Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jean Dufort Baptichon, Petitioner v. Department of Education, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 9, 2024

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1A:

Order of the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia,

Filed: 03/11/2024......................................

APPENDIX IB

Judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia,

Filed 01/11/2024.........................................

APPENDIX 1C

Order of the United States Court of

Appeals For the District of Columbia,

Filed 12/28/2023....................................

APPENDIX ID

Order of the United States District Court

For the District of Columbia,

Filed 03/17/2023............................................

APPENDIX IE

Memorandum of the District Court of the

District of Columbia, Filed 03/17/2023 ....

APPENDIX IF

Memorandum from Eastern District Court

of New Yok, Filed 09/08/2020.......................

APPENDIX 1G

Order denying IFP from the Western

District Court of Michigan, Filed 07/09/2018

APPENDIX 1H

Judgment from Western District Court

of Michigan, Filed 12/28/2009................

APPENDIX II

Order from State of Michigan Circuit Court,

Filed 12/28/2009.............................................

APPENDIX 1J

Order from Circuit Court Ingham

County, Filed 11/02/2004.............

APPENDIX IK

Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint

APPENDIX 1L

Verified Bill of Complaint

APPENDIX 1A

©mtrij States Court of Uppeate

For The District of Columbia

No. 23-5081

SEPTEMBER TERM,2023

l:22-cv—00941-CJN

Filed On: March 11, 2024

Jean Dufort Baptichon

Appellant

United States Department of Education and

WMU/Cooley Law School

Appellees

BEFORE: Srinivasan, Chief Judge, and Henderson,

Millett, Pillard, Wilkins, Katsas. Rao, Walker, Childs,

Pari, and Garcia, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition for hearing en

banc, and the absence of a request by any member of

the court for a vote, it is

ORDERED that the petition is denied.

Per Curiam

APPENDIX 1A

FOOR THE COURT

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

By:

/s/

Daniel J Reidy

Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX IB

QSmteti States: Court of Appeals;

For The District of Columbia

No. 23-5081

SEPTEMBER TERM,2023

l:22-cv—00941-CJN

Filed On: January 11, 2024

Jean Dufort Baptichon

Appellant

United States Department of Education and

WMU/Cooley Law School

Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COMLUMBIA

BEFORE: Henderson, Childs, and Pan, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

This appeal was considered on the record from Unit

ed States District Court for the District of Columbia

and on the brief filed by appellant. See Fed. R. App. P

34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34<j). It is

APPENDIX IB

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district courts or

der filled March 17,2023, be affirmed as to appellee Thomas M.

Cooley Law School. The district court correctly dismissed ap

pellant’s claims against Cooley for lack of personal jurisdiction.

See Erwin-Simpson v. Air-Asia Berhad, 935 F.3d 883, 888-89

(D.C. Cir. 2021). Appellant has failed to establish any contacts

with the District of Columbia that would support the district

court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Cooley. See id. (construct

ing D.C. Code §13-334 and §13-422); D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(b); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 57 (D.C. 2017)

(holding that “[cjonclusory statements” do not satisfy the

plaintiff’s burden of showing pertinent jurisdictional facts to

survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

(quotation omitted)). The district court also did not abuse its

discretion in failing to sua sponte transfer appellant’s claims

against Cooley. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 107071 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 28 U.S.C. §1631.

Pursuant to D, C. Circuit Rule

36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed

to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days

after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition

for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. 888-89P. 41(b), D.C. Cir.

Rule 41.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

By: Is/

Daniel J Reidy

Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX 1C

GHntteb States Court of Appeals;

For The District of Columbia

No. 23-5081

SEPTEMBER TERM,2023

l:22-cv—00941-CJN

Filed On: December 28, 2023

Jean Dufort Baptichon

Appellant

United States Department of Education and

WMU/Cooley Law School

Appellees

BEFORE: Henderson, Childs, and Pan, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellant’s brief; the motion

to dismiss and the motion for summary affirmation,

the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by

Thomas M. Cooley Law School be denied. Appellant’s

statement of issues is non-binding and does not limit

the scope of the appeal. See United States v. Pogue.

19F.3d 663, 666 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also D.C.

APPENDIX 1C

Circuit Handbook of Practice and internal Procedure

22 (2021). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the court concludes, on

its own motion, that oral argument will not assist the

court in this case as to Thomas M. Cooley Law School.

Accordingly, the court will dispose of the appeal, as to

Coley without oral argument on the basis of the record

and the presentation in appellant’s brief. See Fed. R.

App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summa

ry affirmation filed by the United States Department

of Education be granted. The merits of the parties’

positions are so clear as to warrant summary action.

See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc v. Stanley, 819 F.2d

294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The district

court properly dismissed appellant’s forgery claim

against the Department of Education because the

United States has not waived its sovereign immunity

under the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims arising

out of misrepresentation.” 28 U.S.C. § 2880(h); Block

v. Neal 480 U.S. 289, 293-97 (1983). The district Court

also properly denied appellant’s motion to amend his

complaint because the proposed amendments would

be futile. See Aguiar v. Drug Enf. Admin, 992 F.3d

1108,1113-14 (D.C. Cir.

2021)

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition

will not be published. The Clerk is directed to with

hold issuance of the mandate herein until resolution

of the reminder of the appeal.

APPENDIX 1C

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

By: /s/

Laura M. Morgan

Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX ID

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Jean Dufort Baptichon

Civil Action No. 1 :22-cv00941 (CJN)

Plaintif,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, et al.

Defendants

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Thom

as M. Cooley Law School’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No.

4. Defendant Department of Education’s Motion to Dis

miss, ECF No. 14 and Plaintiff Jean Dufort Baptichon’s

Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. ECF No.

18. For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memo

randum Opinion, it is

ORDERED that Defendant Thomas M. Cooley Law

School’s Motion to Dismiss is granted and that Plain

tiffs Complaint against this Defendant is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE> It is further

ORDERED that Defendant Department of Educa

tion’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and that Plain

tiff s Complaint against this Defendant is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE> And it is further

APPENDIX ID

ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File

Amended Complaint is DENIED. This is a final appealable order. This Clerk is directed to terminate the case.

Date: March 17, 2023

Is/.

CARL J NICHOLS

United States District Judge

APPENDIX IE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Jean Dufort Baptichon

Civil Action No. 1 :22-cv00941 (CJN)

Plaintif,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, et al.

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff Jean Dufort Baptichon, a former stu

dent at Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cool

ey Law School filed a complaint against Cooley and the

U.S. Department of Education relating to his academ

ic dismissal from Cooley and his federal student loan.

After Cooley and the Department separately moved to

dismiss. Baptichon moved for leave to file an amended

complaint. See Cooley Mot. To dismiss, ECF No. 4 Dept.

Mot. To dismiss, ECF No. 14. Pl.’s Mot. For Leave Am.

Compl., ECF No. 18. For the reasons explained below,

the Court grants both Defendants’ motions to dismiss

and denies Baptichon’s motion for leave to amend.

I. Background

As Baptichon states in his Complaint, the lawsuit is

“a continuation of his long-standing litigation” concern-

APPENDIX IE

ing Cooley’s 2003 decision to dismiss him for academic

deficiencies” and the collection of his student loan debt.

Compl. Tf 7, ECF No. 1. These events have now been the

subject of several court opinions in other federal and

state courts around the country. See Baptichon v. U.S.

Dept, of Educ. No. 20-CV-2400, 2020 WL 6565126, at

*1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov 9, 2020) (citing cases including a 2004

decision dismissing federal due process claims). Bapti

chon alleges here that Cooley miscalculated his GPA

beginning in the January 2002 academic term. Compl.

t 25. Then in the May 2002 term, a professor allegedly

lost one of Baptichon’s exam answer books, causing his

cumulative GPA to fall below the required 2.0 thresh

old. Id.

8—11. As a result, Baptichon was placed on

academic probation. Id. f 11. In September 2003, Cool

ey issued a grade report listing his cumulative GPA as

2.05 but revised the report three days later to state his

cumulative GPA as 1.96. Id. f f 14-15, 25. Cooley then

dismissed Baptichon due to his academic performance.

See id.

Baptichon brings various claims against Cooley

based on this dismissal—including fraud, libel, and

denial of due process and equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment—all stemming from the theo

ry that Cooley miscalculated his GPA. Baptichon also

alleges that Cooley and/or the Department forged his

signature on a federal student loan application and

promissory note, causing him to be wrongfully “ha

rassed by multiple debt collection agencies.” 1 Id. 30.

In response, both Defendants have filed motions to dis

miss. Cooley argues for dismissal because Baptichon’s

claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limita

tions and res judicata; venue is improper; the Court

APPENDIX IE

lacks personal jurisdiction over it; and Baptichon has

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Department contends that Baptichon’s Complaint

should be dismissed because he failed to properly ex

haust his administrative remedies and timely file his

Complaint; the. Department has not waived its sover

eign immunity; and Baptichon failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Baptichon, in turn,

moves to amend his Complaint.

1 Baptichon also alleged that the signature was

forged by American Student Assistance, an organi

zation named as a defendant that was subsequent

ly voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit. Compl. |

30; Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, ECF No. 15. Case

l:22-cv-00941-CJN Document 22 Filed 03/17/23 Page 2

of 10 3 II.

II. Legal Standards

The Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(6). The

Court focused on the jurisdictional issues raised by

their Motions. Rule 12(b)(1) governs dismissal for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction. When “deciding whether

to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,” the

Court “may consider materials outside the pleadings.”

Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249,

1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Although the Court “accept[s] as

true all the factual allegations contained in the com

plaint,” those allegations “will bear closer scrutiny in

resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6)

motion for failure to state a claim.” Wright v. Foreign

Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C.

APPENDIX IE

2007) (quotations omitted). Pro se complaints are liber

ally construed, but “even a pro se plaintiff must meet

his burden of proving that the Court has subject matter

jurisdiction over the claims.” Fontaine v. Bank of Am.,

N.A., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2014).

Rule 12(b)(2) provides for dismissal based on lack of

personal jurisdiction. A plaintiff must establish a fac

tual basis for the Court to assert personal jurisdiction

over a defendant. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y,

894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). And while plaintiffs

may “satisfy that burden with a prima facie showing”

at this stage, they must nevertheless “allege specific

acts connecting the defendant with the forum.” Mwani

v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quotation

omitted); Second Amend. Found, v. U.S. Conf. of May

ors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quotation and

brackets omitted).

The Court grants leave to amend a complaint “when

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But “if the

proposed amendment is futile,” meaning that “it would

not withstand a motion to dismiss,” the Court will deny

leave to amend. Singletary v. Howard Univ., 939 F.3d

287, 295 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quotation and brackets omit

ted)

III. Analysis

A. Cooley’s Motion to Dismiss

Cooley moves to dismiss for lack of personal juris

diction, arguing that Baptichon has failed to meet his

burden of showing either general or specific jurisdic-

APPENDIX IE

tion. General jurisdiction “permits a court to assert ju

risdiction over a defendant based on a forum connec

tion unrelated to the underlying suit.” Erwin-Simpson

v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2021)

(quotation omitted). Specific jurisdiction “depends on

an affiliation between the forum and the underlying

controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that

takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject

to the State’s regulation.” Id. at 888 (quotation and

brackets omitted). The Court must generally assess

whether either type of jurisdiction exists under D.C.

law before analyzing “whether an exercise of jurisdic

tion would comport with constitutional limitations.”

See id.; Forras v. Rauf, 812 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C.

Cir. 2016). Here, Cooley focuses its attention on the

lack of a statutory basis for jurisdiction.

1. General Jurisdiction

Under D.C. Code § 13-422, a D.C. court “may exer

cise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in,

organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its

principal place of business in, the District of Columbia

as to any claim for relief.” Baptichon acknowledges in

his Complaint that Cooley is a citizen of Michigan,

and it is undisputed that Cooley is “not domiciled in”

or “organized under the laws of’ the District of Colum

bia, and also that it “does not maintain its principal

place of business in the District of Columbia”—mak

ing jurisdiction under D.C. Code § 13-422 unavailable.

Compl. f 3; Cooley Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dis

miss (“Cooley Mem.”) at 8, ECF No. 4-1.

Baptichon does not invoke any other statutory ba-

APPENDIX IE

sis for general jurisdiction. Instead, he argues that

Cooley has “engaged in continuous and systematic ac

tivity” in the District, such that exercising jurisdiction

would accord with the constitutional requirement of

due process. Pl.’s Opp’n to Cooley Mot. to Dismiss at

17, ECF No. 7; see, e.g., Erwin-Simpson, 985 F.3d at

889—90. The constitutionality of exercising general ju

risdiction over a defendant does not, standing alone,

provide an adequate basis to do so here. In any event,

Baptichon does not offer any factual allegations to

support his assertion that Cooley’s affiliations in the

District are continuous and systematic. For example,

as Cooley points out, Baptichon does not allege that

it “transacted business” or “contracted to supply ser

vices” in the District.

Cooley Mem. at 9. Rather, Baptichon claims that

Cooley has certain connections with the American

Bar Association and the Department, which operate

in the District. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Cooley Mot. to Dis

miss at 16 (stating that Cooley is “allegedly the larg

est American Bar Association Accredited Law School,”

that “the American Bar Association has its office in

the forum state,” and that Cooley was “acting as an

agent” of the Department). But “merely maintaining

professional relationships with persons and entities in

the district is not sufficient to establish general juris

diction.” Ashhab-Jones v. Cherokee Nation Strategic

Programs, LLC, No. 19-cv-00089, 2020 WL 6262090,

at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2020); Bigelow v. Garrett, 299 F.

Supp. 3d 34, 43 (D.D.C. 2018).

2. Specific Jurisdiction

APPENDIX IE

For the Court to exercise specific personal jurisdic

tion over Cooley, as noted above, it “must first exam

ine whether jurisdiction is applicable under the [Dis

trict’s] long-arm statute and then determine whether

a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional re

quirements of due process.” GTE New Media Servs.

Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir.

2000).

The District’s long-arm statute provides in rele

vant part that a defendant’s contacts with the District

of Columbia can establish specific jurisdiction if the

claim arises from the defendant’s:

(1) transacting any business in the District of Co

lumbia;

(2) contracting to supply services in the District of

Columbia;

(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Colum

bia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;

[or]

(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Colum

bia by an act or omission outside the District of Co

lumbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engag

es in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives

substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or

services rendered, in the District of Columbia . . . .

D.C. Code § 13-423(a).

Baptichon has not shown that the long-arm stat

ute supplies a basis for specific jurisdiction.

APPENDIX IE

First, he has not alleged that he suffered any tor

tious injury in the District of Columbia. See id. § 13423(a)(3)—(4). While most of the events at issue in this

lawsuit occurred in Michigan, where Cooley is located,

Baptichon also alleges that the Department’s “unlaw

ful actions injured the Plaintiff in New York,” where

he currently resides. Compl. 5. But he does not al

lege that any injury occurred here.

Second, Baptichon has not shown that his claims

arise out of Cooley’s “transacting any business” or

“contracting to supply services” in the District of Co

lumbia. D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(l)-(2). Although the

factual basis underlying his assertion of specific juris

diction is somewhat unclear, he appears to rely on the

relationship between the Department and Cooley in

connection with his federal student loans. He argues

that Cooley acted as an “agent” of the Department

“when brokering [his] student loans,” i.e., disburs

ing any surplus amount to him after receiving loan

payments from the Department. Pl.’s Opp’n to Cooley

Mot. to Dismiss at 16. But this allegation falls short of

claiming that Cooley transacted business or contract

ed to supply services in the District in a manner that

gave rise to Baptichon’s claims within the meaning

of D.C. Code § 13-423(a). Put simply, Baptichon has

failed to “allege specific acts connecting the defendant

with the forum.” Second Amend. Found., 274 F.3d at

524 (quotation and brackets omitted).

B. Department of Education’s Motion to Dismiss

The Department moves to dismiss on the ground

APPENDIX IE

that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not

waive sovereign immunity for “forgery” (Count V),

the only claim asserted against it in the initial Com

plaint.2 “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields

the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Although

the FTCA grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear a

set of tort claims against the federal government, the

statute does not grant jurisdiction over “[a]ny claim

arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,

false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,

libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interfer

ence with contract rights.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1),

2680(h). Here, the parties dispute whether Baptichon’s “forgery” claim falls within the exception to the

FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for any claim

arising out of “misrepresentation.”

The Court agrees with the Department that the

misrepresentation exception applies. “[T]he essence

of an action for misrepresentation, whether negligent

or intentional, is the communication of misinforma

tion on which the recipient relies.” Block v. Neal, 460

U.S. 289, 296 (1983). Baptichon alleges that the De

partment (or Cooley) forged his signature on a federal

student loan2 application and promissory note, caus-

2 As this Court has noted previously, “there is some question wheth

er the sovereign immunity of the United States presents a subject-mat

ter jurisdiction question.” Embrey v. United States, No. 21-cv-0235,

2022 WL 392312, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2022) (citing Mowrer v. U.S.

Dep’t of Transp., 14 F.4th 723 (D.C. Cir. 2021)). The Court will continue

to analyze “the lack of a clear waiver of federal sovereign immunity as a

jurisdictional defect” under Rule 12(b)(1). Id. (emphasis omitted).

APPENDIX IE

ing “multiple debt collection agencies and the credit

bureau” to rely on the defective application to Baptichon’s detriment. Compl. Tf 30. Because his alleged

injury is based on “the communication of misinforma

tion” on which others relied, his action “aris[es] out”

of the Department’s alleged misrepresentation. Block,

460 U.S. at 296; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

Baptichon disputes that his forgery claim involves

misrepresentation, but forgery is “not in and of itself

a civil cause of action” under District of Columbia law.

Nwaoha v. Onyeoziri, No. 04-1799, 2006 WL 3361540,

at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2006); see McCrea v. D.C., No.

16-cv-0808, 2021 WL 1209219, at *14 (D.D.C. March

31, 2021). Instead, it is “a criminal offense which may,

in some instances, include[] commission of other civil

torts,” like “conversion or fraud.” Nwaoha, 2006 WL

3361540, at *4. If Baptichon’s claim were construed

so as not to include an allegation of fraud or misrep

resentation—despite his concession that “forgeries

are a species of fraud”—he would have failed to state

a claim, which would also warrant dismissal.3 Pl.’s

Opp’n to Dep’t Mot. to Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 16; see

also id. at 2-3, 8 (invoking “modern statutes” which

make forgery a felony).

B. Baptichon’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Com

plaint

Baptichon proposes to amend his Complaint by

adding three claims against the Department for “col

lection harassments,” abuse of process, and negli

gent supervision. Because none of these claims would

survive a motion to dismiss by the Department, the

APPENDIX IE

amendment would be futile.

3 The Court declines Baptichon’s request to con

strue this “forgery” count as a Bivens claim. Pl.’s

Opp’n to Dep’t Mot. to Dismiss at 12-13. It is “the

duty of the lower federal courts to stop insubstantial

Bivens actions in their tracks and get rid of them,”

Simpkins v. D.C. Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 370 (D.C. Cir.

1997), and here Baptichon does not seek to hold any

federal official personally liable for being “personally

and directly involved” in any unconstitutional conduct

related to his forgery allegations. Taylor v. Dir. of Bu

reau of Prisons, No. 09 0859, 2009 WL 1322281, at *1

(D.D.C. May 8, 2009).

First, Baptichon’s “collection harassments” claim—

which the Court, like the Department, construes as

attempting to state a cause of action under the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)—would fail be

cause the federal government has not waived its sov

ereign immunity as to its efforts to collect on a debt.

See Dep’t Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Am. Compl. at 5, ECF

No. 20; Wagstaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 509 F.3d 661,

664 (5th Cir. 2007). The FDCPA also excludes “any of

ficer or employee of the United States or any State to

the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any

debt is in the performance of his official duties” from

the definition of “debt collector,” making the statute’s

prohibition on harassing debt collection efforts inap

plicable. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(6)(C), 1692d.

Second, the Department would have sovereign im

munity against Baptichon’s claim for abuse of process,

because that intentional tort is excepted from the FT-

APPENDIX IE

CA’s sovereign-immunity waiver. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

Third, Baptichon’s negligent supervision claim

would be dismissed because Baptichon did not pres

ent the claim to the Department within two years of

its accrual. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Like Baptichon’s

forgery claim, his proposed negligent supervision

claim is based on the alleged forgery of his signature

on a federal loan application and promissory note.

Am. Compl. ^ 35, ECF No. 18-1 (alleging that the De

partment “failed to supervise its agents” who manage

the Federal Family Education Loan Program). Bapti

chon argues that his November 20, 2020 submission

to the Department (a Standard Form 95) fell within

the two-year period because “he first discovered . . .

the wrongful act on January 1, 2020,” when “the de

fendant Federal agency presented the forged Federal

Family Educational Loan document, i.e., the ‘Prom

issory Note’ to the Plaintiff for the first time.” Pl.’s

Opp’n to Dep’t Mot. to Dismiss at 3, 9-10. That asser

tion is contradicted by the loan discharge application

that Baptichon submitted in August 2018, in which

he attested that his name was signed without autho

rization on the promissory note.3 Defs Ex. 2 (Loan

Discharge Application), ECF No. 17-2; see Webster

v. Spencer, No. 17-cv-1472, 2020 WL 2104231, at *5

(D.D.C. May 1, 2020) (holding that a court may con

sider administrative records when ruling on a 12(b)

(6) motion “for assessing exhaustion and timeliness

attacks, particularly when . . . neither side disputes

3 It is also in tension with Baptichon’s argument in his response to Cool

ey’s Motion to Dismiss, in which he states that “Defendant DOE pre- •

sented said Promissory Note to the Plaintiff for payment on or about

October 2014.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Cooley Mot. to Dismiss at 8.

APPENDIX IE

their authenticity”); see also Am. Compl. 33 (incor

porating August 15, 2018 Loan Discharge Application

by reference). Because Baptichon discovered by Au

gust 2018 at the latest that the promissory note was

(as he says) signed in his name without authorization,

he did not submit notice of his claim to the Depart

ment within the two-year window as required.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, Baptichon’s claims against Cool

ey are dismissed without prejudice for lack of person

al jurisdiction, and his action against the Department

is dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Baptichon’s motion for leave to file an

amended complaint is denied. An order will issue con

temporaneously with this opinion.

Date: March 17, 2023

/s/_

CARL J NICHOLS

United States District Judge

APPENDIX IF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Jean Dufort Baptichon

MEMORANDUM

& ORDER

20-CV-2400 (PKC)

Plaintif,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, et al.

Defendants

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff filed this pro se Complaint on May 26, 2020,

seeking damages against the United States Depart

ment of Education (Complain (“Compl.”), (Dkt. 1,) at

ECF41.) on August 21, 2020. Plaintiff requested to pro

ceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). DKT. 13. For the rea

sons discussed below, Plaintiffs request to proceed IFP

is granted solely for the purpose of showing cause with

in forty-five (45) days that the Court has subject matter

jurisdiction over this action.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff pro se’s Complaint is a continuation of

his longstanding litigation concerning the Thomas M.

4 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s

CM/ECF docketing system and not the document’s internal pagination.

APPENDIX IF

Cooley Law School’s (the law school) 2003 decision to

dismiss Plaintiff for academic deficiencies, and the col

lection of Plaintiff s student loan in connection with his

attendance there. Plaintiff brings this case after two

prior unsuccessful actions in federal court. See Order

and Judgment Approving Report and Recommendation,

Baptichon v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. (W.D. Mich.

May 3, 2004) (No. 03-CV-176 (RAE) (ESC)), ECF No. 27

(dismissing Plaintiffs federal due process claims and

remanding state claims to Michigan state court); Bap

tichon v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. NO. 09-CV-562

(JTN (ESC) 2009 WL 5214911, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Dec.

28, 2009) (entering judgment in Defendants’ favor). In

this action, Plaintiff again disputes his $210,663.33

in student loan debt and brings the following claims

against the Department of Education, pursuant to

Federal Tort Claim Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b),

2671, et seq.: (1) forgery, (2) promissory equitable es

toppel, (3) unlawful collection actions, and (4) unlawful

withholding in violation of due process. (Compl., Dkt. 1.

At 8-14).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court shall dismiss an IFP action where it

is satisfied the action is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii)

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 18 U.S.C. §1915€(2)(B). In

reviewing Plaintiffs Complaint, the Court is mindful

“that the submission of a pro se litigant must be con

strued liberally and interpreted “to raise the strongest

arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed Bu

reau of Prison, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (em-

APPENDIX IF

phasis and additional citations omitted) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241,248 (2d. Cir. 2006)).

“Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard

afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if

the subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.” Koso v. McCulloh, No. 18-CV-7415 (JMA) (AYS) 2019 WL1748606,

at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2019) (citing Lyndonville Sav.

Bank & Tr. Co v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d.

Cir. 2000)) Because it involves a court’s power to hear a

case. 5555 Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited,

waived, or conferred by consent of the parties.” Platinum-Montaur Life Scis, LLC v. Navidea Biopharma

ceuticals, Inc. 943 F.3d 613, 617 (2d Cir 2019) (citing

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); Ca

ble Television Ass’n of N.Y. v. Finneran, 954 F.2d 91,94

(2d Cir. 1992)). Federal cours “have an independent ob

ligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdic

tion exists, even in the absence of challenge from any

party.” Nguyen v. FXCM Inc. 364 F. Supp. 3d 227, 237

(S.D.N.Y 2019) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546

U.S. 500, 514 (2006)) Where jurisdiction is lacking....

Dismissal is mandatory.” Yong Qin Luo v. Mikel, 625

F.3d 772,775 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United Food & Co.

Workers Union Loc. 919 v. Center Mark Props Meridien Square Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994)). Feder

al jurisdiction is available where a federal question” is

presented, 28 U.S.C. §1331, or where the plaintiff and

the defendant are of diverse citizenship and the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,00. 28 U.S.C. §1332.

APPENDIX IF

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff files this action against the Department

of Education, a federal agency, pursuant to the FTCA,

(Compl., Dkt 1, at 2.) Absent a waiver, sovereign immu

nity shields the Federal Government and its agencies

from suit.” Binder & Binder, P.C. v. Colvin, 818 F.3d

66, 70 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer. 510 U.S.

471,475 (1994)). In fact, the waiver of sovereign immu

nity is a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction.”

Fangfang Xu v. Cissna, 434 F. Supp. 3d 43, 57 (S.D.N.Y.

2020) quoting Presidential Gardens Assocs. v. U.S. ex

rel. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 175 F.3d 132, 139 (2d

Cir. 1999). “[Waivers of sovereign immunity must be

unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text and cannot

simply be implied.” Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d

144, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Nor

dic Vill., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992).

[TJhe FTCA authorizes suit against the federal gov

ernment to recover damages: for injury or loss of

property, or personal injury or death caused by the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em

ployee of the Government while acting within the

scope of his office or employment, under circum

stances where the United States, if a private per

son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance

with the law of the place where the act or omission

occurred.

Mathias v. United States

F. Supp. 3d____,

2020 WL 4381761, at *5 E.D.N.Y. 2020) quoting 28

U.S.C. §1346 (b)(1)). “Although the FTCA provides

a limited waiver of the United States sovereign im-

APPENDIX IF

munity for certain tortious conduct, it also requires

“that the claimant exhaust his administrative reme

dies before filing an action in federal court. Shabtai

v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. No. 02-CV-8437 (LAP), 2003

WL 21983025 at &6 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 2003) (quoting 28

U.S.C. §2675(a))). This requirement is jurisdictional

and cannot be waived.” Celestine v. Mr. Vernon Neigh

borhood Health Ctr. 403 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2005),

and applies equally to litigants with counsel and to

those proceeding pro se,” Davila v. Gutierrez, 330 F.3d

925,926 (S.D.N.Y. 2018))= (quoting Adeleke, 355 F.3d

at 153), affd 791 F. App x 211 (2d Cir. 2019). The par

ty asserting this court’s jurisdiction has the burden

to both plead and prove compliance with the statuto

ry [exhaustion] requirements.’” Collins v. U.S. Postal

Serv., ..._F. Supp. 3d.

.2020 WL 2734362, at *4

(E.D.N.Y.2020) (quoting In re agent Orange Prod.

Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 210,214 (2d Cir. 1987)).

Exhaustion is satisfied only when the claimant,

within two years of the claim accruing brought the

“claim to the appropriate Federal agency and that

agency either made a final denial of the claim or failed

to make a disposition on the claim within six months

after it was filed.” Liriano v. ICE/DHS, 827 F. Supp. 2d

264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. §2675(a));

see also Torres v. United States, 612 F. App’x 37,39 (2d

Cir. 2015) (summary order (As a precondition for suit

under FTCA, an administrative claim must be filed

with the responsible federal agency within two years

of a plaintiffs alleged injury.”). Moreover, the FT CA

“require [es] commencement of any tort claim against

the United States within six months of the agency’s

final denial.” Sanon v. Dep’t of Higher Educ., 435 F

APPENDIX IF

App’x 28,30 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (quoting

28 U.S.C. §2401(b))). Here, Plaintiffs Complaint does

not allege that Plaintiff filed an administrative claim

with the Department of Education for each of his

claim, that such claim was brought within two years

after it accrued. Or that such claim was either denied

or six months have elapsed since the claim was sub

mitted. Nor does the Complaint establish that, if ad

ministrative remedies were exhausted by way of the

agency’s final denial of Plaintiffs claim this action was

commenced no more than six months after the final

denial. It appears from attachments to the Complaint

that Plaintiff may have at least partially exhausted

the administrative remedies required to assert some

of his claims against the Department of Education.

(See Letters from the Department of Education dat

ed September 6, 2018, October 2, 2018, December 20,

2018, and January 31, 2019. Dkt. 1, at ECF 37-46;

Letters from Plaintiff to the Department of Education

dated September 13,2018 and October 15, 2018, Dkt.

1, at ECF 67-71.) Because it is Plaintiffs duty to plead

exhaustion and establish this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, Plaintiff is ordered to demonstrate that

his claims are timely and establish which, if any, of

his FTCA claims have been exhausted with the ap

propriate agency. See Shabtai, 2003 WL 21983025, at

*6 (dismissing FTCA claim for the pro se plaintiffs

failure to allege administrative exhaustion (citing Or

ange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 214)).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff shall

within forty-five days show cause why this Court has

APPENDIX IF

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the FTCA and

demonstrate that his claims are timely. Plaintiff shall

provide the date on which he believes each claim ac

crued, the date on which he filed for administrative

relief as to each claim, the name of the federal agency

with which he filled the claims, and the agency’s final

decision on each claim. Plaintiff must attach a copy of

his administrative tort claim(s) and a copy of the fed

eral agency with which he filed the claims and a copy

of the federal agency’s final decision(s). If Plaintiff

fails to comply with this Order or show good cause why

he cannot comply within the time allowed, the action

will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. All further proceedings including

Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. 4),

shall be stayed for forty-five (45) days for Plaintiff to

comply with this Order. Plaintiff’s application for pro

bono counsel (Dkt. 2) is denied without prejudice. The

Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) that

any appeal from this order would not be taken in good

faith and therefore IFP status is denied for purposes

of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,

444-45 (1962)

SO ORDERED

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

United States

District Judge

Dated: September 8, 2020

Brooklyn, New York

APPENDIX 1G

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Jean Dufort Baptichon

Plaintif,

Case No. l:18-cv-550

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

STATE OF MICHIGAN, THOMAS M. COOLEY

LAW SCHOOL, CHASE STUDENT LOAN

SERVICING, LLC., THE DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, and UNKNOWN PARTIES

Defendants

ORDER DENYING IN FORMA P

AUPERIS STATUS

Plaintiff filed this pro se action in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York,

seeking damages in excess of $20,999,999.00. The

Court characterized plaintiffs complaint as a continu

ation of his longstanding dispute with Thomas M. Cool

ey Law School (“Cooley”) arising from Cooley’s decision

to dismiss plaintiff for academic deficiencies in 2003.

Plaintiff filed two lawsuits in the Western District of

Michigan involving his dismissal: Jean Dufort Bap

tichon v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 5:03-cv-176

(W.D. Mich. (“Baptichon I”); and Jean Dufort Batichon

v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School et al., l:09-cv-562

APPENDIX 1G

(W.D. Mich.) (“Baptichon II”).5 The Court further not

ed that while plaintiff was a resident of Freeport, New

York, none of the defendants were located in New York,

with defendant State of Michigan and Cooley being lo

cated in Michigan, defendant Chase Student Loan Ser

vicing LLC being located in Mississippi, and defendant

Department of Education being located in Washington,

D.C. Given plaintiffs litigation history and the location

of defendants, the court concluded that venue was not

proper in the Eastern District Court of New York and

transferred the case to the Western District of Michi

gan. See Transfer Order (ECF No. 5).

The matter is now before this Court on plaintiffs

application and amended application to proceed in for

ma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2 and 11). On May 7,

2018, the magistrate judge entered a deficiency order

because plaintiffs original application to proceed IFP

did not contain sufficient detail of his financial condi

tion, including plaintiffs household income, assets, and

financial obligations. See Order ECF No.9). The Court

provided plaintiff with a copy of this Court’ Application

for proceed in district court without prepaying fees or

costs (long form) (AO 239).

Plaintiff filed an amended application ECF N. 11),

which rendered his original application moot. The

5 In Baptichon I, this Court dismissed plaintiffs federal due process

claims and remanded his state law claims to the Ingham County Circuit

Court. See Baptichon I (Order and Judgment. May3, 2004) ECF No 27)..

In Baptichon II, this Court observed that plaintiffs case was a “contin

uation of Plaintiffs long-standing battle with Cooley Law School con

cerning their decision to dismiss Plaintiff for academic deficiencies” sud

dismissed all claims. See Baptichon II, 2009 WL 5214911 at *1 (W.D.

Mich.) (Dec. 28,2009.

APPENDIX 1G

amended application included a 77 -page exhibit con

taining plaintiffs 2017 joint income tax returns (ECF

No. 11-1). In his amended application, plaintiff stated

that during the past 12 months he earned an average

of $331.00 per month from self-employment as an in

dependent law clerk,” and expected to earn $561 next

month. (Page ID .144-145). However, plaintiff objected

to providing any information with respect to his spouse

and referred the Court to his voluminous income tax

returns (Page ID.202). The tax returns indicate that

plaintiffs spouse earned $70,000.00 in 2017, but that

plaintiff and his spouse reported a negative adjusted

gross income due to reported capital loss of $3,000 .00

and reported loss on royalties and rents of84,745.00

(Page ID.151,214,223) ECF No. 11-1). The tax returns

also reflect that plaintiff, and his spouse received a fed

eral income tax refund of $7230.00 (Page ID. 150) and

a state income tax return of #3,654.00 (Page ID.207).

Plaintiff amended application also failed to provide

itemized monthly expenses referring the Court to his

income tax returns (Page ID. 147-148). Plaintiff also

objected to questions regarding his spouse’s financial

condition (Page ID 144-148. Plaintiff stated that he

had $372.70 in a saving account and $59.10 in a check

ing account but objected to providing any information

about his wife’s bank account. (Page ID 145) while

plaintiff stated he owns a 2003 Infiniti worth $5,000.00

and a Porsche worth $10,000.00. (Page ID. 146) he did

not disclose the value of his home or other real estate

on the amended application, once again, referring the

Court to his income tax returns (Page ID. 146) Based on

these returns, it appears that plaintiff owns real estate

located at 66 Laurel Avenue, Hempstead, New York

APPENDIX 1G

and 188 N Long Beach Avenue, Freeport, New York

(Page ID. 182, 184, 223). Plaintiff also declared under

penalty of perjury that the United States of America

owes him $20 Billion” Page ID. 146).

Plaintiff is not entitled to proceed as an indigent in

this Court. First, plaintiff did not complete the amend

ed application, having refused to provide requested

information regarding both himself and his spouse.

“Federal Courts, which are charged with evaluating

IFP application, have consistently considered not only

an IFP applicant’s personal income but also his or her

other financial resource, including the resources that

could be made available from the applicant’s spouse,

or other family members.” Helland v. St Mary’s Duluth

Clinic Health System, No CIV. 10-31 RHK/RLE., 2010

WL 502781 at *l(D.Minn. Feb. 5, 2010. The income of

the party’s spouse is particularly relevant and failure

to disclose a spouse’s income may result in denial of

IFP status Behmlander v. Commissioner of Social Se

curity; No 12-cv- 14424, 2012 WL 5457466 at *2 (E.D.

Mich. Oct. 16, 2012). R & R adopted 2012 WL 5457383

(Nov 8, 2012). See Onischuk v. Johnson Control Inc.,

182 Fed. Appx. 532 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming district

court’s denial of plaintiff s application to proceed in for

ma pauperis because he did not provide financial infor

mation about his wife.

Second, plaintiff has sufficient resources to pay

the filing fee. “The federal in forma pauperis statute,

enacted in 1892 and presently codified as 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915, is designed to ensure that indigent litigants

have meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, (1980)). Plaintiff is

APPENDIX 1G

not an indigent. While Plaintiff reported negative in

come adjusted gross income on his federal income tax

return, he and his wife earned over $70,000.00 in the

past year and received income tax refunds exceeding

$10,000.00Plaintiffs assets include two houses and

two vehicles (including a Porsche. Finally, plaintiff de

clared under penalty of perjury that the United States

of America owes him $20 billion.

Accordingly, plaintiffs application and amended

application for leave to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2 and 11)

are DENIED. Plaintiff must submit the $400.00 filing

fee within 28 days of the date of this order, or this ac

tion will be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Date: July 9, 2018

/s/ Paul Maloney

Paul L. Maloney

United States

District Judge

APPENDIX 1H

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Jean Dufort Baptichon

Case No. l:09*cv-562

Hon. Janet T. Neff

Plaintif,

THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW

SCHOOL, et al.

Defendants

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Defendants and

against Plaintiff.

Dated: December 28, 2009

/s/ Janet T Neff

JANET T. NEFF

United States

District Judge

APPENDIX 11

STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE INGHAM COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

GENERAL TRIAL DIVISION

JEAN DUFORT BAPTICHON

Plaintiff,

File No. 03-1784-CZ

Hon. Paula J.M. Manderfield

THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW

SCHOOL

Defendant

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTION AND

TO DISPENSE WITH ORAL ARGUMENT

AT A SESSION OF SAID Court held on the 18th

Day of December 2009, in the City of Lansing,

County of Ingham, State of Michigan.

PRESENT: HONORABLE PAULA J.M. MANDER

FIELD

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff s Motion

for Relief from Judgment pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)

(l)(c). Plaintiff seeks reversal of this Court’s Novem

ber 2, 2004 Opinion and Order granting summary dis

position in Defendant’s favor, based on Defendant’s

alleged fraud on the Court. In response to this Motion,

Defendant has filed a Motion for Sanctions and to Dis

pense with Oral Argument. The Court has reviewed

APPENDIX 11

the parties’ motions and, pursuant to MCR 2.119(E)

(3), the Court exercises its discretion to dispense with

oral argument and decides this motion based on the

parties’ written submission.

The order that Plaintiff seeks to have this Court

reverse was entered more than five years prior to the

time Plaintiff filed his motion. MCR 2.612(C)(2), how

ever, provides that a motion based on the grounds set

forth in MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a), (b), or (c) must be filed

both “within a reasonable time,” and within one year

after the judgment or order was entered or taken. Ac

cordingly, Plaintiffs motion is untimely and the Court

lacks jurisdiction to consider it.

Moreover, even a quick review of the record in this

case reveals that Plaintiff motion is devoid of evidence

to support it and entirely without merit. Plaintiff as

serts that various individuals connected with Defen

dant engaged in a conspiracy to ensure that predeter

mine grades were given to Plaintiff in order to prevent

him from raising his cumulative grade point average

to 2.0, so that Defendant would be justified in dismiss

ing Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not presented even a shred

of evidence, however, to support his outlandish claim.

Plaintiff further argues that injunction entered by the

Court in October 2003, prevented the Defendant from

dismissing Plaintiff on academic grounds at the end of

that semester, even, even if Plaintiffs grades were in

sufficient to raise his cumulative grade point average

to 2.0. The transcript of the show cause hearing, how

ever, clearly indicates that no such bar was created.

Rather, the transcript confirms that if Plaintiff failed

to raise his cumulative grade point average to 2.0 by

APPENDIX 11

the end of the term concluding in December 2003, then

Defendant had the authority to dismiss Plaintiff6.

MCR 2.114(D) provides that the signature of a par

ty or attorney on a motion or other pleading signifies

that to the best of the signer’s knowledge, informa

tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the

document is well grounded in fact and is warrant

ed by existing law or a good-faith for the extension,

modification, or reversal of existing law, and that the

document is not interposed for any improper purpose,

MCR 2.114(D), the Court shall impose an appropriate

sanction, including reasonable expenses. Moreover,

MCR 2.625(A)(2) provides that in an action filed on or

after October 1, 1986, if the court finds that an action

or defense is frivolous, costs shall be awarded as pro

vided by MCL 600.2591. MCL 600.2591(3)(a) that an

action or defense is frivolous when at least one of the

following conditions is met:

1. The primary purpose in initiating the action or

asserting the defense was to harass, embarrass or

injure the prevailing party.

2. There was no reasonable basis to believe the un

derlying facts were true; or

3. Their position was devoid of arguable legal mer

it.

Plaintiff s motion fails within the second and third

6 Transcript of Show cause hearing, attached to Defendant’s motion as

Exhibit 5. Pp 41-42

APPENDIX 11

of these conditions, at the very least. Accordingly, pur

suant to MCR 2.114 and 2.625, and MCL: 600.2591,

Defendant is entitled to costs and expenses.

Based on the above, the Court enters the following

Orders:

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion

for Relief from Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s

Motion for Sanctions and to Dispense with Oral Ar

gument is GRANTED, Plaintiff is ordered to pay De

fendant’s fees and costs incurred in connection with

defending Plaintiffs motion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk’s Of

fice shall not accept any further pleadings attempted

to be filed on Plaintiffs behalf without leave of the

Court.

This decision resolves the last pending claim and

closes the case.

/s/ Paula J.M. Manderfield

Hon. Paula J.M. Manderfield.

Circuit Court Judge

APPENDIX 1J

ORDER

For reasons more fully discussed above

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Mo

tion for Summary Disposition is GRANTED pursuant

to M.C.R 2.116(C)(10) and Plaintiffs Complaint is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

Pursuant to MCR 2.602(3), this Opinion and Or

der resolves the last pending claim in this matter and

closes the case.

Dated: November 2nd, 2004

/s/ Paula J.M. Manderfield

Hon. Paula J.M. Manderfield.

Circuit Court Judge

APPENDIX IK

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Mr. Dufort J. Baptichon,

Plaintiff,

vs.

The Secretary of the U.

S. Department of Educa

tion, WMU/Cooley Law

School, et al.

Defendant(s)

Case No.: 22-0941 (CJN)

PLAINTIFFS’ MO

TION FOR LEAVE

TO FILE BILL OF

COMPLAINT

Pursuant to Rule

Plaintiff hereby moves this Court for leave to file

the annexed Bill of Complaint pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 17.3. For the reasons to add additional

claims as set forth in the accompanying Bill of Com

plaint, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court

grant it leave to file the Bill of Complaint because it

will clarify the dispute between the parties and will

not cause any prejudice.

Respectfully submitted,

/S/ Dufort J Baptichon

Dufort J Baptichon

Plaintiff Pro se

APPENDIX 1L

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Mr. Dufort J. Baptichon,

Plaintiff,

vs.

The Secretary of the U.

S. Department of Educa

tion, WMU/Cooley Law

School, et al.

Defendant(s)

Docket No.:

VERIFIED BILL OF

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Residence:

188 N Long Beach Avenue

Freeport, New York

11520

718-751-5488

Plaintiff pro se, Jean Dufort Baptichon, (hereinaf

ter referred to as the plaintiff), on his own behalf, for

his claim states as follows:

1. The plaintiff is a citizen of New York who re

sides in the County of Nassau, State of New York.

2. The defendant United States Department of

Education (hereinafter referred to as the defendant

DOE) is a citizen of the District of Columbia.

3. The defendant WMU Cooley Law School (here

inafter referred to as the defendant law school) is an

educational institution affiliated with Western Mich

igan University, and a citizen of the Western District

of Michigan.

APPENDIX 1L

JURISDICTION

4. This Court has original and exclusive jurisdic

tion under Article III of the Constitution of the United

States to hear this case, and personal jurisdiction over

all parties in this action.

PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND

5. By way of background, the plaintiffs Complaint”

is a continuation of his long standing litigation con

cerning the defendant law school’s 2003 decision to

dismiss the plaintiff for alleged “academic deficien

cies” (see the plaintiffs miscalculated Official Tran

script from the defendant law school in the lower

courts records as Exhibit 1), and the collection of the

plaintiffs alleged “student loan in connection with a

“forged promissory note,” which signature thereon

was fraudulently signed by either defendant DOE, de

fendant law school, who allegedly implied that said

promissory note was signed by the plaintiff while in

attendance at the defendant law school or following

plaintiffs dismissal therefrom, by referring such al

leged student’s debt to multiple debt collection agen

cies. (See forged promissory note in the lower courts

records annexed thereto as exhibit 2).

6. A defendant law school’s professor or agent,

who taught the Professional Responsibility (PR) class

therein, had caused the loss of one of the plaintiffs

two Professional Responsibility blue books exam an

swers in the May 2002 Term, leaving one of the plain

tiff student’s answer book uncorrected for that term.

APPENDIX 1L

7. Following such incident caused by that profes

sor, the plaintiff then student reasonably informed

the dean of the defendant law school of the incident in

a writing, which was accompanied by an another law

student eyewitness’ notarized statement under oath

that she (the student eyewitness, whose name is Eliz

abeth Moore) was present when the plaintiff returned

his two PR exam blue books to the law school’s cus

todian located in the basement of the defendant law

school, requesting for the search of the uncorrected

blue answer book or the opportunity to retake that PR

exam that term, and

8. The law school’s dean denied the plaintiffs re

quest and did not let him retake the exam for that

term.

9. As a result of this academic incident, the plain

tiffs GPA dropped below the required 2.0, and the

plaintiff was placed on academic probation for that

May 02 Term.

10. Again, for Term of September 02, the defen

dant law school miscalculated the plaintiff s Term and

Cum GPA.

11. In addition, for Term of May 03, the defendant

re-miscalculated the plaintiff s Term and Cum GPA.

12. However, in the following Trinity Term of Sep

tember 26, 2003, the plaintiffs GPA rose to 3.0 putting

him on the Dean’s list for that term, (see Dean’s List

Letter in the lower courts records annexed thereto as

Exhibit 3), giving him a cumulative summary grade

APPENDIX 1L

of 2.05, removing him from the academic probation to

graduation, (see Exhibit 3A and compare to exhibit

3B, as annexed to lower courts records).

13. Ironically, on September 29, 2003, while the

law school dean did not allow the plaintiff to retake

the prior term PR exam after having lost plaintiffs

law exam answer bluebook and therefore failed to cor

rect one of plaintiff s two blue books exam answers, the

defendant law school prepared a revised grade report

to reduce the plaintiffs cumulative summary grade

to 1.96 in order to academically dismiss the plaintiff

in retaliation, (see Exhibit 3B and compare to exhibit

3A), because of the lawsuit by way of a temporary re

straining order, and a preliminary injunction, as well

as a complaint that the plaintiff then a student had

filed against the defendant law school in the Michigan

State Court.

14. In summary, when the defendant school is

not losing its students’ Blue Books exams answers,

the defendant school is miscalculating its students’

Grade Point Averages (GPAs), (see Exhibits 3A and

3B). The defendant law school’s recklessness or will

ful negligence does not stop there because when its

professors, employees or agents are not losing exam

answer books, or miscalculating GPAs, they are mak

ing errors in students’ tax documents and blaming

their errors on computer calculation errors, as if the

computer is the one that input the data in its base,

(see lower courts records Exhibit 4 annexed thereto).

Further, when the defendant law school is not doing

all the wrong and unlawful actions above- mentioned,

its representative counsel is soliciting, plotting and

APPENDIX 1L

planting the conspiratorial idea in his client’s mind to

retaliate against the plaintiff then a student litigant

in a court hearing before a judge by asking the judge

“if the plaintiff student does not make the required

GPA of 2.0 in the final exams, can the defendant law

school then dismiss the plaintiff student,” (see prelim

inary injunction hearing in The State Court, which is

clearly suggestive (See preliminary injunction hear

ing Transcript, in the Ingham County Circuit Court

in Baptichon v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School File

No.: 03-1784-CZ). These facts are not devoid of legal

merits in this case as the proponents of the defendant

law school would want to make the courts believe.

15. The lawyer who represented the plaintiff then

a student at the defendant law school in his case at

the Ingham County Circuit Court was a graduate of

the defendant law school and the lawyer who repre

sented the defendant law school was not a graduate

from the defendant law school.

16. Upon argument before a Michigan State Court

Judge, a preliminary injunction against the defendant

law school was granted and that court ordered the de

fendant law school to reinstate the then student plain

tiff and not to dismiss the student plaintiff from the

defendant law school poor academic performance.

17. Then at the request of the defendant law

school’s lawyer who asked the judge: “what if the stu

dent plaintiff does not make the required 2.0 GPA in

the final law school exam, can the law school dismiss

him then? (Preliminary injunction hearing transcript

in the Ingham County Circuit Court will be available

APPENDIX 1L

upon discovery),

18. The judge replied that the defendant law school

could not dismiss the student plaintiff unless and un

til the defendant law school obtained an order from

the court!

19. The next day following that court order the stu

dent plaintiff went to class every day on time, always

ready and participated in all class discussions only

to be ironized and ridiculed by two specific law pro

fessors, one of whom teaches remedies and the other

teaches evidence classes.

20. The plaintiff, then student, reported these crit

ical incidents to his defendant law school’s graduate

lawyer advising him to inform that court but nothing

was done to his knowledge and belief. As foreseen,

based on those two professors in class threats to the

plaintiff student, each one of them assigned a c- minus

to the plaintiff student in their final exams calculated

just enough to keep the plaintiff student below the re

quired 2.0 GPA.

THE NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS CLAIM

21. The defendant wrongfully academically dis

missed the plaintiff from the defendant’s law school.

The plaintiff was eligible to continue the defendant

law school’s program and in fact had legally complet

ed the defendant law school’s program, as well as the

legal clerkship required by the New York State Appel

late Division and the New York State Board of Law

Examiners, which qualifies the plaintiff to seat for

APPENDIX 1L

the New York State Bar. (Evidence available from the

lower courts’ records). Hence, the plaintiff is seeking

an injunction ordering the defendant law school to is

sue the plaintiff his diploma as he requested and to

pay any and all student loans taken on plaintiff stu

dent’s behalf from Defendant DOE and an injunction

ordering the DOE to cease and desist her unlawful

collection attempts and her violation of plaintiff due

process rights and to acquit such debt for the rea

sons stated herein, and compensate the plaintiff for

all damages caused by the defendants’ wrongful and

unlawful actions from January 2002 Term to date, be

cause the plaintiff student did not contract for such

willful actions on the parts of defendants..

THE MATHEMATICAL FACTS

OF THE PLAINTIFFS CASE

22. The defendant law school committed fraud in

obtaining its judgments against the plaintiff student

in the Ingham County Circuit Court and the United

States District Court, Western District of Michigan,

Southern Division, and the plaintiff just discovered

said fraud. It all started in “Term January 2002,” fol

lowing the “Term September 2001 wherein the plain

tiffs “TERM ATT” credits were 12, his “TERM ERN”

credits were 12, his TERM HRS credits were 12, his

“TERM PTS” were 24 and his “TERM GPA” was 2.00

resulting in a “TERM CUM ATT” 12 credits, a “TERM

CUM ERN” 12 credits, a CUM HRS” 12 credits, a

“CUM PTS” 24 and a “CUM GPA” 2.00..

23. In that “Term of January 2002, the plaintiff

voided two grades, Civil Procedure I and Property II,

APPENDIX 1L

which resulted according to the defendant law school’s

Official Transcript calculations as follows:

A. “TERM ATT” 12 credits, “TERM ERN”

6.00 credits, “TERM HRS” 6 credits, TERM PTS

9.00, and a “TERM GPA 1.50, which resulted in

a “TERM CUM ATT” of 24.00 credits, a “TERM

CUM ERN” of 18.00 credits, a “TERM CUM HRS”

of 18.00 credits, a “TERM CUM PTS” of 33 and a

“TREM CUM” GPA of 1.83, which brings us to the

first issue in this case, which is:

B. The term of January 2002 and the cumula

tive GPAs were false. The defendant law school’s

V-Grade/Retake policy in effect that term was in

tended to afford students whose cumulative grade

point average was falling below the required 2.0

the right to void a maximum of two failing grades

and keep the grades that maintained their 2.0 GPA

for that term, on the condition that the student will

retake the failed courses but will not be credited

for the grade received afterward whether it is an

A, a B or a C when retaken said courses, and with

either of these grades the student will receive a

“P” for passing the course. Here, the plaintiff took

four (4) legal courses: Civil Procedure I, Contract

II, Property II and Torts II, each of which carries 3

credits. The plaintiff failed and voided two courses

with the grades, i.e., 3 credits for Civil Procedure

I and 3 credits for Property II. Hence, the plain

tiff attempted 12 credits and only earned 6 credits

for that term and the remaining two courses and 6

credits the plaintiff voided as per the V-Grade/Retake Policy. Therefore, the term of January 2002

APPENDIX 1L

and the cumulative GPA were false because the

“TERM PTS” and the “CUM PTS” were in fact and

mathematically wrong.

C. The defendant law school intentionally and

systemically discriminated against the plaintiff

because of his race and was willfully negligent in

miscalculating his grade point averages for the

remaining terms of May 2002, September 2002,

May 2003 and September 2003 using its V-Grade/

Retake Policy which appears to be a fraudulent

policy in order to keep collecting the plaintiff stu

dents loans money on his behalf while keeping

him in school despite the fact that his dismissal

was already preordained based on the defendant

law school’s miscalculations of plaintiffs GPAs.

The following table, compared to the Official Tran

script, is the proper and correct method of calculat

ing students GPAs:

TERM: SEPTEMBER 01

CONTRACTS I

CRIMINAL LAW

INTRO TO LAW

PROPERTY I

TORTSI

ATT

TERM 12

CUM 12

ERN

HRS

PTS

BCCR

BCGPA

2.00

APPENDIX 1L

TERM OF JANUARY-02

CIV. PRO. I

CONTRACTS II

PROPERTY II

TORTS I

3 VOID

TERM

CUM

ATT

ERN

HRS

PTS

GPA

2.00

A Voided Grade or Course and/or Retake must not

be factored in the calculation of the GPA

TERM OF MAY-02

CIV PRO II

CRIM PRO

3.00 F

3.00 D

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY

3.00 R

RETAKE

RESEARCH

& WRITING

3.00 BATT

TERM

CUM

9.00

27.00

ERN

6.00

HRS

6.00

PTS

GPA

2.00

TERM SEPTEMBER-2002

CIV. PRO. I

TAXATION

BB-

BUSINESS

ORGANIZATION

TERM

CUM

ATT

ERN

HRS

PTS

15.00 2.5

63.00 2.1

GPA

APPENDIX 1L

TERM OF MAY 2003

CIV. PRO. II

CON LAW I

PROPERTY II

3.00 B

3.00 P

ATT

TERM

CUM

ERN

12.00

48.00

45.00

HRS PTS GPA

6.00 18.00 3.00

36.00 81.00 2.15

TERM OF SEPTEMBER 2003

ADVANCE

3.00 B-

WRITING

CON LAW II

EVIDENCE

3.00 C

3.00 C3.00 C-

EQUITIES

& REMEDIES

TERM

CUM

ATT

ERN

HRS

PTS

GPA

12.00

60.00

12.00

12.00 24.00 2.00

48.00 105.00 2.18

APPENDIX 1L

To wit, in this case, on September 26, 2003 Cooley

Law School issued the plaintiff student’s Grade Report

for the Trinity Term 2003 with a Term GPA of 3.00,

with a Cumulative Summary of 2.05 and Required

Course Cumulative Summary of 2.05, (see attached

Grade Report annexed hereto as Exhibit 3A), only to

later, on September 29, 2003, issue an uncommon Re

vised Grade Report to reflect an updated Term Sum

mary of 3.00, a cumulative Summary of 1.96 and a

Required Course Summary of 1.96 (see the uncommon

Revised Grade Report annexed hereto as Exhibit 3B)

in order to wrongfully dismiss the plaintiff student ac

ademically together with his pending lawsuit against

the law school in the Michigan State Court and the

Western District Court then, (see No.03-CV-176 (RAE)

(ESC)). Therefore, the defendant law school obtained

judgments by fraud in these courts and intentionally

and systemically discriminated against the plaintiff

because of his race and was willfully negligent in mis

calculating his grade point averages for the remaining

terms.

COUNT I, FRAUD

24. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs

1-24 as though fully stated herein. The evidence will

prove to the Court and to the jury for that matter

that the defendant law school has not only committed

fraud in the factum against the plaintiff as a then law

student but also against both the state and federal

courts, as well as to the law students population and

the legal community in general, when the defendant

law school misrepresented the plaintiffs GPA by in

tentionally or recklessly miscalculating said GPA in

APPENDIX 1L

complete disregard of its legal duty as a legal educator

and the consequences to the plaintiff as then a law

student whose legal education was being financed by

federal loans taken on plaintiffs behalf by the defen

dant law school. It is implausible that plaintiff should

be liable for such corrupt student debt. It would not be

fair to say that plaintiff owes the government agency

a debt.

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays this Court to

award him exemplary damages in the amount of

$10,000,000.00 together with an order for the issuance

of his legal diploma from the defendant law school and

any other relief that this Court deems just, proper and

equitable.

COUNT II, LIBEL

25. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs

1-25 (including Exhibits annexed) as though fully stat

ed herein. The evidence will also prove that the defen

dant law school committed libel against the plaintiff

as a law student by printing and publishing false in

formation about his grade point average destroying

his reputation and integrity as a then law student,

as a former law student and as a legal scholar whose

legal career has completely halted and destroyed as a

result of the defendant law school’s libelous actions,

because such defamatory statements by the defen

dant law school is not only libel per se, but also libel

per quod that created special damages to the plaintiff

such as loss of educational opportunities, of legal and

professional employment opportunities as a former

disgraced, wrongfully academically dismissed law

APPENDIX 1L

student. This is a proven deprivation of rights under

§ 1983 pursuant to the plaintiffs “stigma-plus” due

process claim, Plaintiffs has established: (1) the public

disclosure of this stigmatizing statement by a state

actor; (2) the accuracy of which is contested; (3) plus

the denial of some more tangible interest.

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays this Court to award

him special and general damages in the amount of

$19,000,000.00 for the loss of opportunities from the

year 2003 when the defendant law school began its

continuous unlawful and wrongful actions against the

plaintiff to the year 2022 when the plaintiff filed this

complaint, together with an order for the issuance of

his legal diploma from the defendant law school and

any other relief that this Court deems just, proper and

equitable.

COUNT III, VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

26. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs

1-26 (including Exhibits annexed in the lower courts’

records) as though fully stated herein. To be plain and

concise, the undisputed facts will prove that the de

fendant law school violated the Rules of Professional

Conduct and Judicial Ethics as a defending party to

a lawsuit who acted improperly and inappropriately

under the Rules, when, as a party defendant in that

lawsuit, the defendant law school was preliminary

enjoined by that court after a hearing before trial to

prevent the defendant law school from committing the

irreparable injury of dismissing the plaintiff student

APPENDIX 1L

from school before the court had a chance to decide

the case, the defendant law school with its conflicting

interest decided to interfere with the Code of Conduct,

which is a set of ethical principles and guidelines ad

opted by the Judicial Conference that provides guid

ance on issues of judicial or educational integrity and

independence, judicial diligence and impartiality by

which judges must abide for the avoidance of impropri

ety or even its appearance. This means that the defen

dant law school as an enjoined defendant in the plain

tiffs lawsuit must not have acted like a sole judge,

jury and executioner in correcting the plaintiffs final

exam which was the subject matter of the case against

the defendant law school, on which the plaintiff s case

depended to go to trial. In doing so, the defendant

law school violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and

Professional Ethics because it was not impartial and

lacked judicial integrity and independence as well as

educational diligence. The defendant law school failed

to avoid impropriety or even its appearance, as judges

should not hear cases in which they have either per

sonal knowledge of the disputed facts, a personal bias

concerning a party to the case, earlier involvement in

the case as a lawyer, or a financial interest in any par

ty or subject matter of the case, because the defendant

law school had a conflict of interests in that case as

the defendant law school was a party defendant and

the final exam, which an independent uninterested

third party, such as the injunction issuing court or the

Western Michigan University, could have corrected,

as that final exam was the subject matter of the law

suit against the defendant law school. The defendant

law school violated the Code.

APPENDIX 1L

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays this Court to grant

him a declaratory judgment, together with an order

for the issuance of his legal diploma from the defen

dant law school and any other relief that this Court

deems just, proper, and equitable.

COUNT IV, RETALIATORY

ACADEMIC DISMISSAL

27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs

1-27 (including Exhibits annexed) as though fully

stated herein. The defendant law school retaliated

against the plaintiff as a then law student who filed

a lawsuit in state and federal courts and obtained the

state preliminary injunction against the defendant

law school for its wrongful actions, and where after,

the defendant law school’s two agents, employees or

professors who taught evidence, equity & remedies in

term September 2003 verbally threatened the plain

tiff in class, conspired to retaliate against the plaintiff

and retaliated against the plaintiff in their corrections

of the plaintiffs final exams, upon which successful fi

nal exams the plaintiff then student’s lawsuit depend

ed in order not to be dismissed by the state court, for

the benefits of the defendant law school as their em

ployer who then in retaliation dismissed the plaintiff

then student for lack of such success therein, causing

the plaintiff then student litigant’s lawsuit against

the defendant law school to be also automatically dis

missed by the courts.

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays this Court to grant

him a declaratory judgment, as well as punitive dam

ages in the amount of $10,000,000.00 together with an

APPENDIX 1L

order for the issuance of his legal diploma from the de

fendant law school and any other relief that this Court

deems just, proper, and equitable.

COUNT V, FORGERY AND

VIOLATION OF RIGHTS UNDER

42 U.S.C. §1983

28. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs

1-28 (including Exhibits annexed) as though fully

stated herein. The defendant law school and/or the de

fendant DOE forged the plaintiffs signature on a fed

eral student loan document, i.e. a “Promissory Note”

that the plaintiff never signed. This is a federal tort

that destroyed the plaintiff s reputation by bad credit

reports with multiple debt collection agencies and the

credit bureau, in direct violation of plaintiffs rights

to due process. (Bad credit report and credit denial

are available upon request). The plaintiff is being ha

rassed by multiple debt collection agencies generated

by the defendants. (Harassing letters and plaintiffs

responses to such are available upon request). The

defendants forged a Federal Family Education Loan

Program (FFELP), Federal Consolidation Loan Ap

plication and Promissory Note that the plaintiff nev

er had the opportunity to sign personally, and this is

a federal tort and the unfair treatment by both the

State of Michigan and defendant DOE concerns the

rights, privileges, and immunities enumerated in the

United States Constitution.

29. The plaintiffs civil rights and civil liberties

were violated by the respondents pursuant to the Civ

il Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits discrimination in

APPENDIX 1L

education based on Race, Color, Religion, Sex, Nation

al Origin or other personal characteristics.

30. As to plaintiffs forged signature on the prom

issory note at issue, the information on such Appli

cation was apparently from a prior undergraduate

promissory note that the plaintiff had signed while in

undergraduate school, which debt is fully paid and ac

quitted. The signature on that Application is patent

ly not the plaintiffs signature. The defendants’ sec

retaries, employees, or servants (named omitted due

to the temporary nature of the position of secretary)

have forged the plaintiffs signature on that Federal

Application and Promissory Note. Apparently, the de

fendant’s agents knew that the Promissory Note was

defective or altered, and accordingly, as a Guaranty

Agency, the defendant DOE had knowledge that said

loan was uncollectible by reason of this defective con

dition. (Promissory Note and Indemnification Agree

ment for the Assignment of the Promissory Note are

available upon request).

31. As a result of Defendant’s forgery of Plaintiffs

signature, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress,

loss of possession of his property and liberty interests

in his good name, reputation, honor, integrity, credit

worthiness and civil rights, which are protected under

the Constitution. The plaintiff also suffered and con

tinues to suffer actual, consequential, and incidental

losses sustained because of Defendants wrongful ac

tions. (See lower courts Exhibit 6) 32. The defendant

secretary (name omitted) and the state court judge

(name omitted ) acted or omitted to act under color

of state law when the secretary forged the plaintiffs

APPENDIX 1L

signature on the Federal Document and withhold the

plaintiff s and wife’s income tax return without a war

rant, hence violating his Fourth Amendment Rights

against illegal search and seizure and the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, and when the State Court Judge

of Michigan failed to supervise her own preliminary

injunction against defendant law school which presid

ed over this case as a defendant, and the acts [failure

to act] of the defendant deprived the plaintiff of partic

ular rights under [the laws of the United States] [the

United States Constitution] as explained in later in

structions. 33. Defendant Cooley law School’s conduct

was an actual cause of the claimed injury because the

injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s

conduct and the conduct had sufficient connection

with the result. A person acts “under color of state

law” when the person acts or purports to act in the

performance of official duties under any state, county,

or municipal law, ordinance, or regulation. Here the

defendant’s conduct was and is an actual cause of a

plaintiffs injury because the injury would not have

occurred ‘but for’ that conduct, and the conduct has a

sufficient connection to the result. The defendant act

ed under color of state law, the acts or failures to act

of the defendant law school deprived the plaintiff of

particular rights under the laws of the United States,

the United States Constitution, and the defendant’s

conduct was the actual cause of the claimed injury.

COUNT VI, STIGMA-PLUS” DUE PROCESS

CLAIM UNDER § 1983

34. Plaintiff alleges a “stigma-plus” due process

APPENDIX 1L

claim under § 1983 on the grounds that Defendants

violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by deny

ing student plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before

publishing a purportedly erroneous Grade Point Av

erage (GPA) report on a successful final examination.

Plaintiff contends that the publication of this GPA

report caused Plaintiffs to be deprived of protected

employment-related interests. The plaintiff has es

tablished: (1) the public disclosure of this stigmatiz

ing statement by a state actor, here the defendant law

school; (2) the accuracy of which is contested; (3) plus

the denial of some more tangible interest.

35. The respondent law school, as a private entity,

performs a traditional, exclusive public function, i.e.

educating or training lawyers and future judges for

both federal, state, and local courts. The respondent

law school as a private entity performing such gov

ernmental function, is a state actor who is (1) acting

under color of State law; (2) subjects or causes to be

subjected to deprivation; (3) a U.S. citizen (student

plaintiff) or person in the jurisdiction of the United

States; (4) of a right, privilege, or immunity secured

by the Constitution and laws.

36. Defendant Cooley Law School as a state actor

has caused a constitutional violation under the “inte

gral-participant doctrine,” because (1) the defendant

law school knew about and acquiesced in the consti

tutionally defective conduct as part of a common plan,

which is the formula that follows: “academic dismiss

al equals = Complaint’s dismissal^ defendant school

potential financial loss eliminated,” with those (her

servants or agents (names omitted)) whose conduct

APPENDIX 1L

constituted the violation, or (2) the defendant set in

motion a series of acts by others (her servant or agents)

which the defendant knew or reasonably should have

known would cause others to inflict the constitutional

injury on the student plaintiff.”

37. The defendants’ conduct was the actionable

cause of the claimed injuries on the student plain

tiff. The defendant law school’s “conduct is an actual

cause,” or cause-in-fact, of the student plaintiffs in

juries because the injury (“failure to graduate after

about 4 years of study at the defendant law school)

would not have occurred ‘but for’ that conduct, (failure

of the defendant law school to recuse herself from cor

recting the final law exams of the student); her failure

to assign such correction to an independent arbiter,

such as the injunction issuing state court or the Mich

igan Law School as another alternative to her impro

priety in her self-serving correction while a defendant

in the action.

38. The defendant’s conduct is a “proximate cause”

of a plaintiffs injury because “it was not just any

cause, but one with a sufficient connection to the re

sult. “The Stigma-plus” due process claim lies in this

case because reputational harm to student plaintiff

is also accompanied by the additional deprivation of

liberty or property, by the defendants. It was foresee

able that if the student plaintiff is successful in his

final exams, the defendant law school would have lost

the pending lawsuit because winning the lawsuit was

dependent upon the result of the student plaintiffs

final law exams. And the defending law school did

not want to lose the lawsuit.” It was also foreseeable

APPENDIX 1L

that the defendant law school would retaliate against

the student plaintiff for having sued her, a violation

of student plaintiff First Amendment Rights, and the

state court breached her duty to protect the student

plaintiff against such retaliation, but instead facilitat

ed it, a violation of student plaintiffs Equal Protection

Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con

stitution of the United States. The proximate cause

requirement places liability in this situation on the

defendant law school because the causal link between

her conduct and resulting injuries to the student

plaintiff is so related and strong that the consequence

is more aptly described as destructive to the student

plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this

Court to grant judgment in his favor and against the

defendants in an amount in of $15,000,000.00 for

compensatory damages sufficient to compensate the

plaintiff for actual, consequential and incidental loss

es sustained as a result of defendants’ wrongful and

unlawful actions and for exemplary damages in the

amount of $10,000,000 resulting from defendants’ in

tentional, and unlawful actions, ordering the defen

dant DOE to discharge the alleged student loan debt

and to report the discharge of the student loan debt to

alb credit reporting agencies to which the defendant

DOE previously reported the status of the loan and to

remove any and all adverse credit history previously

associated with the loan, together with an order for

the defendant law school to issue the plaintiff his legal

diploma and any other relief that this Court deems

just, proper and equitable.

APPENDIX 1L

COUNT VII, COLLECTION HARASSMENTS

39. The Defendant Agency caused its agents Re

liant Capital, Reliance Coast and others to keep ha

rassing the Plaintiff with threatening collections let

ters during the years 2019 and 2020 and reported the

Plaintiffs name and social security number to the

credit bureau and caused the Plaintiff student to be

denied credit. Further, the Defendant Agency, without

any legal authority or court order, caused the Internal

Revenue Service to garnish the Plaintiffs and wife’s

joint tax returns to the point Plaintiffs wife is forced

to file injured spouse tax form every year to avoid the

illegal garnishment of their income tax returns. The

plaintiff is being harassed by multiple of the Defen

dant Agency’s debt collectors generated by the defen

dants. (Harassing letters and plaintiffs responses to

such are available upon request).

40. As a result of Defendant’s collection harass

ment, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress,

loss of possession of his property and liberty interests

in his good name, reputation, honor, integrity, credit

worthiness and civil rights, which are protected under

the Constitution. The plaintiff also suffered and con

tinues to suffer actual, consequential and incidental

losses sustained as a result of Defendant’s wrongful

actions. (See Exhibit 6)

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this

Court to grant judgment in his favor and against the

defendants in an amount in excess of $75,000 for com

pensatory damages sufficient to compensate the plain

tiff for actual, consequential and incidental losses sus-

APPENDIX 1L

tained as a result of defendants’ wrongful actions and

for exemplary damages in the amount of $1,000,000

resulting from defendants’ intentional, and unlawful

actions, ordering the defendant DOE to discharge the

alleged student loan debt and to report the discharge

of the student loan debt to all credit reporting agencies

to which the defendant DOE previously reported the

status of the loan and to remove any and all adverse

credit history previously associated with the loan, to

gether with an order for the defendant law school to

issue the plaintiff his legal diploma and any other re

lief that this Court deems just, proper and equitable.

COUNT VIII ABUSE OF PROCESS

41. The defendant Federal Agency failed to take

proper action and to disclose its decision in writing

on the Plaintiff student’s Loan Discharge Applica

tion, which the Plaintiff student submitted to the de

fendant agency on August 15, 2018, thereby causing

the Plaintiff student to be prejudiced in exhausting

his administrative tort remedies in a timely manner

pursuant to the applicable regulations and in timely

commencing this action as a decision from the Defen

dant’s agency was pending and awaited.

42. As a result of Defendant Agency’s abuse of

process, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress,

loss of possession of his property and liberty interests

in his good name, reputation, honor, integrity, credit

worthiness, civil rights and liberties, which are pro

tected under the Constitution. The plaintiff also suf

fered and continues to suffer actual, consequential

and incidental losses sustained as a result of Defen-

APPENDIX 1L

dant’s wrongful actions. (See Exhibit 6)

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this

Court to grant judgment in his favor and against the

defendants in an amount in excess of $75,000 for com

pensatory damages sufficient to compensate the plain

tiff for actual, consequential and incidental losses sus

tained as a result of defendants’ wrongful actions and

for exemplary damages in the amount of $1,000,000

resulting from defendants’ intentional, and unlawful

actions, ordering the defendant DOE to discharge the

alleged student loan debt and to report the discharge

of the student loan debt to all credit reporting agencies

to which the defendant DOE previously reported the

status of the loan and to remove any and all adverse

credit history previously associated with the loan, to

gether with an order for the defendant law school to

issue the plaintiff his legal diploma and any other re

lief that this Court deems just, proper and equitable.

COUNT IX NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION

43. The Defendant Federal Agency failed to super

vise its agents whose duty is to manage the Federal

Family Education Loan Program and its Promissory

Notes. The defendants forged a Federal Family Edu

cation Loan Program (FFELP), Federal Consolidation

Loan Application and Promissory Note that the plain

tiff never had the opportunity to sign personally. The

information on such Application was apparently from

a prior undergraduate promissory note that the plain

tiff had signed while in undergraduate school, which

debt is fully paid and acquitted. The signature on that

Application is patently not the Plaintiff student’s sig-

APPENDIX 1L

nature. The Defendants’ agents, employees, or ser

vants have forged the plaintiffs signature on that

Federal Application and Promissory Note. Apparent

ly, the Defendant’s agents knew that the Promissory

Note was defective or altered, and accordingly, as a

Guaranty Agency, the defendant DOE had knowledge

that said loan was uncollectible by reason of this de

fective condition. (Promissory Note and Indemnifica

tion Agreement for the Assignment of the Promissory

Note are available Upon request).

44. As a result of Defendant’s forgery of Plaintiffs

signature, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress,

loss of possession of his property and liberty interests

in his good name, reputation, honor, integrity, cred

it worthiness and civil rights and liberties, which are

protected under the Constitution. The plaintiff also

suffered and continues to suffer actual, consequential

and incidental losses sustained because of Defendant’s

wrongful and unlawful actions. (See lower courts’ re

cords Exhibit 6 annexed thereto);

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this

Court to grant judgment in his favor and against the

defendants in an amount in excess of $75,000 for com

pensatory damages sufficient to compensate the plain

tiff for actual, consequential and incidental losses sus

tained as a result of defendants’ wrongful actions and

for exemplary damages in the amount of $1,000,000

resulting from defendants’ intentional, and unlawful

actions, ordering the defendant DOE to discharge the

alleged student loan debt and to report the discharge

of the student loan debt to all credit reporting agencies

to which the defendant DOE previously reported the

APPENDIX 1L

status of the loan and to remove any and all adverse

credit history previously associated with the loan, to

gether with an order for the defendant law school to

issue the plaintiff his Jurist Diploma and any other

relief that this Court deems just, proper and equita

ble.

COUNT X, VIOLATION OF THE PLAINTIFFS

RIGHTS TO BOTH PROCEDURAL, SUBSTAN

TIVE DUE PROCESSES AND THE RIGHT TO

EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE OF THE

PLAINTIFFS RACE

45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs

1-29 (including Exhibits annexed) as though fully

stated herein. The defendant law school violated the

plaintiffs constitutionally protected rights to both

procedural and substantial due processes and the

plaintiffs right to equal protection as a then law stu

dent when after the defendant law school’s aforemen

tioned professor lost one of the plaintiff s Blue Book

Exam answer causing it not to be corrected, the plain

tiff made a written report to the defendant law school

Dean that was corroborated by another defendant law

school’s student’s notarized affidavit certifying that

the plaintiff student had submitted two Blue Books

Exam Answers to the defendant law school’s custodi

an, the Dean did not believe the plaintiff student and

did not let the plaintiff student retake that PR exam

then despite the eye of an independent and uninter

ested witness’ affidavit because the plaintiff is a black

student. The plaintiff believes if he was a white stu

dent the defendant law school’s Dean would have let

him retake that PR exam. Hence, the defendant law

APPENDIX 1L

school violated the plaintiffs constitutional right to

procedural due process and equal protection.

46. The defendant law school, in failing to assign

the duty of correction of the plaintiff then student lit

igant’s final exams to a disinterested third party like

the Western Michigan University or to the injunc

tion order issuing Court instead of the defendant law

school herself as an interested party in the lawsuit in

both state and federal courts, has violated the plain

tiffs constitutional right to substantial due process

and constitutional right equal protection of the law.

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays this Court to

grant him a declaratory judgment, as well as puni

tive and compensatory damages in the amount of

$10,000,000.00 together with an order for the issuance

of his jurist diploma from the defendant law school

and any other relief that this Court deems just, proper

and equitable.

COUNT XI, DEFENDANT LAW SCHOOL

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AND POSITION OF POWER OVER

ITS FRAUDULENT GRADING SYSTEM

47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs

1-31 (including Exhibits annexed) as though fully

stated herein. The defendant law school abused its

discretion and position of power over its fraudulent

grading system, which the defendant law school used

to kill two birds with one stone, i.e., dismissing the

plaintiff from the defendant law school’s program

while also dismissing the plaintiffs pending lawsuit

APPENDIX 1L

against the defendant law school in state and federal

courts, which could not have occurred if an indepen

dent grader like the Western Michigan University or

the injunction order issuing court had then corrected

the plaintiffs final exams to avoid the appearance of

impropriety on the part of the defendant law school

who was then a defendant in the plaintiff student’s

lawsuit. (See Exhibit 7 Letter to defendant explaining

GPA.)

48. The action, by the defendant law school, of cor

recting its legal adversary’s final exams (the plaintiffs

exams) upon which a pending lawsuit depended in or

der not to be dismissed, shows that the defendant law

school placed itself above the law and that the defen

dant law school is intellectually dishonest, vindictive

and not accountable to the rules of law, which makes

no exception as to who or which entity should not com

ply with the Rules.

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays this Court to grant him

a declaratory judgment, as well as punitive damages

in the amount of $10,000,000.00 together with an or

der to the defendant law school to issue to the plaintiff

his jurist diploma and any other relief that this Court

deems just, proper and equitable.

Dated: 03/25/2024

Freeport, New York

/s/ Dufort J Baptichon

Jean Dufort Baptichon/

Pro se

188 N Long Beach Ave.

Freeport, New York 11520

718-751-5488

APPENDIX 1L

VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK}

ss:

COUNTY OF NASSAU}

Jean Dufort Baptichon, being duly affirmed, de

poses and states that I am the student Plaintiff pro se

in the above referenced action that I have written and

read the foregoing Verified Bill of Complaint, and the

above statement is true to the best of my knowledge,

information and belief.

Is/ Dufort J Baptichon

Jean Dufort Baptichon

Petitioner Pro se

APPENDIX 1L

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of June

2024,1 served a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Verified Bill of Complaint upon the Defendant Depart

ment of Education and the WMU Thomas Cooley Law

School by first class United States mail addressed to:

Patricia King McBride

Assistant Unites States Attorney

601 D Street

Washington, D.C. 20530

Kathryn E. Bonorchis

Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLC

100 Light Street, Suite 130

Baltimore, MD 21202

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Dufort J Baptichon

Dufort J, Baptichon

Petitioner Pro se

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.