Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Justin Glover, Jr., Petitioner v. Tom McGinley, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, et al.

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APPENDIX A

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Case 3:14-cv-01800-MWB-MP Document 80 Filed 08/15/23 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 22-2126

JUSTIN GLOVER, JR.,

Appellant

SUPERINTENDENT FAYETTE SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-14-cv-01800)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

July 13, 2023

Before: PHIPPS, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came to be considered on the record on appeal from the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and was submitted on July 13,

2023. On consideration whereof, it is now hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the order of the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered on May 18, 2022, be and

Case 3:14-cv-01800-MWB-MP Document 80 Filed 08/15/23 Page 2 of 2

the same is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs shall not be taxed in this matter. All of the above

in accordance with the Opinion of this Court.

ATTEST:

s/'Patricia ST Dodszuweit

Clerk

Dated:

August 15, 2023

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

-No7 22-2126

JUSTIN GLOVER, JR.,

Appellant

SUPERINTENDENT FAYETTE SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-14-cv-01800)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

July 13, 2023

Before: PHIPPS, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: August 15, 2023)

OPINION*

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.

Justin Glover, an inmate serving a life sentence at State Correctional Institution - Fayette,

appeals the denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from a judgment denying his petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. In that motion, he claimed actual innocence for the first time as a basis

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute

binding precedent.

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for allowing reconsideration of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that the District

Court rejected in denying his petition. For the reasons below, we will affirm that order.

In 2006, Glover was criminally charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin

County, Pennsylvania, for first-degree murder, conspiracy to murder, and abuse of a corpse. At

trial, the prosecution argued that Glover and a codefendant killed another man, Wesley Person,

for skimming proceeds from a fraudulent loan scheme that the three men ran together. Person

was last seen shopping a couple of days before Christmas in 2005, and through circumstantial

evidence, the prosecution asserted that Glover along with his codefendant killed Person in a

house in Harrisburg owned by the codefendant and afterwards burned Person’s body on the side

of Interstate 83, across the Pennsylvania border in Maryland. Although the prosecution had no

direct evidence that Glover was at either the murder scene or the body dump, cell phone data

suggested that Glover was in Maryland near the location of the burned body on the night of the

murder. Also, several witnesses testified about the fraudulent loan scheme and Glover’s

incriminating behavior during the days surrounding Person’s disappearance. One of those

witnesses, Abdul McCauley, testified that he had seen Person leaving the shopping mall with

Glover the day Person disappeared, and that Glover had seemed anxious and paranoid in the days

following the murder and at Person’s funeral. The jury convicted Glover on all three counts, and

he received a life-without-parole sentence.

Glover challenged his conviction through the state-court system. On direct appeal, his

conviction and sentence were sustained. Later, he collaterally challenged his conviction through

a series of petitions and appeals under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, commonly

referred to as the ‘PCRA.’ See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat §§ 9541—46. Those efforts were similarly

unsuccessful.

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In 2014, after the denial of the first of his PCRA petitions and the related appellate

proceedings, Glover petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Middle District of

Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see also id. § 2241(d) (permitting prisoners in state custody

to file habeas petitions in either the federal district in which they are incarcerated or the federal

district encompassing the state court in which they were convicted). In his petition, Glover

claimed that his state-court trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach McCauley based

on a plea bargain that McCauley received from the prosecution on unrelated charges.

But Glover had not presented that argument in his initial PCRA challenge. By not doing

so, Glover waived his ability to raise it on further PCRA petitions. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 9544(b) (“[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before

trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”).

And because that rule foreclosed collateral review of that issue in the state courts, the District

Court considered that claim procedurally defaulted and dismissed his petition. See Shinn v.

Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1732 (2022) (“Under [the] doctrine [of procedural default], federal

courts generally decline to hear any federal claim that was not presented to the state courts

‘consistent with [the State’s] own procedural rules.’” (last alteration in original) (quoting

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000))). Glover attempted to appeal that ruling, but

this Court denied a certificate of appealability, and the Supreme Court rejected Glover’s petition

challenging that order. See Glover v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 2017 WL 7798635, at *1 (3d

Cir. Nov. 16, 2017) (denying certificate of appealability); Glover v. Lane, 138 S. Ct. 1991

(mem.) (denying petition for writ of certiorari). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

On May 3, 2021, Glover filed pro se a motion for relief from judgment with respect to

the order of August 1, 2017, denying his federal habeas petition. He did so under Rule 60(b)(6),

claiming actual innocence as a gateway to excuse the procedural default as to his ineffective-

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assistance-of-counsel claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524,

531-32, 532 n.4 (2005) (recognizing that Rule 60(b)(6) motions challenging procedural default

are not barred as second or successive petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)). The District Court

denied that motion, finding that the evidence Glover presented did not satisfy the standards of

Rule 60(b)(6) or establish his actual innocence necessary to consider the merits of his

procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Glover timely appealed, and this

Court granted a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.

To overcome the procedural default and allow consideration of the merits of his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Glover must establish actual innocence. See Howell v.

Superintendent Albion SCI, 978 F.3d 54, 59 (3d Cir. 2020); see also McQuiggin v. Perkins,

569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). But proving actual innocence is a heavy burden: the petitioner must

demonstrate that “in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted tofmd him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (emphasis

added). That “demanding” standard is “satisfied only in the ‘rare’ and ‘extraordinary’ case.”

Reeves v. Fayette SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386,

392).

Glover’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion does not clear that high threshold. His principal evidence

of actual innocence is a sworn statement by McCauley’s former cellmate, who claims that

McCauley provided false testimony against Glover in return for the favorable plea deal. But the

crux of that statement is hearsay - the former cellmate’s statement about McCauley, see Fed R.

Evid. 801(c) - and that falls, well short of the reliability required for an actual innocence claim.

As this Court has recognized, actual innocence is “a supremely high bar” that cannot be cleared

by “the second-hand retelling of a jailhouse confession.” Sistrunk v. Rozum, 614 F.3d 181, 192

(3d Cir. 2012); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993); Howell, 978 F.3d at 59

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(evaluating the reliability of the new evidence before turning to the inquiry as to whether the jury

could have convicted petitioner in light of the new evidence).1

Nor could the affidavit — even if it were reliable — overcome the other evidence presented

at trial of Glover’s guilt. If taken as reliable, the affidavit suggests that there was a basis for

impeaching McCauley as his plea agreement provided a strong motive for him to lie: in return

for his testimony, he served only 30 days of probation for a crime for which he faced up to 11

years in prison. Even so, that alone does not clear the actual innocence bar because “mere

impeachment evidence is generally not sufficient to show actual innocence by clear and

convincing evidence.” Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 335 (3d Cir. 2012).

And in this case, Glover does not complement McCauley’s impeachability with

additional “individual and fact-specific” reasons that support actual innocence. Howell, 978 F.3d

at 60. To the contrary, despite not attempting to impeach McCauley on the basis of his plea

deal,2 Glover’s trial counsel conducted an extensive cross-examination and impeached

McCauley on other grounds - prior inconsistent statements and an evidence-tampering

conviction. Also, while McCauley was an important witness, the prosecution could make its

case without him as multiple other witnesses testified to Glover’s involvement in the loan

1 The District Court found that the delay between the swearing of the affidavit (June 2019) and

Glover’s filing of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion (May 2021) also undermined the reliability of the

affidavit. While a court “may consider how the timing of [the petitioner’s] submission .. . bears

on the probable reliability of that evidence,” Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161 (quoting House v. Bell,

547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006)), this delay is not the type that raises reliability concerns. See House,

547 U.S. at 558 (Roberts, C J., concurring) (noting fourteen-year delay in witnesses coming

forward following trial undermined the testimony’s reliability). It is reasonable for a party,

especially an incarcerated person, to secure a sworn statement while a witness is willing and able

to provide it - even before such a statement may be used in litigation.

2 McCauley’s sentence of thirty days’ probation and a fine became final on November 14, 2006,

well before McCauley testified in Glover’s trial in February of 2008. The fact that McCauley

had already served his sentence by the time of Glover’s trial diminishes any prejudice that

Glover may have suffered by Defense counsel’s failure to impeach for bias based on his plea

agreement; he had little to gain by cooperating further with the Government.

Case 3:14-cv-01800-MWB-MP Document 80-1 Filed 08/15/23 Page 6 of 6

scheme and his suspicious behavior the day of and following Person’s disappearance. In

addition to that testimony, the prosecution presented cell phone data that placed Glover near the

precise location Person’s body was found the night of the murder.

Thus, Glover cannot show his actual innocence, and this Court cannot reach his

underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Accordingly, we will affirm the District

Court’s order denying Glover’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

APPENDIX B

Case3:14-cv-01800-MWB-MP Document74 Filed 05/18/22 Page lot9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3:14-CV-01800

JUSTIN GLOVER,

(Chief Judge Brann)

Petitioner,

MARK CAPOZZA,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

May 18,2022

Petitioner Justin Glover returns to this Court, once again seeking to

challenge his 2008 state-court conviction and sentence of life imprisonment for

homicide and related offenses. This time, Glover has filed both a pro se motion

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) claiming “actual innocence”1 as

well as a counseled “supplemental” petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254.2 Glover cannot satisfy Rule 60(b)(6)’s demanding requirements

and the Court has no jurisdiction to consider his second or successive Section 2254

petition. Accordingly, the Court will deny relief on Glover’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion

and dismiss without prejudice his supplemental habeas petition for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

Doc. 66.

2 Doc. 68.

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Glover’s original Section 2254 petition was denied on August 1, 2017, by

the late Honorable Richard P. Conaboy.3 Judge Conaboy dismissed some claims

as procedurally defaulted and denied other claims on the merits.4 The United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied Glover’s request for a

certificate of appealability,5 and the Supreme Court of the United States denied

certiorari on May 14, 2018.6

Glover, however, has continued to file various motions in this Court,

attempting to reopen his habeas proceedings or raise additional claims.7 In May

2021,8 Glover filed the instant pro se Rule 60(b)(6) motion, and then in December

2021 filed a counseled “supplemental” Section 2254 petition raising two grounds

for relief. The following month, counsel withdrew the second claim in the

supplemental habeas petition.9 In May 2022, Glover, through counsel, requested

an evidentiary hearing.10 The Court will briefly explain why Glover’-s filings do

not merit relief.

As to the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Glover has not made the requisite showing

to warrant this extraordinary remedy. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)

Docs. 45, 46.

See Doc. 45 at 4-19.

Doc. 52.

Glover v. Lane, 138 S. Ct. 1991 (2018) (mem.).

See, e.g., Docs. 53, 54, 56, 57, 59-64, 66, 68.

Glover previously filed an identical Rule 60(b)(6) motion in February 2021, but that motion

was denied as premature. See Doc. 65 at 2.

9 Doc. 69 23-24.

10 Doc.70.

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permits a court to grant relief from a final judgment or order “for any other reason

that justifies relief’ other than the reasons listed elsewhere in Rule 60(b).11 Relief

under Rule 60(b)(6) should be granted in only “extraordinary circumstances

where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.

”12

In the habeas context, Rule 60(b) motions cannot be used to circumvent the

AEDPA’s statutory restrictions for filing second or successive habeas petitions.13

Thus, Rule 60(b) motions that bring new claims or “attack the federal court’s

previous resolution of a claim on the merits” are not true Rule 60(b) motions but

are instead disguised second or successive habeas petitions.14

Glover appears to argue that he is not bringing new claims and can satisfy

Rule 60(b)(6)’s stringent demands. He contends that he has newly discovered

evidence that would meet the “actual innocence” gateway requirements in

McQuiggin v. Perkins,15 This new evidence, Glover contends, would permit

review of an “underlying procedurally defaulted claim” of ineffective assistance of

counsel asserted in his original habeas petition.16

11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014).

12 Cox, 757 F.3d at 120 (emphasis added) (quoting Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140

(3d Cir. 1993)); see also Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536 (2005) (noting that relief under

Rule 60(b)(6) demands a showing of “extraordinary circumstances”).

13 See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531-32.

14 Id. (emphasis omitted).

15 569 U.S. 383 (2013).

16 See Doc. 66 at 5. Glover does not identify the ‘"underlying procedurally defaulted claim” for

which he seeks Rule 60(b)(6) relief.

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The primary reason that Glover cannot meet Rule 60(b)(6)’s exacting

standards is that he filed his motion almost two years after discovering the “new

evidence”—an affidavit from Jonathan Cornish, dated June 20, 2019, that asserts

that a witness at Glover’s trial lied to procure a favorable prosecutorial deal for

himself.17 “[0]ne of the critical factors in the equitable and case-dependent nature

of the 60(b)(6) analysis ... is whether the 60(b)(6) motion under review was

brought within a reasonable time[.] ”18 Glover has offered no explanation for why

he waited nearly two years—until February 2021—to file his Rule 60(b)(6)

motion, which cannot be considered a “reasonable time” under any metric.19

Moreover, it does not appear that Glover ever raised this claim in state court,

which further undercuts his attempt to obtain Rule 60(b) relief.20 Glover’s lack of

diligence, the long delay between learning of the information in the affidavit and

filing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, and his failure to exhaust other available avenues of

relief militate strongly against granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief. The Court

additionally notes that Glover’s motion does not implicate a post-judgment change

in law, which is often a weighty factor in Rule 60(b)(6) determinations.21

17 See Doc. 73 at 3.

18 Cox, 757 F.3d at 115-16.

19 Although Glover filed a third PCRA petition in state court and was attempting to exhaust that

petition in 2019 and 2020, the Cornish affidavit was not part of that third petition. See

Commonwealth v. Glover, 253 A.3d 317, 2021 WL 1627218, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 27,

2021) (table) (nonprecedential).

20 See Cox, 757 F.3d at 126 (“Where a movant has not exhausted available avenues of review, a

court may deny relief under Rule 60(b)(6).” (citation omitted)).

21 See Satterfield v. Dist. Attorney Phila., 872 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 2017).

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Even assuming Glover could make the extraordinarily difficult showing of

actual innocence under McQuiggin,22 which is unlikely,23 he cannot establish that

at least one of the defaulted ineffective-assistance claims has merit.24 This fact

further frustrates his Rule 60(b)(6) argument because “[a] court need not provide a

remedy under 60(b)(6) for claims of dubious merit that only weakly establish

ineffective assistance by trial or post-conviction counsel.”25

The gravamen of the first procedurally defaulted Sixth Amendment claim is

that Glover’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of

cellular telephone site data evidence from a phone belonging to Karen Gadson.26

In his original habeas petition, Glover claimed the evidence was obtained in

22 The gateway actual innocence standard requires “evidence of innocence so strong that a court

cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial

was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Reeves v. Fayette SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 161 (3d

Cir. 2018) (quoting McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386, 392). The petitioner must “persuadeQ the

district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted

to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Satterfield, 872 F.3d at 163 (alteration in

original) (quoting McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386, 399).

23 It is doubtful that Glover can satisfy the McQuiggin actual innocence standard through

Cornish’s affidavit. As with the Rule 60(b)(6) analysis, “[unexplained delay in presenting

new evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite

showing” of actual innocence. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399. Furthermore, while McCauley’s

alleged statements to Cornish 14 years after the crime—if true—may demonstrate that

McCauley testified untruthfully, they do not unequivocally exonerate Glover. According to

the affidavit, McCauley claimed that “he knew Justin Glover could not have possession of’ a

particular inculpatory cell phone, but such vague statements do not cast doubt on the jury

verdict such that the McQuiggin standard is satisfied.

24 To show a Sixth Amendment violation for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must

demonstrate that (1) his attorney’s conduct was “deficient,” i.e., fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness; and (2) the deficient conduct prejudiced the defense. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).

25 Cox, 757 F.3d at 124-25.

26 Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 1-1 at 14-24. Karen Gadson is Glover’s mother. See Doc. 1-1 at 15; Doc.

45 at 3 n.2.

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violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the court order

used to secure the cellphone site data was actually issued a month after police

acquired the records from the cellphone service provider.27 He further argued that

the duration of the cell-site location information obtained by police moved the

search beyond the statutory “court order” realm into the Fourth Amendment zone

requiring a warrant based on probable cause.28 Glover maintained that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these arguments to suppress the cell-site

location data.

The fatal flaw with this claim is that the cellphone was not Glover’s, so he

lacked Fourth Amendment “standing”—that is, a legitimate expectation of

pnvacy—to assert a constitutional violation to attempt to suppress the evidence.29

Glover admits that Gadson was the subscriber for the cellphone in question.30 The

Court further observes that it was not until 2018—ten years after Glover’s trial—

that the Supreme Court of the United States held that cell-site location information

is generally protected under the Fourth Amendment and requires a warrant

27 Doc. 1-1 at 17.

28 Id. at 21-23.

29 See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The ‘standing’ inquiry, in

the Fourth Amendment context, is shorthand for the determination of whether a litigant’s

Fourth Amendment rights have been implicated.”); see also Byrd v. United States,__U.S.__ ,

138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018) (explaining that Fourth Amendment standing is “useful

shorthand” for having a “cognizable Fourth Amendment interest” in the place or thing searched

but “should not be confused with Article III standing”).

30 Doc. 1-1 at 14-15.

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supported by probable cause.31 It can hardly be said that Glover’s trial counsel was

deficient for failing to raise a Fourth Amendment suppression argument for a right

that had yet to be established and for a search in which Glover lacked Fourth

Amendment “standing” to contest. Because Glover cannot demonstrate the first

Strickland prong—deficient conduct—for at least one of the defaulted ineffectiveassistance claims, the Court “need not provide a remedy under 60(b)(6)” for it.32

Glover’s supplemental habeas petition requires less discussion. In that

petition, Glover attempts to reassert a claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel.33 He contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach one

of the Commonwealth’s key witnesses—Abdul McCauley—about favorable

treatment McCauley received from the Commonwealth in exchange for his trial

testimony. This claim appears to have been raised in his original habeas petition,

but determined to be procedurally defaulted.35

Glover cannot file another Section 2254 habeas petition in this Court without

authorization from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.36

Without such authorization, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to

31 See generally Carpenter v. United States, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). Even the circuit

court case that Glover cited in support of his ineffectiveness argument post-dates his trial. See,

e.g., Doc. 1-1 at 25 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).

32 Cox, 757 F.3d at 124-25.

33 As noted above, although the supplemental Section 2254 petition contained two grounds for

relief, Glover subsequently withdrew the second claim. See Doc. 69.

34 See Doc. 1-1 at 41-44.

35 Doc. 45 at 4-9.

36 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).

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entertain his second or successive habeas petition.37 Thus, as jurisdiction is

lacking, the Court must dismiss or transfer the petition.38

Because Glover is represented by counsel, the Court declines to transfer the

counseled petition to the Court of Appeals. Rather, if Glover and his attorney see

fit, they may apply for authorization from the Third Circuit to file a second or

successive habeas corpus petition in this Court. After all, Glover appears to be

asserting that “the factual predicate for the claim [involving the Cornish affidavit]

could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence[,]

and the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as

a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [Glover] guilty

of the underlying offense. ”39

AND NOW, upon consideration of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

Glover’s pro se motion (Doc. 66) for relief under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) is DENIED.

Glover’s “supplemental” Section 2254 petition, which is a second or

successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

37 See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 157 (2007). To the extent that an identical claim was

already raised in a previous petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 likewise requires the claim to be

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas

corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be

dismissed.”).

38 Burton, 549 U.S. at 157; Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 820-21 (3d Cir. 2005).

39 2 8 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).

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2254, is DISMISSED without prejudice to Glover’s right to seek

authorization from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit to file a second or successive Section 2254 petition in this

Court.

A certificate of appealability shall not issue, as Glover has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

BY THE COURT:

s/ ‘Matthew W. (Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

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APPENDIX C

Case: 22-2126

Document: 31-1

Page: 1

Date Filed: 10/06/2023

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

PATRICIA S. DODSZUWEIT

United States Court of Appeals

TELEPHONE

215-597-2995

CLERK

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

21400 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE

601 MARKET STREET

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106-1790

Website: www.csi3.uscourts.gov

October 6, 2023

Mr. Peter J. Welsh

United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

William J. Nealon Federal Building & United States Courthouse

235 N Washington Avenue

Scranton, PA 18503

RE: Justin Glover, Jr. v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, et al

Case Number: 22-2126

District Court Case Number: 3-1.4-cv-01800

Dear Mr. Welsh,

Enclosed herewith is the certified judgment together with copy of the opinion or certified

copy of the order in the above-captioned case(s). The certified judgment or order is

issued in lieu of a formal mandate and is to be treated in all respects as a mandate.

Counsel are advised of the issuance of the mandate by copy of this letter. The certified

judgment or order is also enclosed showing costs taxed, if any.

For the Court,

s/ Patricia S. Dodszuweit

Clerk

Date: October 6,2023

Amr/Cc: Ronald Eisenberg, Esq.

Ryan H. Lysaght, Esq.

John J. Waldron, Esq.

Case: 22-2126

Document: 31-2

Page: 1

Date Filed: 10/06/2023

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 22-2126

JUSTIN GLOVER, JR.,

Appellant

SUPERINTENDENT FAYETTE SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-14-cv-01800)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

July 13, 2023

Before: PHIPPS, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came to be considered on the record on appeal from the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and was submitted on July ii,

2023. On consideration whereof, it is now hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the order of the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered on May 18,2022, be and

Case: 22-2126

Document: 31-2

Page: 2

Date Filed: 10/06/2023

the same is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs shall not be taxed in this matter. All of the above

in accordance with the Opinion of this Court.

ATTEST:

s/ Patricia S. Dodszuweit

Clerk

Dated:

August 15, 2023

V. -0.'.4 'A

Certifie'd.y

of a forift^J

y^d issued in lieu

m atepft° 10/06/23

Teste:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Case: 22-2126

Document: 31-3

Page: 1

Date Filed: 10/06/2023

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 22-2126

JUSTIN GLOVER, JR.,

Appellant

SUPERINTENDENT FAYETTE SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-14-cv-01800)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

July 13,2023

Before: PHIPPS, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: August 15, 2023)

OPINION*

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.

Justin Glover, an inmate serving a life sentence at State Correctional Institution - Fayette,

appeals the denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from a judgment denying his petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. In that motion, he claimed actual innocence for the first time as a basis

* This disposition is not an opinion of the foil Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute