Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Stanley Waldron, Petitioner v. Louisiana

filed

MAY o I 2024

DOCKET NO:?

iS'iyi'cSggfge

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STANLEY WALDRON

PETITIONER

V.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

RESPONDENT

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Pro-Se Petitioner

Stanley Waldron #423579

Raymond Laborde Correctional Center

Cajun-1 C-2

1630 Prison Road

Cottonport, Louisiana 71327

QUESTION PRESENTED

IS THE STATE OF LOUISIANA BARRED BY THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION FROM THE PUNISHMENT OF INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AT

HARD LABOR FOR A CLASS OF OFFENDERS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN DULY CONVICTED?

i

ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The following is a list of all parties to the proceeding in the Supreme Court of Louisiana

whose judgment is sought to be reviewed as identified by the Supreme Court of Louisiana:

Clerk of Court Veronica Koclanes

Supreme Court of Louisiana

400 Royal Street Suite 4200

New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

(504) 310-2300

www.lasc.org

Perry M. Nicosia

District Attorney St. Bernard Parish

1101 W. St. Bernard Hwy

Chalmette, Louisiana 70043

(504) 271-1658

nicosia@stbda.orQ

Elizabeth Baker Murrill

Louisiana Department of Justice

1185 North Third Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802

(225) 326-6705

elizabethmurrill@msn.com

Jason Rogers Williams

District Attorney Orleans Parish

619 S. White Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70119

(504) 822-2414

irwilliams@orleansda.com

ALL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS RELATED TO CASE

State v. Waldron, 825 So.2d 603, 02-KA-2756, unpub. (La.App. 4 cir. 2002)

State v. Waldron, 847 So.2d 1221, 02-KO-1993 (La. 2003)

Waldron v. Cain, USDC No. 2:03-CV-2081-C, unpub. (La.E.D. 2004)

Waldron v. Cain, USAppC No. 04-30783 (5th Cir. 2005)

Waldron v. Cain, 546 U.S. 880, 126 S.Ct. 190, 163 L.Ed.2d 180 (2005)

State Ex Rel. Waldron v. State,

So. 3d

, 2017-K-0852 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2017)

State Ex Rel. Waldron v. State, 254 So. 3d 690, 2017-2110 (La. 2018)

State v. Waldron, 334 So. 3d 844, 2021-0512 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2022)

State v. Waldron, 359 So. 3d 19, 2022-00316 (La. 2023)

State v. Waldron,

So. 3d

., 2023-K-0813 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/29/2023)

State v. Waldron,

So. 3d

., 2024-KH-00154 (La. 4/23/2024)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented

All Parties to the Proceedings

ii

All Proceedings in State and Federal Courts Related to Case

ii

Table of Contents

in

Table of Authorities

iv-v

Opinions and Orders Entered in the Case

1

Jurisdiction

1

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

1-2

Statement of the Case

2-3

Compelling Reasons for Granting Writ

3-4

Unresolved Issues of Constitutional Law Raised in State Courts

4

Law and Argument Constitutional Issue No. 1......................

5-8

Sentence is Illegal for Class of Offenders not Duly Convicted

5-6

A Class of Offenders not Duly Convicted

6-8

Law and Argument Constitutional Issue No. 2..............................

8-11

Article 782 (A) and Punishment is not Severable from the Offense

8-9

Ramos Unanimity Rule is a Substantive Constitutional Rule..........

10-11

Law and Argument Constitutional Issue No. 3

11-13

Conclusion

13

Appendix of Opinions and Orders

14

Certificate of Service

17

Verification

18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628,

32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972)........................................

6,9

Atkins v. Virginia, 563 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242,

153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)................................................

10, 11

Bailey v. State of Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145,

55 L.Ed. 191 (1911)......................................................

7,8

ExParte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 5 S.Ct. 935,

29 L.Ed. 89 (1885)....................................

6,7

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595,

91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986).................................................

10, 11

Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951,

32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972).................................................

12

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620,

32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972)..................................

6

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S.Ct. 2551,

192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015)..................................................

9

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455,

183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)......................................

10, 11

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S.190, 136 S.Ct. 718,

193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016)...............................................

11

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934,

106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989)..............................

3-4, 8, 10-11

Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S.

206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020).......

, 140 S.Ct. 1390,

2-4, 6, 8-12

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519,

159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004)...........................................

6

State v. Reddick, 359 So. 3d 19, 2021-1893 (La. 2022)

2-4, 12

IV

State v. Waldron, 334 So. 3d 844, 2021-0512 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2022)

2

State v. Waldron, 359 So. 3d 19, 2022-00316 (La. 2023)

2

, 2023-K-0813 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2023)

State v. Waldron,

So. 3d

State v. Waldron,

So. 3d__ , 2024-KH-00154 (La. 4/23/2024)

1, 3, 15

1, 3, 16

Taylor v. State of Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 62 S.Ct. 415

86 L.Ed. 615 (1942)..................................................

8

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 10-9 S.Ct. 1060

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)............................

3-4, 8, 10, 12

United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,

91 S.Ct. 1041, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971).....................................

5

Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 136 S.Ct. 1257,

194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016)..............................................

9

Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S.Ct. 977,

41 L.Ed. 140 (1896).........................................................

7

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. Amend. V

7

U.S. Const. Amend. VI

2, 6-9, 12

U.S. Const. Amend. VIII

10-11

U.S. Const. Amend. XIII

1, 3-9, 11-13

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV

1-2, 4-8, 13

Statutes

8-9

La.C.Cr.P. Article 782 (A)

v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

NOW INTO COURT comes Pro-Se Petitioner, Stanley Waldron, who respectfully

moves this Honorable Court for consideration in granting this Petition for Writ of Certiorari and

submits the following for this Honorable Court's review.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

State v. Waldron,

So. 3d

, 2023-K-0813 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/29/2023)

State v. Waldron,

So. 3d

, 2024-KH-00154 (La. 4/23/2024)

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana to be reviewed in State v. Waldron,

So.3d

, 2024-KH-00154 (La. 4/23/2024) was entered on April 23, 2024. This

Honorable Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (A). A copy of this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari has been served on the Attorney General of Louisiana as 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (B) may

apply.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case implements the Thirteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution.

United States Constitutional Amendment Thirteen, § 1:

"Neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime where the

party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject

to its jurisdiction."

1

United States Constitutional Amendment Fourteen, § 1:

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws,"

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 12, 2000, Petitioner was found guilty of Attempted 2nd-Degree Murder by a

non-unanimous 11-1 jury verdict. On May 22, 2000, The Louisiana Thirty-fourth Judicial

District Court sentenced Petitioner to serve Fifty years imprisonment at hard labor without

benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence with credit for time served. Sentence

to be served consecutively with his Fifteen year sentence.

On June 15, 2021, the Louisiana Thirty-fourth Judicial District Court denied Petitioner's

claim for post-conviction relief for his 2000 conviction by an 11-1 non-unanimous jury verdict

violating the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

as held in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S.

.,140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020).

On January 24, 2022, the Petitioner's Application for Supervisory Writ of Review was

granted and the District Court's ruling was reversed. State v. Waldron, 334 So.3d 844, 20210512 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/24/2022). State's Application for Writ of Certiorari was granted by

Louisiana Supreme Court which reversed the Court of Appeal's ruling and reinstated the

District Court's ruling which denied post-conviction relief. State v. Waldron, 359 So.3d 19,

2022-00316 (La. 4/12/2023). The Supreme Court cited its ruling in State v. Reddick, 351

So.3d 273, 2021-01893 (La. 10/21/2022) which denied retroactive application of the Ramos

2

unanimity rule as a matter of State law for petitioners seeking post-conviction relief for a nonunanimous jury verdict in the State of Louisiana.

On October 30, 2023 Petitioner filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence as the

Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution barred the State of Louisiana from

the punishment of involuntary servitude at hard labor for a class of offenders who have not

been duly convicted. On October 31, 2023, the Louisiana Thirty-Fourth Judicial District Court

denied Petitioner's Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence without reason. On December 29,

2023, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana denied without reason the Petitioner's

Application for Supervisory Writ of Review of the October 31, 2023 ruling of the district court.

State v. Waldron,

So. 3d

., 2023-K-0813 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/29/2023). On April 23,

2024, The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the Petitioner's Application for Writ of Certiorari

without reason. State v. Waldron

2024-KH-00154 (La. 4/23/2024).

So. 3d

COMPELLING REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

The Louisiana Thirty-fourth Judicial District Court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal of

Louisiana, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana have denied without reason to hear and apply

well established United States Constitutional Law and the jurisprudence of the United States

Supreme Court on the constitutional issues of the State of Louisiana being barred by the

Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution from the punishment of involuntary

servitude at hard labor for a class of offenders who have not been duly convicted; the

Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition making the Ramos unanimity rule a substantive

constitutional rule under Penry and retroactive for post-conviction relief under Teague, and

the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition making State /. Reddick unconstitutional.

3

The State of Louisiana has with full knowledge and will ignored its moral and legal

responsibility to resolve these constitutional issues within the State of Louisiana according to

the laws of the United States Constitution and the well established jurisprudence of the United

States Supreme Court. The State of Louisiana's sole purpose in denying to review the

constitutional issues raised in this case is to uphold its denial in State v. Reddick of retroactive

application of the Ramos unanimity rule as a matter of state law for petitioners seeking post­

conviction relief for a non-unanimous twelve-person jury verdict in the State of Louisiana. The

State of Louisiana is fully aware that it is keeping United States citizens who have not been

duly convicted incarcerated in Louisiana prisons at involuntary servitude at hard labor in

violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. As this is the first time that these constitutional issues have been raised in the

State of Louisiana or in the United States Federal Courts, they are significant unresolved

issues of constitutional law for the State of Louisiana which have not been, but should be

resolved by this Honorable Court.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW RAISED IN STATE COURTS

1. IS THE STATE OF LOUISIANA BARRED BY THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION FROM THE PUNISHMENT OF

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AT HARD LABOR FOR A CLASS OF OFFENDERS

WHO HAVE NOT BEEN DULY CONVICTED?

2. DOES THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION MAKE THE RAMOS

UNANIMITY RULE A SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE UNDER PENRY

AND RETROACTIVE FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF UNDER TEAGUE?

3. DOES THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION MAKE THE LOUISIANA

SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN STATE V. REDDICK UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

4

LAW AND ARGUMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE NO. 1

1. IS THE STATE OF LOUISIANA BARRED BY THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION FROM THE PUNISHMENT OF

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AT HARD LABOR FOR A CLASS OF OFFENDERS

WHO HAVE NOT BEEN DULY CONVICTED?

Sentence is Illegal for Class of Offenders not Duly Convicted

The Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits involuntary

servitude at hard labor for a class of offender who has not been duly convicted. Section 1 of

the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: "Neither slavery, nor

involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime where the party shall have been duly

convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to its jurisdiction."

Black Law's Dictionary defines "Involuntary Servitude" as the condition of one forced to

labor - for pay or not - for another by coercion or imprisonment. Black Law's Dictionary

defines "Hard Labor" as a criminal procedure of work imposed on a prisoner as additional

punishment, usually for misconduct while in prison. Several States (such as Louisiana, Maine,

and New Jersey) impose hard labor as a sentence for a variety of crimes. Black Law's

Dictionary defines "Duly" as in a proper manner; in accordance with legal requirements.

United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 28

L.Ed.2d 434 (1971) held that where a substantive rule has eliminated a state's power to

proscribe the defendant's conduct or impose a given punishment, the conviction or sentence is

not lawfully valid.

5

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) held that

substantive rules set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal

laws and punishments altogether beyond the state's power to impose. It follows that when a

state enforces a proscription or penalty barred by the Constitution, the resulting conviction or

sentence is by definition unlawful.

A Class of Offenders Not Duly Convicted

This Honorable Court in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S.

., 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 LEd.2d

583 (2020) held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as incorporated against the

States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous verdict to convict a

defendant of a serious offense, abrogating Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628,

32 L.Ed.2d 184 and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152.

The following United States Supreme Court decisions which were raised for violations of

the Thirteenth Amendment held that when a conviction violates the United States Constitution

the individual convicted is not duly convicted under the Thirteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.

ExParte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 5 S.Ct. 935, 29 L.Ed 89 (1885) held that imprisonment at

hard labor, compulsory and unpaid, is in the strongest sense of the words, "involuntary

servitude for crime", spoken of in the provision of the Ordnance of 1787, and of the Thirteenth

Amendment of the Constitution, by which all other slavery was abolished and which declares

that such slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist within the United States or any place

subject to their jurisdiction, except as punishment for a crime where the party shall have been

6

duly convicted. It further held that a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years at

hard labor is an infamous crime, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the

Constitution, and that the District Court, in holding the petitioner to answer for such a crime,

and sentencing him to such imprisonment without indictment or presentment to a grand jury,

exceeded its jurisdiction. Thus the petitioner was not duly convicted under the Thirteenth

Amendment.

Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed 140 (1896) held that

imprisonment at hard labor, compulsory and unpaid, is in the strongest words, "involuntary

servitude for crime" citing ExParte Wilson. The Court further held that even aliens shall not be

held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of

a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. As the

petitioner was denied his constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment and Sixth

Amendment of the United States Constitution, he was not duly convicted under the Thirteenth

Amendment.

Bailey v. State of Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed 191 (1911) held that

the State of Alabama's Statute 4730 embodies a substantive prohibition which squarely

contravenes the Thirteenth Amendment and the Act of Congress of March 2,1867. The

necessary consequence is that the one who has received an advance on a contract for

services which he is unable to pay is bound by threat of penal sanction to remain at his

employment until the debt has been discharged. Such coerced labor is peonage. And it is no

less so because a presumed initial fraud rather than a subsequent breach of the employment

contract is the asserted target of the statute. It is of course clear that peonage is a form of

involuntary servitude within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Act of 1867 is

7

an "appropriate" implementation of that Amendment. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 25

S.Ct. 429, 49 L.Ed 726 (1905). Thus the appellant was not duly convicted under the

Thirteenth Amendment.

Taylor V. State of Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 62 S.Ct. 415, 86 L.Ed 615 (1942) held that

there was no material distinction between the State of Georgia's statute 7409 and the State of

Alabama's statute 4730 in Bailey v. State of Alabama as both statutes embodied a substantive

prohibition which squarely contravened the Thirteenth Amendment and the Act of Congress of

March 2, 1867. Thus the appellant was not duly convicted under the Thirteenth Amendment.

Therefore the United States citizens in the State of Louisiana that were convicted with a

non-unanimous twelve-person jury verdict in violation of the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution as held in Ramos v. Louisiana are not duly

convicted under the Thirteenth Amendment.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE NO. 2

2. DOES THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION MAKE THE RAMOS

UNANIMITY RULE A SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE UNDER PENRY

AND RETROACTIVE FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF UNDER TEAGUE?

ARTICLE 782 (A) AND PUNISHMENT IS NOT

SEVERABLE FROM THE OFFENSE

La.C.Cr.P. Article 782 (A) which allowed a non-unanimous 10-2 jury verdict to convict a

citizen for serious offenses is not severable from the serious offenses that "regulates conduct".

8

All serious offenses that "regulate conduct" in the State of Louisiana are punishable by a

number of years or life imprisonment with involuntary servitude at hard labor. The punishment

for a serious offense is not severable from that serious offense.

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) held

that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal

Act (ACCA) violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process due to being

unconstitutionally vague.

Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016) held that

the Johnson decision of "violent felony" in the residual clause of the ACCA was

unconstitutionally vague under due process principles, announced a substantive rule that

applied retroactively on collateral review. Justice Thomas in his dissenting opinion stated:

"Take a state law that defines the crime of robbery and specifies that

only 10 of 12 jurors need to vote to convict someone of that crime. If

this Court were to reverse Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct.

1628, 32 L.Ed.2D 184 (1972), and hold that the Sixth Amendment

requires unanimous jury verdicts, the portion of the statute allowing

non unanimity would be invalid. But assume the state statute allowing

non unanimity was non severable: The Court's jury unanimity rule,

undoubtedly "procedural", would have the effect of invalidating not

only the portion of the statute regarding unanimity but also the provision

defining the crime of robbery, a provision that "regulates conduct". Ante,

at 1268. To the majority, these effects would make the rule substantive."

La.C.Cr.P. Article 782 (A) was invalidated by Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S.

140

S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020). The Thirteenth Amendment invalidated the punishment

provision of the serious offense for a person who is not duly convicted from the serious

offense that "regulates conduct" which would make the rule substantive under United States

Supreme Court's jurisprudence.

9

RAMOS UNANIMITY RULE IS A SUBSTANTIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL RULE

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) held that there

are two exceptions to nonretroactivity of new constitutional rules: (1) all substantive

constitutional rules are retroactive and (2) watershed constitutional rules may be retroactive

that show a likelihood of an accurate conviction was seriously diminished.

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) held that

although an issue would create a "new rule" within the meaning of Teauge, supra, that rule

would fall within the first exception to Tele's general rule of nonretroactivity when applied

to substantive constitutional rules which include "rules forbidding criminal punishment of

certain primary conduct" and "rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of

defendants because of their status or offense." cf.eg. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106

S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) that held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the State

from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane. The Supreme Court further

held that the death penalty of mentally retarded criminals was not prohibited by the Eighth

Amendment.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) held that

executions of mentally retarded criminals were "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by

the Eighth Amendment, abrogating Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106

L.Ed.2d 256 (1989).

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) held that the

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids a sentencing scheme that

mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders.

10

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S.190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) held

that Miller's prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders announced a

new substantive rule that, under the Constitution, is retroactive in cases on state collateral

review.

This Honorable Court determines what is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel

and unusual punishments" provision. See Ford v. Wainwright, Penry v. Lynaugh, Atkins v.

Virginia, and Miller v. Alabama. Once a violation of the Eighth Amendment has been

determined, this Honorable Court has always made it retroactive. See Montgomery v.

Louisiana. The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude at hard labor for a

person who is not duly convicted is clear and concise which does not require further defining

by this Honorable Court.

A substantive constitutional law, the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, prohibits the punishment of involuntary servitude at hard labor for a class of

offenders who have not been duly convicted. Although the Ramos unanimity rule is a "new

rule" within the meaning of Teague, it falls within the first exception to Tease's general rule

of nonretroactivity as the Ramos unanimity procedural rule has a substantive effect on the

State of Louisiana's power to impose a punishment that is barred by the Thirteenth

Amendment when a class of offenders is not duly convicted. This makes the Ramos unanimity

rule a substantive constitutional rule under Penry v. Lynaugh and retroactive under Teague v.

Lane.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE NO. 3

11

3. DOES THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION MAKE THE LOUISIANA

SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN STATE V.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

State v. Reddick, 351 So.3d 273, 2021-01893 (La. 2022) denied retroactive application

of the Rdmos unanimity rule as a matter of State law for petitioners seeking post-conviction

relief for a non-unanimous jury verdict in the State of Louisiana. The Louisiana Supreme Court

ruled:

"In conclusion we find that, though the Sixth Amendment violation at issue

is a serious one, finality and reliance interests, combined with the burden

placed upon the Administration of Justice, informed by the actions of the

citizens of the state and the Legislature, outweigh retroactive application of

the Ramos ru\e. Therefore, the new rule of criminal procedure announced in

Ramos which provides for unanimity in jury verdicts is not retroactive in

Louisiana."

The reasons given by the State of Louisiana in State v. Reddick do not justify denial of

retroactivity of the Ramos unanimity rule in light of the prohibition of the Thirteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and that the Ramos unanimity rule is a

substantive constitutional rule under Penry and retroactive under Teague.

Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972) held that

"Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the

criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth finding function and so raises serious questions

about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete

retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior

constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has

sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances."

Therefore the Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Reddick which denied

retroactive application of the Ramos unanimity rule as a matter of State law for petitioners

12

seeking post-conviction relief for a non-unanimous jury verdict in the State of Louisiana is

unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner respectfully requests that this Honorable

Court grant his Petition for Writ of Certiorari to resolve these constitutional issues of law that

were raised in the Supreme Court of Louisiana and denied without reason.

The State of Louisiana will argue that since the Supreme Court of Louisiana has not

ruled on these constitutional issues, this Honorable Court should deny this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari. If this Honorable Court chooses to deny this Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this

Honorable Court will be knowingly and willfully choosing to disregard its moral and legal

responsibility to uphold the United States Constitution and its own jurisprudence on these

constitutional issues of law.

The Petitioner submits that these constitutional issues of law can be resolved by this

Honorable Court without oral arguments as the State of Louisiana will not be able to justify its

refusal to uphold the United States Constitution and the well established jurisprudence of this

Honorable Court in the constitutional issues raised herein.

13