Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christine H. Scott, Petitioner v. Florida

Supreme Court briefFeb 20, 2024

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No. 24 -

Supreme Court of the United States

Christine Scott,

Petitioner,

vs.

State of Florida,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

the Florida Supreme Court

APPENDIX

Christine Scott

Pro Se Petitioner

212 E. Hillsboro Blvd

Deerfield Beach, FL 33441

misschristinescott@hotmail.com

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Appendix A: Order of the Florida Supreme Court Declining Jurisdiction (November

la

22, 2023) Scott v. State, SC2023 -1188

lal

Appendix Aa: Notice to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction

Appendix B: Opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District

(August 2, 2023) Scott v. State, — So.3d —- (2023), 2023 WL 4917152

2a - 4a

Appendix Ba: Scott v. State, App. 4 Dist., 368 So.3d 8 (2023) Decision notes for

4al

Section 5 of Article I. Right to Assemble

Appendix C: Verdict in the County Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit, Criminal

Division in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (April 6, 2022) Case No.

2021MM007524ANB Div. "P"............................................................................

5a

Appendix Ca: Judgment in the County Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit, Criminal

Division in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (April 6, 2022) Case No.

5aal

2021MM007524ANB Div. "P"

Appendix Cb: Motion for New Trial

5aa2 - 5aa3

Appendix Cc: Order Denying Motion for New Trial

5aa4

Appendix Cd: Notice of Appeal

5aa5

Appendix aD: Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

5al - 5a4

Appendix D: Florida Statute 616

6a - 32a

Appendix E: Palm Beach County Property Appraiser Tangible Property Information'

relating to the Palm Beach County owned property located at 9067 Southern Blvd,

Royal Palm Beach, 334411, contracted to the South Florida Fair and Palm Beach

33a - 35a

County Expositions, Inc.

Appendix F: Palm Beach County Property Appraiser 'Public Ownership' relating to

the Palm Beach County owned property located at 9067 Southern Blvd, Royal

Palm Beach, 334411, contracted to the South Florida Fair and Palm Beach County

36a - 38a

Expositions, Inc.

Appendix G: NAICS Code Description for 921190 - All Other General Government

39a

Appendix H: Trial Transcript Excerpts from the County Court of the 15th Judicial

Circuit, Criminal Division in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (April 6, 2022)

............ ..................................................... ............................ ................... . 40a - I32a2

Appendix Ha: jury Note #1 / Question #1

132a3

Appendix I: Jury Instructions 13.4

133a -134a

Appendix J: Florida Statute 810.09..............................................

135a - 136a

Appendix K: (1867) The Reconstruction Acts, Chap. CLIII, Sec. 5

137a - 139a

Appendix L: State Constitutions in the Federal System: Selected Issues and

Opportunities for State Initiatives, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental

140a

Relations, A-113, July 1989

Appendix M: Excerpt from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803)

.............................................................. .................................................................141a

Appendix A

la

Supreme Court of Jflortba

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 2023

Christine H. Scott,

Petitioner(s)

v.

802023*1188

Lower Tribunal No(s).:

4D22-1204;

502021MM007524AXXXMB

State of Florida,

Respondent(s)

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court on

jurisdictional briefs and portions of the record deemed necessary to

reflect jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b), Florida

Constitution, and the Court having determined that it should

decline to accept jurisdiction, it is ordered that the petition for

review is denied.

No motion for rehearing will be entertained by the Court. See

Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(d)(2).

MUNIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ.,

concur.

A True Copy

Test:

8 11 /22/2023

John A. Tomasino

Clerk. Supreme Court

SC2023-1188 11/22/2023

DL

Appendix B

2a

Scott v. State, — So.3d — (2023)

2023WL49T7152

'

2023 WL 4917152

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED

FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT

LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT1S

SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Christine H. SCOTT, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4022*1204

I

[August 2,2023]

Appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial

Circuit, Palm Beach County; Sherri L. Collins, Judge; L.T.

Case No. 50-202I-MM-007524-AXXX-MB.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Christine C.

Geraghty, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for

appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan

P. Picard, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for

appellee.

Opinion

Damoorgian, J.

*1 Christine Scott (“Scott”) appeals her conviction and

sentence on the charge of misdemeanor trespass after

warning. On appeal, Scott argues: (1) her conviction violates

her right to petition under article I, section 5 of the Florida

Constitution; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in failing

to conduct an adequate

Nelson 1 hearing; and (3) the trial

court's rulings on Scott's proposed jury instruction and her

proffered testimony opining on the law were error. We affirm

Scott’s conviction and sentence and write only to address

whether article 1, section 5 of the Florida Constitution confers

on the citizens a broader right to free speech on another's

private property than the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution.

WESTLAW

The following facts adduced at trial are relevant to our

discussion. Scott desired to run for a seat in the United States

Congress. She attempted to qualify by collecting the required

number of signed petitions from registered Florida voters.

The allegations and evidence forming the basis of Scott's

conviction arose while she attempted to collect signatures

from customers waiting in line to enter a gun show. The gun

show was held on a property owned by South Florida Fair

and Palm Beach County Expositions, Inc. No record evidence

suggests the property was owned or operated by the State or a

government agency. Entry into the gun show required a ticket.

Eventually, a law enforcement officer asked Scott to leave

after being informed by security that Scott was “harassing

patrons in line waiting to enter the Gun Show.” Scott refused

to vacate the premises and was arrested and charged with

trespass after warning.

On appeal, Scott argues she should not have been chaigcd

with—much less convicted of—trespassing at the gun show

because her actions were an exercise of her right to petition

the government on private properly held open to the public.

Although Scott recognizes that the First Amendment does

not afford her the right to engage in political activity on

private property, see f^ Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551

567-69, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L,Ed.2d 131 (1972), she argues

article I, .section 5 of the Florida Constitution provides more

expansive political speech protections than the United States

Constitution. Specifically, Scott argues “Florida's choice to

create a specific section in the state constitution to protect

die right to petition and other political rights, rather than

lump all rights recognized by the First Amendment together

demonstrates that political speech is granted expanded

protection in Florida. In support of her aigument, Scott

references the differences in language between article 1,

section 4 and article I, section 5 of the Florida Constitution.

Compare Art. I, § 4, Fla. Const, (providing “[n]o law shall be

passed”) with Art. 1, § 5, Fla. Const, (providing “(t]he people

shall have the right”). From this, Scott concludes article 1,

section 5 contains no slate action requirement and allows an

individual to engage in political activity on private property.

We disagree.

*2 We do not quarrel with Scott's contention that state

constitutions may provide broader protections than those

conferred by the United Slates Constitution. See generally

PruneYatxiShopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct.

2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). However, we find nothing in

article I, section 5’s text which leads us to conclude that the

2G23 Thomson Reuters. No claim tc cripnat U.S. Government Works.

1

3a

Scott v. State, — So.3d — (2023)

2023 WL 4917152

Florida Constitution confers political speech rights greater

than those provided by the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution. Like the First Amendment. Florida’s

Constitution only protects individuals’ freedom of political

activity and speech against government infringement. See

Attwood v. Clemons, 526 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1174 (N.D.

Fla. 2021) (*‘[T]he expressive political activities protected in

article I, section 5 of the Florida Constitution are identical to

those protected by the First Amendment.” (citing

State v.

J. P. 907 So. 2d 1101,1111 (Fla. 2004))); Publix Super Mkts

Inc. v. Tallahasseans for Prac. L. Enft, No. 2004 CA 1817,

2005 WL 3673662. at *5 (Fla. 2d Cir. Cl. Dec. 13, 2005)

(“Defendants are not entitled under the First Amendment

or the Florida Constitution to solicit signatures or engage

in political speech on Publix's privately owned or leased

property without Publix’s permission.”): Whole Foods Mkt.

Grp., Inc. v. Sarasota Coal, for a Living Wage, No. 2007

CA 002208 NC. 2010 WL 2380390 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. Mar.

31, 2010) (“Florida courts have held that the provisions of

the Declaration of Rights of Florida’s Constitution are only

implicated where there is governmental action.”).

As recognized by other states with constitutional schema akin

to ours, state action is required to trigger the political speech

protections provided by state constitutions:

The firmly established doctrine that

constitutionally guaranteed individual

rights

are drawn

to

restrict

governmental

conduct

and

to

provide protection from governmental

infringement and excesses is not

unique to the federal Bill of

Rights. This has generally been

the view wnth respect to state

bills of rights as well. This

fundamental concept concerning the

reach of constitutionally guaranteed

individual rights is deeply rooted

in constitutional tradition and is

consistent with the very nature of

our constitutional democracy. The

Michigan Constitution's Declaration

of Rights provisions have never been

interpreted as extending to purely

private conduct: these provisions

have consistently been interpreted as

limited to protection against state

action.

Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378

N.W.2d 337, 344 (1985) (internal citations omitted); see

also

SHAD All. v. Smith Haven Malt, 66 N.Y.2d 496,

498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 488 N.E.2d 1211. 1216 (1985) (“State

constitutional provisions ... protect individual liberty by

limiting the plenary powerofthe State over its citizens. Thus,

State action is a crucial foundation for both private autonomy

and separation of powers.” (internal citations omitted));

l^.lacohs v. Major, 139 Wis.2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832, 840

(1987) (“To turn what was prohibition of governmental acts

into positive rights against other private persons is not logical

nor historically established. In fact, it would be contrary to

history.”); fl^Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm.,

159 Ariz. 371, 767 P.2d 719, 723 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)

(“We have reviewed the cases cited by both parties and

conclude that the more persuasive are those in which the

courts have determined that their states’ constitutions do not

require private property owners to permit political activities

on their premises.”); ^People v. DiGuida, 152 II1.2d 104.

178111.Dec. 80,604 N.E.2d 336,345 (1992) (“[W]e conclude

that [the free Speech provision of the Illinois Constitution]

was not intended to apply to actions taken by private persons,

but only to actions by the State. Such a requirement of

State action is necessary in order to preserve the private

autonomyofourcitizcns.”); T^State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d

793, 799. 802 (Minn. 1999) (cautioning that “[i]f the ‘state

action’ requirement is discarded, it is difficult to formulate

a principled line between those privately-owned locations

in which constitutional free speech guarantees should apply

and those where they should not,” and noting that “[t]he

majority of courts having virtually identical language have

interpreted the free speech provisions of their constitutions

as coextensive with that of the First Amendment” (citations

omitted)).

*3 Accordingly, we affirm Scott’s conviction and hold

the political speech protections conferred under article 1.

section 5 of the Florida Constitution arc no broader than

those guaranteed under the First Amendment of the United

States Constitution. Stated differently, article I, section 5

does not provide an expanded right requiring private property

owners to permit political speech on their property over their

objection.

WESTLAW © 2023 Thomson Reuters No claim to ori^ha! U.S. Government Works.

2

i

4a

Scott v. State, — So.3d — (2023)

2023 WL 4917152

All Citations

Affirmed.

— So. 3d —, 2023 WL 4917152

Warner and Kuntz, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1

^Nelson v. Stat(£74 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)

End of Document

WESTLAW

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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3

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