Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Maria Meeker, Petitioner v. Marrison Family Law, LLC

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No.

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IN THE

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Supreme Court, U.S.

FiLCD

APR 1 8 2024

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Maria Meeker & Daniel Blasco — PRO SE PETITIONER(S)

vs.

Marrison Family Law. LLC

— RESPONDENT

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

Colorado Supreme Court for the Tenth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Maria Meeker

Daniel Blasco

5575 County Road 51

DIVIDE, CO 80814

719-459-7993

Questions Presented for Review

1.

Does a court’s requirement for a Certificate of Review defeat a citizen’s

Seventh Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights?

2.

Does a court’s requirement for a Certificate of Review supersede or

nullify the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act?

3.

Does a court have a duty to ensure substantially-verbatim transcripts

are available to litigants?

4.

Does a court have the authority to negate rulings from the Supreme

Court of the United States, or is the Supreme Court of the United States the

final authority on all questions of American law?

5.

If an attorney’s standard Fee Agreement is far outside community

standards and guidelines, is it legally binding?

LIST OF PARTIES

[x] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list

of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of

this petition is as follows:

Related Cases

N/A

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions Below,

1

Jurisdiction

2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved,

4

Statement of the Case

5

Reasons for Granting the Writ

16

Conclusion

33

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A

Decision of County Court, EL PASO CTY, COLORADO

Appendix B

Decision of District Court, EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO

Appendix C

Decision of Colorado Supreme Court, DENVER, COLORADO

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

PAGE

ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999).

28, 29

Barnes v. Jeffreys, 20 C 2137, 4-5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2023)

10, 28, 29

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547,

19, 28, 29

79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) Id. at 895-96 n. 11,

104 S.Ct. At 1547 n. 11

Firestine v. Parkview Health System, Inc. (N.D.Ind. 2005),

27

374 F. Supp. 2d 658, 667 (N.D. Ind. 2005).

Hyland v. Indicator Lites, Inc., 160 F.Supp.2d 981, 986 (N.D.111.2001).

26

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (CA5 1974)

26

Kaylor-Trent v. Bonewicz, 916 F. Supp. 2d 878, 886 (C.D. Ill. 2013)

10, 26, 27

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)

10, 14, 26

Pace v. Pottawattomie Country Club Inc., CAUSE NO. 3:07-CV-347 RM,

22-23 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2009)

Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago

27

9, 19

175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1999)

175 F.3d 544, 556 (7th Cir. 1999) (N.D. Ill. 1998).

STATUTES AND RULES

10, 19, 28, 29

)

Fifth Amendment 5.6.1 Due Process Clause

Seventh Amendment

Fourteenth Amendment, Clause 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); 15 U.S.C. § 1692g 809(b)

Title V Federal Rules of Civil Procedure U.S.C. 26(a)(l)(A)(i)(ii)(iii)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(l)(i), (ii), (iii)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 803(6)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 902(11)

Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16A(a)(l), (2); (b), (d)

C.R.S. § 5-16-109 1 (a), (c), (d)

C.R.S. § 13-20-602, (4)

Martinez v. Badis, 842 P.2d 245 (Colo. 1992)

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at

Appendix.

to the petition and is

or, [ ] has been

[ ] reported at

designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix.

to the

petition and is

or,

[ ] reported at

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[X] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix C

[ ] reported at

to the petition and is

; or,

1

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[X ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the

Appendix B

District Court

court appears at

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

PC ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the

Appendix A

Countv Court

court appears at

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at.

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[X] is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was.

[ X] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

2

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date:.

, and a copy of the order

denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including.

(date) on

(date) in Application

No..

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was January 22.

20204 . A copy of that decision appears at Appendix___C

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following

date:

and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at

Appendix.

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and

including

(date) on

(date) in Application No..

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Fifth Amendment 5.6.1 Due Process Clause

Fourteenth Amendment, Clause 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Seventh Amendment

Fair Debt Collection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)

Fair Debt Collection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g 809(b)

(Title V Federal Rules of Civil Procedure U.S.C. 26(a)(l)(A)(i)(ii)(iii)

Corporate Disclosure Statement

1. Petitioners Maria Meeker and F. Daniel Blasco have no known

relationship to any institution involved in this Petition.

2. To the best of Petitioners’ knowledge, Respondents have no known

relationships to institutions involved in this Petition.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In August 2021, Maria Meeker and her psychological father, Daniel

Blasco, were sued in a collections action brought by local law firm, Marrison

Family Law. Marrison claimed Meeker owed nearly $25,000 in past legal

fees; Meeker and Blasco vehemently disputed the alleged fees and demanded

that Marrison produce evidence of the alleged debt according to the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act. Marrison sent copies of invoices but refused to

review or discuss disputed charges or the alleged debt with the alleged

debtors at all. She simply stated through her attorney that, You will pay me

$25,000 or you will go to court. With the alleged debtholder refusing to

validate the alleged debt, Meeker and Blasco had no choice but to go to court.

I.

Respondent Marrison Entered Into a Verbal Agreement with

Petitioners Meeker and Blasco.

On October 21, 2019, Attorney Mary Patricia Marrison of Marrison

Family Law entered into a verbal agreement with Maria Meeker and

Meeker’s psychological father, Daniel Blasco, to represent Maria Meeker in

an ongoing divorce case.

During the introductory consultation, Petitioners apprised Respondent

of the facts; that Petitioner Blasco had initially hired a firm from Denver but

was now seeking a local firm to substitute in; that the case was ongoing about

5

six months; that Petitioner Meeker was a brand new mother, newly single,

had limited means, and was seeking favorable payment terms that, frankly,

several other law firms had already rejected.

Respondent agreed to accept a $4,000 retainer from Petitioner Blasco,

and timely, monthly payments of $400 thereafter from Petitioner Meeker

until resolution of the case. This was the first verbal agreement that was

made separate and apart from the signed Fee Agreement. Meeker and

Blasco made their respective payments according to the verbal agreement,

and Respondent accepted all payments per the verbal agreement.

In furtherance of the verbal agreement, to keep the Respondent’s costs

down, Marrison directed Blasco to pay legal service providers directly, and he

did. Blasco paid nearly $10,000 to service providers and experts directly:

Parental responsibility evaluators, domestic violence assessors, doctors,

mediator, expert testimony fees. Whatever legal service provider Marrison

directed Blasco to pay, he paid, even for the opposition.

In March 2020, a second verbal financial agreement was entered into,

this time instigated by the Respondent. Marrison offered Blasco a $6,000

credit for a $6,000 payment. Blasco countered with $5,000, and Marrison

agreed. On March 20, 2020, per the second verbal agreement, Blasco sent

Marrison a check for $5,000. This payment-for-credit offer brought Meeker’s

balance down to $1628. This credit-for-payment was not asked for by

6

Petitioners, but it was offered by Respondent, and Petitioners accepted. Who

would not accept a $5,000 discount on their bill?

This second verbal financial agreement is also not memorialized in any

formal writing, but it is memorialized in a “Credit Memo” and reflected in the

Respondent’s invoices.

II.

A Demand For Payment Is Made In Violation Of Both The Verbal And

Written Fee Agreements

On April 1, 2020, the relationship between Respondent Marrison and

Petitioners Meeker and Blasco took a dramatic and unexpected turn for the

worse. Meeker received an emailed invoice for $10,591, plus a request for an

additional $2,000 for the retainer account. Meeker was alarmed and emailed

Marrison, citing back to the verbal agreement. Marrison communicated to

Meeker through her employees that Meeker must pay the invoice and the

retainer replenishment in full on or before April 10, 2020, or Marrison is

dropping Meeker’s case.

Petitioners were astonished. Blasco had just paid thousands of dollars

to Marrison’s service providers specifically so Marrison didn’t have to bear

the cost. Blasco’s check to Marrison had just cleared the bank. Meeker’s

payments were on time, all according to the verbal agreement. The balance

was only $1,628 before this emailed demand. Petitioners questioned: How

7

did this invoice reach $10,591 in three weeks’ time without benefit of a single

hearing, deposition, or appearance in court?

Petitioners tried to call Respondent to question the invoice, to no avail.

Respondent cut off all further communication with her client. Meeker tried

to inquire of Marrison Family Law Attorney JAD Ditlow, who was directly

assigned to Meeker’s case, but Ditlow redirected all of Meeker’s inquiries

back to Marrison, who was refusing to speak to her client at all. Between

April 1 and April 15, there is almost no communication between Counsel and

Client whatsoever. Petitioners were left in limbo: We cannot move forward

until Marrison does, and Marrison is not talking to anyone.

On April 16, 2020, Attorney Ditlow emailed Meeker and told her that if

Meeker paid Marrison, Marrison would allow Ditlow to re-enter the case.

Three days prior, Meeker and her psychological mother, Rebecca Blasco, had

a brief telephone conversation with Ditlow in which Ditlow told Meeker and

Mrs. Blasco that Marrison had dropped Meeker’s case and was also not going

to enforce the court’s Forthwith Orders to Compel.

Petitioners were in a quandary: The invoice is in dispute, but if we

don’t pay it, Marrison will not resume the case. Final Orders hearing is 12

weeks away. If Meeker has to hire new counsel, does that mean the

Forthwith Orders to Compel that were just signed will be vacated? All the

work we have just accomplished will be lost. What were Petitioners supposed

8

to do? Blasco directed Meeker to email Marrison and offer her $25,000 to

finish Meeker’s case.

Marrison never responded to Meeker’s offer. Instead, she filed a

Motion to Withdraw citing lack of payment, which was granted a month

later. The Forthwith Orders to Compel were completely abandoned by the

Respondent and Petitioner was forced to hire new counsel. Petitioners

requested that the Respondent forward the client file back to the client per

Code, and Marrison refused (CRPC 1.16A(al(lk (21: (b). (dll.

III.

Assertion of Debt is not Validation of Debt

About a year after the demise of the relationship, sometime in 2021,

Respondent Marrison filed a collections lawsuit against Meeker and Blasco seeking

“the principal amount of $22,987.55,” plus accrued interest, plus attorneys fees, et

cetera. Marrison was claiming a principal amount more than double that of the

invoice that terminated the relationship a year prior and Petitioners could not

understand why. The Petitioners partially relied on the protections of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 1692a(6): 1692g 809(b). when it asked Marrison

to “produce the note.”

Marrison sent copies of invoices and the Fee Agreement, but no other

Spegonsupporting documentation (Snegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago. 175 F.3d

544. 550 (7th Cir. 1999k 15 U.S.C. §

809rhV). Meeker and her

psychological mother, Rebecca Blasco, began inspecting the invoices line by line and

9

discovered that the invoices had at least one duplicative line item, line items for

work that was allegedly performed after Respondent was released as attorney of

record, and exorbitant paralegal hourly rates charged for even the most mundane of

clerical tasks, greatly inflating the bills. (Missouri v Jenkins. 491 U.S. 274 (19891:

Kavlor-Trent v. Bonewicz, 916 F. Supp. 2d 878. 886 (C.D. Ill. 20131: Barnes v.

Jeffreys. 20 C 2137. 4-5 (N.D. Til. Mar. 20. 20231.

Petitioners had reasonable questions concerning Marrison’s invoices and had

a right to question Marrison about them, but the Respondent refused to answer.

Petitioners had a right to dispute charges that were questionable, exorbitant,

duplicative, and in some instances, completely devoid of explanation. Petitioners

were being told to pay nearly $25,000 on Respondent Marrison’s say-so alone

(transcript pp 60:1-61:6) (Spegon v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago. 175 F.3d 544.

556 (7th Cir. 1999): Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g 809(b):

C.R.S. $ 5-16-109 1 (ah (cl. (dh 2 (11(c). 3.

Marrison refused to discuss her invoices at all, saying in sum and substance,

You will pay me $25,000 or you will go to court. Presented with no other

alternatives, Petitioners became civil defendants and went to court.

IV.

Pretrial Hearing to Set Discovery and Trial

In truth, Petitioners are not certain of what the first hearing was called, only

that several things happened during that hearing that bring Petitioners’ questions

before this Honorable Court.

10

The Petitioners motioned the district court for discovery, and the district

court denied Petitioners’ motion stating that any attempt to challenge the

Respondent’s invoices was a thinly-veiled attempt to bring a fraud claim against the

Respondent, and because the Petitioners did not bring a Certificate of Review,

Petitioners were not allowed to question the invoices (transcript pp. 72:1-3); Fifth

Amendment

Fourteenth Amendment. Clause 1. 42 U.S.C. § 19831

The Petitioners had originally filed a counterclaim against Respondent, and

the district court ordered a Certificate of Review (C.R.S. § 13-20-6021. Petitioners

chose not to pursue a Certificate of Review for myriad reasons, but ultimately,

because Petitioners had no interest in pursuing a fraud claim and believed the

errors on the invoices were facially observable so the Certificate was not required

(Martinez v. Badis. 842 P.2d 245 ('Colo. 199211. Petitioners were not questioning the

hours one might have spent reading the documents, only why we were being

charged $150 an hour to print the documents. It seemed that the district court was

wholly unable to bifurcate the issues and refused to permit any form of discovery.

Petitioners’ countersuit was dismissed for lack of a Certificate of Review

(C.R.S. $ 13-20-602(4)1. Petitioners did not object; Petitioners were expecting our

countersuit to be dismissed because of the lack of the Certificate of Review. But

Petitioners were still defendants in a civil lawsuit. Petitioners had a right to defend

themselves, to act as their own counsel with the same duties and responsibilities as

hired counsel, and with right to conduct discovery just as if Petitioners had hired

11

counsel and counsel had motioned for discovery (Title V Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure U.S.C. 26(a)(l)(A)(i)(ii)(iii)).

V.

Petitioners Meeker and Blasco Appear In Court As In Pro Per Civil

Defendants Without Benefit of Their Due Process Rights

On or about December 1, 2021, Meeker and Blasco appeared in the local

Fourth District Court in Colorado Springs, Colorado to defend themselves against

Respondent Attorney Mary Patricia Marrison of Marrison Family Law. Respondent

Marrison was sworn in as a witness (transcript pp 4:19-22) and testified under oath

that she was unaware of any verbal agreement that Meeker thought she might have

had (transcript pp 32:20 - 35:12-21).

Respondent also testified that she engaged the paralegals to perform clerical

tasks at a reduced rate of $100 an hour (transcript pp 23:10 - 24:10), and that she

had already destroyed the client’s client file by the time she had requested it

(transcript pp 45:16-17); CRPC Rule 1.16A (a)(1). (2). and (b).

Petitioners had come to court with whatever records could be found from the

client’s side of the client file. The records were emails created in the ordinary

course of business, authored by Respondent Marrison, copied to Marrison’s legal

staff by Marrison, electronically transmitted to Petitioners Meeker and Blasco from

Marrison’s IP address, date and time stamped by Marrison’s computer system, and

Marrison had already testified that she could discuss “invoices, emails, things of

that nature” (transcript pp 22:24 - 23:1).

12

Petitioners believed that these emails were self-authenticating business

records exempt from the hearsay rule. But even if they were not, the author of the

emails was still duly sworn, on the witness stand, and testified that she could

discuss “invoices, emails, things of that nature.” Petitioners moved to have the

business records admitted into evidence. Without looking at a single piece of paper,

the district court ruled that these emails that were created in the ordinary course of

business and transmitted electronically through the Respondent’s IP address were

hearsay and would not be admitted into evidence (transcript pp 39:1-22); (Federal

Rules of Evidence Rules 803(6) and 902(11)1.

After Respondent Marrison is excused from the witness stand, Witness

Rebecca Blasco, the Petitioners’ wife and psychological mother respectively, was

placed under oath (transcript pp 54:9-13) and called to testify about her research

into the dubious nature of the invoices and the discrepancies found within

(transcript pp 58:22 - 59:10).

Witness Blasco testified about invoices that were created for alleged legal

work performed after Respondents were no longer attorneys of record. Witness

Blasco also testified about a particular invoice that had been sent to Petitioners

that contained no identifying information or descriptions of work detail whatsoever

(transcript pp 60:3-61:6).

The district court admonished Witness Blasco about straying too near the

boundary of “Certificate of Review,” which further demonstrates the difficulty and

entwined nature of the Certificate of Review with the Fair Debt Collection Practices

13

Act. Witness Blasco states, “They’re asking me to pay this, and I have no idea why.”

The district court commiserated with the witness; the court seemed completely

unable to bifurcate the issues; negligence versus negligence per se versus validating

a debt as prescribed by the FDCPA.

Witness Blasco also testified that Petitioners discovered that Respondent was

charging paralegal rates of $100 to $150 an hour for purely clerical tasks that

require no skill or training to perform, and that such charges were unconstitutional

as the Supreme Court of the United States has held since the 1980s that lawyers

cannot charge paralegal rates for tasks that require no training or skill to complete,

such as photocopying, printing, filling out forms (Missouri v Jenkins. 491 U.S. 274

(1989V).

The district court made an objection from the bench that rulings from the

Supreme Court of the United States are legal opinions and have no business in the

courtroom. This colloquy is omitted from the defective transcript, but then

Respondent’s counsel, Kenneth Davidson, makes an objection for 'legal opinion,”

and the court sustains his objection. The district court agreed that the rulings of

the Supreme Court of the United States are ‘legal opinions” and are therefore not

admissible in court (transcript pp 65:10-22).

Shortly after the above exchange, the court begins to shut down the

Petitioners’ case stating that she has been more than lenient with Petitioners but

essentially this is accomplishing nothing. Petitioner Blasco rests his case and

engages in discussion with the district court in which she confirms that she denied

14

discovery because of lack of a Certificate of Review (transcript pp 72:1-4), the case is

closed and the parties are excused.

VI.

The Court Rules Partially for the Respondent (Plaintiff) and

Partially for the Petitioners (Defendants).

The court found for the Respondent in the amount of $15,325.03 plus court

costs, attorneys’ fees, and interest. The court ruled that, “Plaintiff also invoiced

Defendant for $7662.52, which plaintiff testified was a ‘finance charge,’ that reflects

one-third of the amount due on the unpaid invoices. This one-third amount is set

forth in the Fee Agreement under ‘Withdrawal and Termination.”’

The court denied the Respondent’s (plaintiffs) claim of $7662.52 stating:

“The court will not enforce the provision of the fee agreement which

provided for such a charge to be added to the amount due and owing. This

type of charge is a formula outside that permitted by law. Collections

costs are very specific: attorney’s fees, service of process fees, court costs, etc.

A flat one-third penalty is beyond any Lodestar calculation.”

The court further stated that: “Defendants testified that there was some

unwritten agreement that Plaintiff would accept $400 per month, however, this

court Finds [sic] that the Fee Agreement was not vague or ambiguous in its terms

and reflected the complete agreement between the parties.”

VII.

Petitioners filed a Formal Complaint Against Respondent Mary

Patricia Marrison with the Colorado Supreme Court Office of Attorney

Regulation Counsel

15

On January 16, 2023, Petitioners filed a complaint with the Colorado

Supreme Court Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel and requested a formal

investigation into Respondent Marrison’s billing practices. The investigation is

ongoing.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

VIII. The district court denied Petitioners’ Motion for Discovery, severely

prejudicing Petitioners’ right to defend themselves in court.

During a pretrial hearing, Petitioner Blasco motioned the district court

for Petitioners’ constitutionally-protected right to discovery. Petitioners were

appearing in court acting as counsel on their own behalf with all the same duties

and responsibilities as retained counsel would have (Fifth Amendment 5.6.1:

Fourteenth Amendment. Clause 1. 42 U.S.C. § 19831.

Shockingly, the district court denied the Petitioners’ request. The district

court surmised that any request for discovery was a thinly-veiled attempt at

bringing a fraud claim into court through the back door. Petitioner Blasco and the

district court discussed the court’s refusal to grant discovery at the close of evidence

on the day of trial (transcript pp 72:1-4). The electronic court recording is not

available for transcription from the pretrial hearing date.

Discovery is a basic, fundamental right of Due Process afforded to both civil

and criminal litigants dating all the way back to English Common Law. Petitioners

16

had a right to a copy of all the documents that the Respondent relied on when she

filed suit against us, not just the Respondent’s invoices and Fee Agreement (Title V

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure U.S.C. 2fi(aim(A1(fi(ifi(iiiV

The Respondent is required to preserve for trial any documents that were

relied upon in bringing suit against a citizen once the decision to sue has been

made. Respondent’s own Fee Agreement states under the “Withdrawal and

Termination” clause that, “...we customarily file suit or turn your case over to a

collection attorney,” outlining in writing the Respondent’s predetermination to sue.

The same documents that Respondent relied on in bringing suit are the same

documents that Petitioners had a constitutional right to rely on in defending

themselves from the lawsuit, but Petitioners were denied discovery.

When the district court denie'd Petitioners’ right to discovery, the district

court essentially shifted the burden of proof from the Respondent to the Petitioners,

telling the Petitioners that they were required to rely on Respondent’s invoices and

Fee Agreement for their defense but were not allowed to challenge the invoices in

any way because there was no Certificate of Review (C.R.S. S 13-20-602(41.

The district court cited as a reason for her ruling against Petitioners that,

“the Fee Agreement was not vague or ambiguous in its terms and reflected the

complete agreement between the parties...”

It did not. In a separate but related matter, the Respondent produced an

email in her own defense dated October 29, 2019. The email was written by

Respondent and electronically transferred to Trisha Badger, Respondent’s

17

bookkeeper. In it, the Respondent writes, "I called Maria's dad. The

agreement was for 4K not due until the 20 of Nov because that's when they

get the funds. He thinks we discussed $400 a month from Maria thereafter.

I didn't approve that, but we will see what happens.”

Respondent testified that she had no knowledge of a verbal agreement

(transcript pp 32:20; 35:12-21). But this email memorializes the verbal payment

arrangement that Petitioners had made with Respondent point by point. The email

states an amount, $400; a timeline, per month; and a duration, until the end of the

case. Marrison claims in her email that she “didn’t approve that,” but she also

correctly states Blasco’s belief that Meeker has a $400 monthly payment

arrangement with the Respondent until resolution of the case.

The district court stated in her ruling that she relied on the fact that there

was no evidence of a verbal agreement to make her ruling. If the Petitioners had

been given discovery, this document would have been among the documents

propounded by the Respondent and the Petitioners would likely have prevailed.

The Petitioners had a right to rely on the verbal representations of the

Respondent, especially because the Respondent was a duly sworn Officer of the

Court.

This was a collection suit, not a fraud suit. The court denied discovery due to

lack of a Certificate of Review. The Petitioners had no duty to bring a Certificate of

Review because it was the Respondent who had the burden of proving that a debt

was owed and that her rates fell within industry standards. It was not the

18

Petitioners’ burden to try to prove otherwise (Snegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.

175 F.3d 544. 550. 556 (7th Cir. 1999): Blum v. Stenson. 465 U.S. 886. 895. 104

S.Ct. 1541. 1547. 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984V

As the court denied discovery, she also barred Petitioners from challenging

the Respondent’s invoices for lack of a Certificate of Review. If the Petitioners are

barred from challenging the invoices, how can the Petitioners defend themselves

against the alleged debt? Petitioners were civil defendants being sued in a

collections suit for fees that Petitioners vehemently disputed. Petitioners had a

right to dispute the debt, and to require the Respondent “produce the note.”

IX. A Certificate of Review is Obstreperous, Burdensome, Prejudicial,

Duplicative, Creates Separate Classes of Citizens, and deprives the Citizen

of his Seventh, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.

The Seventh Amendment states:

“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed

twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried

by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States,

than according to the rules of the common law.”

The Fifth Amendment states in part that a citizen shall not “be deprived of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

The Fourteenth Amendment states that:

“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.”

19

The Seventh Amendment does not require a citizen to hire the opinion of a

favorable expert to agree that he has a right to bring his controversy before a jury.

It simply states that a citizen has a right to have his controversy decided by a jury.

The Fifth Amendment holds that the citizen shall not, “be deprived of life,

liberty or property without due process of law,” and the Fourteenth Amendment

does not allow States to make or enforce laws that abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens, nor deprive citizens of the due process of law, nor deny to

any person the equal protection of the law.

The Certificate of Review defeats all three.

In cases where a Certificate of Review is required, the Certificate is required

before the citizen can proceed to the next stage of trial. The Certificate of Review

acts as a sort of permission slip that a citizen is required to give to the court, which

in turn allows the court to now grant the citizen their Seventh, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. If a Certificate of Review is not obtained, the

citizen’s case is summarily dismissed (C.R.S. § 13-20-602(4)), depriving the citizen

of his Seventh, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Certificates of Review are unduly prejudicial. Citizens who are required to

obtain a Certificate of Review before they are allowed to proceed to trial are

required to obtain the Certificate without the benefit of discovery. This tilts the

burden of proof backwards, forcing the citizen to meet his burden of proof before he

is granted his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Due Process. If the

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citizen cannot meet his burden of proof to the court without the benefit of Due

Process, the citizen is deprived of his Seventh Amendment rights.

Certificates of Review are not required in all cases, only in certain kinds of

cases involving certain kinds of white-collar professionals. This creates a separate,

protected class of citizen who enjoys an added layer of protection from scrutiny from

the law. If certain types of professionals are carved out from the equal application

of the law, with special requirements that must be met before they can be sued, this

is a type of qualified immunity for the protected class who now cannot be

scrutinized without the express written permission of a hired pretrial expert,

placing a bar before the courtroom door.

The requirement for a Certificate of Review places an unreasonable financial

burden on the citizen that must be overcome before he is able to enjoy his Seventh,

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, disproportionately affecting the poor and

indigent. If a citizen is unable to obtain a Certificate of Review, it is assumed that

the citizen’s case had no merit and the case is dismissed, barring the citizen from

the courtroom door.

If a citizen has no financial constraints, a citizen is free to hire as many

pretrial experts as necessary until he finds one who is willing to provide a

Certificate of Review, which further demonstrates the obstreperous, burdensome,

even prejudicial nature of the Certificate of Review. The wealthy, either

themselves or through their counsel, can afford to hire experts until an agreeable

one is found. The indigent have their cases dismissed for lack of standing. If a

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citizen cannot afford to expert-shop, a citizen is deprived of his Fifth, Fourteenth,

and Seventh Amendment rights, barring the citizen from the courtroom door.

The requirement for a Certificate of Review is duplicative. Experts are

already hired in nearly all cases to establish standards of care and breaches to the

standards of care, and retaining more than one expert to testify on a same topic is

duplicative, so what does a Certificate of Review actually accomplish pretrial that

regular expert testimony will not also accomplish during trial? Is the Certificate of

Review admissible? Can a plaintiff testify to the jury about how he had to hire a

pretrial expert to establish injury before the courtroom door was unbarred? What

happens when the Certificate of Review and the jury’s verdict contradict each other?

If the jury verdict defeats the Certificate of Review no matter what, then the

Certificate of Review is wholly unnecessary, no matter what.

If a Certificate of Review is not admissible because it would be prejudicial to

defendants, what is its purpose but to act as a deterrent to citizens fifing lawsuits

against white-collar professionals? If the Certificate of Review does not aid the jury

in its fact-finding, who does it aid? If its only purpose is to give permission to

proceed, and without it a citizen’s case is dismissed, then its only purpose is to

deprive citizens of their Seventh, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

How does a Certificate of Review help guard against frivolous lawsuits when

courts have discretion to dismiss lawsuits for lack of standing at certain intervals

throughout the course of the case? Many lawsuits are dismissed for lack of standing

right from the outset, from children suing their parents for lack of birthday presents

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to drivers suing the Department of Transportation because “the speed limit is

archaic and inane.” Judges have discretion to dismiss cases with or without

prejudice, with or without Certificates of Review, and do so every single day. So

why is a Certificate of Review necessary?

There are numerous steps between the courtroom door and a jury verdict,

and even more between receiving a verdict and collecting an award. The plaintiff s

case remains imperiled all along the way. After expert depositions, defense counsel

motions the court for Summary Judgment. If the plaintiff is demonstrably

incapable of meeting his burden of proof, the court grants Summary Judgment to

the defendant and the plaintiffs case is dismissed. Summary Judgments are

granted in American courtrooms every single day, without benefit of a Certificate of

Review.

When the plaintiff rests his case, defense counsel motions the court for a

directed verdict. If the court agrees that the plaintiff has not met his burden of

proof at the close of plaintiffs case in chief, the court grants a directed verdict to the

defense and sends the jury home with the court’s appreciation and thanks. Directed

Verdicts are granted in American courtrooms every single day, without benefit of a

Certificate of Review.

The Certificate of Review is an expensive pretrial burden that bars citizens

from enjoying their constitutional rights and protects white-collar professionals

from being sued.

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Courts also have discretion to waive the Certificate of Review “if the

negligence per se is facially observable” (Martinez v Badis. 842 P.2d 245 (1992V).

Who determines if the negligence per se is facially observable? When the plaintiff

and defense disagree on whether the “negligence per se is facially observable,” the

defendant is provided “with a means to obtain early judicial resolution of the

question.”

If a court has discretion to order the Certificate or waive the Certificate based

upon facially-observable negligence per se, and the defendant is provided “with a

means to obtain early judicial resolution of the question,” does not the court then

have a duty to examine the evidence of the citizen to determine whether the

negligence per se is facially observable before ordering the citizen to obtain a

Certificate of Review?

If a court has discretion to waive the Certificate of Review based upon the

court’s review of the citizen’s evidence, then the court has stepped into the role of

the trier of fact, determining without benefit of discovery, exhibits, or sworn expert

testimony if the citizen has enough evidence to bring a suit against a member of

this new protected white-collar class. If the citizen cannot meet the requirements of

a Certificate of Review without his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, then

the citizen is deprived of his Fifth, Fourteenth, and Seventh Amendment rights.

The Seventh Amendment does not require a citizen to submit his case to a

jury of one before he submits his case to a jury of 12. A Citizen is not required to

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meet his burden of proof before he is given his Due Process rights, unless he is first

required to provide a Certificate of Review.

X.

“Negligence Per Se” Was Facially Observable. No Certificate of

Review Was Needed.

Martinez v. Radis. 842 P.2d 245 (Colo. 199211 states plainly that a Certificate

of Review is not necessary if the alleged negligence per se is facially observable:

10/25/19 Prepared request for transcript, 1.0 x $150 = $150.00

10/25/19 Emailed transcript request to court, 0.2 x $150 = $30.00

01/08/20 Printed off Subpoena documents, 0.8 x $100 = $80.00

02/07/20 Prepared certified mail receipt for ltr to OP RE: child support 0.3

hours x $150 = $45.00

02/11/20 E-filed notice of mediation, 0.2 hours x $150 = $30.00

02/12/20 E-filed notice of mediation, 0.2 hours x $150 = $30.00

(duplicate entry?)

02/11/20 Email notice of mediation to client, 0.1 x $150 = $15.00

02/25/20 Printed off and formatted interrogatories for discovery notebook,

0.6 x $150 = $90.00

02/25/20 Printed off discovery documents for notebook, 1.25 x $150 =

$187.50

02/26/20 Continued to print off discovery documents for notebook, 1.5 x

150.00 = $225.00

The question is, do the above excerpts from Respondent’s invoices reflect

“negligence per se” or “overbilling”? The Respondent was charging Petitioners well

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outside community standards, from the very beginning of the relationship, and

those overcharges are clearly evident on the face of the invoices.

Courts have been narrowing the scope of attorney’s fees for decades. In the

landmark decision Missouri v. Jenkins. 491 U.S. 274 (1989). this Honorable Court

held that it is inappropriate for attorneys to charge clients for clerical or secretarial

tasks, stating: “Of course, purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed

at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them.”

In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express. Inc.. 488 F.2d 714. 717 (CA5 19741.

the court said the work of attorneys is applicable by analogy to paralegals:

"It is appropriate to distinguish between legal work, in the strict sense,

and investigation, clerical work, compilation of facts and statistics and other

work which can often be accomplished by nonlawyers but which a lawyer may

do because he has no other help available. Such nonlegal work may

command a lesser rate. Its dollar value is not enhanced just because a

lawyer does it."

Hvland v. Indicator Lites. Inc.. 160 F.Supp.2d 981, 986 (N.D.I11.20011 states

that, “The court shouldn’t allow entries that ‘detail clerical tasks that need

not be performed by attorneys, such as time spent filing motions or photocopying.’”

Kavlor-Trent v. Bonewicz. 916 F. Supp. 2d 878. 886 (C.D. Ill. 2013) is a case

that is similarly situated to the Petitioners. In this case, the court ruled that

attorneys are not entitled to “fees for excessive, unnecessary time entries” or for

“clerical, ministerial, or secretarial tasks.” The defendant in that case,

Kaylor-Trent, complained that she was charged paralegal rates for strictly clerical

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work: Calls made to hire process servers, mailing documents, and updating

calendar deadlines.

Kaylor-Trent also claimed that her attorney charged “excessive, unnecessary

time entries” in charging 1.5 hours for filling out form documents and having many

in-house conferences, including discussing a Motion with the firm’s partner. The

court in Kaylor-Trent v. Bonewicz agreed that Kaylor-Trent was charged excessive

and unnecessary attorney’s fees, and also that she was charged paralegal rates for

strictly clerical work, and the court reduced the attorney’s fees.

(Pace v. Pottawattomie Country Club Inc.. CAUSE NO. 3:07-CV-347 RM. 22

(N.D. Ind. Pec. 11. 20091 is also on point: The court agreed that:

“Certain tasks performed were of a clerical nature, such as: sending

pleadings to client; review of appearances, summons, waiver of service and

other similar documents; payment to EEOC; drafting cover sheets; and filing

documents with the court. Although some of these tasks were performed by a

paralegal, they are clerical in nature and cannot be part of the fee

award.”

In Firostino v. Parkview Health System. Inc. (N.D.Ind. 20051. 374 F. Supp. 2d

658. 667 (N.D. Ind. 20051. like Petitioners, the defendant’s biggest objection was the

sheer number of time entries for clerical work billed at paralegal or attorney’s rates:

Organizing file folders, document preparation, copying, scheduling matters, and

mailing letters. In Firestine, the paralegals were billing at a rate of $75.00 to

$85.00. The court found this rate was “not remotely justifiable.” The court also

found that the above-listed tasks were

“...administrative and clerical in nature and thus, are not reimbursable

fees. For this reason, the court has reviewed the time entries and disallows

25.5 hours in legal assistant time spent on purely clerical or administrative

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tasks. In addition, to the extent attorney time was utilized for clerical or

administrative tasks, those entries shall also be disallowed...”

Barnes v. Jeffreys. 20 C 2137. 4-5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20. 2023) is also similarly

situated to the Petitioners. The court in that case stated that it should “disallow

time spent on what are essentially clerical or secretarial tasks.”

Further, when it comes to attorneys not exercising billing judgment, ACLU v.

Barnes. 168 F.3d 423. 428 (11th Cir. 19991 holds that “If fee applicants do not

exercise billing judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them, to cut the amount

of hours for which payment is sought, pruning out those that are ‘excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”’

And in Blum v. Stenson. 465 U.S. 886. 895. 104 S.Ct. 1541. 1547. 79 L.Ed.2d

891 (1984). the Supreme Court stated that in order to help the court determine the

appropriate market rate for the services of an attorney: “The burden is on the fee

applicant to produce satisfactory evidence — in addition to the attorney's own

affidavits — that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

experience, and reputation.”)

Snegon v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago. 175 F.3d 544. 556 (7th Cir. 1999)

also states that, “An attorney's self-serving affidavit alone cannot satisfy the

plaintiffs burden of establishing the market rate for that attorney's services.

Respondent’s Fee Agreement is unique. It shifts almost every fee of overhead

to the client. The Respondent charged Petitioners at a premium rate for everything

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from photocopying to postage stamps. The Respondent charged Petitioners $150 an

ACLUhour for filling out the little green USPS return receipt form that the Post

Office gives out for free. Respondent even testified that she “lowers” the rates of her

legal assistants to $100 an hour for performing clerical tasks (transcript pp 23:10 24:10), admitting that she is charging clients three times the prevailing wage for

her legal assistants, a type of forced generosity at others’ expense.

If the burden of proof lies with the Plaintiff to prove that her invoices are

within community standards (Blum v. Stenson. 465 U.S. 886. 895. 104 S.Ct. 1541.

1547. 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984Y). and she is obligated to do so by comparison against

others attorneys’ invoices in the community because her own “self-serving affidavit”

cannot satisfy her burden (Snegon v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago. 175 F.3d 544.

556 (7th Cir. 1999V). and the courts are obligated to “prune out” excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary charges (ACLU v. Barnes. 168 F.3d 423. 428

(11th Cir. 199911. is this Respondent’s Fee Agreement even binding?

XI.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Protects Consumers From

Unfounded Or Erroneous Debts.

It is not enough to simply assert that a debt is owed. The Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act requires that creditors keep records that corroborate their

bills, and that corroborating evidence be provided to a consumer when the consumer

demands that a creditor validate the alleged debt (Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act. 15 U.S.C. S 1692g 809(bT).

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The FDCPA was originally passed because there were not adequate laws for

protecting consumers from the abusive, deceptive, and unfair collection practices

found being used by many debt collectors. The FDCPA also rightly assumes that

typos, duplicative line items, misplaced decimal points or commas, even billing code

errors, can and do occur. Consumers are regularly advised to review their bills and

dispute errors. Even the Respondent advises clients to inspect her invoices and

report errors because, “surprise and disappointment can ruin the healthiest

attorney-client relationship.” But when Respondent’s client tried to report errors or

discuss questionable charges, Respondent refused to accept that any errors could

exist and demanded payment in full.

When a consumer is confronted with a bill that is questionable, a consumer is

allowed to question alleged debts, dispute alleged debts, and require the alleged

creditor to verify the alleged debt before the alleged debtor is liable for paying the

debt. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act fairly assigns the burden of proof to

the creditor.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act also provides protections for

consumers who have entered into verbal financial agreements with creditors. The

Act provides that consumers are allowed to substantially rely on the verbal

representations made by creditors. If an alleged debtor is allowed to substantially

rely on the verbal representations and agreements made with a debtholder of

common pursuits, how much more should a citizen be able to substantially rely on

the representations and agreements made with an Officer of the Court?

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XII.

The Court’s Failure to Ensure Substantially-Verbatim Transcripts

Unduly Prejudices Litigants

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Petitioners attempted to order transcripts of the first hearing for preparation

for trial and appeal. The district court failed to ensure that the electronic court

recorder was operational. The court’s failure to ensure substantially-verbatim

transcripts absolutely prejudiced the defendants’ ability to adequately prepare for

trial and appeal. “Certain to lose” is not a good enough reason to deny litigants a

fundamental right of due process.

Defendants next ordered the official Transcript of Proceedings from the trial.

The transcript was rife with formatting errors, spelling errors, grammatical errors,

“(inaudible)s,” and was no more than a glorified paraphrase. Objections made by

the court were omitted from the transcript entirely; exchanges between the court

and witnesses were omitted from the transcript entirely.

The defendants next tried to order an amended, substantially-verbatim

Transcript of Proceedings prepared per Code. The lay transcriptionist employed by

this court responded in writing, “What does ‘verbatim’ mean?”

Petitioners then tried to obtain an amended, substantially-verbatim

transcript prepared by a different transcription company, only to discover that the

original tape of the proceedings had already been destroyed, less than a year after

the original court date. There is no substantially-verbatim transcript, and now

there never will be.

Petitioners pray for relief from the lower court’s erroneous and

unconstitutional rulings. The errors are too great to remedy. The only fair and

reasonable exercise of justice is to vacate the lower court’s orders with prejudice.

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t

r

9

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

r-

Date:

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