Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Glen Taylor Helzer, Petitioner v. California

CAPITAL CASE

No. ________

In the Supreme Court of the United States

Pctober Term, 2024

GLENN TAYLOR HELZER,

Petitioner,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JEANNE KEEVAN-LYNCH

Attorney at Law

SBN 101710

P.O. Box 2433

Mendocino CA 95460

Tel: 707- 895-2090

Email JKL@MyWord.WS

Attorney for Appellant

*Counsel of Record

Attorney for Petitioner

Glen Taylor Helzer

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the plain view doctrine apply where police enter and seize a home under a

warrant to search for evidence of specified crimes, and forego getting a new warrant

before proceeding to search for evidence of other crimes that police discover while

they are occupying the home?

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties to the proceeding in the Superior Court were defendant-appellant

Glenn Taylor Helzer (petitioner in this Court), co-defendants Justin Alan Helzer and

Dawn Godman, and plaintiff-respondent People of the State of California. Petitioner

alone completed an appeal to the California Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

1. State Trial Court: People v. Glenn Taylor Helzer, Justin Alan Helzer

and Dawn Godman,. Superior Court Of California, Contra Costa

County No. 02057–6, judgment entered March 11, 2005.

2. State Court of Appeal Pretrial Writ Petitions: Glenn Taylor Helzer,

et.al., v. Superior Court Nos. A105741 (dismissed March 11, 2004),

A103679 (denied September 4, 2003) and A100518 (denied November

12, 2002).

3. Direct Appeal Decision: People v. Glen Taylor Helzer, S132256, filed

January 24, 2024.

4. State Supreme Court Habeas Petition: In re Glen Taylor Helzer, No.

S283398, filed January 12, 2024, pending.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i

LIST OF PARTIES .................................................................................................... i

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................ iii

PETITION ...................................................................................................................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................................................................. 1

JURISDICTION ....................................................................................................... 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................................................... 1

Fourth Amendment .................................................................................................. 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............................................................. 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 2

1.

Trial Court Proceedings............................................................................ 2

2.

Petitioner’s Appeal.................................................................................... 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .............................................................. 4

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 9

APPENDIX “A” ............................................................................................................ 10

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Creamer v. Porter

754 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985) ................................................................................ 6

Florida v. Jardines

569 U.S. 1 (2013) .................................................................................................... 4

Horton v. California

496 U.S. 128 (1990) ................................................................................................ 6

People v. Helzer

15 Cal.5th 622 (2024) ......................................................................................... 1, 3

People v. Hughes

506 Mich. 512 (2020) .............................................................................................. 7

Triplett v. United States, No. 1:09cr154-MPM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

103917

2014 WL 3756353 (N.D. Mass. July 30, 2014) ...................................................... 5

United States Mann

592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................. 4

United States v. Carter, Criminal No. 09-161, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

23696

2012 WL 604162 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012) ............................................................ 5

United States v. Giberson

527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................. 5

United States v. Gray

78 F.Supp.2d 524 (E.D. Va. 1999) .......................................................................... 5

United States v. Loera

923 F.3d 907 (10th Cir. 2019) ................................................................................ 8

United States v. Rettig

589 F.2d 418 (1978) .................................................................................... 5, 6, 7, 9

United States v. Williams

592 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................. 5

Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 1257 .......................................................................................................... 1

Constitutions:

U.S. Const., 4th Amend. ................................................................................. 2, 4, 7, 8

iii

Other:

Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use

Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1 (2015) .................... 6

iv

Petition

Petitioner GLENN TAYLOR HELZER respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment and decision of the Supreme Court of the State of

California entered on January 22, 2024.

OPINIONS BELOW

The California Supreme Court's opinion affirming the death judgment is reported

as People v. Helzer, 15 Cal.5th 622 (2024).

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of California issued its opinion in this case on January 22,

2024. A copy of that opinion is attached as Appendix A. This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1257(3).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Fourth Amendment

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

28 U.S.C. section 1257(3).

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Trial Court Proceedings

Petitioner, his brother Justin Helzer, and their friend Dawn Godman were charged

as codefendants in the kidnaping and murders of Ivan and Annette Stineman and

the murders of Selina Bishop, Bishop's mother, Jennifer Villarin, and Villarin's

friend James Gamble.

On behalf of all three defendants, Godman moved to suppress all of the evidence

obtained by police executing serial search warrants at the home the defendants

shared because the searching officers searched for and seized things that were not

the stated objects of their warrants in what amounted to a “general search” that the

Fourth Amendment was written to prohibit. The motion was denied.

Godman subsequently pleaded guilty to 18 counts in exchange for her agreement

to testify against petitioner and his brother. After the trial court denied the brothers'

motions for separate trials, petitioner pleaded guilty to all charges and received a

penalty phase trial. Both brothers were sentenced to death. Justin Helzer died while

his case was on appeal.

2. Petitioner’s Appeal

Petitioner argued that police disregarded the limits of their warrants as to purpose

and failed to show justification for over-seizures at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The state court rejected this claim after averting to the plain view doctrine:

There is substantial evidence supporting the trial court's determination

that seizures of items not specifically described in the warrant were

nonetheless appropriate under the plain view doctrine, and did not reflect a general, indiscriminate search of the premises. Detective Nash

testified that seizures were made in light of "[t]he entire picture of what

[they] were getting as [they] were getting it and whether it was related

to this series of murders and financial stuff." He further explained: "So

we wouldn't just arbitrarily say yeah, that's related. We would actually

have information at some point in there that we felt that it was related

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to the series of crimes." And Detective Nash responded in the affirmative when asked whether he had made "every effort to try to seize only those items that were either specifically listed in the search warrant

or items which [he] believed there was probable cause to believe constituted the fruits [or] instrumentality of the crime." Similarly, Detective Chiabotti testified that the evidence that was seized at the premises "related to instrumentality of the crimes [they] were investigating,

evidence that would tend to show who committed the crimes, how the

crimes were committed, evidence which went to state of mind . , planning, preparation."

(People v. Helzer, 15 Cal.5th 622, 651.)

The unstated problem with the state court’s conclusion is that the “crimes” referred

to by the officers were the murders of the Stinemans and Selina Bishop and the mutilation of their remains, crimes that were not disclosed to the magistrates issuing the

warrants, crimes that became known to the officers only after the warranted searches were underway. It was those murders and mutilations at petitioner’s residence

that explained the eight-day occupation and ransacking of the home for all writings

and artifacts bearing on the mentality of the residents. The question is whether police were required to get a warrant that contemplated what the officers were looking

for and why, or were they allowed to conduct a general search in reliance on the plain

view doctrine?

Here, the place to be searched was the defendant's home, and the specified items

in the only warrant actually read by lead Detective Nash were the gun used in a double murder, evidence of occupancy and anything related to one missing person, the

daughter of one of the victims of a shooting in another county.

There was no exigency compelling continuation of the search before getting a new

warrant, and no new warrant was sought after police learned that the missing persons had been killed and their remains mutilated in the home under search. The

place was seized and searched for eight days.

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Lower state and federal courts need guidance on the application of the plain view

doctrine when a search goes beyond the objects of the search warrant as to purpose

and intensity, but not location. Petitioner urges this Court to hold that a search warrant for a home is a license, like the implicit license to approach a front door of a

home, that is limited not only to a particular area, but to a particular purpose. (Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013). When the purpose and intensity of the intrusion far exceed that necessary to locate the objects of the warrant, blanket suppression may be appropriate, and is appropriate here.

The California Supreme Court opinion’s reliance on the plain view doctrine here

will lead to more general searches – the evil that the Fourth Amendment was enacted to prevent – unless certiorari is granted. The officers’ testimony, as quoted in the

decision, does not show that they were pursuing the objects of the warrant when they

came to view all of what they opened, read, and seized. On the contrary, it shows that

they were pursuing mens rea and bad character evidence to use in a death penalty

trial for murders and mutilations not disclosed to any magistrate in issuing any warrant for the home.

The court’s extension of the plain view doctrine to cover discoveries made while

searching for purposes other than the object of the warrants is at odds with Jardines

v. Florida, and with many lower federal court decisions respecting warrants to

search computers and phones that produce evidence of new crimes. Where, as here,

there is no exigency, the Fourth Amendment demands that the police obtain a new

warrant describing the intended objects of the search. Lower federal courts acknowledge that obligation, at least in the context of digital data searches.¹ But the Califor¹ See United States Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding "troubling"

detective's "failure to stop his search and request a separate warrant for child

pornography" where, during search seeking to uncover evidence of voyeurism under

lawful warrant, detective discovered child pornography). Government agents rou-

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nia Supreme Court did not do so in petitioner’s case. It failed to condemn the ransacking of petitioner’s home and review of all of his papers and artifacts – things

clearly not within the scope of any warrant – and thus set a bad precedent.

This Court can negate that bad precedent by clarifying a simple point for all state

and lower federal courts: a search warrant is a license to search for specified purposes. Hence, any evidence that came into plain view only when searching for other purposes must be suppressed. And where, as here, it is not possible to identify after the

fact the discrete items of evidence that would have been discovered had the agents

focused exclusively on the objects of the warrants, blanket suppression is necessary

and appropriate. (United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (1978).

Petitioner’s suggested clarification of the plain view doctrine as applied to searches

for evidence outside the scope of the warrant integrates the rule announced in Jartinely do just that. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 516 n.2 (4th

Cir. 2010) (obtaining a second search warrant specifically to authorize a search for

child pornography where FBI agent, conducting search under state warrant for evidence related to Virginia crimes of threatening bodily harm and harassment by a

computer, observed evidence of child pornography); United States v. Giberson, 527

F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2008) (government only searched computer for pornographic

files after obtaining third search warrant allowing it to search for child pornography); Triplett v. United States, No. 1:09cr154-MPM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103917,

2014 WL 3756353, *1 (N.D. Mass. July 30, 2014) ("[A] search warrant was issued

for items at the Morris-Triplett residence that could lead to information about

Kaila's disappearance. . . . Several computers were seized from the home, and a

forensic examination of the computers was conducted. After a forensic examination

revealed images of what the investigator believed to be child pornography, the investigator ceased his examination and called the Sheriff's Department to advise

them to apply for another search warrant. A second search warrant was obtained,

and over 4,000 images of child pornography were located on the computers."); United States v. Carter, Criminal No. 09-161, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23696, 2012 WL

604162, *4-5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012) (computer search for evidence of counterfeiting halted to obtain second search warrant to look for child pornography when evidence of child pornography found); United States v. Gray, 78 F.Supp.2d 524, 527–28

(E.D. Va. 1999) (upon discovering child pornography while conducting computer

search for evidence of unauthorized computer intrusions as authorized by search

warrant, agent stops search and obtains a second warrant authorizing search for

child pornography).

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dines with well settled principles respecting the execution of search warrants. A

search pursuant to warrant must be directed “`toward the objects specified in the

warrant or for other means and instrumentalities by which the crime charged had

been committed.’ [Citation.]” (United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 cf. Horton

v. California (1990) 496 US 128, 141 [“if the three rings and other items named in

the warrant had been found at the outset -- or petitioner had them in his possession

and had responded to the warrant by producing them immediately -- no search for

weapons could have taken place.”]; Creamer v. Porter (5th Cir. 1985) 754 F.2d 1311,

1319 ["[a] reasonable officer would be aware . . . [of] the rule confining the search to

items particularly described in the warrant"].)

Notably, petitioner’s suggestion does not seek to bar use of evidence of new crimes

discovered in the search of seized electronic devices discovered while pursuing the

objects of the warrant. See Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence:

The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1, 2–5

(2015). Petitioner’s approach allows states to use evidence of new crimes discovered

when searching under a warrant for other evidence so long as police seek and obtain

a new warrant.

Recent federal court and other state court decisions addressing searches for evidence of crimes not disclosed to the magistrate support petitioner’s modest approach.

They focus on the apparent purpose of the searches that led to the discovery of the

matter.

Under the Fourth Amendment, when law enforcement personnel obtain

a warrant to search for a specific crime but later, for whatever reason,

seek to broaden their scope to search for evidence of another crime, a

new warrant is required. [Citations.]

***

And, when they fail to do so, evidence outside the scope of the original

warrant is subject to exclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172

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F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1998) (suppressing child pornography evidence where police, conducting search under warrant for drug offenses,

continued to search for child pornography without obtaining warrant);

United States v. Hulscher, 4:16-CR-40070–01-KES, 2017 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 22874, 2017 WL 657436, *2 (D.S.D. Feb. 17, 2017) (suppressing

evidence from second search of Iphone for evidence to support federal

firearms charges where search warrant allowing seizure and search of

phone was to investigate forgery, counterfeiting, and identify theft offenses because agent "should have applied for and obtained a second

warrant [that] would have authorized him to search Mr. Hulscher's cell

phone data for evidence of firearms offenses"); United States v. Schlingloff, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (concluding scope of

search warrant was exceeded and suppressing evidence of child pornography where law enforcement agent was searching computer for evidence of passport fraud and identify theft but, upon covering evidence

of child pornography, failed to seek a second warrant). (United States v.

Nasher-Alneam (S.D.W.Va. 2019) 399 F. Supp. 3d 579, 592–594.)

At least one state Supreme Court has focused on the purpose of the search in excluding evidence that the officers viewed while executing a warrant for a different crime.

In People v. Hughes (Mich. Supr. 2020) 506 Mich. 512, 517, the state Supreme Court

suppressed armed robbery evidence required where "the officer's review of defendant's cell-phone data for incriminating evidence relating to an armed robbery was

not reasonably directed at obtaining evidence regarding drug trafficking--the criminal activity alleged in the warrant--and therefore the search for that evidence was

outside the purview of the warrant and thus violative of the Fourth Amendment."

It bears emphasis here that searches of a home during an eight-day seizure in

which officers seek to uncover all evidence of the residents mentality are not readily distinguishable from the search of electronic information seized from a hard drive. Both involve looking into every possible hiding place for the desired data. Both

give police access to personal writings that reveal the inner life and private affairs of

the suspect. In both contexts, courts can and should determine whether the search

process was reasonably directed at uncovering the evidence specified in the search

warrant. See United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978) [the "search

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must be one directed in good faith toward the objects specified in the warrant or for

other means and instrumentalities by which the crime charged had been committed."].)

In both scenarios, it is "unrealistic to expect a warrant prospectively [to] restrict

the scope of a search” by precise location. (See United States v. Loera, 923 F.3d 907,

917 (10th Cir. 2019). Consequently, courts must make an ex post examination of the

purpose of the searches actually conducted to see if they were all directed to the objects of the warrant. (Id.)

Also, the intensity of the search, rather than its precise location, determines its

reasonableness, whether the location is a cell phone or a person’s home. To quote:

Imagine a warrant authorizes police officers to search a "residence" for

evidence of "firearms and ammunition." Under that warrant, it would

be reasonable for a police officer to search the medicine cabinet in the

bathroom for a minute or two to see if a small gun or ammunition is

hidden there, however, it would be unreasonable for the officer to spend

two hours reading the labels on each bottle of medicine in the cabinet.

On the other hand, if the warrant had authorized the officer to search

the residence for evidence of "illegal drug trafficking and manufacture,"

an intensive search of the medicine cabinet would be reasonable. In

both cases, the medicine cabinet is fair game to search, but the intensity level of the permitted search differs depending on the evidence to be

seized. The same is true for electronic searches. (United States v. Loera,

923 F.3d 907, 920–21 (10th Cir. 2019)

The intensity of the search in this case reached all writings, artifacts, even rolled-up

posters in the garage, long after the bodies of the missing persons were found, because the crimes not disclosed in applying for warrants generated special interest in

the mentality of the residents, There was no exigency; the home had been seized and

would continue to be seized while officers completed their searches. Where, as here,

there is no exigency, the Fourth Amendment demands that the police obtain a new

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warrant describing the intended objects of the search. Lower federal courts acknowledge that obligation, at least in the context of digital data searches. But the California Supreme Court did not do so in petitioner’s case.

Finally, petitioner urges this Court to require blanket suppression of evidence

where, as here, it is impracticable to determine which of the items of evidence police

seized were discovered while searching for the stated objects of their warrant as opposed to the undisclosed crimes. The detectives conflated the two, as shown in their

testimony. The purpose of the searches conducted in the home was broadly explained

by the officers (as noted in the state court opinion) to include information and evidence not contemplated by their warrants, but useful in showing decadent lifestyle,

belief in witchcraft and other aggravating evidence connected to the murders that

were not known and therefore not disclosed to any magistrate. “Under the circumstances, it is not possible for the court to identify after the fact the discrete items of

evidence which would have been discovered had the agents kept their search within

the bounds permitted by the warrant; and therefore all evidence seized during the

search must be suppressed.

United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d at 423.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: April 18, 2024

By: /s/ Jeanne Keevan-Lynch

Attorney for Petitioner

Glen Taylor Helzer

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Appendix “A”

10