Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Semaj Lemar Williams, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefNov 1, 2023

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No. ______________________

______________________________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

______________________________

SEMAJ WILLIAMS – PETITIONER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA – RESPONDENT

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

__________________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Takura Nyamfukudza

Chartier & Nyamfukudza, P.L.C.

Attorney for Petitioner – CJA Appointment

2295 Sower Boulevard

Okemos, MI 48864

517.885.3305

takura@cndefenders.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Mr. Williams moved to suppress the evidence related to the controlled

substances because he was unlawfully detained when there was no

reasonable suspicion to justify the detention. Did the district court

improperly deny suppression and did the appellate court improperly affirm

the district court?

II.

Mr. Williams moved to suppress the evidence related to the controlled

substances because the officers carried out a prolonged detention beyond

the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for

the traffic violations. Did the district court improperly deny suppression

and did the appellate court improperly affirm the district court?

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented

List of Parties

Table of Contents

Index to Appendices

Table of Authorities Cited

Opinions Below

Jurisdiction

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

Statement of the Case

Reasons for Granting the Petition

I. There was insufficient particularized suspicion to conclude

that the contraband officers found in the car belonged to Mr.

Williams.

II. Officers carried out a prolonged detention beyond the time

reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket

for traffic violations.

Conclusion and Relief Requested

iii

vii

viii

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A

United States v. Semaj Williams, 22-1522 (August 14, 2023)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32; 121 S. Ct. 447; 148 19

L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000)

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491; 103 S. Ct. 1319; 75 L. Ed. 2d 229

(1983)

Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2020)

Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183; 206 L. Ed. 2d 412 (2020)

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609; 191 L. Ed. 2d 492

(2015)

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348; 135 S. Ct. 1609; 191

L. Ed. 2d 492; (2015)

Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40; 88 S. Ct. 1889; 20 L. Ed. 2d

917 (1968)

United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1985)

United States v. Ellis, 497 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2007)

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675; 105 S. Ct. 1568; 84 L.

Ed. 2d 605 (1985)

United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2012)

21, 22

11, 21, 22

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. Amend. IV

ix, 12, 19

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

viii

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is

unpublished.

vii

JURISDICTION

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

decided Mr. Williams’ case was August 14, 2023. No petition for rehearing was filed.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

viii

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. Williams was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute and

possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine as well as one count of possession

with intent to distribute methamphetamine. (Indictment, RE 1, Page ID # 1, 2.) Each

count subjected him to up to life in prison. (Penalty Sheet, RE 05, Page ID # 8.)

Before Mr. Williams entered a guilty plea, there was a motion hearing

regarding suppression of the contraband found in a car following a traffic stop.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 318.) Mr. Williams argued that he was detained

without reasonable suspicion, there were insufficient specific and articulable facts to

justify the conclusion that the drugs found in the car were his, and that the stop was

prolonged unreasonably. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 401, 402, 403, 404, 405.) The

court denied the motion. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 437.)

During the evidentiary hearing, evidence was presented that on March 13,

2021, Mr. Williams was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Ms. Ellis. (Transcript, RE

81, Page ID # 323, 336, 364, 372.) The vehicle was parked in front of 935 Princeton in

Kalamazoo, Michigan, when Officer Colin Morgan drove by close to 9:30 p.m. that

evening. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 324-325.) Due to previous and unrelated

events, Officer Morgan believed that narcotics were being sold from that address.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 324.) This, however, was unsubstantiated. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 380-381.)

As he passed the vehicle, the officer claimed to have noticed the interior dome

light in the car was on, which led him to believe that someone had recently gotten

into or out of the car. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 325, 331.) Officer Morgan said

that was when he “planned on watching the vehicle for an extended period of time,”

but as he passed the vehicle it pulled away from the curb and did not use a turn

signal, which is a violation of the law. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 326, 331, 332333.) He claimed to have been watching the vehicle in his rearview and side view

mirrors as it pulled away from the curb. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 325-326, 332,

333.)

At this time, the officer turned around and caught up with the vehicle in order

to get the license plate number. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 326-327.) He ran the

license plate number through the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) and

discovered that the vehicle was not insured. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 327.) Due

to the lack of insurance, the officer decided to conduct a traffic stop on the vehicle.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 328, 334.) The officer testified that the car pulled over

immediately and that it seemed to do so very abruptly. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID

# 335.) He alleged that this is not typical and that it appeared that the driver hit the

brakes “very hard.” (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 335.)

The officer shined his flashlight into the vehicle while speaking with the driver.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 336, 340.) He saw four people in the vehicle and

testified that he recognized Mr. Williams—who was seated in the back seat on the

passenger side—as one of the passengers. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 336-337.)

The officer claimed to know Mr. Williams due to being called to the street Mr.

Williams resided on for “fights, shots fired and disturbances.” (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 337.) But this was an unfair characterization of Mr. Williams since the

officer then clarified that Mr. Williams was not a suspect in those crimes. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 338.)

The prosecutor, however, was not as genuine and unfairly eluded that Mr.

Williams was a person of interest whenever the police were called to the street he

lived on. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 415.) And when prompted by the prosecutor,

the officer added that Mr. Williams was listed as a “priority offender” with the

Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 338.) A

priority offender is a person who is “committing the most crimes in the city

specifically related to gun and gang violence.” (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 338.)

Officer Morgan claimed that Mr. Williams seemed nervous during the traffic

stop, avoided eye contact with the officer, and tried to “shield” his face. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 338, 341-342.) The officer claimed that Mr. Williams had “rapid

breathing” and was allegedly making “furtive movements” with his feet. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 339.) But then the officer also said that he was focused on the hands

of all of the people who were in the vehicle for safety purposes. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 339-340.) At some point, another officer—Officer Whitaker—arrived on

scene and the officers communicated on what they were seeing. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 342-343.) Officer Whitaker claimed that she saw furtive movements from

Mr. Williams, too. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 343, 399-400.)

Officer Morgan ultimately returned to his vehicle to confirm Ms. Ellis’ driving

status, insurance information, and plate information. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID

#344, 346.) He also checked to see if any of the occupants had outstanding warrants.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 344.) It should be noted that the officer’s body camera

should automatically activate with the patrol vehicle lights but did not in this case.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 345.) Curiously here, the body camera was not

recording until Officer Morgan manually activated it when he returned to his vehicle

for these checks—so the so-called “furtive movements” were not captured on video.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 345.)

During the computer checks, Officer Morgan discovered that the driver had an

expired temporary instructor’s permit. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 347.) This was

an arrestable offense. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 347.) It was also discovered that

the driver had a warrant out for her arrest for a misdemeanor offense. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 354-355.) It is worth noting here that despite having committed an

arrestable offense and having a warrant out for her arrest—which was the alleged

reason for the delay in the traffic stop—she was never arrested. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 348-357, 367.) Instead, she was only issued a citation for the civil infraction

of no proof of insurance, a warning for driving with no license, and received a verbal

warning for failing to use a traffic signal. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 369-370, 372373.) At this time, the officer asked the driver to step out of the car for a “private

conversation.” (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 348.) However, this was not just done in

reference to the expired permit and lack of insurance, but also to ask her about his

“previous observations” regarding the vehicle’s “contact” at 935 Princeton Avenue.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 348-349.)

The information provided by the driver did not satisfy the officer, who seemed

to believe that his preferred direction of travel was the only correct way to get from

where Ms. Ellis said she left to the place she was headed. (Transcript, RE 81, Page

ID # 349-350.) But there were multiple routes that could have been taken.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 392.) The driver also denied making any stops,

including at 935 Princeton. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 351.) Upon further pushing

by the officer, the driver stated that she had stopped at her father’s house on the same

street. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 352.) But, according to the officer, this address

was allegedly four or five blocks from where the officer had seen the car by the curb.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 352.)

Officer Morgan also asked Ms. Ellis if she knew the names of her passengers.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 353.) The officer testified that Ms. Ellis did not know

their legal names and was only able to provide the “street names” of the passengers.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 353, 391.) The officer painted this as unusual and

claimed that the use of street names typically signals that that person is involved in

gang activity. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 353-354.) However, this does not account

for other factors, such as that “street names” could actually be just family nicknames

that were still used. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 377.)

The officer also asked Ms. Ellis if there was anything illegal in the car, to which

she responded, “There shouldn’t be.” (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 355.) Here, the

officer seemed to think this was an odd answer and stated, “People who are driving

their vehicle know 100 percent whether they have something illegal or not inside of

their vehicle. When somebody makes a statement like that, it means they genuinely

don’t know or there could be something illegal in the vehicle.” (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 355-356.)

When the officer asked the driver why the dome light was on, the driver

allegedly said that the back seat passenger had gotten out of the vehicle. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 356.) The driver then recanted her story about stopping at her

father’s house when the officer relentlessly asked her about it. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 357.) It was at this point that the officer made the decision to pull all of the

passengers out of the vehicle in order to “further the narcotics investigation” that he

claimed he had suspicion of. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 357.)

Mr. Williams was the first passenger pulled out because the officer perceived

him to be the “biggest threat.” (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 358.) Mr. Williams was

patted down to ensure he had no weapons on his person. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID

# 358.) Mr. Williams had his cell phone in his hand and appeared to be recording the

interaction with the police. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 359.)

Later, Officer Morgan also spoke to Paris Black, the other backseat passenger.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 360.) Mr. Black agreed that the passengers were

nervous but did not offer any guesses as to why. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 360.)

Of import here, Officer Morgan noted that Mr. Black exhibited the exact same

behavior as Mr. Williams—nervousness, attempts to avoid eye contact, and furtive

movements. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 360, 405.) Of note, Mr. Black also had a

bag in his lap that he was fidgeting with. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 360-361.)

At this point, two additional officers arrived on scene. (Transcript, RE 81, Page

ID # 362.) Officer Morgan stated that he had a “reasonable suspicion” that there was

a narcotics violation being committed, so he decided to call for a canine to conduct a

“free air” check on the vehicle. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 362.) The officer’s

recording was purposefully muted at one point due to the officer having a “private

discussion” with the dog handler by phone. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 363.)

Ms. Ellis did not give consent to search the vehicle when first asked.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 364.) The officer then explained to her that he was

calling a dog to conduct a free air search and that if there was a positive alert on the

vehicle, then he would have probable cause to conduct an interior search. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 364-365.) The officer made the assumption that Ms. Ellis’ statement,

“So it’s going to be on me” was a reference to illegal substances in the vehicle.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 365.) Officer Morgan continued to push Ms. Ellis and

she ultimately revealed that there was something illegal—methamphetamine—in

the vehicle. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 365-366.) She also named Mr. Williams as

the person the methamphetamine belonged to because she then claimed that he went

into the house at 935 Princeton. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 366, 391.) Despite not

knowing Mr. Williams very well, she told the officer that Mr. Williams was not a drug

user, but a drug dealer. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 366, 390, 407.)

Ms. Ellis then tried to give consent for the vehicle search, but the officer was

“more comfortable” with a canine search since she had previously denied his request.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 367.) The officer claimed that he did not want her to

feel “coerced” due to their conversation. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 367.)

When the canine handler arrived, Officer Morgan again muted his body

camera so that they could have a private conversation about his “reasonable

suspicion” factors. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 369.) The handler must have

agreed—although no one knows what was actually said between the two—and the

free air search was conducted. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 369-370.) The handler

alleged that the dog alerted on the exterior of the vehicle near the passenger’s side

near the back door by the bottom seams. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 370-371.) The

dog also allegedly alerted during a subsequent interior search to the floorboard of the

back passenger seat. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 371.) Suspected crack cocaine and

methamphetamine were found. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 371.) Mr. Williams was

subsequently placed under arrest. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 372.)

It is important to note, though, that while Officer Morgan may have seen the

vehicle parked at the curb in front of 935 Princeton, he did not see Mr. Williams enter

that house. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 374.) Nor did Officer Morgan enter that

residence himself or see any drug activity. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 374.) Indeed,

he did not see anyone inside that home. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 374.) And the

officer also agreed that there were houses on either side of 935 Princeton and it was

legal to park a vehicle on either side of the street. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 374375.) Also, the officer did not know if the passengers had switched seats at any point

in time that evening before he made contact. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 376, 393.)

The officer admitted that it would have been an additional crime if Ms. Ellis

had not stopped her car when Officer Morgan turned on his lights and siren.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 376-377.) And he had to admit that all of the passengers

in the vehicle appeared to be nervous—not just Mr. Williams. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 377.) Officer Morgan also agreed that many people are nervous when pulled

over by the police, not just those who are doing something illegal. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 377.) And the officer agreed that someone’s “street name” could also be

simply a childhood nickname from family that stuck with the person. (Transcript, RE

81, Page ID # 377.)

Mr. Williams did not have any weapons on him, nor did he become aggressive

or violent or try to flee at any time. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 377-378, 382.) Most

importantly, he did not have any drugs on his person and there was no objective

evidence that Mr. Williams had engaged in any drug sales other than what Ms. Ellis

had told the officers after being relentlessly pressured while knowing that she did not

have a valid driver’s license, did not have insurance, and had a warrant out for her

arrest. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 382-383, 389, 402.)

It should be noted that no one—not Ms. Ellis, nor any other passenger in the

car, nor any police officer—saw Mr. Williams buy any narcotics. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 378-379, 384.) And none of the “half dozen-ish” officers at the scene

returned to 935 Princeton to attempt to corroborate the suspected drug activity there.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 380-381.) The officer claimed that while it would not

have hindered this particular investigation, it may have hindered future ones.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 380-381.)

It was pointed out on cross-examination that the other back seat passenger,

Paris Black, had a warrant out for his arrest that related to narcotics. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 368, 384.) At the time of the traffic stop, Mr. Black had a bag on his

person and that bag was large enough to hold the narcotics that were found on the

floor of the vehicle. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 385.) It was also noted that Mr.

Black was also fidgeting and nervous, just as Mr. Williams was. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 385.) Critically, Mr. Black, along with the front seat passenger, were still

in the vehicle for a period of time after Mr. Williams had been removed and before

any other officer arrived at the scene. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 385-386.)

Vital here, the officer claimed that he was able to simultaneously keep track of

where the driver—who was not in the vehicle—was, pat down Mr. Williams, and keep

eyes on the remaining vehicle occupants in order to monitor their activity inside the

vehicle—all by himself and before any other officers arrived. (Transcript, RE 81, Page

ID # 386.) And it should also be noted that the vehicle had tinted windows and it was

dark outside. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 325, 333, 399.) In fact, the officer had to

use a flashlight to see into the backseat of the vehicle—even when he was standing

right at the driver’s door. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 340, 399, 432.) Also

complicating matters, the vehicle had clothes, bags, and purses strewn throughout

the inside making it impossible to know what was already in the car prior to the

passengers getting in. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 393.)

Mr. Williams had been out of the car for approximately eleven minutes before

the canine arrived. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 395.) And he had been out of the

car for about 22 minutes before the illegal substances were found. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 396-397.)

Counsel argued that the extended traffic stop violated Rodriguez v. United

States, 575 U.S. 348, 356; 135 S. Ct. 1609; 191 L. Ed. 2d 492; (2015), which states

that a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 402.) Here, the driver was pulled over for driving a

vehicle without insurance. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 402.) Additionally, she had

not used a turn signal when entering the roadway and she did not have a valid

driver’s license. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 402.) It is of utmost import here that

Mr. Williams had not committed any crime. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 402.)

In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686; 105 S. Ct. 1568; 84 L. Ed. 2d

605 (1985), counsel explained, this Court decided that the authority for a seizure ends

when the tasks tied to the traffic infraction are or should have been completed.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 402.) In short, to continue questioning the passengers

and calling for that canine in the instant matter equated to a fishing expedition in

violation of both Rodriguez and Sharpe. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 402.)

Here, the officer lacked particularized suspicion with regard to Mr. Williams.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 403.) The officer had no idea where the occupants of

the vehicle had been sitting prior to the traffic stop. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID #

403.) The other passengers—including Mr. Black—exhibited the same nervousness

as Mr. Williams and Mr. Black had a narcotics warrant out for his arrest and he was

holding a bag on his lap that was large enough to contain the illegal substances found

on the floor of the car. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 368, 384-385, 403.) Additionally,

the car was full of clothing, bags, and miscellaneous items that could have hidden any

sort of contraband before Mr. Williams even entered the vehicle. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 403.)

Counsel argued that all the officer knew when he initiated the stop was that

the driver did not have insurance or a valid license. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID #

403.) To leave Mr. Williams standing on the side of the road during an extended traffic

stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 403, 407.)

And the court agreed that Mr. Williams had standing to challenge the scope and

duration of the seizure based on United States v. Ellis, 497 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir.

2007). (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 429.)

After the officer ascertained that the driver had no license or insurance, the

citation should have been issued, the traffic stop should have ended there, and no

further inquiry was necessary. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 402, 405, 430.) To pull

the occupants out and continue to question them went too far afield and violated Mr.

Williams’ constitutional rights. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 402, 405, 408.)

Additionally, counsel pointed out that the other details of the situation do not

support attributing the evidence found after the extended stop to Mr. Williams.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 404.) These include the facts that:

•

The car was legally parked when the officer first saw it. (Transcript, RE

81, Page ID # 375.)

•

No one was witness to what events may have taken place inside the

house at 935 Princeton. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 374, 426.)

•

No one saw any illegal substances exchanged. (Transcript, RE 81, Page

ID # 382-383, 389, 426.)

•

The car was messy, and many items could have been previously hidden

without the occupants’ knowledge. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 386,

403.)

•

The officer had no idea where the occupants of the car had been sitting

or if they had switched seats throughout the evening prior to the traffic

stop. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 376, 393, 403.)

•

Every occupant was nervous during the stop, not just Mr. Williams.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 339, 341-342, 352, 360, 377, 385, 419, 425,

427, 431.)

•

Two other occupants of the vehicle—not Mr. Williams—had warrants

out for their arrest and one of those warrants was for narcotics, no less.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 354-355, 368, 384, 403, 404, 417, 423, 425,

431.)

•

The other person with the narcotics warrant—Mr. Black—had a bag on

his lap that could have held the narcotics found and was exhibiting the

same “suspicious” actions as Mr. Williams. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID

# 360, 367, 385, 405, 425-426, 431.)

•

No drugs or weapons were found on Mr. Williams’ person. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 377-378, 382, 389, 406, 410, 428.) However, marijuana

was found on Mr. Black’s person, albeit a legal amount for his age.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 361.)

•

Mr. Williams did not resist at any point and was not at all aggressive or

violent. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 378, 406.)

•

And Mr. Williams did not have a warrant out for his arrest. (Transcript,

RE 81, Page ID # 406, 407, 421, 422, 423, 426, 427, 431.)

Yet Mr. Williams was the only one of the four occupants arrested. (Transcript, RE 81,

Page ID # 355, 367, 372.) And he was the only one charged with any crime in relation

to this incident. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 424.)

The court and prosecutor erroneously relied on Ms. Ellis’ self-serving, biased,

and unreliable explanation that Mr. Williams was a “meth dealer,” that Mr. Williams

entered the house on Princeton, and the unsubstantiated report that the house on

Princeton was a “drug house” for the basis of its opinion allowing the extension of the

stop. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 366, 390, 407, 408-409, 426, 427, 430-431.)

Counsel then pointed out that “[t]he only crime that was afoot [] was that the

driver was driving without a valid license and without insurance. She admitted, he

verified it. At that point, any additional fishing prolongs the stop illegally.”

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 430.) And it is worth noting here that the court

questioned counsel about the relationship between the length of the stop and the fact

that the car could not be driven away by anyone since it had no insurance on it.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 410.) Of great import, it is unlawful for a vehicle to be

driven without insurance—in fact, it was the main reason cited by the officer for the

traffic stop—yet Ms. Ellis was allowed to drive the car away after Mr. Williams’ arrest

with a warrant out for her arrest, an uninsured vehicle, no valid driver’s license, and

the fact that she had just committed an arrestable offense. (Transcript, RE 81, Page

ID # 328, 334, 347, 354-355, 403, 410-412, 421, 437.) To be sure, the officer went on a

“fishing expedition” and it cannot be argued that his fishing trip paid off for him.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 402-403, 410, 421, 430.)

The court correctly stated that the furtive movements and lack of eye contact

from the two backseat passengers alone may not have been enough to prolong the

stop. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 434.) However, the court erred when it ruled that

the information gleaned throughout the stop allowed the officer to conclude that

criminal activity may be afoot. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 434-435.) In the end,

the court found that the traffic stop, the elongation of the stop, and the subsequent

search of the vehicle were valid. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 431-432, 435-436.)

At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Williams also objected to the quantity of

methamphetamine attributed to him. (Transcript, RE 83, Page ID # 494.) Indeed, any

of the other passengers could have dropped the product in front of where Mr. Williams

had been sitting after Mr. Williams had been removed from the car and before any

other officers reported to the scene to keep watch of the remaining occupants.

(Transcript, RE 83, Page ID # 497-498.) The court overruled the defense’s objection

to the amount discovered in the car after it concluded that this argument was “totally

incredible.” (Transcript, RE 83, Page ID # 502.)

The court stated that it intended to impose a sentence “at the low end of the

advisory guideline range” and ultimately sentenced Mr. Williams to a term of 188

months imprisonment—with a supervised release term of five years—within the

Bureau of Prisons. (Transcript, RE 83, Page ID # 515.) Mr. Williams filed an appeal

with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and his conviction was

affirmed. (Appendix A, Opinion, RE 34-2, Page ID # 8.)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

There was insufficient particularized suspicion to conclude that the

contraband officers found in the car belonged to Mr. Williams.

The district court clearly erred in its factual findings and improperly reached

the legal determination that there was reasonable suspicion to prolong the search

which resulted in the recovery of contraband. As the government noted, the district

court focused on seven factors that it believed created probable cause to search the

interior of the car and that the contraband found in the car belonged to Mr. Williams.

(Government Response Brief, RE 27, Page ID # 23; Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 433435.) It listed the time of the traffic stop, the driver’s lack of a valid license, the

driver’s lack of insurance, lies told by the driver, Mr. Williams’ nervousness, the

driver’s pitstop at a supposed drug house, and Mr. Williams’ designation as a priority

offender. (Government Response Brief, RE 27, Page ID # 23.) None of these, though,

justify the officer taking the driver out of the car and relentlessly interrogating her

until she told him something that he wanted to hear. He should have either arrested

her for her offenses and warrant, or issued her a citation and sent them on their way.

The prolonged stop never should have happened. And the court was clearly wrong

when it ruled otherwise.

Notably, most of the factors the court relied on were associated with the other

people in the car, not Mr. Williams himself. Perhaps not surprisingly, the government

also omitted the fact that Mr. Williams was the only person in the car who did not

have an active warrant for his arrest or commit a crime in front of law enforcement.

Moreover, Mr. Williams was extracted from the car before the backseat passenger

who had a warrant for dangerous drugs and coincidentally had drugs on his person

when he was searched.

Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, even if this Court should agree that

the actions of other people in the car justified the prolonged stop, they do not translate

into specific and articulable facts that justify the continued detention of Mr. Williams.

This is particularly so since the officers patted him down and found no contraband

whatsoever on Mr. Williams’ person. Further, the driver’s lies and the evidence found

in the backpack of the backseat passenger do not attach to Mr. Williams to become

justifiable cause to prolong the detention of Mr. Williams. Because a person’s mere

proximity to others suspected of criminal activity does not give rise to a constitutional

justification to search that person, the district court’s decision was incorrect. See

United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Sibron v. New York,

392 U.S. 40, 62-63; 88 S. Ct. 1889; 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968).

Additionally, the car was legally parked when the officer first saw it, rather

than stopped and conducting any suspicious activity. It was merely parked on the

side of the road, allegedly with a dome light on. This is certainly not cause for

suspicion or surveillance. The officer then made much of the driver’s route and Mr.

Williams’ designation as a priority offender. But the driver’s route was not necessary

information for the officer to cite the driver for having no license, no insurance, and

a warrant out for her arrest. And the Sixth Circuit has held that knowledge of a

defendant’s criminal history, when combined with other minimal factors such as

nervousness and illogical travels, was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.

See Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 446 (6th Cir. 2020); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.

491, 512; 103 S. Ct. 1319; 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). Thus, this factor should have been

given no weight. Particularly given the district court’s assertion that the furtive

movements and lack of eye contact by both rear seat passengers did not amount to

reasonable suspicion. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 434.)

Additionally, despite the district court determining that the car was not going

anywhere after the stop because it was not insured in an attempt to justify the

violation of Mr. Williams’ constitutional rights, the driver ultimately was allowed by

law enforcement to get into that very same car and drove away following Mr.

Williams’ arrest, despite having a warrant for her arrest and after she committed an

arrestable offense that was witnessed by an officer. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID #

328, 334, 347, 354-355, 403, 410-412, 421, 437.) Because courts must review the

evidence “with a common sense approach, as understood by those in the field of law

enforcement,” the district court—after the fact—cannot give this factor more weight

than the actual troopers did at the time of the incident. United States v. Stepp, 680

F.3d 651, 664 (6th Cir. 2012). In other words, since the officers did not feel that the

driver’s multiple violations of the law were important enough to address, then the

court could not give them any weight, either. Thus, the district court erred when it

considered this factor as part of the totality of circumstances.

At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that the other backseat

passenger who remained in the car after Mr. Williams was extracted from the car had

a bag on his lap that was sizeable enough to secret the contraband officers found on

the floorboard. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 368, 384-385, 403.) The officer also

confirmed that the car was full of clothing, bags, and miscellaneous items that could

have hidden any sort of contraband before Mr. Williams even set foot therein.

(Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 403.) Critically, there was no objective evidence that

Mr. Williams had engaged in any drug sales beyond the driver’s uncorroborated and

self-serving misrepresentations. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 382-383, 389.) And

when assessing the driver’s credibility, it is critical to remember that she had

multiple arrestable violations of the law herself at the time of the traffic stop. Taken

together, these factors adjure a conclusion that the officer lacked the objective and

particularized suspicion that this Court has deemed indispensable to the Fourth

Amendment. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37; 121 S. Ct. 447; 148

L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000). Instead, the officer stacked and applied assumptions that were

unreasonable without further factual basis in a manner that is abhorrent to the

prohibition against officers relying on hunches. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183,

1187; 206 L. Ed. 2d 412 (2020).

The government engaged in revisionist history when it stated that

methamphetamine was found at Mr. Williams’ feet. (Government Response Brief, RE

27, Page ID # 13, 27.) In fact, here the officer testified that Mr. Williams did not have

any drugs or weapons on his person and there was no proof that he planned or made

any drug sales. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 382-383.) There was time, however, for

the other backseat passenger—who did have drugs on his person as well as a warrant

for charges related to illegal substances—to hide the contraband where Mr. Williams

had been sitting before being pulled from the vehicle. And there is nothing to support

the notion that the contraband was not there before Mr. Williams even got into the

vehicle.

Finally, the government assumed that the inevitable discovery doctrine would

apply in this case because the car was not going anywhere given that it did not have

insurance, which the district court posited was further evidence that the stop was not

impermissibly extended. (Government Response Brief, RE 27, Page ID # 24.)

However, as previously noted, the driver was allowed to drive that very car away

after Mr. Williams’ arrest even though there was a warrant out for her arrest, she

was driving an uninsured car, she had no valid license, and she had just committed

an arrestable offense. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 328, 334, 347, 354-355, 403, 410412, 421, 437.) Since she was allowed to drive away as free as a bird, that reasoning

cannot be used as justification for the prolonged stop that led to the search of the car

and the improper designation of Mr. Williams as the owner of the contraband found

as a result. Mr. Williams had been out of the car for approximately 22 minutes before

the illicit drugs were found. (Transcript, RE 81, Page ID # 396-397.) This triples the

time of the seven- or eight-minute delay for purposes of conducting a dog sniff that

this Court concluded was impermissible in Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at358. For all of these

reasons, the inevitable discovery doctrine would not apply.

When looking at the totality of the circumstances—including the officer’s own

testimony in addition to his actions during the traffic stop—there was no safety

concern in relation to Mr. Williams that rose to the level of reasonable suspicion and

that warranted a search. Furthermore, there were insufficient articulable facts that

the district court used to justify the claim that the drugs belonged to Mr. Williams.

The district court erred in coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit should not have affirmed, and their decisions should be overturned by

this Court.

II.

Officers carried out a prolonged detention beyond the time reasonably

required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for traffic violations.

Traffic stops are, by their nature, typically short in duration; thus, they are

akin to Terry stops. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614; 191 L. Ed. 2d

492 (2015). “[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is

determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted

the stop . . . and attend to related safety concerns.” Id. The stop may not last longer

than is necessary to achieve this mission. Id. “Authority for the seizure thus ends

when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

completed.” Id.

In Mr. Williams’ case, approximately 12 minutes elapsed from the time the

traffic stop began before the police decided to search him. (Transcript, RE 81, Page

ID # 415, 417.) Then another 21 minutes passed while officers summoned a drug dog

and searched the car before returning to interrogate Mr. Williams. (Transcript, RE

81, Page ID # 397-398, 417.) It is worthy of mention that the officer in Rodriguez

made the driver and passenger wait for seven or eight minutes and this Court

ultimately disagreed with the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s determination

that a seven- or eight-minute delay is a permissible de minimis intrusion. Rodriguez,

575 U.S. at 353.

The car here was originally pulled over for failing to use a turn signal. But

instead of issuing a citation for that minor violation, Officer Morgan deliberately

chose to escort the driver to a nearby sidewalk and interrogate her before another

officer finally returned to the car and asked Mr. Williams to step out of the car. At

this juncture, Officer Morgan had already gone back to his police car and discovered

that the driver had an active warrant for her arrest in addition to an expired learner’s

permit. Because tasks for the traffic stop should have been completed after the officer

had the driver’s name and ran it through the computer, authority for the seizure

ended and the detention was prolonged. At this point, the officer should have arrested

the driver and released the passengers from the scene.

Curiously, as can be seen on what incomplete traffic stop footage there was,

the officers mute their cameras at multiple points and are seen congregating in the

traffic stop footage instead of carrying on with their traffic stop as the law requires.

They were plotting the roadside interrogations and canine search that followed.

However, by this point, the mission of the stop was achieved, and the officers should

have given the driver a ticket for the violation—if they felt the need to—and let the

car go on its way. And contrary to the district court’s contention that the car was

inevitably going to be searched for impound purposes, Ms. Ellis was ultimately

allowed to drive the car away despite having no insurance or even a valid license.

Thus, the court’s reasoning was not sound or accurate given the events that took

place. Neither Officer Morgan nor any of the others who arrived to provide backup

had any idea whether the passengers had switched seats at any point in time before

the official police contact at issue here. They ignored the fact that the car was full of

clothing, bags, and other receptacles that could have hidden the contraband before

Mr. Williams set foot inside it. They also let the other back seat passenger—who had

a warrant for his arrest related to a narcotics violation, was in possession of a bag

large enough to hold the contraband found, and had drugs on his person when

searched—go free from the scene with no repercussions of any sort. It is not just

concerning, but shockingly so, that Mr. Williams was the only person arrested and

charged with a crime even though other occupants had active warrants or were

witnessed committing crimes by Officer Morgan and his cohorts. The police singled

out Mr. Williams during their “fishing expedition” and—like many fishermen’s

stories—the tale of the whopper they caught got bigger and better every time it was

told. And this injustice must not be countenanced by any court of law.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

The law applies to all regardless of the crimes that a man has been charged

with committing. In this case, Mr. Williams’ rights were violated by numerous

decisions that were made before and during the motion to suppress and also at

sentencing. The district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit erroneously held otherwise. Accordingly, Mr. Williams respectfully requests

that this Court grant his petition.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARTIER & NYAMFUKUDZA, P.L.C.

Dated: 10/30/2023

/s/ TAKURA NYAMFUKUDZA

Takura Nyamfukudza

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.