Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Johnnie Demond Jackson, Petitioner v. Kevin R. Sproul, Sheriff, Dougherty County, Georgia, et al.
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USGA11 Case: 22-13577
Document: 47-1
Date Filed: 08/09/2023
Page: 1 of 5
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No. 22-13577
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHNNIE DEMOND JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF KEVIN R. SPROUL,
LT CARLA WATSON,
PHOEBE PUTNEY HOSPITAL,
NURSE AUDREY JOINER,
NURSE LYNN MONTGERARD,
Defendants-Appellees,
CPT JERROMA WILLIAMS, et al.,
■
•
USCA11 Case: 22-13577
Document: 47-1.
Date Filed: 08/09/2023
22-13577
Opinion of the Court
2
Page: 2 of 5
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C Docket No. l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Johnnie Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Kevin
Sproul, Shirley Adams, Carla Watson, and Dominique Kendricks
(collectively the "jail officers”), as well as in favor of Phoebe Putney
Memorial Hospital ("PPMH”), Lynn Montgerard, Audrea Joiner,
Escolethia Miller, and Sherryl Haugabrook (collectively the “medical providers”), on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. After responding
to the motions for summary judgment, Mr. Jackson filed motions
to supplement the record, which the district court denied. On ap
peal Mr. Jackson argues that the court erred in granting summary
judgment for the jail officers and medical providers on his § 1983
claims alleging deliberate indifference as to food and medical
needs, denial of access to mail, failure to train nurses, and retalia
tion. He also contends that the court erred in denying his motion
to supplement the record, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
USCA11 Case: 22-13577
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Date Filed: 08/09/2023
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r
22-13577
Opinion of the Court
3
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg
ment and construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. See Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth.,
271 F.3d 1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001). We review the denial of a
motion to supplement for abuse of discretion. See Shipner v. E. Air
Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 407 (11th Cir. 1989).
A party who fails to object to a magistrate judge’s findings
or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the
right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions, if the party was
informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on
appeal for failing to object. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1. However, in the
absence of a proper objection we may review the issue for plain
error if necessary in the interests ofjustice. See id.
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than at
torney-drafted pleadings and are, therefore, liberally construed. See
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
The leniency afforded pro se litigants with liberal construction does
not give a court license to act as de facto counsel or permit it to re
write an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action. Campbell
v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). [Ijssues
not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.”
Timsonv. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omit
ted). An appellant fails to adequately brief a claim when he does
not "plainly and prominendy raise it.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian
3cl-^
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Document: 47-1
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Opinion of the Court
Page: 5 of 5
5
(11th Cir. 1987) (same); Farina v. Mission Inv. Tr., 615 F.2d 1068,
1076 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
Here, the district.court did not abuse its discretion in deny
ing Mr. Jackson's motions to supplement the record because he
failed to show excusable neglect. He did not, for example, explain
why he was unable to submit his evidence with his declarations.
Further, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) is inapplicable because summary
judgment motions are not pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a).
AFFIRMED.
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USCA11 Case: 22-13577
Document: 56-2
Date Filed: 12/15/2023
Page: 1 of 2
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No. 22-13577
JOHNNIE DEMOND JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF KEVIN R. SPROUL,
LT CARLA WATSON,
PHOEBE PUTNEY HOSPITAL,
NURSE AUDREY JOINER,
NURSE LYNN MONTGERARD.
Defendants-Appellees,
CPT JERROMA WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants.
A
^
USCA11 Case: 22-13577
Document: 56-2
Date Filed: 12/15/2023
Page: 2 of 2
x.
Order of the Court
2
22-13577
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL
ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND PETITION(S) FOR
REHEARING EN BANC
Before Jordan, Newsom, and Abudu, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED, no judge in
regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court
be polled on rehearing en banc. FRAP 35. The “Motion for Recon
sideration,” construed as a Petition for Panel Rehearing, is
DENIED. FRAP 35, IOP 2.
9,-fA
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 227 Filed 09/14/22 Page lot 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
JOHNNIE DEMOND JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: L21-CV-28 (LAG) (TQL)
v.
SHERIFF KEVIN R. SPROUL, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are the Magistrate Judge’s Reports and Recommendations (R&Rs)
issued on August 2 and 4, 2022 (Docs. 223, 224), and Plaintiffs Objections to each R&R
(Docs. 225, 226). For the reasons below, Plaintiffs Objections (Docs. 225, 226) are
OVERRULED, and the R&Rs (Docs. 223, 224) are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED.
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Johnnie Demond Jackson initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on
February 10, 2021, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during his pretrial
detention at the Dougherty County Jail. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff brings claims against Sherriff
Kevin Sproul, Lt. Shirley Adams, Lt. Carla Watson, Lt. Dominique Kendricks (the County
Defendants), Nurses Escolethia Miller, Lynn Montgerard, Audrea Joiner, Sherryl
Haugabrook, and Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (the Hospital Defendants). The
County Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 19, 2022.
(Doc. 153). The Hospital Defendants filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment on
January 27, 2022. (Doc. 156). On August 2, 2022, the Magistrate Judge issued the first
R&R, recommending that the Court grant the County Defendants’ Motion in its entirety.
(Doc.223 at 18). The Magistrate Judge issued the second R&R on August4, 2022,
recommending that the Court also grant the Hospital Defendants’ Motion in its entirety.
(Doc. 224 at 14). Plaintiff timely filed Objections to both R&Rs. (Docs. 225, 226).
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 227 Filed 09/14/22 Page 2 of 4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
District courts have a “duty to conduct a careful and complete review” to determine
“whether to accept, reject, or modify” a magistrate judge’s order and recommendations.
Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732,732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
The Court reviews de novo dispositive portions of the R&Rs to which Plaintiff objects. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Unobjected-to portions of the R&Rs and
non-dispositive orders are reviewed for clear error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a). A party objecting to an R&R “must clearly advise the district court and
pinpoint the specific findings that the party disagrees with.” United States v. Schultz, 565
F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). But when an objection is “[fjrivolous,
conclusive, or general,” the Court need not consider it. Id. at 1361 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
In his Objection to the first R&R, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that the Court grant summary judgment on his deliberate indifference
claim against Defendant Kendricks. (Doc. 226 at 1). After reviewing Plaintiffs sworn
declaration, Defendant Kendricks’ affidavit, and Plaintiffs medical records, the Magistrate
Judge concluded that, “[vjiewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the
nonmoving party, Plaintiff was seen in the medical department by a nurse on July 15,2020,
after suffering an injury to his left arm.” (Doc. 223 at 16-17). Although “[x]-rays and a
doctor’s visit were to be scheduled thereafter,” Plaintiff “did not receive x-rays of his arm
until weeks later.” (Id. at 17). Defendant Kendricks claimed that when he came to
Plaintiffs cell to take him to the follow-up appointment with medical during the afternoon
of July 15,2020, Plaintiff refused to walk to the back of his cell and kneel for the placement
of handcuffs and leg irons, which were required due to Plaintiff “caus[ing] so many
disruptions” in the jail. (Doc. 153-6
4-5). After Plaintiff refused a second order from
Defendant Kendricks, Defendant Kendricks “spoke with the nurse on duty [and]
explained] that Plaintiff refused to cooperate, so he would not be taken to medical” at that
time. (Id. ffl] 6-7). Plaintiff disputed Defendant Kendricks’ account, asserting that, after his
initial morning visit to medical, “no one came to say anything to me about anything having
2
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anything whatsoever to do with medical.” (Doc. 166 at 6). Thus, crediting Plaintiffs
version of events, Plaintiff “did not refuse medical treatment on July 15, 2020, and no jail
personnel spoke to him about returning to medical that day.” (Doc. 223 at 17). Plaintiff
noted Defendant Kendricks’ rank and position as “Building Supervisor” and asserted that
Defendant Kendricks “was responsible for getting [him] to medical.” (Doc. 166 at 6). The
Magistrate Judge found that this supposition was not sufficient “to establish that Defendant
Kendricks was aware of yet disregarded a serious medical condition or worsening of
Plaintiffs condition.” (Doc. 223 at 17). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge correctly held
that Plaintiff had not established that Defendant Kendricks was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiffs serious medical condition. (See id.).
In his Objection, Plaintiff first argues that he “provided proof of a fracture in his
elbow [that was] more than de minimis.” (Doc. 226 at 1). He also contends that he was
“scheduled for medical x rays and a physician visit and it never came nor was [he]
notified.” (Id.). Neither of Plaintiffs arguments address the reasons why the Magistrate
Judge concluded that Plaintiff failed to show Defendant Kendricks violated his
constitutional rights. The Magistrate Judge did, in fact, accept that Plaintiffs injured arm
was a serious medical need, but he found that Plaintiff did not show that Defendant
Kendricks knew or should have known “of any condition suffered by Plaintiff that required
additional medical attention.” (Doc. 223 at 17). Plaintiff does not address this failing in his
Objection. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not show that any delay in treatment exacerbated his
injury or caused additional complications, as required to show a constitutional violation
based on a delay in medical treatment. See Visage v. Woodall, 798 F. App’x 406,410 (11th
Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254,1259-60 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact remains as to
Defendant Kendricks’ deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.
In the Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s second R&R regarding the Hospital
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff asserts that he “has provided clear
and convincing evidence ... to deny summary judgment” and that he “objects on the
grounds of [ijmpertenant, redundant and scandal” as to each of his claims against the
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Hospital Defendants. (Doc. 225 at 1-2). Plaintiff argues that “a specialist Dr. Womack and
his associate found a fracture in [Plaintiffs] elbow as is in evidence with this Honorable
Court,” so “the [Hospital] [Defendants should not be granted summary judgment in this
case and this case should go to [j]ury [t]rial.” (Id. at 2). Again, Plaintiffs Objection does
not address the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning and fails to explain how any aspect of the
R&R is factually or legally incorrect. The Magistrate Judge explained that “if, as Plaintiff
asserts, neither Defendant Miller nor Joiner were told Plaintiff refused additional treatment
and neither of these Defendants saw Plaintiff after his initial visit on July 15, 2020, neither
Defendant could have been aware of any worsening condition or ongoing need for medical
attention.” (Doc. 224 at 9). The Magistrate Judge also found that Plaintiff “failed to
establish that any delay in treatment exacerbated his conditions.” (Id.). The Court therefore
finds the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to establish a deliberate
indifference claim against the Hospital Defendants.
Plaintiff does not object to the remaining portions of the Magistrate Judge’s R&Rs.
Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the rest of the R&Rs for clear error and finds none
therein. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
CONCLUSION
Upon a careful and complete review of the record, the Court finds that the
Magistrate Judge’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and that
the correct legal standards were applied. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
Objections
(Docs. 225,226) are OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s Reports and
Recommendations (Docs. 223, 224) are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as the Orders of
the Court. The County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 153) and the
Hospital Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 156) are GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 14th day of September, 2022.
/s/ Leslie A. Gardner
LESLIE A. GARDNER, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4
>
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 224 Filed 08/04/22 Page 1 of 15
WU-"
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
JOHNNIE DEMOND JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
1 : 21-CV-28 (LAG)
SHERIFF KEVIN SPROUL, et al.,
Defendants.
■f
1
ORDER and RECOMMENDATION
Pending is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants
Montgerard, Joiner, Miller, Haugabrook, and Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, and
Plaintiffs Motion for Settlement Conference. (Docs. 156, 221). Plaintiff was notified of
the filing of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, advised of his obligations
under the law, and directed to respond thereto within thirty (30) days. (Doc. 159).
Plaintiff has responded to Defendants’ motion. (Doc. 169). Defendants have filed a reply.
(Doc. 184).
RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff filed this action in February 2021, and several of Plaintiff s pending cases
were ordered consolidated into this action. (Doc. 1); Jackson v. Dougherty County Jail, et
al., No. 1 : 20-CV-198 (M.D.Ga.)(LAG); Jackson v. Trent, et al., No. 1 : 21-CV-08
(M.D.Ga.)(LAG); Jackson v. Dougherty County Georgia, et al., No. 1 : 20-CV-249
(M.D.Ga.)(LAG); Jackson v. Adams, et al., No. 1 : 21-CV-09 (M.D.Ga.)(LAG). The
Court directed Plaintiff to file a recast Complaint on the proper form, along with a
\
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complete motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff ultimately complied with
this directive. (Docs. 8, 27). The Court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed in forma
pauperis and allowed certain claims to go forward by Order dated May 26, 2021. (Doc.
34). Based on Plaintiffs subsequent objection, which was construed to be a motion to
amend his complaint, the Court withdrew its May 26, 2021 Order and Recommendation
and issued a new Order and Recommendation, granting Plaintiffs Motion to Amend.
(Doc. 59). All motions to amend filed prior to the June 4, 2021 Amended Complaint were
denied as moot, and the June 4, 2021 Amended Complaint was deemed the operative
complaint. (Docs. 8, 39, 59, 74). The Court allowed certain claims to go forward, and
after the adoption of the Recommendation issued on November 9, 2021 and the dismissal
of certain claims based on a lack of exhaustion, the following claims remain pending:
• Failure to provide adequate medical treatment against Defendants
Miller, Joiner, and Kendrick
• First Amendment mail interference claims against Defendants Adams
and Watson
• Conditions of confinement claims against Defendant Sproul
pertaining to the provision of inadequate nutrition
• Retaliation claims against Defendants Miller, Montgerard, and
Haugabrook (identified as “Haugabrooks” in Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint)
• Claims concerning the alleged failure to provide adequate medical
treatment against Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital
(Docs. 129, 202).
Defendants Ostrander, Green, Trent, Gilbert, and Boges were dismissed by Order dated
2
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March 2, 2022. (Doc. 202).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs claims arise out of events occurring during his confinement as a pretrial
detainee at the Dougherty County Jail beginning on or about July 14, 2020. In the claims
that remain and pertain to the Defendants on whose behalf this summary judgment is
brought, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Miller and Joiner were deliberately indifferent
to Plaintiffs medical needs regarding his elbow, that Defendants Montgerard, Miller, and
Haugabrook retaliated against Plaintiff for requesting medical treatment by instructing
other officers to issue Plaintiff a disciplinary report, and that Phoebe Putney Memorial
Hospital has a policy of providing substandard care to inmates of the Dougherty County
Jail, and/or has failed to adequately train or supervise medical professionals contracted to
provide care at the jail. (Doc. 59).
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the “court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
3
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
As the parties moving for summary judgment, Defendants have the initial burden to
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains in the case. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, All U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.
1991). The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record, including
pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, All U.S. at 323. “If a party fails to properly
support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as
required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... grant summary judgment if the motion and
supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is
entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Defendants have supported their motion with their
affidavits, portions of Plaintiff s medical records, and discovery documents. (Docs. 1563-156-11).
1. Defendants Miller and Joiner - medical treatment
In the deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim that was allowed to
proceed against Defendants Miller and Joiner, Plaintiff states that these Defendants
falsified medical records to show that Plaintiff refused x-rays for his arm. (Doc. 39, pp. 710). Plaintiff alleges that his arm was injured when an officer slammed and punched his
arm in the cell door tray flap on July 15, 2020, and that Defendant Miller told Plaintiff he
would receive x-rays for his arm on that same day. Id. Plaintiff claims that he did not
4
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receive an x-ray until months later. Id.
In her affidavit, Defendant Miller states that she is a registered nurse, employed by
Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital to provide medical services to inmates at the
Dougherty County Jail. (Doc. 156-5,
2, 6). According to Defendant Miller, Plaintiff
submitted a medical inquiry on September 13, 2020 stating that his arm was “popin [sic]
in and out of place”, and Miller saw Plaintiff at sick call later that day. Id. at If 8. Miller
obtained an order from a physician for an x-ray of Plaintiff s left arm/elbow, which took
place on September 16, 2020. Id. at ^ 8-9. Plaintiff submitted additional medical
inquiries in October and December 2020 and March 2021 regarding his arm, and
Defendant Miller placed Plaintiff on the sick call list to be seen by a physician’s assistant
or a physician each time. Id. at fflf 10-13.
Defendant Joiner states in her affidavit that she is a registered nurse, employed by
Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital to provide medical services to inmates at the
Dougherty County Jail. (Doc. 156-6, || 2, 6). Joiner states that Plaintiff was examined by
Nurse Wade following an altercation on July 15, 2020, and that when Joiner later
attempted to get Plaintiff to go to the medical office to be examined by a physician,
Plaintiff refused. Id. at
7-9.
Plaintiffs medical records submitted by Defendants show that he was seen in the
medical department on July 15, 2020 and he complained that his left elbow was fractured.
(Doc. 156-3, p. 56). In the midst of talking, yelling, and cursing, Plaintiff refused to move
his left arm or squeeze with his left hand. Id. at pp. 107, 170. The medical records reflect
that Plaintiff later refused to return to medical to see the physician, and that officers were
5
s
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unable to get Plaintiff to sign the refusal of treatment form due to Plaintiff “acting out”.
Id. at pp. 55, 170. Plaintiff submitted medical inquiries to be seen by medical for his arm
in September 2020, was placed on the sick call list, and his arm was x-rayed on
September 16, 2020, with findings of “[n]o fracture, dislocation, or significant
arthropathy of the left elbow ... No acute osseous abnormality”. Id. at pp. 29, 195, 196,
220. Plaintiff ultimately underwent an MRI that showed he had “no significant elbow
ligamentous or tendon abnormality. Small amount of elbow joint fluid. Mild peripheral
elbow joint degenerative change.” Id. at p. 217.
In a sworn declaration, Plaintiff states that he was denied medical care in the form
of x-rays on July 15, 2020 and that Defendants Miller and Joiner “violated policy” in
relying on the statements of Defendant Kendricks that Plaintiff was refusing medical
care. (Doc. 148, pp. 1-3). Plaintiff asserts that medical records showing that Nurse Wade
examined him on July 15, 2020, as opposed to Defendant Miller, and that Plaintiff
refused medical care were fabricated by Defendants Miller and Joiner. Id. at pp. 1-4. In
his sworn response to the other Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff
maintains that after he was returned to his cell on July 15, 2020, and x-rays had been
scheduled, no one came to his cell or said anything to him about returning to medical.
(Doc. 166, p. 6). According to Plaintiff “no one came to say anything to me about
anything having whatsoever to do with medical”. Id.
In his unsworn declaration filed in response to these Defendants’ summary
judgment motion, Plaintiff again states that Defendants Miller and Joiner, along with
others, fabricated his refusal of medical care and thereby deprived him of necessary
6
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medical care for his elbow/arm. (Doc. 169). Plaintiff maintains that these Defendants
violated jail policy and thereby were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs,
in that they did not personally observe or hear Plaintiff refuse medical care but relied on
Defendant Kendricks’ statements that he could not get Plaintiff to sign a refusal form. Id.
The Court notes that the discs submitted by Plaintiff in support of his claims show only xray and MRI images for his spine and elbow, with no accompanying explanation or
written results. (Doc. 6).
It is well established that prison personnel may not subject inmates to "acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “To show that a prison official acted
with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an
objective and a subjective inquiry. First, a plaintiff must set forth evidence of an
objectively serious medical need. Second, a plaintiff must prove that the prison official
acted with an attitude of ‘deliberate indifference’ to that serious medical need.” Farrow v.
West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). “[Djeliberate
indifference has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm;
(2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” McElligott
v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).
“Mere incidents of negligence or malpractice do not rise to the level of
constitutional violations. Nor does a simple difference in medical opinion between the
prison's medical staff and the inmate as to the latter's diagnosis or course of treatment
support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment." Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
7
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1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the nonmoving party,
Plaintiff was seen in the medical department by a nurse on July 15, 2020, after suffering
an injury to his left arm. X-rays and a doctor’s visit were to be scheduled thereafter. He
did not receive x-rays of his arm until weeks later, and Plaintiff did not sign a refusal of
medical care form on that day. According to Plaintiff, he did not refuse medical treatment
on July 15, 2020, and neither Defendant Miller nor Joiner followed up with Plaintiff to
see if he had in fact refused medical care.
"Prison officials must have been deliberately indifferent to a known danger before
we can say that their failure to intervene offended 'evolving standards of decency',
thereby rising to the level of a constitutional tort. The known risk of injury must be 'a
strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility'". Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537
(1 lth.Cir. 1990) (quoting Estelle , 429 U.S. 97 and Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271,
1276 (11th Cir. 1989)).
Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants Miller and Joiner were aware of yet
disregarded a serious medical condition or worsening of Plaintiff s condition. To the
contrary, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff was seen
by Defendant Miller and scheduled for x-rays and a physician consultation, and Plaintiff
has not come forth with any facts showing that Miller and Joiner were aware of any
condition suffered by Plaintiff that required additional medical attention. The Jail records
submitted by Defendants show that Plaintiff did not submit a medical inquiry seeking
attention for his arm until September 13, 2020. (Doc. 156-3, p. 196).
8
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Plaintiff maintains that neither Defendant Miller nor Joiner checked with Plaintiff
to see if he had in fact refused medical care, and that this failure was a violation of jail
policy. However, if such inaction violated a jail policy, a policy violation does not
establish a deliberate indifference claim. Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir.
2000) (“failure to follow procedures does not, by itself, rise to the level of deliberate
indifference because doing so is at most a form of negligence”). Moreover, if, as Plaintiff
asserts, neither Defendant Miller nor Joiner were told Plaintiff refused additional
treatment and neither of these Defendants saw Plaintiff after his initial visit on July 15,
2020, neither Defendant could have been aware of any worsening condition or ongoing
need for medical attention. Plaintiff has failed to present anything more than conclusory
allegations that his medical records were somehow “fabricated” by these Defendants and
what purpose such fabrication would serve.
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to establish that any delay in treatment exacerbated his
conditions. “[Djelay in medical treatment must be interpreted in the context of the
seriousness of the medical need, deciding whether the delay worsened the medical
condition, and considering the reason for the delay.” Hill v. DeKalb RYDC, 40 F.3d 1176,
1189 (11th Cir. 1994), overruled in part on other grounds, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730
(2002). “An inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a
constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish
the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Id. at 1188.
2. Defendants Montgerard, Miller, and Haugabrook - retaliation
In his retaliation claims against Defendants Montgerard, Miller, and Haugabrook,
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Plaintiff maintains that these Defendants instructed other officers to issue Plaintiff a
disciplinary report when Plaintiff sought medical treatment for his chest pain and/or
sought additional information about his medical condition. (Doc. 39, pp. 17-18; Doc. 59,
p. 24).
“The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliating against prisoners for
exercising the right of free speech.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir.
2003). In order to state a claim for retaliation, the Plaintiff “must establish first, that his
speech or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the defendant’s retaliatory
conduct adversely affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal
connection between the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” Bennett v.
Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005). The prisoner “must show that, as a
subjective matter, a motivation for the defendant’s adverse action was the prisoner’s
[protected speech].” Jemison v. Wise, 386 F. A’ppx 961, 965 (11th Cir. 2010); Smith v.
Governor for Alabama, 562 F. A’ppx 806, 815 (11th Cir. 2014).
For purposes of the preliminary screening of Plaintiff s claims, the Court assumed
that Plaintiff had engaged in protected activity in seeking medical care and/or medical
records. (Doc. 59, p. 24). Defendants have continued to rely on this assumption for
purposes of their summary judgment motion. (Doc. 156-1, p. 13).
Defendants Montgerard, Miller, and Haugabrook state in their affidavits that they
never asked or instructed an officer to discipline Plaintiff and never retaliated against
Plaintiff. (Doc. 156-4,
30-32; Doc. 156-5,14-16; Doc. 156-7,
9-11). Defendant
10
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Montgerard further states that nurses at the jail have no authority to discipline inmates.
(Doc. 156-4,129).
Plaintiff has offered nothing beyond his conclusory allegations to establish that
Defendants Montgerard, Miller, and Haugabrook retaliated against him by having jail
officers issue a disciplinary report. “An inmate’s conclusory allegations, taken alone, are
insufficient to support a retaliation claim.” Booth v. Bobbit, 2020 WL 4281119, *4
(M.D.Ga. 2020) (MTT). Plaintiffs conclusory allegations of retaliation are insufficient
support for the retaliation claim, and any causal connection between Defendants
Montgerard, Miller, and Haugabrook and the disciplinary report at issue “is too tenuous
to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Pittman v. Tucker, 213 F. A’ppx 867, 872
(11th Cir. 2007).
As further established by Defendant Montgerard’s affidavit testimony and unrefuted
by Plaintiff, these Defendants had no authority regarding the discipline of inmates, and
“[wjhere the defendant is not the decision-maker, there is no causal connection between
the [protected speech] and the [adverse event].” Goins v. Weilenman, 2009 WL 2224637,
*4 (S.D.Ga. 2009). Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions that these Defendants directed that a
disciplinary report be issued against him, documentation submitted by Plaintiff shows
that Sgt. Trent directed Officer Nixon to issue a disciplinary report to Plaintiff in
November 2020 after it was determined that Plaintiff had lied about having chest pains to
access the medical staff for other purposes. (Doc. 147-1, pp. 50-52).
3. Defendant Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital — failure to train/supervise
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In his claims against Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, Plaintiff claims that the
hospital is responsible for providing medical care for Jail inmates and that the hospital is
liable for medical staffs deliberate indifference based on a failure to train and supervise.
(Doc. 39, pp. 23-24). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to rely on alleged
inmate deaths to establish liability on the part of Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital. Id.;
Doc. 59, p. 31.
As noted in its Order reviewing Plaintiffs operative Amended Complaint, hospitals
may be considered state actors and held responsible for constitutional violations under §
1983. See Wofford v. Glynn Brunswick Mem. Hosp., 864 F.2d 117, 118 (11th Cir. 1989)
(actions of public hospital authority created under Georgia law “constitute state acts
within the meaning of § 1983”). Such an entity may only be liable “if such constitutional
torts result from an official government policy, the actions of an official fairly deemed to
represent government policy, or a custom or practice so pervasive and well-settled that it
assumes the force of law.” Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty., 218 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2000). Municipalities and their agencies are not subject to liability on the basis of
respondeat superior, as only direct liability may be imposed. Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
An entity’s deliberate indifference can also be shown by “continued adherence to
an approach that [policymakers] know or should know has failed to prevent tortious
conduct” or by “the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained
employees”. Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1997). To
establish deliberate indifference based on a failure to train, “a plaintiff must present some
evidence that the [entity] knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and
12
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the [entity] made a deliberate choice not to take any action”. Gold v. City ofMiami, 151
F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998).
Defendant Montgerard states in her affidavit that Phoebe Putney does not have an
official policy or custom of providing substandard, inadequate, or delayed medical care to
inmates at the Jail. (Doc. 156-4, ^[ 32-35). Plaintiff has not come forth with evidence of a
pattern of conduct by Phoebe Putney employees that the hospital knew provided a basis
for a need to train, and which the hospital made a deliberate choice to ignore.
Plaintiff points to three (3) alleged inmate deaths over a multi-year period and his
own alleged elbow injury as evidence of the hospital’s failure to train its employees, in
addition to allegations that Jail medical staff failed to follow Jail policies. (Doc. 39, pp
24, 26; Doc. 169, p. 7). However, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that Phoebe
Putney had notice of a pattern of conduct by its employees that required additional
training. “[WJithout notice of a need to train or supervise in a particular area, a
municipality is not liable as a matter of law for any failure to train and supervise.” Knight
through Kerr v. Miami-Dade County, 856 F.3d 795, 820 (11th Cir. 2017). Furthermore,
while a supervising officer can be held liable for a failure to train subordinates, and a
history of widespread abuse can put the supervisor on notice of the need for corrective
action, “one incident will not suffice; rather, the deprivations that constitute widespread
abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant, and
of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Id.
Conclusion
Based on Plaintiffs failure to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
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Defendants Miller or Joiner acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical
condition, whether Defendants Montgerard, Miller, or Haugabrook retaliated against
Plaintiff, or as to whether Defendant Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital failed to
adequately train and supervise employees providing medical care to Dougherty County
Jail inmates, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that these Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. (Doc. 156).
Objections
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written
objections to the recommendations herein, or seek an extension of time to file objections,
WITHIN FOURTEEN 041 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District
Judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to
which objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by
the District Judge for clear error. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20)
PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3 -1, “[a] party
failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report
and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives
the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the
consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however,
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the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
ORDER
Plaintiffs Motion for Settlement Conference is DENIED. (Doc. 221).
SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED, this 4th day of August, 2022.
s/ Thomas Q. Langstaff
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
JOHNNIE DEMOND JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
1 : 21-CV-28 (LAG)
SHERIFF KEVIN SPROUL, et al.,
Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION
Pending is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Sproul,
Adams, Watson, and Kendricks, otherwise identified by defense counsel as the
Dougherty County Defendants. (Doc. 153). Plaintiff was notified of the filing of
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, advised of his obligations under the law,
and directed to respond thereto within thirty (30) days. (Doc. 154). Plaintiff has
responded to Defendants’ motion. (Doc. 166). Defendants have filed a reply. (Doc. 179).
Plaintiff filed this action in February 2021, and several of Plaintiff s pending cases
were ordered consolidated into this action. (Doc. 1); Jackson v. Dougherty County Jail, et
al., No. 1 : 20-CV-198 (M.D.Ga.)(LAG); Jackson v. Trent, et al., No. 1 : 21-CV-08
(M.D.Ga.)(LAG); Jackson v. Dougherty County Georgia, et al., No. 1 : 20-CV-249
(M.D.Ga.)(LAG); Jackson v. Adams, etal., No. 1 : 21-CV-09 (M.D.Ga.)(LAG). The
Court directed Plaintiff to file a recast Complaint on the proper form, along with a
complete motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff ultimately complied with
this directive. (Docs. 8, 27). The Court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed in forma
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 223 Filed 08/02/22 Page 2 of 19
pauperis and allowed certain claims to go forward by Order dated May 26, 2021. (Doc.
34). Based on Plaintiffs subsequent objection, which was construed to be a motion to
amend his complaint, the Court withdrew its May 26, 2021 Order and Recommendation
and issued a new Order and Recommendation, granting Plaintiffs Motion to Amend.
(Doc. 59). All motions to amend filed prior to the June 4, 2021 Amended Complaint were
denied as moot, and the June 4, 2021 Amended Complaint was deemed the operative
complaint. (Docs. 8, 39, 59, 74). The Court allowed certain claims to go forward, and
after the adoption of the Recommendation issued on November 9, 2021 and the dismissal
of certain claims based on a lack of exhaustion, the following claims remain pending:
• Failure to provide adequate medical treatment against Defendants
Miller, Joiner, and Kendricks
• First Amendment mail interference claims against Defendants Adams
and Watson
• Conditions of confinement claims against Defendant Sproul
pertaining to the provision of inadequate nutrition
• Retaliation claims against Defendants Miller, Montgerard, and
Haugabrooks
• Claims concerning the alleged failure to provide adequate medical
treatment against Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital
(Docs. 129, 202).
Defendants Ostrander, Green, Trent, Gilbert, and Boges were dismissed by Order dated
March 2, 2022. (Doc. 202).
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs claims arise out of events occurring during his confinement as a pretrial
detainee at the Dougherty County Jail beginning on or about July 14, 2020. In the claims
that remain and pertain to the Dougherty County Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Kendrick (identified as Defendant “Kendricks” in Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment) was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs medical needs regarding
an x-ray, that Defendants Adams and Watson violated Plaintiffs First Amendment rights
by interfering with Plaintiffs legal and personal mail, and that Defendant Sproul is
responsible for unconstitutional conditions of confinement in regard to provision of
inadequate nutrition. (Doc. 59).
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the “court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
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As the parties moving for summary judgment, Defendants have the initial burden to
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains in the case. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.
1991). The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record, including
pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “If a party fails to properly
support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as
required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... grant summary judgment if the motion and
supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is
entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Defendants have supported their motion with their
affidavits, portions of Plaintiffs jail records, and documentation regarding jail
procedures. (Docs. 153-3- 153-6).
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert that they are entitled to
the protection of qualified immunity, in that Plaintiff has failed to establish a
constitutional violation. They also contend that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
Qualified immunity
Defendants assert that they are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity
regarding Plaintiffs claims brought against them in their individual capacities. “Qualified
immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads
facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that
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the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).
Inasmuch as qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the “public official must
first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the
allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002).
“To determine whether an official was engaged in a discretionary function,” federal
courts look to see whether the challenged actions “fell within the employee's job
responsibilities.” Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal
citation omitted).
Defendants’ actions taken within their role as law enforcement officers establish
that they were acting within their discretionary authority. “Discretionary authority”
includes “all actions of a governmental official that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the
performance of his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his authority.” Jordan v. Doe,
38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994). These “objective circumstances ... compel the
conclusion that [Defendants’] actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of
[their] duties and within the scope of his authority.” Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County,
972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 1992). “[W]here ... it is undisputed that government
officials were acting within their discretionary authority, the burden is on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Hicks v. Ferrero, 241 F. A’ppx
595, 597 (11th Cir. 2007).
“To [show that qualified immunity is not appropriate], the plaintiff must
demonstrate (taking all the facts in the light most favorable to [him]) the following two
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things: (1) that the defendant violated [his] constitutional rights, and (2) that, at the time
of the violation, those rights were clearly established”. Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d
1203,1208 (11th Cir. 2017).
1. Defendant Sproul: nutrition
In his remaining claim against Defendant Sproul, Plaintiff alleges that he was
provided with inadequate food while housed in segregation and lost “40-50 pounds”.
(Doc. 59, p. 20). In his verified Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that the practice at
the jail was to provide inmates “like 1200” calories per day. (Doc. 39, p. 22). In a
subsequently filed declaration, Plaintiff states that he was housed in the isolation unit at
the Dougherty County Jail between June 10,2020 and January 9, 2021, and that during
this time period his weight dropped from 206 pounds to 167 pounds as a result of food
deprivation. (Doc. 143, p. I)1. Plaintiff maintains that inmates held in isolation were
provided with smaller and/or less nutritious portions as a means of discipline.
In his affidavit, Defendant Sproul states that the Dougherty County Sheriffs Office
contracts with Trinity Food Services to provide inmate meals, and that Trinity employs
dieticians who approve the menus and portions for inmate meals. (Doc. 153-4,3-4).
Inmate meals provide more than 2000 calories per day. Id. at ]) 5. Sproul attributes any
weight loss suffered by Plaintiff while he was confined in disciplinary detention to
Plaintiff not eating the meals or the meals being healthier than those provided outside of
detention. Id. at ^ 7. In Plaintiffs jail medical records, Plaintiff was reported to be “wellnourished and well developed” upon examination by a physician on November 20, 2020.
1 Plaintiff signed Document 143, but inserted his declaration “under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct” on page 3 of Document 143, thereby rendering the preceding text a sworn statement. (Doc. 143).
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(Doc. 153-3, p. 62).
In his sworn response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff
maintains that the portions of food provided to inmates in segregation are inadequate,
based in part on information from a former jail kitchen worker, an ex-girlfriend of
Plaintiff, who allegedly quit because the jail “was not feeding inmates enough”. (Doc.
166, p. 12)2.
In his sworn declaration, Plaintiff maintains that he lost weight during his
confinement in isolation at the Dougherty County Jail, between July 2020 and January
2021 due to food deprivation. (Doc. 143, pp. 1-2). Plaintiff states that he complained
about the food and portions through food service inquiries, and that Chief Ostrander
responded that he was contacting “portion control” about his complaints. Id. at p. 2.
Plaintiff has also previously filed certain of Defendant Sproul’s interrogatory
responses, in which Defendant Sproul states that inmate meals are supposed to be 2000
calories, that Plaintiff at times was housed in the isolation unit at the jail between July
2020 and January 2021, and that the jail provided Nutraloaf to inmates in isolation from
some time in 2015 through February 8,2020. (Doc. 143-1, pp. 18-19).
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference
to conditions of confinement, Plaintiff must meet both an objective and a subjective
standard. Chandler v. Cosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).3 “Generally
2 Plaintiff signed Document 166, but inserted his declaration “under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct” on page 14 of Document 143, thereby rendering the preceding text a sworn statement. (Doc. 166).
3 Although Plaintiff brought his claims as a pretrial detainee, and his conditions of confinement claims are therefore
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, “the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates applies
equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (1 l'h Cir. 1996).
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speaking, prison conditions rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation only when
they involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Id. Initially, the prisoner
must show that, objectively, the condition is sufficiently serious, and “at the very least
show [the condition] poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or
safety”. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). The Eighth Amendment
guarantees that prisoners will not be “deprive[d]... of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
Secondly, the prisoner must show that the defendant official acted with deliberate
indifference to the condition. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). The official
must “know[] of and disregard^ an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Viewing the facts regarding nutrition in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, Plaintiff lost at least thirty (30) pounds while confined in isolation at
the Dougherty County Jail between June 2020 and January 2021, which he attributes to
the meals provided to isolation inmates. Although Plaintiff contends that the meals
provided to inmates in isolation were nutritionally lacking, he has offered no description
of the meals provided and no explanation as what and how much was served, other than
stating that he was not provided fruits. Plaintiff has generally provided only his
conclusory allegations that the meals were lacking in nutrition. In order to defeat
summary judgment, a nonmoving party’s “affidavit cannot be conclusory”. United States
v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 856 (1 llh Cir. 2018). “[Cjonclusory allegations without specific
supporting facts have no probative value” in determining a summary judgment motion.
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Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000), internal citations
omitted.
To the extent that Plaintiff relies on Defendant Sproul’s discovery responses to
establish that he provided Nutraloaf to inmates in isolation, the discovery responses to
which Plaintiff points show that the jail provided Nutraloaf in isolation only up until
February 8, 2020, well before the time Plaintiff was confined in isolation. Doc. 143-1, p.
19. Plaintiff has not refuted this showing with competent summary judgment evidence.
“The Constitution requires that prisoners be provided reasonably adequate food. A
well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health, is all that is
required.” Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985), internal
citations omitted. Defendant Sproul has established, and Plaintiff has failed to refute, that
meals provided to Plaintiff while he was confined in isolation were constitutionally
sufficient. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Sproul was aware of
any insufficiency that rose to the level of an excessive risk to Plaintiffs health and safety,
and disregarded this risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
2. Defendants Adams and Watson - mail interference
In his mail interference claim that was allowed to go forward, Plaintiff alleges in
his verified Amended Complaint that Defendants Adams and Watson interfered with his
outgoing personal and legal mail, refusing to allow him to write letters to certain
individuals and entities. (Doc. 59, p. 10). Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants
Adams and Watson prohibited him from writing letters to the media and the post office,
and he asserts that his mail was being read based on his ability to re-open the envelopes
provided by the Jail, presumably for his legal mail. (Doc. 39, pp. 14, 15). The Court notes
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that Plaintiffs access to the courts claims were dismissed, and only his claims that
Defendants violated his First Amendment free speech rights by interfering with his
personal and legal mail were allowed to proceed. (Docs. 59, 74). Plaintiff claims that he
wanted to write to the media to obtain video footage of his June 2020 arrest, and that he
wanted to write to the Post Office to verify whether Sheriff Sproul had received his
letters. (Doc. 39, pp. 14-16).
Defendant Adams testifies in her affidavit that she serves as the Legal Liaison and
secondary Custodian of Records for the Dougherty County Sheriffs Office, and that
Plaintiff has been incarcerated multiple times in the Dougherty County Jail. (Doc. 153-3,
p. 1). In regard to inmate mail, inmates who qualify as indigent and are proceeding pro se
in litigation are provided with paper, pens, and envelopes, as well as postage for legal
mail. Id. at p. 3. Defendant Adams initially told Plaintiff she needed more proof as to his
pro se status after he filed his first lawsuit, and Plaintiff was later certified by the Court as
proceeding pro se. Id.
Plaintiff complained to Defendant Adams about the lack of indigent postage for
media outlets, the Post Office, medical providers, and family members, and the Jail
eventually agreed to pay for mail directed to his medical providers because Plaintiff was
trying to gather evidence for his civil case. Id. at p. 4. The Jail did not pay postage for
mail directed to media outlets, the Post Office, or family members “because that mail was
not reasonably related to Plaintiffs prosecution of his civil case or his defense of his
criminal case. Those envelopes were returned to Plaintiff unopened.” Id. All non-legal
mail was required to be on postcards so that the Jail could ensure that it contained no
contraband or illegal communication. Id. Plaintiff was not prevented from sending mail to
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media outlets, the Post Office, or his family, but this mail was not classified as “legal
mail”, meaning it could not be contained in a sealed envelope and the jail did not pay for
postage. Id. Defendant Adams “never read or tampered with any of Plaintiff s legal mail.
[She is] not even involved in processing inmate mail... [and] only sees copies of
envelopes that are mailed out.” Id.
Defendant Watson, the Custody Services Lieutenant for the Dougherty County Jail,
oversees pro se inmates’ legal mail, providing them with supplies and making sure the
mail is sent out. (Doc. 153-5, ffl[ 2, 4). Defendant Watson testifies in her affidavit that no
legal mail sits overnight before being mailed out, and that she has “never opened, read, or
tampered with any of Plaintiff s outgoing legal mail.” Id. at
12-13. Incoming legal
mail is opened in the presence of the receiving inmate to verify that there is no
contraband in the envelope, a process of which Defendant Watson is not a part. Id. at
14. Watson never prohibited Plaintiff from communicating with the media, the Post
Office, or his family members, but merely instructed him that he could not use his pro se
supplies to do so. Id. at f 15.
According to the Inmate Handbook for the Dougherty County Jail Facility,
[i]nmates ... are allowed to correspond with any individual
of their choice unless they have been restricted by the Jail
Administration or Court Official... Legal or Governmental
correspondences are considered privileged mail and may be
opened and inspected for contraband only in the inmate’s
presence. Non-privileged mail (regular) mail, both incoming
and outgoing will be subject to inspection... Both incoming
and outgoing regular mail are restricted to postcards only.
Pre-stamped postcards are available through the commissary
and are included in indigent packages. Any outgoing mail
other than postcards will not be accepted for delivery.
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The “postcard only” rule does not apply to incoming/outgoing
legal mail, which will be processed as usual. Indigent inmates
who are “pro se” will be provided adequate envelopes/stamps
for their legal correspondence.
.. . Any inmate who has been declared indigent and who
thereafter shows no money credited to his/her account is
eligible to receive the following once per month: (6) Postal
Stamps, (6) envelopes, Sufficient writing paper, and (1) pen.
(Doc. 153-3, pp. 110-112).
Defendant Adams states in her affidavit that jail policy restricting non-legal mail to
postcards is in place to restrict contraband and to ensure that mail contains no disruptive
or illegal communication. Id. at p. 4.
In his sworn declaration included in his response to Defendants’ summary
judgment motion, Plaintiff maintains that all of his “dealings” with Defendants Adams
and Watson involved legal mail, and that Defendant Watson did not provide him with pro
se supplies to write to the media, the post office, or to family. (Doc. 166, pp. 13-14).
Plaintiff maintains that “all of my written affairs were strictly legal business”. Id. at p. 14.
Plaintiff further alleges that he was allowed to use pro se postage and materials to send
mail to a media outlet once, so he should be allowed to do so thereafter. Id. at p. 13.
“The First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits
states from abridging the freedom of speech. Mail is one medium of free speech, and the
right to send and receive mail exists under the First Amendment.” Al-Amin v. Smith, 511
F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008). “[A] prison regulation may impinge ... freedom of
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speech if the Court determines that ‘it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests’”. Prison Legal News v. Champman, 2013 WL 1296367, at *3 (M.D.Ga.)
(CAR), quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
Under Turner, a prison regulation that allegedly abridges free speech must be
examined to determine 1) the valid and rational connection between the regulation and
the asserted legitimate governmental interest; 2) whether there are alternative means of
exercising the constitutional right; 3) any effect accommodating the right would have on
guards and inmates; and 4) the absence or existence of ready alternatives. Turner, 482
U.S. at 89.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants Adams and
Watson would not allow Plaintiff to designate correspondence to the media, to family
members, and to the post office as legal mail, which would have enabled Plaintiff to send
said correspondence using pro se indigent legal materials. Plaintiffs non-legal
correspondence was limited to postcards, per jail policy.
Pursuant to Defendant Adams’ affidavit testimony, the jail defined legal mail as
being “reasonably related to Plaintiffs prosecution of his civil case or his defense of his
criminal case”. (Doc. 153-3, p. 4). In a response to an inquiry from Plaintiff, jail officials
explained to Plaintiff that legal mail “includes correspondence to the courts or an
attorney. It does not include correspondence to the media, family, or other government
agencies such as the Post Office. For those, you would have to use a post card.” Id. at p.
90.
Plaintiff was allowed to correspond with his family, the media, and the Post Office
using post cards. Defendants did not prevent Plaintiff from mailing anything to his
13
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family, the media, or the Post Office, but did not allow him to do so using postage and
supplies designated for use in legal mailing. Plaintiff was free to mail anything he wanted
to on a postcard, which either he paid for or was part of what was provided to indigent
inmates per jail policy. Plaintiff has not come forth with sufficient facts to overcome
Defendants’ summary judgment showing that they did not restrict his free speech rights
regarding mail.
3. Defendant Kendricks — medical treatment
In the deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim that was allowed to
proceed against Defendant Kendricks, Plaintiff states that Kendricks falsified medical
records to show that Plaintiff refused x-rays for his arm. (Doc. 39, pp. 6-10). Plaintiff
alleges that his arm was injured when an officer slammed and punched his arm in the cell
door tray flap on July 15, 2020, and that Defendant Kendricks knew Plaintiff required
medical treatment but failed to ensure Plaintiff received treatment. Plaintiff claims that he
did not receive an x-ray until months later. Id.
In his affidavit, Defendant Kendricks states that he is a lieutenant with the
Dougherty County Sheriffs Office and was the supervisor over Plaintiffs pod on July
15, 2020. (Doc. 153-6,
2-3). On the morning of July 15, 2020, Plaintiff was on
handcuff and leg iron restrictions, meaning that he had to be placed in handcuffs and leg
irons whenever he was escorted through the Jail, due to his having “caused so many
disruptions” in the Jail. Id. at 4. When the nurse called for Plaintiff to be brought to
medical on the afternoon of July 15, 2020, Plaintiff refused to walk to the back of his cell,
face the wall, and kneel for the placement of handcuffs and leg irons by Defendant
14
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Kendricks, saying that no one was going to handcuff him. Id. at ^ 5. After Plaintiff
refused a second order from Defendant Kendricks, Kendricks told the nurse on duty that
Plaintiff refused to cooperate “so he would not be taken to medical”. Id. at
6-7.
Kendricks could not get Plaintiff to sign a refusal of treatment form because Plaintiff
“was acting out”. Id. at ^ 8. Kendricks did not believe Plaintiffs behavior warranted a
disciplinary report, but states that he should have written a security report, and that
Plaintiff did not appear to be in serious need of medical care. Id. at ]H[ 9-10.
Plaintiffs medical records submitted by Defendants show that he was seen in the
medical department on July 15, 2020 after a dry tasing incident, and he complained that
his left elbow was fractured. (Doc. 153-3, p. 44). In the midst of “continuously cursing
[and] talking loud”, Plaintiff refused to move his left arm or squeeze with his left hand.
Id. The medical records reflect that Plaintiff later refused to return to medical to see the
physician, and that Kendricks reported he was unable to get Plaintiff to sign the refusal of
treatment form due to Plaintiff “acting out”. Id. Plaintiff submitted medical inquiries to
be seen by medical for his arm in September 2020, was placed on the sick call list, and
his arm was x-rayed on September 16, 2020, with findings of “[n]o fracture, dislocation,
or significant arthropathy of the left elbow ... No acute osseous abnormality”. Id. at pp.
51, 52-53. After further medical inquiries, Plaintiff was examined by an outside
specialist, who found that an MRI showed he had “no significant injury” to his elbow. Id.
atpp. 57, 58,71-73,75-76.
In a sworn declaration, Plaintiff states that he did not refuse medical care on July
15, 2020, and asserts that Defendant Kendricks fabricated his statements that Plaintiff
15
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refused medical treatment. (Doc. 148, pp. 1-4). In his sworn response to Defendants’
summary judgment motion, Plaintiff maintains that after he was returned to his cell on
July 15, 2020, and x-rays had been scheduled, no one came to his cell or said anything to
him about returning to medical. (Doc. 166, p. 6). According to Plaintiff “no one came to
say anything to me about anything having whatsoever to do with medical”. Id.
It is well established that prison personnel may not subject inmates to "acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “To show that a prison official acted
with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an
objective and a subjective inquiry. First, a plaintiff must set forth evidence of an
objectively serious medical need. Second, a plaintiff must prove that the prison official
acted with an attitude of ‘deliberate indifference’ to that serious medical need.” Farrow v.
West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). “[Deliberate
indifference has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm;
(2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” McElligott
v. Foley, 182F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).
“Mere incidents of negligence or malpractice do not rise to the level of
constitutional violations. Nor does a simple difference in medical opinion between the
prison's medical staff and the inmate as to the latter's diagnosis or course of treatment
support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment." Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the nonmoving party,
16
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Plaintiff was seen in the medical department by a nurse on July '15, 2020, after suffering
an injury to his left arm. X-rays and a doctor’s visit were to be scheduled thereafter. He
did not receive x-rays of his arm until weeks later, and Plaintiff did not sign a refusal of
medical care form on that day. According to Plaintiff, he did not refuse medical treatment
on July 15, 2020, and no jail personnel spoke to him about returning to medical that day.
"Prison officials must have been deliberately indifferent to a known danger before
we can say that their failure to intervene offended ’evolving standards of decency’,
thereby rising to the level of a constitutional tort. The known risk of injury must be ’a
strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility’". Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537
(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Estelle , 429 U.S. 97 and Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271,
1276(11th Cir. 1989)).
Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Kendricks was aware of yet
disregarded a serious medical condition or worsening of Plaintiff s condition. To the
contrary, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Defendant
Kendricks never spoke to Plaintiff on the day in question about going back to medical,
and Plaintiff has not come forth with any facts showing that Kendricks was aware of any
condition suffered by Plaintiff that required additional medical attention.
As the Court finds no constitutional violations based on the facts provided,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Baltimore v. City of Albany, Ga., 183 F.
A’ppx 891, 896 (11th Cir. 2006).
Eleventh Amendment immunity
To the extent that Plaintiff brings his claims against the Defendants in their official
17
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 223 Filed 08/02/22 Page 18 of 19
capacities, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs claims. A state is not considered a
“person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983, such that “neither a state nor
its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983”. Will v.
Michigan Dep't. ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Thus, a suit brought against a
defendant deputy sheriff in his official capacitiy is in reality a suit against the state and as
such is not cognizable under § 1983. Id.; Kinsey v. Thomas, 2021 WL 3116822, n.4
(M.D.Ga. 2021) (CDL) (noting that for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity a
Georgia county sheriff acted as an arm of the State); Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala.,
137 F.3d 1285, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 1998) (sheriff and his deputies act as officers of the
State when supervising inmates and operating county jails); Scruggs v. Lee, 256 F. A’ppx
229, 231 (11th Cir. 2007) (sheriffs deputies entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in
their official capacities).
Conclusion
Based on Plaintiffs failure to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendant Sproul provided inadequate nutrition to Plaintiff while confined in isolation,
whether Defendants Adams and Watson violated Plaintiffs First Amendment rights as to
his mail, and as to whether Defendant Kendricks acted with deliberate indifference to
Plaintiffs serious medical needs, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that
Defendants Sproul, Adams, Watson, and Kendricks’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 153) be GRANTED.
Objections
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written
18
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 223 Filed 08/02/22 Page 19 of 19
objections to the recommendations herein, or seek an extension of time to file objections,
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District
Judge shall make a de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to
which objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by
the District Judge for clear error. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20)
PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party
failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report
and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives
the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the
consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however,
the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 2nd day of August, 2022.
s/ Thomas Q. Langstaff
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
19
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Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 209 Filed 03/17/22 Page 1 of 7
K.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
JOHNNIE DEMOND JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
1 : 21-CV-28 (LAG)
SHERIFF KEVIN SPROUL, et al.,
A*
% ^
Defendants.
ORDER and RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff filed this action in February 2021, and several of Plaintiff s pending cases
were ordered consolidated into this action. (Doc. 1); Jackson v. Dougherty County Jail, et
al., No. 1 : 20-CV-198 (M.D.Ga.)(LAG); Jackson v. Trent, etal., No. 1 : 21-CV-08
(M.D.Ga.)(LAG); Jackson v. Dougherty County Georgia, et al., No. 1 : 20-CV-249
(M.D.Ga.)(LAG); Jackson v. Adams, et al., No. 1 : 21-CV-09 (M.D.Ga.)(LAG). The Court
directed Plaintiff to file a recast Complaint on the proper form, along with a complete
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff ultimately complied with this directive.
(Docs. 8, 27). The Court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis and
allowed certain claims to go forward by Order dated May 26, 2021. (Doc. 34). Based on
Plaintiffs subsequent objection, which was construed to be a motion to amend his
complaint, the Court withdrew its May 26, 2021 Order and Recommendation and issued a
new Order and Recommendation, granting Plaintiff s Motion to Amend. (Doc. 59). All
motions to amend filed prior to the June 4,2021 Amended Complaint were denied as moot,
and the June 4, 2021 Amended Complaint was deemed the operative complaint. (Docs. 8,
i
' Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 209 Filed 03/17/22 Page 2 of 7
39, 59, 74). The Court allowed certain claims to go forward, and after the adoption of the
Recommendation issued on November 9,2021 and the dismissal of certain claims based on
a lack of exhaustion, the following claims remain pending:
• Failure to provide adequate medical treatment against Defendants
Miller, Joiner, and Kendrick
• First Amendment mail interference claims against Defendants Adams
and Watson
• Conditions of confinement claims against Defendant Sproul pertaining
to the provision of inadequate nutrition
• Retaliation claims against Defendants Miller, Montgerard, and
Haugabrooks
• Claims concerning the alleged failure to provide adequate medical
treatment against Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital
(Docs. 129, 202).
Defendants Ostrander, Green, Trent, Gilbert, and Boges were dismissed by Order dated March
2, 2022. (Doc. 202). The Clerk is DIRECTED to update the docket accordingly.
Plaintiffs claims arise out of events occurring during his confinement as a pretrial
detainee at the Dougherty County Jail beginning on or about July i4, 2020. In the claims
that remain, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Miller, Joiner and Kendrick were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiffs medical needs regarding an x-ray, that Defendants Adams and
Watson violated Plaintiffs First Amendment rights by interfering with Plaintiff s legal and
personal mail, that Defendant Sproul is responsible for unconstitutional conditions of
confinement in regard to provision of inadequate nutrition, that Defendants Miller,
2
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Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 209 Filed 03/17/22 Page 3 of 7
Montgerard, and Haugabrooks retaliated against Plaintiff, and that Phoebe Putney
Memorial Hospital has a policy or custom of providing dangerously substandard or
delayed care to inmates at the Dougherty County Jail. (Doc. 59).
RECOMMENDATION
Motion for injunctive relief
In a motion filed on November 16, 2021, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. (Doc.
131). Plaintiff seeks an injunction to ensure the provision of adequate medical care,
nutrition, access to the courts, protection from retaliation, sanitation, and mail delivery. Id.
In order to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief, the Plaintiff must prove that: (1)
there is a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits; (2) he will suffer
irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant
outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and
(4) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest. Zardui-Quintana v.
Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 1985); Snook v. Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of
Savannah, N.A., 909 F.2d 480,483 (11th Cir. 1990). Injunctive relief will not issue unless
the conduct at issue is imminent and no other relief or compensation is available.
Cunningham v. Adams, 808 F.2d 815, 821 (11th Cir. 1987). “In this Circuit, a preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant
clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to the four requisites.” McDonald’s Corp.
v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998).
A review of the Plaintiffs motion reveals an inadequate basis for the issuance of
3
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 209 Filed 03/17/22 Page 4 of 7
inj unctive relief. Plaintiff has not established that he is entitled to injunctive relief in regard
to his requests, i.e., that there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits or resulting
irreparable harm, or that no other relief is available to address his alleged injuries.
Accordingly, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction/TRO be DENIED. (Doc. 131).
Motions for summary judgment
Plaintiff has filed multiple motions seeking the entry of summary judgment on his
claims. (Docs. 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150). A review of these motions reveals that
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material
fact remain in this case. The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains in the case. Celotex, All U.S. at
325; Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1991). The movant “always
bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the record, including pleadings, discovery materials, and
affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Plaintiffs summary judgment motions consist merely of a
reiteration of his claims as set out in his Complaint, in addition to summary conclusions
that the facts as alleged establish the violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, it is
the Recommendation of the undersigned that the Plaintiffs motions for summary judgment
be DENIED. (Docs. 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150). The Court notes that one of these
motions pertains to claim that have been dismissed. (Docs. 146).
4
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%
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 209 Filed 03/17/22 Page 5 of 7
Conclusion
Accordingly, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that Plaintiff s Motions
(Docs. 131, 143, 146, 147, 148, 149 & 150) be DENIED.
Objections
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections
to the recommendations herein, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN
FOURTEEN 1141 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District Judge shall
make a. de novo determination as to those portions of the Recommendation to which
objection is made; all other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed by the
District Judge for clear error. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20)
PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a]
party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a
report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to
factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and
the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection,
however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of
justice.”
r
■A
Case t21-cv-0002S-LAG-TQL Document 209 Filed 03/17/22 Page 6 ot 7
ORDER
Plaintiff s Motion to have the U.S. Marshal serve4ris motion seeking injunctive relief
on the Defendants is DENIED as moot. (Doc. 130). Plaintiffs motion seeking to have a
S1
xO
“person appointed by the court to take disposition” of this case is DENIED, as the Court ^
finds no basis for the relief sought by Plaintiff. (Doc. 134).
In a series of motions in limine, Plaintiff appears to seek to exclude certain evidence^
he expects to be submitted by Defendants. (Docs; 163, 164, 165, 167). In ruling on
dispositive motions, the Court will consider the admissibility of evidence presented by
both Plaintiff .and Defendants. The filing of separate motions addressing the admissibility
I
' of expected future evidence is unnecessary at this time, and to the extent Plaintiff s
objections to future evidence are presented as pending motions, these motions are
DENIED. (Docs. 163, 164,165,167). Plaintiff s Motion seeking independent examination
of Document 6, Plaintiffs Notice of filing electronic exhibits, for hearsay, is also
DENIED. (Doc. 172).
Plaintiffs motions to exceed the page limitation in his original response to
Defendants’ summary judgment motion filed on January 19, 2022 (Doc. 153) and
Defendants’ summary judgment motion filed on January 27, 2022 (Doc. 156) are
GRANTED. (Docs. 173, 183). Plaintiffs Motion to stay unidentified responses until his
motions for summary judgment have been ruled upon is DENIED. (Doc. 191).
Plaintiff has also filed motions seeking to supplement the file and for leave to file
additional documents. (Docs. 174-177, 180, 181, 189, 190, 192, 205). These motions are
t
8
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Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 216 Filed 04/26/22 Page 1 of 4
7 /
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
JOHNNIE DEMOND JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.: l:21-CV-28 (LAG) (TQL)
v.
SHEPJFF KEVIN R. SPROUL, et al.
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are the Magistrate Judge’s Order and Recommendation (O&R)
(Doc. 209) and Plaintiffs Objection (Doc. 215). For the reasons explained below,
Plaintiffs Objection is OVERRULED, and the O&R is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Johnnie Demond Jackson initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on
February 10, 2021, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during his pretrial
detention at the Dougherty County Jail. (Doc. 1). The Court consolidated this case with
four of Plaintiffs other pending § 1983 cases raising related claims on March 9, 2021.
(See Doc. 8 at 3). Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss several of Plaintiff s claims
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the Court granted Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss on March 2, 2022. (Doc. 68; Doc. 202 at 2-5). The following claims remain
pending before the Court:
(1) Failure to provide adequate medical treatment claims against
Defendants Miller, Joiner, and Kendrick;
(2) Mail interference claims against Defendants Adams and Watson;
(3) Conditions of confinement claim against Defendant Sproul based on the
failure to provide adequate nutrition;
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 216 Filed 04/26/22 Page 2 of 4
(4) Retaliation claims against Defendants Miller, Montgerard, and
Haugabrooks; and
(5) Failure to provide adequate medical treatment claim against Phoebe
Putney Memorial Hospital.
(Doc. 129 at 10; Doc. 202). On November 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Injunctive
Relief. (Doc. 131). Plaintiff subsequently filed multiple Motions for Summary Judgment
on January 10, 2022. (Docs. 143, 146-50). Plaintiff also filed supplemental Exhibits for
his Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Kendrick and a Demand for Trial by
Jury. (Docs. 144-45). After the Court granted Defendants an extension of time to respond,
Defendants Haugabrooks, Miller, Montgerard, Joiner, and Phoebe Putney Memorial
Hospital filed their Responses on January 31, 2022. (Docs. 160-62). Defendant Sproul
filed his Responses on February 28, 2022. (Docs. 197-98).
The Magistrate Judge issued the instant O&R on March 17, 2022. (Doc.209).
Therein, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court deny all of Plaintiff s Motions
for Summary Judgment. {Id. at 4-5). The Magistrate Judge also recommends that the Court
deny a Motion for Preliminary Injunction that Plaintiff filed on November 16,2021. {Id. at
3-4 (citing Doc. 131)). After receiving notice that Plaintiff had been transferred to the
Jackson County State Prison, the Court mailed the Magistrate Judge’s O&R to Plaintiffs
new address on April 5, 2022. (Doc. 211; see Docket). Plaintiff timely filed an Objection
on April 20, 2022.1 (Doc. 215).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
District courts have “the duty to conduct a careful and complete review” to
determine “whether to accept, reject, or modify” a magistrate judge’s order and
recommendation. Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732,732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(citation omitted). The Court reviews de novo the dispositive portions of a magistrate
1
Although the Clerk of Court did not receive Plaintiffs Objection until April 25, 2022, Plaintiff
signed his Objection on April 20, 2022. {See Doc. 215 at 2). Under the “prison mailbox rule,” a pro se
prisoner “is presumed to have submitted his [legal filing] on the day he signed it, absent evidence to the
contrary.” Boatman v. Berreto, 938 F.3d 1275,1277—78 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff s
Objection is timely.
2
Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 216 Filed 04/26/22 Page 3 of 4
judge’s order and recommendation to which a party objects and reviews the rest for clear
error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), (C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), (b)(3). When a party’s
objections, however, are “[fjrivolous, conclusive, or general,” the Court “need not”
consider them. United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(citation omitted). An objecting party “must clearly advise the district court and pinpoint
the specific findings that the party disagrees with.” Id. at 1360.
DISCUSSION
In the O&R, the Magistrate Judge explained that Plaintiffs Motions for Summary
Judgments “consist merely of a reiteration of his claims as set out in his Complaint . . .
[and] summary conclusions that the facts as alleged establish the violation of his
constitutional rights.” (Doc. 209 at 4). Thus, the Magistrate Judge concluded that “Plaintiff
has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact remain
in this case” and Plaintiffs Motions should be denied. (Id.). In his Objection, Plaintiff
argues that his Motions for Summary Judgment should not be dismissed because at the
time he filed his Motions, Defendants “only supplied him with the regulation sized white
legal envelopes” and all his filings “would not fit into the envelope . . . which caused
[Plaintiff] to have to supplement” his motions. (Doc.215 at 1). Plaintiff claims that
Defendants “limited [his] filing supplies,” which “obstructed” his “access to courts” and
his ability to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules governing
motions for summary judgment. (Id. at 1-2).
Plaintiffs first and second Motions for Summary Judgment on the claims against
Defendant Sproul, including supporting exhibits, are 45 and 65 pages long, respectively.
(See Docs. 143, 146). Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants
Haugabrooks, Miller, and Montegerard is 108 pages long, the Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Defendants Miller, Joiner, and Kendrick—not including the 14 pages filed
as supplemental exhibits against Defendant Kendrick—is 115 pages long, the Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Defendants Adams and Watson is 138 pages long, and the Motion
for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital is 145 pages
long. (See Docs. 147-50). In light of these voluminous filings, Plaintiffs claim that
3
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Case l:21-cv-00028-LAG-TQL Document 216 Filed 04/26/22 Page 4 of 4
Defendants obstructed his ability to file complete motions for summary judgment is
incredible. Moreover, Plaintiffs Objection is “[fjrivolous, conclusive, [and] general,” and
does not “clearly advise” the Court of “the specific findings that [he] disagrees with.” See
Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1360-61 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs Objection fails to address the
Magistrate Judge’s reason for concluding the Motions should be denied—that Plaintiff has
failed to establish no genuine issue of material fact remains. (Doc. 209 at 4).
Plaintiff does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court
deny his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. {See id. at 3-4). Accordingly, the Court has
reviewed the rest of the O&R for clear error and finds none therein. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
CONCLUSION
Upon a careful and complete review of the record, Plaintiffs Objection (Doc. 215)
is OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s Order & Recommendation (Doc. 209) is
ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as the Order of this Court. Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 131) and Plaintiffs Motions for Summary Judgment
(Docs. 143, 146-50) are DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 26th day of April, 2022.
/s/ Leslie A. Gardner
LESLIE A. GARDNER, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4
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Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.