Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christine H. Scott, Petitioner v. Florida
Supreme Court briefFeb 20, 2024
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No. 24 -
Supreme Court of the United States
Christine Scott,
Petitioner,
vs.
State of Florida,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the Florida Supreme Court
APPENDIX
Christine Scott
Pro Se Petitioner
212 E. Hillsboro Blvd
Deerfield Beach, FL 33441
misschristinescott@hotmail.com
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Appendix A: Order of the Florida Supreme Court Declining Jurisdiction (November
la
22, 2023) Scott v. State, SC2023 -1188
lal
Appendix Aa: Notice to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction
Appendix B: Opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District
(August 2, 2023) Scott v. State, — So.3d —- (2023), 2023 WL 4917152
2a - 4a
Appendix Ba: Scott v. State, App. 4 Dist., 368 So.3d 8 (2023) Decision notes for
4al
Section 5 of Article I. Right to Assemble
Appendix C: Verdict in the County Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit, Criminal
Division in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (April 6, 2022) Case No.
2021MM007524ANB Div. "P"............................................................................
5a
Appendix Ca: Judgment in the County Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit, Criminal
Division in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (April 6, 2022) Case No.
5aal
2021MM007524ANB Div. "P"
Appendix Cb: Motion for New Trial
5aa2 - 5aa3
Appendix Cc: Order Denying Motion for New Trial
5aa4
Appendix Cd: Notice of Appeal
5aa5
Appendix aD: Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
5al - 5a4
Appendix D: Florida Statute 616
6a - 32a
Appendix E: Palm Beach County Property Appraiser Tangible Property Information'
relating to the Palm Beach County owned property located at 9067 Southern Blvd,
Royal Palm Beach, 334411, contracted to the South Florida Fair and Palm Beach
33a - 35a
County Expositions, Inc.
Appendix F: Palm Beach County Property Appraiser 'Public Ownership' relating to
the Palm Beach County owned property located at 9067 Southern Blvd, Royal
Palm Beach, 334411, contracted to the South Florida Fair and Palm Beach County
36a - 38a
Expositions, Inc.
Appendix G: NAICS Code Description for 921190 - All Other General Government
39a
Appendix H: Trial Transcript Excerpts from the County Court of the 15th Judicial
Circuit, Criminal Division in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (April 6, 2022)
............ ..................................................... ............................ ................... . 40a - I32a2
Appendix Ha: jury Note #1 / Question #1
132a3
Appendix I: Jury Instructions 13.4
133a -134a
Appendix J: Florida Statute 810.09..............................................
135a - 136a
Appendix K: (1867) The Reconstruction Acts, Chap. CLIII, Sec. 5
137a - 139a
Appendix L: State Constitutions in the Federal System: Selected Issues and
Opportunities for State Initiatives, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
140a
Relations, A-113, July 1989
Appendix M: Excerpt from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803)
.............................................................. .................................................................141a
Appendix A
la
Supreme Court of Jflortba
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 2023
Christine H. Scott,
Petitioner(s)
v.
802023*1188
Lower Tribunal No(s).:
4D22-1204;
502021MM007524AXXXMB
State of Florida,
Respondent(s)
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court on
jurisdictional briefs and portions of the record deemed necessary to
reflect jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b), Florida
Constitution, and the Court having determined that it should
decline to accept jurisdiction, it is ordered that the petition for
review is denied.
No motion for rehearing will be entertained by the Court. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(d)(2).
MUNIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ.,
concur.
A True Copy
Test:
8 11 /22/2023
John A. Tomasino
Clerk. Supreme Court
SC2023-1188 11/22/2023
DL
Appendix B
2a
Scott v. State, — So.3d — (2023)
2023WL49T7152
'
2023 WL 4917152
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED
FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT
LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT1S
SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Christine H. SCOTT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4022*1204
I
[August 2,2023]
Appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit, Palm Beach County; Sherri L. Collins, Judge; L.T.
Case No. 50-202I-MM-007524-AXXX-MB.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Christine C.
Geraghty, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for
appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan
P. Picard, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
appellee.
Opinion
Damoorgian, J.
*1 Christine Scott (“Scott”) appeals her conviction and
sentence on the charge of misdemeanor trespass after
warning. On appeal, Scott argues: (1) her conviction violates
her right to petition under article I, section 5 of the Florida
Constitution; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in failing
to conduct an adequate
Nelson 1 hearing; and (3) the trial
court's rulings on Scott's proposed jury instruction and her
proffered testimony opining on the law were error. We affirm
Scott’s conviction and sentence and write only to address
whether article 1, section 5 of the Florida Constitution confers
on the citizens a broader right to free speech on another's
private property than the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
WESTLAW
The following facts adduced at trial are relevant to our
discussion. Scott desired to run for a seat in the United States
Congress. She attempted to qualify by collecting the required
number of signed petitions from registered Florida voters.
The allegations and evidence forming the basis of Scott's
conviction arose while she attempted to collect signatures
from customers waiting in line to enter a gun show. The gun
show was held on a property owned by South Florida Fair
and Palm Beach County Expositions, Inc. No record evidence
suggests the property was owned or operated by the State or a
government agency. Entry into the gun show required a ticket.
Eventually, a law enforcement officer asked Scott to leave
after being informed by security that Scott was “harassing
patrons in line waiting to enter the Gun Show.” Scott refused
to vacate the premises and was arrested and charged with
trespass after warning.
On appeal, Scott argues she should not have been chaigcd
with—much less convicted of—trespassing at the gun show
because her actions were an exercise of her right to petition
the government on private properly held open to the public.
Although Scott recognizes that the First Amendment does
not afford her the right to engage in political activity on
private property, see f^ Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
567-69, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L,Ed.2d 131 (1972), she argues
article I, .section 5 of the Florida Constitution provides more
expansive political speech protections than the United States
Constitution. Specifically, Scott argues “Florida's choice to
create a specific section in the state constitution to protect
die right to petition and other political rights, rather than
lump all rights recognized by the First Amendment together
demonstrates that political speech is granted expanded
protection in Florida. In support of her aigument, Scott
references the differences in language between article 1,
section 4 and article I, section 5 of the Florida Constitution.
Compare Art. I, § 4, Fla. Const, (providing “[n]o law shall be
passed”) with Art. 1, § 5, Fla. Const, (providing “(t]he people
shall have the right”). From this, Scott concludes article 1,
section 5 contains no slate action requirement and allows an
individual to engage in political activity on private property.
We disagree.
*2 We do not quarrel with Scott's contention that state
constitutions may provide broader protections than those
conferred by the United Slates Constitution. See generally
PruneYatxiShopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct.
2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). However, we find nothing in
article I, section 5’s text which leads us to conclude that the
2G23 Thomson Reuters. No claim tc cripnat U.S. Government Works.
1
3a
Scott v. State, — So.3d — (2023)
2023 WL 4917152
Florida Constitution confers political speech rights greater
than those provided by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Like the First Amendment. Florida’s
Constitution only protects individuals’ freedom of political
activity and speech against government infringement. See
Attwood v. Clemons, 526 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1174 (N.D.
Fla. 2021) (*‘[T]he expressive political activities protected in
article I, section 5 of the Florida Constitution are identical to
those protected by the First Amendment.” (citing
State v.
J. P. 907 So. 2d 1101,1111 (Fla. 2004))); Publix Super Mkts
Inc. v. Tallahasseans for Prac. L. Enft, No. 2004 CA 1817,
2005 WL 3673662. at *5 (Fla. 2d Cir. Cl. Dec. 13, 2005)
(“Defendants are not entitled under the First Amendment
or the Florida Constitution to solicit signatures or engage
in political speech on Publix's privately owned or leased
property without Publix’s permission.”): Whole Foods Mkt.
Grp., Inc. v. Sarasota Coal, for a Living Wage, No. 2007
CA 002208 NC. 2010 WL 2380390 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. Mar.
31, 2010) (“Florida courts have held that the provisions of
the Declaration of Rights of Florida’s Constitution are only
implicated where there is governmental action.”).
As recognized by other states with constitutional schema akin
to ours, state action is required to trigger the political speech
protections provided by state constitutions:
The firmly established doctrine that
constitutionally guaranteed individual
rights
are drawn
to
restrict
governmental
conduct
and
to
provide protection from governmental
infringement and excesses is not
unique to the federal Bill of
Rights. This has generally been
the view wnth respect to state
bills of rights as well. This
fundamental concept concerning the
reach of constitutionally guaranteed
individual rights is deeply rooted
in constitutional tradition and is
consistent with the very nature of
our constitutional democracy. The
Michigan Constitution's Declaration
of Rights provisions have never been
interpreted as extending to purely
private conduct: these provisions
have consistently been interpreted as
limited to protection against state
action.
Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378
N.W.2d 337, 344 (1985) (internal citations omitted); see
also
SHAD All. v. Smith Haven Malt, 66 N.Y.2d 496,
498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 488 N.E.2d 1211. 1216 (1985) (“State
constitutional provisions ... protect individual liberty by
limiting the plenary powerofthe State over its citizens. Thus,
State action is a crucial foundation for both private autonomy
and separation of powers.” (internal citations omitted));
l^.lacohs v. Major, 139 Wis.2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832, 840
(1987) (“To turn what was prohibition of governmental acts
into positive rights against other private persons is not logical
nor historically established. In fact, it would be contrary to
history.”); fl^Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm.,
159 Ariz. 371, 767 P.2d 719, 723 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)
(“We have reviewed the cases cited by both parties and
conclude that the more persuasive are those in which the
courts have determined that their states’ constitutions do not
require private property owners to permit political activities
on their premises.”); ^People v. DiGuida, 152 II1.2d 104.
178111.Dec. 80,604 N.E.2d 336,345 (1992) (“[W]e conclude
that [the free Speech provision of the Illinois Constitution]
was not intended to apply to actions taken by private persons,
but only to actions by the State. Such a requirement of
State action is necessary in order to preserve the private
autonomyofourcitizcns.”); T^State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d
793, 799. 802 (Minn. 1999) (cautioning that “[i]f the ‘state
action’ requirement is discarded, it is difficult to formulate
a principled line between those privately-owned locations
in which constitutional free speech guarantees should apply
and those where they should not,” and noting that “[t]he
majority of courts having virtually identical language have
interpreted the free speech provisions of their constitutions
as coextensive with that of the First Amendment” (citations
omitted)).
*3 Accordingly, we affirm Scott’s conviction and hold
the political speech protections conferred under article 1.
section 5 of the Florida Constitution arc no broader than
those guaranteed under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Stated differently, article I, section 5
does not provide an expanded right requiring private property
owners to permit political speech on their property over their
objection.
WESTLAW © 2023 Thomson Reuters No claim to ori^ha! U.S. Government Works.
2
i
4a
Scott v. State, — So.3d — (2023)
2023 WL 4917152
All Citations
Affirmed.
— So. 3d —, 2023 WL 4917152
Warner and Kuntz, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
^Nelson v. Stat(£74 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
End of Document
WESTLAW
© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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3
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