Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Clarence F. Stephenson, Petitioner v. Florida

Supreme Court briefApr 11, 2024

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No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CLARENCE F. STEPHENSON, PETITIONER

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

_____________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

_____________

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

Benjamin Hunter Eisenberg

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 355-7600

beisenberg@pd15.state.fl.us

appeals@pd15.org

Stephenson v. State, 368 So.3d 5 (2023)

48 Fla. L. Weekly D1393

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan

P. Picard, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for

appellee.

368 So.3d 5

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Clarence F. STEPHENSON, Appellant,

STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

No.

4D22

291

[July 12, 2023]

Synopsis

Background: Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court,

15th Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Caroline Shepherd,

J., of possession and trafficking in several different drugs,

including amphetamines, phenethylamines, and morphine.

Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The District Court of Appeal held that:

defendant's conviction by six-person jury did not violate his

constitutional rights;

assessment of mandatory statutory

unconstitutionally excessive; but

fines

was

not

remand was required for trial court to correct scrivener's error.

Affirmed, but remanded.

Procedural Posture(s): Appellate Review; Pre-Trial Hearing

Motion.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial

Circuit, Palm Beach County; Caroline C. Shepherd, Judge;

L.T. Case No. 50-2019-CF-005431-AXXXX-MB.

We affirm appellant's convictions and sentences for various

counts of possession and trafficking in several different drugs.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the evidence and statements obtained

during the traffic stop which led to the discovery of drugs.

We find competent substantial evidence to support the trial

court's conclusions that the stop was valid, the officer

observed a container containing illicit drugs in plain view

after approaching the vehicle, and appellant's incriminating

statements were obtained after he was *6 read his Miranda

rights. While one admission was obtained before appellant

was read his Miranda rights, its introduction into evidence

was harmless error.

Appellant also claims that he was unconstitutionally tried by

a six-member jury instead of a twelve-member jury. We have

previously rejected this argument in Guzman v. State, 350 So.

3d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), rev. denied, No. SC22-1597,

2023 WL 3830251 (Fla. June 6, 2023). We likewise reject the

claim in this case.

Additionally, Appellant challenges the $210,000 in

mandatory statutory fines assessed against him as

unconstitutionally excessive. 1 We conclude that the fines are

not unconstitutional. See Gordon v. State, 139 So. 3d 958, 964

(Fla. 2d DCA 2014). We do agree with appellant's claim that

the order assessing costs and fines incorrectly lists $52,500

as a discretionary fine when this was a mandatory fine. We

remand for the trial court to correct this scrivener's error. See

Bryant v. State, 301 So. 3d 352, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).

Appellant need not be present for the correction. Id.

Affirmed, but remanded to correct a scrivener's error in

sentence.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Cynthia L.

Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for

appellant.

Warner, May and Gerber, JJ., concur.

All Citations

368 So.3d 5, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1393

Stephenson v. State, 368 So.3d 5 (2023)

48 Fla. L. Weekly D1393

Footnotes

See § 893.135(1)(f)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2018) (a person who traffics between fourteen and twenty-eight grams of

amphetamines “shall be ordered to pay a fine of $50,000”); § 893.135(1)(k)2.a., Fla. Stat. (2018) (a person

who traffics between ten and two-hundred grams of phenethylamines “shall be ordered to pay a fine of

$50,000”); § 893.135(1)(c)1.b., Fla. Stat. (2018) (a person who traffics between fourteen and twenty-eight

grams of morphine “shall be ordered to pay a fine of $100,000”); and § 938.04, Fla. Stat. (2018) (“In addition

to any fine for any criminal offense prescribed by law, including a criminal traffic offense ... there is hereby

established and created as a court cost an additional 5-percent surcharge thereon which shall be imposed[.]”)

End of Document

Stephenson v. Florida, Not Reported in So. Rptr. (2023)

2023 WL 8361303

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

Supreme Court of Florida.

CORRECTED ORDER 1

*1 The original petition seeking belated discretionary

review is hereby granted and a new case styled Stephenson v.

State of Florida, Case No. SC2023-1608, has been set up as

a notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction which is seeking

review of the order of the Fourth District Court of Appeal

dated July 12, 2023. Case No. SC2023-1200 is closed.

Clarence F. STEPHENSON, Petitioner(s)

State of FLORIDA, Respondent(s)

SC2023-1200

November 21, 2023

Lower

Tribunal

No(s).:

502019CF005431AXXXXMB

4D22-0291,

CANADY, LABARGA, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and

SASSO, JJ., concur.

All Citations

Not Reported in So. Rptr., 2023 WL 8361303

Footnotes

Corrected the new case number from SC2023-1588 to SC2023-1608 on December 4, 2023.

End of Document

Clarence F. Stephenson, Petitioner(s) v. State of Florida,..., Not Reported in So....

A True Copy

2024 WL 1366348

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Test:

Clarence F. Stephenson, Petitioner(s)

State of Florida, Respondent(s)

Served:

SC2023

1608

APRIL 1, 2024

Lower

Tribunal

No(s).:

502019CF005431AXXXMB

CYNTHIA LORRAINE ANDERSON

CRIM APP WPB ATTORNEY GENERAL

4DCA CLERK

4D2022-0291;

Opinion

*1 This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court

on jurisdictional briefs and portions of the record deemed

necessary to reflect jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b),

Florida Constitution, and the Court having determined that

it should decline to accept jurisdiction, it is ordered that the

petition for review is denied.

No motion for rehearing will be entertained by the Court. See

Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(d)(2).

PALM BEACH CLERK

JESSENIA J CONCEPCION

JONATHAN P PICARD

HON. CAROLINE CAHILL SHEPHERD

CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and

SASSO, JJ., concur.

All Citations

Not Reported in So. Rptr., 2024 WL 1366348

End of Document

III.

Appellant was entitled to a twelve person jury under the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and he did not waive

that right.

Stephenson was convicted by a jury comprised of six people. T

238. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to

a twelve-person jury when the defendant is charged with a felony.

A. Standard of review and preservation

The standard of review of constitutional claims is de novo. See

A.B. v. Florida Dept. of Children & Family Services, 901 So. 2d 324,

326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

Stephenson did not personally waive his right to a twelve person

jury.

B. The Constitution requires a twelve-person jury.

Although the Supreme Court held in Williams v. Florida, 399

U.S. 78, 86 (1970), that juries as small as six were constitutionally

permissible, Williams is impossible to square with the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), which

concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s “trial by an impartial jury”

requirement encompasses what the term “meant at the time of the

Sixth Amendment’s adoption,” id. at 1395; U.S. Const. amend. VI.

Prior to 1970, subjecting Stephenson to a trial with only six

jurors would have indisputably violated his Sixth Amendment rights.

As the Ramos Court observed, even Blackstone recognized that under

the common law, “no person could be found guilty of a serious crime

unless ‘the truth of every accusation … should … be confirmed by

the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors[.]”

Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1395. “A ‘verdict, taken from eleven, was no

verdict’ at all.” Id.

After the Sixth Amendment was enacted, a bevy of state

courts—ranging from Alabama to Missouri to New Hampshire—

interpreted it to require a twelve-person jury. See Miller, Comment,

Six of One Is Not A Dozen of the Other, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 643

n.133 (1998) (collecting cases from the late 1700s to the 1860s). In

1898, the U.S. Supreme Court added its voice to the chorus, noting

that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to be tried by

a twelve-person jury. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-350

(1898) overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S.

37, 51-52 (1990). As the Thompson Court explained, since the time

of the Magna Carta, the word “jury” had been understood to mean a

body of twelve people. Id. Given that understanding had been

accepted since 1215, the Court reasoned, “[i]t must” have been “that

the word ‘jury’” in the Sixth Amendment was “placed in the

constitution of the United States with reference to [that] meaning

affixed to [it].” Id. at 350.

The Supreme Court continued to cite the basic principle that

the Sixth Amendment requires a twelve-person jury in criminal cases

for seventy more years. For example, in 1900, the Court explained

that “there [could] be no doubt” “[t]hat a jury composed, as at

common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the Sixth Amendment

to the Federal Constitution.” Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586

(1900). Thirty years later, the Court reiterated that it was “not open

to question” that “the phrase ‘trial by jury’” in the Constitution

incorporated juries’ “essential elements” as “they were recognized in

this country and England,” including the requirement that they

“consist of twelve men, neither more nor less.” Patton v. United States,

281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). And as recently as 1968, the Court

remarked that “by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in

criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries

and carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta,”

such as the necessary inclusion of twelve members. Duncan v.

Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-152 (1968). 1

In 1970, however, the Williams Court overruled this line of

precedent in a decision that Justice Harlan described as “stripping

off the livery of history from the jury trial” and ignoring both “the

intent of the Framers” and the Court’s long held understanding that

constitutional “provisions are framed in the language of the English

common law [] and … read in the light of its history.” Baldwin v. New

York, 399 U.S. 117, 122-24 (1970) (citation omitted) (Harlan, J.,

concurring in the result in Williams). Indeed, Williams recognized that

the Framers “may well” have had “the usual expectation” in drafting

the Sixth Amendment “that the jury would consist of 12” members.

Williams, 399 U.S. at 98-99. But Williams concluded that such

“purely historical considerations” were not dispositive. Id. at 99.

Rather, the Court focused on the “function” that the jury plays in the

See also, e.g., Capital Traction Co v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899)

(“‘Trial by jury,’ in the primary and usual sense of the term at the

common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial

by a jury of 12 men” but also contains other requirements);

Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529 (1905) (“The

constitutional requirement that ‘the trial of all crimes, except in cases

of impeachment, shall be by jury,’ means, as this court has adjudged,

a trial by the historical, common-law jury of twelve persons”).

Constitution, concluding that the “essential feature” of a jury is it

leaves justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of laymen”

and thus allows “guilt or innocence” to be determined via “community

participation and [with] shared responsibility.” Id. at 100-01.

According to the Williams Court, both “currently available evidence

[and] theory” suggested that function could just as easily be

performed with six jurors as with twelve. Id. at 101-102 & n.48; cf.

Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979) (acknowledging that

Williams and its progeny “departed from the strictly historical

requirements of jury trial”).

Williams’s ruling that the Sixth Amendment (as incorporated to

the States by the Fourteenth) permits a six-person jury cannot stand

in light of Ramos. There, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth

Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of

a serious offense. In reaching that conclusion, the Ramos Court

overturned Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), a decision that

it faulted for “subject[ing] the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury

verdict to its own functionalist assessment.” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at

1401-02.

That reasoning undermines Williams as well. Ramos rejected

the same kind of “cost-benefit analysis” the Court undertook in

Williams, observing that it is not the Court’s role to “distinguish

between the historic features of common law jury trials that (we

think) serve ‘important enough functions to migrate silently into the

Sixth Amendment and those that don’t.’” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 140001. Ultimately, the Ramos Court explained, the question is whether

“at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption, the right to trial by

jury included” the particular feature at issue. Id. at 1402. As the

history summarized above establishes, there can be no serious doubt

that the common understanding of the jury trial during the

Revolutionary War era was that twelve jurors were required—a

“verdict, taken from eleven, was no verdict at all.” See id. at 1395

(quotation marks omitted).

Even setting aside Williams’s now-disfavored functionalist logic,

its ruling suffered from another significant flaw: it was based on

research that was out of date shortly after the opinion issued.

Specifically, the Williams Court “f[ou]nd little reason to think”

that the goals of the jury guarantee—including, among others, “to

provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative[] cross-section

of the community”—“are in any meaningful sense less likely to be

achieved when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers 12.”

Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. The Court theorized that “in practice the

difference between the 12-man and the six-man jury in terms of the

cross-section of the community represented seems likely to be

negligible.” Id. at 102.

In the time since Williams, that determination has proven

incorrect. Indeed, the Court acknowledged as much just eight years

later in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), when it concluded

that the Sixth Amendment barred the use of a five-person jury.

Although Ballew did not overturn Williams, the Ballew Court

observed that empirical studies conducted in the handful of

intervening years highlighted several problems with Williams’

assumptions. For example, Ballew noted that more recent research

showed that (1) “smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group

deliberation,” id. at 232, (2) smaller juries may be less accurate and

cause “increasing inconsistency” in verdict results, id. at 234, (3) the

chance

for

hung

juries

decreases

with

smaller

juries,

disproportionally harming the defendant, id. at 236; and (4)

decreasing jury sizes “foretell[] problems … for the representation of

minority groups in the community,” undermining a jury’s likelihood

of being “truly representative of the community,” id. at 236-37.

Moreover, the Ballew Court “admit[ted]” that it “d[id] not

pretend to discern a clear line between six members and five,”

effectively acknowledging that the studies it relied on also cast doubt

on the effectiveness of the six-member jury. Id. at 239; see also id. at

245-46 (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing that five-member juries are

unconstitutional, while acknowledging that “the line between fiveand six-member juries is difficult to justify”).

Post-Ballew

research

has

further

undermined

Williams.

Current empirical evidence indicates that “reducing jury size

inevitably has a drastic effect on the representation of minority group

members on the jury.” Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the

Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL

STUD. 425, 427 (Sept. 2009); see also Higginbotham et al., Better by

the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury, 104

Judicature 47, 52 (Summer 2020) (“Larger juries are also more

inclusive and more representative of the community. … In reality,

cutting the size of the jury dramatically increases the chance of

excluding minorities.”). Because “the 12-member jury produces

significantly greater heterogeneity than does the six-member jury,”

Diamond et al., at 449, it increases “the opportunity for meaningful

and appropriate representation” and helps ensure that juries

“represent adequately a cross-section of the community.” Ballew, 435

U.S. at 237.

Other important considerations also weigh in favor of the

twelve-member jury. For instance, studies indicate that twelvemember juries deliberate longer, recall evidence better, and rely less

on irrelevant factors during deliberation. See Smith & Saks, The Case

for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury, 60 FLA. L.

REV. 441, 465 (2008). Minority views are also more likely to be

thoroughly expressed in a larger jury, as “having a large minority

helps

make

the

minority

subgroup

influential,”

and,

unsurprisingly, “the chance of minority members having allies is

greater on a twelve-person jury.” Id. at 466. Finally, larger juries

deliver more predictable results. In the civil context, for example,

“[s]ix-person juries are four times more likely to return extremely

high or low damage awards compared to the average.” Higginbotham

et al., at 52.

Stephenson recognizes that the state constitution provides:

SECTION 22. Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall be

secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the

number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law.

Art. I, § 22, Fla. Const. And he recognizes that section 913.10, Florida

Statutes, provides for six jurors except in capital cases. See also Fla.

R. Crim. P. 3.270.

But Florida’s provision for a jury of six stems from the dawn of

the Jim Crow era, one month after federal troops were withdrawn

from the state. The historical background is as follows:

In 1875, the Jury Clause of the 1868 constitution was amended

to provide that the number of jurors “for the trial of causes in any

court may be fixed by law.” See Florida Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v. Boswell,

34 So. 241, 241 (Fla. 1903).

The common law rule of a jury of twelve was still kept in Florida

while federal troops remained in the state. There was no provision for

a jury of less than twelve until the Legislature enacted a provision

specifying a jury of six in Chapter 3010, section 6. See Gibson v.

State, 16 Fla. 291, 297–98 (1877) (quoting and discussing Chapter

3010, section 6, Laws of Florida (1877)); Florida Fertilizer, 34 So. at

241 (noting that previously all juries had twelve members).

The Legislature enacted chapter 3010 with the jury-of-six

provision on February 17, 1877. Gibson, 16 Fla. at 294. This was less

than a month after the last federal troops were withdrawn from

Florida in January 1877. See JERRELL H. SHOFNER, Reconstruction and

Renewal, 1865-1877, in THE HISTORY OF FLORIDA 273 (Michael

Gannon, ed., first paperback edition 2018) (“there were [no] federal

troops” in Florida after 23 January 1877”).

The jury-of-six thus first saw light at the birth of the Jim Crow

era as former Confederates regained power in southern states and

state prosecutors made a concerted effort to prevent Blacks from

serving on jurors.

On its face the 1868 constitution extended the franchise to

Black men. But the historical context shows that that it was part of

the overall resistance to Reconstruction efforts to protect the rights

of Black citizens. The constitution was the product of a remarkable

series of events including a coup in which leaders of the white

southern (or native) faction took possession of the assembly hall in

the middle of the night, excluding Radical Republican delegates from

the proceedings. See Richard L. Hume, Membership of the Florida

Constitutional Convention of 1868: A Case Study of Republican

Factionalism in the Reconstruction South, 51 Fla. Hist. Q. 1, 5-6

(1972); SHOFNER, at 266. A reconciliation was effected as the “outside”

whites “united with the majority of the body’s native whites to frame

a constitution designed to continue white dominance.” Hume at 15.

The racist purpose of the resulting constitution was spelled out

by Harrison Reed, a leader of the prevailing faction and the first

governor elected under the 1868 constitution, who wrote to Senator

Yulee that the new constitution was constructed to bar Blacks from

legislative office:

Under our Constitution the Judiciary & State officers will be

appointed & the apportionment will prevent a negro legislature.

Hume, at 15-16. See also SHOFNER, at 266.

In Ramos, Justice Gorsuch noted that the Louisiana nonunanimity rule arose from Jim Crow era efforts to enforce white

supremacy. Ramos, 140 So. Ct. at 1394; see also id. at 1417

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (non-unanimity was enacted “as one

pillar of a comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow

measures against African-Americans, especially in voting and jury

service.”). The history of Florida’s jury of six arises from the same

historical context.

In view of the foregoing, a jury of six at a criminal trial is

unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the

United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. VI, U.S. Const.

amend. XIV.

Finally, Stephenson did not waive his Sixth Amendment right

to a twelve-person jury. A defendant may waive his right to a

constitutional jury, but the “express and intelligent consent of the

defendant” is required. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312. Stephenson’s claim

is of “constitutional dimension” not statutory right, which is

fundamental error and can be raised for the first time on appeal. See

e.g., Johnson v. State, 994 So. 2d 960, 964 (Fla. 2008) (holding

Johnson’s general silence “did not constitute a valid waiver” of “his

right to a jury trial”); Smith v. State, 857 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2003) (reasoning the constitutional right to a jury trial is

fundamental in nature).

This Court should reverse the judgment and sentence and

remand for a new trial with a twelve-person jury, as required by the

Sixth

and

Constitution.

Fourteenth

Amendments

the

United

States

C. Stephenson acknowledges pending cases on

identical issue and requests cite to Guzman

This Court recently affirmed the issue based Williams but

undersigned counsel has an obligation to keep Stephenson’s claim in

the pipeline. Perez v. Dep’t. Corr., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (S.D.

Fla. 2002). The concurrence indicated that “the originalist analysis

in Ramos would undercut Williams’s functionalist underpinnings. At

a minimum, Ramos—which relied on the original meaning of the

Sixth Amendment rather than an analysis of the jury's role in

contemporary society—suggests that Williams was wrongly decided.”

Guzman v. State, No. 4D22-0148, 2022 WL 14688085, *5 (Fla. 4th

DCA Oct. 26, 2022) (Gross, J., concurring). Therefore, Stephenson

respectfully request that, if the Court is inclined to affirm his

conviction on this ground, it include a citation to Guzman so that he

may be kept in the pipeline for this important issue.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO: 20 l 9CF00543 l AMB

DIV:R

OBTS NUMBER:

STA TE OF FLORIDA

SINERO CLARENCE FRANK MYERS STEPHENSON,

] PROBATION VIOLATOR

] COMMUNITY CONTROL VIOLATOR

] RETRIAL

] RESENTENCE

BIM,

09/05/1971, 261-71-4343

JUDGMENT

The above defendant, being personally before this Court represented by

(attorney)

[ x]

Having been tried and found

guilty of the following

crime(s):

COUNT

[

]

CRIME

DA YID CASALS ESQ

Having entered a plea of guilty

to the following crime(s):

[

]

Having entered a

plea ofnolo

contendere to the

following crime(s):

OFFENSE STATUTE NUMBER(S)

DEGREE

Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Sell

893. IJ(l)(a)I

Trafficking in Amphetamine (14-28g)

893.135(1)(f)la

Trafficking in Phenethlyamines (MDMA)

(I0-200g)

893.135(1)(k)I, (l)(k)2a

Trafficking in Heroin (14-28g)

893.135(1 )( c) I b

Possession of Morphine with Intent to Sell

893. IJ(l)(a)I

[ ]

[ x ]

[ ]

and the Court having made a factual finding, the above crime(s) qualify as a crime of domestic violence

pursuant to s. 741.28.

and no cause having been shown why the Defendant should not be adjudicated guilty, IT IS ORDERED THAT the

defendant is hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY of the above crime(s).

and being a qualified offender pursuant to s. 943.325, the Defendant shall be required to submit DNA samples as

required by law.

and good cause being shown: IT IS ORDERED THAT ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE WITHHELD.

The Defendant in Open Court was advised of his right to appeal from the Judgment by filing notice of appeal with the Clerk of

Court within thirty days following the date sentence is imposed or probation is ordered pursuant to this adjudication. The

defendant was also advised fhis right to the assistance of counsel in taking said appeal at the expense of the State upon showing

of indigency.

I C1

DONE AND ORDERE in Open Court at Palm Beach County, Florida, this __j___{_ day of

, 2021.

Af2rt/,

FILED

Circuit Criminal Department

NOV 19 2021

JOSEPH ABRUZZO

Clerk of the Cin:ull Court &Compll'Olllr

Palm 8Hch County

IN THE CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE

FIFTEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA,

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY

CASE NO. 50-2019-CF-005431-AXXX-MB

DIV. R: Felony - R (Circuit)

OBTS NUMBER: 5003439950

STATE OF FLORIDA

[

]COMMUNITY

CONTROL

VIOLATOR

[

] PROBATION

SINERO CLARENCE FRANK MYERS

STEPHENSON

DEFENDANT

VIOLATION

September 5, 1971

Black

Male

DATE OF BIRTH

RACE

GENDER

The fingerprints below are those of said Defendant taken by Deputy Sheriff

1.R. THUMB

2.R.INDEX

3.R.MIDDLE

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4.R.RING

5.R. UTILE

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7. L.INDEX

8. L.MIDDLE

9. L. RING

10. L. UTILE

I hereby certify that the above and foregoing fingerprints are the fingerprints of the defendin~INERO CLARENCE

STEPHENSON, and that they were placed thereon by said defendant in my presence this

day of A ~

T'iv

- Deputy Sheriff

( Rl\ll\ \L-l l'.\(il!Zl'Rl'.\ l CARD I'll

~2~1-

/NK

MYERS

, 2~r

-:-·

\..:

.,)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

SENTENCE

(As to Count(s) _\.....,._5_____,)

Defendant:

Chrtnu S/=f{Jbr:m

Case Number:

11CFfJOS'-f 3} Amf>

OBTS Number: -----------The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record,

and having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in

mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why Defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown,

IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT that:

The Defendant pay a fine of$

pursuant to §

, Florida Statutes, plus all costs and additional charges as outlined in

the Order assessing additional charges, costs and fines as set forth in a separate order entered herein

The Defendant is ~tzeby committed to the custody of the

l,M Department of Corrections

[ ] Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Florida

] Depart~nt of Corrections as a youthful offender

For a term of

r- / . It is further ordered that the Defendant shall be allowed a total of ?,~/:, days as credit for time

incarcerated prior to i osition of this sentence. It is further ordered that the composite term of all sentences imposed for the counts

specified in the order shall run

[ ] consecutive to [/4.concurrent with (check one) the following:

[ ]

Any active sentence being served.

, \1_ h, ,!...

I~_

' I/

l':J.

Specific sentences: U:rY\C.y l'('f:rrr W\-1'V\ '-M.IL

((j=t:;Ltn,111f1Uk W\'f1L,

Ylisf=

[ ]

o1s \ / l 1 3(4/S

The instant sentence is based upon the Court having previously placed the Defendant on probation and

having subsequently revoked the Defendant's probation for violation(s) of condition(s)_ _ _ _ _ __

In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Florida is hereby ordered and

directed to deliver the Defendant to the Department of Corrections together with a copy of the Judgment and Sentence, and any other

documents specified by Florida Statute. Additionally, pursuant to §947.16(4), Florida Statutes, the Court retains jurisdiction over the

Defendant.

[ ]

The Sentencing Court objects to the Defendant being placed into the Youthful Offender Basic Training Program pursuant to

Florida Statute §958.045.

[]

Pursuant to §322.055, 322.056, 322.26, 322.274, Florida Statutes, The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is

directed to revoke the Defendant's privilege to drive. The Clerk of the Court is Ordered to report the conviction and

revocation to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.

DONE AND ORDERED in Open Court at We'1 Pa1m Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida thIB

FILED

Circuit Criminal _Department

t 1- a of' ~ 20.1{

CIRCUIT

NB.'J.. 19 2021

August, 2013

JOSEPH ASftUZZO

Clerk of lh• Circuitaut& Cemptroller

. Palm eeatJCounty

Form# 14

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

SENTENCE

(As to Count(s)

2 1 ?? 1 Lf

)

Defendant: ()~,

Case Number:

$fq;;hvzSl2>1

/q(EOO SJ.fB!A/1/6

OBTS Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record,

and having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in

mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why Defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown,

IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT that:

pursuant to §

, Florida Statutes, plus all costs and additional charges as outlined in

The Defendant pay a fine of$

the Order assessing additional charges, costs and fines as set forth in a separate order entered herein

In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Florida is hereby ordered and

directed to deliver the Defendant to the Department of Corrections together with a copy of the Judgment and Sentence, and any other

documents specified by Florida Statute. Additionally, pursuant to §947.16(4), Florida Statutes, the Court retains jurisdiction over the

Defendant.

[ ]

The Sentencing Court objects to the Defendant being placed into the Youthful Offender Basic Training Program pursuant to

Florida Statute §958.045.

[ ]

Pursuant to §322.055, 322.056, 322.26, 322.274, Florida Statutes, The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is

directed to revoke the Defendant's privilege to drive. The Clerk of the Court is Ordered to report the conviction and

revocation to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.

DONE AND ORDERED in Open Court at We" Palm Beoch, Palm Beach County, Florida this {

· day of

FILED

Circuit Criminal Department

NOV 19 2021

August, 2013

JOSEPH ABRUZZO

Cllrkd ... Cln:uilCUl&~

Palm Beach County

Form# 14

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

SENTENCE WITH

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(As to Count(s) _ _l~1. .Q

. ____,)

Defendant:

Cf ar~n~ Sfr.pfltntofl

Case Number: Wlt1C£00£1~

IAXX

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record,

and having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in

mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why Defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown,

FILED

IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT that:

Circuit Criminal De,artment

By reference to count, the following additional provisions apply to the sentence imposed:

Count

NOV 19 2021

JOSEPH ABRUZZO

FIREARM

Cieri( of 1119 CIA:uil Ccut &Compnller

him Beach County

It is further ordered that the

(__J year minimum imprisonment provision of section 775.087(2), Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

PRISON RELEASEE RE-OFFENDER

The Defendant is adjudicated a prison release re-offender and has been sentenced in accordance with the provisions

of Florida Statute 775.082(9). The Defendant shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be

eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release. Additionally, the Defendant must serve 100 percent

of the statutory maximum. The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated in the record

in Open Court.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

It is further ordered that the _........._~tt=Y'- mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.135(1),

Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed

r the sentence specified in this count.

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF SCHOOL

It is further ordered that the 3-year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(l)(c)l, Florida Statutes, is

hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

HABITUAL FELONY OFFENDER

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended term in accordance

with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a

separate order or stated on the record in Open Court.

HABITUAL VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended term in

year(s)

accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A minimum term of

must be served prior to release. The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the

record in Open Court.

June,2014

Page 1of3

Form# 14.1

THREE TIME VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER

The Defendant is adjudicated a three-time violent felony offender and has been sentenced in accordance with the

provisions of Florida Statute 775.084(4)(c). The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a separate order or

stated in the record in Open Court.

VIOLENT CAREER CRIMINAL

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent offender and has been sentenced to an extended term in accordance

with the provisions of Florida Statute 775.084(4)(d). A minimum term of

years must be served prior

to release. The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated in the record in Open Court.

DUI MANSLAUGHTER

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall serve a mandatory minimum of four (4) years before release in

accordance with Florida Statute 316.193.

LAW ENFORCEMENT PROTECTION ACT

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall serve a minimum of

years before release in accordance

with section 775.0823, Florida Statutes. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994)

CRIMES AGAINST LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (check one)

[__] The Defendant having been convicted of Aggravated Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer, it is further

ordered that the Defendant shall serve a minimum of 3 years before release in accordance with Florida

Statute 784.07(2)(c).

[__] The Defendant having been convicted of Aggravated Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer, it is further

ordered that the Defendant shall serve a minimum of 5 years before release in accordance with Florida

Statute 784.07(2)(d).

[__] The Defendant having been convicted of Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer and having possessed a

firearm or destructive device during the commission of said offense, it is further ordered that the Defendant

shall serve a minimum of3 years before release in accordance with Florida Statute 784.07(3)(a).

CAPITAL OFFENSE

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with the provisions of section

775.082(1), Florida Statutes. (Offenses committed before October 1, 1995)

SHORT-BARRELED RIFLE, SHOTGUN, MACHINE GUN

It is further ordered that the 5-year minimum provisions of section 790.221 (2), Florida Statutes, are hereby imposed

for the sentence specified in this count. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994)

TAKING A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S FIREARM

It is further ordered that the 3-year mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section 775.0875(1), Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994)

SEXUAL OFFENDER/SEXUAL PREDATOR DETERMINATIONS:

SEXUAL PREDA TOR

The Defendant is adjudicated a sexual predator as set forth in section 775.21, Florida Statutes.

SEXUAL OFFENDER

The Defendant meets the criteria for a sexual offender as set forth in section 943.0435(l)(a)la., b., c., or d.

AGE OF VICTIM

The victim was _ _ _ _ _ years of age at the time of the offense.

AGE OF DEFENDANT

The Defendant was _ _ _ _ years of age at the time of the offense.

June,2014

Page 2of3

Form# 14.2

,,.)

Case No lllC.E6DS'i3\

Defendant: C~ Skp~

RELATIONSHIP TO VICTIM

The Defendant is not the victim's parent or guardian.

SEXUAL ACTIVITY [F.S. 800.04(4))

The offense

did

did not involve sexual activity.

USE OF FORCE OR COERCION [F.S. 800.04(4))

The sexual activity described herein _ _ did _ _ _ did not involve the use of force or coercion.

USE OF FORCE OR COERCION/UNCLOTHED GENITALS [F.S. 800.04(5))

The molestation

did

did not involve unclothed genitals or genital area.

The molestation

did

did not involve the use of force or coercion.

OTHER PROVISIONS:

CRIMINAL GANG ACTIVITY

The felony conviction is for an offense that was found, pursuant to section 874.04, Florida Statutes, to have been

committed for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang.

RETENTION OF JURISDICTION

The Court retains jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes.

SUSPENDED AND/OR SPLIT SENTENCES:

Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of _ _ _ _ _ subject to conditions set forth in a separate order

entered herein.

imprisonment the balance of such sentence shall be suspended

However, after serving a period of

under supervision of the Department

and the Defendant shall be placed on probation for a period of

of Corrections, according to the terms and conditions of probation as set forth in a separate order entered herein.

Followed by a period of

on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections,

according to the terms and conditions of probation as set forth in a separate order entered herein.

In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Florida is hereby ordered and

directed to deliver the Defendant to the Department of Corrections together with a copy of the Judgment and Sentence, and any other

documents specified by Florida Statute. Additionally, pursuant to §947.16(4), Florida Statutes, the Court retains jurisdiction over the

Defendant.

poNE AND ORDERED in Open Court at Palm Beach County, Florida on this

20~.

fl_ day of __AW

_______

C~uit@t)

June,2014

Page 3of3

Form# 14.3

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

SENTENCE WITH

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

4_____,)

(As to Count(s) _ _

CAa.rtorL (~ S'DY/

Case Number: (q[FC05H ~ A-tnS

Defendant:

The Defendant, being personally before this Court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney ofrecord,

and having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the Court having given the Defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in

mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why Defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause i!1JLo~,D

Circuit Criminal Department

IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT that:

By reference to count, the following additional provisions apply to the sentence imposed:

NOV 19 2021

JOSEPH ABRUZZO

Count

~ of the Cin:ull Court &Complroler

Plllm .... County

FIREARM

It is further ordered that the

(____)year minimum imprisonment provision of section 775.087(2), Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

PRISON RELEASEE RE-OFFENDER

The Defendant is adjudicated a prison release re-offender and has been sentenced in accordance with the provisions

of Florida Statute 775.082(9). The Defendant shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be

eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release. Additionally, the Defendant must serve 100 percent

of the statutory maximum. The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated in the record

in Open Court.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

It is further ordered that the I_

mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.135(1 ),

Florida Statutes, is hereby impbsed or tlie sentence specified in this count.

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF SCHOOL

It is further ordered that the 3-year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(l)(c)l, Florida Statutes, is

hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

HABITUAL FELONY OFFENDER

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended term in accordance

with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a

separate order or stated on the record in Open Court.

HABITUAL VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended term in

year(s)

accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A minimum term of

must be served prior to release. The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the

record in Open Court.

June,2014

Page 1of3

Form# 14.1

THREE TIME VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER

The Defendant is adjudicated a three-time violent felony offender and has been sentenced in accordance with the

provisions of Florida Statute 775.084(4)(c). The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a separate order or

stated in the record in Open Court.

VIOLENT CAREER CRIMINAL

The Defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent offender and has been sentenced to an extended term in accordance

years must be served prior

with the provisions of Florida Statute 775.084(4)(d). A minimum term of

to release. The requisite findings by the Court are set forth in a separate order or stated in the record in Open Court.

DUI MANSLAUGHTER

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall serve a mandatory minimum of four (4) years before release in

accordance with Florida Statute 316.193.

LAW ENFORCEMENT PROTECTION ACT

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall serve a minimum of

years before release in accordance

with section 775.0823, Florida Statutes. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994)

CRIMES AGAINST LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (check one)

[ _ ] The Defendant having been convicted of Aggravated Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer, it is further

ordered that the Defendant shall serve a minimum of 3 years before release in accordance with Florida

Statute 784.07(2)(c).

[ _ ] The Defendant having been convicted of Aggravated Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer, it is further

ordered that the Defendant shall serve a minimum of 5 years before release in accordance with Florida

Statute 784.07(2)( d).

[__] The Defendant having been convicted of Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer and having possessed a

firearm or destructive device during the commission of said offense, it is further ordered that the Defendant

shall serve a minimum of3 years before release in accordance with Florida Statute 784.07(3)(a).

CAPITAL OFFENSE

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall serve no less than 25 years in accordance with the provisions of section

775.082(1), Florida Statutes. (Offenses committed before October 1, 1995)

SHORT-BARRELED RIFLE, SHOTGUN, MACHINE GUN

It is further ordered that the 5-year minimum provisions of section 790.221 (2), Florida Statutes, are hereby imposed

for the sentence specified in this count. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994)

TAKING A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S FIREARM

It is further ordered that the 3-year mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section 775.0875(1), Florida

Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. (Offenses committed before January 1, 1994)

SEXUAL OFFENDER/SEXUAL PREDATOR DETERMINATIONS:

SEXUAL PREDATOR

The Defendant is adjudicated a sexual predator as set forth in section 775.21, Florida Statutes.

SEXUAL OFFENDER

The Defendant meets the criteria for a sexual offender as set forth in section 943.0435(l)(a)la., b., c., or d.

AGE OF VICTIM

The victim was _ _ _ _ _ years of age at the time of the offense.

AGE OF DEFENDANT

The Defendant was _ _ _ _ years of age at the time of the offense.

June, 2014

Page 2of3

Form# 14.2

RELATIONSHIP TO VICTIM

The Defendant is not the victim's parent or guardian.

SEXUAL ACTIVITY [F.S. 800.04(4)]

The offense

did

did not involve sexual activity.

USE OF FORCE OR COERCION [F.S. 800.04(4)]

The sexual activity described herein _ _ did - - - did not involve the use of force or coercion.

USE OF FORCE OR COERCION/UNCLOTHED GENITALS [F.S. 800.04(5)]

The molestation

did

did not involve unclothed genitals or genital area.

The molestation

did

did not involve the use of force or coercion.

OTHER PROVISIONS:

CRIMINAL GANG ACTIVITY

The felony conviction is for an offense that was found, pursuant to section 874.04, Florida Statutes, to have been

committed for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang.

RETENTION OF JURISDICTION

The Court retains jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to section 94 7.16(4), Florida Statutes.

SUSPENDED AND/OR SPLIT SENTENCES:

Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of _ _ _ _ _ subject to conditions set forth in a separate order

entered herein.

However, after serving a period of

imprisonment the balance of such sentence shall be suspended

and the Defendant shall be placed on probation for a period of

under supervision of the Department

of Corrections, according to the terms and conditions of probation as set forth in a separate order entered herein.

Followed by a period of

on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections,

according to the terms and conditions of probation as set forth in a separate order entered herein.

In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Palm Beach County, Florida is hereby ordered and

directed to deliver the Defendant to the Department of Corrections together with a copy of the Judgment and Sentence, and any other

documents specified by Florida Statute. Additionally, pursuant to §947.16(4), Florida Statutes, the Court retains jurisdiction over the

Defendant.

j}.,fDONE AND ORDERED in Open Court at Palm Beach County, Florida on this

2~.

June, 2014

(

day of

Page 3of3

Form# 14.3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.