Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Roberto Carlos Mendives, Individually and On Behalf of His Four Minor Children, R. C. M., II, M. A. M., G. L. M., and E. F. M., Petitioner v. Bexar County, Texas, et al.

-5831

No.

3fn ®Ije

Supreme Court

tCIje ®mte& States;

Roberto Carlos Mendives Sr.; individually and on

Behalf of his four minor children, R.C.M. II;

G.L.M.; and, E.F.M.;

Petitioner (s),

v.

Suprsfiie Court, U.b.

FIIXO

Bexar County Court ET AL.; State of Texas, et il.;

Angela Rose Wooten (in err); Department of Health

^ 2023

& Human Services, o/b/o; Department of Justice

ricnrtF OF THE CLERK—

o/b/o; Attorney Velia Judith Meza,

Respondent(s).

Petition for a Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respectfully submitted by:

Roberto Carlos Mendives, Sr., Sui Juris

P.O. Box 380003, San Antonio, Texas

78268.

Telephone: (321) 831-0710

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether this court should overrule the fact

that the state court has separated a fit parent from

his/her minor children without an adjudication

hearing when federal courts have repeatedly found

that parent and child share an intimate and

expressive relationship that is protected by the First

Amendment concept of free association and this court

has recognized that there is fundamental right of

parents to direct their children’s upbringing resolves

this case, and concluded that strict scrutiny is the

appropriate standard of review to apply to

infringements of fundamental rights.

2. Whether it is beyond any doubt that a fit

parent’s constitutional rights exist, that they are First

Amendment rights, and that they apply to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment; and, that where

the state infringes upon the rights of parents it also

infringes upon the rights of the child. Surely, the state

must carry a heavy burden of proof before it can

deprive a child of fundamental rights based on nothing

more than a state judge’s opinion of that child’s best

interests.

3. Whether there is a presumption that fit

parents act in their children’s best interests, that

there is normally no reason for the State to inject

itself into the private realm of the family to further

question fit parents’ ability to make the best decisions

regarding their children

4. Whether an adjudicated parent who has sired

his minor children can be deprive by the state from

personally care for his minor children to instead

activate the parens patriae doctrine without any type

of adjudication hearing to self-ward [Petitioner’s]

minor children to the state in order to obtain Title IVD Child Support funding from the federal

government.

II

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner(s) were the appellant in the court of

appeals. They are Roberto Carlos Mendives Sr.;

individually and on Behalf of his four minor children,

R.C.M. II; M.A.M.; G.L.M.; and, E.F.M. (the two oldest

of the minors in this case are now adults).

Respondents were the appellees in the court of

appeals. They are Bexar County Court ET AL.; State

of Texas, et al.; Angela Rose Wooten (in err);

Department of Health & Human Services, o/b/o;

Department of Justice o/b/o; Attorney Velia Judith

Meza.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San

Antonio Division filed on Oct 8, 2021

•

Case No. SA-21-CV-0356-JKP (W.D. Tex. Oct.

8, 2021)

United States Court of Appeals for The Fifth Circuit

•

Mendives v. Bexar County, Case No. 21-51040

(5th Cir. 2023), petition for rehearing denied,

May 5th of 2023.

Bexar County Court of San Antonio in the state of

Texas.

•

Case No. 2015-CI-00877

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

II

QUESTIONS PRESENTED...........

III

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

III

RELATED PROCEEDINGS............

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.........

In absent of an Adjudication Hearing(s)

I.

proves that state court lacks jurisdiction over a fit

parent’s minor children.

10

Procedures by Presumption is colossally

II.

damaging the American families and implied

15

jurisdiction is unconstitutional.

The Duty of Courts to Instruct

III.

Unconstitutional Acts by Governmental Officials ..16

This Court should grant the Petition to

IV.

clarify the level of scrutiny court must use in

adjudication parent’s fundamental rights of care,

custody and control of their children; and, why

Adjudication hearings are required to avoid

20

miscarriage of justice..........

21

V.

Footnote Four

22

Constitutional Parental Rights

VI.

First Amendment Free Association

VII.

Right

25

28

VIII.

Conclusion

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, (1902)

18

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., (2015) ...17

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S.

17

320 (2015)............................................................

17

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)......................

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) (1821).

18

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. (2001)

17

County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893)........

18

Davis v. Turner......................................................

29

Familias Unidas v. Briscoe. 619 F. 2d 391 - Court of

27

Appeals. 5th Circuit 1980

Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene

Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938

5

Kipps v. Caillier, 205 F. 3d 203 - Court of Appeals. 5th

Circuit 2000

27

Lexmark Inti, Inc. v. Static Ctrl. Components, 572

U.S. (2014)................................................

18

19

Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. (1905)....

Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. (2018)................

17

24

Mathews v Eldridse. 424 US (1976).......

13

Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976)

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New

18

Orleans, 491 U.S.(1989)

Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Florida, 457 U.

12

S. 500 (1982)..........................................................

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

15

Roberts v. United States Javcees, 468 US, (1984) ...26

Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753; 102 S Ct 1388;

71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982).......................................

23

Santosky v. Kramer, (1982)................................

16

24

Santosky, 455 US at 758......................................

Stanley v Illinois, 405 US (1972).......................

23

18

Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) (1840)

Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F. 3d 1042 - Court of

Appeals, 5th Circuit 1996

26

V

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 720 (1997)

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)............

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 232 (1972)............

15

15

15

15

Statutes

§ 1331....................

41

15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)

29

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ..

23

Constitutional Provisions

passim

Fourteenth Amendment

Fourth Amendment

21

US Const. Am XIV. $ 1

37

VI

3ht tlje Supreme Court of W$t Sintteb States;

No.

Roberto Carlos Mendives Sr.; individually and on

Behalf of his four minor children, R.C.M. II;

G.L.M.; and, E.F.M.;

Petitioner(s),

v.

Bexar County Court ET AL.; State of Texas, et al.;

Angela Rose Wooten (in err); Department of Health

& Human Services, o/b/o; Department of Justice

o/b/o; Attorney Velia Judith Meza,

Respondents).

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Petitioner, individually and on behalf of his minor

children in this case, respectfully petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this

case.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the court of appeals. The order denying

rehearing en banc, along with concurring and

dissenting opinions. The opinion of the district court

as reported and agreed upon by the appeals court.

JURISDICTION

May 5, 2023. A petition for rehearing en banc in the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Based on Rule

13 - Review on Certiorari: Time for Petitioning - the

Petitioner has 90 days (August 3rd of 2023) to file a

writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment from

the appeals court after the entry of the order denying

a judicial and discretionary review.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction

under First Amendment of the United States

Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. 51983 [Equal

Protection], U.S.C. 241 [Conspiracy against rights],

18 U.S.C. 242 [Deprivation of Rights Under Color of

Law], Also, this Court has jurisdiction over this

matter pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory

Judgement Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201-2202.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Enforcement of Fundamental Rights

Fundamental rights are a group of rights that

have been recognized by the Supreme Court as

requiring a high degree of protection from

government encroachment,

These rights are

specifically identified in the Constitution [especially

in the Bill of Rights] or have been implied through

interpretation of clauses, such as under Due Process.

These laws are said to be “fundamental” because they

were found to be so important for individual liberty

that they should be beyond the reach of the political

process, and therefore, they are enshrined in the

Constitution. Laws encroaching on a fundamental

right generally must pass strict scrutiny to be upheld

as constitutional.

For almost nine years the Petitioner has been

demanding the vindication of his and his minor

children fundamental rights. It is fundamental

principle of the administration of justice that the

courts will aid those who vigilant and who not sleep

in their rights. This principle embodied in the equity’s

maxim “Delay defeats equity” and in the statutes of

limitations, is intended to discourage unreasonable

delay in presentation of claims and enforcement of

rights. The Constitution empowers the United States

Page 2 of 30

Supreme Court to issue direction or order or writs, as

such is in this case, a writ of certiorari for the

enforcement of fundamental rights. Further, the right

to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of

fundamental rights has been a guaranteed right.

This case is important to every parent who

seeks to assert their right to determine the

upbringing of their child as a state, federal, natural,

and God-given right.

The Petitioner submits this Petition arising

under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the

United States where-in a constitutionally protected

interest has been invaded for almost nine [9] years.

All which was done in the best interest of the children.

STATEMENT

This case centers upon the very cornerstone of

our society: the family. Deeper still, this case involves

the intersection of the family and the law: parents’

fundamental rights in directing the care, custody, and

control of their children as a family and the State’s

power to affect, limit, or even terminate those rights.

This Court has determined that parents have a

fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and

control of their children. This Court also has

determined that the government shall not interfere

with this right unless and until a parent is proven

unfit,. In contradiction to this determination, the

Petitioner has been deprived of the fundamental right

to upbring his minor children for the last nine years.

In fact, the Petitioner does not know the whereabouts

of his minor children.

This case presents the opportunity for the

Court to vindicate Petitioner and his children

fundamental rights and unequivocally articulate the

fitness of the parent as that test and strict scrutiny as

that level of scrutiny for judicial review. Indeed, this

case presents the appropriate vehicle to do so because

it involves the rights of two natural parents.

Page 3 of 30

Therefore, this Court should grant the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Firstly, it is [almost] nine [9] years since the

very last time the unadjudicated Petitioner,

[biological] father of the four minor children in this

case, has been deprived from seeing and knowing the

whereabouts of his minor children. This has been an

unconstitutionally

infringement

Petitioner’s

fundamental right to [personally] rear his children.

The Federal Constitution permits a State to

interfere with this right only to prevent harm or

potential harm to the child; it does not require a

threshold showing of harm and sweeps too broadly by

permitting any person to petition at any time with the

only requirement being what serves in the best

interest of the child.

The Petitioner, knowing that it was beyond

impossible to find him unfit because he has been an

almost perfect father contested false allegations by

filing several motions requesting Adjudication

Hearings. These motions were postponed several

times by the attorney of record Velia Judith Meza

(Ms. Meza) in the state’s Case No. 2015-CI-00877

stating that she was not ready. Consequently, the

state court is without justification and is still without

any justification on records to deny the Petitioner of

his rights to personally care for his children.

The Petitioner’s fundamental parental rights

and his child’s fundamental rights cannot depend on

the Petitioner’s marital status or a change in my

marital status. Where divorce statutes create two

unequal classes of parent or two unequal classes of

children, they violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Equal Protection Clause. Where the divorce court

asserts child custody jurisdiction solely on the basis of

a divorce between parents, the court fails the

constitutional test of showing a “compelling state

Page 4 of 30

interest” that is “necessary” to achieve a permissible

state policy.

Moreover, on February 22nd of 2019, the

Attorney General of Texas, Mr. Ken Paxton (Mr.

Paxton) in his Opinion No. KP. 0241 stated that 1)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment protects fundamental parental rights; 2)

As a general matter the Courts apply strict scrutiny

to review state statutes that infringe upon

fundamental parental rights; 3) Certain contexts

regarding child custody determinations may warrant

the application of additional standards; and, 4) in his

summary explained that the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment protects certain

fundamental parental rights, including the right of

parents to make decisions concerning the care,

custody, and control of their children, to direct the

upbringing and education of their children, the right

to make medical decisions on behalf of their children,

and, in conjunction with the First Amendment, to

guide the religious future and education of their

children.

What Mr. Paxton explains is not anything

new into the judicial systems; in fact, in

Footnote Four1 of United States v. Carolene

Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) presages a

shift, in the Supreme Court from predominately

protecting property rights to protecting other

individual rights, such as those found in the First

Amendment. The Footnote Four is reiterated when

federal courts repeatedly found that parent and child

1 This deferential posture toward the legislative branch

represents the crux of judicial self-restraint, a judicial

philosophy that advocates a narrow role for courts in U.S.

constitutional democracy. Because state and federal legislatures

are constitutionally authorized to make the law, proponents of

judicial self-restraint argue, courts must limit their role to

interpreting and applying the law, except in the rare instance

where a piece of legislation clearly and unequivocally violates a

constitutional provision, in which case they may strike it down.

Page 5 of 30

share an intimate and expressive relationship that is

protected by the First Amendment concept of free

association. In all cases where the state seeks to

infringe upon these rights, the state must bear the

burden of proof to the level of strict scrutiny.

Secondly, the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Texas allegedly lacks jurisdiction

to right the wrongs committed by the court in state of

Texas under the Rocker-Feldman Doctrine; In doing

so, the U.S. District court err by even not rendering a

Declaratory judgement; not aligning with the

promises of the U.S. Constitution which is seriously

understood, the oath provides a solution to the “dead

hand” problem and explains how the people can

legitimately hold accountable their government

representatives due to fact generally, federal courts

have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise

the jurisdiction siven them”2 by Congress. Ryan v.

Johnson. 115 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting

Colorado River, 422 U.S. at 817). Thus, the pendency

of a state court action does not ordinarily bar federal

court proceedings concerning the same matter.

Colorado River. 424 U.S. at 817. In fact, it is a “well

recognized” rule that “the pendency of an action in the

state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the

same matter in the Federal Court having jurisdiction

. . . .” Id. at 817; see also University of Maryland v.

Peat Marwick Main & Co.. 923 F.2d 265, 275-76 (3d

Cir. 1991) (“The general rule regarding simultaneous

litigation of similar issues in both state and federal

courts is that both actions may proceed until one has

2 See, 3rd Cir. Case No. 18-3373 - Surender Malhan, for himself

and as parent of E.M. and V.M., Appellant v. SECRETARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ATTORNEY

GENERAL NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW JERSEY;

ELIZABETH CONNOLLY, in her official capacity as acting

Commissioner of Office of Child Support Services; NATASHA

JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Director Division of

Family Development; JOHN DOES 1- 10; OFFICE OF CHILD

SUPPORT SERVICES

Page 6 of 30

come to judgment, at which point that judgment may

create a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on the

other action.”)

“A threshold issue that must be determined in

any Colorado River abstention case is whether the two

actions are ‘parallelRyan. 115 F.3d at 196. The

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained

that parallel cases are those that “involve the same

parties and substantially identical claims, raising

nearly identical allegations and issues.” IFC

Interconsult v. Safeguard Int’l Partners. 438 F.3d

298, 306 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Yang v. Tsui. 416 F.3d

199, 204-05 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations

omitted)). Consequently, if all of the issues to be

litigated are not identical or nearly identical, the

district court lacks the power to abstain. See

University of Maryland. 923 F.2d at 276 (“[Wjhile

certain issues to be litigated in the . . . federal claim

may be identical to issues that have been or will be

raised ... in state court, the lack of identity of all

issues necessarily precludes Colorado River

abstention.”) This is because “a decision to invoke

Colorado River, necessarily contemplates that the

federal court will have nothing further to do in

resolving any substantive part of the [federal] case

[after resolution of the state action], whether [the

federal court] stays or dismisses.” Moses H. Cone, 460

U.S. at 28; see also Michelson v. Citicorp Nat’l Srvcs.,

138 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Colorado

River doctrine applies only if there is parallel state

court litigation involving the same parties and issues

that will completely and finally resolve the issues

between the parties.” (quoting Marcus v. Township of

Abington, 38 F.3d 1367, 1371 (3d Cir. 1994))).

Considerations of the Petitioner’s and his

minor children’s injuries are parallels argument in

this court within the meaning of the parallel term in

Colorado River.

Page 7 of 30

Under no exclusion evidence, this court is

constitutionally empowered to issue a Federal

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 et.

seq., that authorizes any court of the United States to

declare the rights and other legal relations of any

interested

party

seeking

such

declaration.

Furthermore, the Petitioner is asserting that a

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, provides

a method to determine the existence or nonexistence

of a right, duty power, liability, privilege, disability,

immunity, status, or any fact on which such legal

relations depend.3 Specifically, the Act provides:

In a case of actual controversy within its

jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon

the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the

rights and other legal relations of any interested party

seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief

is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have

the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and

shall be reviewable as such.4

Thirdly, a dicta of a judge cannot impliedly

deprive an Article III courts of their inherent and

statutory power to decide ripe constitutional

challenges to an agency’s structure and procedures

when-in fact federal courts have repeatedly found

that parent and child share an intimate and

expressive relationship that is protected by the First

Amendment concept of free association. In all cases

where the state seeks to infringe upon these rights,

the state must bear the burden of proof to the level of

strict scrutiny. In this case, the state is without

3 Am. Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Niagra Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y., 43 F.

Supp. 933, 935 (N.D. Ala. 1942) (consolidating three declaratory

judgment actions wherein each defendant was a fire insurance

company with which plaintiffs had a fire insurance policy at the

time of a fire at their factory).

4 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

Page 8 of 30

justification to favor one constitutionally protected

relationship over the other.

For these

and many other reasons

classifications that impact fundamental rights such as

1st Amendment family association rights must

survive strict scrutiny review. Kadrmas v. Dickinson

Public Schools. 487 US 450, 457 (Supreme Court

1988), (Unless a statute provokes "strict judicial

scrutiny" because it interferes with a "fundamental

right"...) Qutb v. Strauss. 11 F. 3d 488, 492 (5th

Circuit 1993), (If a classification disadvantages a

"suspect class" or impinges upon a "fundamental

right," the ordinance is subject to strict scrutiny...

Under the strict scrutiny standard, we accord the

classification no presumption of constitutionality.)

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez.

411 US 1, 17 (Supreme Court 1973), (We must decide,

first, whether the Texas system of financing public

education operates to the disadvantage of some

suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right

explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution,

thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.) Parental

rights are also fundamental rights protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment, see Troxel v. Granville. 530

US 57, 66 (Supreme Court 2000), (In light of this

extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

protects the fundamental right of parents to make

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of

their children.)

Moreover, awarding child support are in fact

reclassifications of parents as payor and payee,

fundamentally altering the liberty right to directly

care for one’s child, the privacy right to make decisions

regarding the care of one’s child, and impacting the

protected speech between parent and child by limiting

its quality and quantity. The state creates a

disadvantaged class by subjecting the payor to

potential contempt and criminal penalties for failure

Page 9 of 30

to pay. This invokes criminal and quasi-criminal

constitutional protections. The state also creates a

disadvantaged class where it orders a parent to pay

amounts that exceed the minimum reasonable

standard of care applied to all parents.

The state is holding a subset of parents to a higher

standard of care than it applies to married parents

based solely on marital status. Parents as all people

do have a possessory interest in their wages and any

money or valuables in their possession. Where the

state infringes upon this possessory interest, it

implicates the Fourth Amendment. While all parents

are subject to a general duty to care for their minor

children to minimum reasonable standards of care,

where the state converts this general duty to a specific

order to pay specific amounts of money or property to

a third party it may do so only after applying the

proper due process which at a minimum is the process

afforded to seizures of property under the Fourth

Amendment. Any interference with a possessory

interest is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

I.

ARGUMENT

In absent of an Adjudication Hearing(s)

proves that state court lacks jurisdiction

over a fit parent’s minor children.

The 14th Amendment specifically limits actions

by the state even where a third party asks the state

to take an action such as in a divorce custody

proceeding where one parent is asking the state to

deprive the other parent and/or child of fundamental

rights.

The state’s court lacks jurisdiction without an

adjudication hearing; and, in essence the “In The Best

Interest Of The Children”5 doctrine has been only

5 As the term suggests, the “best interest of the child” standard

prioritizes an affected child’s interests in the context of

adjudication or other decision-making processes. The standard

Page 10 of 30

scheme used by the states’ court actors to

fraudulently obtain jurisdiction over a minor child on

the basis that the trespassing acts of the state court’s

actors are based on the Best Interest of the Child.

Subsequently, in this case the state’ court purposely

avoided an adjudication hearing (Phase I) and moved

into to the dispositional phase (phase II) with respect

to the Petitioner. In doing so, the doctrine therefore

eliminated the state’s obligation to prove that the

unadjudicated parent, the Petitioner, is unfit before

the Petitioner is and/or was subject to the

dispositional authority of the court; conveniently.

There has never been an adjudication hearing

against the Petitioner in this case; thus, the state

court has never had justification(s) to separate the

Petitioner from his minor children. Consequently, it

has been almost nine [9] years since the last time the

Petitioner was able to see, hugs and more importantly

personally care his minor children [R.C.M. II;

M.A.M.;6 G.L.M.; and, E.F.M.;]. Moreover, the state’s

trespass against the Petitioner’s and his four minor

children’s, led to breaking that natural bond of

affection that grows and is led by the upbringing of

children [by parents.]

Furthermore, the problem here is that almost

nine years later a perfectly fit parent is an estranger

to his minor and vice-versa the minor children are

is typically employed by courts or administrative bodies

considering issues implicating a child’s welfare, including child

custody and placement decisions. See generally Dept, of Health

& Human Services, Children’s Bureau, Determining the Best

Interests of the Child (updated November 2012) [hereinafter

“HHS

Overview

of State

Statutes”],

Available

at

https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes

/best_interest.pdf (providing overview of standard, its

application, and various state statutes implementing the

standard); Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the

Best Interests of the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence,

10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 376 (2008) (discussing origins and

development of standard).

6 As of the day of filing this particular document, R.C.M. II and

M.A.M are above the age of eighteen [18] years old.

Page 11 of 30

estranger to this fit parent. In this case, the state

court’s intervention without an adjudication hearing

against a fit parent, the Petitioner, and his children

resulted to be “in the worst interest of the children”.

This proves that the state’s court gave no special

weight at all to the Petitioner’s determination(s) of his

minor children’ best interests. More importantly, it

appears that the state’s court applied exactly the

opposite presumption.

In addition, the state’s court pretenses of “In

the Best Interest of Children was to self-ward the

minor children to the state of Texas in order to obtain

Title IV-D Child Support’s funding [appropriation(s)]

from the United States federal government. In doing

so, Petitioner’s wages have been unlawfully and

illegally garnished

At issue, in this case is that the Title IV-D

Child Support’s Purpose Law7, without an

adjudication hearing in records proving that the

state’s legal nexus is neither without justification, nor

a bona fide need leading to deprive the Petitioner to

personally care for his minor children, to impoverish

the Petitioner and for the state’s court to obtain the

Title IV-D Child Support funding from the federal

government.

This case has been a tremendous miscarriage

of justice that caused the Petitioner to become

homeless due to the unlawful and illegal garnishment

of his wages. Further, Petitioner’s homestead

property was theft away and sold causing an

enormous pecuniary lost to the Petitioner.

Both, the state and the appellate courts failed

its constitutional mission to promote an engaged

judiciary capable of securing Americans’ essential

constitutional rights. The state’s Court failed to

7 The Purpose Law, 31 USC 1301, states: Appropriations shall

be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were

made except as otherwise provided by law.

Page 12 of 30

protect the police power,8 in U.S. constitutional law,

the permissible scope of federal and/or state

legislation so far as it may affect the rights of an

individual when those rights conflict with the

promotion and maintenance of the health, safety,

morals, and general welfare of the public.

The state’s court violated Petitioner’s U.S.

Constitutional guarantees of 1) procedural and 2)

substantive due process which is a substantive

component that provides heightened protection

against governmental interference with fundamental

rights and liberty interests, including the right of

parents to make decisions concerning the care,

custody, and control of their children.

Notwithstanding,

the

United

States

Constitution, recognizes a presumption that fit

parents act in the best interests of their children and

that there will normally be no reason for the state to

insert itself into the private realm of the family to

further question the ability of fit parents to make the

best decisions concerning the rearing of their

children. Due process demands that an individual be

afforded minimal procedural protections before the

state can burden a fundamental right, and the threepart balancing test of Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US

319 (1976), is applied to determine what process is

due when the state seeks to curtail or infringe an

individual right. The test requires consideration of

three factors: (1) the private interest that the official

action will affect, (2) the risk of an erroneous

8 Police powers are the fundamental ability of a government to

enact laws to coerce its citizenry for the public good, although

the term eludes an exact definition. The term does not directly

relate to the common connotation of police as officers charged

with maintaining public order, but rather to broad governmental

regulatory power. Berman v. Parker, a 1954 U.S. Supreme Court

case, stated that “[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace

and quiet, law and order. . . are some of the more conspicuous

examples of the traditional application of the police power”;

while recognizing that “[a]n attempt to define [police power’s]

reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless.”

Page 13 of 30

deprivation of the interest through the procedures

used and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the state’s

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal

and administrative burdens that the additional or

substitute procedural requirement would entail. In

essence, the test balances the costs of certain

procedural safeguards (in this case, an adjudication)

against the risks of not adopting those procedures.

It is simple, without an adjudication hearing,

the state’s court cannot deprive the Petitioner from

his minor children; not even for a minute. Thus, it is

beyond any doubt that every single action(s) from the

Defendants and the state’s court actors has been

unlawful and illegal from the case’s inception.” This

was just a divorce; but the state officials trespassed

against Petitioner’s and his minor children rights in

order to wardship the minor children to the state of

Texas. (See, James Monroe vs. Pape (1961) Quoting

.... Officials’ actions were illegal from inception). The

mere purpose of warding Petitioner’s four [4] minor

children to the state of Texas was to obtain Title IV-D

Child Support Benefits from the federal government

on “four” minor children. Thus, depriving the

Petitioner of his rights to “personally’ care for his

minor children.

Incongruently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit has made clear that the Petitioner’s

attempts for the vindication of his and his children

rights are 1) frivolous; and, 2) malicious. Thus,

concurring with the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Texas. Petitioner asserts that the

Appellate court err to point out Defendants vicious

violations of 1) procedural due process; and, 2) the

violations of substantive due process against the

Petitioner and his minor children.

Page 14 of 30

II.

Procedures by Presumption is colossally

damaging the American families and implied

jurisdiction is unconstitutional.

The 14th Amendment specifically limits actions by

the state even where a third party asks the state to

take an action such as in a divorce custody proceeding

where one parent is asking the state to deprive the

other parent and/or child of fundamental rights.

Nearly one hundred years ago, this Court

acknowledged that “the child is not the mere creature

of the State; those who nurture him and direct his

destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to

recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

Thereafter, in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),

this Court affirmed the fundamental rights of parents

“in the companionship, care, custody, and

management” of their children. Id. at 651. That same

year, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the

Court declared that “[tjhis primary role of the parents

in the upbringing of their children is now established

beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 232 (1972).

More recently, this Court declared in Washington

v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), that the

Constitution, and specifically the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the

fundamental right of parents to direct the care,

upbringing, and education of their children.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 720 (1997). And

in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), this Court

again unequivocally affirmed the fundamental right

of parents to direct the care, custody, and control of

their children.

In absent of an adjudication hearing, the state’s

court’s expertise is at issue in this case for violating

Petitioner’s and his children rights since the

adjudication hearing is the “only” fact-finding phase

regarding Petitioner’s parental fitness, and the

Page 15 of 30

procedures which afforded to parents are tied to the

allegations of unfitness in the state’s court

allegations, protecting parents from the risk of

erroneous deprivation of their parental rights.

Facts are facts, and can be proven with evidence

under no exclusion but presumptions are not facts and

can be dismantled for lack of evidences.

Essentially, the fact that state’s court actors

trespassed against the Petitioner’s and his minor

children’s rights then impermissibly delegates control

over to the federal courts’ jurisdiction, recognizes “a

presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of

their children” and that “there will normally be no

reason for the State to inject itself into the private

realm of the family to further question the ability of

[fit parents] to make the best decisions concerning the

rearing of [their] children.” Troxel, 530 US at 68-69

(opinion by O’Connor, J.). Further, the right is so

deeply rooted that “[t]he fundamental liberty interest

of natural parents in the care, custody, and

management of their child does not evaporate simply

because they have not been model parents . . . .”

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US 745, 753; 102 S Ct 1388;

71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982).

III.

The

Duty

of

Courts

Unconstitutional Acts by

Officials

to

Instruct

Governmental

The fact that after almost nine years the

Petitioner does not know the whereabouts his minor

children make this case the ideal vehicle for this

Court to clearly articulate the fitness of the parent’s

test as the appropriate test for all State courts

because this case involves a lower court’s review of the

rights of the Petitioner as natural parent. Troxel,

while providing cogent precedent, involved the rights

of a natural parent and the rights of grandparents

after the children’s father died. Stanley, likewise, is

analytically different because it involved the natural

Page 16 of 30

but unwed father of the children who had been

declared wards of the state after their mother died. As

demonstrated in Petitioner’s Petition of Certiorari tot

in the Appellate Court, this case involves a natural

biological father [of four minor children], who has

fundamental rights protected from unwarranted

government interference by the

Fourteenth

Amendment and who seek care, custody, and control

of his minor children. Only the fitness test protects

the constitutional rights of natural parents in a

custody case such as that presented in this Petition.

Moreover, Article III imposes on courts a “duty

... to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor

of the Constitution void.” The Federalist No. 78

The

(Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added),

doctrine of implied jurisdiction stripping is at odds

with that judicial duty.

The judicial duty imposed by Article III

compels [all] courts to enjoin federal officials from

carrying out statutory and administrative schemes

that violate the U.S. Constitution. Bell v. Hood, 327

U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (“[I]t is established practice for

this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts

to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by

the Constitution.”); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v.

Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (“[I]njunctive relief

has long been recognized as the proper means for

preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally.”).

The courts’ authority to stop unlawful conduct by

governmental officials is an equitable power that

“reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal

executive action, tracing back to England.”

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S.

320, 326-37 (2015) (citation omitted). When executive

action violates the Constitution, equity requires that

courts remain open to vindicate a plaintiffs rights.

See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (‘“[0]ne

who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional

validity of the appointment of an officer who

Page 17 of 30

adjudicates his case’ is entitled to relief.”) (citation

omitted). “Otherwise, the individual is left to the

absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a

public and administrative officer[.]” Am. Sch. of

Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110

(1902).

The Judiciary Act of 1789, which established

the lower courts and vested them with jurisdiction

over federal questions and diversity suits, “carries out

the constitutional right” to a federal forum. Suydam

v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67, 75 (1840). And with

that statutory grant of jurisdiction, all federal

courts—not just the Supreme Court—are duty-bound

to exercise their jurisdiction in such cases. See

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)

(Courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of

jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which

is not given.”). The judiciary’s obligation to “‘decide’

cases within its jurisdiction” is “virtually

unflagging.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Ctrl.

Components, 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014) (citation

omitted). That’s why this Court has reiterated, time

and again, that federal courts must not “abdicate

their authority or duty” and must “proceed to

judgment and [] afford redress to suitors before them

in every case to which their jurisdiction extends.”

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1989) (quoting Chicot

County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893)); Elgin,

567 U.S. at 35 (Alito, J., joined by Ginsburg and

Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (“The presumptive power of

the federal courts to hear

This case shows how court actors have refused to

uphold the U.S. Constitutional protection against the

damages, from a long and unfounded campaign

perpetuated by Defendants utilizing the Courts of the

State of Texas improperly to: 1) Violation of Due

Process; 2) Falsely Allegation that were material in

the underlying case against the Petitioner and his

Page 18 of 30

children; 3) Illegally and immorally garnishment of

the Petitioner’s wages under the pretenses of Title IVD Child Support impoverishing the Petitioner causing

him to end homeless and malnourished; 4) Denial of

due the equal protection of the law under the color of

law; 5) to create court orders causing invidious

classifications that denied Petitioner and his children

the equal protection; 6) forced Petitioner to contract

with the Title IV-D Child Support Agency in violation

of Petitioner’s economic freedom as this court held in

Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. (1905), and forcedly

reclassifying the Petitioner as an “obligor” in a Title

IV-D Child Support Agency contract; 7) unlawfully

and illegally placing the Petitioner into a

disadvantaged class by subjecting him as the payor to

potential contempt and criminal penalties for failure

to pay; 8) Violating Petitioner’s possessory property

interest in his wages, by the state infringing and

trespassing on his wages violating the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution; 9)

Garnishment of Petitioner’s wages and impeding him

to personally care for his children; 10) for theft of

Petitioner’s homestead property; 11) Miscarriage of

justice forcing Petitioner’s to pay for Title IV-D Child

Support agency knowing that there is plenty of cases

in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that: 12) Title

IV-D does not constitute a federal right;9 13) It is not

for the need of a particular person to be satisfied such

as in the case of mother and child;10 14) it is a contract

just like a student loan or a car note11 and it is

violation of Freedom from Contract;12 15) Demands

“payments” from those labeled obligor - not from

9 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S 329 (1977).

10 Blessing v. Freestone (1977)

11 United States v. Sage, 92 F. 3d 101 (2nd Circuit 1996)

12 Freedom of contract is the ability of parties to bargain and

create the terms of their agreement as they desire without

outside interference from the government. It is the opposite of

government regulation.

Page 19 of 30

father13 to get away from the fact that adjudication

hearing is a constitutional requirement under due

process before the state intrudes into the private

realm of an unadjudicated father and his minor

children; and, 16) There is no Title IV-D child support

agency court - and the so called “judges” violate the

Separation of Power Doctrine.14-15

Yet, the U.S. District Court and the Fifth Circuit

judges err against the Petitioner with strawman and

ad hominem arguments. Nevertheless, the U.S.

Federal Appellate Courts has been in unanimous

agreement with the U.S. Supreme Court that parents

and children share a First Amendment right to free

association that is strongly protected.

IV.

This Court should grant the Petition to

clarify the level of scrutiny court must use in

adjudication parent’s fundamental rights of

care, custody and control of their children; and,

why Adjudication hearings are required to

avoid miscarriage of justice.

In the concurring opinion in Troxel, Justice

Thomas summarized an important aspect of this

Court’s precedential opinion in Pierce v. Society of

Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), writing that “parents

have a fundamental constitutional right to rear their

children, including the right to determine who shall

educate and socialize them.” Troxel at 80 (Thomas, J.,

concurring). This fundamental right is just as critical

and sacred today as when Justice Thomas wrote those

words twenty years ago and when this Court

cemented that truth in 1925. Justice Thomas

proceeded to the next step in the analysis by

concluding: the Petitioner would apply strict scrutiny

to infringements of fundamental rights.”

13 United States v. Sage, 92 F. 3d 101 (2nd Circuit 1996)

14 Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588, 2d, 720 (1999)

15 Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Page 20 of 30

To avoid any judicial incongruencies, wrong

presumptions and/or to avoid the mishandling of

justice and/or to avoid the trespassing of a perfectly

fit father’s and/or mishandling of a child’s rights, as it

happened in this case to the Petitioner and his minor

children. Thus, the Petitioner agrees that strict

scrutiny is the only and appropriate level of review

and submits that this issue alone, as presented in this

case, supports this Court granting the Petition.

Petitioner Roberto Carlos Mendives, Sr., now

providing this Court with the ideal opportunity to

declare the appropriate level of scrutiny for the courts

of this nation to apply.

V.

Footnote Four

First, The Footnote four of United States v.

Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938)

presages a shift in the Supreme Court from

predominately protecting property rights to

protecting other individual rights, such as those found

in the First Amendment.

The Footnote Four clearly explains an unjustly

treatment of a certain group. Furthermore, it

suggested that "prejudice against discrete and insular

minorities may be a special condition, which tends

seriously to curtail the operation of those political

processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect

minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly

more searching judicial inquiry." The importance of

this principle cannot be overstated. It pervaded the

work of the Court and has played a prominent role in

constitutional discourse ever since.

Strictly scrutinizing these proceedings would

protect Americans instead of having to be learned in

law to assert that any state statute that authorizes

the court to make such an invidious reclassification is

void; on its face.

Page 21 of 30

VI.

Constitutional Parental Rights

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall. . .

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” US

Const, Am XIV, § 1. Included in the Fourteenth

Amendment’s promise of due process is a substantive

component that “provides heightened protection

against government interference with certain

fundamental

rights

and

liberty

interests.”

Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720; 117 S Ct

2258; 138 L Ed 2d 772 (1997).

Among these

fundamental rights is the right of parents to make

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of

their children. See Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390,

399-400; 43 S Ct 625; 67 L Ed 1042 (1923). In the

words of this Court, “[pjarents have a significant

interest in the companionship, care, custody, and

management of their children, and the interest is an

element of liberty protected by due process. The right

to parent one’s children is “essential to the orderly

pursuit of happiness by free men,” Meyer, 262 US at

399, and “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental

liberty interests,” Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 65;

120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000) (opinion by

O’Connor, J.). The right is an expression of the

importance of the familial relationship and “stems

from the emotional attachments that derive from the

intimacy of daily association” between child and

parent. Smith v Org of Foster Families for Equality

& Reform, 431 US 816, 844; 97 S Ct 2094; 53 L Ed 2d

14 (1977).

This court has clearly established that Parents

have constitutional protections. Notwithstanding, it

has been almost nine years since the last time the

Petitioner had any contact with his minor children,

not knowing the whereabouts of his minor children.

Page 22 of 30

The right to parent one’s children is “essential

to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,”

Meyer, 262 US at 399, and “is perhaps the oldest of

the fundamental liberty interests,” Troxel v Granville,

530 US 57, 65; 120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000)

(opinion by O’Connor, J.). The right is an expression

of the importance of the familial relationship and

“stems from the emotional attachments that derive

from the intimacy of daily association” between child

and parent. Smith v Org of Foster Families for

Equality & Reform, 431 US 816, 844; 97 S Ct 2094; 53

LEd 2d 14 (1977).

A parent’s right to control the custody and care

of her children is not absolute, as the state has a

legitimate interest in protecting “the moral,

emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor”

and in some circumstances “neglectful parents may be

separated from their children.” Stanley v Illinois, 405

US 645, 652; 92 S Ct 1208; 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

The United States Constitution, however,

recognizes “a presumption that fit parents act in the

best interest of their children” and that “there will

normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into

the private realm of the family to further question the

ability of [fit parents] to make the best decisions

concerning the rearing of [their] children.” Troxel,

530 US at 68-69 (opinion by O’Connor, J.). Further,

the right is so deeply rooted that “[t]he fundamental

liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,

and management of their child does not evaporate

simply because they have not been model parents . . .

.” Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753; 102 S Ct

1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982).

This Court has also recognized that due process

demands that minimal procedural protections be

afforded an individual before the state can burden a

fundamental right. In Mathews v Eldridge, the

Supreme Court famously articulated a three-part

Page 23 of 30

balancing test to determine “what process is due”

when the state seeks to curtail or infringe an

individual right:

rildentification of the specific dictates of due process

generally requires consideration of three distinct

factors: First. the private interest that will be affected

by the official action: second, the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures

used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards: and finally. the

Government’s interest, including the function

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail. fMathews v Eldridge, 424

US 319. 333, 335: 96 S Ct 893: 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976).I

In essence, the Eldridge test balances the costs

of certain procedural

safeguards—here,

an

adjudication—against the risks of not adopting such

procedures.

The Supreme Court has regularly

employed the Eldridge test to determine the nature of

the process due in child protective proceedings in

related contexts. See Santosky, 455 US at 758

(“Evaluation of the three Eldridge factors compels the

conclusion that use of a ‘fair preponderance of the

evidence’ standard in [parental rights termination]

proceedings is inconsistent with due process.”);

Smith, 431 US at 848-852 (addressing New York

City’s procedures for removing a minor from a foster

home).

Even with the U.S. Suprme Court cases been

established and regurgitated, the state’s county

courts are overlooking this court’s precedents.

The importance of the private interest at stake

here—a fit father, the Petitioner, fundamental right

to direct the care, custody, and control of his children

free from governmental interference—cannot be

understated.16 For almost nine years, the Petitioner’s

16 If a parent is unfit, the child’s interest aligns with the state’s

parens patriae interest. On the other hand, the child also has

Page 24 of 30

and his children’s fundamental rights, substantive

rights, have been blatantly violated. A family bond is

a core liberty interest recognized by the Fourteenth

Amendment. “Even when blood relationships are

strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing

the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”

Santosky, 455 US at 753.

VII.

First Amendment Free Association Right

Where the state intervenes in any form, it must

pass the Least Restrictive Means Test. Additionally,

the state is without justification to favor one

constitutionally protected relationship over the other

just to obtain Title IV-D Child Support funding from

the federal government.

The state is without justification to presume

that where the parents are not married and/or do not

live together that equal shared time with each parent

would not be in the child’s best interests. The child

shares a right equally to benefit from companionship

with both parents. It is the reciprocal sharing that

occurs through routine daily interaction and the

fundamental importance of this exchange that sets

the foundation for protection of this right. This

foundation strongly implicates any and all argument

of the state to suggest that depriving equal access

and/or equal possession of a child is a permissible

infringement of rights for it is the intimate

companionship itself that creates that foundation.

Remove that intimate companionship and you

an interest in remaining in his or her natural family

environment.

In which direction the child’s interest

preponderates cannot be known without first a specific

adjudication of a parent’s unfitness, as “the State cannot

presume that a child and his parents are adversaries.”

Santosky, 455 US at 760. Rather, only “[a]fter the State has

established parental unfitness . . . [may] the court. . . assume at

the dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the

natural parents do diverge.” Id.

Page 25 of 30

necessarily harm the bond and the protected

relationship.

It has been established in this Court in Roberts

v. United States Javcees, 468 US 609 - Supreme Court

1984, (The Court has long recognized that, because the

Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty,

it must afford the formation and preservation of

certain kinds of highly personal relationships a

substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified

interference by the State... Without precisely

identifying every consideration that may underlie this

type of constitutional protection, we have noted that

certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical

role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by

cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs;

they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers

between the individual and the power of the State...

Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such

relationships reflects the realization that individuals

draw much of their emotional enrichment from close

ties with others. Protecting these relationships from

unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards

the ability independently to define one's identity that

is central to any concept of liberty... The personal

affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and

that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on

the relationships that might be entitled to this sort of

constitutional protection, are those that attend the

creation and sustenance of a family — marriage, ...;

childbirth, ...; the raising and education of children,

...; and cohabitation with one's relatives, ... Family

relationships, by their nature, involve deep

attachments and commitments to the necessarily few

other individuals with whom one shares not only a

special community of thoughts, experiences, and

beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's

life.)

And, in the Fifth Circuit it has been establish in

Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F. 3d 1042 - Court of

Appeals. 5th Circuit 1996, (The specific types of

Page 26 of 30

intimate associations which have found protection in

the First Amendment have been more intimate than

our image of typical coach-player relationships. ...

(listing cases affording constitutional protection to

marriage, begetting and bearing children, child

rearing and education, and living with relatives)

(citations omitted).)

Familias Unidas v. Briscoe. 619 F. 2d 391 Court of Appeals. 5th Circuit 1980, (It is beyond

question that "freedom of association for the purpose

of advancing ideas and airing grievances" is a

fundamental liberty protected from governmental

intrusion by the First and Fourteenth Amendments...

Moreover, privacy in that association — particularly

with respect to groups championing unpopular causes

— is a vital incident of the primary right. Indeed,

"[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in

many circumstances be indispensable to preservation

of freedom of association, particularly where a group

espouses dissident beliefs.")

Kipps v. Caillier, 205 F. 3d 203 - Court of

Appeals. 5th Circuit 2000. (According to Supreme

Court precedent, the Constitution accords special

protection to two different types of association,

"intimate association" and "expressive association." ...

In Roberts, the Court noted that the right to intimate

association, the freedom to choose "to enter into and

maintain certain intimate human relationships," is a

"fundamental element of personal liberty." 468 U.S. at

617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244... Supreme Court

There should be no reason in the United States

that a father is not allowed to care of his own minor

children because the state court decides that it wants

Title IV-D Child Support funding from the federal

government.

The fact that Petitioner’s children were wards

of the state and used by the state’s court to obtain Title

IV-D Child Support from the federal government is, in

Page 27 of 30

general, a human/child trafficking business feeding

on conditions of vulnerability, such ignorance, social

exclusion, and ongoing demand.

The State’s actors engaged in human trafficking

under the sophisticated “in the Best Interest of the

Children Doctrine.”

Petitioner ask this court to put a stop on the

state’s scheme. This is destroying the American

family. It is beyond any doubt that Parental

constitutional rights exist, that they are First

Amendment, rights, and that they apply to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment.

In none of these cases [mentioned in this

section] nor in any case it has been found that any

federal appellate court stated that these rights do not

apply to single parents and/or that they may be

waived, ignored, or obviated by the filing of divorce

proceedings and/or any other type of custody

proceeding. Due Process simply demands much more

than the filing of a suit and holding a hearing where

the state judge presumes authority to deny

fundamental liberties.

Conclusion

VIII.

It is almost nine years since the last time the

Petitioner had a chance to see and hugs his minor

children. Additionally, the Petitioner has been left

homeless by the unlawful and illegal action(s) of the

state to fraudulently ward Petitioner’s minor children

to the state in order to obtain Title Iv-D Children

Support benefits form the federal government. The

state purpose to obtain Title IV-D was intentionally

avaricious and hidden under the “in the best interest

of the child.”

The Petitioner ask this court to vindicate his

rights and the rights of his minor children as well as

to compel these bad actors who wrongfully and

negligently injured the Petitioner and his minor

children to pay money to the Petitioner; thus, the tort

Page 28 of 30

system serves at least two functions: (1) deterring

people from harming others and (2) compensating

those who are injured.

The decision of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (No. 21-51040) on May

5th of 2023 is inconsistent with Supreme Court and

even its own Fifth Circuit precedent in Davis v.

Turner, and “ventures down a slippery slope that

erodes individuals’ constitutional rights to go about

their lives free from arbitrary interference. 17

The Defendants’ trespass against Petitioner is

“rough treatment, illegal handling, personal

indignities, and incivilities” starting with Defendants

extrinsically committing perjury in court by

Defendants’ false accusations of domestic violence

and false accusations of rape and the state court

officers

colluding

intrinsically

to

self-ward

Petitioner’s minor children to the state of Texas to

obtain Title IV-D Child Support funding from the

federal government; though, this is tyrannical and

perverse, it is also frivolous and malicious violating

procedural due process and substantive due process.

Furthermore, the Department of Justice (DOJ)

has reiterated in at least two issued letters 1) on April

20th of 2023, when the DOJ Civil Rights Division and

Office of Access to Justice issued a “Dear Colleague”

Letter signed by the Associate Attorney General Ms.

Vanita Gupta to outline that circumstances where

unjust imposition and enforcement of fines and fees

violate the civil rights of adults and youth “accused”

of felonies, misdemeanors, juvenile offenses, quasi17 In Davis vs. Turner, the Fifth Circuit heard allegations that

a sheriff in Tyler, Texas had searched a store, found nothing

illegal, but arrested the store owner Helen Davis, then refusing

to tell her what she was being charged with subjecting her to

quote “rough treatment, illegal handling, personal indignities,

and incivilities.” The Fifth Circuit said Helen Davis’s suit could

proceed to trial.

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criminal ordinance violations, and civil infractions, as

well as circumstances that raise significant public

policy concerns. In particular, the letter outlined

seven constitutional principles; and, 2) on March 14th

of 2016 the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division and Office for

Access to Justice sent a “Dear Colleague” letter to

State Court Administrators and Chief Justices in

each state clarifying the legal framework that governs

the enforcement of fines and fees, including the

importance of procedural protections and, in

appropriate cases, the right to counsel.

The gravamen of this case is that

"fundamentally miscarriage of justice" has occurred

when the state encroached on the fundamental rights

of the Petitioner and his minor children for over nine

years. Fundamental rights are personal rights

protected by the U.S. Constitution

The Petitioner has been left with no other

option but filing in the U.S. Supreme Court to ask this

court to vindicate his rights and the rights of his

children.

This Court should affirm the Fifth Circuit as it

did in in Michelle Cochran v Securities & Exchange

Commission, ET. AL., (2022) as the Petitioner fell

prey of the system when administrative agencies

deprived him and his children of their fundamental

rights - rights protected by the United States

Constitution.

Respectfully Submitted,

Roberto Carlos Mendives

BY: /s/ Roberto Carlos Mendives Sr.,

Roberto Carlos Mendives Sr., Sui Juris

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