Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Scottie Andrea Jackson, Petitioner v. Florida

Supreme Court briefSep 8, 2023

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No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON, PETITIONER

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

_____________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

_____________

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CAREY HAUGHWOUT

Public Defender

Paul Edward Petillo

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 355-7600

ppetillo@pd15.state.fl.us

appeals@pd15.org

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON,

Appellant,

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-3551

[February 1, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,

Indian River County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case No.

312020CF000783A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

ON MOTION FOR WRITTEN OPINION

PER CURIAM.

We grant appellant’s motion for written opinion and substitute the

following opinion for the original one.

Affirmed. See Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), rev.

pending, No. SC22-1597.

GROSS, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

Supreme Court of Florida

RECEIVED 06/14/2023 9:13 am

Fourth District Court Of Appeal

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 14, 2023

Scottie Andrea Jackson,

Petitioner(s)

SC2023-0166

Lower Tribunal No(s).:

4D21-3551

312020CF000783AXXXXX

State of Florida,

Respondent(s)

This case is hereby dismissed. This Court lacks jurisdiction to

review an unelaborated decision from a district court of appeal that

is issued without opinion or explanation or that merely cites to an

authority that is not a case pending review in, or reversed or

quashed by, this Court. See Wheeler v. State, 296 So. 3d 895 (Fla.

2020); Wells v. State, 132 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. 2014); Jackson v. State,

926 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2006); Gandy v. State, 846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla.

2003); Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002); Harrison v.

Hyster Co., 515 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1987); Dodi Publ’g Co. v. Editorial

Am. S.A., 385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980); Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d

1356 (Fla. 1980).

No motion for rehearing or reinstatement will be entertained

by the Court.

A True Copy

Test:

SC2023-0166 6/14/2023

CASE NO.: SC2023-0166

Page Two

Served:

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

MELYNDA L. MELEAR

PAUL EDWARD PETILLO

HON. JEFFREY R. SMITH

HON. DAN L. VAUGHN

HON. LONN WEISSBLUM

ARGUMENT

POINT I

APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO A TWELVE-PERSON

JURY UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENTS AND HE DID NOT WAIVE THAT RIGHT

Appellant was convicted of felonies by a jury comprised of a

mere six people. T 474. He argues that the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments guarantee the right to a twelve-person jury when the

defendant is charged with a felony. The standard of review of

constitutional claims is de novo. See A.B. v. Florida Dept. of Children

& Family Services, 901 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

Although the Supreme Court held in Williams v. Florida, 399

U.S. 78, 86 (1970), that juries as small as six were constitutionally

permissible, Williams is impossible to square with the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), which

concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s “trial by an impartial jury”

requirement encompasses what the term “meant at the Sixth

Amendment’s adoption,” id. at 1395.

Prior to 1970, subjecting appellant to a trial with only six

jurors would have indisputably violated his Sixth Amendment

rights. As the Ramos Court observed, even Blackstone recognized

that under the common law, “no person could be found guilty of a

serious crime unless ‘the truth of every accusation … should … be

confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and

neighbors[.]” 140 S. Ct. at 1395. “A ‘verdict, taken from eleven, was

no verdict’ at all.” Id.

After the Sixth Amendment was enacted, a bevy of state

courts—ranging from Alabama to Missouri to New Hampshire—

interpreted it to require a twelve-person jury. See Miller, Comment,

Six of One Is Not A Dozen of the Other, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 621, 643

n.133 (1998) (collecting cases from the late 1700s to the 1860s). In

1898, the U.S. Supreme Court added its voice to the chorus, noting

that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to be tried

by a twelve-person jury. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-350

(1898). As the Thompson Court explained, since the time of Magna

Carta, the word “jury” had been understood to mean a body of

twelve people. Id. Given that understanding had been accepted

since 1215, the Court reasoned, “[i]t must” have been “that the

word ‘jury’” in the Sixth Amendment was “placed in the constitution

of the United States with reference to [that] meaning affixed to [it].”

Id. at 350.

The Supreme Court continued to cite the basic principle that

the Sixth Amendment requires a twelve-person jury in criminal

cases for seventy more years. For example, in 1900, the Court

explained that “there [could] be no doubt” “[t]hat a jury composed,

as at common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the Sixth

Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.

581, 586 (1900). Thirty years later, the Court reiterated that it was

“not open to question” that “the phrase ‘trial by jury’” in the

Constitution incorporated juries’ “essential elements” as “they were

recognized in this country and England,” including the requirement

that they “consist of twelve men, neither more nor less.” Patton v.

United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). And as recently as 1968,

the Court remarked that “by the time our Constitution was written,

jury trial in criminal cases had been in existence for several

centuries and carried impressive credentials traced by many to

Magna Carta,” such as the necessary inclusion of twelve members.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-152 (1968).1

See also, e.g., Capital Traction Co v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13

(1899) (“‘Trial by jury,’ in the primary and usual sense of the term

at the common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely

a trial by a jury of 12 men” but also contains other requirements);

In 1970, however, the Williams Court overruled this line of

precedent in a decision that Justice Harlan described as “stripping

off the livery of history from the jury trial” and ignoring both “the

intent of the Framers” and the Court’s long held understanding that

constitutional “provisions are framed in the language of the English

common law [] and … read in the light of its history.” Baldwin v.

New York, 399 U.S. 117, 122-123 (1970) (citation omitted) (Harlan,

J., concurring in the result in Williams). Indeed, Williams recognized

that the Framers “may well” have had “the usual expectation” in

drafting the Sixth Amendment “that the jury would consist of 12”

members. Williams, 399 U.S. at 98-99. But Williams concluded that

such “purely historical considerations” were not dispositive. Id. at

99. Rather, the Court focused on the “function” that the jury plays

in the Constitution, concluding that the “essential feature” of a jury

is it leaves justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of

laymen” and thus allows “guilt or innocence” to be determined via

Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 529 (1905) (“The

constitutional requirement that ‘the trial of all crimes, except in

cases of impeachment, shall be by jury,’ means, as this court has

adjudged, a trial by the historical, common-law jury of twelve

persons”).

“community participation and [with] shared responsibility.” Id. at

100-01. According to the Williams Court, both “currently available

evidence [and] theory” suggested that function could just as easily

be performed with six jurors as with twelve. Id. at 101-102 & n.48;

cf. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979) (acknowledging

that Williams and its progeny “departed from the strictly historical

requirements of jury trial”).

Williams’s ruling that the Sixth Amendment (as incorporated

to the States by the Fourteenth) permits a six-person jury cannot

stand in light of Ramos. There, the Supreme Court held that the

Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a

defendant of a serious offense. In reaching that conclusion, the

Ramos Court overturned Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), a

decision that it faulted for “subject[ing] the ancient guarantee of a

unanimous jury verdict to its own functionalist assessment.” 140 S.

Ct. at 1401-1402.

That reasoning undermines Williams as well. Ramos rejected

the same kind of “cost-benefit analysis” the Court undertook in

Williams, observing that it is not the Court’s role to “distinguish

between the historic features of common law jury trials that (we

think) serve ‘important enough functions to migrate silently into the

Sixth Amendment and those that don’t.’” 140 S. Ct. at 1400-01.

Ultimately, the Ramos Court explained, the question is whether “at

the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption, the right to trial by

jury included” the particular feature at issue. Id. at 1402. As the

history summarized above establishes, there can be no serious

doubt that the common understanding of the jury trial during the

Revolutionary War era was that twelve jurors were required—“a

verdict, taken from eleven, was no verdict at all.” See 140 S. Ct. at

1395 (quotation marks omitted).

Even setting aside Williams’s now-disfavored functionalist

logic, its ruling suffered from another significant flaw: it was based

on research that was out of date shortly after the opinion issued.

Specifically, the Williams Court “f[ou]nd little reason to think” that

the goals of the jury guarantee—including, among others, “to

provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative[] crosssection of the community”—“are in any meaningful sense less likely

to be achieved when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers

12.” Id. at 100. The Court theorized that “in practice the difference

between the 12-man and the six-man jury in terms of the cross15

section of the community represented seems likely to be negligible.”

Id. at 102.

In the time since Williams, that determination has proven

incorrect. Indeed, the Court acknowledged as much just eight years

later in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), when it concluded

that the Sixth Amendment barred the use of a five-person jury.

Although Ballew did not overturn Williams, the Ballew Court

observed that empirical studies conducted in the handful of

intervening years highlighted several problems with Williams’

assumptions. For example, Ballew noted that more recent research

showed that (1) “smaller juries are less likely to foster effective

group deliberation,” id. at 233, (2) smaller juries may be less

accurate and cause “increasing inconsistency” in verdict results, id.

at 234, (3) the chance for hung juries decreases with smaller juries,

disproportionally harming the defendant, id. at 236; and (4)

decreasing jury sizes “foretell[] problems … for the representation of

minority groups in the community,” undermining a jury’s likelihood

of being “truly representative of the community,” id. at 236-37.

Moreover, the Ballew Court “admit[ted]” that it “d[id] not pretend to

discern a clear line between six members and five,” effectively

acknowledging that the studies it relied on also cast doubt on the

effectiveness of the six-member jury. Id. at 239; see also id. at 24546

(Powell,

J.)

(agreeing

that

five-member

juries

are

unconstitutional, while acknowledging that “the line between fiveand six-member juries is difficult to justify”).

Post-Ballew

research

has

further

undermined

Williams.

Current empirical evidence indicates that “reducing jury size

inevitably has a drastic effect on the representation of minority

group members on the jury.” Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on

the Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. of Empirical

Legal Stud. 425, 427 (Sept. 2009); see also Higginbotham et al.,

Better by the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury, 104

Judicature 47, 52 (Summer 2020) (“Larger juries are also more

inclusive and more representative of the community. … In reality,

cutting the size of the jury dramatically increases the chance of

excluding minorities.”). Because “the 12-member jury produces

significantly greater heterogeneity than does the six-member jury,”

Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury, supra, at 449, it

increases

“the

opportunity

for

meaningful

and

appropriate

representation” and helps ensure that juries “represent adequately

a cross-section of the community.” Ballew, 435 U.S. at 237.

Other important considerations also weigh in favor of the

twelve-member jury. For instance, studies indicate that twelvemember juries deliberate longer, recall evidence better, and rely less

on irrelevant factors during deliberation. See Smith & Saks, The

Case for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury, 60

Fla. L. Rev. 441, 465 (2008). Minority views are also more likely to

be thoroughly expressed in a larger jury, as “having a large minority

helps

make

the

minority

subgroup

influential,”

and,

unsurprisingly, “the chance of minority members having allies is

greater on a twelve-person jury.” Id. at 466. Finally, larger juries

deliver more predictable results. In the civil context, for example,

“[s]ix-person juries are four times more likely to return extremely

high

low

damage

awards

compared

the

average.”

Higginbotham et al., Better by the Dozen, supra, at 52.

Appellant recognizes that the state constitution provides:

SECTION 22. Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury

shall be secure to all and remain inviolate. The

qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than

six, shall be fixed by law.

Art. I, § 22, Fla. Const. And he recognizes that section 913.10,

Florida Statutes, provides for six jurors except in capital cases. See

also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.270.

But Florida’s provision for a jury of six stems from the dawn of

the Jim Crow era, one month after federal troops were withdrawn

from the state. The historical background is as follows:

In 1875, the Jury Clause of the 1868 constitution was

amended to provide that the number of jurors “for the trial of

causes in any court may be fixed by law.” See Florida Fertilizer &

Mfg. Co. v. Boswell, 34 So. 241, 241 (Fla. 1903).

The common law rule of a jury of twelve was still kept in

Florida while federal troops remained in the state. There was no

provision for a jury of less than twelve until the Legislature enacted

a provision specifying a jury of six in Chapter 3010, section 6. See

Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 297–98 (1877) (quoting and discussing

Chapter 3010, section 6, Laws of Florida (1877)); Florida Fertilizer,

34 So. 15 241 (noting that previously all juries had twelve

members).

The Legislature enacted chapter 3010 with the jury-of-six

provision on February 17, 1877. Gibson, 16 Fla. 294. This was less

than a month after the last federal troops were withdrawn from

Florida in January 1877. See Jerrell H. Shofner, Reconstruction and

Renewal, 1865-1877, in The History of Florida 273 (Michael

Gannon, ed., first paperback edition 2018) (“there were [no federal

troops” in Florida after 23 January 1877”).

The jury-of-six thus first saw light at the birth of the Jim Crow

era as former Confederates regained power in southern states and

state prosecutors made a concerted effort to prevent blacks from

serving on jurors.

On its face the 1868 constitution extended the franchise to

black men. But the historical context shows that that it was part of

the overall resistance to Reconstruction efforts to protect the rights

of black citizens. The constitution was the product of a remarkable

series of events including a coup in which leaders of the white

southern (or native) faction took possession of the assembly hall in

the middle of the night, excluding Radical Republican delegates

from the proceedings. See Richard L. Hume, Membership of the

Florida Constitutional Convention of 1868: A Case Study of

Republican Factionalism in the Reconstruction South, 51 Fla. Hist. Q.

1, 5-6 (1972); Shofner at 266. A reconciliation was effected as the

“outside” whites “united with the majority of the body’s native

whites to frame a constitution designed to continue white

dominance.” Hume at 15.

The racist purpose of the resulting constitution was spelled

out by Harrison Reed, a leader of the prevailing faction and the first

governor elected under the 1868 constitution, who wrote to Senator

Yulee that the new constitution was constructed to bar blacks from

legislative office:

Under our Constitution the Judiciary & State officers will

be appointed & the apportionment will prevent a negro

legislature.

Hume, 15-16. See also Shofner 266.

In Ramos, Justice Gorsuch noted that the Louisiana nonunanimity rule arose from Jim Crow era efforts to enforce white

supremacy. Id. at 1394; see also id. at 1417 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring) (non-unanimity was enacted “as one pillar of a

comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures

against African-Americans, especially in voting and jury service.”).

The history of Florida’s jury of six arises from the same historical

context.

In view of the foregoing, a jury of six at a criminal trial for a

crime punishable by up to life imprisonment is unconstitutional

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution.

Finally, appellant did not waive his Sixth Amendment right to

a twelve-person jury. A defendant may waive his right to a

constitutional jury, but the “express and intelligent consent of the

defendant” is required. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312.

In Johnson v. State, 994 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2008), for example,

Johnson was charged with felony DUI, which is committing DUI

with three prior DUI convictions. Johnson, 994 So. 2d at 962. After

a jury found Johnson guilty of the base offense of DUI, the trial

court, by stipulation, became the factfinder as to the prior DUI

convictions. The trial court found that Johnson had the requisite

prior convictions and adjudicated him guilty of felony DUI.

Johnson appealed, and this Court affirmed, holding that

Johnson’s counsel’s stipulation that the trial court act as factfinder

was a valid waiver of Johnson’s Sixth Amendment right to have a

jury decide the prior-convictions element. Johnson v. State, 944 So.

2d 474, 476-77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Johnson sought review in the Florida Supreme Court. The

supreme

court

held

that

defense

counsel’s

stipulation

was

insufficient, that Johnson’s personal waiver of his jury-trial right

was required. Johnson, 994 So. 2d at 963. “Further, a defendant’s

silence does not establish a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial.”

Id. Thus, Johnson could raise this issue for the first time on appeal:

“[B]ecause a defendant’s silence clearly does not constitute a valid

waiver, it logically follows that defendants are not required to break

their silence (through either a request for a jury trial or an objection

to the bench trial) to preserve appellate review of this claim. Here,

just as Johnson’s silence was insufficient to waive his right to a jury

trial, his silence was insufficient to waive appellate review of this

claim.” Id. at 964 (citation omitted).

As in Johnson, appellant’s failure to raise this issue in the

lower court “does not constitute a waiver of appellate review on this

claim.” Id.

The Third District’s decision in Jimenez v. State, 167 So. 3d

497 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), rev. denied, 192 So. 3d 38 (Fla. 2015),

supports appellant’s argument. Jimenez was tried by a jury of six

people when he should have been tried by a jury of twelve people

(he was charged with first-degree murder, a capital offense). This

violated section 913.10, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.270. This was not fundamental error, the

Third District said, because the “right to a jury of twelve persons is

not of constitutional dimension. Rather, it is a right provided by

state statute and in the corresponding Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure.” Jimenez, 167 So. 3d at 499 (citations omitted). The

court continued: “Jimenez was not denied his constitutional right to

a trial by jury. Rather, he was provided with a trial by jury, but

consisting of six rather than twelve persons. While this failed to

comply with the statutory requirement, it was not fundamental

error such that it could have been raised for the first time on

appeal.” Id. (citations omitted).

Jimenez

was

issued

before

Ramos

effectively

overruled

Williams. Appellant’s argument is that a jury of twelve persons is of

“constitutional dimension.” Jimenez implies that if it is an issue of

“constitutional dimension,” then it may be raised for the first time

on appeal.

This Court should reverse the judgment and sentence and

remand for a new trial with a twelve-person jury, as required by the

Sixth

and

Fourteenth

Amendments

Constitution.

the

United

States

SCOTTIE

ANDREA JACKSON

SCOTTIE ANDREA

JACKSON vs.

vs. STATE

STATE OF

OF FLORIDA

FLORIDA

LT.

LT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 2020

2020 CF

CF 000783

000783 A

HT.

HT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 4D21-3551

4D21-3551

BK: 3504 PG: 2031

[_] Probation Violator

[_] Modified

In the Circuit Court,

[_] Community Control Violator [_] Amended

Nineteenth Judicial Circuit

[_] Re-sentence

["] Mitigated

In and for Indian River County, Florida

[_] Sentence Absentia

[_] Corrected

Division: Felony

Case Number(s):

312020CFO00783AXXXXX

State of Florida

VS.

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

Defendant.

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Defendant’s Attorney | HAROLD CHRISTOPHER WALSH

State’s Attorney

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The above Defendant, being personally before this Court and having:

been tried and found guilty by Jury/by Court ofthe following crime(s).

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(1 entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crime(s)

Count

Crime

Offense Statute

Number

Deg of Crime

OBTS #

RESISTING OFFICER WITH VIOLENCE

843.01(0)

3101132216

ROBBERY

812.13(1)

3101132216

&X] and no cause having been shown why the Defendant should not be adjudicated guilty, IT IS ORDERED THAT the Defendant is

hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY of the above crime(s).

Dd and being a qualified offender pursuant to s. 943.325, the Defendant shall be required to submit DNA samples as required by law.

C1 and good cause being shown; IT IS ORDERED THAT ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE WITHHELD.

DONE AND ORDERED in open court on DECEMBER 9, 2021 in Indian River County, Florida.

NUNC PRO TUNC

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211

SCOTTIE

ANDREA JACKSON

SCOTTIE ANDREA

JACKSON vs.

vs. STATE

STATE OF

OF FLORIDA

FLORIDA

LT.

LT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 2020

2020 CF

CF 000783

000783 A

HT.

HT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 4D21-3551

4D21-3551

BK: 3504 PG: 2032

STATE OF FLORIDA

Vs.

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

Case: 312020CFO00783AXXXXX

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212

SCOTTIE

ANDREA JACKSON

SCOTTIE ANDREA

JACKSON vs.

vs. STATE

STATE OF

OF FLORIDA

FLORIDA

LT.

LT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 2020

2020 CF

CF 000783

000783 A

HT.

HT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 4D21-3551

4D21-3551

BK: 3504 PG: 2033

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR INDIAN RIVER COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA

Defendant: SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

Case:

312020CFO00783AXKXKXX

(As to Count 1 )

The Defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record, HAROLD CHRISTOPHER WALSH and

having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the court having given Defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence,

and to show cause why the Defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause bring shown.

(check one if applicable)

and the Court having on

deferred imposition of sentence until

and the Court having previously entered ajudgment in this case on

and the Court having placed Defendant on []probation/[_]community control and having subsequently revoked the Defendant's

now resentences the Defendant.

CIprobation/_]community control.

;

It Is the Sentence of the Court That:

The Defendant pay a fine of $

required by section 960.25, Florida Statutes

, pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus $

as the 5% surcharge

‘

The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody ofthe Department of Corrections.

The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody ofthe Sheriff of Indian River County, Florida.

The Defendant is sentenced as-a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

The Defendant is hereby sentenced

CO Probation

LJ Dmg Offender Probation

LJ Community Control

;

CD Sex Offender Probation

To Be Imprisoned (Check one, unmarked sections are inapplicable):

For a term of natural life.

For a term of __10

Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of

Year(s)

Month(s)

Day(s)

as a condition of [] Probation [] Community Control |

subject to conditions set forth in this order.

If "Split" sentence, complete the appropriate paragraph.

Followed by a period of

Year(s)

However, after serving a period of

Month(s) _

Day(s) on []probation/[]Jcommunity control under the supervision

of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision set forth in a separate order.

imprisonment in

the balance of the sentence shall be suspended and the

Defendant shall be placed on [_]probation4_]community control for a period of

under supervision of the Department of

Corrections according to the terms and conditions of probation/community control set forth in a separate order.

In the event the Defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before the Defendant begins

service of the supervision terms.

213

SCOTTIE

ANDREA JACKSON

SCOTTIE ANDREA

JACKSON vs.

vs. STATE

STATE OF

OF FLORIDA

FLORIDA

LT.

LT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 2020

2020 CF

CF 000783

000783 A

HT.

HT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 4D21-3551

4D21-3551

BK: 3504 PG: 2034

Defendant:

Case:

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

312020CFO00783AXXXXX

(As to Count 1)

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed:

Minimum/Mandatory Provisions:

Firearm

It is further ordered that the

year minimum imprisonment provisions of section 775.087(2),

Drug Trafficking

It is further ordered that the

minimum mandatory imprisonment provisions of section

Controlled Substance

(within 1000 ft. of school)

siIt is further ordered that the 3-year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(1)(e)1,

Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Habitual Felony

Offender

Habitual Violent

Felony Offender

Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

$93.135(1), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

The defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended

term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The requisite

findings by the court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

Cl]

The defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an

extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A

minimum term of

year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings of the

Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

Law Enforcement

Short-Barreled Rifle

Shotgun, Machine Gun

[1 _ Itis further ordered that the 5-year minimum provisions of section 790.221(2), Florida Statutes, are

hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Prison Releasee

[]

Protection Act

Reoffender

sit is further ordered that the defendant shall serve a minimum of

accordance with section 775.0823, Florida Statutes.

years before release in

The defendant is adjudicated a prison releasee reoffender and has been sentenced to an extended

term of

years as such in accordance with the provisions of section 775.082(9)(a), Florida

Statutes. In accordance with section 775.082(b) the defendant must serve 100 percent of that

portion of the total sentence.

Criminal use of Personal

[]

It is further ordered that the 3 year mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section

Continuing Criminal

LC]

It is further ordered that the 25-year minimum sentence provisions of section 893.20, Florida

Taking a Law

LC]

It is further ordered that the 3-year mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section

Identification

Information

$17.568(2)(b), Florida Statutes hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court.

Other Provisions:

Enterprise

Enforcement Officer’s

Firearm

Retention of Judication

Statutes, are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

775.0875(1), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court.

The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida

Statutes (1983) _

214

SCOTTIE

ANDREA JACKSON

SCOTTIE ANDREA

JACKSON vs.

vs. STATE

STATE OF

OF FLORIDA

FLORIDA

LT.

LT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 2020

2020 CF

CF 000783

000783 A

HT.

HT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 4D21-3551

4D21-3551

BK: 3504 PG: 2035

Defendant:

Case:

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

Jail Credit

XX]

Credit for Time Servedin

312020CFO00783AXXXXXK

It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of 538 days as credit for time

incarcerated before imposition of this sentence [] All Cts. Or Ct.

It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed

Resentencing after

Violation of Probation or

Community Control

days time served between the date of

arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of re-sentencing. The Department of

Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served

and unforfeited gain time previously awarded on case/count

(Offenses committed before

October 1, 1989).

itis further ordered that the defendant be allowed

days time served between date of arrest as

a violator following release from prison to the date of re-sentencing. The Department of

Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served

on case/count

Cl]

LC]

(Offenses committed between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 1993).

The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited

under section 948.06(6).

The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time

may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)).

itis further ordered that the defendant be allowed

days time served between date of arrest as

a violator following release from prison to the date of re-sentencing. The Department of

Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served

only pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida Statutes, on case/count

(Offenses committed on

or after January 1, 1994)

Consecutive/Concurrent

[[]

As To Other Counts

As To Other Convictions

It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall run (check one)

L1Consecutive to

Concurrent with sentence set forth in count 002 of this case.

It is further ordered that the composite term of all sentencing imposed for the counts specified in

this order shall run (check one) [_] consecutive to [] concurrent with the following: (check one)

Anyactive sentence being served.

. (0 | Specific sentences:

215

SCOTTIE

ANDREA JACKSON

SCOTTIE ANDREA

JACKSON vs.

vs. STATE

STATE OF

OF FLORIDA

FLORIDA

LT.

LT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 2020

2020 CF

CF 000783

000783 A

HT.

HT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 4D21-3551

4D21-3551

BK: 3504 PG: 2036

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR INDIAN RIVER COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA

Defendant: SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

Case:

312020CF000783AXXXXX

(As to Count 2 )

The Defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record, HAROLD CHRISTOPHER WALSH and

having been adjudicated guilty herein, and the court having given Defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence,

and to show cause why the Defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause bring shown.

(check one if applicable)

and the Court having on

deferred imposition of sentence until

and the Court having previously entered a judgment in this case on

and the Court having placed Defendant on []probation/[Jcommunity control and having subsequently revoked the Defendant's

now resentences the Defendant.

Ciprobation/_community control.

It Is the Sentence of the Court That:

The Defendant paya fine of $

The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody ofthe Department of Corrections.

The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Indian River County, Florida.

The Defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida Statutes.

The Defendant is hereby sentenced

required by section 960.25, Florida Statutes

, pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus $

as the 5% surcharge

LJ Probation

(1 Drug Offender Probation

{] Community Control

( Sex Offender Probation

To Be Imprisoned (Check one, unmarked sections are inapplicable):

For a term of natural life.

For a term of _30 Years / 15 Year Minimum / Mandatory Year(s)

Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of

Probation [] Community Control

Month(s)

Day(s)

as a condition of [J

subject to conditions set forth in this order.

If "Split" sentence, complete the appropriate paragraph.

Followed by a period of

Year(s)

Month(s)

Day(s) on [Jprobation/L]community control under the supervision

However, after serving a period of

imprisonment in

the balance of the sentence shall be suspended and the

Defendant shall be placed on []probation/_]community control for a period of

under supervision of the Department of

of the Department of Corrections according to the terms and conditions of supervision set forth in a separate order.

Corrections according to the terms and conditions of probation/community control set forth in a separate order.

In the event the Defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before the Defendant begins

service of the supervision terms.

216

SCOTTIE

ANDREA JACKSON

SCOTTIE ANDREA

JACKSON vs.

vs. STATE

STATE OF

OF FLORIDA

FLORIDA

LT.

LT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 2020

2020 CF

CF 000783

000783 A

HT.

HT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 4D21-3551

4021-3551

BK: 3504 PG: 2037

Defendant:

Case:

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

312020CFO00783AXXXXX

(As to Count 2 )

By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed:

Minimum/Mandatory_ Provisions:

Firearm

)

_sItis further ordered that the

year minimum imprisonment provisions of section 775.087(2),

minimum mandatory imprisonment ‘provisions of section

Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Drug Trafficking

It is further ordered that the

Controlled Substance

sit is further ordered that the 3-year minimum imprisonment provision of section 893.13(1)(e)1,

(within 1000 ft. of school)

Habitual Felony

Offender

Habitual Violent

Felony Offender

893.135(1), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

The defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended

term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The requisite

findings by the court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

The defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been sentenced to an

extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(b), Florida Statutes. A

minimum term of

year(s) must be served prior to release. The requisite findings of the

Court are set forth in a separate order or stated on the record in open court.

Law Enforcement

Short-Barreled Rifle

Prison Releasee

The defendant is adjudicated a prison releasee reoffender and has been sentenced to an extended

Criminal use of Personal

[]

It is further ordered that the 3 year mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section

Continuing Criminal

sit is further ordered that the 25-year minimum sentence provisions of section 893.20, Florida

Taking a Law

It is further ordered that the 3-year mandatory minimum imprisonment provision of section

Protection Act

Shotgun, Machine Gun

Reoffender

Identification

Information

Csit is further ordered that the defendant shall serve a minimum of

years before release in

accordance with section 775.0823, Florida Statutes.

itis further ordered that the 5-year minimum provisions of section 790.221(2), Florida Statutes, are

hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

term of 30 YEARS (15 YEAR MIN/MAN) years as such in accordance with the provisions of

section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes. In accordance with section 775.082(b) the defendant must

serve 100 percent of that portion of the total sentence.

‘

817.568(2)(b), Florida Statutes hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court.

Other Provisions:

Enterprise

Enforcement Officer’s

Firearm

Retention of Judication

Statutes, are hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.

775.0875(1), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this court.

The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida

Statutes (1983)

217

SCOTTIE

ANDREA JACKSON

SCOTTIE ANDREA

JACKSON vs.

vs. STATE

STATE OF

OF FLORIDA

FLORIDA

LT.

LT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 2020

2020 CF

CF 000783

000783 A

HT.

HT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 4D21-3551

4D21-3551

BK: 3504 PG: 2038

Defendant:

Case:

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

Jail Credit

[IX]

Credit for Time Servedin

[J]

Resentencing after

Violation of Probation or

Community Control

312020CF000783AXXKXXXK

It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of _538 days as credit for time

incarcerated before imposition of this sentence [] All Cts. Or Ct.

It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed

days time served between the date of

arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of re-sentencing. The Department of

Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served

and unforfeited gain time previously awarded on case/count

(Offenses committed before

October 1, 1989).

LJ]

itis further ordered that the defendant be allowed

days time served between date of arrest as

a violator following release from prison to the date of re-sentencing. The Department of

Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served

on case/count

(Offenses committed between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 1993).

The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited

under section 948.06(6).

[1 _ The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time

may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)).

sItis further ordered that the defendant be allowed

days time served between date of arrest as

a violator following release from prison to the date of re-sentencing. The Department of

Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served

only pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida Statutes, on case/count

or after January 1, 1994)

(Offenses committed on

Consecutive/Concurrent

As To Other Convictions

[] _ It is further ordered that the composite term of all sentencing imposed for the counts specified in

this order shall run (check one) [[] consecutive to ([] concurrent with the following: (check one)

As To Other Counts

It is further ordered that the sentence imposed for this count shall run (check one) _

[_|Consecutive to [_] Concurrent with sentence set forth in count

Any active sentence being served.

Specific sentences:

218

of this case.

SCOTTIE

ANDREA JACKSON

SCOTTIE ANDREA

JACKSON vs.

vs. STATE

STATE OF

OF FLORIDA

FLORIDA

LT.

LT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 2020

2020 CF

CF 000783

000783 A

HT.

HT. CASE

CASE NO:

NO: 4D21-3551

4D21-3551

BK: 3504 PG: 2039

Defendant:

SCOTTIE ANDREA JACKSON

Case:

;

312020CFO00783AXXXXX

Other Provisions:

In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Indian River County, Florida, is hereby ordered and

directed to deliver the defendant to the Department of Corrections at the facility designated by the department together with a copy of

this judgment and sentence and any other document specified by Florida Statute.

The defendant in open court was advised of the right to appeal from this sentence by filing notice of appeal within 30 days from this

date with the clerk of this court and the defendant's right to assistance of counsel in taking the appeal at the expense of the State on

showing of indigency.

In imposing the above sentence, the court further recommends STATUTORY FEES/COSTS REDUCED TO A CIVIL LIEN, COURT

RESERVES JURISDICTION ON ADDITIONAL COURT COSTS.

DONE AND ORDERED in open court on DECEMBER 9, 2021 at Indian River County, Florida.

NUNCPRO TUNC

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.