Opposition Brief — Jeremy Moody, Petitioner v. Georgia

No. 23-5857

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Jeremy Moody,

Petitioner,

v.

State of Georgia,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Georgia

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Christopher M. Carr

Attorney General

Beth A. Burton

Deputy Attorney General

Clint M. Malcolm

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Sabrina D. Graham

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Georgia

Attorney General

40 Capitol Square, SW

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

(404) 694-7975

sgraham@law.ga.gov

Counsel for Respondent

QUESTION PRESENTED

1.

Whether the Georgia Supreme Court correctly applied this Court’s

precedent in determining that Moody’s antecedent constitutional claims, that

did not concern the state’s power bring the petitioner to court, were waived

on direct review by virtue of Moody’s valid guilty plea.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented .................................................................................... 2

Table of Authorities .................................................................................. iv

Opinions Below .......................................................................................... 1

Constitutional Provisions Involved ........................................................... 1

Introduction................................................................................................ 1

Statement ................................................................................................... 3

A. Facts of the Crimes ........................................................................ 4

B. Pre-Trial Proceedings .................................................................... 7

C. Trial................................................................................................. 9

D. Direct Appeal ................................................................................ 17

Reasons for Denying the Petition ........................................................... 19

I. The validity of Moody’s guilty plea is an intensively fact-bound

question that does not present an issue worthy of certiorari. ... 20

II. Moody’s claim that an alleged violation of his due process rights

invalidates his guilty plea is waived because it was not raised in

the state courts. ........................................................................... 22

III. The Georgia Supreme Court correctly determined under this

Court’s precedent that Moody’s guilty plea waive his Faretta

claim. ............................................................................................ 25

IV. The Georgia Supreme Court correctly determined under this

Court’s precedent that Moody’s guilty plea waived his McCoy

claim. ............................................................................................ 30

Conclusion ................................................................................................ 33

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Blackledge v. Perry,

417 U.S. 21 (1974) ........................................................................ passim

Brady v. United States,

397 U.S. 742 (1970) ....................................................................... 25, 26

Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806 (1975) ...................................................................... passim

Gomez v. Berge,

434 F.3d 940 (II) (7th Cir. 2006) ........................................................ 29

Illinois v. Gates,

462 U.S. 213 (1983) ............................................................................. 22

McCoy v. Louisiana,

138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) ....................................................... 17, 19, 30, 31

Menna v. New York,

423 U.S. 61 (1975) ............................................................................... 30

Parker v. North Carolina,

397 U.S. 790 (1970) ....................................................................... 25, 26

Tollet v. Henderson,

411 U.S. 258 (1973) ....................................................................... 23, 25

Tollett, McMann v. Richardson,

397 U.S. 759 (1970) ...................................................................... passim

United States v. Dewberry,

936 F.3d 803 (II) (8th Cir. 2019) ........................................................ 29

United States v. Flynn,

969 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2020)............................................................... 20

iv

United States v. Hernandez,

203 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2000)........................................................ passim

United States v. Moussaoui,

591 F.3d 263 (II) (A) (4th Cir. 2010) .................................................. 29

United States v. Perillo,

897 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2018)............................................................... 20

Other Authorities

Moody’s Farretta ...................................................................................... 25

United States Constitution Sixth Amendment .........................................1

United States Constitution Fourteenth Amendment ...............................1

v

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in the criminal direct appeal

is published at 316 Ga. 490, 888 S.E.2d 109 (2023) and is included in

Petitioner’s Appendix.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in

relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .

. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,

in relevant part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

INTRODUCTION

After the State laid out the evidence of Petitioner Jeremy Moody’s guilt

in opening remarks at the beginning of the guilt phase of trial, Moody chose

to plead guilty. When asked by the trial court during the plea colloquy if he

wanted to plead guilty, Moody responded, “I just feel it would be more

appropriate for the families involved in this not to have to go through trial

procedure.” Vol. 25, T. 2794. When asked if he was pleading guilty

voluntarily, Moody answered in the affirmative. Pet. App. 8a. And when

asked by the trial court if Moody felt he was “forc[ed]” to plead guilty by the

trial court’s denial of his request for self-representation or because Moody felt

1

“it’s the best thing” to do, Moody responded, “I feel it is the best thing for me

do at this time.” Pet. App. 6a.

Largely ignoring his guilty plea statements, and with a dash of

unsupported revision, Moody asks this Court to grant certiorari to create new

law regarding which antecedent constitutional claims are waived with a valid

guilty plea. Relying mostly on an outlier opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals, Moody argues that his claims challenging the trial court’s denial

of his request to control strategy decisions and to represent himself were not

waived on appeal by his guilty plea. In a somewhat circular fashion, Moody

argues that his guilty plea is invalid because of the trial court’s denials.

This Court should deny certiorari. To start, the validity of his guilty plea

is a heavily fact-bound one, that was answered in the affirmative after a full

record review by the Georgia Supreme Court and not refuted by Moody. Pet.

App. 5a-9a. As for Moody’s arguments that his antecedent constitutional

claims were not waived by his guilty plea, the Georgia Supreme Court rightly

rejected the arguments as they were inconsistent this Court’s long-standing

precedent that exceptions to waiver only concern antecedent constitutional

claims that “[go] to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into

court.” Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974). Since Moody’s antecedent

constitutional claims would not preclude the State from bringing the charges

filed against Moody, the state court correctly determined this exception did

not apply and his claims were waived for direct review. Further, Moody’s

attempt to create a due process violation from the trial court’s finding that

trial counsel, not Moody, was in charge of trial strategy was not raised in the

2

court below and is not before this Court for review. Therefore, Moody has

failed to present a claim worthy of this Court’s review and his petition should

be denied.

STATEMENT

Petitioner Jeremy Moody was indicted in 2007 for the “rape and murder

of 13-year-old Chrisondra Kimble and the murder of Kimble’s 15-year-old

cousin, Delarlonva Mattox, Jr.,” and for two counts of aggravated assault, two

counts of aggravated assault with intent to rob, and two counts of kidnapping

with bodily injury. Vol. 1, R. 4-9.1 On April 10, 2013, Moody pled guilty as

charged in the indictment. Vol. 22, T. 2740-72, 2777-800 (plea colloquy); Vol.

31, T. 5225-29 (guilty plea form). “At the conclusion of the sentencing phase,

a jury found the existence of multiple statutory aggravating circumstances as

to each murder and recommended a sentence of death for each murder, and

the trial court sentenced Moody accordingly.” Pet. App. 2a.2

1 “Vol. __, R. __” refers to the Georgia Supreme Court’s online docket

volume and page number(s) of the clerk’s record.

“Vol. __, T. __” refers to the Georgia Supreme Court’s online docket

volume and page number(s) of the trial transcript.

“Supp. Vol. __, T. __” refers to the Georgia Supreme Court’s online

docket volume and page number(s) of the supplement trial transcript

from William Felt’s trial.

2 Moody was also sentenced “to consecutive terms of imprisonment of twenty

years for each of the two counts of aggravated assault with intent to rob, life

for each of the two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, and life for the

count of rape.” Pet. App. 32 n.2.

3

A.

Facts of the Crimes

On April 5, 2007, Chrisondra Kimble and Delarlonva Mattox, Jr., left

Mattox’s father’s residence between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. and walked to a

Dollar Tree to purchase snacks. Vol. 25, T. 2883-84, 2461–62 2946-50. They

never returned home.

Kimble’s and Mattox’s families contacted law enforcement and

conducted a search. Vol. 25, T. 2885-87, 2950-54, 2966-73. On the afternoon of

April 6, 2007, Kimble’s mother located the victims’ bodies in a wooded area

near a school playground. Id. at 2887, 2954-55, 2962, 2982; Vol. 26, T. 307172. Both victims were naked, and Mattox had a leather belt tied around his

ankles. Vol. 25, T. 2984-93; Vol. 27, T. 3473-74. Both had been stabbed

multiple times; the wounds “were consistent with being caused by a flatheaded screwdriver.” Pet. App. 3a.

According to the medical examiner, Kimble was stabbed thirteen times

in her neck and three times in her head. Pet. App. 3a. Although the stabbing

was the primary cause of death, she also suffered blunt trauma to the neck

and petechial hemorrhages in her eyes, consistent with manual

strangulation. Vol. 27, T. 3358, 3362-64. Scratches on her face suggested she

was forcibly held to the ground in a wooded area, and bruising in and around

her vagina indicated that she was raped. Id. at 3358, 3365-69. “The medical

examiner opined that the stab wounds and the injuries to the vaginal area

most likely occurred before Kimble’s death and that Kimble could have

survived for ‘minutes’ or for ‘hours’ after the stab wounds, although she

would not have survived ‘very long following the strangulation.” Pet. App. 3a.

4

The forensic testing of the vaginal smears from Kimble revealed the presence

of Moody’s DNA. Vol. 25, T. 2939.

Mattox was likewise killed by “stab wounds to the head, neck, and

chest.” Pet. App. 3a. “[H]e had approximately 41 stab wounds in total.” Id.

Some of the stab wounds to Mattox’s head went through the skull and

penetrated his brain, which “would have required a significant amount of

force to inflict” and would have been “very painful.” Id. “[T]he injuries to his

neck would have been ‘quite painful’ and would have resulted in ‘significant

bleeding,’ as his left carotid artery and both of his jugular veins were

pierced.” Id. The stabs to his chest penetrated his chest cavity, damaged the

cephalic brachial vein, and caused blood to pool in his chest. Vol. 27, T. 337981. “[I]t would have taken ‘several minutes to an hour or so’ for Mattox to

bleed to death.” Pet. App. 3a.

The day after the victims’ bodies were found, “law enforcement officials

received a telephone call from Moody’s ex-girlfriend, Tameka Wright, who

identified Moody as a suspect” and informed them that Moody might be

attempting to leave town on a Greyhound bus. Pet. App. 3a; Vol. 25, T. 300001, 3019-20; Vol. 26, T. 3105-07. “Moody was arrested at the bus station with

paperwork in his possession regarding trips to Orlando and Houston.” Pet.

App. 3a. On the way to the police station, when the officers would not tell him

the reason for his arrest, Moody stated that he watched the news and

“[y]ou’re not going to put those kids on me.” Id. at 3002-03.

Wright gave a statement to law enforcement, which she testified about

at trial. Vol. 25, T. 3020-23; State’s Exhibit 11-11A. According to Wright’s

5

statement, “Moody called her at 5:21 p.m. on the day of the murders and said

that he was going to commit a robbery.” Pet. App. 3a. Later that night, Moody

informed Wright that he killed two drug dealers who he believed had a gun

and left their bodies in the woods by his mother’s house. Vol. 25, T. 30283033. Moody described the victims as young and scared. Id. at 3032-33.

Moody also stated “that he undressed the victims because he did not want

any evidence, such as hairs or fibers, to be found on them.” Pet. App. 4a.

Moody also told Wright that he wanted to return to the scene to move the

bodies so they would not be located. Vol. 25, T. 3032-33. Moody expressed

concern that the victims’ bodies would start to smell but stated that they

probably would not smell because it was still cold outside. Id. at 3033. Moody

further stated that he wished it would rain. Id. In response, Wright told him

to not move the victims’ bodies. Id. at 3032-33.

“[O]n the night of April 6, 2007, Moody called [Wright] to inform her

that, according to news reports, the victims’ bodies had been discovered.” Pet.

App. 4a. Wright confronted Moody after learning on the news that the victims

were two children and not drug dealers. Vol. 25, T. 3036-37; Vol. 26, T. 305051. In response, Moody stated the victims meant nothing to him and that

they appeared to be adults, as they were larger than him. Id. Moody never

“expressed remorse” for murdering the victims and denied raping the victims.

Pet. App. 4a.

In further support of the death penalty, the “State presented extensive

non-statutory aggravating evidence regarding Moody’s violent behavior both

prior to the murders and during his pretrial detention.” Pet. App. 4a. “The

6

State introduced evidence of Moody’s certified convictions for simple battery,

for simple battery involving family violence, and for obstruction of an officer

that resulted from an incident in which Moody attacked his girlfriend at the

time and a person who came to her defense.” Id. Additionally, the State

presented evidence that Moody had harassed a former girlfriend and

threatened to kill her, her family, and her co-workers. Id. Moody also beat

“Wright’s five-to-six-year-old daughter with a belt” and strangled and

threatened another female friend after “she thwarted his plans to have sex

with her.” Id.

During his incarceration awaiting trial, the State presented evidence

that Moody

had been violent with jail personnel many times, including

attacking a guard with a shank; he had made numerous verbal and

written threats to kill specific jail personnel, including a law

librarian and a detention officer; he had been found in possession

of contraband, including a shank, pills, and cellphones, both in his

cell and on his person; he had been involved in numerous incidents

in which the jail’s special team for dealing with dangerous inmates

had to intervene, and he had tried to intimidate new officers on

this team by throwing water or feces on them and spitting at them;

and he had abused the nurses at the jail in numerous ways,

including making derogatory sexual comments to them, throwing

various liquids such as a mixture of urine and sour milk at them,

spitting at and kicking one of them, and exposing himself to one of

them.

Pet. App. 4a.

B.

Pre-Trial Proceedings

1. Ex Parte Hearings. Five years passed between Moody’s indictment in

April of 2007 and of his trial in April of 2013. Pet. App. 32a n.2. Roughly five

7

months before jury selection, Moody “express[ed] to the trial court that he

was dissatisfied with his counsel and that he wanted to represent himself”

but gave no specifics. Id. at 33a n.7. Then, during several ex parte hearings

that began the month before jury selection and occurred throughout voir dire,

“Moody vacillated as to whether his frustrations were with his attorneys or

with the conditions of his incarceration and as to whether he truly desired to

represent himself at trial.” Id. He also alternated his position on whether

trial counsel should present evidence of his mental illness. At one point he

disagreed with this strategy and then after meeting with counsel agreed to

the strategy. Vol. 41, T. 407-08. Additionally, during this time, Moody refused

to take his psychiatric medication and reopened wounds on his body which

delayed the on-going voir dire proceedings. Vol. 20, T. 1331-32; Vol. 41, T.

370-72, 376-81. Moody admitted during one ex parte hearing that his request

to represent himself had been “triggered” by his “mental health issues.” Vol.

41, T. 473-74.

2. Faretta Hearing. Two days before the guilt phase of trial, the court

held a Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) hearing to address Moody’s

request to represent himself. Vol. 24, T. 2677. After going through the proper

components of a Faretta hearing, the trial court denied Moody’s request. Id.

at 2677-724. The Court found Moody was “self-destructive” as evidenced in

part by his setting himself on fire resulting in “significant burns over a large

part of his body” and that “he continued to harm himself.” Id. at 2721. The

court also found that Moody’s alternating opinion about representing himself

was further evidence of his “self-destructive behavior” and an attempt “to

8

[a]ffect his situation at the jail.” Id. The court was clear it was not being

“critical” of Moody for his actions. Id. at 2722. Moreover, the court took into

consideration Moody’s “psychiatric history,” “psychiatric evaluations,” and

the court’s “personal observations” of Moody. Id. Finally, the court found that,

because his request was motivated by “self-destructive behavior” and his

desire to secure “better treatment at the jail” rather than a genuine concern

“about the outcome of [his] case,” his decision to proceed without counsel

could not be knowing and intelligent. Id. at 2722-23.

C.

Trial

1. Prior to Guilty Plea. On the first day of the guilt phase of trial,

Moody’s counsel informed the court that he wanted to address the Faretta

hearing and a “disagreement amongst the defense team and Mr. Moody

concerning the appropriate strategy to pursue in this case.” Vol. 25, T. 2732.

Regarding the strategy problem, counsel informed the court:

Your Honor, Mr. Moody has expressed to us this morning that he

would prefer to pursue a not guilty by reason of insanity defense or

a defense of simply not guilty. The defense team believes that the

more appropriate strategy is to pursue a strategy that basically

embraces the notion of guilty but mentally ill. That is the strategy

that we are prepared to present and that Mr. Moody disagrees

with.

Id. at 2733.

The court then made the following finding:

Well, Mr. Morrison, I have, based on our hearing on day before

yesterday, I’ve made a determination about Mr. Moody’s

representation. We went through an extensive Faretta hearing

based on the case law and upon the facts as I found them to be. I

have made a decision that Mr. Moody will continue to be

9

represented by counsel based upon my finding that he had not

made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to be

represented by counsel. So, therefore, strategy decisions are

appropriately given to his attorneys.

Vol. 25, T. 2734-735.

The court then asked Moody “[s]o has what Mr. Morrison described to

me an accurate description of the disagreement that you have with them?”

Vol. 25, T. 2735. Moody responded: “Not completely, your honor.” Id. The

court asked Moody to speak with counsel to “flesh out what the additional

nuances of that disagreement are.” Id. After consultation, counsel for Moody

informed the court:

Mr. Moody did want me to reiterate to you that he strongly

believes that we are pursuing a strategy that he disagrees with. He

believes that under the bar rules that we are ethically obligated to

pursue the strategy that he believes is the most appropriate.

Second, Mr. Moody wanted me to inform the court that he had not

been administered any of his medications this morning, that he did

not feel physically capable of being present during the trial, and

that he wished to absent himself from the trial unless he is

properly medicated.

Id. at 2736.

The court informed Moody that it would inquire about his medication

issue. Vol. 25, T. 2736. The court also explained that the decision of whether

to stay in the courtroom was Moody’s but the court asked Moody not to

absent himself just because he was upset with the court. Id. at 2736-37.

Moody chose to stay in the courtroom.

2. Guilty Plea. After the trial court had sworn the jury, given

preliminary instructions, and the State had delivered opening remarks,

10

Moody entered a guilty plea. Vol. 25, T. 2740-72, 2777-800 (plea colloquy);

Vol. 31, T. 5225-29 (guilty plea form). After going through all the necessary

components of a plea colloquy, which Moody does not dispute, the trial court

“found that [Moody’s] plea of guilty is freely, voluntarily, and knowingly

entered.” Vol. 25, T. 2800.

Specifically, “Moody testified under oath at the plea hearing that he was

35 years old, had completed his G.E.D., and was not then under the influence

of alcohol, drugs, or medication.” Pet. App. 4a. Moody acknowledged that he

understood the charges brought against him; that “he was waiving the right

to a jury trial” and other trial rights; and his initials and signature on the

five-page guilty-plea form,” which “he had discussed with both of his

attorneys.” Id. “This form set out the charges that Moody faced and the

maximum sentence that could be imposed for each charge, including a

sentence of death for each of the murders.” Id.

“Both on the guilty plea form and during the hearing, Moody confirmed

that no one had in any way ‘threatened,’ ‘forced,’ or ‘coerced’ him to plead

guilty and that no one had ‘promised [him] anything to get [him] to enter this

guilty plea.’” Pet. App. 5a. When asked by the State whether it was Moody’s

“‘decision to waive these rights and enter a guilty plea because you are, in

fact, guilty’ Moody testified ‘[y]es.’” Vol. 25, T. 2788. The State then went

through each charge and Moody pleaded guilty to each one. Id. at 2788-89.

“After pleading guilty, Moody affirmed that his guilty plea was freely and

voluntarily given with full knowledge of the charges against him and that he

11

understood that he might have only a limited right to appeal his guilty-plea

convictions.” Pet. App. 5a.

Additionally, the trial court had the following colloquy with Moody

about his reasons for pleading guilty:

THE COURT: Okay. Are you pleading guilty now rather than

going through with a trial as to the guilt innocence phase because

that’s what you want to do?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor. I just feel it would be more

appropriate for the families involved in this not to have to go

through trial procedure, and it’s just, you know, just a decision I

made, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. So as far as the reason why you’re doing it,

you believe it’s in your best interest to go that way as opposed to

putting the state and the families and other people through the

trial of the facts as to the guilt and innocence. Is that what you’re

saying?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor, just to try to resolve this

issue as quickly as possible, your honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And the important part for me -- because

remember my job is to make sure that what you’re doing is freely

and voluntarily done. And is that true? Are you doing that freely

and voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor.

Vol. 25, T. 2794-795 (emphasis added).

Moody affirmed twice more to the trial court that “that he was pleading

guilty because he believed that it was in his best interest to do so:”

THE COURT: Okay. And, again, are you [pleading guilty and

foregoing a jury trial as to guilt/innocence] because you want to do

it?

12

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor.

THE COURT: As I understood what you said before, you’re doing it

because you believe that’s the best thing for you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor.

***

THE COURT: ... We have had a discussion otherwise in this case

recently about your rights as they pertain to going forward with

this case. The important question I have for you is, despite the fact

that I have made a ruling about your representation, are you still

pleading guilty understanding where we go from here because

that’s what you want to do and not because of that ruling that I

made? In other words, am I forcing – do you feel like I’m forcing you

into pleading guilty because of the ruling I made or are you

pleading guilty because you think it’s the best thing for you to do?

THE DEFENDANT: I feel it is the best thing to do at this time.

Pet. App. 6a (emphasis added).

3. Moody’s Request to Withdraw Guilty Plea. The jurors retired for

sentencing deliberations on April 23, 2013 at approximately 2:00 p.m. and

continued until released that evening prior to reaching a decision. Vol. 28, T.

3984, 3991, 4000. The following morning, while the jurors were deliberating,

Moody sought to withdraw his guilty plea. Vol. 29, T. 3517. Counsel for

Moody explained that there were several reasons Moody wished to withdraw

his guilty plea. At first, counsel stated that although Moody had not “exactly

[stated] what his basis is” counsel “would contend that his basis is just

general disagreement with the strategy of the defense and the way that the

case was worked up, including such issues as whether or not he testified at

his sentencing hearing, just other general matters.” Id. at 4004. Counsel then

sought input from Moody, and counsel reported the following issues from

13

Moody that prompted his request to withdraw his guilty plea: (1) a contention

that “he never saw his discovery”; (2) the complaint that “he wanted to

represent himself” and felt “he could have done a better job, he would have

prepared the case differently, he would have presented it differently”; (3) an

allegation that “he has been denied access to the law library”; (4) the

“contention [] that his antidepressants, whether they be Wellbutrin or any

other antidepressants prescribed at the jail, that those medications have not

been provided to him in a medically reasonable manner and that they have

affected his ability to basically participate in the trial”; and (5) the allegation

that “was pressured into a Faretta hearing,” which he thought “he was not

prepared for.” Id. at 4004-008.

The trial court took each of Moody’s reasons in turn and found they were

not a proper basis for withdrawing his guilty plea. First, the court addressed

Moody’s medication issue. The court stated that “the only medication that

changed recently for Mr. Moody is that he was, in addition to other

medications, given Wellbutrin because of his requests on several occasions for

it.” Vol. 29, T. 4009. The court explained that this occurred “only after we had

a discussion with the physicians treating him that they essentially

acquiesced to him receiving this medication as opposed to another medication

that he was already receiving, [] in their words, equally if not more effective

mood stabilization medications” in order to “placate” him. Id. Finally, the

court found that Moody “has regularly refused various components of his

medication over the last several weeks, several months, several years” which

was evidence of “self-destructive behavior, behavior here at the courthouse

14

and at the jail designed to either draw attention or divert attention from

something else, draw attention to himself or divert attention away from

something else, i.e., this case and the movement of it.” Id. at 4009-010.

In conjunction with the medication issue, the trial court also addressed

Moody’s allegation that his medication interfered with his ability to

“participate in his trial.” The court noted for the record that Moody had

“consistent[] active participation …in his defense.” Vol. 29, T. 4015. The court

found Moody has “written notes, talked to, argued with, … his counsel…

during the course of this proceeding” and the court was informed that

Moody’s suggestions “have been considered, incorporated, and actually used

by defense counsel during the prosecution of this case from the defense’s

perspective.” Id. at 4015-16.

Additionally, the court addressed Moody’s contention that he was denied

access to the law library. The court stated that “[i]f nothing else is clear from

this record, both ex parte and in joint session conversations, it is that Mr.

Moody’s situation at the jail is almost exclusively a result of his own

conduct.” Vol. 29, T. 4012-13. This conduct, as found by the court, was

illustrated in the law librarian’s testimony that Moody “mistreated” her.” Id.

at 4013. The court found this “was an emblematic example of why Mr. Moody

had forfeited his right to such things as being able to go to the law library on

a regular basis or have the information brought to him.” Id. The court went

on to find that “[t]he constant threats to staff, the assaults on staff, the

berating, the refusal to abide by all of the rules and regulations, all of those

things have caused him to forfeit so many opportunities, including the ability

15

to safely have him interact with staff in a way that would permit him to do

that.” Id.

The court also addressed Moody’s allegation that he was “forced” into a

Faretta hearing, which the court found “could be nothing further from the

truth.” Vol. 29, T. 4010. The court explained that it “regularly spoke with Mr.

Moody in the presence of opposing counsel and ex parte on several occasions”

and “had regular, full free-ranging discussions about Mr. Moody’s feelings

about his attorneys.” Id. The discussions, the court found, showed that

Moody’s feelings about his counsel “vacillated dramatically back and forth

between trying to say something about his representation to change and

otherwise affect his treatment at the jail to wanting to have them put off the

case to he’s happy basically with them, all back and forth.” Id. All of this

contributed to the court denying Moody’s request to represent himself, which

the court stood by. Id. The court concluded that “to say that [Moody] was

forced into a Faretta hearing would be to utterly ignore all of the record

evidence in this case.” Id.

Additionally, the court found that the Faretta hearing had “nothing to

do with the plea” and “there is a clear dividing line” at “the beginning of the

trial and the opening statement of the State and Mr. Moody’s clear,

unequivocal, voluntary decision in the face of what he knew would be the

evidence against him to plead guilty and accept responsibility.” Vol. 29, T.

4013. The court stated there was “no question in my mind” that Moody’s “plea

of guilty was freely and voluntarily made at the time” and denied the request

to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at 4014.

16

The Court then addressed the guilty plea colloquy. The court took

specific notice of the fact that Moody’s decision to enter a plea occurred

directly after the State had given its opening argument “chronicling [] the

evidence that would have come out in this case in the guilt innocence phase

had that gone forward.” Vol. 29, T. 4011. The court found “[i]t was in the face

of that very promise… of that evidence coming out that Mr. Moody made his

decision to plead guilty,” which was “not a unique experience in the court’s

experience as a lawyer or a judge that when faced with the reality of what the

evidence against him was going to be a defendant pled guilty.” Id.

Additionally, the court found “to say that [Moody] was pressured into

[pleading guilty] would not only be untrue, but it would also fly in the face of

the very questions he was asked during the plea colloquy.” Id. at 4011-012.

D.

Direct Appeal

On appeal, Moody challenged his guilty plea, the trial court’s denial of

his request to represent himself at trial, and the trial court’s alleged

prevention of Moody “determining the objective of his defense in violation of

the federal constitution” as held in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500

(2018). Pet. App. 5a-11a. The Georgia Supreme Court determined Moody’s

guilty plea passed review and that it “waived any argument regarding his

right to self-representation at the guilt/innocence phase,” which included his

adjacent claim based on McCoy. Id.

As part of his attack on his guilty plea, Moody argued, “that his

response to the trial court that he felt that pleading guilty was ‘the best thing

to do at this time’ indicates that he believed that pleading guilty was ‘the best

17

thing’ for him to do given that, at that time, ‘the [trial] court [had] told [him]

that if he went to trial, his lawyers would admit his guilt[.]’” Pet. App. 8a.

The Georgia Supreme Court rejected Moody’s interpretation of the record.

Instead, the Court determined that “[a]t no time did Moody state that his

decision to plead guilty was the result of feeling coerced to do so by the trial

court’s rulings denying his request to represent himself and permitting trial

counsel to pursue a strategy that he expressed opposition to” “even when the

trial court explicitly asked him whether he felt that its ‘ruling about [his]

representation]’ had ‘forc[ed him] into pleading guilty.’” Id. Ultimately, the

Court held that the record “amply support[ed] the trial court’s findings that

the plea was not coerced by the trial court’s rulings denying Moody’s request

to represent himself and allowing trial counsel to determine the objective of

the defense” and “that Moody’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.” Id.

at 9a. Further, the Court “conclude[d] that the withdrawal of the guilty plea

was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id.

The Court then analyzed whether Moody’s guilty plea waived his

challenges to self-representation. The Court noted that “[u]nder both this

Court’s precedent and that of the United States Supreme Court, a valid

guilty plea generally operates as a waiver of independent claims of

constitutional error that occurred before the plea.” Pet. App. 9a. However,

“[w]hether this principle mean[t] that a defendant …waived a Faretta

challenge on appeal [was] a question of first impression” for the Georgia

Supreme Court and one this Court “has not spoken directly on.” Id. at 10a.

18

Looking at the federal courts of appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court

found that all but one of the courts that had answered this question

determined a valid guilty plea waived a Faretta challenge. Pet. App. 10a.

The court analyzed the outlier opinion, United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d

614 (9th Cir. 2000), and determined its reasoning was unpersuasive when

compared to the opinions of the other circuits. In coming to this decision, the

court relied on this Court’s precedent that “‘[a]n exception will only be made

if the error goes to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into

court’” because a “guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which

has preceded it in the criminal process.’” Pet. App. 9a (quoting Tollet v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Moore v. State, 285 Ga. 855, 858 (2009)).

Thus, the court rejected Moody’s arguments and held that his Faretta

challenge and McCoy claim were waived.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

Moody argues he is entitled to relief on the theory that his guilty plea

was involuntary because the trial court denied his request to choose his

defense strategy and his request for self-representation. See Pet. at 15. The

Georgia Supreme Court rightly rejected that far-reaching argument. And this

Court should deny review, for two main reasons.

First, this case does not present a question worthy of certiorari. The

voluntariness of a guilty plea is an intensively fact-bound question. Second,

Moody’s argument lacks merit. To the extent there is a legal question, the

denial of self-representation and to choose one’s defense strategy is not

19

among the narrow class of challenges identified by this Court that a

defendant can raise on direct review following a guilty plea. Contrary to

Moody’s argument of a significant split regarding whether a Farretta claim

can be waived on appeal by a valid guilty plea, every court but one to decide

this issue has held the claim is waived. Thus, there is no significant split in

authority requiring this Court’s attention.

I.

The validity of Moody’s guilty plea is an intensively fact-bound

question that does not present an issue worthy of certiorari.

This Court generally does not grant certiorari to review fact-heavy

decisions. Determining whether a guilty plea was entered voluntarily is

always a fact-bound inquiry. See United States v. Flynn, 969 F.3d 873, 878

(8th Cir. 2020). That determination requires courts to consider “the total

circumstances surrounding the plea,” including whether the court conducted

a sufficient plea colloquy and whether the defendant was adequately

informed of his rights. United States v. Perillo, 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir.

2018). Voluntariness, in other words, is an often-detailed inquiry that is not

easily susceptible to broad categorical rules.

This case is no exception, as the validity of Moody’s guilty plea is a pile

of facts from beginning to end. In determining the voluntariness of Moody’s

plea, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the whole record, including

Moody’s plea colloquy with the trial court, to decide whether “the trial court’s

factual findings” on that point were correct. Pet. App. 8a (emphasis added).

Ultimately, the Georgia Supreme Court deemed those factual findings

20

correct, noting that “the record supports” the conclusion that “the trial court’s

adverse rulings and Moody’s decision to plead guilty were unrelated.” Id.

Of particular relevance, when Moody was asked why he was pleading

guilty, he answered that he “felt it would be more appropriate for the families

involved in this not to have to go through trial procedure, and it’s just, you

know, just a decision I made, sir.” Vol. 25, T. 2794. The trial court then

asked, “Are you doing that freely and voluntarily?” to which Moody responded

“Yes, your honor.” Id. at 2795. Towards the end of the plea colloquy, the trial

court specifically asked if Moody was pleading guilty because the court had

denied his request to represent himself or because “you think it’s the best

thing for you to do?” Moody responded, “I feel it is the best thing to do at this

time.” Pet. App. 6a. Thus, when given the chance to specifically state whether

he felt coerced into pleading guilty because the court had denied his request

for self-representation, and by extension his right to choose the strategy for

defense, Moody chose to state the opposite.

And when Moody attempted to withdraw his guilty plea after the jury

had begun sentencing deliberations based in part on his claim that he should

have been allowed to represent himself, the trial court found the Faretta

hearing had “nothing to do with the plea” and “there [was] a clear dividing

line” at “the beginning of the trial and the opening statement of the State and

Mr. Moody’s clear, unequivocal, voluntary decision in the face of what he

knew would be the evidence against him to plead guilty and accept

responsibility.” Vol. 29, T. 4013. The court concluded, in denying the request

to withdraw the plea, that there was “no question in [its] mind” that Moody’s

21

“plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily made at the time” and denied the

request to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at 4014.

Moody’s case, in other words, is a poor vehicle for determining whether

guilty pleas are rendered involuntary if they are entered following the denial

of a request for self-representation, because—as his colloquy with the trial

court makes clear—he pleaded guilty for reasons separate from the selfrepresentation issue. At the very least, this is an intensively factual issue.

II.

Moody’s claim that an alleged violation of his due process rights

invalidates his guilty plea is waived because it was not raised in

the state courts.

Moody argues that the denial of his request to control his defense was

violation of his due process rights that invalidates his guilty plea. Moody did

not raise this argument in the state courts; thus it is not properly before this

Court for review. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 247 (1983) (“we have

consistently dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the federal claim

asserted in this Court was not raised below”); Pet. App. 5a-12a. But even if it

were, this Court’s precedent does not support Moody’s argument. The only

antecedent constitutional claims that render a guilty plea void are ones that

would have precluded a state from bringing charges in the first place. See

Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30. The right to choose one’s trial strategy does not

implicate a state’s ability to “hale” a person into court. Id. Thus, Moody has

not presented this Court with a claim for certiorari review.

Moody relies on Tollett, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970),

and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), to support his argument that

certain due process violations may invalidate a guilty plea. Starting with

22

Tollett, it is easily distinguishable. The petitioner in Tollett did not challenge

the validity of his guilty plea. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 268 (“The Court of

Appeals was at pains to point out that respondent’s present petition did not

attack the guilty plea.”). The only issue addressed by the Court was whether

a valid guilty plea waived a challenge to the antecedent constitutional claim

of an infirm grand jury, which the Court held it did. The only holding in

Tollett that is relevant to Moody’s argument is that “a guilty plea represents

a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.”

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. Although Moody acknowledges this holding, he fails

to admit that it firmly cuts against his argument. As found by the state

courts, Moody’s request to represent himself and his guilty plea “were

unrelated to each other” which is not only shown by the record but by Tollett’s

holding that a guilty plea is separate from all the events that occurred before.

Pet. App. 8a. Thus, Tollett offers Moody no help because it does not even

suggest Moody’s alleged due process violation voided his guilty plea.

Moody also relies upon McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 760

(1970), but it also undermines his argument. On review in McMann was the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision that if “a guilty plea is shown to

have been triggered by a coerced confession …the plea is vulnerable …where

the guilty plea was taken prior to Jackson v. Denno.” Id. at 766. This Court

disagreed with the court of appeals and held “that a defendant who alleges

that he pleaded guilty because of a prior coerced confession is not, without

more, entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus. Nor do we deem

the situation substantially different where the defendant’s plea was entered

23

prior to Jackson v. Denno.” Id. at 771. The only exception, or attack, to the

validity of the plea discussed in McMann was where the petitioner could

“allege and prove serious derelictions on the part of counsel sufficient to show

that his plea was not, after all, a knowing and intelligent act.” Id. at 774.

Moody has not alleged trial counsel were ineffective with regard to the guilty

plea, but, as in McMann, that a prior alleged unconstitutional act coerced his

guilty plea. Thus, nothing in McMann suggests that his current attack on his

guilty plea can be used to prove his plea was invalid because of a due process

violation.

Finally, Moody relies on Blackledge, which also provides no support for

his certiorari request. Petitioner Perry pleaded guilty to a felony charge but

on appeal challenged the state’s right to have filed the charge against him

under the due process clause because the felony charge was only filed after

Perry appealed his misdemeanor conviction for the same crime. This Court

held that the due process clause “simply could not permissibly require Perry

to answer to the felony charge.” Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 31. The Court

distinguished Tollett, explaining “[u]nlike the defendant in Tollett, Perry is

not complaining of ‘antecedent constitutional violations’” but ‘[r]ather…the

right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge” because the

“initiation of the proceedings against him in the Superior Court thus

operated to deny him due process of law.” Id. at 30-31 (quoting Tollett, 411

U.S. at 266, 267). Obviously, no similar situation occurred here.

In sum, even assuming Moody had raised a due process claim below and

the trial court erroneously precluded Moody from choosing his trial strategy,

24

this ruling had nothing to do with whether the state could “hale” him into

court for the crimes charged. Therefore, as shown above, and will be argued

more below, any of Moody’s antecedent constitutional claims that relate to his

chosen trial strategy and self-representation was correctly held by the

Georgia Supreme Court to be waived on review by his guilty plea.

III. The Georgia Supreme Court correctly determined under this

Court’s precedent that Moody’s guilty plea waive his Faretta

claim.

Relying solely on the outlier Hernandez decision of the Ninth Circuit—

holding that Faretta claims cannot be waived by a guilty plea—Moody asks

this Court to grant certiorari review to create new law. However, as

determined by every other federal court of appeals that has decided this

issue, and the Georgia Supreme Court, the Hernandez Faretta holding

conflicts with this Court’s long-standing precedent. The Georgia Supreme

Court correctly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding and held that Moody’s

Farretta claim did not fall within an exception to the waiver rule.

As mentioned above, decades ago in Tollett, this Court examined

whether “direct inquiry into the merits of claimed antecedent constitutional

violations” was required if a valid guilty plea was entered. Tollett, 411 U.S.

at 265. The Court looked to its prior precedent—known as the Brady

trilogy—where the Court had determined that review of alleged

constitutional violations that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea

precluded review of those claims. In two of the cases that made up the Brady

trilogy, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) and Parker v. North

Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), the antecedent constitutional violation related

25

to an improper “burden placed on the exercise of the right to jury trial,” which

the respondents claimed motivated the guilty pleas. Id. And in the third case,

McMann, “each of the respondents asserted that a coerced confession had

been obtained by the State” that led them to plead guilty. Id.

The Court “reaffirm[ed] the principle recognized in the Brady trilogy: a

guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in

the criminal process.” Id. at 267. In support, the Court explained that “[w]hen

a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact

guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Id. Thus, the Court concluded

that Tollett’s “claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury” was

“foreclose[d]” on appeal because he pled guilty. Id. at 266.

During the next term in Blackledge, as explained above, the Court

provided an exception to the waiver of antecedent constitutional claims that

“went to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court.”

Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30. However, the Court explained that antecedent

constitutional claims that didn’t preclude a defendant from being charged for

a particular offense were not part of this exception. The Court pointed out

that “[t]he defendants in McMann …could surely have been brought to trial

without the use of the allegedly coerced confessions, and even a tainted

indictment of the sort alleged in Tollett could have been cured through a new

indictment by a properly selected grand jury.” Id. (cleaned up). Whereas, in

Blackledge, “by contrast, the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity

26

[was] markedly different” because the state could not obtain a conviction for a

misdemeanor charge in one state court and then require “the respondent to

answer to the more serious [felony] charge” in a higher state court under the

due process clause. Id. No other exceptions to the waiver rule have been

identified by this Court. Here, obviously the State was not precluded from

bringing Moody into court to answer the felony charges brought against him.

Based upon Tollett and Blackledge, the Georgia Supreme Court

disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez. The Hernandez

court held that a “court’s refusal to allow [a defendant] to exercise the right of

self-representation forced him to choose between pleading guilty and

submitting to a trial the very structure of which would be unconstitutional,”

which “‘imposed unreasonable constraints’ on the defendant’s decision to

plead guilty.” Hernandez, 203 F.3d at 626 (emphasis in original); Pet. App.

10a (quoting Hernandez, supra at 627). The Georgia Supreme Court pointed

out that the four other federal courts of appeal that had decided the issue

disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, and the state court found their decisions,

unlike the Ninth Circuit, aligned with this Court’s precedent. Pet. App. 10a

(citing United States v. Dewberry, 936 F.3d 803, 805-807 (II) (8th Cir. 2019);

United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279-280 (II) (A) (4th Cir. 2010);

Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 942-943 (II) (7th Cir. 2006); and United States

v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1406-1407 (10th Cir. 1976)).

In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Georgia Supreme Court

agreed with Fourth and Eighth Circuit’s point that “Hernandez’s rationale ‘is

based on the false premise that the defendant who is denied his right to

27

represent himself is forced to either plead guilty or submit to an

unconstitutional trial.’” Pet. App. 10a (emphasis in original) (quoting

Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 806) (citing Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 28). “As both the

Fourth and Eighth Circuits reasoned, this premise is flawed because it ‘fails

to account for the fact that if the defendant proceeded to trial and was

convicted, he could seek an appellate remedy for the constitutional violations

he alleged.’” Id. (quoting Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 280) (citing Dewberry, 936

F.3d at 806 (same).

This reasoning is supported by this Court’s decision in McMann, which

concerned defendants claiming alleged coerced confessions forced them to

plead guilty. This Court rejected that rationale stating that “[f]or the

defendant who considers his confession involuntary and hence unusable

against him at a trial, tendering a plea of guilty would seem a most

improbable alternative.” McMann, 397 U.S. at 768. Instead, “[t]he sensible

course would be to contest his guilt, prevail on his confession claim at trial,

on appeal, or, if necessary, in a collateral proceeding, and win acquittal,

however guilty he might be.” Id. Likewise, here, Moody allegedly objected to

his counsel conceding his guilty, which he could have then challenged on

appeal. It makes no sense to find that he was forced to plead guilty because

his counsel had chosen a strategy to concede guilt.

Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court correctly found persuasive, the

Eighth Circuit’s point that “‘the approach used in Hernandez is inconsistent

with [long-standing] Supreme Court precedent’ holding that a ‘guilty plea

represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the

28

criminal process.’” Pet. App. 10a (brackets in original) (quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 807). “As the Eighth Circuit further

noted, Supreme Court precedent also holds that ‘case-related constitutional

defects’ are made ‘irrelevant to the constitutional validity of the conviction’ by

a later guilty plea ‘because the defendant has admitted the charges against

him.’” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dewberry, supra). This is

especially true in this case where Moody’s objection to counsel’s performance,

and the reason for his request to represent himself, was the disagreement to

concede guilt. Whatever objection he had to this strategy was obliterated by

his subsequent confession of guilt, which he explicitly stated he was doing

because he “fe[lt] it would be more appropriate for the families involved in this

not to have to go through trial procedure.” Vol. 25, T. 2794-795 (emphasis

added).

Additionally, because Hernandez was one of the earliest decisions to

address the question, it lacked the benefit of its fellow circuit courts’

reasoning to the contrary. See, e.g., Gomez, 434 F.3d at 942-43; Moussaoui,

591 F.3d at 279-80; Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 806. And it lacked the benefit of

this Court’s decision in Class v. United States, which clarified that a

defendant who has pleaded guilty may “challenge [on appeal] the

Government’s power to criminalize [the defendant’s] (admitted) conduct,” but

may not challenge “case-related constitutional defects that occurred prior to

the entry of the guilty plea.” 583 U.S. 174, 181 (2018) (quotation omitted); see

also Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 807 (explaining that “Hernandez’s approach turns

the [Class] rule on its head by making a defendant’s admission of guilt

29

irrelevant because of an earlier purported case-related constitutional defect”).

Notably, Hernandez remains the only case in which the Ninth Circuit has

permitted a defendant to raise a self-representation claim on appeal after

pleading guilty.

As correctly held by the Georgia Supreme Court, in line with Blackledge

and Class, “[t]he limited exceptions to the general rule of waiver are for

claims that go ‘to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into

court to answer the charge brought against him.’” Pet. App. 11a (quoting

Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30). Moody does not argue—and could not argue—

that, “judged on [their] face,” the murder charges levied against him were

ones “which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” Menna v. New

York, 423 U.S. 61, 52 n.2 (1975). So the Georgia Supreme Court correctly held

that Moody did not qualify for an exception to the general rule that a guilty

plea precludes challenging antecedent constitutional violations on appeal.

Outside of Hernandez, Moody has not identified any other decision, from

any court, supporting his position—the Ninth Circuit stands alone. To the

extent that Hernandez even remains the law of the Ninth Circuit, it is hardly

a basis for review here, where the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the

overwhelming majority view that aligns precisely with this Court’s precedent.

IV. The Georgia Supreme Court correctly determined under this

Court’s precedent that Moody’s guilty plea waived his McCoy

claim.

On direct appeal, relying on McCoy, Moody also argued that the trial

court “prevented him from determining the objective of his defense in

violation of the federal constitution.” Pet. App. 11a. Moody argues that the

30

Georgia Supreme Court was in error to find this claim was “waived by virtue

of his guilty plea” because it “affected whether a trial would proceed at all”

and essentially forced him to plead guilty. Pet. App. 11a; Brief at 20. Moody

is wrong.

As already shown above, antecedent constitutional claims that do not

fall within the class of claims that preclude the State from bringing charges,

are precluded from review following a valid guilty plea. As correctly

explained by the Georgia Supreme Court, and not refuted by Moody, his

“McCoy claim is related to the manner in which he would have conducted his

defense at trial, and it focuses on a ruling on a non-jurisdictional issue

unrelated to his guilty plea, and that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty

plea.” Pet. App. 12a. The exception to the waiver rule clearly does not apply

here.

Additionally, the state court pointed out in determining his McCoy claim

was waived, “‘a valid guilty plea relinquishes any claim that would contradict

the admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.’” Id.

(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805). Applying that

holding, Moody’s admission of guilt cleared the slate of any claim that

concerned any objection he had to admitting guilt. As wisely noted by the

Georgia Supreme Court at the beginning of its review of Moody’s guilty plea,

“the ‘[e]ntry of a plea is not some empty ceremony, and statements made to a

[trial] judge in open court are not trifles that defendants may elect to

disregard.’” Pet. App. 5a (quoting United States v. Stewart, 198 F.3d 984, 987

31

(7th Cir. 1999)). Moody can ignore what he stated during his guilty plea, but

the Georgia Supreme Court did not err by refusing to follow this path.

Accordingly, Moody has failed to identify an issue worthy of this Court’s

review.

32

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, this Court should deny the petition.

Respectfully submitted.

/s/ Sabrina D. Graham

Sabrina D. Graham

Christopher M. Carr

Attorney General

Beth A. Burton

Deputy Attorney General

Clint Malcolm

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Sabrina D. Graham

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Georgia

Attorney General

40 Capitol Square, SW

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

(404) 694-7975

sgraham@law.ga.gov

Counsel for Respondent

33

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 21, 2023, I served this brief on all

parties required to be served by mailing a copy of the brief to be delivered via

email, addressed as follows:

Michael Admirand

Mark Loudon-Brown

Southern Center For Human Rights

60 Walton Street NW

Atlanta, GA 30303

madmirand@schr.org

mloudonbrown@schr.org

/s/ Sabrina D. Graham

Sabrina D. Graham