Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Vonell Davis, Jr., Petitioner v. Wayne Hill, et al.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 2023

No.

VONELL DAVIS,JR.

Appellant

V.

MR. WAYNE HILL; MS MARIA MAXIMO-SABUNDAYO, MR. VERNON

CROWELL; PEANUT KIDS,INC; LIEUTENANT SILAS, Dietary

Supervisor; R. HALE, Captain

Appellees

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DECISIONS BELOW:

The decision of ther United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit is unreported. It is cited as No.

23-6212, Filed Juuly 23, 2023 (1:21-cv-02740-PX). The

Order of the United States District Court in DAVIS V.

HILL, No. 1:21-CV-027040-PX (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2023) was

affirmed Per Curiam. A copy of the decision of the

United States Court of Appeals is attached, and a copy

of the lower Court's.decision-will be provided, even

though it is part of the file.

FILED: July 28, 2023

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-6212

(l:21-cv-02740-PX)

VONELL DAVIS, JR.

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

MR WAYNE HILL- MS. MARIA MAXINO-SABUNDAYO, MR. VERNON

CROWELL; PEANUT KIDS. INC.; LIEUTENANT SILAS. Dietary Supemsor;

R. HALE, Captain

Defendants - Appellees

JUDGMENT

In accordance

with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in

accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/g/PATKTCIA s. connor^clerk

UNPUBLISHED

united states court of appeals

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-6212

VONELL DAVIS, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MR WAYNE HILL MS. MARIA MAXINO-SABUNDAYO; MR VERNON

CROWEL^PEANUT KIDS, INC, LIEUTENANT SILAS, Dietary Superior,

R. HALE, Captain,

Defendants - Appellees.

District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Appeal from the United States

Paula Xinis, District Judge. (1:21 -cv-02740-PX)

Submitted: July 25, 2023

Decided: July 28, 2023

Before WYNN and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affinned by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sandra Diana Lee, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

Vonell Davis, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Vonell Davis, Jr., appeals the district court s

order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 complaint and denying his motion to amend his complaint, We have reviewed the

record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

Davis v. Hill, No. l:21-cv-02740-PX (D. Md. Jan

argument because the facts and legal contentions are

affirm the district court’s order.

30, 2023). We dispense with oral

adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process

AFFIRMED

2

V

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

VONELL DAVIS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. PX-21-2740

v.

MR. WAYNE HILL, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is this 30th day of

January, 2023, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby

ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) IS GRANTED;

2. The Complaint IS DISMISSED without prejudice;

3. Plaintiffs Motions for Clerk’s Entry of Default (ECF No. 17) and for Default

Judgment (ECF No. 18) are DENIED as moot;

4. Plaintiffs Motion to Extend Time to Respond (ECF No. 25) is GRANTED

nunc pro tunc;

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 26) and Motion to Appoint

Counsel (ECF No. 28) are DENIED;

6. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case; and

7. The Clerk SHALL SEND a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Opinion and

a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants.

IS/

Paula Xinis

United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

VONELL DAVIS, JR.,

*

Plaintiff,

*

v.

*

MR. WAYNE HILL, et al.,

*

Defendants.

*

Civil Action No. PX-21-2740

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Vonell Davis, Jr., an inmate at Dorsey Run Correctional Facility in Jessup,

Maryland, has filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that defendants are feeding him

and other inmates peanut butter with known carcinogens, in violation of his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. ECF No. 1, Defendants Wayne Hill, Maria

Maxino-Sabundayo, and Vernon Crowell have filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint to which

Davis has responded. ECF No. 19, 25 & 27.1 Davis also separately moves for clerk’s entry of

default and default judgment (ECF Nos. 17 & 18), to amend the complaint, (ECF No. 26), and to

appoint counsel (ECF No. 28).

The Court has reviewed the pleadings and finds no need for a hearing. See D. Md. Local

R. 105.6. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, and Davis’

motions are denied. The Court turns first to the motion to dismiss.

I.

Background

While incarcerated, Davis worked in the kitchens at both Jessup Correctional Institution

and Dorsey Run Correctional Facility. He discovered that inmates are served “Peanut Kids”

Davis moved for an extension of time to respond to the motion (ECF No. 25) which the Court grants nunc pro tunc.

peanut butter, which purportedly includes a warning “stamp” on the package alerting the consumer

that the peanut butter “may expose you to a cancerous chemical component ‘acrylamide’” as well

as “lead.” ECF No. 1 at 3. The Complaint alleges that the peanut butter is served almost every

week. Defendants are officers within the Maryland Division of Corrections, and they generally

authorize the provision of meals at the prisons. From this, the Complaint avers that Defendants

are responsible for Davis having consumed “this poison for the last 3 yrs [sic].” Id. Davis requests

money damages for his “pain and suffering” and that the Court enjoin the Division of Corrections

from serving the peanut butter in the future. Id. at 5.

II.

Analysis

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the

complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

r'N2

662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the Court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although courts

should construe pleadings of self-represented litigants liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

\

94 (2007), legal conclusions devoid of supporting facts do not suffice, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The

Court must examine the complaint as a whole and construe the complaint facts as true and most

favorably to the plaintiff to ascertain whether the claim survives challenge. Albright v. Oliver, 510

U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm ’rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.

2005).

Although Defendants front many arguments for dismissal, the Court focuses solely on why

the claim fails as a matter of law. Construed most charitably to Davis, the Complaint avers that

Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment

when, they allowed Peanut Kids peanut butter to be served to him. The Eighth Amendment

■

2

“protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Iko v. Shreve, 535

F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).

Conditions of confinement that “involve wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,” or which

“deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” may amount to cruel and

unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). But harsh or restrictive

conditions alone do not violate the Eighth Amendment because such conditions “are part of the

penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id.

An unconstitutional conditions claim must plausibly aver that the defendant deprived the

inmate of “a basic human need” that was objectively sufficiently serious, and “that subjectively the

officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166

(4th Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “These requirements spring from the text

of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly

be called ‘punishment,’ and absent severity, such punishment cannot be called ‘cruel and

unusual.’” Iko, 535 F.3d at 238 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991)). For

the deprivation to be objectively serious, some facts need to show that the inmate suffered “serious

or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions;” or that a

substantial risk of such serious harm exists from the inmate’s “unwilling exposure to the

challenged conditions.” Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166 (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381

(4th Cir. 1993)). Thus, “a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious

illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year” violates the Eighth Amendment,

even if “the complaining inmate shows no serious current symptoms.” Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993); see also Webb v. Deboo, 423 F. App’x 299, 300 (4th Cir. 2011). As to the

subjective element of the claim, the complaint must plausibly aver that that the defendant knew of

3

and recklessly disregarded the excessive risk of harm to the inmate’s health or safety. See Wilson,

501 U.S. at 302-03 (applying the deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement

claims).

Viewing the Complaint facts as true and most favorably to Davis, the claim fails firstly

' because no facts make plausible that Davis had been deprived of a basic human need through

\

extraordinarily harsh confinement conditions. The Complaint avers that Davis learned of the

health risks associated with a certain brand peanut butter because he saw a warning label on the

&

product. But no facts make plausible that Davis was forced to eat the offending peanut butter or

i7 ?

had otherwise been deprived a basic life necessity if he chose not to eat the peanut butter.

f

Additionally, no facts make plausible that Defendants subjectively knew about the label warnings

on the peanut butter and recklessly disregarded them. The Complaint merely alleges that

defendants generally “order and approve” the food served to inmates. ECF No. 1 at 4. General

involvement in food services does not permit the reasonable inference that Defendants knowingly

authorized the provision of this particular peanut butter. Accordingly, the claim fails and must be

dismissed.2

III.

Davis’ Motions

Davis’ motions can be disposed of summarily. As to his motions for entry of default

pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, default judgment is reserved for

those matters where the adversary process has been halted by an unresponsive party. See United

States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993). That is not this case. Although

2 Davis also named “Peanut Kids” as a third defendant, but because Davis did not perfect service on Peanut Kids, the

corporation has not appeared in the case. Additionally, no constitutional claim may lie against a private corporation

for which no state action is alleged. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, all allegations against Peanut Kids are

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

4

Davis is correct that the Defendants had filed their motion beyond the original filing deadline, they

also sought an extension of time and ultimately filed a substantive motion to dismiss the claim.

Defendants can hardly be deemed an unresponsive party. Further, because the Complaint fails to

V state a legally cognizable cause of action, default judgment cannot be granted in any event. See

Olekanma v. Wolfe, 2017 WL 784121 (D. Md. Mar. 1,2017) (noting that “entry of default [means]

only that the well-pled allegations in a complaint as to liability are taken as true.”) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). The motion is thus denied.

As for Davis’ motion to amend the Complaint, Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he court

should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” But if the proposed amendment is

futile, the Court may deny the motion. An amendment is futile if the amended claim still fails as

la matter of law. See Katyle v. Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc. 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2011), citing

United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008).

Here, the proposed amended complaint adds defendants, bortHealiegations otherwise mirrorthe$e

of the original complaint. ECF No. 26-1. Accordingly, the proposed amended complaint suffers

from the same defects as the operative Complaint, and so the motion to amend is denied as futile.

Last, the Court turns to Davis’ motion for court appointed counsel. ECF NO. 28. Because

the Complaint will be dismissed and Davis’ other requests for relief denied, the case is at an end.

Accordingly, the motion for court appointed counsel is denied as moot.

IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 19, is GRANTED.

Davis’ Motions for Clerk’s Entry of Default (ECF No. 17), for Default Judgment (ECF No. 18),

to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 26) and to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 28) are DENIED. Davis’

5

Motion to Extend Time to File Response (ECF No. 25) is GRANTED nunc pro tunc. A separate

Order follows.

/S/

1/30/23'

Paula Xinis

United States District Judge

Date

6