Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jamilah Abdul-Haqq, Petitioner v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., et al.

APPENDIX

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TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — MEMORANDUM OF

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,

FILED MARCH 18,2024...............................

la

APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,

FILED OCTOBER 12,2022.........................

7a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,

FILED MARCH 2,2022.................................

14a

APPENDIX D — DENIAL OF REHEARING

OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,

FILED MARCH 28,2024...............................

18a

la

APPENDIX A — MEMORANDUM OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED MARCH 18, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-16684

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-03727-JD

JAMILAH TALIBAH ABDUL-HAQQ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC., TPMG

FORM UNKNOWN, KAISER FOUNDATION

HOSPITALS, (KFH) UNKNOWN FORM, TERYE

GAUSTAD, DENNIS RAMAS, ROBERTO

MARTINEZ, SONYA BROOKS, KAROL BURNETTQUICK, SHELLEY ROMBOUGH, BERNARD

TYSON, GREGORY ADAMS, CALIFORNIA

NURSES ASSOCIATION, (CNA),

Defendants-Appellees,

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

James Donato, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 18, 2024*

San Francisco, California

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable

for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2a

Appendix A

Before: WALLACE, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN,

Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM**

Plaintiff-Appellant Jamilah Talibah Abdul-Haqq

appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of Defendant-Appellee Permanente Medical

Group, Inc. (TPMG) on Abdul-Haqq’s claim of wrongful

termination and the district court’s summary judgment in

favor of Defendant-Appellee California Nurses Association

(CNA) on Abdul-Haqq’s claim of breach of the duty of fair

representation. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. “We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a

summary judgment motion.” Cottonwood Env. L. Ctr. v.

Edwards, 86 F.4th 1255,1260 (9th Cir. 2023). “We review

the district court’s rulings concerning discovery... for abuse

of discretion.” Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore,

LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2011).

1. The district court properly granted summary

judgment for TPMG on Abdul-Haqq’s claim of wrongful

termination based on disability discrimination and

retaliation. In California, both disability discrimination

and retaliation for filing workplace complaints provide

a basis for a common law wrongful discharge claim.

See City of Moorpark v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 4th 1143,

1161, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 959 P.2d 752 (1998) (disability

discrimination); Wilkin v. Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey

Peninsula, 71 Cal. App. 5th 806, 828, 286 Cal. Rptr.

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and

is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

3a

Appendix A

3d 729 (2021) (retaliation). When, as here, a plaintiff

seeks to prove her wrongful termination claim based on

circumstantial evidence, California applies the federal

three-part burden-shifting test from the Supreme Court’s

decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). See Wills v.

Superior Ct., 195 Cal. App. 4th 143,159,125 Cal. Rptr. 3d

1 (2011), citing Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317,

354-55,100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089 (2000).

Assuming without deciding that Abdul-Haqq

established a prima facie case, TPMG established a

nondiscriminatory, nonretaliatory reason for terminating

Abdul-Haqq—multiple violations of TPMG policy that

negatively impacted patient care and the workplace

environment. Abdul-Haqq does not dispute that

she committed these violations. Thus, the burden

shifts back to Abdul-Haqq. To establish pretext, she

“must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons.” Hersant v.

Dep’t ofSoc. Servs., 57 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1005, 67 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 483 (1997). Abdul-Haqq contends she met this

burden because she points to supposed inconsistencies

in TPMG’s paperwork surrounding her termination,

the supposed lack of training on certain policies, and

a computer problem. But these mere allegations are

insufficient to show pretext when Abdul-Haqq engaged in

a pattern of policy violations over multiple years, TPMG

met—or attempted to meet—with Abdul-Haqq many

times to address the incidents, TPMG granted her leave

requests, TPMG gave Abdul-Haqq multiple verbal and

4a

Appendix A

written warnings that continued violation of policy would

result in termination, and TPMG only terminated AbdulHaqq after her repeated noncompliance with reasonable

requests.

Abdul-Haqq also argues that TPMG’s stated

reasons are mere pretext because she was terminated

approximately one month after filing a complaint against

TPMG with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission. While evidence of temporal proximity is

sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation,

it is ordinarily insufficient to satisfy the secondary burden

to provide evidence of pretext. See Loggins v. Kaiser

Permanente Int’l, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 1112, 60 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 45 (2007). In this case, temporal proximity

between Abdul-Haqq’s termination and her complaint,

when examined in the context of the record, “does not

create a triable issue as to pretext, and summary judgment

for the employer is proper.” See Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc.,

163 Cal. App. 4th 327, 357, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654 (2008).

2. The district court properly granted summary

judgment for CNA on Abdul-Haqq’s claim of breach of

the duty of fair representation. A union breaches the

duty of fair representation if it exercises its judgment

in bad faith or in a discriminatory manner. See Moore v.

Bechtel Power Corp., 840 F.2d 634, 636 (9th Cir. 1988).

“To establish that the union’s exercise of judgment was

in bad faith, the plaintiff must show ‘substantial evidence

of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.’” Beck v.

United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 506 F.3d 874,

880 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Amalgamated Ass’n of St.,

5a

Appendix A

Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees ofAm. v. Lockridge,

403 U.S. 274, 299, 91 S. Ct. 1909,29 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1971).

The plaintiff bears the burden of proving a breach of the

duty of fair representation. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,

177, 87 S. Ct. 903, 17 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1967). Abdul-Haqq

fell short of her burden of proving that CNA breached the

duty of fair representation when it opted not to pursue

her case in arbitration. To the contrary, CNA faithfully

attended Abdul-Haqq’s disciplinary meetings, heeded

Abdul-Haqq’s commands regarding which arguments to

raise with TPMG, and followed multiple avenues in an

effort to achieve Abdul-Haqq’s reinstatement or lessen

TPMG’s disciplinary action against her. CNA’s decision

not to pursue arbitration, especially considering AbdulHaqq’s significant admissions in her “rebuttal” letter, was

not made in bad faith.

3. Abdul-Haqq waived her argument that the district

court abused its discretion by not assisting her in discovery

and not including certain documents she requested in the

discovery order because she failed to object to the order

or move to compel additional discovery. See Helfand v.

Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining

that the plaintiff waived their challenge to defendant’s

discovery objection by failing to bring a motion to compel);

see also Lane v. Dep’t ofInterior, 523 F.3d 1128,1134 (9th

Cir. 2008) (“A district court has wide latitude in controlling

discovery, and its rulings will not be overturned in absence

of a clear abuse of discretion”) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); N.D. Cal. Local Rule 37-3 (“No

discovery-related motions may be filed more than 7 days

after the discovery cut-off”). Abdul-Haqq’s pro se status

6a

Appendix A

does not relieve her other obligation to follow procedural

rules. See Briones v. Riviera Hotel Casino, 116 F.3d 379,

381-82 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

We do not consider matters not specifically and

distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See

Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

7a

APPENDIX B — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, FILED

OCTOBER 12, 2022

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 3:19-cv-03727-JD

JAMILAH ABDUL-HAQQ,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

October 12, 2022, Decided

October 12,2022, Filed

ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE THE

PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP

Plaintiff Jamilah Abdul-Haqq filed this lawsuit against

defendants The Permanente Medical Group (TPMG),

Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (KFH), the California

Nurses Association (CNA), and eight individuals,

asserting various claims arising from her employment

with TPMG. Dkt. No. 20. The Court dismissed all the

claims except for Abdul-Haqq’s wrongful termination

claim against TPMG and her claim for violation of the

8a

Appendix B

duty of fair representation against CNA, Dkt. No. 82,

and subsequently granted summary judgment for CNA

on that count, Dkt. Nos. 155,156.

Consequently, the sole remaining claim in this case

is whether TPMG wrongfully terminated Abdul-Haqq

from her job as a nurse in violation of public policy. Dkt.

No. 82. The Court initially understood that this claim

related only to Abdul-Haqq’s allegations of retaliation for

filing workplace complaints, id., but the parties discussed

disability discrimination as another potential public policy

ground in their cross-motions for summary judgment, and

so that will be taken up here as well. Dkt. No. 121 (TPMG

motion); Dkt. No. 126 (Abdul-Haqq motion).

The record before the Court indicated that TPMG

had legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-pretextual

reasons for terminating Abdul-Haqq’s employment, and

Abdul-Haqq did not demonstrate any genuine disputes of

fact that might weigh against summary judgment. Dkt.

No. 157. Even so, out of an abundance of caution in light

of Abdul-Haqq’s pro se status, the Court held a hearing

on July 21, 2022, to allow Abdul-Haqq to identify the

evidence that might warrant a trial. Dkt. Nos. 157, 177.

The parties’ familiarity with the record is assumed, and

summary judgment is granted in TPMG’s favor.

STANDARDS

Parties “may move for summary judgment, identifying

each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense

— on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall

9a

Appendix B

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248,106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law. See id. To determine

whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists,

the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, and “all justifiable inferences are

to be drawn” in that party’s favor. Id. at 255. The moving

party may initially establish the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact by “pointing out to the district court that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 325,

106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). It is then the

nonmoving party’s burden to go beyond the pleadings and

identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial.

Id. at 323-24. “A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is

merely colorable or not significantly probative does not

present a genuine issue of material fact.” Addisu v. Fred

Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130,1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

“It is not the Court’s responsibility to root through

the record to establish the absence of factual disputes,

or to look for evidence on the nonmoving parties’ behalf.”

CZ Servs., Inc. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., No.

3:18-cv-04217-JD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135498, 2020

WL 4368212, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (citations

10a

Appendix B

omitted); see also Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey,

293 F. Supp. 3d 980, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 932 F.3d

861 (9th Cir. 2019).

DISCUSSION

“The central assertion of a claim of wrongful

termination in violation of public policy is that the

employer’s motives for terminating the employee are

so contrary to fundamental norms that the termination

inflicted an injury sounding in tort.” Roby v. McKesson

Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686,702,101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773,219 P.3d

749 (2009) (citing Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27 Cal.

3d 167, 176, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980)). To

prove a wrongful-termination claim, Abdul-Haqq must

show that TPMG terminated her employment, that “the

termination was substantially motivated by a violation

of public policy,” and that “the discharge caused [her]

harm.” Yau v. Allen, 229 Cal. App. 4th 144,154,176 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 824 (2014).

Under California law, “disability discrimination can

form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim.”

City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143,1161,

77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445,959 P.2d 752 (1998). For Abdul-Haqq

to prove wrongful termination in this context, she must

show that TPMG terminated her employment “because of

the disability.” Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc., 242 Cal.

App. 4th 1367,1378,196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68 (2015) (internal

quotation and citation omitted).

11a

Appendix B

TPMG presented solid evidence of non-discriminatory

reasons for terminating Abdul-Haqq’s employment.

Several doctors reported that Abdul-Haqq committed

errors in delivering nursing care, such as delay in

administering medication and in responding to her work

phone while on duty, delay in registering medication

that had been administered, and failure to notify a

treating physician that a patient under her care was

hypotensive. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 121-1, Exhs. C, D, F, H.

Additionally, an investigation found that Abdul-Haqq

“participated in an inappropriate, unprofessional and

loud hostile verbal argument with another employee

that continued on throughout patient care areas” in the

emergency department. Id., Exh. B. TPMG has also

submitted evidence that Abdul-Haqq avoided meeting

with a supervisor to discuss these incidents, and the

meetings that did occur did not resolve the supervisor’s

concerns. Dkt. No. 121-1 Hf 9-10, 14, 16, 20, 23 (Gaustad

declaration); see also id., Exhs. A, E. Consequently,

the burden shifted to Abdul-Haqq to “demonstrate a

triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the

employer’s stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or

that the employer acted with a discriminatory animus,

such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the

employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other

unlawful action.” Serri v. Santa Clara Univ., 226 Cal.

App. 4th 830, 861, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 732 (2014) (internal

quotation and citation omitted).

Abdul-Haqq has not adduced evidence that TPMG’s

reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual,

or that TPMG otherwise acted with discriminatory intent.

12a

Appendix B

“[Generally, pretext may be demonstrated by showing

the proffered reason had no basis in fact, the proffered

reason did not actually motivate the discharge, or, the

proffered reason was insufficient to motivate discharge .”

Zamora v. Sec. Indus. Specialists, Inc., 71 Cal. App. 5th

1, 56, 285 Cal. Rptr. 3d 809 (2021) (internal quotations

and citation omitted). Again, the record shows that

TPMG received multiple reports that Abdul-Haqq did not

comply with its standards and policies, with implications

for patient wellbeing. In response, Abdul-Haqq alleges

inconsistencies in her disciplinary paperwork, disagrees

with how TPMG handled her case, and says that a

“computer problem was the root cause of the alleged”

nursing errors. Dkt. No. 126 at 15. But the evidence she

has identified is insufficient to demonstrate that TPMG’s

reasons were pretextual. See Wills v. Superior Court, 195

Cal. App. 4th 143, 160, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (2011) (“The

employee cannot simply show that the employer’s decision

was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue

is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer,

not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or

competent.” (cleaned up)).

To the extent that Abdul-Haqq’s claim for wrongful

termination is premised upon retaliation, it fares no better.

“In summary judgment proceedings, a FEHA [California

Fair Employment and Housing Act] retaliation claim is

treated the same as a FEHA discrimination claim: Where

the employer presents admissible evidence . . . that the

adverse employment action was based on legitimate,

nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory factors, the employer

will be entitled to summary judgment unless the employee

13a

Appendix B

produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue

of fact material to the employer’s showing.” Wilkin v.

Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey Peninsula, 71 Cal. App.

5th 806, 828, 286 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (2021) (cleaned up).

Abdul-Haqq did not adduce evidence to the effect that

TPMG’s reasons for terminating her employment were

pretextual. She points to the timing of an EEOC contact

with TPMG in July 2016 and her suspension in August

2016, Dkt. No. 145 at 13, but temporal proximity alone is

insufficient to carry her burden. See hoggins v. Kaiser

Permanente Int’l, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 1112, 60 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 45 (2007). Temporal proximity is also insufficient

to raise a genuine dispute of material fact when combined

with her other evidence, such as the problems with her

disciplinary paperwork.

Consequently, TPMG is entitled to judgment in its

favor. Abdul-Haqq’s motion for summary judgment is

denied for the same reasons.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2022

/s/ James Donato

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

14a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT

OF CALIFORNIA, FILED MARCH 2, 2022

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 3:19-cv-03727-JD

Re: Dkt. Nos. 132,135

JAMILAH ABDUL-HAQQ,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC., et al,

Defendants.

ORDER RE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RE CALIFORNIA NURSES ASSOCIATION

The Court’s motion to dismiss order allowed pro se

plaintiff Abdul-Haqq to pursue a duty of fair representation

claim against her union, the California Nurses Association

(CNA), solely on the basis of alleged bad faith. Dkt. No.

82 (citing Burkevich v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., Int’l., 894

F.2d 346, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1990). The parties each moved

for summary judgment on the bad faith claim. Dkt. No.

132 (plaintiffs motion); Dkt. No. 135 (CNA’s motion). A

familiarity with the record is assumed, and CNA’s motion

is granted. Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

15a

Appendix C

Parties “may move for summary judgment, identifying

each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense

— on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “The Court may dispose of less than the entire case

and even just portions of a claim or defense.” CZ Servs.,

Inc. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., No. 3:18-CV-04217JD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135498, 2020 WL 4368212,

at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (citing Smith v. Cal. Dep’t

of Highway Patrol, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1179 (N.D. Cal.

2014)). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,

248,106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law. Id. To determine whether a

genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the Court

views the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, and “all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn” in that party’s favor. Id. at 255. The moving party

may initially establish the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact by “pointing out to the district court that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 325,

106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). It is then the

nonmoving party’s burden to go beyond the pleadings and

identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial.

Id. at 323-24. “A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is

merely colorable or not significantly probative does not

16a

Appendix C

present a genuine issue of material fact.” Addisu v. Fred

Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130,1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

“It is not the Court’s responsibility to root through

the record to establish the absence of factual disputes,

or to look for evidence on the nonmoving parties’ behalf.”

CZ Servs., Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135498, 2020

WL 4368212, at *3 (internal quotations and citations

omitted); see also Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey,

293 F. Supp. 3d 980, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2017), affd, 932 F.3d

861 (9th Cir. 2019). The Court’s review of a union’s duty of

fair representation is narrow in order to give “substantial

deference” to unions concerning how they represent their

members. See Peterson v. Kennedy, 111 F.2d 1244,1253

(9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 756

F.2d 1461,1466 (9th Cir. 1985)). When, as here, a union’s

conduct involved judgment, a plaintiff may prevail only

if the union’s conduct was discriminatory or in bad faith.

Wellman v. Writers Guild ofAm., W., Inc., 146 F.3d 666,

670 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Marino v. Writers Guild of

Am., E., Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)); see

also Demetris v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 862

F.3d 799, 805 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). The plaintiff bears

the burden of establishing bad faith. Beck v. United Food

& Commercial Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874,

879-80 (9th Cir. 2007).

“To establish that the union’s exercise of judgment

was in bad faith, the plaintiff must show ‘substantial

evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.’”

Id. at 880 (citation omitted). A “disagreement between a

union and an employee over a grievance, standing alone”

17a

Appendix C

is not “evidence of bad faith, even when the employee’s

grievance is meritorious.” Moore v. Bechtel Power Corp.,

840 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1988). “[M]ere negligence and

erroneous judgment calls cannot, by themselves, support

an inference of bad faith.” Demetris, 862 F.3d at 808.

Even giving Abdul-Haqq every benefit of the doubt

as a pro se plaintiff, the record fails to raise a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether CNA acted in bad

faith in handling Abdul-Haqq’s employment issues. To

the contrary, the record indicates that CNA acted in a

reasoned and rational way with respect to Abdul-Haqq’s

concerns. To be sure, Abdul-Haqq disagreed with CNA’s

decision not to pursue an arbitration and other judgment

calls, but that alone is not evidence of fraud, deceit, or

dishonest conduct by CNA. Abdul-Haqq did not proffer

any other evidence to the contrary.

Consequently, CNA is entitled to judgment in its favor.

Abdul-Haqq’s motion for summary judgment is denied for

the same reasons.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2022

/s/ James Donato

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

18a

APPENDIX D — DENIAL OF REHEARING OF

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED MARCH 28, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-16684

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-03727-JD

Northern District of California

JAMILAH TALIBAH ABDUL-HAQQ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC, TPMG

FORM UNKNOWN, KAISER FOUNDATION

HOSPITALS, (KFH) UNKNOWN FORM, TERYE

GAUSTAD, DENNIS RAMAS, ROBERTO

MARTINEZ, SONYA BROOKS, KAROL BURNETTQUICK, SHELLEY ROMBOUGH, BERNARD

TYSON, GREGORY ADAMS, CALIFORNIA

NURSES ASSOCIATION, (CNA),

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Before: WALLACE, FERNANDEZ, and

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant’s petition for panel rehearing is

DENIED.