Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Eric St. George, Petitioner v. E. E.

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20CA0853-StGeorge vEE02-03-2022~

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

DATE FILED: February 3, 2022

Court of Appeals No. 20CA0853

Jefferson County District Court No. 17CV413

Honorable Russell Klein, Judge

Eric St. George,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

E.E.,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division IV

Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN

Tow and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced February 3, 2022

Eric St. George, Pro Se

No Appearance for Defendant-Appellee

APPENDIX A

1 1

Eric St. George, pro se, appeals the district court’s orders

dismissing his case. We affirm.

I.

12

Background

On St. George’s thirty-ninth birthday, he hired defendant

E.E., to perform a striptease and lap dance at his residence. i

During E.E.’s performance, St. George touched her inappropriately,

so she stopped dancing and left the residence, keeping the money

St. George had paid her. This upset St. George, who began

following E.E. as she walked back to her car. Then St. George fired

a gun into the air and, it is alleged, at E.E. E.E. fled and called

911. Later that night, police officers wounded St. George in a

shootout. As-a result of his actions, St. George was charged with

numerous criminal offenses; he took his case to trial. See People v.

St. George, (Colo. App. No. 18CA0962, Dec. 16, 2021) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

13

Before his criminal trial began, St. George sued E.E., claiming

that she had robbed him and lied to the police. His pro se

complaint, which is not in a standard form setting forth specific

1 The facts in this section are gleaned from an arrest affidavit that is

part of the record on appeal.

1

claims for relief and therefore is difficult to interpret, nonetheless

includes the following requests for relief:

(1) a demand that E.E. produce a signed affidavit “recanting

her materially false statements” and “rescinding her

spurious allegations”;

(2) a demand that the district court compel the local district

attorney to file various criminal charges against E.E.;

(3) a “demand for judgement in the form of financial

renumeration [sic] for the injuries sustained resultant from

[E.E.’s] conduct”;

(4) a “demand for judgement in the form of financial

renumeration [sic] for the economic damages suffered as a

result, namely loss of income”; and

(5) a “demand for judgement in the form of fiscal renumeration

[sic] for economic damages sustained as a result of . . . libel

and slander.”

14

E.E. answered the complaint and filed counterclaims for,

among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Later, she filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss St. George’s

claims, and the court granted her motion.

2

15

St. George appealed the court’s order dismissing his claims

but that appeal was dismissed for want of a final, appealable order

because E.E.’s counterclaims had not yet been adjudicated.

.16

Once the appeal was dismissed, St. George asked the district

court to do two things: (1) vacate its order dismissing his claims

and (2) permit him to amend his complaint. The court denied the

motion in its entirety.2 Months later, St. George moved for the

same relief. Again, the court denied his request.

17

Now St. George appeals for the second time, asserting that the

district court erred when it dismissed his case.3

II.

18

Analysis

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted tests the formal sufficiency of a plaintiffs

complaint. Allen v. Steele, 252 P.3d 476, 481 (Colo. 2011). We ‘

review such motions de novo, applying the same standards as the

2 Technically, the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue this

order, as it was issued before the court of appeals issued — or even

could issue — its mandate. People v. Jones, 631 P.2d 1132, 113334 (Colo. 1981); C.A.R. 41. Nonetheless, the district court explicitly

incorporated the order into a different order that was issued after it

was formally revested with jurisdiction.

3 He does not appeal the court’s denial of his motion to amend.

3

district court. Begley v. Ireson, 2017 COA 3, f 7. When reviewing a

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, a court must accept all

averments of material fact as true and view the allegations in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Allen, 252 P.3d at 481. In so

doing, the court may not consider information outside the confines

of the pleading. Id. To survive summary dismissal for failure to

state a claim, “a party must plead sufficient facts that, if taken as

true, suggest plausible grounds to support a claim for relief.”

Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, *|j 23.

19

When a party moves for dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) after

the pleadings have closed, the reviewing court should treat the

motion as a C.R.C.P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Barnes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2021 COA 89, | 19.

“Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if, from the pleadings,

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” City &

Cnty. of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 754 (Colo. 2001).

H io

We liberally construe a pro se party’s pleadings. See Jones v.

Williams, 2019 CO 61, f 5 (“Pleadings by pro se litigants must be

broadly construed to ensure that they are not denied review of

4

important issues because of their inability to articulate their

argument like a lawyer.”).

11 11

In this case, E.E.’s motion to dismiss was filed after the

pleadings had closed. Thus, the district court should have

construed the motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings,

not as a motion to dismiss. But as we will explain, St. George’s

claims lack merit under either rule, and we “disregard any error or

defect in [a] proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights

of the parties.” C.R.C.P. 61.

11 12

Turning to St. George’s claims, we begin with his request that

the district court compel the local district attorney to file criminal

charges against E.E. Pursuant to section 16-5-209, C.R.S. 2021,

someone may ask a court to compel a district attorney to file

criminal charges against another person, but the request must be

accompanied by an affidavit alleging that the district attorney

unjustifiably refused prosecution. St. George’s complaint neither

includes the required affidavit nor alleges that the district attorney

refused prosecution. Therefore, his claim is legally deficient, and

the district court properly dismissed it.

5

1 13

Moving to St. George’s other claims, they all relate to his

allegation that E.E. repeatedly made a “materially false statement,”

i.e., lied, to the police. But the complaint does not specify the

contents of the allegedly false statement or explain why it is false.

And that, we conclude, is fatal because no matter whether we

construe St. George’s claims as defamation claims or fraud claims

both causes of action require that the allegedly false statement be

spelled out.

1 14

With respect to defamation, “[djefamation is a communication

that holds an individual up to contempt or ridicule thereby causing

him to incur injury or damage,” Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293,

1297 (Colo. 1994), and the plaintiff must prove that the statement

complained of is both false and material, SG Ints. I, Ltd. v.

Kolbenschlag, 2019 COA 115,

22. One cannot satisfy these

elements without identifying the statement at issue.

If 15

With respect to fraud, C.R.C.P. 9(b) requires that fraud claims

be pleaded with particularity, meaning “the complaint must

sufficiently specify the statements it claims were false or

misleading, give particulars as to the respect in which plaintiff

contends the statements were fraudulent, state when and where the

6

statements were made, and identify those responsible for the

statements.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 899 P.2d

285, 288 (Colo. App. 1994) (citation omitted). St. George’s

complaint contains only some of these requirements.

1 16

Having concluded that St. George’s complaint fails to state any

claims upon which relief can be granted, we decline to address any

of the district court’s alternative bases for dismissing the complaint.

III.

Tf 17

Conclusion

The district court’s orders are affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE GROVE concur.

7

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DISTRICT COURT, JEFFERSON COUNTY, COLORADO

Court Address:

100 JEFFERSON COUNTY PARKWAY, GOLDEN. CO, 80401-6002

CD'ATE~ FI LED: April. 2. ,2020

Plaintiff(s) ERIC ST GEORGE

V.

Defendant(s) EMILY ELLIOTT

A COURT USE ONLY A

Case Numbelr.~20f7CV413^-' ^

Courtroom:

Division: 8

>” Order of Dismissal

This matter is before the Court an two separate but misted Issues. Roth s'em from the Court of Appeals order dismissing the

appeal on December 20, 2019.

On January 23, 2020 the Court issued an order addressing a Motion to Vacate Order of Dismissal from December 2018

asking the Court to set aside its dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint and the opportunity to amend the Complaint. The Court

denied that motion on the grounds that Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, Eric St. George (Mr. St. George) had failed to show

that there were changed circumstances, legal or factual error, an intervening change in the law, or manifest injustice, and

that Mr. St. George had likewise failed to show that amendment of the Complaint would be futile.

In light of the instructions from the Court of Appeals, the Court directed Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff, Emily Elliott (Ms.

Elliott) to file a status report within twenty-eight days indicating how she intends to proceed with her counterclaims. No status

report or other filings were received by Ms. Elliott.

On February 26, 2020, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing Ms. Elliott to show cause pursuant to C.R.C.P.

121 s. 1-10 as to why the remaining counterclaims should not be dismissed and giving thirty-five (35) days for Ms. Elliott to

respond. No response or other filings have been received by the Court from Ms. Elliott. Ms. Elliott has not taken action in this

case since her counsel filed a motion to withdraw in February of 2019. Ms. Elliott has not appeared to taken any action in the

appeal of this case (2019CA53) with the exception of her counsel withdrawing from the appeal on June 27, 2019.

In the interim, Mr. St. George filed his Motion to Vacate Dismissal (March 2020); Order of Dismissal from Dec 2018,

essentially re-arguing his prior motion that he filed on January 14, 2020, which itself is a longer version of his Motion to

Vacate Dismissal and Give Leave to Amend (that motion was denied due to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, which divested

the trial court of jurisdiction).

This Court has already addressed the merits of the complaint in both the Order re: Motion to Dismiss issued on December

27, 2018, and the Order re: Motion to Vacate Order of Dismissal from Dec 2018 issued on January 23,2020. In the former,

the Court adopted the reasoning of the Motion to Dismiss filed by Ms. Elliott. In the latter, the Court addressed the procedural

history and the standard necessary for Mr. St. George to meet in order to receive a different outcome with the dismissal

order. The Court adopts and reincorporates those orders here in this motion.

The crux of this case is a Complaint filed by Mr. St. George alleging criminal violations by Ms. Elliott in connection with Mr.

St. George's criminal case, 2016CR2509, which resulted in numerous convictions against Mr. St. George. Mr. St. George

alleges that Ms. Elliott made materially false statements to a police officer and in an official proceeding (her interviews with

the district attorney) in 2016 and 2017, and demands that this Court (1) require defendant to recant her prior statements and

rescind her allegations, (2) compel the Jefferson County District Attorney or appoint a special prosecutor to bring criminal

charges against defendant, and (3) financial relief against Ms. Elliott. Mr. St. George's motion has not changed the analysis

in this case as to whether he has a viable complaint or that amendment would be futile. In fact, to the contrary, the iaw <

prohibits retaliatory litigation against a witness or victim in a criminal case; harassment or retaliation or retribution against-Ms.Elliott on the basis of her being a victim or a witness in a criminal proceeding appears to be the specific intent of the f

/

a legislature by enacting s*. 18-8-706, C.R.S. See Grynberg v. Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp., 116 P.3d 1260, 1267 (Colo.

! App. 2005) ("the supreme court, in construing s. 18-8-706, observed that 'the legislature's intended purpose is to protect

people who are or who are thought to be actual or potential witnesses to criminal proceeding.' The court also held that the

APPENDIX B

Pagel of2

2004020085 0454 152-1016 1

'the-statute applied to one with 'the specific intent to retaliate or to seek retribution against a person protected by the statute.

because of that person's relationship to a criminal proceeding" (emphasis in original)).-This is notwithstanding whether the

principles of collateral estoppel would even permit Mr. St. George to assert in this case that he was not guilty or would permit

the Court to find that Mr. St. George was not guilty. Either way, Colorado law does not permit litigation of this type that

appears to be an effort to pressure Ms. Elliott into recanting her testimony. Mr. St. George's avenues and tools have been

available to him in his criminal proceeding under the Colorado Rules of Criminal Proceeding, and through his appeal in that

case.

For the reasons stated above, the counterclaims filed by Ms. Elliott against Mr. St. George are dismissed.

For the reasons stated above, the Motion filed by Mr. St. George seeking to vacate the dismissal is denied.

Based on the foregoing, all claims in this case are dismissed.

Issue Date: 4/2/2020

RUSSELL BRENT KLEIN

District Court Judge

Page2 of2

2004020085 0454 152-1016 3

DATE FILED: September 26, 2022

Colorado Supreme Court

2 East 14th Avenue

Denver, CO 80203

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, 2020CA853

District Court, Jefferson County, 2017CV413

Petitioner:

Supreme Court Case No:

2022SC292

Eric St. George,

v.

Respondent:

E. E.

ORDER OF COURT

Upon consideration of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Colorado

Court of Appeals and after review of the record, briefs, and the judgment of said

Court of Appeals,

IT IS ORDERED that said Petition for Writ of Certiorari shall be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED.

BY THE COURT, EN BANC, SEPTEMBER 26, 2022.

NOTICE OF INTENT TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORIRI

10 October 2022:

The Plaintiff-Petitioner Eric St. George, pro-se herewith gives notice to thei

honorable Court of his intent to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 10(b) the Petition is made from Colorado Suprem Court case no.

22SC292. The Petitioner will proceed iun forma pauperis and requires any

proprietaryu forms used in this Court in order to so proceed. The order denying

Certiorari in the Colorado Supreme Codirt issued on 26 September 2022. Pursuant to

Rule 13 Petitioner shall file his Petition for Writ of Certiorari no later than

26 December 2022 in order to be dimely filed.

APPENDIX C

2209262023 3265 1-294-1003 2

Colorado Court of Appeals

2 East 14th Avenue

Denver, CO 80203

Jefferson County 17CV413

Judge Russell Klein

Plaintiff-Appellant:

Eric St. George

v.

Case No. 20CA853

Defendant-Appellee:

Opinion

by Richman, Tow and Grove

Emily Catherine Elliott

PETITION FOR REHEARING PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 40(a)

The Plaintiff-Appellant Eric St. George, pro-se petitions this Court for a

rehearing on Case No. 20CA853 St. George v. Elliott and argues in support of

his petition as follows:

On 31 July 2016, Emily Catherine Elliott, AKA "Effy" DOB: 19 Aug 1993, a 22 year

old adult woman and no victim (Plaintiff-Appellant St. George takes exception to

this Court's use of "EE" to designate the Defendant in an attempt to suggest

■ otherwise) used the Lakewood Police as a deadly weapon against St. George. She

committed an act of fraud and felony; she called 911 and she fabricated an attept

to murder her, a lie. The fact of her lie is incontrovertible, it was adjudicated

by a jury to be a lie and the jury acquitted St. George on this false charge. Her

false report sicced the violence of the Lakewood Police Department against Eric

St. George; culminating in an attempt to murder St. George by the Lakewood PD.

This fact is incontoovertible, the 10th Cir. Court of Appeals opined on 20 Aug

2021 that Agt. Trimmer of the Lakewood PD did use excessive force against St.

George, violating his 4th Amendment rights when Trimmer shot him while attempting

to murder him. This false 911 report by Emily Elliott is an act known as

SWATTING, a dangerous act that utilizes police as a weapon, conduct that is

.almost certain to result in violence, assault and often death where police are

oversealous and not properly trained to be wary of SWATTING.

Our police rely on "citizen reporters." (People v. Glaubman 485 P.2d 711 (Colo.

1971) When Emily Elliott abused the trust of police, misleading them, lying to

them, using them as a violent weapon, that act must be prosecuted. Because this

court refuses to hold Emily Elliott to account this Court give3sa mandate to

others to commit the same crime. Because this Court chooses to abuse its

discretion to abet, ultimately the violent attempt to murder St. George by LPD

APPENDIX D

in a zealous response to Emily Elliott's false 911 report, St. George's blood

is on this Court's hands, Anyone who seeks the cause of Colorado's lawlessness

need look no farther than its Courts, particularly and instantly judges Richman,

Tow and Grove. These judges have permitted Emily Elliott and Lakewood'

dangerous, bloody and violent conduct to occur through their ratification of the

conduct. These judges choose to advocate for the Defendant-Appellee, representing

Emily Elliott on appeal sua sponte in their opinion as no appearance is made by

her or by a counsel on her behalf.

These judges appear to be completely blind to the consequences of permitting

Elliott to make a false report to police without any repurcussions. The judges

likely believe they are insulated from the risks of police reaction to a false

report that leads to police violence, This judges must imagine themselves, or

a loved-on as a victim of SWATTING like that committed by Elliott in order that

they may gain perspective, Perhaps these judges would never hire the services of

a prostitute exactly as in the instant case, bbt instead could fall,victim to a

jilted spouse or partner, Maybe it isn't the judge but instead a family member,

friend or co-worker? Facts are simple: Encounters with police are violent,

dangerous, and regularly result in injury or death, (Hutchins, Corey, "Colorado

police shoot people more than almost anywhere else--ano local nev/s orgs ask why."

Colorado Independent, 7 FEB 2020) Police acting on false information are known to

be overzealous and react with aggression and violence; so common is this that

"SWATTING" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Life isn't fair, and it is

innocent Coloradans who'will reap what this Court has sown.

So:long as these judges act as rubber-stampers, upholding the wrong-headed rulings

of local District Court judges who act to protect the misconduct of their local

police, one might expect this scenario to keep playing out over and again. This

Court must rehear this Appeal in order that an accurate Opinion may be rendered;

these judges must render an opinion that is consistent with the relevant caselaw and with the facts of this case. This Court must allow for justice, remand

this case back to the District Court such that a jury may render a verdict on

the merits of this case.

FACTS AND POINTS OF LAVf:

I. Facts are facts, and these judges may not engage in recasting Cne facts to

suit their fancies. The Court must accept the facts as they are.

Emily Catherine Elliott is not a "striptease artist" or a "iapdancer." She is a

pg 2

prostitute. Elliott tells investigators on 1 Aug 2016, "...I had told him the

name of the company and it didn't sound familiar to him... I believe that he

probably found me on Backpage." [Interview 1 Aug 2016, p4] "I was only ever

■ advertised on Denver Ladies and Backpage to my knowledge." [Trial X-script 1

Feb 2018, p 23.5, In 12-14] ("...advertiscent on 8ackpage.com ("Backpage"), a

website where prostitutes solicit clients..." U.S. v. Roach 896 F.3d 1185, 1187

(CA 10 (NM) 2018)) ("Backpage.com is a website known for posting disguised

advertisments for prostitution services." U.S. v. Canty 617 Fed.Appx 630, 631

n.1 (8th Cir. 2015)) ("Backpage.corn's adult services section overwhelmingly

contains advertisments for prostitution... the majority of the advertisments

there are for sex." Backpage.com v. Dart 127 F.Supp,3d 917, 922 (ND Ill 2015))

("Backpage listed each ad featuring Jane Doe No. 1 as an offer of 'escort'

services, a common euphemism for prostitution." Doe v. Backpage.com LLC 104 F.

Supp.Sd (D.Mass 2015)) The repeated attempts at recasting Elliott as anything

othse than a prostitute who was "catfishing," "hustling," or otherwise swindling

St. George and ultimately robbing hirn is disingenuous at best, more likely a

deliberate misrepresentation of the facts in the record. Further, this court must

stop asserting that St. George's firing of his gun into the air was anything but

a response to Elliott holding a weapon in her'hand, and that there may have been

a "second gunshot." The record reflects the facts, incontrovertible, that St.

George did not threaten Elliott with a weapon prior to her drawing a weapon from

her purse. (Q: So, you were not aware of me having a gun. prior to that? A: No.)

[Trial 2 Feb 2018, p64, In 17-19] (Q: And you had that pottle of mace in your

hands? A: No, in my purse. Q: Did ;you have your keys in your hands when you went

to the car? A: Yeah. Q: Okay, and at that point you had that bottle of mace and

your keys in your hands?'A; Yes.,...) [Trial 2' Feb 2018, pp 69-70, In 23-25 S. 15] As to the false "second gunshot," the jury acquitted St. George of that false

charge of attempted murder against Elliott, that this courtscontinues to obliquely

suggest that perhaps it may have happened runs contrary to the principle of res

judicata. It is a slander. There can be no question that Elliott definitely

lied about there ever having been a gunshot fired at her and she always knew that

she was lying.

.II, St. George incorporated by referenceample evidence of. Emily Elliott's fraud

beginning in the Complaint from the-very beginning of this action. St. George

points to Elliott's cell phone calls at 10:09PM on 31 duly 2016 to 911, and to

pg 3

Daundrea Bryant at 9:52PM on 31 July 2016. ("We consider only the facts alleged

in the Mellons' amended complaint, the documents they attached as exhibits or

incorporated by reference, and matters proper for judicial notice." Miller v.

Bank of Hew York Mellon 379 P.3d 342 (Colo. App. 2016)) ("A document that is

referred to in the Complaint even though not fornaliyyiimcorporatediuiyirefereiliefe^ce

or attached to the Complaint, is not considered a 'matter outside the pleadings, I H

Walker v. Van Laningham 14S P.3d 391 (Colo. App. 2016)) These incorporated phone

calls fully specify the contents of Elliott's lie. The calls are short, only a

minute or two each. In the 9:52 call to Bryant, Elliott describes one gunshot, "a

fire into the air," and only minutes later tells a 911 operator that there were

two, "in the air and then at me." St. George calls this a "spurious allegation"

in his Complaint, and a "materially false statement." St. George has particularized'

t;he incident of fraud with exceptional specificity. Yet, Richman, Tow and Grove

suggest in paragraphs 13 & 15 of their opinion that S%. George has failed to state

his claim and that the District Court's order to dismiss was proper. There can be

no question that these judges are willful in their misapprehension of the facts.

III. Motions to Dismiss are supposed to be disfavored, and yet it is the favorite

weapon of courtrooms against pro-se litigants seeking justice and used with alacrity

and relish by tiyib courts of Colorado. Indeed, it has-been used against St. George

5 times in Colorado's state District Courts, and 3 times in the Federal District of

Colorado. Not once has the Colorado Court of Appeals overturned one of these false

dismissals and remanded in order that St. George may be heard on the merits of his

case. However, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has done just that. Are we to be

persuaded that St. George's pleadings^were so different from one venue to the next,

or perhaps the difference lies in the venues themselves. The Colorado Court of

Appeals does not conform itself to the disfavor of dismissals, qq'iitt to the contrary

it loves dismissals. Dismissals are not "rarely granted"... they are constaiiPly

granted. (Motions to Dismiss are disfavored, se: Bly v. Story 2fl1 P.3d 529 (Colo.

2010); Begley v. Ireson 399 P.3d 777 (Colo. App. 2017); Marks v. Koch 294 P.3d 118

(Colo. App. 2011); Giduck v. Niblett 408 P.3d 853 (Colo. App. 2014); Rigg v. City

of Lakewood 896 F.Supp.2d 976 (D.Colo. 2012); Davidson v. Dill 503 P.2d 157 (Colo.

1972))

IV. On pg. 3 of the Opinion, in a footnote, the judges state, "[St. George] does

not appeal the couttss denial of his motion to amend." This is factually inaccurate.

St. George plainly states in his Provisional Opening Brief on the fourth page of his

Argument 1, under C. Applicable Law and analysis, "The Plaintiff has hever been

pg 4

given an opportunity to amend. Draconian1 dismissal was the first action invoked."

This is sufficient to liberally preserve review of the District Court's denial of

St. George's Motion to Amend. St. George .has argued that his Complaint has always

stated a claim upon which relief could be granted; because the truth was brought

into question St. George ought to have been permitted to give, "a more definite

statement of any matter not averred with sufficient definitions or particularity."

St. George filed a motion for leave to amend, and he's presented the issue on appeal.

V.

St. George is not an attorney. Mis pleadings are entitled to a level of

deference; legal precident states a pro-se litigant is aentitled to have his

pleadings liberally construed. (Liberal Construction means,na less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hall v. Bellmen 935 F.2d 1106

1110 (10th Cir. 1991)) Colorado has adopted the Twombly standard of pleading in

Warne. ("...plaintiffs need not provide 'detailed factual allegations' to survive

a motion to dismiss, they must provide more than 'labels and conclusions or a

'formulaic recitation of the elements of a' cause of action. I II Bell AtI. Corp. v,

Twombly 550 US 544, 124 S.Ct. 1955 (US 2007); Warne V. Hall 373 P.3d 588 (Colo.

201j6)_) St. George's Complaint is plausible, and he has provided plenty "more,"

pointing directly at the incident which was the fraud, That is a "set of facts

consistent with thte allegations in the Complaint." Moreover, St. George's cornplaint has been outrightly proven since he filed it. I his Court has construed

St. George's. Complaint in a way that is more strict., and more narrow than even

the standard a lawyer would be construed, when St. George's Complaint was en­

titled to be broadly and liberally construed. Why the prejudice? It is bias

against the Plaintiff that dirves the prejudice, deliberate and wanton.

VI. St. George is the non-moving party. He is entitled to the benefit of alk

favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts.

(Peterson v. Halstead 629 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1992)) There's been no dispute as to

the contents of Emily Elliott's phone call to 911, or the prior statement against

interest that proves that she knew she was lying. These judges have nonetheless

been incapable of inferring an act of fraud from those facts. That is incredible!

A juyy of lay-people were capable of figuring out that Emily Elliott was a liar

and committed fraud—a jury that went on towrongly convict .St. George on other

charges—clearly not a jury friend-ly to St. George, It is plain that these judges

have misapprehended the facts and the lav;.

yil. St. George asserts that the real cause for these judges' abuse of their

pg 5

L

• '» J

V

benches Is to avoid making a ruling on Oudge Klein's erroneous dismissal on

"retaliatory litigation" grounds. St. George's argument as contained in his

Provisional Opening Brief in Section II, was 100% correct, These judges are

terrified that if District Courts who cppitalize on false reports and perjury

of witnesses to gain illicit convictions agaiatt their defendant victims can

have the court activities exposed through civil actions against the perjurors.

judge Klein was erroneous, and St. George has proven it. Emily Elliott is a

liar, and the government has profitted from her lie.

These judges have ruled in a manner that is shameful. These judges have

deliberately abused their power to protect this defendant, and by extension the

City of Lakewood's police department that acted with aggression anc violence;

they attempted to murder the Plaintiff as an overzealous and mis-led response

to the Defendant's criminal fraud. ("in about 1% of [exonerations], police

officers falsely testified that they themselfes had been assaulted by the

defendants, usually to cover up their own violence." Government Misconduct and

Convicting the Innocent: The Role of Prosecutors, Police and Other Law Enforcement,

pg. 72, University of Michigan Law School, Samuel R. Gross, et al (1 Sept 2020))

St. Georoe prays that these judges have-the humility to acknowledge that tneir

poor judgment is dangerous, it promotes violence and degrades the public's

safety. These judges have a responsibility to permit St. George to seek justice

and vindication, to uphold the laws of the State of Colorado which apply equally

to all. Emily Elliott broke the law when she called in her false report to 911,

and -Lakewood Police broke the law when they laid seige to St. George's house and

tried to murder him in response.

pg 6

Court Address:

Colorado Supreme Court

2 East 14th Avenue

Denver CO 80203

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, 2020CA853

District Court Oefferson County, 2017CV413

Petitioner:

Eric St. George

v.

A COURT USE ONLY A

Respondent:

E.C.E.

Attorney or Party Without Attorney (Name and Address):

Eric St. George, pro-se

c/'o BVCF—180161

P0 Box 2017

Buena Vista, CO 81211

Case No:

2022SC292

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

APPENDIX E

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of CAR 28

or CAR 28.1, and CAR 32, including all formatting requirements set forth

in these rules. Specifically, the undersigned certifies that:

The brief complies wiht the applicable word limits set forth in CAR 28(g)

or CAR 28.1(g)

It contains less than

words.

I acknowledge that my brief may be stricken if it fails to comply with any of

the requirements of CAR 28 or CAR 28.1 and CAR 32.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Caption Page

Certificate of Compliance

Table of Contents

Table of Authorities

Statement of the Case and Facts

Issue Presented for Review

Statement on Time

Summary of the Argument

Argument

A. Consideration Governing Review

B. Relevant Law

C. Analysis

Conclusion

AUTHORITIES

A Good Time Rental v. First American Title, 259 P.3P 534, 541

(Colo. App. 2011)

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009)

Begley v. Ireson, 399 P.3d 111 (Colo. App. 2017)

Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)

Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529 (Colo. 2010)

Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008)

Cloverleaf Golf Course, 2011 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 76658 *12

Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972)

Depp v. Heard, 108 Va.Cir. 382 (Fairfax Co., VA 2022)

Fidelity Nat11 v. Intercounty Nat*1, 412 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2005)

Giduck v. Niblett, 408 P.3d 858, 872 (Colo. App. 2014)

Haines v. Kerner, 404* U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)

Marks v. Koch, 284 P.3d 118 (Colo. App. 2011)

People v. St. George 16CR2509

Rigg v. City of Lakewood, 896 F.Supp.2d 978, 979 (D. Colo. 2012)

Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (2008)

St. George v. City of Lakewood, 2021 U.S.App.LEXIS 24934

St. Georae v. Larson, Oefferson County 17CV416; COA 19CA52; 20SC368

State Farm v. Parrish, 899 P.2d 285, 288 (Colo. App. 1994)

Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588, 591, 595 (Colo. 2016)

Bogart, 0., Living with Twombly, Utah Bar Oournal Vol. 22 No. 2 Pg. 24

Garcia and Bach, Iqbal is not a game changer, 42 N.M.L.Rev. 329, 345 (2012)

Wexler, L., 2018 Symposium Lecture, 22 Rich,Pub.Int.L.Rev. 181, 189 (2019)

C.A.R. 49(a)(4)

C.A.R. 53

CROP 9(b)

CROP 12(b)(5)

CROP 12(e)

CROP 15(a)

P

OPiNhoiO Vo W rc.vne.ux0

C.op^

pov s 0 fivV

’Vd

WCM

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

(taken directly from Appellate Opening Brief)

On duly 31, 2016, Defendant E---- C............. E.........- was hired by the Plaintiff,

responding to an ad posted to Backpage.com, a website that marketed "Escorts,"

a euphemism for prostitutes. At 9:46 PM, [Defendant] took money from the

Plaintiff by use of force, an act of Robbery and Theft. At 10:09 PM [Defendant]

made a spurious allegation in a recorded 911 telephone call, [Complaint, pg 1,

para. 1] [Defendant] says to Lakewood Police, "He was firing the gun in the

air and then at me..." "He fired it twice." [911 telephone call, 31 duly 2016,

10:09 PM] See Appendix (of the Appellate Opening Brief). She makes similar

Materially False Statements in a 10:17 PM phone call with Agent Eric Brennan

of the Lakewood Police Department, and again in an August 10, 2017 interview

with Kimberly Gallerani of the defferson County District Attorney’s Office,

and also the August 1, 2016 interview with Sergeant (sic) deff Larson of the

Lakewood Police. [Complaint, pg 1, para. 1] Prior to those false allegations,

at 9:52 PM on duly 31,2016, in a recorded phone call the Defendant makes a

statement wherein she demonstrates that hep later statements are false and she

knows them to be false. [Complaint, pg. 1, para. 2] [Defendant] says to

Daundrea Bryant, "He shot _a fire into the air." Asked, "[D]id he shoot at your

car or anything after that?" Responds, "No." [Daundrea Bryant, 31 duly 2016,

9:52 PM] See Appendix (of the Appellate Opening Brief). The.Plaintiff learns

of the contents of these recordings of phone calls and interviews beginning

dune 9, 2017, after he is given access to Discovery in the criminal case

against him. [defferson Co. 16CR2509] [Complaint, pg 3, Time] The Materially

False Statements are criminal and represent acts of Perjury and Slander. The

instant Complaint was filed December 18, 2017. This Court shall'take judicial

notice that during the pendency of the instant case, the Plaintiff has been

acquitted of the allegation of firing his gun at [Defendant] despite Iwrihsvinq

been suborned to Perjury by Michael Freeman and Katherine Decker of the First

Judicial District. [Defendant's] was a dangerous lie that sicced the Lakewood

Police on the Plaintiff, resulting in Plaintiff's nearly being murdered by those

Police. Plaintiff suffered gunshot wounds, and an illicit cover-up of the LPD's

murder attempt initiated by [Defendant's] false reporting.

(addition to facts section not in the Appellate Opening Brief)

The Colorado Court of Appeals' invocation of "an arrest affidavit that is part

of the record on appeal," [OPINION, 3 FEB 2022, pg. 1, n. 1] opens the door

to consideration of the arrest affidavit. Authored by Detective Oeff Larson,

and subject of Mr. St. George's suit for fraud that ran parallel to the^instant

suit, [17CV416, 19CA52, 20SC368] that Affidavit contained the exact same

fraudulent statement that is the subject of this suit. (St. George was denied

any justice in St. George v. Larson, that defendant was granted immunity. The

case was never decided on its merits) Detective Larson stated, " • • « in the

middle of the street, raise (sic) his left arm and she [E.C.E.] saw a flash

and heard what she believed to be a gunshot into the air. She got to her car

and looked back again, and the male had leveled (sic) his hand towards her and

another flash was seen with the sound of a gunshot where she felt he had shot

at.her." [Oefferson County Warrant Arrest Affidavit 16-03418, 2 AUG 2016, pg 1]

Larson testifies to the exact same fraudulent statement at St. George's

Preliminary Hearing [Oefferson Count 16CR2509, 9 SEP 2016, TR p 3] yet in

response to a jury question in the criminal trial Larson capitulates and admits,

"...but based on the evidence that we found, I didn't find evidence of a second

shot at [E.C.E.]." [Trial OeffCo 16CR2509, 8 FEB 2018, p 58, Ln 17-18] The

Affidavit was a fraud, and the Colorado Court of Appeals knows that it is a

fraud.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I.

Colorado's Court of Appeals and District Courts below abuse their

power to dismiss the complaints of pro-se litigants. Colorado's'

Court of Appeals and District Courts below abuse their power in

not permitting pro-se litigants to amend complaints that the judge

or defendant allege to be deficient.

STATEMENT ON TIME

The judgment that the petitioner seeks to be reviewed was entered 3 FEB 2022.

On 24 MAR 2022, the C0A denied rehearing. On 26 MAY 2022 this Court responded

to petitioner's expansion of time request, granting up to and including 23 DUN

2022. C.A.R. 53(a)(3)(A) S (B)

SUGARY OF THE ARGUMENT

St. George repeatedly sought to amend his complaint base upon the allegations

that it was deficient. Dismissals are disfavored. Leave to amend is to be

freely given. Pro-se litigants are to be held to a less stringent standard in

their pleadings. St. George ought to have been given at minimum one good-faith

opportunity to amend as justice demands it.

ARGUMENT

I. Colorado's Court of Appeals and District Courts below abuse

their power to dismiss the complaints of pro-se litigants.

Colorado's Court of Appeals and District Courts below abuse

their power in not permitting pro-se litigants to amend

complaints that the judge or defendant allege to be deficient.

A. The Court of Appeals departed so far from accepted and usual course

of judicial proceedings as to call for Supreme Court power of supervision.

C.A.R. 49(a)(4)

B.

RELEVANT LAW

"A complaint that alleges all of the elements of the claim necessariily is

sufficient. But a complaint which omits some essential elements may still

succeed so long as the missing elements are plausibly inferred from what is

alleged." Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) as quoted

in Bogart, 3., Living with Twombly, Utah Bar Dournal Vol. 22 No. 2 Pg. 24.

"Stating a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true)

to suggest that an agreement was made." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US 544,

127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation

that discovery will reveal evidence of an illegal agreement." Id. Replacing

"agreement" with "fraud" for relevance* Explicitly adopting Iqbal in Colo,

in Warne v. Hall 373 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2016) "plausible standard" and "beyond mere

speculation" Warne @ 591, 595. "specificity necessary to establish plausibility

and fair notice... depends on context." , Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242,

1248 (2008) In State Farm v. Parrish, 899 P.2d 285, 288 (Colo. App. 1994) defines

in fraud cases particularity is "...the respect in which the plaintiff contends

the statements were fraudulent

when ®nd where the statements were made

those responsible for the statements." Motions to Dismiss are Disfavored.

"Motions to dismiss are generally viewed with disfavor." Rigg v. City of Lakewood, 696 F.Supp.2d 978, 979 (D. Colo. 2012) "Motions to dismiss under CRCP

12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim are disfavored in Colorado." Giduck v.

Niblett, 408 P.3d 858, 872 (Colo, App. 2014) see also: Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d

529 (Colo. 2010); Begley v. Iresor,, 399 P.3d 777 (Colo. App. 2017); Marks v.

Koch, 284 P,3d 118 (Colo. App. 2011); Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972)

"Where a motion for a more definite statement is justified and an effort is made

to comply with the order of the court granting it, the insufficiency of the

> • ♦ •

V

i

9 • ♦ •

Those phone calls were fully incorporated by reference into St. George's

Complaint.. Those phone calls only contain one statement in each of them.

The calls are 1 - 2 minutes long. The calls oontain only a few hundred words

apiece.

In the context of a fraud claim, a Defendant telling her employer's secretary

one thing, and only minutes later telling a 911 operator another is a more

than plausible act of fraud -- she's caught red-handed.

In the Federal District of Colorado's Court, and in the 10th Circuit, it is

still the case that Motions to Dismiss are disfavored, even after TWombly and

Iqbal.

Is it the case that in Colorado's corresponding State-level districts and in the

Colorado Cort of Appeals, after Warne, motions to dismiss are no.longer

disfavored?

Is it no longer fare to dismiss a case without affording the Plaintiff the

opportunity to amend? In this State, St. George has been dismissed 100% of the

time. In the Federal District of Colorado, when St. George was dismissed, he

was given the opportunity to amend (sua sponte, even.) That amended complaint

was dismissed and the 10th Circuit appellate court overturned the erroneous

dismissal, (see: St. George v. City of Lakewood, 2021 U.S.App.LEXIS 24934)

A Plaintiff has a right to bring his claims to court. Oudges ought not be

permitted to dismiss claims that they don't want to hear because they are biased

against the Plaintiff who brings them. (The inference of bias is made based

upon the panel below's OPINION that says, "As a result of his actions, St. Glorge

was charged with numerous criminal offenses," which is a readsertion of a false

narrative. Also, reference to the "arrest affidavit," a fraudulent document

authored by Oeff Larson, a defendant to State and Federal fraud suits.)

Dismissal is being abused. Leave to amend should be freely given. If a Complaint

is not "particular" enough, and a more definite statement is needed to meet the

rules 12(b)(5) or 9(b), an opportunity to amend must be afforded. This is

especially so with pro-se litigants. What ever happened to liberal 'construction

and the deference for pro-se litigants afforded by Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519,

520-21 (1972)? Also CROP 12(e)?

When'courthouses do to pro-se litigants what's been done to St. George instantly,

the public is apt to believe that courtrooms are illegitimate. Are courtrooms

the exclusive private club for bar members only to litigate claims; or are

y

courtrooms a place where members of the public are capable of bringing their

complaints on their own behalf? The ruthless dismissal of pro-se authored

complaints will ultimately have a chilling,deterrent effect on their filings.

The public likely already believes this is the case.

In the event the Plaintiff had been contumacious in his filing, or the case

were frivolous, or if the Complaint contained scandalous immaterial language-a rare dismissal without leave to amend may have been appropriate. That is

not the case here.

The Defendant here capitalized on the contemporary #1eToo movement, knowing that

zero legitimate examination of her fraud would occur. This civil action is

critical to insure that these types of fraud are kept in check.

Granting this Writ will signal that pro-se litigants will be heard in Colorado

courthouses and that courtrooms are not the exclusive dominion of bar members.

The right to amend afforded by rule will be maintained. Motions to dismiss will

continue to be disfavored. Motions to dismiss will be granted rarely without

an opportunity to amend afforded. Draconian dismissal will be a last resort,

not the first.

CONCLUSION

St. George's Complaint was dismissed over repeated objections, amendment requests,

appeals, & motion to vacate, The dimissal was erroneous owing to St. George

never once being given an opportunity to amend his complaint to meet the standards

of the judge.

The merits of this case are especially of interest in the public sphere. The

//MeToo movement's maxim of "believe all women" left unscrutinized has and will

run amok. To elucidate just how interested the public is in these matters, one

need took only to the recent live television coverage of Depp v. Heard in Fairfax

County, VA. A slander and fraud case between a man and woman that was broadcast

nationwide to a large audience. No doubt due to the celebrity status of the

litigants, and the salacious details exposed; but this Plaintiff believes also

because of the outcome. The liar, a woman, was found culpable for her public

slander of a man, despite her appeals to //HeToo ideology.

APPENDIX

(BRYANT) Oh my gosh. uh. just wow. uhh... okay April's asking 1 have, I have pulled, lei me

go back and look at your call, that was a house, right?

(ELLIOTT)It was an apartment

«rcmaindcr of transcript taken directly from Discover)', not from recording»

(ELLIOTT)lt was. um. building 7, apartment 103

(BRYANT) Okay, Buildme 7. apartment 103. Um, and that was Eric I believe, yeah Eric.

(ELLIOTT)Mhm.

(BRYANT) Because I remember putting you over to Aiex (unintelligible), um, dial is like

terrifying. April let me send April this info she’s putting it on like the Black List system now so

sure not to...

(ELUOTOYcah, like shit.

(BRYANT) Kay, no that my panic attack is over oh my goodness.

(ELLIOTT)I’m probably going to have mine for like the rest of the night.

(BRYANT) Oh Jesus Christ. Oh my goodness like.

(ELLIOTT)Wlio the fuck pulls out a gun? Like he, he followed me outside in his underwear like

out, out of his apartment like so close like what the fuck? lie did not give a shit.

(BRYANT) People are crazy. Like I mean somebody else would have to heard that.

(ELLIOTT)Yeah, I’m sure we’re not the only ones that called the police like.

(BRYANT) Oh my goodness. Okay, hold on I’m tryin’ to get this info to April to while I have

you on the phone okay (inaudible) Alright, alright so April has all the information and everything

and she’s handlin' that situation.

(BLLIOTT)Ycah, no I'm goin’ home, this scared the shit out of me, 1 ncc (inaudible)

(BRYANT) Hold on. April. Hold on, I think April wants to talk to you.

Incorporated by reference in the Complaint, the following appeindices are included here for the

convenience of the Court Appellant is not readily ublc to provide “clean, unmarked cop ies" of

the other documents additionally referenced in the Complaint. Upon this Court’s Order,

Appellant will provide copies of his marked-up copies with redactions to cover work-product

and to be filed under seal of the Court.

Transcript of telephone call

July31,2016 9:52PM

Daundrea Bryant to Emily Elliott

«lronscribed directly from recording»

(ELLlOTT)hello

(BRYANT) hey

(BRYANT) okay, so I have April taking care of, um, all of that

(ELLlOTO(Laughs) Uh, yeah, oh my God it gave me a heart attack, I was like “oh my God"

(Talking over one another, unintelligible) go get Efiy like my Mom

(ELLIOTDno, I was like, (unintelligible) fuckin’, and then I don’t know if you heard it or not

over the phone he shot p'Tirefmtathe air!

(BRYANT) I didn't hear it (unintelligible) All I heard was like “oh my God he shot” and that’s

when I told you just to run (laughing)

(ELLIOTT)Yeah, no, (unintelligible) Yeah,! mean he's standing right by my car, I almost hit

him with my car, like it into reverse

(BRYANT) Oh my goodness, did he shoot at your.car .ofjaoything after thai?

(ELLIOTT)No... I think maybe because I was like call the fuckin’ police, call the fuckin’ police,

(laughs)

(BRYANT) Ohh myy godd. That's insane.

(ELLIOTDLikc, Holy shit.

(BRYANT) Oh my God, my heart is just still beating so fast, I sound super calm right now, but

my heart is like, beating out of its chest. Like it’s freaky...

(ELLIOTT)Ycah, like, no no (unintelligible)

Both: (laughing together)

(ELL10TT)Why is it always me?

(BRYANT-) Oh my goodness, you're not the only one, trust me. (unintelligible)

(ELLIOTT) Last week it was the guy with a machete tried to pull me while I was (unintelligible)

(BRYANT) Oh my god that was mv call too, I was like, what the heck is his problem?

(unintelligible) Yeah we blacklisted him and had security go up there it wus o mess, so uhhh, this

guy is definitely going on the blacklist make sure never, ever, ever (unintelligible) again.

(ELLIOTT) Yeah, that was so dangerous, he like acted like he didn’t know he did anything

ng, like, I warned you three times and then l was like “fuck you” like it (unintelligible) super

rough and everything like that, you need to like calm down

(m.Liornokay.

•

Transcript of telephone coll

July 31,2016 10:09

Emily Elliott to Lakewood 911

«lnuiscribcd from recording**

(Lakewood Police) Lakewood 911. what is the address of your emergency?

(ELLIOTT) 8139 West Eastman Place. Lakewood

(Lakewood Police) You’re going to have to say that for me one more time please.

, (ELLIOTT) 8139 West Eastman Place

(Lakewood Police) 8139 West Eastman Place. What’s going on there?

(ELLIOTT) Um, somebody tried to shoot me. He!s still there, Building 7 Apartment 103, the

guy’s name is Eric.

(Lakewood Police) What do you mean he tried to shoot you?

(ELLIOTT) I work for “Denver Ladies” and we don’t provide illegal services and he tried to

touch me inappropriately several limes so I left, and he ran after me outside the apartment and he

tried to shoot me. And he nut after me to the car and I drove away.

(Lakewood Police) Did you actually see a gun?

(ELLIOTT) Yes, yes l did. He shot it, he shot it.

(Lakewood Police) Okay, take adeep breath so you can tell me exactly what happened, OK/

(ELLIOTT) Okay, sorry, sorry.

(Lakewood Police) Was the party at the Windsor Apartments there?

(ELLIOTT) Yes.

(Lakewood Police) And you said he tried to touch you?

(ELLIOTT) Yes, well basically when 1 walked in I let him know that I didn’t offer any illegal

services He wanted to cancel and we ended up telling him there would be a slight charge then

he said “All right, that’s fine, we'll do it anyway." and then he kepi trying to touch me

inappropriately and I was like alright I’m leaving, and he said, “You can’t leave you still have

my money." and I’m like, “well, y’know. the show’s almost over, you touched me

inappropriately. I’m leaving!" and he followed me outside with a gun.

(I akewood Police) Okay, was he showing you the gun, or pointing it at you, cr what happened.

(ELLIOTT) (histrionic) No. he was firing it.

(Lakewood Police) He was firing the gun?

(ELLIOTT) Yes.

(Lakewood Police) In the air?

(ELLIOTT) He was firing the gun, in the air and then at me,

(Lakewood Police) (typing) Where are you now'

(ELLIOTT) I’m at Rideegateand 1-25. I got out of there as fest as I fucking could.

complex and he did.’. Mow

■

'

me in a car or anything.

it, do you remember?

(Lakewood Police) Okay, What kind of gun

(ELLIOTT) I didn't see it. it was dark. I only heard it fire.

(Lakewood Police) Okey. but you Ite.id the shots? I low many times did He lire tl (

•

(BRYANT) Okay. Hold on one second.

«Discovery transcript cnds»

(ELLIOTT) He fired it twice.

(Lakewood Police) (typing) Okay, do you know his name?

(ELLIOTT) He gave the name Eric. I could he a fake name or it could be his real name.

(Lakewood Police) You don't know last then?

(ELLIOTT) No, no, they don’t give me last names.

(Lakewood Police) Okay, okay, tell me exactly where you are.

(ELLIOTT) I’m getting off 1-25 south exit to Ridgcgate. I’m on my way back to my place.

(Lakewood Police) When did this happen?

(ELLIOTT) This happened, truly, like 20 to 25 minutes ago.

(Lakewood Police) Okay, is this person, black, white, Asian, Hispanic?

(ELLIOTT) He’s white with brown hair. He’s probably about 5’9:-5'10”.

(Lakewood Police) Okay, was heavy, slim, or average built?

(ELLIOTT) He was average build.

(Lakewood Police)-What was he wearing? How old do you think he was?

(ELLIOT!-) Um, I’m thinking he was maybe mid 30's early 40’s.

(Lakewood Police) Okay, do you remember what he was wearing?

(ELLIOTT) He chased me out of the house in black boxers.

(Lakewood Police) I'm sorry ma’am, what did you say?

(ELLIOTT-) He chased me out of the house in black boxers and that was it

(Lakewood Police) Okay, and do you know what apartment you were in?

(ELLIOTT) It was building 7, apartment 103.

(Lakewood Police) Okay... and os far as you know, is he still there?

(ELLIOTT) Yeah

(Lakewood Police) Was this his apartment?

(ELLIOTT) Yeah, it was his apartment.

(Lakewood Police) and, how do you know this person?

EE Like I said, 1 work for “Denver Ladies.” it’s a completely legal escorting service. We don’t

provide any sort of illegal activitcs at ail. and that upset him I guess, hah-hah.

(Lakewood Police) okay

(ELLIOT!-) But, yeah, in the beginning we gave him the option to cancel and be opted out of

that. He decided he slill wanted to do it, even though he would not be provided any illegal

services.

(Lakewood Police) Okay, and then when you refused the services, he got upset and chased you

out with the gun?

(ELLIOTT) Well, it's that, I huve, because of Lakewood’s law I have to keep on some sort of

buttoins, like a G-string, or panties, or something and like he kept trying to touch me

inappropriately, and 1, ami I just left. I felt really disrespected, so Ijust left.

(Likewood Police) Okay, and then that happened about 25 minutes ago, you said?

(ELLIOTT) Yes

(I jkewood Police) Okay, what’s your last name mn’mn?

(ELLIOT!-) The last name is Elliott. E-I^L-I-O-T-T

(Lakewood Police) Okay, and what’s your first?

(ELLIOTT) Emily. E-M-l-L-Y

(Lakewood Police) And what’s a good phone number for you Emily?

•V'VCV/ MH. 7

^\mViik^7lXol^s)

"^TiAa6 UU> 4i

District Court of Jefferson County

100 Jefferson County Parkway

Golden, CO 80401

Eric St. George

(plaintiff)

C T\\PO

V.

Emily Elliott

(defendant)

ACOURT USE ONLYA

Plaintiff, pro se

Eric St. George

c/b BCCF-180161

11560 CRFF.75

Las Animas, CO 81054

Case No.: 17CV413

Div: 8 Ctrm: 4D

MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL (MARCH 2020); ORDER of DISMISSAL from

DEC 2018

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, pro-se, does herewith move this court to vacate its order to dismiss

and allow the Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint.

INTRODUCTION

This Court is thoroughly apprised of the facts of this case. This Court is in possession of

competent evidence that clearly demonstrates that the Defendant Elliott is guilty of every

allegation that the Plaintiff has made. The Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant committed

perjury and false reporting in a 911 call particularly referenced in his Complaint, made on July

31, 2016 at 10:09 PM. Tins Court possesses the transcript of inis caii, along with a transcript of

her statement against interest made immediately prior. This Court knows that she falsely alleges

that the Plaintiff fired a gunshot aimed at her, a second of two; this is perjury. This Court knows

that the Defendant repeats her peijury in her interview with a Lakewood Detective the following

morning. This Court knows that die Defendant did use force to steal money from the Plaintiff,

an act of robbery. This Court is capable of reasonably inferring that the Defendant’s other

allegations are also perjuries.

This Plaintiff is opposed to any dismissal of any claim to relief. This is inclusive of the

Defendant’s spurious counter-claims, as well as his own claims. To deny the Plaintiff of

discovery and the inevitable failure of the Defendant’s claims before a jury is to deny Plaintiff

justice.

APPENDIX F

THE TIMELINE

July 31, 2016 9:46 PM Defendant Elliott is hired by Plaintiff from Backpage.com, a website tbat

is used to advertise for prostitution. The Defendant takes money from Plaintiff that she knows

belongs to the Plaintiff, Defendant uses force in her theft. Defendant pulls a weapon from her

purse and turns to confront the Plaintiff when he demands return of his money.

July 31, 2016 9:52 PM Defendant Elliott states irrefutably in a recorded phone call that the

Plaintiff shot a gun into the air, and no gunshot at her car or anything after that. She does not

report the theft, or her use of a weapon to confront the Plaintiff, a bottle of mace.

July 31, 2016 10:09 PM Defendant Elliott calls 911, and makes a spurious allegation. She tells

the 911 operator that the Plaintiff has fired twice, once in the air and a second aimed at her.

July 31, 2016 10:17 PM Defendant Elliott repeats the allegation of 2 gunshots, once in the air

and a second aimed at her, in a phone call with Agent Eric Brennan LPD.

August 1, 2016 Defendant Elliott repeats the allegation of 2 gunshots, once in the air and a

second aimed at her, in a phone call with Detective Jeff Larson.

August 10, 2017 Defendant Elliott repeats the allegation of 2 gunshots, once in the air and a

second aimed at her, in a phone call with Kimberly Gallerani.

June 9, 2017 The Plaintiff acquires Discovery in Criminal Case 16CR2509, wherein he discovers

the content of the phone calls, and interviews. St. George was forced to declare pro-se status in

order to obtain the discovery as it was kept from him by the Public Defenders office, despite

written demands by St. George to obtain it. This is recorded in the ICON report of 16CR2509

and court record.

December 10,2017 Plaintiff files the instant complaint; Plaintiff cites particularly the contents of

the discovered documents.

2018 Motion to Dismiss is filed by counsel for the Defendant.

January 2019 Dismissal granted

Januaiy 2019 Appeal filed

January 2019 Motion to Vacate Dismissal filed by Plaintiff

February 2019 Motion to Vacate denied; lack ofjurisdiction cited

December 2019 Appeal dismissed without prejudice; lack of jurisdiction cited

January' 2020 Motion to Vacate Dismissal filed, by Plaintiff

CLAIMS

1) Demand for a true affidavit free of perjury

2) Demand for a Special Prosecutor to file criminal charges (theft, robbery,

peijury, false reporting, reckless endangerment.)

3) Demand for damages, physical injury

4) Demand for damages, false reporting

5) Demand for damages, fraud (slander and libel)

ARGUMENT

1. The Plaintiff acknowledges this is a repeated motion to vacate the dismissal.

2. This Plaintiff is unwilling to abandon his claims. His claims are genuine, brought in

good faith, reasoned, and righteous.

3. Warne v. Hall 373 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2016) imposes the plausible standard for claims to

relief. In the instant case, the Plaintiff made plausible claims.

4. This Court is within the bounds of its discretion to reverse its former denial of vacation

pursuant to Plaintiffs motion. This Court’s ruling to deny vacation of its dismissal order

was erroneous and a manifest injustice both. A trial court may, in its discretion,

reconsider and reverse a prior ruling if it determines that "its former ruling is no longer

sound because of changed conditions, it needs to correct its previous ruling because of a

legal or factual error, an intervening change in the law has occurred, or manifest injustice

would result from its original ruling." Janssen v. Denver Career Serv. Bd., 998 P.2d 9, 15

(Colo.App. 1999). see also People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 758 (Colo. 1999); People ex

rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983). Warren 55 P.3d 809

5. This case was filed in this Court in 2017, it is now 2020.

6. The appeal of this Court’s dismissal was filed in January 2019, it is now January 2020.

7. An exceptional amount ofjudicial resources have been wasted in the attempt to frustrate

and dissuade this Plaintiff from pursuing justice and relief as demanded in his Complaint.

8. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if frilly set forth here his January 2019

MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL AND GIVE LEAVE TO AMEND.

9. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth here his OPENING BRIEF in

the appellate case 19CA53. (A courtesy copy is submitted instantly)

10. The Plaintiff states that this Court shall take judicial notice that this Defendant has not

answered Plaintiff’s OPENING BRIEF in appellate case 19CA53, or 19CA470.

11. Backpage.com is a website that was used to advertise prostitutes. US v. Roach 896F. 3d

1185. 1187 (CA 10 (NM) 2018). also US v. Canty 617Fed.Addx. 630. 631 n.l ($h Cir.

2105)

12. There is nothing frivolous about the Plaintiff’s claims to relief. The Defendant perjured

herself in making false allegations against the Plaintiff; most glaringly an allegation of

attempted murder. This allegation has been proven false during the pendency of the

instant case. The Defendant’s vicious allegation was proven false in the face of the full

force and complicity of the First Judicial District’s Attorneys that abetted her in making

that perjury, and suborned her perjury at trial right here in this Courthouse, (see

16CR2509)

13. The record shows that the Defendant made Materially False Statements about a “He was

firing the gun, in the air and then at me [911 Call, 7-31-2016,10:09PM],” in contrast to

her statement against interest, “.. .did he shoot at your car or anything after that? No... I

think maybe because I was like call the fuckin’ police, call the fuckin’ police [Denver

Ladies Call, 7-31-2016,9:54PM];” she lies also about not carrying a weapon (mace)

[Larson interview, 8-1-2016] that she later confessed was in her hands [Jury trial, 2-12018,pg246 In 2-14], “he ran after me outside the apartment” [911 Call, 7-31-2016],

where she later said he walking slowly “like a horror movie” [Larson interview, 8-1-

2016], her counter-claim alleges “false imprisonment” and yet when asked under oath at

trial “Did he physically block you from leaving his bedroom?” She confesses “He stood

in front of the doorway and I pushed past him. I wouldn’t say he got physical with me.”

[Jury trial, 2-1-2018, pg 252, In 12-18] ... The reasoned inference is that the Defendant is

a serial liar, and if probed further in these proceedings her additional lies will also be

recanted.

14. The record shows that the Defendant did commit theft and robbery by admission. “Yeah,

and in my mind, you know, the show is pretty much halfway over anyway and you’re

inappropriate so I don’t care if that’s your money, it’s mine now.” [Jury trial, 2-1-2018,

pg 251, In 23-25] Was it a robbery? Did she use force? She tells the DA “He stood in

front of the doorway and I pushed past him...” Asked, “So you didn’t have to use a lot of

force to get by?” (emphasis added) [Id. @ pg 252, In 16] Because force was used and

the DA sought to mitigate it.

15. During the pendency of this case, the Plaintiff has filed an affidavit seeking the

prosecution of this Defendant. The affidavit was sent to the Attorney General of the State

of Colorado. The District Attorney of the First District was a participant in the

Defendant’s perjury in subornation. The Attorney General has refused pursuant to CRS

§16-5-209 and Kailey v. Chambers. Thusly, this Court has jurisdiction to order a special

prosecutor.

16. To vacate the Court’s self-serving dismissal of the Plaintiffs Complaint and permit him

to amend is not futile. “Amendments are futile if they are legally insufficient, for

example, when a proposed amendment fails to cure defects in previous pleadings, fails to

state a legal theory, or would not withstand a motion to dismiss.” The Plaintiff has a

legitimate claim to relief based on competent evidence; Plaintiff has never amended his

Complaint in the instant case, and has nothing but justice as motive. Amended, the

Plaintiffs Complaint would withstand any Motion to Dismiss, even in a courtroom

friendly to the Defendant. The Plaintiff will provide an exaggerated amount of

particularity, over and above that which is minimally required.

17. It is the belief of this Plaintiff that his original Complaint was sufficient. The Particulars

of the materially false statements were given as “who, when and where” pursuant to State

Farm v. Parrish, 899 P.2d285, 288 (Colo. App. 1994) the court defines particulars as,

“...the respect in which plaintiff contends the statements were fraudulent, ...when and

where the statements were made, ...those responsible for the statements.” The

Appellant’s Complaint contains all of these “particulars.” Appellant states the respect of

the fraudulency as being “materially false statement in the form of a spurious allegation

against the plaintiff.” See OPENING BRIEF...

18. Properly contemplated, the Defendants Motion to Dismiss should have been construed a

request for additional clarification.. “CRCP 12(e) permits a party to request a more

definite statement of any matter not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity...

the draconian remedy of dismissal of the action should be invoked only as a last resort.”

(emphasis added) Giduck v. Niblett 408 P.3d 858 (Colo. App. 2014) The court was

motivated to grant the dismissal to serve its own interests. That interest, plainly stated,

was to frustrate the Plaintiff efforts in seeking justice.

19. Leave to amend should properly be “freely given.” “Thus Polk is correct in observing

that a motion to amend is entitled to a lenient examination.” and “If the underlying facts

or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be proper subject of relief, he ought to be

afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or

declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of

amendment, etc—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’” Polk v.

Denver Dist. Court, 849 P. 2d 23. 25 (Colo. 1993)

20. This Plaintiff even opposes dismissal of the Defendant’s counter-claims. If Elliott

believes that her claims are legitimate, let her prosecute them; as such this CounterclaimDefendant may be permitted to prove them to be the additional lies that they are through

discovery and trial.

WHEREFORE, this Court shall GRANT this Plaintiffs MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL

(MARCH 2020); ORDER of DISMISSAL from DEC 2018 for good cause shown.

Additionally, the Plaintiff opposes dismissal of the Counterclaim-Plaintiffs spurious claims.

This Counterclaim-Defendant prefers to demonstrate the falsity of those claims on their merits.

Eric St. George

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the date listed below, I hereby certify that I did place with the BCCF Legal Mail Clerk,

postage prepaid, a copy ofthe MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL (MARCH 2020);

ORDER of DISMISSAL from DEC 2018, addressed to the Court and Defendant’s counsel as

below:

Emily Catherine Elliott

18159 E. Main St. #16-305

Parker, CO 80134

DATE FILED: September 26, 2022

Colorado Court of Appeals

2 East 14th Avenue

Denver, CO 80203

Jefferson County

2017CV413

Plaintiff-Appellant:

Court of Appeals Case

Number:

2020CA853

Eric St George,

v.

Defendant-Appellee:

E.E.

MANDATE

This proceeding was presented to this Court on the record on appeal. In

accordance with its announced opinion, the Court of Appeals hereby ORDERS:

ORDERS AFFIRMED

POLLY BROCK

CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

DATE: SEPTEMBER 26, 2022

APPENDIX G

2209262023 1005 1-106-1007 2

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DISTRICT COURT, JEFFERSON COUNTY, STATE

OF COLORADO.

100 Jefferson County Parkway. Golden Colorado 80401

DATE FILED: ;DeceinbeT;27r-20J:8~

V-r'"'

'

‘—”

PLAINTIFF(S): ERIC ST. GEORGE

v.

ACOURT USE ONLYA

DEFENDANT(S): EMILY ELLIOTT.

CASE NUM BERH7-CV-413^

Div: 8

Ctrm: 4D

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

THE COURT having received the Defendant Emily Elliott’s Motion to Dismiss, and the court

having reviewed the Court file, and otherwise being advised in the premises hereby grants the

Motion. The Plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Even viewing the allegations

in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff he has failed to state legal claims entitling him to civil relief.

Done in open court this____ day of_______

December 27, 2018

, 2018.

BY THE COURT:

My.

MARGIE L. ENQUlSTT5TsmcECourt Judge

APPENDIX H

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