Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jonathan Ericksen, Petitioner v. United States

NO. _________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

____________

JONATHAN ERICKSEN,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

____________

On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Submitted in Behalf of

Petitioner, JONATHAN ERICKSEN

___________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

____________

DANIEL G. CRONIN

Assistant Federal Public Defender

650 Missouri Avenue, Rm. G10-A

East St. Louis, Illinois 62201

(618) 482-9050

(618) 482-9057 (fax)

Dan_Cronin@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

At the close of the government’s evidence at his jury trial for Attempted Enticement of a

Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), Petitioner Ericksen made an oral motion for judgment

of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That motion was

denied.

Following the jury’s guilty verdict, Petitioner Ericksen submitted a written motion for

judgment of acquittal, under Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That motion

was also denied, and the denial was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit.

Petitioner Ericksen concedes that the lower courts applied the current standard for such

motions: Whether there is any evidence, however weighed, which would support a guilty verdict.

Consequently, the issue respectfully presented is whether this Court should overrule its decision in

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 325 (1979), which rejected the “reasonable hypothesis” test for

motions for a judgment of acquittal.

i

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

LIST OF PARTIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. As a practical matter, the current legal standard for motions for a judgment of acquittal in

prosecutions like the one against Petitioner appears insurmountable. Return to the “reasonable

hypothesis” standard would make motions under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure viable again in all types of prosecutions.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2. The issue Petitioner raises is important, because the legal standard which currently applies to

motions for judgment of acquittal has the practical impact of making the denial of such motions

effectively unreviewable in prosecutions for Enticement of a Minor.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3. Petitioner has a meritorious claim that application of the “reasonable hypothesis” standard

supported his motion for a judgment of acquittal.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

iii

APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

District Court Memorandum and Order.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A1

Judgment in a Criminal Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A6

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A14

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Final Judgment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A16

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitutional Provisions

Page

U.S. Const. amend. V.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Cases

Griffin v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 2023 WL 6214219

(M.D.Fla., September 25, 2023). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 7

United States v. Allen, 383 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Butler, 496 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Castro-Aguirre, 983 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Clark, 787 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Ericksen, 2023 WL 4946723 (7th Cir. 2023). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4

United States v. Fearn, 589 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1978).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 2006).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Katz, 582 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. LaBudda, et al., 882 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Meadows, 91 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Moya, 721 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1983), reh’g denied;

cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1037 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

United States v. Oberhellmann, 946 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Payne, 102 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 1996), reh’g denied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

v

United States v. Peters, 277 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Pulungan, 569 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2009), reh’g denied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2008), reh’g denied; cert denied,

560 U.S. 933 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d (7th Cir. 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Other

Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 29. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 3, 4, 7, 8

vi

NO. ________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

____________

JONATHAN ERICKSEN,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

____________

On Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

____________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner JONATHAN ERICKSEN, by his court-appointed counsel Daniel G. Cronin,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the final

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, issued on August 3,

2023.

OPINIONS BELOW

The District Court issued a Memorandum and Order on November 18, 2022, which

denied the defense’s written motion for judgment of acquittal. (A1). The Judgment in a Criminal

Case was filed on February 7, 2023. (A6). On August 3, 2023, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a written order which affirmed the denial of the motion

1

for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Ericksen, 2023 WL 4946723 (7th Cir. 2023). (A14).

Also on August 3, 2023, the Seventh Circuit filed a final judgment affirming that denial. (A16).

JURISDICTION

On August 3, 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a

written order (A14) which affirmed the District Court’s denial of the defense’s written motion

for judgment of acquittal. (A1). The final judgment affirming that denial was also filed on

August 3, 2023. (A16).

No petition for rehearing was filed. This petition is timely filed within 90 days of that

date. Review by certiorari is sought pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1254(1).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “No

person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

The relevant provisions of Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are:

.......

Rule 29(a) and (c)(1), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The statutory provision under which Petitioner Ericksen was convicted provides:

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Procedural History

On March 13, 2021, Petitioner Ericksen was charged in a one-count complaint with

Attempted Enticement of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). On April 6, 2021,

Petitioner was indicted on the same charge.

Trial began on September 27, 2022. At the close of the government’s evidence, the

defense made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal, under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. That oral motion was denied, as was a subsequent written motion for a

judgment of acquittal. See Memorandum and Order of the District Court. (A1).

Judgment was imposed on February 7, 2023, and included a term of 120 months of

imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. See Judgment in a Criminal Case.

(A6). Financial penalties were a fine of $200.00, and a special assessment of $100.00. Id.

On February 21, 2023, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Both parties waived oral

argument, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled on the briefing. That ruling

came in the form of an Order filed on August 3, 2023, which affirmed the District Court’s denial

of the written motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Ericksen, 2023 WL 4946723

(7th Cir. 2023). (A14). Consistent with that Order, the Seventh Circuit issued its Final Judgment

(A16) against Petitioner that same day.

4

II. Factual Statement

In its Memorandum and Order (A1) which denied Petitioner’s written motion for

judgment of acquittal, the District Court accurately summarized the most salient facts:

On December 20, 2020, Ericksen began chatting with an individual that

he believed was named “Lindsey.” However, “Lindsey” was actually an undercover FBI Agent who was using the social media platform, Skout. The conversation later transitioned to a different platform named Kik. Ericksen was chatting

with “Lindsey” from March 10, 2021, until March 14, 2021. The conversation

between Ericksen and “Lindsey” was sexually charged. For example, Ericksen

told “Lindsey” that she can do “what ever you’re okay doing with me doing”

and promised to bring his “apatite” when referring to oral sex. Later he clarified

“you do want to have sex don’t you.” On March 13, Ericksen made plans to meet

“Lindsey,” asked for “Lindsey’s” address, traveled from Tennessee to Illinois,

arriving at the rendezvous point, and let her know when he would arrive.

After Ericksen’s arrival, he was stopped and interviewed by FBI Agents.

During the interview he admitted it was him communicating with the “Lindsey”

profile on both platforms, admitted to knowing she was 15 years old, and admitted to traveling from Tennessee to Illinois to meet the purported minor.

Memorandum and Order (A1) at p. 2.

To this summary, undersigned counsel respectfully adds four facts. The government

introduced into evidence that among the “sexually charged” communications was one from

Petitioner, telling “Lindsey”: “Wow! You are going to be a beautiful woman...Yeah you’re

going to have all the boys chasing you if they aren’t - - if they’re not already.” And Petitioner

responded “...no harm, no foul...” when informed by “Lindsey” that she was 15 years old.

On the other side of the ledger, the defense emphasized below that when Petitioner was

arrested by the F.B.I. at the location at which he had agreed to meet for sex with “Lindsey,”

Petitioner had neither the alcohol nor the condoms which he had promised to bring to her. Also,

Petitioner’s statements to the F.B.I. included skepticism that anyone who is who they claim to be

on the Internet; a skepticism reflected in the F.B.I.’s website on “romance scams.”

5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. As a practical matter, the current legal standard for motions for a judgment of

acquittal in prosecutions like the one against Petitioner appears insurmountable. Return to the

“reasonable hypothesis” standard would make motions under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure viable again in all types of prosecutions.

The legal standards which apply to a motion for judgment of acquittal are quite daunting:

A district court's ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal is reviewed

de novo. United States v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2008). Such a motion

should be granted only if there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction. Id.

A defendant's burden in showing the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction is “nearly insurmountable.” Id. We view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government and will overturn a conviction “only if the record

contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed,” from which the jury could

have found the defendant was guilty. Id. (quotation omitted). It is up to the jury

to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses; we do not

second-guess the jury's assessment of the evidence. United States v. Graham, 315

F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th Cir. 2008), reh’g denied; cert denied, 560 U.S.

933 (2010); see also United States v. Payne, 102 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 1996), reh’g denied. But

a different standard once applied, especially within the Fifth Circuit:

The defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal is tested in the Seventh

Circuit by the standard of whether substantial evidence, taken in the light most

favorable to the government, tends to show that the defendant is guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt. In the Fifth Circuit, a slightly more precise, but equivalent,

test has been developed. There the test of sufficiency of proof on a motion for

judgment of acquittal or denial of such a motion, is whether the jury might reasonably conclude that the evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis of the defendant’s

innocence. Another way of expressing the same rule is that the motion for judgment

of acquittal must be granted when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the government, is so scant that the jury could only speculate as to the defendant’s

guilt, and is such that a reasonably-minded jury must have a reasonable doubt as to

the defendant’s guilt.

United States v. Fearn, 589 F.2d 1316, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1978) (footnotes and citations omiitted).

But in that same year, this Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s “hypothesis of innocence” test, in

6

the context of its habeas review of a conviction in state court:

We hold that in a challenge to a state criminal conviction brought under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 - if the settled procedural prerequisites for such a claim have otherwise been satisfied - the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found

that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could

have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (footnotes omitted). And in the wake of Jackson

v. Virginia, lower courts declared that its previous decisions which referred to the hypothesis of

innocence test did so only as dicta. See, e.g., United States v. Moya, 721 F.2d 606, 609 (7th Cir.

1983), reh’g denied; cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1037 (1984).

At present, the “reasonable hypothesis” standard is very much the outlier. For example,

five weeks ago, a federal district court noted that it still applies in Florida’s state courts - but

only when a conviction rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. See Griffin v. Secretary,

Florida Department of Corrections, 2023 WL 6214219, *4 (FN 2) (M.D.Fla., September 25,

2023). Petitioner does not lightly ask this Court to consider reversing itself, but he and other

defendants like him have no other option if they are going to have meaningful recourse to Rule

29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2. The issue Petitioner raises is important, because the legal standard which currently

applies to motions for judgment of acquittal has the practical impact of making the denial of such

motions effectively unreviewable in prosecutions for Enticement of a Minor.

Undersigned counsel has been unable to find any cases within the Seventh Circuit in

which a prosecution for Enticement of a Minor or, as in Petitioner’s case, Attempted Enticement

of a Minor, were the subject of a judgment of acquittal. This is in stark contrast to the types of

charges within the same Circuit which have been made the subject of a judgment of acquittal:

7

Prosecutions Subjected to Judgment of Acquittal

Crime

Caption

Citation

Bank Robbery

U.S. v. Thornton

539 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2008)

Criminal Contempt

U.S. v. Oberhellmann

946 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1991)

Exporting Defense Articles

Without a License

U.S. v. Pulungan

569 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2009),

reh’g denied

False Statements to (1)

Draft Board (2) MODOT

(1) U.S. v. Butler

(2) U.S. v. Clark

(1) 496 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1974)

(2) 787 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2015)

Felon in Possession of Firearm

(1) U.S. v. Allen

(2) U.S. v. Groves

(3) U.S. v. Katz

(1) 383 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004)

(2) 470 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 2006)

(3) 582 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2009)

Money Laundering Conspiracy

U.S. v. Castro-Aguirre 983 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2020)

Perjury

U.S. v. Tranowski

659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981)

Possession with Intent

to Distribute C/S

U.S. v. Jones

713 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2013)

Possession of an Unregistered

Firearm

U.S. v. Meadows

91 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 1996)

Sale of Stolen Savings Bonds

U.S. v. LaBudda, et al. 882 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1989)

Sexual Abuse

U.S. v. Peters

277 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2002)

Transport and Possession

of Contraband Cigarettes

U.S. v. Mohamed

759 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2014)

Wire Fraud

U.S. v. Weimert

819 F.3d (7th Cir. 2016)

Whatever the reasons for this discrepancy (and the prejudicial nature of any charge

involving illegal sexual activity with a child would seem to be a leading candidate), it is

respectfully submitted that Due Process is not well-served by a legal standard which makes a

jury’s verdict in a particular kind of case effectively immune from the provisions of Rule 29 of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

8

3. Petitioner has a meritorious claim that application of the “reasonable hypothesis”

standard supported his motion for a judgment of acquittal.

Under the “hypothesis of innocence” standard, a judgment of acquittal is justified on the

following evidence from Petitioner’s trial:

•

There is a general understanding that people are not necessarily who they claim to be on

the Internet, as the FBI’s website warns regarding “romance scams.”

•

Petitioner expressed this skepticism to the two FBI agents who conducted his postMiranda interview, and explained previous interactions on the Internet which led him to

conclude that people are not who they claim to be on the Internet.

•

Certain of Petitioner’s actions - or more accurately, inactions - were consistent with the

skepticism which he expressed. Specifically, he brought neither the alcohol or condoms

which he agreed to bring when exchanging messages with an undercover FBI employee

posing as a 15-year-old girl.

As a matter of law, a defendant cannot have the requisite intent for an Attempted

Enticement if he does not believe he is actually communicating with a minor. And as noted

supra, there is evidence supporting that hypothesis regarding Petitioner. 1

Petitioner concedes that his guilt is another possible hypothesis (and obviously the

conclusion reached by the jury), based on evidence which include his messages about having sex

with a purported 15-year-old girl, driving approximately 1 ½ hours to the meeting location, and

post-Miranda statements to the FBI that he understood the person with whom he exchanged

1

It is noted that the District Court concluded that a judgment of acquittal would not be

supported by the evidence below, even if the “reasonable hypothesis” standard was applied. See

Memorandum and Order (A1) at pp. 3 - 4.

9

messages was a 15-year-old girl. It is on account of these concessions that Petitioner urges a

return to the “hypothesis of innocence” standard previously applied by lower federal courts

(most notably, within the Fifth Circuit) to motions for judgment of acquittal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner suggests that his case warrants this Court’s grant of

certiorari.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Daniel G. Cronin

DANIEL G. CRONIN

Assistant Federal Public Defender

650 Missouri Avenue

East St. Louis, Illinois 62201

(618) 482-9050

(618) 482-9057 (fax)

Dan_Cronin@fd.org

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

10

APPENDIX

District Court Memorandum and Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A1

Judgment in a Criminal Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A6

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A14

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Final Judgment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A16

11

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