Reply Brief — Growth Energy, et al., Petitioners v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.

No. 23-1230

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

GROWTH ENERGY AND THE

RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners,

v.

CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, LLC, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

DAVID M. LEHN

JAY SCHUFFENHAUER

BOIES SCHILLER

FLEXNER LLP

1401 New York Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 237-2727

dlehn@bsfllp.com

EVAN M. EZRAY

BOIES SCHILLER

FLEXNER LLP

401 East Las Olas Boulevard

Suite 1200

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

(954) 377-4237

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 663-6800

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

Counsel for Petitioners

MATTHEW W. MORRISON

SHELBY L. DYL

PILLSBURY WINTHROP

SHAW PITTMAN LLP

1200 Seventeenth St. NW

Washington, DC 20036

Counsel for Growth Energy (202) 663-8036

matthew.morrison

@pillsburylaw.com

Counsel for the Renewable

Fuels Association

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................... ii

INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 1

ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 2

I.

THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG .............................. 2

II. THIS CASE REMAINS AN IDEAL VEHICLE ................ 5

III. PETITIONERS HAVE A STRONG INTEREST

IN THIS CASE ................................................................ 9

CONCLUSION ................................................................. 12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA,

936 F.3d 628 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .................................... 10

Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d

691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .............................................. 10, 12

Association of Data Processing Service

Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150

(1970) ............................................................................ 10

Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v.

FEC, 788 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ......................... 12

Cuff v. Trans States Holdings, Inc., 768 F.3d

605 (7th Cir. 2014)......................................................... 8

HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v.

Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382 (2021) ........ 1, 9

Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul

Home v. Pennsylvania, 591 U.S. 657 (2020) .......... 11

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.

Ct. 2244 (2024) ............................................................... 4

Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458

(1980) .............................................................................. 7

Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206

(10th Cir. 2020)............................................................ 10

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 221073, 2024 WL 3801747 (D.C. Cir. July 26,

2024) ......................................................................5-6, 11

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

STATUTES, RULES, AND LEGISLATIVE

MATERIALS

5 U.S.C. §706 ........................................................................ 4

42 U.S.C. §7607 .................................................................3-4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 ............................................................... 10

S. Rep. No. 91-1196 (1970) .................................................. 3

41 Fed. Reg. 56,767 (Dec. 30, 1976) ................................... 3

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

87 Fed. Reg. 39,600 (July 1, 2022) ................................... 11

EPA, April 2022 Alternative Compliance

Demonstrative Approach for Certain Small

Refineries, https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF

.cgi?Dockey=P1014EK3.pdf ................................10-11

EPA, RFS Annual Rules, Regulatory Impact

Analysis (June 2022), https://nepis.epa.gov/

Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10155TQ.pdf ................ 11

EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, https://

www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reportingand-compliance-help/rfs-small-refineryexemptions (updated Aug. 15, 2024) .......................... 7

BRIEFS AND OTHER FILINGS

Brief in Opposition, Elgin v. Department of

Treasury, No. 11-45 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2011) ................... 6

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, HollyFrontier

Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable

Fuels Association, No. 20-472 (U.S. Sept. 4,

2020) ............................................................................... 9

Order, Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA,

No. 22-1073 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2023)....................... 10

Petitioners’ Final Joint Opening Brief, Sinclair

Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 22-1073

(D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2024) ................................................. 6

Brief in Opposition, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft

Foods Group Brands LLC, No. 16-341 (U.S.

Nov. 16, 2016) ................................................................ 6

INTRODUCTION

Respondents concede that the question presented

involves a clear circuit split on a nationally important issue.

Therefore, respondents’ merits arguments are no

reason to avoid review—indeed, they reinforce the division among the circuits and the need for clarification.

They are also wrong.

Nor are there any problems with using this case as

a vehicle to resolve the question presented. The merits

decision below and the D.C. Circuit’s recent counterpart

decision differ substantively, but even if they were identical, immediate review would still be warranted. This

Court has routinely clarified standards for determining

the proper court irrespective of whether doing so would

affect the case’s ultimate outcome, to avert wasteful litigation over inevitably recurring forum questions.

The risk of wasteful litigation and inconsistent results, and thus the need for immediate clarification, is especially strong here. EPA will issue new decisions on

the Renewable Fuel Program (“RFP”) exemption petitions remanded by the court below and by the D.C. Circuit in its counterpart case, as well as on other pending

and future exemption petitions. These myriad decisions

will almost certainly precipitate a stream of new lawsuits, again raising venue questions and creating serious

risk of divergent merits decisions. This Court should

grant certiorari now to ensure an efficient process for

the uniform review of nationally significant RFP exemption actions.

The pending certiorari petitions in Oklahoma v.

EPA, No. 23-1067, and PacifiCorp v. EPA, No. 23-1068,

do not present a better vehicle. This Court recently

2

recognized the importance of RFP exemptions—which

have a huge effect on the transportation-fuel industry—

when it granted certiorari in HollyFrontier Cheyenne

Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 594 U.S. 382

(2021). And, as respondents acknowledge, granting certiorari both here and in Oklahoma/PacifiCorp would

yield more complete guidance on venue.

Finally, petitioners’ interest in this case is clear, as

the court below and the D.C. Circuit in its counterpart

case recognized in granting petitioners’ opposed intervention motions.

The Court should grant certiorari.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG

Respondents present new arguments in hopes of rehabilitating a decision whose reasoning they do not defend. Because the question presented undisputedly involves a circuit split, the Court need not dwell on respondents’ new merits arguments now. Regardless,

those arguments fail.

A. Respondents principally argue that “the relevant administrative action is EPA’s denial of each small

refinery’s individual petition for hardship relief.”

Opp.17, 20-21 (cleaned up). Their argument confirms the

need for certiorari. As the petition explained (at 16-21),

the circuit courts—across various Clean Air Act contexts—are broadly divided over whether an integrated

decision resolving multiple individual parties’ interests

is the relevant “action” for venue purposes.

Also, respondents are wrong in this case. EPA defined the “actions” as the two integrated decisions denying multiple exemption petitions: “In this action, [EPA]

3

is denying 69 petitions …. This final action … is a single

action, but it is comprised of the adjudication of 69 [exemption] petitions.” Pet.App.45a; see Pet.10, 30. Respondents’ contrary statutory arguments beg the question by assuming that the “action” can only be the decision on an individual exemption petition. See Opp.18-19.

Respondents’ argument is also beside the point, in

two ways.

First, every individual RFP exemption adjudication

is “nationally applicable” and would qualify for a published EPA finding that it is “based on a determination

of nationwide scope or effect,” 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), because, as petitioners explained (at 9, 30-31), every RFP

exemption necessarily either creates a national renewable-fuel shortfall or increases the RFP obligations of all

non-exempt obligated parties around the country. Respondents ignore this point.

Second, each individual 2022 exemption adjudication

is “nationally applicable” and “based on a determination

of nationwide scope or effect” because each adopted and

applied a common standard governing all small refineries wherever they are located: a causation requirement

and a presumption based on a general cost-recoupment

finding. Pet.9-11, 29-30. Indeed, those general, national

determinations are the target of respondents’ litigation.

See Pet.30. Therefore, given that each 2022 exemption

adjudication “involve[s] generic determinations” and

“issues,” “centralize[d] review” in the D.C. Circuit is

necessary to achieve the “even and consistent national

application” that Congress desired in establishing the

venue provision. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,767, 56,768:3-56,769:1

(Dec. 30, 1976) (cleaned up); S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 41

(1970); see Pet.27-30.

4

Respondents counter (at 21-23) that small refineries

“typically” base their RFP exemption petitions on

claims that they “face unique burdens related to their local circumstances and market conditions,” and that EPA

“could not have complied with the CAA without”

“bas[ing] its ultimate [2022] denial actions on determinations about local facts and data.” Maybe so, but the Act’s

venue provision recognizes the reality that EPA’s decisions may be based on multiple determinations and

venue may be laid in the D.C. Circuit if any of those determinations has nationwide scope or effect, as is the

case for the 2022 exemption actions. Pet.32-33.1

B. Respondents argue (at 24-26) that the “uniformstandard rationale … proves too much”: the D.C. Circuit

would have exclusive venue over every EPA action “because every action is traceable to a uniform statutory

standard.” It is respondents who overstate their case.

The 2022 exemption actions differ from many Clean

Air Act actions and did not merely “appl[y a] new interpretation of the hardship standard and [a] new economic” finding. Opp.24. Those uniform elements were

adopted through the actions, Pet.App.181a; and they are

the target of respondents’ challenge, see Pet.30.

Moreover, even if, as respondents contend, the “uniform-standard rationale” meant that virtually all EPA

actions were “based on a determination of nationwide

scope or effect,” it would not follow that the D.C. Circuit

1

Contrary to respondents’ call (at 22) for “de novo” review,

EPA’s finding that the 2022 exemption actions are based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect must be reviewed deferentially. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A); Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

144 S. Ct. 2244, 2247, 2261 (2024); see also 42 U.S.C. §7607(d)(9)(A).

But that finding is so obviously correct that the standard of review

is irrelevant.

5

would always be the exclusive venue for review. EPA

would also have to publish the requisite finding for each

action. This qualification is salutary; it allows EPA—

which will be more familiar than courts with the precise

scope and consequences of its actions—to centralize review in the D.C. Circuit when EPA recognizes that there

is a national issue requiring uniform resolution, and otherwise to allow more localized disputes to proceed in local circuits.

C. Finally, respondents fret (at 21) that “joint

briefing” in the D.C. Circuit “alongside dozens of other

refineries” will make it “difficult … to draw attention to

their particular local circumstances.” That fear cannot

override Congress’s interest in ensuring efficient and

uniform resolution of nationally significant issues. It

also is misplaced, as shown by the fact that nearly 30 refinery-petitioners in the D.C. Circuit’s counterpart case

adequately briefed their individual circumstances. See

Pet’rs.’ Final Joint Opening Br.81-88, ECF #2035080,

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 22-1073

(D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2024).

II. THIS CASE REMAINS AN IDEAL VEHICLE

None of respondents’ supposed vehicle problems

would hinder effective review.

A. Respondents contend (at 26-27) that this case is

no longer “important enough to warrant” review because the D.C. Circuit, in its counterpart case, has now

vacated 2022 exemption actions like the court below did,

and therefore the outcome is the same in either circuit.

See Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 221073, 2024 WL 3801747, at *6-13 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2024).

That decision—which is the subject of a pending rehearing petition—does not diminish the need for certiorari.

6

To start, respondents disregard the significant differences between the Fifth and D.C. Circuits’ merits decisions. Although both courts vacated the exemption actions, they did not “adopt[] the same reasoning” in all respects, Opp.27, leaving EPA ample room to reach different results on remand from the two courts. The court

below held that EPA impermissibly acted retroactively

when it ceased relying on the Department of Energy’s

2011 Study and “scoring matrix.” Pet.App.16a-22a. In

contrast, the D.C. Circuit declined to reach the retroactivity issues. Sinclair Wyoming, 2024 WL 3801747, at

*13 n.12. Therefore, EPA must adhere to that old methodology when re-adjudicating the exemption petitions

remanded by the Fifth Circuit but not when re-adjudicating the ones remanded by the D.C. Circuit. Additionally, the court below and the D.C. Circuit found different

flaws in EPA’s RIN-passthrough analysis. Compare

Pet.App.29a-32a with Sinclair Wyoming, 2024 WL

3801747, at *10-13.

But more fundamentally, the worthiness of this certiorari petition has nothing to do with whether the Fifth

and D.C. Circuits have agreed on the merits of the 2022

exemption actions. This Court has routinely granted

certiorari to resolve questions about the proper forum

regardless of whether doing so would affect the case’s

ultimate outcome, see Pet.21-23 (cases collected)—and

even when resolving the forum question would probably

not affect the ultimate outcome, see Opp.15, Elgin v. Department of Treasury, No. 11-45 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2011)

(“Resolution of the question presented would not be outcome-determinative in this case ….”); Opp.33-34, TC

Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, No.

16-341 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2016) (“a ruling on the venue question is unlikely to affect the actual dispute between these

parties”). The Court has done so in recognition that “[i]t

7

is of first importance to have a [rule] … that will not invite extensive threshold litigation” over the proper

court because such inevitably recurring “litigation … is

essentially a waste of time and resources.” Navarro

Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 464 n.13 (1980)

(cleaned up).

That concern is acute here. Even if the Fifth and

D.C. Circuits’ merits decisions were identical, immediate

review of the question presented would still be imperative because litigation over RFP exemption decisions—

and thus over the venue for reviewing them—will continue in this case and in future cases. EPA’s re-adjudications on remand will spur a new round of litigation.

EPA’s 2023 exemption action has already prompted litigation in the D.C. Circuit and seven local circuits.

Pet.24. And refineries presumably will continue filing

exemption petitions annually, prompting more rounds of

litigation (currently, 48 exemption petitions await adjudication). Id.; EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions

at tbl. SRE-2.2

These new rounds of lawsuits will surely raise the

venue issue again, at least outside the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. And as long as the circuit split remains—

and especially if it expands—the potential for divergent

outcomes on the merits will persist. Denying certiorari

now and waiting for the issue to return would needlessly

guarantee more wasted resources on threshold litigation

and needlessly increase the likelihood of inconsistent

substantive RFP rules, contrary to Congress’s desire for

the Act’s venue provision to ensure uniformity on significant national issues. See Pet.27-29.

2

https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-com

pliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions (updated Aug. 15, 2024).

8

Respondents object (at 26) that the “parties and the

circuit courts have already expended enormous time and

resources to thoroughly evaluate EPA’s Denials.” That

reflects the sunk-cost fallacy. See Cuff v. Trans States

Holdings, Inc., 768 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2014). The

pertinent question is how best to avoid future costs. The

answer is to grant certiorari now and take advantage of

the parties’ and the courts’ existing investment in the

venue issue, rather than force them to make the investment all over again just to arrive at the same place.

B. Respondents speculate (at 27-28) that this case

will not “conclusively determine venue for future RFS

cases” because it presents a “one-off” situation: “simultaneously announc[ing and applying] a new regulatory

approach” in a “bundle” of adjudications made possible

by EPA’s failure to adjudicate each petition by the statutory deadline.

This case is not unique. As explained, every RFP

exemption adjudication is inherently nationally significant because each one necessarily either creates a national renewable-fuel shortfall or increases the RFP obligations of all non-exempt obligated parties. See supra

p.3. Additionally, as also explained, EPA’s use of new

uniform standards triggers D.C. Circuit venue even

without “bundling.” See supra p.3. And little imagination is needed to see the potential for similar situations

to arise. EPA may well continue to “bundle” adjudications because of common issues or administrative efficiency. Or it might announce and apply another change

in its approach during future exemption adjudications,

whether bundled or not.

C. Finally, respondents argue (at 27, 29-31) that

Oklahoma/PacifiCorp offers a “much more suitable vehicle[]” to address the Act’s venue provision. Their

9

points are meritless—and tellingly, they eventually concede that the best course is to grant certiorari in both

cases.

Respondents cast (at 17, 27) RFP exemption as “a

relatively obscure CAA provision,” compared to “the rejection of a SIP,” the “commonly recurring type of EPA

action” present in Oklahoma/PacifiCorp. That assertion does not hold up. EPA annually receives dozens of

RFP exemption petitions covering billions of gallons of

renewable fuel—more than 10% of the total RFP requirement. Like the RFP itself, exemptions potentially

affect every level of the supply chain, from fuel producers all the way to consumers. Pet.25. And litigation invariably ensues from EPA’s adjudication of exemption

petitions. See supra pp.6-7. Indeed, this Court granted

certiorari to resolve a unique issue regarding the RFP

exemption provision—despite the absence of a circuit

split—based on the refinery-petitioners’ claim that the

functioning of the “exemption program” was “exceptional[ly] important.” Pet.11, HollyFrontier, No. 20-472

(U.S. Sept. 4, 2020); see 594 U.S. 382.

Moreover, as the petition explained (at 33-34), there

are real differences between the EPA actions at issue

here and in Oklahoma/PacifiCorp. Respondents rightly

admit (at 31 n.7) that such difference favors granting certiorari in both cases so the Court can “assess the venue

issues in light of a broader range of circumstances and

provide more complete guidance for EPA, private litigants, and the circuit courts.”

III. PETITIONERS HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN THIS CASE

Respondents are wrong to assert that petitioners

have no “plausible interest in this case.” Opp.31. Petitioners are associations representing the producers of

the ethanol used to meet about two-thirds of the annual

10

“conventional” RFP requirements and about half of the

annual “total” RFP requirements. The court below and

the D.C. Circuit in its counterpart case recognized petitioners’ interest in granting petitioners’ opposed motions to intervene. See C.A.ECF #303 (Mar. 16, 2023);

Order, ECF #1987065, Sinclair Wyoming, No. 22-1073

(D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2023); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

A. The RFP mandates the percentage of the national transportation-fuel supply that must be renewable; thus it determines the national renewable-fuel demand and precludes petroleum producers from competing with renewable-fuel producers for that portion of the

transportation-fuel supply. Pet.5-6; see also Americans

for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691, 696-697, 710

(D.C. Cir. 2017). If granted, the exemption petitions covered by the 2022 exemption actions would injure petitioners’ members because the exemptions would in effect reduce the national RFP requirements, thereby diminishing national demand for the members’ renewable

fuel and expanding the portion of the market in which

the members would face competition from petroleum

producers. Pet.8-9; see, e.g., Alon Refining Krotz

Springs, Inc. v. EPA, 936 F.3d 628, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2019);

Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 12331236 (10th Cir. 2020), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

HollyFrontier, 594 U.S. 382; Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.

150, 152 (1970).

This is true even though the 2022 exemption actions

involve “past compliance years.” Opp.31. As EPA

found, requiring compliance from the refineries covered

by the actions would “increase demand for renewable

fuels in the future.” EPA, April 2022 Alternative Compliance Demonstrative Approach for Certain Small

11

Refineries 17 (“Alternative Compliance”)3; EPA, RFS

Annual Rules, Regulatory Impact Analysis 7 (June

2022).4 To comply with the obligations that were reinstated by the exemption denials, obligated parties would

have to either use additional renewable fuel immediately

or draw down the RIN bank. Alternative Compliance

at 12-14; Pet.7. A bank drawdown would make those

used RINs unavailable to meet a future year’s obligations, forcing obligated parties to use more renewable

fuel in the future to meet that future year’s obligations.

See 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600, 39,613:1 n.75 (July 1, 2022).

In holding that petitioner Growth Energy lacked

standing to challenge a different RFP action in a different case, Sinclair Wyoming, 2024 WL 3801747, at *1921, the D.C. Circuit misapprehended these basic RFP

mechanics, contradicted precedents of this Court and

the Circuit on standing, and contravened the Tenth Circuit’s ruling that the identically situated Renewable

Fuels Association (also a petitioner here) had standing

to challenge three exemptions for other past years, see

Renewable Fuels, 948 F.3d at 1236. Consequently,

Growth Energy has sought rehearing of the D.C. Circuit’s standing ruling. In any event, as intervenors now

seeking the same relief as EPA here, petitioners’ standing in this case is irrelevant to the certworthiness of

their petition. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter &

Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 591 U.S. 657, 674 n.6

(2020).

B. Petitioners also have a strong “stake in the

venue issue.” Opp.32. As regular participants in lawsuits involving RFP exemption actions around the

3

4

https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1014EK3.pdf.

https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P10155TQ.pdf.

12

country, petitioners strongly prefer centralized review

of RFP exemption actions in the D.C. Circuit to avoid

expensive duplicative litigation and inconsistent exemption standards—both for any EPA actions on remand regarding the exemption petitions at issue here and for

any other future RFP exemption actions. Uniformity

engenders “the market certainty so critical to the

[RFP’s] long term success” by, among other things, enabling the renewable-fuels industry to plan for future

demand more reliably. Americans for Clean Energy,

864 F.3d at 715 (cleaned up).

Nor does the government “adequately represent[]”

petitioners. Opp.32. Courts “look skeptically on government entities serving as adequate advocates for private

parties.” Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v.

FEC, 788 F.3d 312, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2015). And petitioners

have presented some arguments that are different from

the government’s to ensure that all RFP exemption adjudications are reviewable in the D.C. Circuit.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant certiorari here, regardless

of whether it does so in Oklahoma/PacifiCorp.

13

Respectfully submitted.

DAVID M. LEHN

JAY SCHUFFENHAUER

BOIES SCHILLER

FLEXNER LLP

1401 New York Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 237-2727

dlehn@bsfllp.com

EVAN M. EZRAY

BOIES SCHILLER

FLEXNER LLP

401 East Las Olas Boulevard

Suite 1200

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

(954) 377-4237

SETH P. WAXMAN

Counsel of Record

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE AND DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 663-6800

seth.waxman@wilmerhale.com

Counsel for Petitioners

MATTHEW W. MORRISON

SHELBY L. DYL

PILLSBURY WINTHROP

SHAW PITTMAN LLP

1200 Seventeenth St. NW

Washington, DC 20036

Counsel for Growth Energy (202) 663-8036

matthew.morrison

@pillsburylaw.com

Counsel for the Renewable

Fuels Association

SEPTEMBER 2024