Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Terrence Michael Taylor, aka Terrance Michael Taylor, Petitioner v. United States

No. 23-_________

______________________________________________________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

______________________________________________________

Terrence Michael Taylor,

Petitioner,

v.

United States of America,

Respondent.

______________________________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

_______________________________________________________

APPENDIX

TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_______________________________________________________

United States v. Taylor, 86 F.4th 853 (2023)

Opinion

86 F.4th 853

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Terrence Michael Taylor pleaded guilty in the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Oklahoma to two counts of felon in possession of ammunition

and one count of felon in possession of firearms. See 18

U.S.C. § 922(g). He now argues that these charges are

multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We

reject this argument because he waived his multiplicity claim

when he entered his plea to the three separate offenses.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Terrence Michael TAYLOR, a/k/a Terrance

Michael Taylor, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-6114

|

FILED November 14, 2023

Synopsis

Background: Defendant pled guilty in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, David

L. Russell, Senior District Judge, to two counts of felon

in possession of ammunition and one count of felon in

possession of firearms, and he appealed.

The Court of Appeals, Hartz, Circuit Judge, held that

defendant could not collaterally attack his guilty plea on

double jeopardy grounds.

Affirmed.

Procedural Posture(s): Appellate Review; Plea Challenge or

Motion.

*854 Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 5:21CR-00161-R-1)

Attorneys and Law Firms

Submitted on the briefs: *

Amy W. Senia, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia

L. Grady, Federal Public Defender with her on the brief),

Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellant.

Travis Leverett, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert

J. Troester, United States Attorney with him on the brief),

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before HARTZ, KELLY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

We summarize the facts set forth in the unchallenged

presentence report and in police reports submitted in district

court. Mr. Taylor was arrested on June 6, 2020, after two

shooting incidents. The first shooting occurred on May 29,

2020, when Mr. Taylor shot the tires of a victim's car because

the victim had refused to give him a refund for mechanical

issues with a vehicle the victim had sold him. Four 9mm shell

casings were recovered near the vehicle. The second shooting

occurred on June 6. Officers responded to a shots-fired call

at a residence and discovered a different victim lying in her

yard with several gunshot wounds to her legs and hands. The

victim told officers that she and Mr. Taylor had an argument

over a used-car sale that ended when Mr. Taylor shot her,

snatched her purse, and fled in his vehicle. Officers recovered

three 9mm shell casings in the street, two shell casings in the

driveway, and two shell casings inside the residence. Witness

descriptions of Mr. Taylor's vehicle led officers to him, and

he was arrested. After the arrest, officers contacted his wife,

Brandy Spivey, who said that she had never seen Mr. Taylor

with a gun but her own 9mm gun was missing.

On June 8 officers executed a search warrant for Mr. Taylor's

residence based on a jail call he made to Ms. Spivey in which

he asked if she had “cleaned the trash behind the dryer” and

said “it don't need to be there, but needs to be somewhere.”

R. Vol. II at 11 ¶ 25. During the search, officers seized a

Marlin .22 rifle behind a bed and a 50-round box of 9mm

*855 ammunition in a safe in the living room. The officers

asked Ms. Spivey what was behind the dryer. She initially said

that she did not know, but when officers told her that they

A1

1

United States v. Taylor, 86 F.4th 853 (2023)

heard the jail call, she told them she removed a purse from

behind the dryer and disposed of it in a dumpster.

The next day, Ms. Spivey called the officers and told them

that she had found a firearm at the residence. Officers went

to the residence and recovered a 9mm Kel-Tec pistol behind

a bookshelf in the living room and a box (whose location is

not mentioned) containing 21 rounds of 9mm ammunition.

Investigators confirmed that the shell casings recovered from

the scenes of the shootings were fired from a 9mm Kel-Tec

pistol.

B. Procedural History

A grand jury indicted Mr. Taylor on one count of felon

in possession of five pistol cartridges marked “FC .9MM

LUGER” on May 29, 2020; one count of felon in possession

of seven pistol cartridges marked “FC .9MM LUGER” on

June 6, 2020; and one count of felon in possession of the 9mm

Kel-Tec pistol and the Marlin .22 rifle between June 6 and

June 10, 2020.

A week before trial the district court granted Mr. Taylor's

request to represent himself and have his previous counsel

appointed as stand-by counsel. On the day set for trial he

pleaded guilty to all three counts. The district court found that

his guilty plea was voluntary and made with an understanding

of the charges and the consequences of his plea.

Three weeks after entering his plea, Mr. Taylor submitted

pleadings alleging misconduct by his counsel. The district

court terminated his original counsel and appointed new

counsel to represent him at sentencing. He then personally

sent numerous letters to the district court claiming that

prosecutors violated his constitutional rights, including his

right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. He also submitted

a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court

denied the motion, explaining that his plea had been “knowing

and voluntary.” Mr. Taylor was sentenced to 300 months’

imprisonment.

II. DISCUSSION

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall

be “subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy

of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Among other things,

this clause protects criminal defendants “against multiple

punishments for the same offense imposed in a single

proceeding.” Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381, 109 S.Ct.

2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Mr. Taylor argues on appeal that the three counts of

felon in possession are multiplicitous in that they reflect one

continuous incident of possession, so each count states the

same offense, for which he can receive only a single sentence.

We hold that he waived this argument by pleading guilty to

the three separate counts.

A. Waiver

Subject to limited exceptions, a “plea of guilty and the ensuing

conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal elements

necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a

lawful sentence.” United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569,

109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). By pleading guilty the

defendant is not only admitting “the discrete acts described in

the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.”

Id. at 570, 109 S.Ct. 757.

In Broce the two defendants each pleaded guilty to two counts

of conspiracy based on agreements to rig bids for highway

contracts. See id. at 565–66, 109 S.Ct. 757. *856 The

defendants then brought a double-jeopardy challenge to their

convictions, claiming “that the bid-rigging schemes alleged

in their indictments were but a single conspiracy.” Id. at 567,

109 S.Ct. 757. The district court permitted them to put on

evidence that the court said established that “the indictments

merely charged different aspects of the same conspiracy.”

Id. at 568, 109 S.Ct. 757. It vacated the judgment on one

of the charges, and the court of appeals affirmed. See id. at

568–69, 109 S.Ct. 757. The Supreme Court reversed. It held

that the defendants waived their double-jeopardy argument by

pleading guilty to “two charges of conspiracy on the explicit

premise of two agreements which started at different times

and embraced separate objectives.” Id. at 571, 109 S.Ct. 757.

“Just as a defendant who pleads guilty to a single count admits

guilt to the specified offense, so too does a defendant who

pleads guilty to two counts with facial allegations of distinct

offenses concede that he has committed two separate crimes.”

Id. at 570, 109 S.Ct. 757.

The Supreme Court did, however, recognize one exception

to waiver by pleading guilty. Although Broce held that the

defendants in that case should not have been permitted to put

on evidence to show that the two alleged conspiracies were

really only part of the same single conspiracy, a guilty plea

does not waive a defendant's right to claim a constitutional

A2

2

United States v. Taylor, 86 F.4th 853 (2023)

violation if the violation can be established “without any need

to venture beyond [the] record.” Id. at 574–75, 109 S.Ct.

757. The Court gave as an example a defendant who was

adjudicated in contempt of court for refusal to obey a court

order to testify and served jail time but then pleaded guilty to

an indictment charging the same refusal to answer questions.

In that circumstance the defendant could successfully raise a

double-jeopardy challenge to the second conviction. As the

Court explained, the defendant did not waive his doublejeopardy challenge because “ ‘a plea of guilty to a charge does

not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one

which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.’ ” Id. at

575, 109 S.Ct. 757 (quoting Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61,

63 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam)).

The exception did not apply in Broce because the defendants

in that case could not “prove their claim by relying on [the]

indictments and the existing record.” Broce, 488 U.S. at 576,

109 S.Ct. 757.

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Broce when it applied

this exception to the general doctrine in Class v. United States,

583 U.S. 174, 138 S. Ct. 798, 200 L.Ed.2d 37 (2018). The

Court held that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from

challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction

on direct appeal. See id. at 803. While recognizing that Broce

held that “a valid guilty plea relinquishes any claim that

would contradict the admissions necessarily made upon entry

of a voluntary plea of guilty,” it said that Class's challenge

was “consistent with [his] admission that he engaged in

the conduct alleged in the indictment.” Id. at 805 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The scope of Broce is well-illustrated by this court's decision

in Thomas v. Kerby, 44 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 1995). We

considered on habeas review several convictions in New

Mexico state court. The defendant was charged with forging

two checks from one business on the same day (depositing

them into a single bank account) and later writing two checks

from the bank account to two different stores. See id. at

886. He pleaded nolo contendere 1 to two counts of *857

forgery and two counts of knowingly issuing checks drawn

on insufficient funds. See id. We held that his guilty plea

did not waive his later double-jeopardy challenge to the two

forgery counts. We said that under New Mexico law, “a single

taking at one place from several victims, or a series of takings

from one victim,” is a single offense, id. at 887–88, so the

two forgery charges were a single offense “as a matter of

law,” see id. at 889. But as for the worthless-check counts, we

held that the double-jeopardy challenge was waived because

“the information and record do not conclusively demonstrate

a single offense but, rather, raise at most a question of fact

that might have been resolved in [defendant]’s favor if he

had disputed the matter at trial.” Id. at 889. Whether waiver

barred a claim depended on whether the defendant could

conclusively demonstrate his claim without supplementing

the evidentiary record.

Mr. Taylor contends that his guilty plea does not waive his

double-jeopardy claim so long as his claim is “consistent

with the universe of facts established in the district court.”

Reply Br. at 3. He relies on the following statement in United

States v. Berres, 777 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting

double-jeopardy claim): “[A] defendant advancing a double

jeopardy claim following a guilty plea must prove his claim

by relying on the indictment and the existing record without

contradicting the indictment,” id. at 1091 (cleaned up). But he

gets backwards who has the burden of resolving ambiguity.

The language in Berres, which was taken largely from Broce,

does not mean that a double-jeopardy claim will prevail so

long as it is consistent with the record and does not contradict

the indictment. It means that such a claim can prevail only

if it is established by the indictment and the original record,

without contradicting the indictment. If the quoted language

may be somewhat ambiguous, what happened in Broce is not.

The defendants’ double-jeopardy claim in that case was not

inconsistent with the factual allegations in the indictments.

Indeed, the evidence at the evidentiary hearing conducted

by the district court after the defendants raised their doublejeopardy claim apparently established that there in fact was

only one conspiracy, which encompassed the agreements

charged in the two indictments. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 568,

109 S.Ct. 757. But that evidentiary hearing was conducted

after the guilty plea. See id. at 566, 568, 109 S.Ct. 757.

So even though there could have been (and apparently was)

evidence that was consistent with the factual allegations in

the indictment and showed a single conspiracy, the doublejeopardy claim had been waived at the time of the plea.

A panel of this court expressed the point nicely in an

unpublished opinion:

A3

Although further factual development

might allow [the defendant] to prove

that his conviction and sentence

caused multiple punishments for the

same offense, his plea forecloses such

factual development. Therefore, we

are unable to conclude that the facts

3

United States v. Taylor, 86 F.4th 853 (2023)

which Edwards admitted during his

plea allocution could not form the

basis for the separate crimes to which

he pleaded guilty.

Edwards v. Thomas, 1997 WL 46845, at *3 (10th Cir. 1997).

Hence, the question we must answer is clear: Is Mr. Taylor's

double-jeopardy challenge “conclusively demonstrate[d]” on

the face of the record (and therefore not waived) or does it

require addressing unresolved factual issues (and therefore is

*858 waived)? Thomas, 44 F.3d at 889. We think the latter

is true.

B. Separate Offenses Under § 922(g)

Before turning to the facts of this case, we must say a few

words about what the unit of prosecution is for offenses

under § 922(g), which makes it unlawful for a convicted

felon to “possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or

ammunition.” We need not provide a complete description.

Interesting questions abound regarding whether and when

a person can be said to possess the same object on more

than one occasion, and whether and when the simultaneous

possession of multiple objects can be considered to constitute

separate offenses under the statute. We have said that

“[t]he simultaneous possession of multiple firearms generally

constitutes only one offense unless there is evidence that

the weapons were stored in different places or acquired at

different times.” United States v. Hutching, 75 F.3d 1453,

1460 (10th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up) (possession of three

firearms present at three different locations—the defendant's

bedroom, a car parked in his garage, and his pickup truck—

constituted three separate offenses). And Mr. Taylor concedes

—relying on out-of-circuit authority and our unpublished

opinion in United States v. Curls, 219 Fed. App'x. 746 (10th

Cir. 2007)—that separate possessions may be demonstrated

“when the government proves that the defendant possessed

the same firearm(s) and/or ammunition on different dates, and

that his constructive and actual possession was interrupted at

some point between those dates.” Aplt. Br. at 10–11. 2

C. Application

Mr. Taylor pleaded guilty to (1) possessing five 9mm pistol

cartridges on or about May 29, (2) possessing seven 9mm

pistol cartridges on or about June 6, and (3) possessing a

9mm Kel-Tec pistol between on or about June 6 and June

10. To be sure, the indictment does not explicitly state “that

the firearm and ammunition were each separately acquired,

separately stored, or relinquished and repossessed.” Aplt.

Reply Br. at 7. But that does not matter. “[T]he indictments

[in Broce] did not include an express statement that the two

conspiracies were separate.” Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 109

S.Ct. 757. The Supreme Court explained that “[j]ust as a

defendant who pleads guilty to a single count admits guilt

to the specified offense, so too does a defendant who pleads

guilty to two counts with facial allegations of distinct offenses

concede that he has committed two separate crimes.” Id. at

570, 109 S.Ct. 757. Here, the indictment on its face alleges

distinct offenses. It does not allege, for example, that from

June 6 through June 10 Mr. Taylor continuously carried

a bag containing two firearms and a box of ammunition,

which he had acquired in the same transaction, containing

all the ammunition and firearms mentioned in the indictment.

If those had been the facts, Mr. Taylor could have raised

the issue before his plea and likely prevailed in having the

charges consolidated into one charge. But the indictment is

fully consistent with the possibility that Mr. Taylor acquired

and stored the firearms separately and had multiple caches

of ammunition that he accessed on different dates. Even

if we credit the unchallenged presentence report and also

consider the relevant police reports in the record (we assume,

without deciding, that these are part of the record that Broce

permits the court to consider), 3 “the [indictment] and record

do *859 not conclusively demonstrate a single offense,”

Thomas, 44 F.3d at 889. The searches of the home showed

that Mr. Taylor did not store the firearms and ammunition in

one place, with the Marlin .22 rifle in a bedroom behind a

bed, the 9mm Kel-Tec pistol behind a living-room bookshelf,

one box of ammunition in a living-room safe, and one box

of ammunition in an unspecified location. And those searches

could not show who had the objects and where they were

during the previous few days.

Because we affirm on the authority of Broce, we need not

address the government's argument that Mr. Taylor waived

appellate review by failing to file a timely pretrial motion

challenging multiplicity under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)

(ii).

III. CONCLUSION

A4

4

United States v. Taylor, 86 F.4th 853 (2023)

We AFFIRM the judgment below.

All Citations

86 F.4th 853

Footnotes

*

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument

would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.

34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

1

We noted that “[f]or the purposes of the case in which it is entered, a nolo plea in New Mexico amounts to

a confession of guilt.” Thomas, 44 F.3d at 888 n. 4.

2

Because of this concession, we have no need to resolve the issue.

3

As we have already stated, Broce permits double-jeopardy challenges that appear on the “face of the record.”

Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 109 S.Ct. 757. But the Court's analysis was limited to the face of the indictment.

See id. at 570–71, 109 S.Ct. 757. It is therefore not entirely clear what parts of the record we may consider,

although it is likely that we can consider only the record at the time of the plea. See Thomas, 44 F.3d at 888

(“[I]f a double jeopardy violation is apparent on the face of the indictment and/or the record existing at the

time the plea was entered, it is not waived.”).

End of Document

© 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

A5

5

Case 5:21-cr-00161-R Document 121 Filed 07/07/22 Page 1 of 7

Appellate Case: 22-6114 Document: 010110737033 Date Filed: 09/12/2022

Page: 419

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Western District of Oklahoma

)

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

)

v.

)

)

Case Number:

CR-21-00161-001

TERRENCE MICHAEL TAYLOR

)

a/k/a Terrance Michael Taylor

)

USM Number:

54685-509

)

Joseph L. Wells

)

Defendant’s Attorney

)

THE DEFENDANT:

pleaded guilty to count(s) One (1) – Three (3) of the Indictment

pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)

which was accepted by the court.

was found guilty on count(s)

after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section

Nature of Offense

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)

and 924(a)(2)

Felon in Possession of Ammunition

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)

and 924(a)(2)

Felon in Possession of Ammunition

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)

and 924(a)(2)

Felon in Possession of a Firearm

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through

the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

7

Offense Ended

Count

05/29/2020

1

06/06/2020

2

06/06/2020

3

of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to

The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)

Count(s)

is

are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence,

or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay

restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

July 6, 2022

Date of Imposition of Judgment

July 7, 2022

Date Signed

A6

Case 5:21-cr-00161-R Document 121 Filed 07/07/22 Page 2 of 7

Date Filed: 09/12/2022

AO 245B

(Rev. 09/19)Case:

Judgment

in Criminal Case

Appellate

22-6114

Document: 010110737033

Sheet 2 — Imprisonment

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Page: 420

2

of

7

TAYLOR, TERRENCE MICHAEL a/k/a Terrance Michael Taylor

CR-21-00161-001

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:

Counts 1-2: 120 months, to run consecutively; Count 3: 60 months, to run consecutive to Counts 1 and 2,

for a total of 300 months

The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

It is recommended the defendant participate in the Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program at a rate

determined by Bureau of Prisons staff in accordance with the program.

It is recommended the defendant be designated to a facility within the states of Missouri or Colorado.

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

at

a.m.

p.m.

on

.

as notified by the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

By 2 p.m. on

as notified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

at

to

, with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

A7

Case 5:21-cr-00161-R Document 121 Filed 07/07/22 Page 3 of 7

Appellate

Case:

22-6114 Document: 010110737033 Date Filed: 09/12/2022

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Page: 421

Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

3

of

7

TAYLOR, TERRENCE MICHAEL a/k/a Terrance Michael Taylor

CR-21-00161-001

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of: Counts 1-3: Three (3) years per count,

to run concurrently

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of

release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, not to exceed eight (8) drug tests per month.

The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you pose a low risk

of future substance abuse. (check if applicable)

You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a

restitution. (check if applicable)

You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (check if applicable)

You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et

seq.) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the

location where you reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check if applicable)

You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (check if applicable)

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on

the attached page.

A8

Case 5:21-cr-00161-R Document 121 Filed 07/07/22 Page 4 of 7

Appellate Case: 22-6114 Document: 010110737033 Date Filed: 09/12/2022

Page: 422

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3A — Supervised Release

Judgment—

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

4

of

7

TAYLOR, TERRENCE MICHAEL a/k/a Terrance Michael Taylor

CR-21-00161-001

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed

because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation

officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours

of your release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or

within a different time frame.

2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about

how and when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.

3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission

from the court or the probation officer.

4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.

5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your

living arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the

change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify

the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation

officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

7. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses

you from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation

officer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your

position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying

the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the

probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has

been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the

permission of the probation officer.

9. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e.,

anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person

such as nunchakus or tasers).

11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or

informant without first getting the permission of the court.

12. Stricken.

13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy

of this judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see Overview of Probation

and Supervised Release Conditions, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant's

Signature

Date

A9

Case 5:21-cr-00161-R Document 121 Filed 07/07/22 Page 5 of 7

Date Filed: 09/12/2022

AO 245B(Rev.

09/19)

Judgment

in a Criminal Document:

Case

Appellate

Case:

22-6114

010110737033

Sheet 3B— Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Page: 423

5

of

7

TAYLOR, TERRENCE MICHAEL a/k/a Terrance Michael Taylor

CR-21-00161-001

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

The defendant must submit to a search of his person, property, electronic devices or any automobile under

his control to be conducted in a reasonable manner and at a reasonable time, for the purpose of determining

possession, or evidence of possession, of firearms, controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, stolen items,

and/or drug trafficking, at the direction of the probation officer upon reasonable suspicion. Further, the

defendant must inform any residents that the premises may be subject to a search.

The defendant shall participate in a program of substance abuse aftercare at the direction of the probation

officer to include urine, breath, or sweat patch testing, and outpatient treatment. The defendant shall totally

abstain from the use of alcohol and other intoxicants both during and after completion of any treatment

program. The defendant shall not frequent bars, clubs, or other establishments where alcohol is the main

business. The court may order that the defendant contribute to the cost of services rendered (copayment) in

an amount to be determined by the probation officer based on the defendant’s ability to pay.

The defendant shall participate in a program of mental health aftercare at the direction of the probation

officer. The court may order that the defendant contribute to the cost of services rendered (copayment) in

an amount to be determined by the probation officer based on the defendant’s ability to pay.

A10

Case 5:21-cr-00161-R Document 121 Filed 07/07/22 Page 6 of 7

Date Filed: 09/12/2022

AO 245B

(Rev. 09/19)Case:

Judgment

in a Criminal Case

Appellate

22-6114

Document: 010110737033

Sheet 5 — Criminal Monetary Penalties

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Page: 424

6

of

7

TAYLOR, TERRENCE MICHAEL a/k/a Terrance Michael Taylor

CR-21-00161-001

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

TOTALS

Assessment

$ 300.00

Restitution

$ 0.00

Fine

$ 0.00

The determination of restitution is deferred until

entered after such determination.

$

AVAA Assessment*

0.00

JVTA Assessment**

$ 0.00

. An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C) will be

The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise

in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid

before the United States is paid.

Name of Payee

TOTALS

Restitution Ordered

Total Loss***

$

Priority or Percentage

$

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before

the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may

be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

the interest requirement is waived for the

fine

the interest requirement for the

restitution is modified as follows:

fine

A11

restitution.

Case 5:21-cr-00161-R Document 121 Filed 07/07/22 Page 7 of 7

Date Filed: 09/12/2022

AO 245BAppellate

(Rev. 09/19) Case:

Judgment22-6114

in a Criminal Case

Document: 010110737033

Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Page: 425

7

of

7

TAYLOR, TERRENCE MICHAEL a/k/a Terrance Michael Taylor

CR-21-00161-001

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

A

Lump sum payment of $ 300.00

due immediately, balance due

not later than

in accordance with

, or

C,

D,

E, or

B

Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with

C

Payment in equal

D

Payment in equal

F below; or

C,

D, or

F below); or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., months or years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., months or years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a

term of supervision; or

E

Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within

(e.g., 30 or 60 days)

after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant’s

ability to pay at that time; or

F

Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

If restitution is not paid immediately, the defendant shall make payments of 10% of the defendant’s quarterly earnings

during the term of imprisonment.

After release from confinement, if restitution is not paid immediately, the defendant shall make payments of the greater of

$______ per month or 10% of defendant’s gross monthly income, as directed by the probation officer. Payments are to

commence not later than 30 days after release from confinement.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties

is due during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal

Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, shall be paid through the United States Court Clerk for the Western

District of Oklahoma, 200 N.W. 4th Street, Room 1210, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

Joint and Several

Case Number

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names

(including defendant number)

Total Amount

Joint and Several

Amount

Corresponding Payee,

if appropriate

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:

All right, title, and interest in the assets listed in the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture dated __11/17/2021___(doc. no. _54_).

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA

assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs,

including cost of prosecution and court costs.

A12