Amicus Curiae Brief — Jascha Chiaverini, et al., Petitioners v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 7, 2024
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No. 23-50
In the Supreme Court of the United States
JASCHA CHIAVERINI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
SUPPORTING VACATUR
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
KRISTEN CLARKE
Assistant Attorney General
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
CURTIS E. GANNON
Deputy Solicitor General
VIVEK SURI
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
ERIN H. FLYNN
CAROLINE W. TAN
BRANT S. LEVINE
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a police officer who initiates a baseless
criminal charge that causes an unreasonable seizure is
liable on a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution
claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 if the baseless charge was
accompanied by a separate, valid charge for which the
officer had probable cause.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Interest of the United States....................................................... 1
Constitutional and statutory provisions involved ...................... 2
Statement ...................................................................................... 2
Summary of argument ................................................................. 6
Argument....................................................................................... 9
A. The court of appeals erred in holding that a single
valid charge automatically defeats a Fourth
Amendment malicious-prosecution claim ..................... 11
1. Section 1983 provides redress when a police
officer’s initiation of a baseless criminal charge
causes an unreasonable seizure ............................... 11
2. A baseless charge can cause an unreasonable
seizure even if accompanied by a valid charge ...... 14
3. A categorical any-crime rule conflicts with
background principles of tort law ........................... 18
4. Concerns about unwarranted Section 1983 suits
do not justify a categorical any-crime rule............. 21
5. The court of appeals’ judgment should be
vacated ....................................................................... 22
B. This Court should not adopt some of petitioners’
broader contentions ........................................................ 23
1. Petitioners’ contentions concerning the
Warrant Clause and the seizure of their
effects are not properly before this Court ............. 23
2. Petitioners err in contending that an arrest
warrant violates the Warrant Clause
whenever the warrant affidavit contains a
falsified charge .......................................................... 26
3. Petitioners err to the extent they suggest
that the need to show causation of a seizure
pertains only to damages ......................................... 29
Conclusion ................................................................................... 31
Appendix — Constitutional and statutory provisions .......... 1a
(III)
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Page
Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013) ...................... 12
Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189 (1858) ..................................... 20
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) .................... 2, 10
Boogher v. Bryant, 86 Mo. 42 (1885) ................................... 20
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) .................................. 18
Cordova v. City of Albuquerque,
816 F.3d 645 (10th Cir. 2016) ............................................. 30
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44 (1991) ......................................................... 15, 17
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) ........................ 28
Delisser v. Towne, 113 Eng. Rep. 1159 (Q.B. 1841) ........... 20
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) ............................ 15
Dinsman v. Wilkes, 12 How. 390 (1852) ............................. 19
Ellis v. Abrahams, 115 Eng. Rep. 1039 (Q.B. 1846) .......... 20
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) ....................... 26-28
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) .... 12, 15, 17, 19, 25, 27
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) .............................. 18
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) ...................... 28
Gregory v. Thomas, 5 Ky. 286 (1811) .................................. 20
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) ................................. 27
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) ............................... 25
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) ................... 10
Hill v. Palm, 38 Mo. 13 (1866) .............................................. 20
Howse v. Hodous, 953 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2020),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1515 (2021) ............................. 14, 18
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) ................................... 21
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)............................ 22
Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006) ...................... 14
V
Cases—Continued:
Page
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) .................................. 12
Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017) ...... 9, 15-17, 24
McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019) ..................... 30
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019) ............................ 19
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) ....................................... 28
Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388 (2012) ...................................... 23
Pierce v. Thompson, 23 Mass. 193 (1828) ........................... 20
Pitt v. District of Columbia,
491 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ............................................. 13
Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1991) ........................ 10
Reed v. Taylor, 128 Eng. Rep. 472 (C.P. 1812)................... 20
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) ..................................... 11
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)................ 17
Sutton v. McConnell, 50 N.W. 414 (Wis. 1879)................... 20
Thompson v. Clark,
596 U.S. 36 (2022) .................. 9, 12, 13, 19, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006) ....................... 28
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) ........................ 25
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) .............. 14, 15
United States National Bank of Oregon v.
Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.,
508 U.S. 439 (1993) ............................................................. 19
Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How. 544 (1861) ......................... 19, 21
Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020) ... 16, 29
Constitution and statutes:
U.S. Const.:
Amend. I ........................................................................... 19
Amend. IV ................................. 1, 2, 5-19, 21-24, 26-30, 1a
Reasonableness Clause ....................................... 12, 24
Warrant Clause........................................... 8, 12, 24-27
VI
Constitution and statutes—Continued:
Page
Amend. XIV (Due Process Clause) ............................... 30
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13......................... 19
Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1874) ......................................................... 19
18 U.S.C. 241 ...................................................................... 1, 10
18 U.S.C. 242 ...................................................................... 1, 10
34 U.S.C. 12601 .................................................................. 1, 10
42 U.S.C. 1983 ................................. 1, 2, 5-13, 18-21, 25-29, 1a
Ohio Rev. Code (2016):
§ 1315.55(A)(1) ............................................................... 3, 4
§ 2913.51(A) ........................................................................ 3
§ 2923.31(I)(2)(c) ................................................................ 4
§ 4728.02(A) ........................................................................ 3
Miscellaneous:
2 C. G. Addison, A Treatise on the Law of
Torts (Am. ed. 1878) ........................................................... 21
2 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law
of Evidence (rev. by Isaac F. Redfield,
10th ed. 1868) ...................................................................... 20
1 Francis Hilliard, The Law of Torts or
Private Wrongs (4th ed. 1874) ........................................... 21
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure:
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
(6th ed. 2022) ................................................................. 25, 26
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 23-50
JASCHA CHIAVERINI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
SUPPORTING VACATUR
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
The question presented concerns the elements of a
Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under
42 U.S.C. 1983. The United States has a substantial interest in the resolution of that question.
First, the United States has a substantial interest in
ensuring that the constitutional rights at issue here are
carefully safeguarded. The United States prosecutes
individuals—mostly state and local law-enforcement
officers—who willfully violate federal rights under color
of law. See 18 U.S.C. 241, 242. The United States also
brings civil suits against state and local lawenforcement agencies under 34 U.S.C. 12601, which authorizes the Attorney General to seek appropriate relief
to remedy a pattern or practice of law-enforcement officers’ violations of constitutional rights.
(1)
2
Second, although this case involves a civil suit
against local law-enforcement officers under Section
1983, this Court’s resolution of the question presented
could conceivably affect Fourth Amendment suits
against federal officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). The United States has a substantial interest in the circumstances in which federal officers can
be sued for violating the Fourth Amendment.
Third, the United States brings criminal charges and
detains suspects pending trial on those charges. The
United States has a substantial interest in the scope of
constitutional rights relating to criminal prosecution
and pretrial detention.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are
reproduced in the appendix. App., infra, 1a.
STATEMENT
1. Petitioner Jascha Chiaverini manages a jewelry
store owned by petitioner Chiaverini, Inc., in Napoleon,
Ohio. See Pet. App. 2a & n.1. In 2016, Chiaverini bought
a ring and an earring from a jewel thief. See id. at 2a.
The thief had stolen the jewelry from David and Christina Hill, but the parties dispute whether Chiaverini
knew of the theft at the time of the purchase. See ibid.
Later that day, the Hills called the store and asked
Chiaverini to return the jewelry. See Pet. App. 2a. He
refused, and the Hills and Chiaverini both called the police. See ibid. David Hill then went to the store to demand the return of the jewelry, but to no avail. See id.
at 3a. Meanwhile, the Napoleon Police Department dispatched Officers Nicholas Evanoff and David Steward
to the store. See ibid. Officer Evanoff confirmed to
3
Chiaverini that the jewelry had been stolen and instructed him not to sell it. See ibid.
The next day, the police department sent the store a
letter asking it to retain the jewelry as evidence of theft
and to return the jewelry to the Hills. See Pet. App. 4a.
Chiaverini believed that the request to return the jewelry contradicted the request to retain it. See ibid.
Christina Hill went to the store later that day to pick up
the jewelry, but Chiaverini refused to turn it over. See
ibid. The police then returned to the store and directed
him to surrender the jewelry, but he again refused. See
ibid.
Two days later, Chiaverini confronted the police
chief outside the police station. See Pet. App. 4a. In
that conversation, he stated that he would not return
the jewelry to the Hills. See id. at 4a-5a. He also implied that he lacked a valid license to deal in precious
metals. See id. at 5a. The police later confirmed that
his license was inactive. See ibid.
2. After meeting with a prosecutor, Officer Evanoff
signed criminal complaints charging Chiaverini with
three offenses: (1) retaining stolen property, in violation
of Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.51(A) (2016) (a misdemeanor);
(2) dealing in precious metals without a license, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4728.02(A) (2016) (a misdemeanor); and (3) money laundering, in violation of Ohio
Rev. Code § 1315.55(A)(1) (2016) (a felony). See Pet.
App. 6a. Officer Evanoff also applied for an arrest warrant and a search warrant, and he submitted affidavits
in support of those applications. See id. at 6a, 34a.
The case comes to this Court on the premise that the
police had probable cause for the stolen-property and
unlicensed-dealing charges, but not necessarily for the
money-laundering charge. See Pet. App. 10a & n.8. The
4
Ohio money-laundering statute provides: “No person
shall conduct or attempt to conduct a transaction knowing that the property involved in the transaction is the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity with the purpose of committing or furthering the commission of corrupt activity.” Ohio Rev. Code § 1315.55(A)(1) (2016).
According to petitioners (Br. 7), the money-laundering
statute would have applied only if Chiaverini knew, at
the time he purchased the ring and earring, that the
transaction involved the proceeds of illegal activity. To
provide evidence of Chiaverini’s mental state, Officers
Evanoff and Steward alleged that, when they visited the
store, he confessed suspecting that the jewelry “was in
fact stolen.” Pet. App. 3a. But Chiaverini denies making that statement. See id. at 4a. He claims that the
police fabricated the statement—specifically, that Officer Steward doctored a police report to include the
statement, and that Officer Evanoff then repeated the
falsified statement in his affidavit. See id. at 3a-4a, 6a.
Petitioners also argue that the money-laundering
statute would have applied only if the value of the ring
and earring exceeded $1000. See Br. 7-8 (citing Ohio
Rev. Code § 2923.31(I)(2)(c) (2016)). They claim (Br. 8)
that Chiaverini had bought the jewelry for only $45 and
that Officer Evanoff listed the jewelry’s value at only
$350 in the criminal complaint.
3. A judge of the Napoleon Municipal Court issued
the arrest and search warrants sought by the police.
Pet. App. 6a. The arrest warrant listed all three
charges against Chiaverini. See D. Ct. Doc. 27-8 (Nov.
29, 2018). The search warrant authorized the police to
search the store and to seize jewelry and other evidence
of the crimes. See J.A. 18-19. In accordance with the
warrants, the police arrested Chiaverini, searched the
5
store, and seized jewelry, documents, and computers.
See Pet. App. 25a. Chiaverini remained in custody for
three days before being released. See J.A. 75.
After his release, the municipal court held a preliminary hearing to determine which charges to bind over
for trial. See Pet. App. 6a-7a. Chiaverini and Officer
Evanoff provided conflicting testimony about whether
Chiaverini had admitted suspecting that the jewelry
had been stolen. See ibid. The court found probable
cause to support all three charges. See id. at 7a.
The prosecution did not timely present the case to a
grand jury. See Pet. App. 7a. The municipal court accordingly dismissed without prejudice all the charges
against Chiaverini, and the police returned the items
that they had seized from him. See ibid.
4. Petitioners sued respondents—the City of Napoleon, Officer Evanoff, Officer Steward, and two other
police officers—in the Henry County Court of Common
Pleas. See Pet. App. 18a. Respondents removed the
case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. See ibid.
Petitioners’ suit raises multiple federal and state
claims, including a Fourth Amendment claim under 42
U.S.C. 1983 alleging “damages in excess of $3 million.”
J.A. 60-61. Petitioners allege that respondents initiated
criminal charges without probable cause and that, as a
result, Chiaverini suffered unlawful arrest and detention. See J.A. 61. The parties refer to that count as a
“Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim.” Pet.
Br. 2; see Br. in Opp. i.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents on most counts of the complaint. See
Pet. App. 18a-48a. In rejecting petitioners’ Fourth
Amendment claim, the court found that probable cause
6
supported all three criminal charges against Chiaverini.
See id. at 32a-41a.
5. The court of appeals affirmed. See Pet. App. 1a17a. The court first held that respondents had probable
cause to believe that Chiaverini had retained stolen
property, see id. at 11a-13a, and that he had acted as a
precious-metals dealer without a license, see id. at 13a16a. But the court did not decide whether respondents
had probable cause to support the charge of money
laundering. See id. at 10a n.8. The court instead stated:
“Because probable cause existed to arrest and prosecute Chiaverini on at least one charge, his maliciousprosecution and false-arrest claims fail.” Id. at 16a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A person who faced a baseless criminal charge may
bring a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution
claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 even if he also faced a valid
charge. But the person must show that the baseless
charge caused an unreasonable seizure.
A. Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon a state actor only if he subjects a person, or causes a person to be
subjected, to the denial of a federal right. Filing a baseless criminal charge does not, by itself, “subject” a person to a denial of Fourth Amendment rights. The
Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and
seizures, not unreasonable charges. Filing a baseless
criminal charge can, however, “cause” a denial of
Fourth Amendment rights, most obviously by causing
an unlawful arrest or unlawful pretrial detention. A
claim that a police officer has caused an unreasonable
seizure of the plaintiff by initiating a baseless criminal
charge is sometimes known as a Fourth Amendment
malicious-prosecution claim.
7
Contrary to the categorical rule applied by the court
of appeals, the presence of a single valid charge does not
automatically defeat a Fourth Amendment maliciousprosecution claim. A baseless charge can cause an unreasonable seizure even if it is accompanied by a valid
charge. For example, the inclusion of the baseless
charge can unreasonably prolong a suspect’s pretrial
detention. When a baseless charge has such an effect,
or causes an unreasonable seizure in some other way,
Section 1983 allows the wronged party to seek redress.
In defining the elements of a Section 1983 damages
claim, this Court has also considered the elements of the
most analogous tort in 1871—here, the tort of malicious
prosecution. In the 19th century, American courts and
commentators agreed that a person who initiated a
baseless charge could be sued for malicious prosecution
even if he also initiated a valid charge at the same time.
Put another way, courts proceeded charge by charge in
evaluating the probable-cause element of the maliciousprosecution tort. This Court should follow a similar
charge-specific approach in evaluating Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims.
Even under such a charge-specific approach, police
officers would retain significant protection from unfounded Section 1983 suits. A plaintiff would still need
to show that an officer lacked probable cause to initiate
the charge at issue. And the officer could invoke qualified immunity.
In this case, the court of appeals rejected petitioners’
Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim after
determining that probable cause supported two of the
three charges against Chiaverini. The court did not ask
(as it should have) whether the remaining, allegedly
baseless charge caused an unreasonable seizure. This
8
Court should accordingly vacate the court of appeals’
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
B. This Court should not adopt some of petitioners’
broader arguments. Petitioners invoke not only the
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable
seizures of the person, but also its guarantee against
unreasonable seizures of effects and its restrictions on
warrants. The question presented, however, concerns
only the elements of a “Fourth Amendment maliciousprosecution claim.” And under this Court’s precedents,
such a claim concerns only unreasonable seizures of
persons. Although Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to
seek relief for violations of other Fourth Amendment
rights, amalgamating different Fourth Amendment
rights into a single constitutional tort would likely cause
significant confusion about the tort’s elements.
Petitioners in any event misinterpret the Warrant
Clause. Contrary to their contention, an arrest warrant
does not automatically violate the Warrant Clause
whenever the warrant affidavit includes a falsified
charge. Rather, when a warrant affidavit includes a deliberate or reckless falsehood, a court should excise the
falsehood and ask whether the remaining content in the
affidavit supports the warrant. In this case, even after
a court excises the alleged falsehoods relating to the
money-laundering charge, the warrant affidavit would
contain sufficient content to support the probable-cause
findings on the other two charges—and, thus, sufficient
content to support the arrest warrant.
Finally, petitioners briefly suggest that a causal link
between a baseless charge and an unreasonable seizure
is relevant only to compensatory damages and is not an
element of the plaintiff ’s claim. That argument conflicts
with Section 1983’s text, which expressly requires the
9
plaintiff to prove that the defendant caused a denial of
a federal right—here, an unreasonable seizure.
ARGUMENT
In 42 U.S.C. 1983, Congress imposed civil liability
upon a state actor who subjects a person, or causes a
person to be subjected, to the deprivation of a federal
right. If a police officer institutes a baseless criminal
charge, and the charge causes an unreasonable seizure,
Section 1983 allows the injured party to bring a “Fourth
Amendment claim * * * for malicious prosecution.”
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022); see Manuel
v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 364-369 (2017).
To prevail on such a Fourth Amendment claim, a
plaintiff must prove that the police officer initiated a
criminal charge without probable cause, see Thompson,
596 U.S. at 43; the plaintiff obtained a favorable termination of that criminal charge, see id. at 44; and the
criminal charge caused an unreasonable seizure of the
plaintiff, see id. at 42, 43 n.2; Manuel, 580 U.S. at 364369. This Court has reserved judgment on what mentalstate element, if any, the plaintiff must prove. See
Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44 n.3. The United States has
argued that the plaintiff must prove that the police officer acted with the intent to deceive or with reckless
disregard for the absence of probable cause. See U.S.
Amicus Br. at 25-26, Manuel, supra (No. 14-9496).
This case concerns the application of those elements
to a case in which a police officer initiates multiple
charges, some of which are supported by probable cause
but others of which are not. In the decision below, the
court of appeals applied a categorical rule, under which
the police officer wins if he has probable cause to support any one charge. See Pet. App. 10a, 16a. Other
courts have applied an equally categorical but opposite
10
rule, under which the officer loses unless probable cause
supported every charge. See, e.g., Posr v. Doherty, 944
F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1991).
The correct answer lies between the extremes of an
“any crime” rule and an “every crime” rule. A person
who faced a baseless criminal charge may bring a
Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim, even
if the baseless charge was accompanied by a valid one,
but only if the baseless charge caused an unreasonable
seizure. Because the court of appeals applied a different rule, this Court should vacate its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. In doing so,
however, the Court should refrain from adopting some
of petitioners’ broader contentions. 1
This case concerns only a civil suit against a state actor under
Section 1983. It does not concern a criminal prosecution under 18
U.S.C. 241 or 242 for willfully violating constitutional rights or conspiring to do so, or a federal civil-rights enforcement action under
34 U.S.C. 12601 for a pattern or practice of violating constitutional
rights. The limits contained in those statutes differ from the limits
in Section 1983. See U.S. Amicus Br. at 13-14, Gonzalez v. Trevino,
No. 22-1025 (oral argument scheduled for Mar. 20, 2024).
Nor does this case concern a suit against a federal officer under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This Court has not previously extended
Bivens to the context of Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution
claims.
Nor, finally, does this case concern the scope of the exclusionary
rule in a criminal case. A violation of the Fourth Amendment does
not automatically trigger the remedy of suppression. See Herring
v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009).
1
11
A. The Court Of Appeals Erred In Holding That A Single
Valid Charge Automatically Defeats A Fourth Amendment Malicious-Prosecution Claim
In the decision below, the court of appeals held that
probable cause for a single charge automatically defeats
a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim
predicated on a separate charge for which probable
cause was absent. That categorical rule is inconsistent
with the text of Section 1983 and the Fourth Amendment, conflicts with background principles of tort law,
and is unnecessary to protect police officers from unfounded suits.
1. Section 1983 provides redress when a police officer’s
initiation of a baseless criminal charge causes an
unreasonable seizure
The interpretation of a statute begins with its text.
The statute at issue here, Section 1983, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. 1983 (emphasis added). Section 1983 thus imposes civil liability upon a state actor only if he either
(1) “subjects” someone to the denial of a federal right or
(2) “causes” someone “to be subjected” to such a denial.
Ibid.; see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-371 (1976).
Filing a baseless criminal charge does not, by itself,
“subject” anyone to the denial of Fourth Amendment
12
rights. The Fourth Amendment forbids “unreasonable
searches and seizures,” not unreasonable initiation of
criminal charges. To be sure, the Amendment’s Warrant Clause requires probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant, see U.S. Const. Amend. IV, and its Reasonableness Clause requires probable cause for certain
searches and seizures, see Bailey v. United States, 568
U.S. 186, 192-193 (2013). But nothing in the Amendment requires probable cause—or any other level of
suspicion—for the initiation of a criminal charge. See
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118-119, 125 n.26 (1975).
Nor does the Amendment entitle the accused “to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute.”
Id. at 119.
Filing a baseless criminal charge can, however,
cause a person to suffer a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Most importantly, an unjustified charge
can lead to unjustified arrest and unjustified detention
pending trial. If a police officer’s initiation of a baseless
criminal charge causes such a violation, Section 1983
makes the officer liable for damages. See Thompson,
596 U.S. at 42.
That reading of Section 1983 fits with its commonlaw background. At common law, a person who filed a
wrongful criminal complaint, thereby causing wrongful
arrest and detention, could be held liable for that injury
through a tort claim for malicious prosecution. See
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-341 (1986). Because
“the common law recognized the causal link between the
submission of a complaint and an ensuing arrest,” this
Court has “read § 1983 as recognizing the same causal
link.” Id. at 345 n.7. This Court has referred to a claim
based on that theory as a “Fourth Amendment claim
under § 1983 for malicious prosecution.” Thompson,
13
596 U.S. at 39. The “malicious prosecution” label should
not, however, obscure the fact that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only the unreasonable seizure, not the
prosecution.
This Court’s decision in Thompson confirms that understanding. The Court noted that a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim is also known as “a
claim for unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process”—indicating that the claim requires proof of an unreasonable seizure. Thompson, 596 U.S. at 42. The
Court added that, “[b]ecause this claim is housed in the
Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff also has to prove that
the malicious prosecution resulted in a seizure of the
plaintiff.” Id. at 43 n.2. And the Court quoted an opinion stating that “[n]early every [court of appeals] has
held that malicious prosecution is actionable under the
Fourth Amendment to the extent that the defendant’s
actions cause the plaintiff to be ‘seized’ without probable cause.” Id. at 42 (quoting Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494, 510-511 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (emphasis
added).
That understanding of the legal basis of Fourth
Amendment malicious-prosecution claims helps resolve
the question presented. A person who faced both valid
and baseless criminal charges may bring such a claim,
so long as the baseless charge “cause[d]” him “to be
subjected” to an unreasonable seizure. 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Contrary to the court of appeals’ any-crime rule, the police officer does not automatically win whenever probable cause supports any one charge. A baseless charge
can cause an unreasonable seizure—such as a prolongation of pretrial detention—even if the police have probable cause to support some other, valid charge. See pp.
14-18, infra. At the same time, contrary to the every-
14
crime rule applied by some other courts, the police officer does not automatically lose whenever one of the
charges was groundless. That rule would improperly
relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving that the
baseless charge caused a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
2. A baseless charge can cause an unreasonable seizure
even if accompanied by a valid charge
A plaintiff bringing a Fourth Amendment maliciousprosecution case typically alleges—as petitioners did
here—that a police officer’s wrongful initiation of a
criminal charge resulted in an unreasonable arrest and
then in unreasonable pretrial detention. See J.A. 61.
The existence of even a single valid charge usually establishes that an arrest was reasonable. An arrest complies with the Fourth Amendment if the police have
probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a
crime. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414424 (1976). Probable cause for any one charge suffices;
“it is not relevant whether probable cause exist[s] with
respect to each individual charge.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439
F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.). The
Fourth Amendment, after all, focuses “on the validity of
the arrest, and not on the validity of each charge.” Ibid.
Before the decision below, the Sixth Circuit had already reasoned that “[t]he same rules apply” to pretrial
detention. Howse v. Hodous, 953 F.3d 402, 409 (2020),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1515 (2021). But that leap is unwarranted. The Fourth Amendment standards for pretrial detention differ in some respects from those for arrest. As a result of those differences, a baseless criminal charge can, in some cases, result in unreasonable
pretrial detention despite the existence of probable
cause with respect to some other crime.
15
a. To begin, extended pretrial detention—that is,
detention that lasts more than 48 hours after arrest—
ordinarily complies with the Fourth Amendment only if
supported by a valid finding of probable cause on at
least one charge pending against the suspect. See
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56
(1991); Manuel, 580 U.S. at 364-368. If no such finding
exists, a police officer may not defend the constitutionality of extended pretrial detention by invoking the existence of probable cause for uncharged crimes.
That result follows from the difference between the
Fourth Amendment requirements for arrest and those
for extended pretrial detention. A police officer generally may arrest a suspect without a warrant based on
his own judgment of probable cause. See Watson, 423
U.S. at 416-417. A reviewing court must focus on the
arrest’s objective reasonableness, not the arresting officer’s motives or reasoning. See Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). It follows that the objective
existence of probable cause with respect to a crime—
any crime—justifies an arrest, regardless of whether
the arresting officer relied on or cited that particular
offense when making the arrest. See id. at 153-156.
Extended pretrial detention, in contrast, generally
requires more than the existence of probable cause. It
requires a “fair and reliable determination” of probable
cause, by a neutral magistrate or grand jury, either before or promptly after arrest. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125.
That requirement can be satisfied by a magistrate’s
finding in the course of issuing an arrest warrant, see
id. at 112-113; a magistrate’s finding in a hearing after
a warrantless arrest, see id. at 114; or a grand jury’s
indictment before or after arrest, see id. at 117 n.19.
But if the finding is invalid—for example, because it was
16
tainted by fabricated evidence, see Manuel, 580 U.S. at
369 n.8—the police officer cannot refute the constitutional claim by asserting probable cause for some other
offense never charged by the prosecutor and never considered by the magistrate or grand jury. Allowing that
substitution would erase the requirement that probable
cause not only exist, but also be properly found, before
extended pretrial detention.
Those principles explain why the Eleventh Circuit
reached the right result on the facts of Williams v.
Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (2020), one of the cases in the
circuit conflict that petitioners ask this Court to resolve.
See Pet. 13. According to the plaintiff in Williams, police officers falsified charges of attempted murder, used
fabricated evidence to obtain an arrest warrant on those
charges, and caused him to spend more than 16 months
in jail while awaiting trial on those charges. See 965
F.3d at 1153-1156. The police officers had probable
cause to believe that the plaintiff had engaged in a different, uncharged crime—carrying a concealed firearm
—but that was no defense to the plaintiff ’s Fourth
Amendment claim. See id. at 1152. Because no magistrate or grand jury had ever made a valid finding of
probable cause as to the uncharged crime, the alleged
existence of probable cause as to that crime could not
have authorized the plaintiff ’s 16-month confinement.
b. If a magistrate or grand jury has made a valid
finding of probable cause on at least one charge, the
Fourth Amendment permits the suspect’s continued detention pending trial on that charge. But even in that
situation, the suspect can establish an unreasonable seizure by showing, for example, that a fabricated charge
prolonged his pretrial detention—or, a fortiori, by
17
showing that it caused pretrial detention that would not
otherwise have occurred.
The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness command
governs not only the initiation of a seizure, but also its
duration. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348,
354-357 (2015). For example, the Fourth Amendment
limits the length of time for which the police may detain
an individual who was arrested without a warrant and
who has not yet received a judicial determination of
probable cause. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125. As a
general rule, such judicially unreviewed detention may
last only 48 hours. See County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at
56. And even within that 48-hour period, the government may not unreasonably delay a probable-cause
hearing. See ibid. “Examples of unreasonable delay
are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will
against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s
sake.” Ibid.
The Fourth Amendment’s protections—including its
guarantee against unreasonably prolonged detention—
continue to apply even after a magistrate has found
probable cause. See Manuel, 580 U.S. at 369 n.8. Pretrial detention may not outlast the purpose that justified it—which means, in this context, that it may not last
longer than required by the valid criminal charges. If
a police officer’s fabrication of a charge adds time to the
suspect’s stay in jail, the suspect’s seizure for that extra
time is unreasonable.
To use a simple example, suppose a police officer initiates a valid drug charge and a fabricated gun charge,
and the prosecutor later drops the drug charge, but the
suspect remains in jail awaiting trial on the gun charge.
In that example, continued pretrial detention after the
18
dismissal of the only valid charge would plainly violate
the Fourth Amendment. See Howse, 953 F.3d at 410 n.3
(acknowledging that a baseless charge that “change[s]
the length of detention” would present “a different issue”); Br. in Opp. 10 (conceding a Fourth Amendment
violation where the baseless charge “lengthened [the]
duration” of detention).
c. A baseless charge accompanied by a valid charge
can cause an unreasonable seizure in yet other ways.
For instance, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use
of excessive force in effecting an arrest. See Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-395 (1989). The degree of
force permitted depends on, among other things, “the
severity of the crime at issue.” Id. at 396. If a police
officer’s initiation of a baseless charge causes a more
forceful arrest than the valid charge alone would have
justified, the victim could sue the officer for causing an
unreasonable seizure.
Resolving this case does not require this Court to
catalogue all the circumstances in which a baseless
charge can cause an unreasonable seizure even though
accompanied by a valid charge. It suffices to recognize
that, contrary to the categorical rule applied in the decision below, some such cases exist—and that when they
arise, Section 1983 allows the injured party to seek redress.
3. A categorical any-crime rule conflicts with background principles of tort law
a. Congress enacted Section 1983 against the backdrop of the common law of torts. See Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 257-258 (1978). In defining the elements
of a Section 1983 damages claim, therefore, a court
should consider “the elements of the most analogous
tort as of 1871 when § 1983 was enacted,” to the extent
19
those elements comport with “ ‘the values and purposes
of the constitutional right at issue.’ ” Thompson, 596
U.S. at 43 (citation omitted).2
Tort law does not, of course, determine the meaning
of the underlying constitutional right. The meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, for example, depends on its
text, its purposes, and the common law in 1791. See
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114-116. It does not depend on the
elements of the most analogous tort in 1871.
Tort law does, however, help determine the elements
of a damages claim under Section 1983, which sometimes require the plaintiff to establish more than the
underlying constitutional violation. For example, this
Court has relied on the elements of an analogous tort in
recognizing the favorable-termination element of a
Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim, see
Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44, and the no-probable-cause
element of a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim,
see Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726-1727 (2019).
b. The most analogous tort to the Fourth Amendment claim here is malicious prosecution. See Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43. A claim for that tort traditionally
required proof that a person initiated a charge without
probable cause. See Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How. 544,
549-550 (1861). That element helped avoid the risk that
tort claims would deter well-founded prosecutions. See
Dinsman v. Wilkes, 12 How. 390, 402 (1852).
Section 1983 was first enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871. See § 1, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. But it was re-enacted in substantially its current form when Congress adopted the Revised Statutes
as positive law in 1874. See Rev. Stat. § 1979; United States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 449 n.4 (1993).
2
20
If a person lacked probable cause for initiating one
criminal charge, however, he could not defend himself
from a malicious-prosecution claim by showing that
probable cause supported a different charge. English
courts in the early 19th century held that a maliciousprosecution claim could proceed on the basis of “an indictment containing several charges, whereof for some
there is, and for others there is not probable cause.”
Reed v. Taylor, 128 Eng. Rep. 472, 473 (C.P. 1812)
(opinion of Mansfield, C.J.); see ibid. (opinion of Gibbs,
J.); see also Ellis v. Abrahams, 115 Eng. Rep. 1039,
1041 (Q.B. 1846); Delisser v. Towne, 113 Eng. Rep. 1159,
1163 (Q.B. 1841).
American courts followed the English precedents.
Several state supreme courts held that a person could
not “protect himself from the consequences of prosecuting a malicious action, by commencing at the same time
an action founded on a valid demand.” Pierce v. Thompson, 23 Mass. 193, 197 (1828); see Boogher v. Bryant, 86
Mo. 42, 49-50 (1885); Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 198
(1858). Relatedly, several state supreme courts held
that probable cause for an uncharged crime did not
compensate for a lack of probable cause for the crime
actually charged. See Sutton v. McConnell, 50 N.W.
414, 414-415 (Wis. 1879); Hill v. Palm, 38 Mo. 13, 20
(1866); Gregory v. Thomas, 5 Ky. 286, 286 (1811).
Those principles were settled by the time of Section
1983’s enactment. As one commentator wrote, “[i]t is
not necessary that the whole proceeding be utterly
groundless; for if groundless charges are maliciously
and without probable cause coupled with others, which
are well founded, they are not on that account the less
injurious.” 2 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law
of Evidence, § 449, at 400 (rev. by Isaac F. Redfield,
21
10th ed. 1868); see 2 C. G. Addison, A Treatise on the
Law of Torts § 860, at 77 (Am. ed. 1878); 1 Francis Hilliard, The Law of Torts or Private Wrongs § 1, at 435
n.(b) (4th ed. 1874).
In sum, the probable-cause element of the maliciousprosecution tort was assessed charge by charge under
the common law. This Court should follow a similar
charge-specific approach in evaluating Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims.
Yet that does not mean that a plaintiff who proves
the absence of probable cause on a single charge will
always prevail. A tort plaintiff would still need to prove
the other elements of the tort, such as malice and favorable termination. See Wheeler, 24 How. at 549-550. In
the same way, a Section 1983 plaintiff would still need
to prove the other elements of the Fourth Amendment
claim, such as favorable termination and causation of an
unreasonable seizure. See Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43
n.2, 44. But when a plaintiff can prove those other elements, nothing in Section 1983’s tort-law background
supports denying relief.
4. Concerns about unwarranted Section 1983 suits do
not justify a categorical any-crime rule
A categorical any-crime rule is not necessary to protect police officers from unwarranted Section 1983
claims. Other elements adequately limit the scope of
Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims.
First, a plaintiff may bring such a claim only if the
police officer lacks probable cause to initiate the charge
at issue. See Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43. Probable cause
“means less than evidence which would justify condemnation.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (citation omitted). It requires “only the probability, and
not a prima facia showing, of criminal activity.” Ibid.
22
(citation omitted). The probable-cause element, even
when assessed charge by charge, should thus provide
significant protection for a police officer who initiates a
criminal charge that turns out to be mistaken. See
Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49.
Second, although this Court has not resolved the issue, the United States has argued that the plaintiff must
prove that the police officer acted with intent to deceive
or reckless disregard for the absence of probable cause.
See U.S. Amicus Br. at 25-26, Manuel, supra (No. 149496). Without such proof, the plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption of regularity afforded to the
magistrate’s or grand jury’s neutral determination of
probable cause in the original criminal case. See ibid.
Finally, Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution
claims are subject to applicable immunities. Absolute
immunity precludes such claims against prosecutors,
see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-428 (1976),
and qualified immunity limits such claims against police
officers, see Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49.
5. The court of appeals’ judgment should be vacated
In this case, the court of appeals held that probable
cause supported the stolen-property and unlicenseddealing charges against Chiaverini. See Pet. App. 11a16a. The court then stated: “Because probable cause
existed to arrest and prosecute Chiaverini on at least
one charge, his malicious-prosecution and false-arrest
claims fail.” Id. at 16a. For the reasons discussed
above, that analysis was wrong. The allegedly fabricated money-laundering charge would support a Fourth
Amendment malicious-prosecution claim, notwithstanding the presence of the valid charges, if it caused an unreasonable seizure.
23
Petitioners contend (Br. 40) that the money-laundering charge did cause an unreasonable seizure. Specifically, they contend (ibid.) that the alleged fabrication of
that charge caused Chiaverini to suffer almost four days
of detention that he would not otherwise have suffered.
This Court should vacate the court of appeals’ judgment
and remand the case to give the court the opportunity
to consider that contention in the first instance.
At the certiorari stage, respondents argued (Br. in
Opp. 11-14) that, contrary to appearances, the court of
appeals did not actually apply a categorical “any-crime”
rule. As petitioners observe (Br. 39-40; Cert. Reply Br.
2-5), that description conflicts with the language of the
decision below, with respondents’ own arguments below, and with district courts’ understanding of Sixth
Circuit precedent. Because it is at best unclear whether
the court of appeals applied the correct legal rule, vacatur and remand are appropriate. See Perry v. Perez,
565 U.S. 388, 399 (2012) (per curiam).
B. This Court Should Not Adopt Some Of Petitioners’
Broader Contentions
Petitioners and the United States share common
ground on much of this case. In particular, petitioners
and the United States agree that courts should evaluate
the probable-cause element of a Fourth Amendment
malicious-prosecution claim charge by charge rather
than en bloc. The United States does not, however,
agree with some of petitioners’ broader arguments.
1. Petitioners’ contentions concerning the Warrant
Clause and the seizure of their effects are not
properly before this Court
Petitioners argue that a plaintiff may bring a Fourth
Amendment malicious-prosecution claim when a police
24
officer’s initiation of a baseless charge causes “a harm
‘housed in the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Pet. Br. 17 (quoting Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43 n.2). Petitioners appear
(Br. 11) to understand that phrase to encompass not
only claims for unreasonable seizures of a person, but
also claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment’s
Warrant Clause and for unreasonable seizures of effects. But petitioners’ contentions concerning warrants
and seizures of effects are not properly before this Court.
The question presented concerns the elements of a
“Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.” Pet.
i. The “ ‘specific constitutional right’ at issue” in such a
claim is the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons against unreasonable seizures.” Manuel, 580
U.S. at 364, 370 (emphasis added; citation and ellipses
omitted). This Court has explained that a plaintiff who
brings such a claim “has to prove that the malicious
prosecution resulted in a seizure of the plaintiff.”
Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43 n.2 (emphasis added).
Amalgamating claims involving seizures of persons,
tainted warrants, and seizures of effects into a single
omnibus tort risks causing significant confusion. The
elements of a Section 1983 claim depend on “pinpointing” the precise constitutional provision that the defendant is charged with violating. Manuel, 580 U.S. at
370. But the Warrant Clause and the Reasonableness
Clause are different provisions. One governs a neutral
magistrate’s act of issuing the warrant; the other governs a police officer’s act of conducting a search or seizure. Combining both provisions into one constitutional
tort risks blurring their distinct texts and distinct requirements.
Similarly, seizures of effects differ in some respects
from seizures of persons. Detention of a person ordi-
25
narily requires “probable cause to believe the suspect
has committed a crime.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added). A seizure of property, in contrast, ordinarily requires probable cause to believe that the property is “contraband or evidence of a crime.” United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (emphasis
added). In some circumstances, a police officer could
have probable cause for a search and seizure of effects,
but not for detention of the person. See 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 3.1(b), at 13 (6th ed. 2020). Combining a
claim for an unreasonable seizure of the person with one
for unreasonable seizure of effects risks erasing such
distinctions.
Relatedly, in determining the elements of a Section
1983 claim for a constitutional violation, a court should
consider “the elements of the most analogous tort.”
Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43. It is far from obvious that
the most analogous tort for a claim involving the seizure
of effects is a form of malicious prosecution, as opposed
to, say, trespass. Nor is it obvious that malicious prosecution’s favorable-termination element would apply to
a property-seizure claim. See Haring v. Prosise, 462
U.S. 306, 317-323 (1983) (permitting a Section 1983
claim for unreasonable seizure of effects despite the
plaintiff ’s guilty plea and conviction).
This Court should therefore limit its decision to the
right against unreasonable seizures of the person, and
should not consider petitioners’ arguments concerning
the Warrant Clause and the seizure of their effects. It
should instead leave those contentions, to the extent
that petitioners have preserved them, for remand.
26
2. Petitioners err in contending that an arrest warrant
violates the Warrant Clause whenever the warrant
affidavit contains a falsified charge
Petitioners contend (Pet. Br. 28-30, 36-37) that an arrest warrant violates the Warrant Clause whenever the
warrant affidavit includes a falsified charge. For the
reasons discussed above, that contention is not properly
before this Court. See pp. 23-25, supra. The contention
in any event lacks merit.
a. The Warrant Clause provides that “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. In Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978), this Court read the Clause to require “a
truthful showing” of probable cause. Id. at 164-165 (citation omitted). “This does not mean ‘truthful’ in the
sense that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is
necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded
upon hearsay and upon information received from informants.” Id. at 165. It does, however, mean that the
probable-cause showing may not rest on “a deliberately
or recklessly false statement.” Ibid.
A falsehood in the affidavit invalidates a warrant
only if the statement was “necessary to the finding of
probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. Thus, if a
criminal defendant files a suppression motion challenging the affidavit’s veracity, the court should “set to one
side” the “material that is the subject of the alleged falsity.” Id. at 171-172. If “there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of
probable cause,” the challenge to the warrant fails. Id.
at 172; see 2 LaFave § 4.4(c), at 684 (“[W]hen the
Franks defect is inclusion in the affidavit of recklessly
27
or knowingly false information, that information must
be deleted and the affidavit judged on the basis of the
remaining information.”).
Under Franks, the alleged falsehoods in this case do
not invalidate Chiaverini’s arrest warrant. An arrest
warrant requires “probable cause to believe the suspect
has committed a crime.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120. The
warrant here rested on a finding of probable cause that
Chiaverini had committed three crimes: retaining stolen property, acting as a precious-metals dealer without
a license, and money laundering. See D. Ct. Doc. 27-8.
Petitioners contend (Br. 7) that falsehoods in the warrant affidavit undermined the probable-cause finding on
the money-laundering charge. But even if those alleged
falsehoods were “set to one side,” there would still be
“sufficient content in the warrant affidavit” to support
the findings of probable cause on the other charges—
and, thus, constitutionally sufficient content to support
the arrest warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 172; see Pet.
App. 11a-16a.
b. Petitioners’ contrary arguments are incorrect.
Petitioners argue (Br. 30-31) that the inclusion of a falsified charge in a warrant affidavit violates the Warrant
Clause’s particularity requirement: “no Warrants shall
issue, but * * * particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
Const. Amend. IV. But that requirement concerns the
content of the warrant, not the content of the affidavit.
See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560-561 (2004). And
it requires a particular description only of “the place to
be searched” and “the persons or things to be seized,”
U.S. Const. Amend. IV—not of the crimes with which
the person is charged. This Court has previously rejected efforts to require particularity about additional
28
points not specified in the Warrant Clause’s text. See
United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97-98 (2006) (conditions precedent to the warrant’s execution); Dalia v.
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979) (specification of
the manner of the warrant’s execution).
Petitioners also argue (Br. 29) that a falsehood in a
warrant application could “slander the victim” even
when it has no effect on the warrant’s authorization of a
search or seizure. But the Fourth Amendment exists to
protect “persons, houses, papers, and effects” from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” U.S. Const. Amend.
IV—not to protect names from slander. A falsehood in
a warrant affidavit, no matter how defamatory, does not
violate anyone’s Fourth Amendment rights if the affidavit’s remaining content suffices to authorize the
search or seizure at issue. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 172.
Victims of defamation may look to state tort law, not the
Constitution, for redress. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 710-712 (1976).
Finally, petitioners argue (Br. 34) that, at the Founding, an arrest warrant’s validity “depended on the precise charges against the arrestee.” Specifically, they argue (ibid.) that the common law distinguished between
arrests for “treason, felony, and breach of the peace”
and other types of arrests. But as this Court has previously recognized, the phrase “treason, felony, and
breach of the peace” covers all crimes. See Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614 (1972). The common
law used the phrase only to exclude arrests in civil
cases, which were common at the Founding but are now
obsolete. See ibid. Petitioners’ evidence thus shows, at
most, that the common law distinguished between criminal arrest warrants and civil arrest warrants—not that
29
it distinguished among criminal arrest warrants based
on the precise charges at issue.
3. Petitioners err to the extent they suggest that the
need to show causation of a seizure pertains only to
damages
In one of the principal cases on which petitioners
rely, the Eleventh Circuit has reasoned that a causal
link between a baseless charge and an unreasonable seizure is relevant only to compensatory damages and is
not an element of the plaintiff ’s claim. See Williams,
965 F.3d at 1161-1162. On that view, a plaintiff who
faced a baseless charge could sue under Section 1983
and recover nominal damages, punitive damages, and
attorney’s fees, but not actual damages, even if the
baseless charge had no causal connection to a seizure of
the plaintiff. See ibid. Petitioners defended that view
in their petition for a writ of certiorari (at 25) and appear to defend it in their brief (at 40 n.14).
That argument is incorrect. The Fourth Amendment
prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable
criminal charges. See p. 12, supra. A charge that lacks
a causal connection to a seizure thus cannot support a
Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim. Indeed, this Court has recognized that, “[b]ecause this
claim is housed in the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff
also has to prove that the malicious prosecution resulted
in a seizure of the plaintiff.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43
n.2.
The Eleventh Circuit’s view also conflicts with Section 1983’s text. Section 1983 expressly requires proof
that the defendant “cause[d]” the plaintiff “to be subjected” to the denial of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. 1983.
That text makes causation an element of the claim, not
simply a fact that affects the calculation of damages.
30
Although the Fourth Amendment would not support
relief in the absence of an unreasonable seizure, other
sources of law might do so. This Court has left open the
question whether the Due Process Clause would support a “malicious prosecution claim” against a police officer who initiated baseless criminal charges. Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43 n.2. “If so, the plaintiff presumably
would not have to prove that he was seized as a result of
the malicious prosecution.” Ibid. Relatedly, the Court
has left open the question whether the Due Process
Clause supports a “fabricated-evidence claim” in a case
where the fabrication of evidence resulted in a deprivation of liberty. McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149,
2155 (2019). Finally, victims of false accusations could
seek relief under state law—including through a traditional tort claim for malicious prosecution. See Cordova
v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 662 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
31
CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate the judgment of the court of
appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted.
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
KRISTEN CLARKE
Assistant Attorney General
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
CURTIS E. GANNON
Deputy Solicitor General
VIVEK SURI
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
ERIN H. FLYNN
CAROLINE W. TAN
BRANT S. LEVINE
Attorneys
FEBRUARY 2024
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Appendix — Constitutional and statutory provisions
U.S. Const. Amend. IV ....................... 1a
42 U.S.C. 1983 ..................................... 1a
APPENDIX
1.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2.
42 U.S.C. 1983 provides:
Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively
to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
(1a)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.