relationship

with the seller, who was a real estate developer, Thus, respondent had a financial interest in the continuation of

his relationship wjth the seller. Also, responcjpnt signed as a witness to his client's signature on a power of

attorney, but vyas not present when the docujnept was signed. Respondent had no prior misconduct in about

App. 80

12 years of practice; he cooperated and expressed remorse; "his motives were not deceitful, but his actions

were intended to help all parties involved;" he is

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