Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Arthur Lomax, Petitioner v. Colorado

Supreme Court briefFeb 21, 2024

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IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:

Court Address:

1 First Street, N.E.

Washington, DC 20543

FILED

FEB 2 1 2024

OFFI< '

SUPi -

LOWER COURT: Colorado Supreme

ACTION NUMBER: Court

2023SA306

LOWER COURT: Colorado Court

ACTION NUMBER: of Appeals

2023CA1070

lower district court:

ACTION NUMBER:

7nnRrpTQ77

Denver District

Court

A COURT USE ONLY A

IN RE: ARTHUR JAMES LOMAX

PETITIONER,

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER:

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

taw

STATE OF COLORADO

RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY/PRO se

Arthur J. Lomax #134416

Bent County Correctional Fac.

11560 County Road, FF-75

Las Animas, CO 81054

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

COMES NOW, Mr. Lomax, petitioner-appellant herein pro se

petition this honorable Court, pursuant to 28 U.S. Code Sute

bsect. 1257 and/or 28 U.S. Code Subsect'. 1254, and Supreme

Court Rule 10. To review, consider, and grant his petition.

■sit

QUESTIOW(S) PRESENTED

When a states "Bill of Rights", calls for the prosecution of

felonies *only by indictment whether prosecution by any other

method conforms with the states constitutional "uniformity of

laws clause", and the protections of the 14th Amendment of the

U.S.Constitution?

Whether a Government Officers "discretion" can abolish the

substantial constitutional safeguard of a grand jury indictment,

to one portion of citizens charge with felonies, but leave it in

effect to another portion of citizens who are charged with

felonies?

An indictment confers competent subj ect-matter jurisdiction on th—

e district court. An indictment is also the culmination of the

probable cause screening process of the Grand Jury and that

procedure functions as a "constitutionally adequa~e" substitute

for a preliminary hearing whther a petitioner can be deprived of

an indictment and a prelTminary hearing and be awarded a fair

trial. (Note: Defendant made no waiver of these protections).

Whether the substantial- due process safeguards to the accused

provided by the requirement that such an offense be prosecuted

by indictment can be eradicated on the theory that noncompliance

is a mere technical departure from the rules? (Note: See.Hagner

vs. United States. 285 U.S. 427, also see, Williams vs. United

States, 341 U.S. 97) [**997]

When a Grand Jury Indictment is incorporated in a States Bill of

Rights, and when a State Habeas applicant makes a Prima Facie

showing that he was prosecuted for a felony,without an indictm

ent . Whether a state judge can dismiss the Habeas as having no

merit? (Note: This arbitrary action violates the due process

protections of the National and State Constitution'll

When the sentencing courts mittimus is absolutely void for want

of jurisdiction, whether a 2254 Habeas applicant can be required to exhaust remedies before his writ is issued? Whether state

statues can be applied in a manner that creates ex post facto

laws, by altering the necessary criminal rules of procedure

(e*8* indictment for a felony) and by requiring that, different

or ^ess testimony is needed the law requires at time oT the

offense to convict the offender?

When a State Bill of Rights guarantees an indictment for a

felony,and when i"t was the common law practice to add any

^acts or elements that increase punishment in an indictment.

Whether a prosecitor can charge a defendant of an aggravated

crime when the defendant was not proceeded against by an

indictment. (Note: See, Appendix vs. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000); also see, Criminal Procedure Section 82 at 51-52).

When a indictment and a preliminary hearing shields the

accused from unwarranted charges. Whether defendant’s retain

ed lawyer and/or public defender(C.R.S.21-1-101 ( 1)) can be

said to have protected defendant s 6th amendment right to

page 1.

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r %*

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effective assistance .of counsel, when defendant's retained lawyer

or public defender did not protect defendant's constitutional

rights to a preliminary hearing and indictment before proceedings

and trial.

When a conviction is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and

absolutely void, because the pretrial and trial court(s) did not

have subject matter jurisdictionythe~felony charge(s)and/or the

parties,and when defendant's retained lawyer/or public defender

was clearly ineffective, seeing the defendant was convicted in a

court that did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the

felony charge(s)and/or thepartie(s), whether such conviction

can be the legal cause of imprisonment?

Whether the statutory enactment 16-5-101 can override the

fundamental constitutional requirement of article 2, section 8,

of the Colorado Constitution, that requires indictments for

felonies? Whether stfautory enactments that are in contrast to

the National and State Constitutions can be upheld as valid?

If the ppovisions of the State Constitution, that until other

wise provided by law, no person shall, for a felony, be proce

eded against criminally otherwise than by indictment, and if

the power conferred upon to provide otherwise. The question

arises how must this power be exercised?

Statute (16-5-204) article 2, section 24: allow citizens to

petition the Government for redress for Grievances. Petitioner's

arrest was without his miranda rights. Considering these facts,

petitioner's retained lawyer/or public defender should have

brought petitioner's case before the Grand Jury to investigate

the acts of County Officials. (Note: Ik> preliminary hearing was

held to contest such actions). When a Court properly has cogni

zance of cause, a mere error of law must be reviewed by appeal

or writ of error.

Is it true,by mandate should all laws of this State have enact

ing clause and/or titles in and publication of each state law,

pursuant to Colo. Const. Art. V, Sect. 18, and Legislative

Construction of Statutes C.R.S. 2-4-213?

Petitioner's point of law did not have to be met at every stage

of criminal proceedings, because it goes beyond a mere error in

point of law. The proceedings were not merely erroneous, but

entirely null and void because the trial and/or sentencing

Court were without subject matter jurisdiction over the cause/

or party.

Petitioner is subject to wrongful and/or illegal imprisonment,

and is held in violation of several amendments of the National

and State Constitutions; petitioner cannot enforce his civil righ

ts in the trial/or sentencing court. Petitioner prays that this

Court will grant his writ and order the lower court to discharge

him from the Department of Corrections,and dismiss all related

charge(sQin this case.

+Conelusion

The petitioner for a writ of habeas should be granted and the

petitioner ask that his record of conviction be expunged.

page

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Civil Cover Page

Page i

Certificate of Compliance

Page ii

Table of Contents................

Table of Cases.................. ..

Table of Statutes........

Table of Authorities.........

Page iii

Page iv,v,vi

Page vi,vii

Pagevii,viii

Pageix

Statement of Issues............

Statement of the Case....

Summary of the Arguments.

Bcguihentstt............... ..................

Conclusion...............................

Page ix

Page ix, -|

Page 1

Page 30

iii

Table of Cases

Cases

Pages

Bonett v. Cook, 2021 U.S. Dist. .LEX-IS, 2.1 2336...

Davidson, 79 P.3d at, 1 228....................... .................

o •

Hugi, 164 F.3d at 380-81 ......... .......................................

People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686 at, 697 (2010)

In re Green, 67 N.C. App. 501,504,313 S.E. 2d 193,195 (1984)

In re McKinney,158 N.C. App. at 443, 581 S.E. 2d at,795

In re Z.T.B

170 N.C. App. 564, 613 S.E. 2d 298,300 (2005). 2

Main v. Thiboutot. 100 S.Ct. 250 (1980)...........................

2;3

Matter of Green, 313 S.E. 2d 193 (N.C. App. 1984)...

Melo v. U.S *.r 505 F.2d 1026.....................................

Honomichi v. State, 333 N.W. 2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1983)

In re U.S

441 F„3d 44, 58 (1st Cir. 2006).............

Rodrigues v. State, 411 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. App. 1983)

Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F. 2d 416 » »

State v. Chatmon. 671 P.2d 533;, 538 (Kan. 1 983)__ ...

Stillwell v, Markham, 10 P. 2d 15 135 Kan. 206 (1932)

U.S, v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002)...........................

U.S. v. Sells Eng1g Inc., 463 U.S. 41 8, 423 (1 983)...

3,4

, 3

Ex parte Carlson, 186 N.W. 722, 725, 176 Wis. 538 (1922) • • • • 4

In Klancher v. Anderson, 113 Colo. 478, 158 P.2d 923....

In re the Marriage of Zubia, 38 Colo. App. 471, 558 P.2d

1 003

. 4

McLeod v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co.,186 Colo. 234,

526 P.2d 1318

.. 4

People v. Hardiman, 347 N.W. 2d 460, 462, 132 Mich. App. 382

(1984).................... ........................................... .....................

Ralph v. Police Court of El Cerrito, 190 P.2d 632, 84 Cal.

App. 2d 257 (1984)

Sauls v. Sauls 40 Colo. App. 275 (1977).................................

Ex parte Carlson, 186 N.W. 722, 725, 176 Wis. 538 (1922) • • • •

Holmes v. Mason, 115 N.W. 770, 80 Neb. 454w......... ..

People v. Katrink, 185 Cal. Rptr. 869, 136 Cal. App. 3d 145

(1982)

State v. Christensen, 329 N.W* 2d 382, 383, 110 Wis. 2d 538

(1983)

State ex rel. Hansen v. Rigg. 256 Minn..338, 104 N. W. 2d 553

(I 960)................................ ..

Kelly v. Meyers, 263 Pac., 903, 905 (Ore. 1928).......... ............... 6

Collier & Cleveland Lithographing Co. v, Henderson, 18 Colo.

259, 32 P. 41 7 (1 893)...................................................................................

Ferrill v. Keel, 151 S.W. 269, 272, Ark. 380 (1912)..................

Sjoberg v. Security Savings & Loan Assn • t 73 Minn. 203, 212

(1 898) .......................................................................

State v. Patterson. 4 S.E. 350, 352, 98 N.C. 660 (1887)....

82 223 Ga. 367 (1 967)....................................................... .........................

Stevens v. Colorado, 18 Fed. App. 779, 780 (10th Cir. Colo.

September 17, 2001)

Joiner v. State,...

Preckel v, Byrne, 243 N.W. 823, 826, 62 N.D. 365 (1932)

Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R. Co

170 S.W. 171, 172, 175,

160 Ky. 745 (191 4)._____ _______........

Sjoberg v. Security Saving & Loan Assn

Minn, 203, 212-214

(1 898)................................................. ................... ....................... ..

State v. Barrow, 104 S.W. 526-29, 119.Term. (1907)

Morgan v. Murry, 328 P.2d 644-54 (Mont. 1958).........

Vaugn Ragsdale Co. v. State Bd. of Eg

96 P.2d 420-24 (Ont.

1939)......................................................... ..

Caine v. Robbons, 131 P.2d 516-18, 61 Nev. 416 (1942)

Kefauver v. Spurling. 290 S.W. 14-15 (Tenn. 1926) • «

State of Nevada v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 120, 261 (1875)

Melntire v. Forbes, 322 Ore. 426............. ..

Bull v. King, 286 N.W. 311 (Minn. 1939)...........

17L

Leininger v. Alger, 26 N.W. 2d 348-51, 316 Mich. 644 (1947).. 17

People v. Monroe, 34 9 III. 182 N.E. 439.............................. 1 7

State v. Burlington & M. RR. Co.. 60 Neb. 741, 84 N.W. (1900)

Hyman v. State, 9 S.W. 372-73, 87 Tenn. 109 (1888)

Megins v. City of Duluth, 106 N.W. 89-97, Minn • 9 23 (1906).. • • 1 8

State v. Clinton County, 76 N.W. 986, 166 Ind. 162 (1906). •' • . 18,

State v. Yardley, 32 S.W. 481, 482, 95 Tenn. 548 (1895)

Wimberly v. Georgia, S. & F.F. Com. 63 S.E. 29, 5 Ga. App.

263 (1 908) .................. ........................................

Brown v. Clower, 166 S.E. 2d 363-65, 225 Ga. 165 (1969)

Ex parte Crane, 151 Pac. 1006, 1010, 1011, 27 Idaho 671 (1915)

1 ,

o •

Leroy v. Special Ind. Sch. Dist •.f 172 N.W. 2d 764, Minn. (1969)

State v. McEnroe, 283 N.W. 57 (N.D. 1983)........................

State v. Rigg. 109 N.W. 2d 31 4, 260 Minn, (1961).........

State v. Maurer, 164 S.W. 551, 552,255 Mo. 152 (1944)

First Bank of N. Longmont v. Banking Bd if 648 P.2d 684 (Colo.

App. 1 982)......... ....................................................

Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218 P.

2d 498 (1 950).................................................................................................

Clandler v. Judicial of Tenth Circuit,389 U.S. 74, 86-88.........

Huslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash. 2d 607, 547 P.2d 1221,

1 230..................................................... .................................... ................................

Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 721........................................

United States v. Auqenblick, 393 U.S. 348.....................................

Vaughn & Ragsdale Co. v. State Bd„ of Equity,96 P.2d 420,423,

424

Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce,121 Colo. 521,218 P.2d

498 (1 950)................................................. .............................. ............................

Butler Taconite v. Roemer, 282 N.W. 2d 867, 870, 871 (Minn.

1 979)............................................. ................................ .....................

Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 9, 97............................................ ..

State v. Holm, 62 N.W. 2d 52, 55, 56, (Minn. 1954)......__ _

State ex. rel. v. Sutton, 147, 150, 65 N.W. 262 (1995)......

Baskin v. State, 232 Pac. 388, 389, 107 Okla. 272 (1925)....

United States v. Siviglia, 686 Fed. 2d 832, 835 (1 981 )........... . 30

Table of Statutes

&.E.S. 18-3-402............................................

C.R.S. 18-3-404(l)(a)...................... .....................

Legislative Construction of Statute 2-4-213

22 C.J.S. "Criminal Law" Sec. 167, p. 202..

22 C.J.S. "Criminal Law", Sec. 157 P.189...

C.R.S. 18-3-402(l)(a)..............................................

C.R.S. 18-3-402(1)(e) ...............................................

C.R.S. l'8-3-404(l)(e) . ............................................

C.R.S. 18-3-402(1)(a)..............................................

. 5

5 ,

C.R.S. 18-3-402(1)(e)

C.R.S. 18-3-404(1)(e)

Legislative Construction of Statutes 2-4-213 > form of enacting

clause............................................. .............................

Colorado Revised Statutes 2-4-213..............

C.R.S. 2-4-213...........................................................

73 Am. Jur. 2d "Statutes" Sec. 93 p. 319,320

Legislative Construction of Statutes 2-4-213, form of enacting

clause............... .................................................................................... ..

Laws 1897 , p. 250......................................................................................... 12

Statute 1875, Session 66........................................ ................................. 15

Colorado Revised Statute Subsection, 2-4-213, form of enacting

clause............ ................................................ ......................................

Colorado Revised Statutes, Vol. I, p. X................................

Legislative Construction of Statutes ,Subsection 2-4-213

Legislative Construction of Statutes, Subsection 2-5-213

. 25

Legislative Construction of Statutes, Subsection 2-4-211

Legislative Construction of Statutes, 2-5-118............ ..

Colorado Revised Statutes Title 18.........................................

Colorado Revised Statutes/Legislative Construction of Statutes*

Subsection 2-5-188...................................................................................... 26

Colorado Revised Statute, Subsection 18-1-410, Post-Conviction

Remedy................................................................. ............................................. 30

• t

Table of Authorities

Colorado Constitution Art. v, Sect. 18

U.S. Const. Amend. V...............................

Colo. Const. Art.II, Sect. 8..................

U.S. Const. Amends. VI and XIV..............

C.A.R. 21........ ......................

C.A.R. 21(a)(1)............ ..

U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI > and XIV

U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, XII, and XIV.......... ..

. 3

Black's Law Dictionary.......... ....................................

Article IV of the Colorado Constitution (1876)

Colorado Constitution (1876), which contains an enacting style

or clause.................................................................................................

vii

Colorado Constitution Art. V, Sect. 18 (Effective date August

1, 1876).......................................................................................................... 7

Minnesota Constitution Art. IV, Sect. 13................... ........... ..

U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, and XIV...................................................... 8

Colorado Constitutional Mandate Under Art. V, Sect. 18, of the

Constitution of Colorado (1876)........................................ .................. 9

U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, and XIV............................................. 10

Const, of the State of Colo. Art.II,. Sect. 25................................ 10

Colorado Const. Art. V, Sect. 18 (1876)........ ................................... 11

U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, IX, XIII, and XIV.......... ....................... 13

U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIII, IX, and XIV.......................................... 14

Colo. Const. Art. V, Sect. 18........................................ ..................

U.S. Const. V, VI, XIII, XIV........ ................................................

Const, of the State of Colorado, Art. V, Sect. 21........................ 16

Const, of the State of Oregon, Art. IV, Sect. 20........................ 16

U.S. Const. Amends. VI, and XIV.................. ..............................

U.S. Const. Amend. VI........ ..............................................................

Const, of the State of Colo., Art. II, Sect. 16............................ 19

U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, VII, and XIV............................................ 21

Colo. Const. Art. V, Subsect. 18............................... ..

M.S. 3C. 07, Subd.l.................................................................................... 22

The Constitution of Colorado, Art. IV, Sect. 11 (1876).......... .. 22

Constitution of the State of Colorado, Art. V, Sect. 18....... 24

U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, VIII, IX, and XIV.................................. 24

The Constitution of Colorado (1876).............. ................................. .. 24,

Colo. Const. Art. V, Sect. 18...................... ........................ ............... 25

Annotation, Sections, Subsection 17-22 of this Article Mandatory

Colorado Constitution, Art. V, Sect. 19.......................... ..

Const, of Colo., Art. XVIII, Sect. 8, Publication of laws

Constitution of Colorado, Art. V, Sect. 17............. .............

Sections 17-22 of this Art. V, of the Const, set forth Mandatory

Provisions with the Legislative Department............... ...............

Constitution of the State of Minnesota, Art. 4, Subsect. 9.

Constitution of the State of Colorado, Art. V, Sect. 18, is

Mandatory.................................................................................................

U.S. Const. Amends. IX, XIII, and XIV........................ ..................

.29

viii

-• i

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

(1 $ Indictment and/or Complaint and information Of felony

charge(s); (2) The nature of personal jurisdiction and subject

matter jurisdiction; (3) By "mandate" all laws must have an

enacting clause; (4) Laws must be published and recorded with

enacting clauses; (5) The alleged laws and/or statutes

referenced to in the Colorado Revised Statute books Title 18

and/or in the complaint and information contain no Titles; (6)

Colorado Revised Statutes are of unknown authority; and (7)

Established Rules <t>f Constitutional Construction.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The accused and/or petitioner is alleging in his false arrest

and wrongful imprisonment: (1) an unlawful detention and depri

vation of liberty against his will; (2) an unreasonable detention

which is not warranted by the circumstances; and (3) an intentio

nal detention. And alleging for his false imprisonment: (1) the

unlawful detention of his person; (2) against his will; (3) With

out legal authority or color of authority; and (4) which is un

reasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances. See, Bonett

v. Cook, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212336.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Originally, Mr. Lomax was arrested on or about June of 2005,

for T8-3-402, C.R.S • 9 a class 3 felony but later became a class

4 felony and were charged by way of a complaint and information.

A jury trial found him guilty of 18-3-402 and also of the lesser

included 18-3-404 (1)(a). The accused and/or petitioner was

sentenced on 12/12/2006 to the CDOC for a term of 6 years to LIFE

and plus 10 years to LIFE mandatory parole. He believes the trial

court for want or lack of subject matter and personal jurisdictic

ion, had no power or authority to try/pass judgment, or sentence

him to the CDOC. Because the alleged laws and/or statutes used

against him from the C.R.S. books 2006, 2006, and 2007 contain no

enacting clauses and/pr titles. As Constitutionally required by

the Colorado Constitution Art. V, Sect. 18, and Legislative Const

titiction of Statute 2-4-213, form of enacting clause. This Const

itutional provision which prescribes an enacting clause for all

laws is not directory, but is mandatoryTherefore, Mr. Lomax's

was prosecuted under false pretense or •‘pretext by the prosecutor

by an unlawful trial. There was no presentment of indictment of

a Grand Jury for his allege infamous crime,see, U.S. Const. Amend

V and Colo. Const. Art.II,Sect.8. And the district court did not

have lawful jurisdiction over the subject matter and party, be

cause there was no existing cause or offense that could have been

charged against the accused. See, U.S. Const. Amends.XYI and XIV.

ARGUMENTS

ARGUMENTS AND POINTS OF AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF

REQUEST FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO C.A.R. @1

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

THE NATURE OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Mr. Lomax, petitioner-appellant herein pro se, petition this

honorable Court, pursuant to C.A.R. 21, to issue a rule to show

cause and to grant appropriate relief in response to the matter

presented below.

The petitioner in this case is not an attorney or skilled |n

the practice of law and pursuant to People v. Bergerud, respect

fully request that this honorable Court, Liberally Construe this

petition and apply any applicable law, irrespective of whether

the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name. People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686 at,697 (2010).

.........................

........

The petitioner states and establish that he has ho other

speeder and adequate remedies available (See, C.A.R. 21(a)(1);

also Davidson,79 P.3d at, 1228).

The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter has been

said to be essential, necessary, indispensable, and elementary or

prerequisite to the exercise of the judicial power. The term jur

isdiction is notoriously malleable and is used in a variety of

contexts (e.g. personal jurisdiction) that have nothing whatever

to do with the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See, Hufri,

164 F.3d at 380-81. In very general terms, "jurisdiction" means

something akin to "authority over". Black's Law Dictionary 855

(7th ed. 1999). United States v„ Gonzalez. 311 F.3d 440, 443,

2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23937, *7-8 (1st Cir. P.R. November 22,

2002). "[A] court's inherent authority does not allow it to act

where it would otherwise lack jurisdiction". In re Mckinney,158

N.C. App. at 443, 581 S.E. 2d at 795. "A court cannot undertake

to adjuicate a controversy on its own motion...before a court

may act there must be some appropriate application invoking the

judicial power of the court with respect to the matter in

question". Id. at 444, 581 S.E. 2d at 795 (emphasis omitted)

(citation omitted). For this reason, a defense based upon lack of

subject matter jurisdiction "cannot be waived and may be asserted

at any time. Accordingly, the appellants may raise the issue of

jurisdiction over the matter for the first time on appeal althoue

gh they initially failed to raise the issue before the trial

court". In re Green, 67 N.C. App. 501,504, 313 S.E. 2d 193, 195

(1984) (citations omitted), see also In re Z.T.B 2_r 170 N.C. App.

564, 613 S.E. 2d 298, 300 (2005) (holding that when defects in a

petition raise a question of the trial court's subject matter

jurisdiction over the action, the issue may properly be raised

for the first time on appeal).

A court cannot proceed with a trial or make a judgement with

out such jurisdiction existing. Therefore, Mr. Lomax's trial was

unfair and unjust, and without legal jurisdiction, and a violatio

ion of his due process rights, and also was deprived the equal

protection of the laws. See, U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, and XIV.

It is elementary that jurisdiction of the court over the subject

matter of the action is most critical aspect of the court's authority to act without it, the court lacks any power to proceed

forward. Therefore, defense based upon this lack cannot be waived

and may be asserted at any time. Matter of Green, 313 S.E. 2d 193

(N.C. App. 1984). "The law provides that once state and federal

jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven", 100 S.Ct.

250 (1980). "Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot

proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction

the court has no authority to reach merits, but rather should

dismiss the action". Melo v. U.S., 505 F. 2d 1026. "Jurisdiction,

once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided", Main v.

Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 250. The burden shifts to the court to prove

jurisdiction", Rosemond v, Lambert, 469 F. 2d 416.

Subject matter jurisdiction "cannot" be conferred by waiver or

consent, and may be raised at any time, Rodrigues v. State, 411

So. 2d 1129 (Fla. App. 1983). The subject matter jurisdiction of

a criminal case is related to the cause of action in general, and

more specifically to the alleged crime or offense which creates

the action. The subject matter of a criminal offense is the crime

itself. Subject matter in it's broadest sense means the cause,

the object, or the thing in dispute, Stillwell v. Markham, 10 P.

2d 15 135 Kan. 206 (1932). The Fifth Amend, provides that "[n]o

person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infam

ous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand Jury.

The Grand Jury determines if there is probable cause to believe

that a crime has been committed and protects citizens against un

founded prosecutions. See, U.S. v. Sells Eng'g Inc.,463 U.S. 418,

423 (1983); See also U.S. v. Cotton,535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002)

(5th Amend, grand jury right serves a vital function... as a

check on prosecutorial power"); See, e.g • f In re U.S

441 F.3d

44* 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (grand juries investigate criminal allega

tions and protect citizens against prosecutorial misconduct). Mr.

Lomax, didn't waive his indictment and/or grand jury investigation due process rights, or his preliminary hearing right which

he was deprived of as well, therefore, his,U.S. Const. Amends. V,

VI, XiEcB, and XIV was violated. The trial court didn't have lawful

jurisdiction over the subject matter and the party.

An indictment in a criminal case is the only means by which a

court obtains subject matter jurisdiction, and is "the jurisdic

tion instrument upon which the accused stands trial','/ 9 State v.

Chatmon, 671 P.2d 531, 538 (Kan. 1983). The indictment is the

foundation of the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, if these

charging instruments are invalid, there is a lack of subject mat*

ter jurisdiction. Without a formal and sufficient indictment a

court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction and thus an

accused may not be punished for a crime. Honomichi v. State. 333

N.W. 2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1983). *

A formal accusation is essential for every trial of a crime.

Without it the court acquires no jurisdiction to proceed, even

with the consent of the parties, and where the indictment or

information is "valid" the court is without jurisdiction. Ex

parte Carlson, 186 N.W. 722, 725, 176 Wis. 538 (1922). Without

a valid indictment any judgment or sentence rendered is, void

ab initio. Ralph v. Police Court of El Cerrito, 190 P.2d 632,

84 Cal. App. 2d 257 (1984); Sauls v. Sauls, 40 Colo. App. 275

(1977). The validity of a judgment depends upon the court's

jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter involved. A

judgment rendered without jurisdiction is "void". McLeod v.

Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co., 186 Colo. 234, 526 P.2d

1318; In re the Marriage of Zubla, 38 Colo. App. 471, 558 P.2d

1003; In Klancher v. Anderson, 113 Colo. 478, j 58 P*2d 923, the

Supreme Court distinguished jurisdiction from the exercise of

jurisdiction:

"The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision

rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction; and when there

is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, the decision of

all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of tha

at jurisdiction • • * "[Jjurisdiction is the power to hear and dete*

rmine • • • [and] the power to decide necessarily’ carries with it

the power to decide wrongly, as well as rightly...

Jurisdiction to try and punish for a crime cannot be acquired

by mere assertion of it, or invoke otherwise than in the mode

prescribed by law, and if it is not so acquired or invoked any

judgment is a nullity,22 C.J.S. "Criminal Law" Sec. 1 67, P. 202.

The charging instrument must not only be in the particular mode

or form prescribed by the constitution and statutes to be valid

but it also must .contain reference to valid laws. Without valid

laws, the charging instrument is insufficient and no subject

matter jurisdiction exist for the matter to be tried. Where an

information charges no crime, the court lacks jurisdiction to try

the accused. People v. Hardiman, 347 N.W. 2d 460,462, 132 Mich.

App. 382 (1984). Whether or not the complaint charges an offense

is a jurisdiction matter. Ex parte Carlson, 186 N.W..722, 725,

176 Wis. 538 (1922). An invalid law chafged against one in a

criminal matter also negates subject matter jurisdiction by the

sheer fact t)|at it fails to create a cause of action. "Subject

matter is the thing in controversy". Holmes v. Mason, 115 N.W.

770, 80 Neb. 454.

Further, citing Black's Law Dictionary:

"Without a valid law, there is no issue or controversy for a

court to decide upon. Thus, where a law does not exist or

does not constitutionally exist, or where the law is invalid,

void or unconstitutional, there is no subject matter jurisdictdcbntion to try one for an offense alleged under the law".

If a criminal statute is unconstitutional, the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction and cannot proceed to try the case.

22 C.J.S. "Criminal Law", Sec. 157 P.189, People v. Katrink, 185

Cal. Rptr. 869, 136 Cal. App. 3d 145 (1982). Where the offense

charged does not exist, the trial court lacks jurisdiction,State

v. Christensen* 329 N.W. 2d 382, 383, 110 Wis. 2d 538 (1983).

Not all statutes create a criminal offense. Thus, where a man

charged with a statute which does not create a criminal offense,

such person was never legally charged with any crime or lawfully

convicted because the trial court did not have jurisdiction of

the subject. State ex rel. Hansen v. Rigg, 258 Minn. 338, 104 N.

W. 2d 553 (1960). The alleged statutes Mr. Lomax was charged with

and convicted of (C.R.S. -#1 8-3-402(1 )(a); C.R.S. #1 8-3-402(1 )(e);

and C.R.S. #18-3-404(1)(e), did not create a criminal offense, he

was never legally charged with any crime or lawfully convicted,

because the statutes did not have any enacting clauses and titles

therefore, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdicti

ion over the subject and party. There must be a valid law in orde

er for subject matter to exist.

In a case where a man convicted of violating certain section

of laws, and he later claimed that the law were unconstitutional

which deprived the county court of jurisdiction to try him for

those offenses. The laws and/or statutes Mr. Lomax was convicted

of were unconstitutional which deprived the county court of

jurisdiction to try him for those offenses. The Supreme Court of

Oregon held:

_ 1 r ”~j ^

"If these section are unconstitutional, the law is void and an

offense created by them is not a crime and a conviction under

them cannot be legal cause for imprisonment, for no court can

acquire jurisdiction to try a person for acts which are made

criminal only by an unconstitutional law". Kelly v. Meyers. 263

Pac.,903, 905 (Ore. 1928).

Without a valid law there can be no crime charged under that

law, and where there is no crime there is no controversy or cause

of action, and without a cause of action there can be no subject

matter jurisdiction. To try a person of violating said law. The

court then has no power or right to hear and decide a particular

case involving such invalid or nonexistent laws. These authoritie

ies and others make it clear that if there are no valid laws

charged against a person, there is nothing that can be deemed a

crime, and without a crime there is no subject matter jurisdict

ion. Further, invalid or unlawful laws make the complaint fatally

defective and insufficient, and without a valid indictment there

is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The accused/petitioner asserts that the alleged laws charged

against him are not valid, or do not constitutionally e^ist as

they do not conform to certain constitutional prerequisites, and

thus are no laws at all which prevents subject matter jurisdicti

ion to trial court. The accused/petitioner has come to realize

after intense and serious legal research, with the assistance of

a prison paralegal that these alleged laws/statutes used in the

Complaint and information against him, are located in and derived from a collection of "Copyrighted Books" entitled "Coloradq

Revised Statutes". Upon researching these copyrighted statutes

in this publication, they do not adhece to several Constitutio

nal provisions of the Colorado Constitution. According to Arti

cle IV of the Colorado Constitution (1876), that all lawmaking

authority for the State ^.s vested in the General Assembly of

Colorado. This article also prescribes certain forms, modes,

and procedures that "must" be followed in otder for a valid law t

to exist under the Constitution. It is fundamental that nothing

can be a law that is not enacted by the General Assembly prescibed in the Colorado's Constitution, and'Which fails to conform to

constitutional, forms, prerequisites, and prohibitions. These are

grounds for challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the

criminal court, since the validity of the law on the complaint

goes to the jurisdiction of the court. The following explains in

authoritative detail, and why the alleged laws cited in the com

plaint against the accused/petitioner are not constitutional

valid laws.

MR. LOMAX'S RIGHTS WAS VIOLATED HIS U.S. CONSTITUTION; AMEND

MENTS V, VI, AND XIV. THE STATE DID DEPRIVED HIM OF LIFE AND

LIBERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; AND DENIED THE EQUAL

PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

BY MANDATE, "ALL LAWS" MUST HAVE AN ENACTING CLAUSE

One of the forms that all laws are required to follow by the

Colorado Constitution (1876) which contains an enacting style or

clause. This provision is stated as follows: Colorado Const.

Art. V, Sect. 18. The style of all laws of this state shall be:

"BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF COLORADO'.'

(Effective date August 1, 1876).

Each of the alleged statutes/laws the accused/petitioner was

unlawfully convicted of #18-3-402(1)(a),C.R.S.; #18-3-402,CIU(e)

C.R.S.; and #1 8-3-404(1 )(e),C.R.S. None of these statutes/laws

cited in the complaint/information against him, as found in the

"Colorado Revised Statute books of 2005, 2006 and 2007 contain

any form of "Enacting Clauses". As Constitutionally required by

the Colorado Constitution Art. V, Sect. 18. And Legislative Con

struction of Statutes 2-4-213, form of enacting clause. The Con

stitution provision which prescribes an enacting clause for all

laws is not directory, but is mandatory. This provision is to be

strictly adhered to as asserted by the Supreme Court of Minnesota

ta:

"Upon both principle and authority, we hold that Art. 4, Sect.

13, of the Constitution, by the Legislature of the State of Minn

esota, is mandatory and that a stat\3te without any enacting clause

is void. See, Sjoberg v. Security Savings & Loan Assn • f 73 Minn.

203, 212 (1898). Also see, Collier & Cleveland Lithographing Co.

v. Henderson, 18 Colo. 259, 32 P.417 (1893).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

stated as follows:

...While it is true that the Colorado's Constitution requires

inclusion of an enacting clause in and publication of each

state law • • • See, Stevens v, Colorado, 18 Fed. App. 779,

780 (10th Cir. Colo. September 17,2001).

MR. LOMAX'S RIGHTS WAS VIOLATED HIS U.S. CONSTITUTION; AMEND

MENTS V, VI, AND XIV. THE STATE DID DEPRIVED HIM OF LIFE AND

LIBERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; AND DENIED THE EQUAL PRO

TECTION OF THE LAWS.

THE PURPOSE FOR PROVISION FOR AN ENACTING CLAUSE

To determine the validity of using laws without an enacting

clause against citizens, we need to determine the purpose and

function of an enacting clause, and see what problems or evils

were intended to avoid by including such a provision in our

State Constitution.

The purpose of thus prescribing an enacting clause is the

style of the act, and to establish it, and to give it perman

ence, uniformity, and certainty; to identify the act of legis

lation as of the General Assembly; to afford evidence of it's

legislative statutory nature; and to secure unifomity of identi

fication, and thus prevent inadvertence, possibly mistake and

fraud. State v. Patterson, 4 S.E. 350, 352, 98 N.C. 660 (1887);

82 223 Ga. 367 (1967). The object of the style of a bill or en

acting clause is to show the authority by which the bill is enacted into law. Also, to show the act comes from a place pointed

out by the constitution as the source of legislation by the

General Assembly. Ferrill v. Keel, 151 S.W. 269, 272, Ark. 380

(1912) .

To fulfill the purpose of identifying the lawmaking authority

of the law, it has been repeatedly declared by the courts of this

land that an enacting clause is to appear on the face of every la

law which the people are to follow and obey. The almost unbroken

custom of centuries has been to preface laws with a statement in

some form declaring the enacting authority. The purpose of an en

acting clause of statute is to identify it as an act of legisla

tion by expressing on it's face the authority behind the act, 73

Aip. Jur. 2d "Statutes" Sec. 93 p. 319, 320; Preckel v. Byrne, 243

N.W. 823, 826, 62N.D. 365 (1932).

For an enacting clause to appear on the face of a law, it must

be recorded or published with the law so that the public can

readily identify the authority for that particular law which they

are expected to follow. The alleged statutes/laws used in the

complaint and information against the accused/petitioner had no

enacting clauses, as required by the Colorado Constitution, Art.

V, Sect. 18, and the legislative construction of statutes as pre

scribed in Colorado Revised Statutes 2-4-213. Both, clearly state

the laws of this State shall be as follows: "BE IT ENACTED BY THE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF COLORADO". They cannot be ident

ified as laws of the legislation of the state of Colorado or en

acted by the General Assembly of Colorado pursuant to it's Const

itutional Mandate under Art. V, Sect. 18, of the Constitution of

Colorado (1876) and C.R.S. 2-4-213, since a law mainly identified

as a true Constitutional law by way of it's enacting clause.

The Supreme Court Of Georgia asserted:

"That a statute must have an enacting clause, even though

their state constitution had no provision for the measure.

The court stated that an enacting clause establishes a law

or statute as being a true and authentic law of the state.

The enacting clause is that portion of a statute which gives

it "jurisdiction identity and constitutional authenticity.11

The failure of a law to display on it's face an enacting qlalfcs

use deprives it of essential legality, and tenders a statute whic

ich omits such clause as "a nullity and no force of law." Joiner

u ? c:

State, supra. The statutes cited in the complaint and informa9.

tion have "no jurisdiction identity arid are "not authentic laws

under the Constitution of Colorado". See, U.S. Amends.V, No pereo

son shall • • • f nor be deprived of life,or liberty,without due pro

cess of law; U.S. Amends. VI,which district shall have been pre

viously ascertained by law; and U.S. Amend. XIV,and subject to

the jurisdiction thereof(Mr. Lomax was not subject to the court's

jurisdiction),therefore, he was deprived of his life and freedom,

without due peocess of law.See also Const, of the State of Colo.

Art.II, Sect.25.

The Court of Appeals of Kentuky held that:

"ThetCenstitutional provision requiring an enacting clause is

a basic concept which has a direct affect upon the validity

of the law"*

The court, in dealing with a law had contained no enacting

clause stated:

"The alleged act or law in question is unnamed it shows no

sign of authority; it carries with it no evidence that the

General Assembly or any other lawmaking power is responsi

ble or answerable for an enacting clause, the makers of the

Constitution intended that the General Assembly should make

it's Impress or seal, as it where, upon each enactment for

the sake of identity, and to assume and show responsibility.

While the "Constitution" makes this a necessity, it did not

-©*?- originate it. The custom is in use practically everywhere,

and is as old as parliamentary government, as, old as king's

decrees, and even they borrowed it. The decrees of Cyrus, King

of Persia, they were not the first to be prefaced with a State

ment of Authority, The law was delivered to the great prophet

Moses in the name (or Authority) of the Great I Am, and the Pro

rogue to the Great Commandments is no less majestic and impell

ing. But, whether these edicts and commands be promugated by the

Supreme Ruler or petty kings, or by the sovereign people them

selves, they have always begun with some form as an evidence of

power and authority. Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 170

S.W. 171,172,175, 160 Ky. 745 (1914).

10.

The alleged statutes/laws the state used against the accused/

petitioner are unnamed. They show no sign of authority on their

"face" as recorded in the Colorado Revised Statutes Title 18

Books. They carry with them no evidence that the General Assembly

of Colorado, pursuant to Art. V, Sect. 18 of the Constitution of

the State of Colorado (1876), and legislative construction of

statutes 2-4-21 3j, form of enacting clause, the laws referenced to

in the complaint/information have no "official evidence" that the

ey are from an authority which I am subject to or required to

obey.

When the question of the obj ects intended to be secured by the

enacting clause provision was before the Supreme Court of Minne

sota, the Court held that:

"Such a clause was necessary to show the people who are too

okffY

law, the authority for their obedience. It was re

vealed that historically, this was a main use for an enact

ing clause, and thus it's use is a fundamental concept of

law, and the Court stated:

All written laws, in all times and in all countries, whether

in the form of decrees issued by absolute monarch, or statutes

enaehactbd by king and Council, or by a representative body, have

as a rule, expressed upon their faces the authority by which

they were promulgated or enacted. The almost unbroken custom

of centuries has been to preface laws with a statement in some

form declaring the enacting authority.If such an enacting clauseuse is a mere matter of form, a relic of antiquity, serving no

useful purpose, why should the Constitutions of many of our

states require that all laws nlust have an enacting clause, and

prescribe it's forms? If an enacting clause is useful and impo

porfjortant, if it is desirable that laws shall bear upon their

-FFF the authority by which they are enacted so that the peo&l

— Pie who are to obey them need not search legislative and other

records to ascertain the authority, that it is not beneath the

dignity of the framers of the Constitution, or unworthy of

such an instrument, to prescribe a unllform style for such an

enacting,clause.

The words of the Constitution that the style of all laws of

11.

this State shall be, "Be it enacted by the Legislature of the

State of Minnessota, imply that all laws must be so expressed or

declared to the end that they may express upon their face the

authority by which they were enacted, and if they did not so

declare, they are not laws of the state. Sjoberg v. Security Sav

ing & Loan Assn. Minn, 203, 212-214 (1898). This case was initi

ated when it was discovered that the law relating to building

saving and loan associations, had ho enacting clause as it was

printed in the statute book,"Laws 1897, p. 250. The court made it

clear that a law existing in that manner is void. Sjoberg, supra,

at p. 214.

The purported laws in the complaint which the accused/peti

tioner is said to have violated are referenced to various laws/or

statutes found printed in the "Colorado Revised Statute books. I

have looked up the alleged laws/or statutes that was charged

against me and found no enacting clause for any of these alleged

laws/or statutes. A citizen is not expected or required to search

through other records or books for the enacting authority. If

such enacting authority is not "on the face" of the laws which

are referenced in the complaint, then they are not laws of this

state and thus are laws to which I am subject. Such they are not

laws of this state, the above named court has no subject matter

jurisdiction, as there can be no crime which can exist from fail

ing to follow laws which do not constitutionally exist, In speaking on the necessity and purpose that each law be prefaced with a

an ehacting clause, the Supreme Court of Tennessee+quoted the

first portion of Sjoberg case cited above, and stated:

"The purpose of provisions of this character is that all stat

utes may bear their faces a declaration of sovereign authority,

by which they are enacted and declared to be the law, and to pro

mote and preserve uniformity in legislation. Such clauses also

import a command of obedience and clothe command respect and aid

in the enforcement of laws". State v, Barrow, 104 S.W. 526-29,

119 Tenn. (1907).

Petitioner contends that the use of an enacting clause does

not merely serve as a "Flag" under which bills run their course

12.

through the legislative machinery. See, -Vaugn Ragsdale Co. v.

State Bd. of Eg * f 96 P.2d 420-24 (Ont. 1939). Th4 enacting clause

of a law goes to its substance, and is not merely procedural.

Morgan v. Murry,328 P.2d 644-54 (Mont. 1958). (any purported

statutes which has no enacting clause on its face is not legally

binding and obigatory upon the people), as it is not constitu

tionally a law at all. See, U.S. Const. Amends V, VI,IX,XIII,and

XIV.

The Supreme Court of Michigan, inciting numerous authorities,

said:

"That an enacting clause was a requisite to a valid law

since the enacting provision was mandatory.

The alleged laws/statutes in the Colorado Revised Statutes do

not show on their "face" the authority by which they are adopted

and promulgated. There is nothing on their "face" which declares

they should be law, or that they are of the proper legislative

authority in the state. These and other authorities all hold that

the enacting clause of a law is to be ?on its face" of the law

dees not and cannot mean that the enacting clause can be buried

away in some other volume,or some other book or records.

FACE - The surface of any thing, especially the front, upperj

or outer part of surface that which particularly offers it

self to the view of a spectator that which is shown by the

language employed, without any explanation, modification,or

addition from intrinsic facts or evidence. Black's Law Diet

tionary,5th Ed. p. 530.

The enacting clause must be intrinsic to the law, not extri

nsic to it. That is, it cannot be hidden away in the session

laws or other records or books. Thus, the enacting clause is

regarded as part of the law and has to appear directly with the

law, "on its face", so that one charge with said law knows the

authority by which it exist.

MR. LOMAX'S RIGHTS WAS VIOLATED HIS U.S. CONSTITUTION; AMEND

MENTS V, VI, XIII, AND XIV. THE STATE DID DEPRIVED HIM OF LIFE?

AND jLIBERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; AND DENIED THE EQUAL

13.

PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

LAWS MUST BE PUBLISHED AND RECORDED WITH ENACTING CLAUSES

^sJ

U.S. Const. Amend. V

of the State and district wherein the

crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been

preiously ascertained by law. U.S. Const. Amend. XIII,. • • except

as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been

duly convicted(the accused was not duly convicted of any lawful

crime); U.S. Copst. Amend.IX,The enumeration in the Constitution,

of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage

others retained by the people. U.S. Const. XIV 9 • • • and subject to

the jurisdiction thereof..No State shall, make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges • • of citizens of the United

States;

m •■ •

Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,or liberty,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Since it has been repeated held that an enacting clause must

appear "on its face" of a law, such a requirement affects the

printing and publishing of laws. The fact; that the Constitution

requires "all laws" to have an enacting clause makes it a requirment and not just bills without the Legislature. But on published

laws, as well. If the Constitution said "all bills" have enacting

clause, it probably could be said that their use in publishing

would not be required. But the historical usage and application

of an enacting clause has been for them 'to be printed and publis

hed along with the body of the law, thus appearing on the face of

the law. It is obvious, then, that the enacting clause must be

readily visible "on it's face" of a statute in common mode in

which it is published so that citizens do not have to search

through the legislative, or other records and books to see the

kind of clauses used, or if any exist at all. Thus, a law in a

statute book without an enacting clause is not a valid publica

tion of law.

In regards to the validity of law that was found in their

"statute books" with a defective enacting clause, the Supreme

14.

Court of Nevada held:

"Our Constitution expressly provided that the enacting clause

of "every law" shall be: The People of the State of Nevada,

represented in senate and assembly, do enact as follows:

This language is suscetible of but one interpretation. Thepe

is no doubtful meaning as to the intention. It is, in our

judgment, an imperative mandate of the people,in their sovereigneign capacity, to the legislature, required that "all laws"

tq be binding upon, shall their face, express the authority

by which they were enacted and since this act comes to us

without such authority appearing "on its face" jt is not a

__ law. State of Nevada v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 120, 261 (1875);

approved in Caine v. Robbons, 131 P.2d 516-18,61 Nev. 416

(1942); Kefauver v. Spurling, 290 S.W. 14-15 (Tenn. 1926).

The petitioner asserts the manner in which the law came to the

Court was by way it was found in the statute book, cited by the

Court as Statute 1875, session 66, and that is how they judge the

validity of the law. Since they saw that the act, as it was

printed in the statute book, which had an insufficient enacting

clause on its face, it |vas deemed to be "not a law2. It is only

by inspecting the publicly printed in the statute book which had

an insufficient enacting clause on its face, it was deemed to be

"not a law". It is only by inspecting the publicly printed stat

ute book that the people can determine the source of authority

and constitutional authenticity of the law they are expected to

follow. It should be noted that laws in the above cases were held

t be "void" for having no "enacting clause" despite the fact th*

ap they were published in an official statute book of the state.

aAd were next to other "laws which had the power enacting claue

ses.

The preceding examples and declarations on the use and purpose

of enacting clauses show beyond that nothing can be called or regarded as a law of this state which is published without an enacting clause on its face. "Nothing" can exist as a State of

Colorado Constitutional law except in the manner prescribed by

the State of Colorado Constitution. Therefore, the provision undi?

er Colorado law is that "all laws must bear on their face a spe—

15.

cific enacting style, that it be enacted by the General Assembly

of the State of Colorado. Colo. Const. Art. V, Sect. 18 and Col

orado Revised Statute Subsection, 2-4-213, forms of enacting

clause." All laws must be published with this clause in order to

be "valid laws," and ^ince the statutes in the Colorado Revised

Statutes are not so published, they are not laws of the State.

MR. LOMAX'S RIGHTS WAS VIOLATED HIS U.S. CONSTITUTION; AMEND

MENTS V, VI, XIII, XIV. THE £TATE DID DEPRIVED HIM OF LIFE AND

LIBERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; AND DENIED THE EQUAL PRO

TECTION OF THE LAWS.

THE LAWS REFERENCED TO IN THE COMPLAINT CONTAIN NO TITLES

The alleged statutes/laws that Mr. Lomax was charged under and

convicted of contain no titles. See, U.S. Const. Amends • t nor

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted; U.S. Amend. XIV, depriv

ed of his life and liberty, without due process of law. The laws

listed in the complaint in question, as cited from the Colorado

Revised Statutes, contain no titles. All laws are to have titles

indicating the subject matter of the law, as required by the

Constitution of the State of Colorado:

Art. V, Sect. 21: No Bill except general appropriate bills

shall be passed containing more than one subject which shall

be clearly expressly in it title, but if subject shall be

embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title,

such act shall be "void" on as to so much thereof as shall not

be so expressed.

Also see, Art. IV, Sect. 20, of the Oregon Const.,provides in

part:

Every Act shall embrace, but one subject and matters properly

connected therewith which subject shall be expressed in the

title, but if any subject shall be embraced in the act which

shall, not be expressed in the title. Such act shall be void

only as to so much thereof, as shall not be expressed in the

title. See, Melntire v. Forbes, 322 Ore. 426.

Nevertheless, as asserted above, by the provision, a title is

16.

required to be on all laws. The title is another one of the forms

of law required by the constitution. This type of constitutional

provision "makes the title an essential part of every law," thus,

the title is as much a part of the act as the body itself. See,

Leininger v. Alger, 26 N.W. 2d 348.-51 , 31 6 Mich. 644 (1 947) .Ther«

efore, the title to a legislative act is apart thereto and must

clearly express the subject of legislation. State v. Burlington &

M. RR. Co., 60 Neb. 741 , 84 N.W. (1900). Nearly all legal author*ities have held that the title is part of the act, especially

when a constitutional provision for a title exist. See, 37 A.L.R.

annotated pp. 984-89. What then can be said of a law in which an

essential part of it is missing, except that it is not a law

under the State Constitution? This provision of the State Consti

tution, providing that every law is to have a title, expressing

one subject is "mandatory" and is to be followed in all laws, as

stated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota:

"We point out that our constitutional debates indicated that

the constitutional requirements relating to enactment of

statutes were intended to remedial and mandatory; remedial,

as guarding against recognized evils arising from loose and

dangerous methods of conducting legislation; and mandatory,

as requiring compliance by the legislature without discre

tion on its part to protect the "public" interest against

such recognized evils, and that the validity of statute

should depend on compliance with such requirement. Bull v.

King, 286 N.W. 311, (Minn. 1939).

The constitutional provisions for a title have been held in

many other states to be mandatory in the highest sense. State

v. Beckman, 185 S.W. 2d 810,816 (Mo. 1945); Leininger v. Alger,

26 N.W. 2d 348, 316 Mich. 644; 82 C.J.S. "Statutes" subsection,

64 of p. 102. The provision for a title in the constitution

renders a title indispensable. 73.Am. Jur. Statutes, subsect • 9

99 p. |325. Citing, People v. Monroe, 349 III. 182 N.E. 439. Since

such provisions regarding a title are mandatory and indispensable, the existence of a title is necessary to the validity of the

act. If a title does not exist, then it is not a law pursuant to

Art. y, Sect. 21, of the Constitution of the State of Colorado

0 876)j.. In speaking of the constitutional provision requiring one.

17.

subject to embraced in the title of each law, the Supreme Court

of Tennessee stated:

"That requirement of the organic law is mandatory and unless

obeyed in every instance. The legislation attempted is invalid

and of no effect whatsoever". State v. Yardley,32 S.W. 481,482,

95 Tepn. 548 (1895) .

Petitioner asserts to further determine the validity of citing

laws in a complaint which have no titles, we must look at the

purpose for this constitutional provision and the evils and pro

blems which it was intended to prevent or defeat. One of the aims

and purposes for a title or caption to an act is to convey to the

people who are to obey it the legislative intent behind the law.

See,U.S. Amend.VI,which district shall have been previously ascee

rtained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation; U.S. Amend. No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges • • of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life or liberty

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jus

risdiction the equal protection of the laws. The statutes/laws

without the title did deprived the petitioner of his due process

of law and the equal protection of the laws.

The constitution has made the title the conclusive index to

the legislative intent as to what shall have operation. Megins v.

City of Duluth, 106 N.W. 89-97, Minn,23 (1906); Hyman v. State. 9

S.W. 372-73, 87 Tenn 109 (1888).

In ruling as to the precise meaning of the language employed

in the statute, noting, as we have said before, is more pertinent

towards ascertain the true intention of legislative mind in the

passage of the enactment than the legislature's own interpretation

ion of the scope and purpose contained intbhe caption. Wimberly

v. Georgia. S. & F.F, Com. 63 S.E. 29, 5 Ga. App. 263 (1908).

Under a constitutional provision requiring the subject of the

legislation to.be expressed in the title, that portion of an act

is often the very window through which the legislative intent

may be seen. See, State v. Clinton County. 76 N.W. 986, 166 Ind.

18.

162 (1906). Without the title the intent of the legislature is

concealed and cloaked from public view. See,U.S. Amend.VI, and

to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; and

the Const, of the State of Colo • f Art.II, Sect. 16fProsecutionsrights of defendant: In criminal prosecutions the accused shall • •

to demand the nature and cause of the accusation. Yet a specific

purpose or function of a title to a law is to "protect the people

against convert legislation." Brown v. Clower, 166 S.E. 2d 36365, 225 Ga. 165 (1969). A title will reveal or give notice to the

public of the general character of the legislation. However, the

nature and intent of the law in the Colorado Revised Statutes hav

ve been concealed and made uncertain by its nonuse of titles. The

true natureof the "subject matter" of the law therein is not majie

clear without titles. Thus, another purpose of the title is to I

apprise (or to give notice to: INFORM) the people of the nature

of legislation, thereby, preventing fraud or deception in regard

to the laws they are to follow. The United State Supreme Court in

determining the purpose of such a provision in state constitutien

ons said:

"The purpose of the Constitutional provision is to prevent the

inclusion of Incongruous and unrelated matter in the same

measure and to guard against inadvertence, stealth, and fraud

in legislation. Courts strictly enforce such provision in

cases that fall within the reasons on which they rest, and

hold that, in order to warrant the setting aside of enact—ents for failure to comply with the rule, the violation must

be substantial and plain".

The complete omission of a title is about as substantial and

plain a violation of this constitution provision as can exist.

The statutes/laws cited in the complaint and information against

the accused/petitioner is of that nature. They have no titles at

an<3 thus, are not laws under the Colorado State Constitu

tion.

The object of the title is to give a general statement of the

subject matter, and such a general statement will sufficient to

include all provisions of the act having a reasonable connection

ith the subject matter mentioned. The object or purpose of the

19.

clause in the constitution is to prevent the perpetration of

fraud upon the members of the legislation or citizens of the

state in the enactment of laws. Ex parte Crane, 151 Pac. 1006,

1010, 1011, 27 Idaho 671 (1915).

The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in speaking on its Consti

tutional provision requiring titles on laws, stated that:

This provision is intended to prevent all surprises or mis

apprehensions on the part of the public. State v. McEnroe,283

N.W. 57 (N.D. 1983).

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in speaking on Art. 4, Subsect

27, which is the same as Art. 5 of subsect. 21, of the Colorado

State Constitution said:

This section of the constitution is designed to prevent decep

tion as to the nature or subject of legislative enactments.

State v. Rigg, 109 N.W. 2d 314, 260 Minn, (1961); Leroy v.

Special Ind. Sch. Dist i./ 172 N.W. 2d 764, Minn. (1969).

Petitioner argues that the purposes of the constitutional pro

vision requiring a one subject title and the mischief which it

was designed to prevent are defeated by the lack of such title on

the face of the law. In which a citizen is charged with violat*^:!

ing. Upon looking at the laws charged in the complaint and infor

mation from the Colorado Revised Statutes? I am left asking "what

is the subject and nature of the laws used in the complaint aga»

inst me". What interests or rights are these laws intended to

affect? Since the particular objects of the provision requiring a

one-subject title are defeated by publication of laws which are

"completely absent of a title", the use of such a publication to

charge citizens with violating such laws is fraudulent and obnox

ious to the constitution.

This provision prevent surreptitious, inconsiderate, misappre

hend legislation, carelessly, inadvertently, or unintentionally

enacted through stealth and fraud, and similar abuses, that the

subject or object of the law is required to be stated in the

title.

Judge Cooley says, that the obj ect of requiring a title is to

20.

fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legisla

tive proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legisla

tion that are being considered". Cooley, Const. Lim.,p.144. The

state constitution requires "one subject titles".The particular

ends to be accomplished by requiring the title of a law are not

fulfilled in the statutes referred to in the Colorado Revised

Statutes. Thus, the laws charged in the complaint and information

against me are not valid laws.

MR. LOMAX'S RIGHTS WAS VIOLATED HIS U.S. CONSTITUTION; AMEND

MENTS V, VI, VIII, AND XIV. THE STATE DID DEPRIVED HIM OP LIFE

AND LIBERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; AND DENIED THE EQUAL

PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

COLORADO REVISED STATUTES ARE OF UNKNOWN AUTHORITY

Mr. Lomax's alleged charge(s) was written on a complaint and

information, and not on a presentment or indictment of a Grand

Jury (for a capitol, or otherwise infamous crime),being then de

prived of his due process of law, and his life and liberty, The

district' shall have be en previously ascertained by law, and the

prosecuting attorney failed to indict the accused of his alleged

felony offense and to inform him of the nature and cause of the

accusation. Therefore, he has recieved a punishment for a crime

whereof he had not been duly convicted of, and was not subject to

the criminal court's jurisdiction.See, U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI,

VIII, and XIV.

Therefore, the omission of the enacting clause from the Colo

rado Revised Statutes render the statutes unconstitutional. See,

Colo. Const. Art. V.,§ 18.

The so call statutes in the Colo. Revised Statutes are not

only absent enacting clause, but are surrounded by other issues

and facts which make their authority unknown or questionable.The

title page of the Colorado Revised Statutes states that the

statutes therein were,compiled, edited, and published by the reviser of the Statutes of Colorado. It does not say that they are

the official laws of the General Assembly of Colorado.

21 .

The official laws of this state have always been listed in the

Session Laws of the State of Colorado. The official laws of this

state always been listed in the Session Laws of the State of Cole

orado passed during the Fourth Session of the State Legislature.

The Colorado Statutes states that: "Colorado Revised Statutes

must not be cited, enumerated, or otherwise treated as a Session

Law". M.S.3C. 07, Subd.1.

The Session Law was published by the Secretary of the State,

who historically and constitutionally is in possession of the

enrolled bills of the legislature which become state law. The

Constitution of Colorado, Art. IV, Sect. 11 (1876) requires that

every bill which passed both the Senate and House, and is signed

by the Governor, is to be deposited "in the office of the Secre

tary of State for preservation". Thus, in this state, as in nea

rly all other states, all official laws, records, and documents

are universally recognized by their being issued or published by

the Secretary of State.

According to the Constitution, enactinggand changing laws for

a state, falls upon the legislative branch of government, and

that branch "cannot" delegate the power to any other. The Code of

Commissioners or Revising Committee may be composed of lawyers,

judges, and private persons. It thus has been noted that "revis

ers have no legislative authority, and powerless to lessen or

expand the letter or meaning of the law." State v. Maurer,164 S.

W. 551, 552, 255 Mo. 152 (1944). Therefore, the work of these

committees "cannot" be regarded as law pursuant to the Constitu

tion. The law they produce is another manner of law coming from a

source other than the Constitution authorized source. The compre

hensive revisions or codifications are like a private law appro

ved by the legislature. The mass of laws written by revisers and

codifiers "is not the law" of the.legislature, even when approved

by it. They were not enacted in the mode intended by the term of

the Constitution. Also, since we have no legal-relationship to

the commission or committee that drafted the code or revised stafe

tutes, it would seem the laws they have no authority over us.

This is made clear by the face that these comprehensive codes and

revisions have no sign or authority which all law is required to

have.

22.

When we look at the specific-subject codes, or the ancient cos

de of the past, such as the Code of Justinian, the Roman Twelve

Tablets, or the Hapoleonic Civil Code, we find in their contents

or in there faces the authority by which promulgated. The specific-suject codes had what is called an "enacting clause" which is

an official declaration of authority and authenticity. The modern

day codes have no such declaration of authority on their faces or

contents.

The Colo. Revised Statutes are published by the Reviser of

Statutes, and are also copyrighted by his/her office. The Session

haws were "never" copyrighted as they are true public documents.

In face, "no true public document of this state or the United

States" has been or can be under a copyright. Public documents ar

are in the public domain. A copy right infers a private right

over the contents of a book, suggesting that the laws in the

Colorado Revised Statutes is derived from a private source, and

thus are "not" true public laws. The Reviser of the Statutes, in

the preface of his/her statute book, called Colorado Revised Stafe

tutes, point out the difference in the various types of arrengements of laws, and states the following:

In order to understand and use statutory law, it is necessary

to know the meaning of the terms used and the inclusiveness and

authority of the laws found in the various arrangements. The

terms laws, acts, statutes, revisions, compilations, and codes

are often used indiscriminately, but in the following discussion

each has a specific meaning. Colorado Revised Statutes,Vol.I,p.X.

The Reviser then proceeds to point out the difference that

exist between the Session Laws and that of a compilation, revision, or code. The Colorado Revised Statutes are apparently a

revision, which was first published in 1945 (p.ix). The Colorado

Statutes appear to be nothing more that a reference book, like

Dunnell Colorado Digest or; West's Colorado Statutes Annotated,

which are also copyrighted. The contents of such reference books

"cannot" be used as law in charging citizens with crimes on a

presentment or indictment or complaints and informations.

The Reviser does not say that the statutes in his/her book are

the official laws of the State of Colorado. He indicates that

these statutes are only "in theory" laws of the State (p.xii).

23.

There are thus many confusing and ambiguous statements made by tb

the Reviser as to the nature and authority of the statutes in the

Colorado Revised Statutes. It is not all made certain that they

are laws pursuant to Art. V, Sect. 18 of the Constitution of the

State of Colorado, as noted:

Uncertain things are held for nothing. Maxim of Law; the law

requires, not conjecture, but certainty. Coffin v. Ogden,85 U.S.

120,124; and where the law is uncertain, there is no law. Bouvier1s Law Dictionary. Vol. 2 "Maxims," 1880 edition.

The purported statutes in the Colorado Revised Statutes do

n°t make it clear by what authority they exist. The Statutes

therein have no enacting authority on their face. In fact, there

is not a hint that the General Assembly of Colorado had anything

at all to do with these so-called statute books. Thus, the statu

tes used against the accused/petitioner are just idle words which

carry no authority of any kind on their face.

MR. LOMAX'S RIGHTS WAS VIOLATED HIS U.S. CONSTITUTION; AMEND

MENTS V, VI, VIII, IX, AND XIV. THE STATE DID DEPRIVED HIM OF

LIFE AND LIBERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; AND DENIED THE

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

ESTABLISHED RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

Mr. Lomax, were not subject to the criminal court jurisdiction

See, U.S. Const. Amends.V, VI, VIII, IX, and XIV. He was deprived

of his life and liberty, without due process of law, and denied

the equal protection of the laws. And has been subjected to' and

forced into cruel and unusual punishment of infliction. Neither

slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for

crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall ex

ist within the United States, or any place subject to their jur4c

isdiction. Mr. Lomax has been in involuntary servitude, without

being duly convicted of any lawful crime, for nearly 20 long

years♦

The issue of subject matter jurisdiction for this case thus

squarely rests upon certain provision of the Constitution of

24.

Colorado (1876); To wit:

Colo. Constitution Art. V, Sect. 18. Enacting Clause. The style

of this state shall be: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly, of

the State of Colorado". (Effective August 1, 1876). Annotation,

Section § 17-22 of this Article mandatory. Watrous v. Golden Chaw

mber of Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218 P.2d 498 (1950).

Legislative Construction of Statutes § 2-4-213 "Form of Enactin

ing Clause." All acts of the General Assembly of the State of

Colorado shall be designated, known and acknowledge in each such

act of said state as follows: Be it enacted by the General Assem

bly of the State of Colorado". Legislative Construction of Statu

tes , § 2-5-213. Effect of enactment of Colorado Revised Statutes,

1973. "Legislative Construction not based on editorial matters.

Legislative Construction of Statutes, § 2-4-211. Liberal Construction: A statute should be construed to accomplish the pur

pose for which it was enacted. First Bank of N. Longmont v.

Banking Bd P 9 648 P.2d 684 (Colo. App. 1982). The alleged Statutes

that the accused was prosecuted on have "no enacting clause" or

purpose for which it was enacjted.

Colorado Constitution Art. v, Sect. 19, when laws take effectintroduction of bills. " An act of the General Assembly shall

take affect on the date stated in the act or, if no date is sta

ted in the act then on its passage, a bill may be introduced At

any time during the session unless limited by action of the Gen

eral Assembly. No bill shall be introduced by title only. There

is no affective date of the Colorado Revised Statutesaused agai

nst the accused, further in violation of the Colorado Constitu

tion. Also, "no bill" shall be introduced by title only as list

ed above. There is no documented link between any bill and the

Colorado Revised Statutes Title 18# that the accused was prose^

cuted under.

Legislative Construction of Statutes, 2-5-118. Official Stat

utes publications by other person or Agencies, when permitted:

and person, or agency, or political subdivision who wishes to

publish, reprint, or disstribute all or substantial part of the

statutes shall also demonstrate to the satisfaction of the comm25.

ittee that the statues will be accurately reproduced. NOTE: They

are not accurately reproduced because they have been reproduced

without the mandated enacting clause. That 2-5-188 in part, says,

"the purpose of this section is to ensure that the official stat

utes are made available to the courts, state and local government

agencies, and other users; that copies of all or substantial part

of Colorado Revised Statutes. When published, reprinted, or dist

ributed to interested citizens, accurately state the law in effec

ect when those copies are prepared, and that unofficial publica

tion, reprinted, or distributions of the statBtSSi are not mis

taken for the official publications, reprinted, or distributions

of the statutes are not mistaken for the official statutes pro

duced and enacted in accordance with this article. NOTE:

The Colorado Revised Statutes "do not" accurately state the

law, because without the mandated enacting clause, they are not

any laws at all".

Const, of Colo., Art. XVIII, Sect. 8, Publication of laws,

states:

"The General Assembly shall provide for the publication of the

laws passed at each session thereof".

The publication and distribution of the Colorado Revised Statu,

utes used against the accused are from a company [not even head

quartered in the State of Colorado] called Lexis Nexus. Further,

they are copyrighted by the committee of legal services for the

State of Colorado. Neither of the two are the General Assembly of

Colorado. Also, "no law" can be copyrighted. A law is in the pub

lic domain, and copyrighted material is in the private domain.

Further, not the court or prosecutor provided the documentation

that either one had the copyright book owner's permission to use

their copyrighted material to falsely imprison the accused.

Constitution of Colorado Art. V, Sect. 17; No law passed but b

by bill-amendments. No law shall be passed except by bill, and no

bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either

house as to change its original purpose • • • Sections 17-22 of this

article of the Constitution set forth "mandatory provisions" with

the legislative department must strictly comply in the enactment

26.

of bills. Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce,121 Colo. 521,218

P.2d 498 (1950). When Lexis Nexus published and distributed Colo

rado Revised Statutes without the mandatory enacting clause they

altered the alleged Colorado law rendering it void. The same for

the Committee on Legal Services for the State of Colorado. Except

that by their copyrightdag of the alleged laws, they are "not

laws" at all, and have no more legal force upon the accused than

a copyrighted Harry Potter novel.

In a long venerable line of cases, the Supreme Court has held

that without proper jurisdiction, a court "cannot" proceed at all

all, but can only note the jurisdiction defect and dismiss the

cause. See, United States v. Augenblick,393 U.S. 348; Philbrook

v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707,721; and Clandler v. Judicial of Tenth

Circuit,389 U.S. 74,86-88, distinguished for a court pronounce

upon a law's meaning or constitutionality when it has no juristdiction to do so is by its very definition, an ultra vires act.

"Ultra vires, an act performed without any authority to act on

subject". Huslund v. City of Seattle,86 Wash. 2d 607, 547 P.2d

1221, 1230.

These provisions are not in the lease ambiguous or suscepti

ble to any other interpretation than their plain and apparent

meaning. The Supreme Court of Montana, in construing such provi

sion said:

That they were "so plainly and clearly expressed and so enti

rely free from ambiguity", that "there is nothing for the court

to construe". Yaughn & Ragsdale Co. v. State Bd. of Equity,96 P.

2d 420,423,424.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota stated how these provisions

are to be construed, when it was considering the meaning of

another provision under the legislative department. Art.4,Sub

section 9:

In treating of constitutional provisions, we believe it is

the general rule among coutts to regard them as mandatory, and

not leave it to the will or pleasure of a legislature to obey or

disregard them. Where the language of the constitution is plain,

we are not permit to indulge in speculation concerning its mean

ing, nor whether it is the embodiment of great wisdom.

The rule with reference to constitutional construction is

27.

also well stated by Johnson, J. in the case of Newell v. People,

7 N.Y. 9, 97 as follows:

"If the words embody a definite meaning which involves no absur

dity and no contradiction between parts of the same writing, then

that meaning apparent upon the face of the instrument is the one

which we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In

such a case there is no room for construction. That which the

words declare is the meaning of the instrument, and neither cou

rts nor legislatures have the right to add or take away from the

meaning. It must be very plain, nay, absolutely certain that the

people did not intend that the language they have employed in its

natural signification imports, before a court will feel itself at

liberty to depart from the plain reading of a constitutional pro

vision". State ex.rel. v. Sutton,147, 150, 65 N.W. 262 (1995);

affirmed, State v. Holm, 62 N.W. 2d 52,55,56 (Minn. 1954); Butler

Taconlte v. Roemer, 282 N.W. 2d 867, 870, 871 (Minn. 1979).

It is certain that the plain and apparent language of these

constitution provisions are not followed in the publication known

as the Colorado Revised Statutes, as being law, that use can neve

er be regarded as exception to the constitution. To support this

publication as law, it "must" be said that it is "absolutely cer

tain" that the framers of the constitution did not intend for

titles and enacting clause to be printed and published with all

laws, but that they did intend for them to be all stripped away

and concealed from public view when complilation of statutes is

made. Such an absurdity will gain the support and respect of no

one. Nor can it be speculated that a revised statute publica

tion which dispenses with all titles and enacting clauses "must"

be allowed under the Constitution as it is more practical and

convenient that the Session Law publication. The use of such

speculation or desired exceptions can "never" be allowed under

the Constitution as it is more practical and convenient that the

Session law publication. The use of such speculation or desire

exceptions can "never" be used in construing such plain and un

ambiguous provision.

The general rule of law is, when a statute or constitution is

is plain and unambiguous, the court is not permitted to indulge

28.

in speculation concerning its meaning, nor whether it is the embe

odiment of great wisdom. A constitution is intended to be framed

in brief and precise language. It is not within the providence of

the court to read an exception into the constitution which the

framers thereof did not see fit to enact therein. Baskin v. State

232 Pac. 388, 389, 107 Okla. 272 (1925).

There is, of course, no need for construction or interpreta

tion of these provisions as they have been adjudicated upon,

especially those dealing with the use of an enacting clause. The

Supreme Court of Colorado has made it clear that Art. V, Sect. 18

of the State Constitution is "mandatory", and a statute without

any enacting clause is void.

Being that the statutes used against the accused/petitioner

are without enacting clauses and titles, they are void, which

means there is no offense, no valid complaint, and thus no sub

ject matter jurisdiction.

The provision requiring andenacting clause and one-subject

titles were adhered to with the publication known as the Session

Iwas and General laws for the State of Colorado. Because certain

people in government thought that they could devise a more convenient way of doing things without regard for provisions of the

State Constitution, they devised the contrivance known as the

Colorado Statutes, and then held it out to the public as being

law. This is of course fraud, subversion, and a great deception

upon the people of the State of Colorado which is now revealed

and exposed. See, U.S. Amend. IX: The ennumeration in the Const

itution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or

disparage others retained by the people. See, U.S. Amend. XIII:

• • • / except

as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall

have been duly convicted. Mr. Lomax was convicted under false

pretense (a false show/or pretext), and by fraud, subversion,

and a great deception. Under counterfeit statutes/laws of this

Scastate.See also, U.S. Amend. XIV: No State shall make or enforce

any law which abridge the privileges..of citizens of the U.S. ?

nor shall any State deprive any person of life of liberty, with

out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jursidiction the equal protection of the laws.

29.

There is no justification for deviating from or violating a

written constitution. The Colorado Revised Statutes "cannot" be

used as law, like the Session Laws once used, solely because the

circumstances have changed and we now have more laws to deal

with. "It cannot be said that the use and need of revised statu

tes without titles and enacting clauses must be justified due to

expedience".

Mr. Lomax, the accused/petitioner,pro se, petitioning this

honorable Court pursuant to Rule 10, to vacate, set aside, or

dismiss this cause for want/lack of subject matter and personal

jurisdiction. And completely expunge his criminal record of all

related charges, and immediately release him from the custody of

the executive director of prisons. The petitioner is not validly

confine and thus entitled to immediate release and that the peti

tioner has suffered a serious infringement of a fundamental con

stitutional right resulting in a significant loss of liberty.

Conclusion

Based upon the above pleading and petition, the petitioner

prays that this Court will grant the appropriate relief in respo

nse to this matter.

For the following reasons:

1. A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must

dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it be

come apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.United States v. Siviglia,686 Fed. 2d 832,835 (1981),case cited.

2. Nothing can be regarded as a law in this State which fails to

conform to the constitutional prerequisites which call for an en

acting clause and title.

3. There is Hothing in the complaint and information which can

constitutionally be regarded as laws, and thus there is nothing

in them which the accused is answerable for or which can be char

ged against him.

4. Since there are no valid or constitutional laws charged agaies

nst the accused, there are no crimes that exist, consequently

there is no subject matter jurisdiction, which he can be tried in

the above named court, and pursuant to C.R.S. § 18-1-410, PostConviction Remedy.

Done this 16th day of February, 2024.

30.

/JFJJtjlWs A.

ArthurirJ. Lomax

I' ^

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

•r'

How the petition for relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 will help in

the lower courts and the courts appellate jurisdiction (State

ments 1-3)

I. This is a question of National and Local importance under the

Colorado Bill of Rights, the state criminal and/or trial court

did not have subject matter jurisdiction or the authority to pro

ceed against the accused/or petitioner (for a felony offense)

without an indictment (See., U.S. Amend. V. and Colo. Const. Art.

II, Sect. 8"J"5 so therefore, the habeas corpus was a right that

could not be denied. The state court had no authority to dismiss

petitioner's habeas (See, Colo. Const. Art. II, Sect. 21), or be

required to exhaust state remedies before the writ is issued.

Others in the same situation (from any place local and national,

subject to their jurisdiction) will benefit from granting the

petition because adjudication of the merits will make it clear to

the less informed public, that a state can11 use technical rules

of constrution (e.g. state remedies & state statutes) to defeat

the objectives of the National & State Constitution.

2. On the Local and National level, the granting of the petition

will clarify that no state can abolish a portion of the State

Bill of Rights (e.g. the Grand Jury Institution) to a portion of

the people charge with felonies, while leaving the same safe-guard in full effect to another portion of the citizens charged

with felonies(See, U.S. Amend. XIV, the equal protection of the

laws). There has not been any Colorado Constitutional amendment

enacted that has abolished the indictment requirement from the

State Bill of Rights, neither has there been an amendment rati

fied by the people that authorize crimes that warrant a infamous

punishment to be prosecuted by any other means than by indietment. Petitioner,s case can aid the lower courts and the courts

appellate,jurisdiction to show that states must abolish the Grand

_Ins titution by constitutional amendment, and not by state

statutes-jurisdicial interpretation, or through the under-utili

zation of the Grand Jury Institution by the prosecutor, that abo

lishes the,institution only to a portion of the state citizens,

while leaving the same safeguard (with wide statutory protpetions) in effect to another portion charged with felonies.

,3. In re Lowrie, 8 Colo. 499, 9 & 489, is Colorado Supreme Court

binding authority that makes it clear that ail felonies are to be

prosecuted by indictment . The principles In re Lowrie & Stare De

cisis are being ignored by the local government. If the petition

is gran ted recent case law can be made tha t will clear any confuunsettled issues, or that which has already been adjudicat

ed on (.Seeing that Lowrie is a old case from 1885), and aid the—

courts appellate jurisdiction, because fair adjudication will

show that the Grand Juify Institution can't be regarded as a mere

rubber stamp on prosecutions, or bypassed as if it is a mere rule

of practice that has no effect on essential rights. If the petitI® granted recent case law can be made to show government

officials and the people (on a local and national level) that no

state official can ignore the.principle of Stare Decisis, and TEe

restraints of amendment 14', sections 1 & 3, and article 6, sect

ions 2 & 3, of the U.S. Constitution.

What Exceptional Circumstances warrant the Exercise of the

Court's Discretionary Powers (statements 4-9)

4. In the case at bar, there are exceptional circumstances beca

use the lower court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over

the cause and party for his alleged felony charge(s), nor was he

indicted for such felony charges as the State Bill of Rights req

uires. The proceedings against him were erroneous, void, and ill

egal, so the petitioner is being held in violation oT the staTe

and national constitutions because the lower court did not have

plenary jurisdiction over both the cause and his person.

5. Accusations of presumption of guilt generally do not imply an

actual legal presumption of guilt, but rather denounce some fail

ures ensuing that suspects are treated well and offered good de

fense conditions. See, 21-1-101 (1), and U.S. Const. Amend. VI.

Exceptional circumstances exist because petitioner's trial was

unfair and unconstitional because he was not subject to the jur

isdiction of the trial court, and seeing he was denied his indi

ctment process and a Grand Jury Investigation, for his alleged

felony offense. Petitioner made ru) waiver of his indictment or

his grand jury investigation , or his preliminary hearing that

was intelligently made on record. The petitioner was prosecuted

under false pretense and by counterfeit laws and statutes.

6. Due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful_ time and in a meaningful manner; due process must be afford

ed before deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Nat. Counsel of Resistance to Iran v. Pep't of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C.

• 2001) . Petitioner is being, held in involuntary servitude

without duly being convicted. Why adequate relief cannot hp

obtained in this state court?

----------7* Ex parte Bain, Ex parte Wilson, Ex parte Moreland, and Ex

parte Mackin, are the U.S. Supreme Court binding authorityTfrom

other circuits) that require indictment for infamous crimes,

Colorado Supreme Court precedent, in Re Lowrie, follows the

listed precedents. For a Colorado state judge (to suspend/or

deny petitioner's state habeas), each application for habeas

corpus mus t be disposed of by sound discretion, and any condi

tions or delays to application, other than by statute'may not

be imposed. To impose any other conditions than stated in

subsect. 13-45-101 et. seq., C.R.S. would be unauthorized pra

ctice of law acting outside the fundamental guidelines stated

by the constitutions and general assembly, legislature. There

fore, to impose conditions on issuance of writ, such as ' appeal process or Rule 35, or exhausting any other available remedies before enacting the habeas corpus is pro tanto a suspension of the writ. Stilley v. Tinsley. 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d

677 (1966) .

8. Under the habeas act of February 5, 1867 petotioner applies

to the U.S. Supreme Court, because the trial court did not have

jurisdiction over the party and the felony charge(s), habeas cor

pus is the proper remedy, and other forms of relief shall not be

used to suspend the writ of habeas. See, In the case of Boumediene v. Bush (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2008), the Supreme Court declared

this policy invalid and ruled that terrorism Suspects had the

right to file writs of habeas corpus in federal court to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. This ruling potentially

affected the rights of some 270 people arrested for suspected

terrorist activities, some of whom had been imprisoned as long as

six years without a court hearing to review their imprisonment■

9. In clear violation of Article 2, Sect. 6, of the Colorado Con

stitution, petitioner is being denied the equality of justice,

and the ri^ht to have justice administered without denial, beca

use he can t enforce his civil rights in the trial and/or sentening court. In violation ot Article 2, Section 3, of the Colora

do Constitution? petitioner is being denied his inalienable rig

hts^. Relief can t be obtained because technical rules of tonstruction are being used to deny the clear objectives of the const

itution. (See, Art. 2, Sect. 8, of the Colorado Constitution).

The reason(s) for making application to the appellate court.

10. (1) The petitioner made application for a state writ of hab

eas corpus in the District Court of Denver, CO it was denied the

first time (2021), and again in (2023) the court did abandoned

and gave no respond to his petition for writ within 90 days, pursuant to 13-5-135 and 13-5-136. (2) The matter at issue concern

something that goes beyond the trial record. (3) The petitioner

is seeking a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person,

or character; and right and justice should be administered without denial or delay. (4) The matter is urgent, because the peti

tioner has been m involuntary servitude for nearly 20 years

without being duly convicted and being punished tor no crimejs)

or for a crime that did not exist. (5) The accused believes he

was wronged by the actions of the trial judge. (6) The accused/

or petitioner has already lodged an unsuccessful direct appeal.

He understand, m some cases, he may file multiple writs, but

have the right to appeal only once.

11. Hurtado vs. ____________

California HO U.S. led. 232 (1884), Davis vs.

Burke,

------_ 179 , U.S.

Maxwell vs. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, and Bollin

felonies are not in violation of the 14th Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution, when the constitution of the State authorizes

prosecutions for felonies on inf ormation . Colorado ' s CnnsH t-ntinn

authorizes felony prosecutions only by indictment, but the accu

sed and/or petitioner was charged for his felony on complaint

and informaton, so that action is in conflict with the" listed

precedents , and the States Bill of Rights. How the decisions

the lower court may be erroneous, the national importance of the

case to others similarly situated. (See, statement 12)

12. This is an issue of National Importance, because sometimes

’

i . *

when the citizen’s rights -are reinforced through a victory in

court, they are disparagingly referred to as legal technicali

ties. The fact that forcing our Government to follow the pre

scribed procedures to an accused and/or incarcerated person, and

prohibiting our Government from cheating to lock citizens away,

was a hard fought victory long-ago when our Country was founded

which sould not be diminished from public ridicule or neglect.

Petitioner's conviction was erroneous, void, and illegal, beca

use was denied a subtantive right and his procedural due pro

cess. Fair litigation on this issue will help others in similar

situations because it will enforce fundamental law.

The Denial of Petitioner's First Amendment Right to Petition

the Government is a Constitutional Error.

13. The Colorado Constitution (Article 2, Section 24) buttresses

the attitude of openness toward the Grand Jury and this is also

embodied.in Statute 16-5-204 and Colo. Const. Art. 2, Sect. 24,

allows citizen to petition the Government for redress for Grievances. Mr. Lomax was denied and deprived this right in the lower

______

court in regard to his petition for state writ of habeas corpus.

When a court properly has cognizance of a case, a mere error of

law must be reviewed by appeal or writ of error. Petitioner's

point oT law did not have to be met at every stage of criminal

proceedings, because it goes beyond a mere error in point of law.

The proceedings were not merely erroneous, but entirely Null and

Void because the lower court was without jurisdiction over the

subject matter and party.

Mr. Lomax, petitioner-appellant herein, petitions this Court,

pursuant to C.A.R. 21, to issue a rule to snow cause and to grant

appropriate relief in response to the matters presented.

Arthur Jams Lomax #134416

Bent County Correctional Fac.

11560 County Road FF-75

Las Animas, CO 81054

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.