Amicus Curiae Brief — Enrique Jevons, as a Managing Member of Jevons Properties LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Jay Inslee, Governor of Washington, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 1, 2023
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No. 23-490
IN THE
ENRIQUE JEVONS, AS A MANAGING MEMBER OF JEVONS
PROPERTIES LLC, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
JAY INSLEE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF OF CITIZEN ACTION DEFENSE FUND AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
JACKSON MAYNARD
Counsel of Record
SAM SPIEGELMAN
Citizen Action Defense Fund
111 21st Avenue SW, Ste. 13
Olympia, Wash., 98501
850.519.3495
jackson@citizenactiondefense.org
sam@citizenactiondefense.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................ 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 1
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4
I. As The Court Confirmed in Cedar Point, the
“Right to Exclude” Others From One’s Property Is
a Longstanding and Fundamental Attribute of
the Anglo-American Conception of Ownership .... 4
A. The Right to Exclude Is the Sine Qua Non of
Ownership .................................................... 4
B. The Original Public Meaning of “Property” 6
C. The Cedar Point Per Se Takings Test ........ 9
II. The Court Should Grant Review In Order to
Clarify That Yee v. City of Escondido Does Not
Protect Emergency, Covid-Related Eviction
Moratoria from Heightened Scrutiny Under
Cedar Point’s Per Se Takings Test ..................... 10
III.The Court Should Grant Review to Prevent
Public Officials From Using “Emergencies” to
Take Ultra Vires Actions ..................................... 19
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 23
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Alabama Association of Realtors v. Department of
Health & Human Services,
141 S.Ct. 2485 (2021) ..................................... 18, 20
Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40 (1960) .................................... 17, 20, 21
Auracle Homes, LLC v. Lamont,
478 F.Supp.3d 199 (D. Conn. 2020) ..................... 17
Block v. Hirsch,
256 U.S. 135 (1921) .............................................. 19
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,
141 S.Ct. 2063 (2021) ......2-4, 7, 9-10, 12-14, 16, 21
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
142 S.Ct. 2228 (2022) ............................................. 4
El Papel, LLC v. City of Seattle,
2023 WL 7040314 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2023) .... 16, 17
Fed. Elec. Comm’n v. Fla. Power Corp.,
480 U.S. 245 (1987) ....................................... 12, 13
Gallo v. District of Columbia,
2023 WL 7552703 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2023).... 15, 17
GHP Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,
2022 WL 17069822 (C.D. Cal. 2022) .................. 17
iii
Gonzales v. Inslee,
535 P.3d 864 (Wash. Sep. 28, 2023) ................... 16
Heights Apartments, LLC v. Walz,
30 F.4th 720 (8th Cir. 2022) ......................... 17, 18
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979) ............................................... 8
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) ........................... 8-9, 12-13, 16
Murr v. Wisconsin,
582 U.S. 383 (2017) ............................................... 7
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922) ............................................. 21
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States,
260 U.S. 327 (1922) ............................................... 8
Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978) ............................................... 8
Rental Housing Association v. City of Seattle,
22 Wash.App.2d 426 (2022) .......................... 14, 17
Roman Catholic Diocese of Bklyn. v. Cuomo,
141 S.Ct. 63 (2020) .............................................. 20
United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946) ............................................... 8
Williams v. Alameda Cnty., Cal.,
iv
642 F.Supp.3d 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2022) ................. 16
Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519 (1992) ................... 3, 10-12, 14-15, 17
Other Authorities
Amanda L. Taylor, Judicial Review in Times of
Emergency: From the Founding Through the
Covid-19 Pandemic, 109 Va. L. Rev. 489 (2023) .. 19
Aristotle, Rhet. (c. 4th cent. BCE) .............................. 5
Brian A. Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 Mich. L. Rev.
391(2015)................................................................ 22
Bryan L. Page, State of Emergency: Washington’s Use
of Emergency Clauses and the People’s Right to
Referendum, 44 Gonz. L. Rev. 219 (2009) ............ 22
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis § II.II.II (1625)6
Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings (1996) .............. 7
James Madison: Writings (Jack N. Rakove, ed.,
1999) ..................................................................... 6, 7
John Adams, 6 Works of John Adams (C. Adams ed.,
1851) ......................................................................... 7
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689) .. 5
John Yoo, Emergency Powers During a Viral
Pandemic, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty (2022) ......... 19
Juan Javier Del Granado, The Genius of Roman Law
from a Law and Economics Perspective, 13 San
v
Diego Int’l L.J. 301 (2011) ....................................... 5
Kenny Mok & Eric A. Posner, Constitutional
Challenges to the Public Health Orders in Federal
Courts During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 102 B.U. L.
Rev. 1729 (2022) .................................................... 18
Magna Carta art. 39 ................................................... 5
R. Hamad, K.A. Lyman et al., The U.S. COVID-19
County Policy Database: A Novel Resource to
Support Pandemic-Related Research, 22 BMC
Public Health (2022)............................................. 19
Richard A. Epstein, A Bombshell Decision on
Property Takings, Hoover Inst., June 28, 2021.... 13
Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal
Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited
Government (2014) .................................................. 6
Robert C. Ellickson & Charles DiA. Thorland,
Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321 (1995)................................... 4
Scott M. Reznick, Empiricism and the Principle of
Conditions in the Evolution of the Police Power: A
Model for Definitional Scrutiny, 1978 Wash. U.
L.Q. 1 (1978) ............................................................ 9
Thomas J. Bollyky, Emma Castro et al., Assessing
Covid-19 Pandemic Policies and Behaviours and
Their Economic and Educational Trade-Offs
Across U.S. States From Jan. 1, 2020 to July 31,
2022: An Observational Analysis, 401 Lancet 1341
vi
(2023)...................................................................... 19
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to
Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 7301 (1998) ..................... 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England (1768) ....................................................... 7
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
This amicus brief is submitted by the Citizen
Action Defense Fund (“CADF”). CADF is an
independent, nonprofit organization based in
Washington State that supports and pursues
strategic, high-impact litigation to advance free
markets, restrain government overreach, and defend
constitutional rights. As a government watchdog,
CADF files lawsuits, represents affected parties,
intervenes in cases, and files amicus briefs when the
state enacts laws that violate the state or federal
constitutions, when government officials take actions
that infringe upon the First Amendment or other
constitutional rights, and when agencies promulgate
rules in violation of state law.
Amicus has a strong interest in the outcome of this
case as they are committed to the protection of
property rights in Washington State and throughout
the United States. Specifically, amicus is concerned
that if the lower court’s opinion in this case stands, it
will incentivize other state and local governments to
further
erode
the
fundamental
protections
constitutionally afforded to private property.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In March 2020, Washington Governor Jay Inslee
instituted an eviction moratorium in response to a
1 Pursuant to Rule 37, counsel for amicus affirm that no counsel
for any party authored this brief in whole or part, and no person
or entity, other than amicus, their members, or counsel, made
any monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. All
parties received timely notice of amicus’ intention to file.
2
growing COVID-19 pandemic, a public health crisis
that would largely come to define American life and
politics in the years to come. Under the moratorium,
residential rental owners were prohibited from
evicting tenants under almost any circumstances,
including but not limited to (a) nonpayment of rent,
(b) the expiration of the lease term, and (c) violation
of lease terms for which eviction is a prescribed or
otherwise lawful remedy. Pet. Br. at 4. These
restrictions were a patent violation of Washington
rental owners’ constitutional “right to exclude” others
from their property, which—it should be obvious—
extends to those who, though invited in, wind up long
overstaying their contractual welcome. The right with
which Governor Inslee has interfered is a
fundamental attribute of ownership—one that dates
to the salad days of the Anglo-American legal
tradition, and was, before that, a mainstay of ancient
and medieval Western legal codes. As the Court
recently made clear in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,
141 S.Ct. 2063 (2021), the Constitution continues to
robustly protect the right:
The right to exclude is “one of the most treasured”
rights of property ownership. According to
Blackstone, the very idea of property entails “that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.” In less exuberant
terms, we have stated that the right to exclude is
“universally held to be a fundamental element of
the property right,” and is “one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.”
Id. at 2072 (internal citations omitted).
3
In this brief, amicus begin with a history of the
right to exclude. This history demonstrates that the
right long predates the Constitution and has been
within the pantheon of Anglo-American law since at
least 1215. Amicus then explain how the lower courts’
reliance on Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519
(1992), to uphold this and several other covid-related
eviction moratoria fatally misreads the Court’s
opinion in that case and in Cedar Point, and makes it
far too easy for officials to interfere with the well-worn
rules and customs of the owner-tenant relationship.
After placing the right to exclude within the AngloAmerican legal tradition and discussing how lower
courts have and continue to misconstrue Yee and
Cedar Point in the eviction-moratorium context,
amicus conclude with why this particular case is so
important and therefore worthy of the Court’s review.
Permitting Governor Inslee and other public
officials to run roughshod over the fundamental rights
of ownership without compensation exposes housing
providers across the United States to future
extraconstitutional restrictions under false claims or
exaggerations of an “emergency.” Covid-related
eviction moratoria predictably have generated
substantial litigation in recent years and there is
widespread concern that if the Court does not
intervene it will further embolden state and local
officials to trample civil rights using subterfuge. In
light of these factors, covid-related eviction
moratoria—even those that have expired—together
serve as an ideal vehicle through which the Court can
make clear to the Ninth and other circuits that
fundamental rights are fundamental, no matter the
reasons for which they have been violated.
4
ARGUMENT
I.
As The Court Confirmed in Cedar Point,
the “Right to Exclude” Others From One’s
Property
Is
a
Longstanding
and
Fundamental Attribute of the AngloAmerican Conception of Ownership
A. The Right to Exclude Is the Sine Qua Non of
Ownership
The Court regularly—and properly—relies upon
legal history and tradition to site fundamental rights,
even those not explicitly included in the Constitution’s
text (cf., the right to free speech). Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Org., 142 S.Ct. 2228, 2246–48 (2022).
The history of the “right to exclude” in particular
highlights its consistent and quintessential role in
limiting governmental overreach. In a celebrated
article, Professor Thomas Merrill called the right
“more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents
of property—it is [its] sine qua non”—i.e., ownership
could not exist without it. Thomas W. Merrill,
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev.
730, 730–31 (1998). This is especially so in the AngloAmerican conception of property, though the right to
exclude has been a mainstay of most legal and
cultural frameworks since the dawn of civilization.
See Robert C. Ellickson & Charles DiA. Thorland,
Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321, 341 (1995) (“The foundational
norm of private property” being “the right to control
entry. On this legal issue there is much textual
evidence from Mesopotamia and Israel, the two
civilizations for which law codes have been found.”).
The right to exclude as the sine qua non of ownership
5
has been central to Western legal theory since at least
the Greek Golden Age and the Pax Romana. See
Aristotle, Rhet., 1361a (c. 4th cent. BCE) (writing that
a thing “is our own if it is in our power to dispose of it
or not”); Juan Javier Del Granado, The Genius of
Roman Law from a Law and Economics Perspective,
13 San Diego Int’l L.J. 301, 316 (2011) (“Roman
property law typically gives a single property holder a
bundle of rights with respect to everything in his
domain, to the exclusion of the rest of the world.”).
In light of what had already been its long history,
it is no surprise that the “right to exclude” was among
the core freedoms English King John’s rebellious
barons demanded from him in the Magna Carta
(1215)—the “Great Charter” that put a (granted,
temporary) stop to their uprising. Specifically, the
Great Charter includes that “[n]o free man shall be
seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or
possessions . . . except by the lawful judgments of his
equals or by the law of the land.” Magna Carta art. 39
(cleaned up) (emphasis added).
By the 1600s, after centuries of violent struggle
between kings, nobles, and crowds for overall political
hegemony
of
Europe’s
nation-states,
many
“Enlightenment” thinkers began gravitating towards
the most rights-based theories of government
theretofore conceived. Most prominent among those
spearheading this welcome shift was English
philosopher John Locke, who soon after the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 declared that the “great and chief
end” for which men “unite into commonwealths” is to
ensure the “preservation of their property.” John
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, IX § 123 (1689)
(cleaned up). Locke himself found inspiration in the
6
writings of Dutchman Hugo Grotius, who earlier
offered that “no man could justly take from another,
what he had thus first taken to himself.” Hugo
Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis § II.II.II (1625).
Shortly after ratification, Madison gave full
endorsement
to
his
intellectual
forebears’
understanding of property, declaring “[t]his being the
end of government, that alone is a just government,
which impartially secures to every man, whatever is
his own.” James Madison, “Property,” in James
Madison: Writings 515 (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 1999)
(1792). And in this he was hardly alone.
B. The Original Public Meaning of “Property”
Summarizing the classical-liberal contours of
public authority, preeminent legal scholar Richard
Epstein declared that “the proper ends under the
police power are those of the private law of nuisance,
no more and no less.” Richard A. Epstein, The
Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest
for Limited Government 353 (2014). Epstein did not
devise this approach in a vacuum. Rather, it reflects
the consensus understanding of government—and the
limitations thereon, especially with respect to
property rights—shared between the Constitution’s
Framers and among late-eighteenth and early-to-midnineteenth centuries American courts tasked with
interpreting their words. Together, their conception of
the Takings Clause and property in general comprise
the former’s original public meaning, a theory of
interpretation that, with some ebbs and flows, has
proven the most durable means of constitutional
interpretation. Precisely because it asks what the
document was popularly understood to mean at
7
ratification. See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings
339–68 (1996).
The Framers, following in Locke’s footsteps,
understood the necessity for robust constitutional
protection of property. James Madison, the chief
author of the Constitution (including of the Takings
Clause), already enamored of Locke and Grotius, also
relied upon eminent English jurist William
Blackstone’s definition of property—viz., “that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.” W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England *2 (1768); Madison, supra, at 515 (“This
term in its particular application means ‘that
dominion which one man claims and exercises over
the external things of the world, in exclusion of every
other individual.’”).
The Court has wholeheartedly endorsed the
Blackstonean definition of property as essentially the
right to exclude, most recently in Cedar Point. 141
S.Ct. at 2072. “The Founders,” Chief Justice Roberts
eloquently wrote, “recognized that the protection of
private property is indispensable to the promotion of
individual freedom.” As John Adams tersely put it,
“[p]roperty must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.”
“Discourses on Davila,” in 6 Works of John Adams (C.
Adams ed., 1851). This Court agrees, having noted
that protection of property rights is “necessary to
preserve freedom” and “empowers persons to shape
and to plan their own destiny in a world where
governments are always eager to do so for them.”
Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 394 (2017).
8
Four decades earlier, a majority of the justices
acknowledged, “in less exuberant terms,” id., that the
right to exclude is “universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right” that is
“one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property.” Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). See
also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)
(“One of the main rights attaching to property is the
right to exclude others . . .”); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946) (agreeing that military flyovers
into skies about private farmland, without
compensating the owner, is a takings violation);
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (similar to Causby, but
involving the military’s firing cannons over private
airspace).
After Kaiser Aetna the Court went even further,
concluding in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), that “[t]he historical
rule that a permanent physical occupation of
another’s property is a taking has more than tradition
to commend it.” Id. at 435. “Such an appropriation is
perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an
owner’s property interests.” Id. Why? Because unlike
restrictions on use, “the government does not simply
take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property
rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of
every strand.” Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 6 –66 (1979)). Without the right to exclude, an
owner loses “any power to control the use of the
property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can
make no nonpossessory use of the property.” Id. at
436. And this is exactly what Governor Inslee has
taken from Petitioners.
9
C. The Cedar Point Per Se Takings Test
The majority in Cedar Point distinguished
between the “physical appropriation of property” ala
Loretto (which involved the running of television cable
on top of private apartments), and governmental
trespasses or occupations that are conditions for “the
grant of a benefit such as a permit, license, or
registration.” 141 S.Ct. at 2079. The latter will often
involve state actions designed specifically to prevent
or minimize the nuisant use of one’s property, which
has never been within the common-law ambit of
ownership. See Scott M. Reznick, Empiricism and the
Principle of Conditions in the Evolution of the Police
Power: A Model for Definitional Scrutiny, 1978 Wash.
U. L.Q. 1, 10 (1978) (“Sic utere [tuo alienum non
laedas]”—roughly, ‘do not use your land so as to injure
others’—is the fountainhead maxim from which both
the common law of nuisance and the police power
arose. As originally applied, sic utere ‘operated to
protect real property from what the courts thought
were injuries resulting from the use of another of his
real property.’ That is, the courts used sic utere
principles to resolve cost spillover conflicts between
the existing uses of neighboring landowners. This
relationship in tort between property owners
originally caused the maxim and the emerging police
power to be defined in terms of the prevention of
harms.”).
The distinction between takings, on the one hand,
and anti-nuisance rules or benefit-conditional
“government health and safety inspection regimes” on
the other is simple enough, and certainly does not
complicate the high standard of review that the per se
rule imposes on physical occupations. While the
10
application of the rule to Governor Inslee’s eviction
moratorium is reserved for the merits, at this stage
amicus urge the Court to consider the importance of
reviewing an appeals-court ruling that—especially
after Cedar Point—maintains the false premise that
nearly any public purpose justifies and excuses
invasions of private property.
Taking all of this into consideration, it is
reasonable to ascribe to Cedar Point the following
foundational test: Outside of standing “inspection
regimes” and other laws designed to prevent nuisant
uses of private property—i.e., state actions preventing
owners from utilizing their properties in ways the
common law already patently prohibits—government
must always pay for what it takes. 141 S.Ct. at 2071.
Applied here, the test requires Washington
compensate Petitioners for lost rent and any other
provable damages resulting from the third-party
occupation of their properties—that is, for the period
past the point at which the contractual or de jure
owner-tenant relationship in each case had ended.
And it is this detail—the moratorium’s forced
extension of tenancies—that renders Yee all but
irrelevant to whether Governor Inslee’s actions
violated the Takings Clause.
II.
The Court Should Grant Review In Order
to Clarify That Yee v. City of Escondido
Does Not Protect Emergency, CovidRelated
Eviction
Moratoria
from
Heightened Scrutiny Under Cedar Point’s
Per Se Takings Test
The District Court for the Western District of
Washington relied upon Yee to uphold Governor
11
Inslee’s covid-related eviction moratorium, concluding
that “Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Yee from this
case fails, as the plaintiffs in Yee similarly argued that
the ordinance required them to lease to tenants
beyond their original lease terms.” Jevons, 561
F.Supp.3d 1082, 1106. Other courts have done the
same or similar. See infra. This comparison ignores a
crucial distinction between the two cases, however.
The local ordinance in Yee did not “require” mobile
park owners in the City of Escondido “to lease to
tenants beyond their original lease terms,” but merely
prohibited them from raising rents on mobile home
“pads” (i.e., lots), allowing those selling their mobile
homes within the park to pocket “a premium from the
purchaser corresponding to” the added value of “the
right to occupy a pad at below-market rent
indefinitely.” 503. U.S. 527. It is vital to note,
however, that the Yees were at all times legally free
to withdraw from the rental market altogether (first
subject, of course, to any outstanding contractual
terms), and that the entire outcome would have been
different if “the statute . . . [were] to compel a
landowner over objection to rent his property or to
refrain in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.” 503
U.S. at 528 (emphasis added). “On their face,” the Yee
Court continued, “the state and local laws at issue
here merely regulate petitioners’ use of their land by
regulating the relationship between landlord and
tenant.” Id. (emphasis original). It forced mobile park
owners to host tenants at apparently below-market
rates, not to continue hosting them until the
government permitted their removal. Yet Governor
Inslee’s moratorium did all of this and more. It
thwarted one Petitioner’s “attempt[] to evict a tenant
who had stopped paying rent”—an evictable offense—
12
“and created enough noise in her unit that a neighbor
complained.” Pet. Br. at 6. Another Petitioner “had
171 tenants who were not current with their rent” Id.
at 5. And all the while the Petitioners still could not
evict anyone who wished to stay. Id. at 4. In short,
Governor Inslee’s eviction moratorium went far
beyond the permissible “regulating [of] the economic
relations” between “landlords and tenants,” Fed. Elec.
Comm’n v. Fla. Power Corp. 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987),
and into the realm of occupation.
And it should go without saying: occupation is not
regulation. While the Yees could not “set rents or
decide who their tenants will be,” they were at least
allowed to take each pad out of the rental market
altogether. Yee, 503 U.S. at 526. Petitioners here had
no such luxury. So long as the government maintained
a pandemic state of emergency, Petitioners would be
forced to continue housing most holdovers—i.e.,
trespassers—with eviction permitted under only the
narrowest of circumstances. In this light, perpetuity
does not mean “permanent”—nor must it. Just as
Loretto clarified that neither the purpose nor extent of
an invasion is relevant to whether a physical
occupation works a taking, 458 U.S. at 436–37, Cedar
Point explained—though hardly for the first time in
the Court’s history—that an invasion’s temporary
duration is also far from dispositive:
To begin with, we have held that a physical
appropriation is a taking whether it is permanent
or temporary. Our cases establish that
“compensation is mandated when a leasehold is
taken and the government occupies property for its
own purposes, even though that use is temporary.”
The duration of an appropriation—just like the
13
size of an appropriation—bears only on the
amount of compensation. For example, after
finding a taking by physical invasion, the Court in
Causby remanded the case to the lower court to
determine “whether the easement taken was
temporary or permanent,” in order to fix the
compensation due.
141 S.Ct. at 2074 (internal citations omitted). The
duration of Governor Inslee’s eviction moratorium is
therefore irrelevant to the overall takings question. It
is only useful as a gauge for how much compensation
the government owes to each owner who was forced to
host “tenants” beyond the conclusion of their leases.
Id. at 2074 (“The duration of an appropriation—just
like the size of an appropriation—bears only on the
amount of compensation.”). And so it is that “the line
which separates [cases involving no forced physical
occupation] from Loretto is the unambiguous
distinction between a commercial lessee and an
interloper with a government license.” Florida Power,
480 U.S. at 253.
As Professor Epstein reiterated soon after the
Court decided Cedar Point: “It is pure sophistry to
claim that the state does not engage in a taking when
it authorized a tenant to stay continuously in
possession of the leased premises after the expiration
of the lease at a rent that is consciously set below
market value.” Richard A. Epstein, A Bombshell
Decision on Property Takings, Hoover Inst., June 28,
2021, https://rb.gy/qcn6nu. That is, “invitation”
implies continual consent, which can be legally
withdrawn at any time (again, whether that would
constitute a private breach is another matter). When
one welcomes invited dinner guests into their vacation
14
home, for example, the parties agree that the
invitation ends that evening. If someone invites a
friend to stay with them—free of charge—until the
latter is “back on their feet,” the former does not, nor
should they reasonably expect, that that friend will
continue staying there once they are back in a position
to live elsewhere. In either case, the parties are free
to draw up a new agreement—perhaps, say, extending
the dinner party into a full weekend retreat. But that
would mean creating an entirely new invitation.
Compared to these hypotheticals, Governor Inslee’s
eviction moratorium at least violated each Petitioner’s
reasonable expectation that once their tenants’ lease
agreements ended—by expiration or the lessee’s
violation of terms—so too would their invitation to
continue occupying the property.
Some courts—though not all—have denied or
ignored this crucial point, and have misread or
misconstrued Yee to all but entirely exempt stateprotected tenant holdovers from Cedar Point’s per se
takings test. For example, in Rental Housing
Association v. City of Seattle, a Washington State
appeals court heard a challenge to Seattle’s covidrelated eviction moratorium. Finding for Seattle, the
court conceded that “Yee was premised on the fact that
the applicable rent control laws did not affect the
landlords’ right to exclude anyone from their
property.” 22 Wash.App.2d 426, 448 (2022). Yet it
proceeded to apply it favorably to an ordinance that
did just that, on the flawed premise that Seattle’s
eviction moratorium “d[id] not require a landlord to
rent property to anyone with whom the landlord has
not already voluntarily entered into a lease
agreement.” But an initial invitation does not cancel
15
out all the other terms of a lease agreement. To
suggest otherwise is to stretch the concept until it
consumes the entirety of the owner-tenant
relationship, when in fact it merely marks its
commencement.
Other courts have made the same categorical error
when using Yee to uphold covid-related eviction
moratoria. One court presumed that the “mobile home
eviction bar” in Yee “did not constitute a ‘compelled
physical invasion’ because the Yees had ‘voluntarily
rented their land to mobile home owners’ in the first
place.” Gallo v. District of Columbia, 2023 WL
7552703, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2023) (slip op.). “In
other words,” the court continued, “the Yees had
consented to the initial physical occupation of their
land when they leased the property to the tenants. At
most, the government policy prolonged that
occupation.” Id. In truth, Yee involved a rate control
ordinance that “took” from the plaintiffs the amount
by which they could have increased rent between
tenants, but for the local law preventing them from
quickly delisting and then re-renting its pads. 503
U.S. at 526–27. That is, the Yees could not reject new
tenants in order to skirt the ordinance by briefly
removing units from the rental market. At no time
were the Yees legally prohibited from actually
removing their pads from the rental market and thus
out from under the disputed ordinance’s mandate.
Plaintiffs challenging covid-related eviction moratoria
did not have this option so long as their state or local
ban remained in effect. Gallo, 2023 WL at *7 (“To be
sure, Gallo was unlucky in the timing of his realestate investment. He bought what he thought would
be a profitable residential unit, and he ended up with
16
a freeloader who avoided eviction because of the
District's COVID-related eviction prohibition.”).
In El Papel, LLC v. City of Seattle, the Ninth
Circuit recently reached the same flawed conclusion,
reasoning that because the eviction ban did not entail
physical invasions from the get-go that it could not
have effected any takings. 2023 WL 7040314, at *2
(9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2023). The Ninth Circuit also noted
that the eviction moratorium in issue still “allowed
the [l]andlords to evict their tenants for some specified
purposes,” and that this also saves it by making the
physical occupation less than all-encompassing. Id.
But under Loretto and Cedar Point the right to
exclude is all or nothing. The government violates it
regardless of the extent or duration of the
interference, and thus whether or not the owner can
exercise the right in some cases. 141 S.Ct. at 2074
(discussing Loretto’s “heightened concerns associated
with ‘[t]he permanence and absolute exclusivity of a
physical occupation,” 458 U.S. at 435, before
proceeding to the narrow “inspections” and antinuisance carveouts that merely illustrates the
Takings Clause protects the common-law conception
of property; no more, no less). See also Gonzales v.
Inslee, 535 P.3d 864, 870, 873 (Wash. Sep. 28, 2023)
(holding that even if Cedar Point applies to
Washington’s takings clause, it does not protect rental
owners from the challenged moratorium because
“there has been no similar intrusion here”); Williams
v. Alameda Cnty., Cal., 642 F.Supp.3d 1001, 1007
(N.D. Cal. 2022) (ignoring Loretto and concluding that
the challenged moratoria “are not an impermissible
physical or per se taking because they are temporary
and not definite on their face”); GHP Mgmt. Corp. v.
17
City of Los Angeles, 2022 WL 17069822, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. 2022) (incorrectly distinguishing a covid-related
eviction moratorium’s “limited, albeit indeterminate”
duration from a law that forces an owner to “refrain
in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy”); Auracle
Homes, LLC v. Lamont, 478 F.Supp.3d 199, 220 (D.
Conn. 2020) (incorrectly assuming that Yee, in holding
“government effects a physical taking only when it
requires the landowner to submit to the physical
occupation of the land,” forever exempted from its
sweep any state-sponsored trespass that did not start
out as one).
In excellent contrast to the outcomes in Rental
Housing Association, Gallo, El Papel, and like
opinions, the Eight Circuit in Heights Apartments,
LLC v. Walz, 30 F.4th 720 (8th Cir. 2022), held Yee
“distinguishable”
from
Minnesota’s
eviction
moratorium, on the same basis upon which
Petitioners’ do theirs. Id. at 733. “The landlords in Yee
sought to exclude future or incoming tenants rather
than existing tenants,” while “here, the [executive
orders] forbade the nonrenewal and termination of
ongoing leases, even after they had been materially
violated.” Id. The Eighth Circuit begins and ends their
Yee analysis there. There is, after all, not much more
to say. While the other courts hyper-focused on initial
invitations to conclude that no invasions occurred, the
Eighth Circuit looked past the semantics and asked,
simply, whether the public is “forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. at 49 (1960).
With the case then still at the pleadings stage, the
Eighth Circuit accepted Heights Apartments, LLC’s
18
argument that Minnesota’s eviction moratorium
“improperly imposed the cost of fighting homelessness
on a subset of the population: rental property owners.”
Heights Apartments, 30 F.4th at 734. Relying upon
this Court’s ruling in Alabama Association of Realtors
v. Department of Health & Human Services, the
Eighth Circuit remained “unconvinced that as a
matter of law the [Minnesota executive orders] are
permissible non-compensable takings.” Id. at 735
(citing 141 S.Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021)).
If this circuit split is not, by itself, reason enough
for the Court to grant review of this case, it certainly
becomes so when considering the broader context. As
the pandemic unfolded, lawmakers and bureaucrats
across the country breathlessly declared that in times
of crisis the Constitution is no barrier to action. And
the lower courts largely deferred to such claims. See
Kenny Mok & Eric A. Posner, Constitutional
Challenges to the Public Health Orders in Federal
Courts During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 102 B.U. L.
Rev. 1729, 1733 (2022) (“In the aggregate, federal
courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs—striking down
public health orders—in 14.2% of the cases,
suggesting a high level of deference to the
government.”). If the Court does not put a stop to this
behavior its silence will embolden public officials to
make increasingly outrageous ultra vires gambits,
and it will strengthen the already-perilous incentive
structure that let those officials take things this far in
the first place.
19
III.
The Court Should Grant Review to
Prevent Public Officials From Using
“Emergencies” to Take Ultra Vires Actions
Unless the Court intervenes here, lower courts will
continue permitting state and local officials to
exaggerate or invent emergency powers to shield ultra
vires acts from the judicial scrutiny they deserve. In
Block v. Hirsch, the Court upheld a District of
Columbia rent-control ordinance on the grounds that
the emergency—urban overpopulation resulting from
the rapid acceleration of industrial output during the
First World War—was “a publicly, notorious and
almost worldwide fact.” 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921).
Whether the coronavirus pandemic was an emergency
sufficient to justify state-sponsored holdover
tenancies and other drastic measures is a matter of
much greater debate. See, e.g., Amanda L. Taylor,
Judicial Review in Times of Emergency: From the
Founding Through the Covid-19 Pandemic, 109 Va. L.
Rev. 489 (2023); John Yoo, Emergency Powers During
a Viral Pandemic, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 822
(2022). Thus did the White House, states, counties,
and municipalities offer wildly different and often
divergent responses. See R. Hamad, K.A. Lyman et al.,
The U.S. COVID-19 County Policy Database: A Novel
Resource to Support Pandemic-Related Research, 22
BMC Public Health 1882 (2022); Thomas J. Bollyky,
Emma Castro et al., Assessing Covid-19 Pandemic
Policies and Behaviours and Their Economic and
Educational Trade-Offs Across U.S. States From Jan.
1, 2020 to July 31, 2022: An Observational Analysis,
401 Lancet 1341 (2023). Among these measures, one
stands out as particularly bold: the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s (“CDC”) nationwide
20
eviction moratorium, which the Court dispatched per
curiam. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S.Ct. 2485 (2021).
Though its ultimate conclusion was that Congress,
rather than a lone federal agency, decides what
constitutes an “emergency” of the caliber necessary to
justify the disruption of property rights, the Court in
Alabama Association of Realtors crucially noted that
the CDC’s “preventing [rental owners] from evicting
tenants who breach their leases intrudes on one of the
most fundamental elements of property ownership—
the right to exclude. Id. at 2489.
Perhaps on the merits the Court will find, in view
of the Framers’ intent and its own emergencies
doctrine, that Governor Inslee indeed acted within his
police powers when he instituted the eviction
moratorium here in issue. Still, as the Court noted in
an earlier covid case, “even in a pandemic the
Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.”
Roman Catholic Diocese of Bklyn. v. Cuomo, 141 S.Ct.
63, 68 (2020). That is, “emergencies” are not get-outjail-free cards for those who have sworn to uphold the
Constitution. This is especially the case for property
rights—the ends of government, as Locke declared—
which are particularly susceptible to erosion when the
majority takes unfettered and unprincipled actions.
The Takings Clause is that restraining mechanism.
Casting it aside in times of crisis is a recipe for
constitutional disaster.
In Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960),
the Court noted that the Takings Clause “was
designed to bar government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Id.
21
at 49. To this equation Cedar Point adds that the
government “must pay for what it takes” unless it is
not taking anything at all but merely restricting
harmful uses or acting in accordance with
longstanding legal practice. 141 S.Ct. at 2079–80.
Under Armstrong and Cedar Point, therefore,
emergency measures involving uncompensated
physical invasions of private property are only
justified if the state’s legal tradition, narrowly
construed, allows it, or if the cost to the impacted
owners is commensurate with the public losses
resulting from the use or misuse the measure is
designed to prevent. 141 S.Ct. at 2079 (citing Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–
29 (1992) for the proposition that “many governmentauthorized physical invasions will not amount to
takings because they are consistent with longstanding
background restrictions on property rights”); Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (suggesting
that certain would-be takings are no longer so—or are
at least thereby just compensation in-kind—when the
disputed restrictions benefit the impacted owners as
much (or more) than it costs them; i.e., if it gives them
a “reciprocity of advantage”).
Whether Governor Inslee’s eviction moratorium
fits either of these frameworks ultimately is a
question for the merits. But posing the question here
shows both the doctrinal and real-world stakes
involved. And it hints strongly at the potential costs
of the Court’s failing to intervene. Washington legal
history all but rules out the first option—that
Governor Inslee was operating under well-worn state
practice. See Bryan L. Page, State of Emergency:
Washington’s Use of Emergency Clauses and the
22
People’s Right to Referendum, 44 Gonz. L. Rev. 219,
238–46 (2009). It remains to be seen whether
Governor Inslee’s eviction moratorium meets the
second criterion of a physical invasion that merely
forces rental owners’ to internalize the would-be
public costs of their use or misuse thereof. It is hard
to see a proximate causal connection between the
enforcement of ordinary contractual obligations and
the makings of a public health disaster. The two are
only connected insofar as shelter is always necessary
to human life and thus always something to consider
when formulating public policies. In its uberdeference to official characterizations of Governor
Inslee’s eviction moratorium, the Western District of
Washington and the Ninth Circuit took this for
granted. Meanwhile in Apartment Heights the Eighth
Circuit rightly asked that the government first
provide some evidence that using the impacted units
for anything other than housing former tenants would
cause public harms that then doing so prevented. The
Court’s emergency-takings precedent suggests the
answer is no. That it is not enough for the government
to proffer that a property interference is preventing
public harm rather than merely conferring a public
benefit (for which compensation is owed). See Brian A.
Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 391, 392 –
401 (2015) (discussing the Court’s varying treatment
of the Takings Clause within different emergency
contexts). Whatever the outcome, amicus urge the
Court to grant review of this case in order to resolve
these and the other outstanding legal questions at
stake.
23
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the
Petition, the Court should grant review of the
Petition, reverse the Ninth Circuit, and remand the
case for further proceedings in accordance with the
Court’s longstanding recognition that state-compelled
third-party occupations of property beyond the
parties’ agreed-upon terms violates the fundamental
right to exclude.
Respectfully submitted,
DECEMBER 2023
/S/ JACKSON MAYNARD
Counsel of Record
SAM SPIEGELMAN
Citizen Action Defense Fund
111 21st SW, Ste. 13
Olympia, Wash., 98501
jackson@citizenactiondefense.org
sam@citizenactiondefense.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
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