Amicus Curiae Brief — M & K Employee Solutions, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund

Supreme Court briefOct 21, 2025

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No. 23-1209

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_______________________

M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

TRUSTEES OF THE IAM NATIONAL

PENSION FUND,

Respondent.

_______________________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CIRCUIT

_________________________________________________

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE AARP AND AARP

FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENT

_______________________________________________

October 21, 2025

Rachel N. Lokken

Counsel of Record

Louis Lopez

William Alvarado Rivera

AARP FOUNDATION

601 E Street, NW

Washington, DC 20049

(202) 434-3392

rlokken@aarp.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 3

ERISA, AS AMENDED BY THE MPPAA,

IS INTENDED TO ENSURE PENSION

PLAN SOLVENCY THAT SAFEGUARDS

THE RETIREMENT SECURITY OF

WORKERS AND RETIREES ........................... 3

The MPPAA Strengthens ERISA’s

Commitment to Protect the

Integrity of the Retirement System ...... 4

The MPPAA’s Plain Language

and Purpose Require Complete

and Accurate Actuarial

Assumptions to Determine

Withdrawal Liability ............................. 7

Petitioners’ timing rule is

not rooted in the statute ............. 8

II.

Petitioners’ argument

thwarts the statute’s

requirement for best

estimate and reasonable

actuarial assumptions ............... 10

UNDERCOUNTING WITHDRAWAL

LIABILITY IN MULTIEMPLOYER

PLANS RISKS UPENDING MILLIONS

OF AMERICANS’ RETIREMENT

SECURITY AMID AN ONGOING

RETIREMENT CRISIS .................................. 13

Many Older Adults and Their

Families Depend on Their HardEarned Pensions to Afford Basic

Necessities, Like Housing, Food,

and Healthcare ..................................... 14

Adopting Petitioners’ Flawed

Interpretation of the Statute Risks

Systemic Destabilization of the

Nation’s Retirement System ................ 21

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 25

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension

Tr. Fund v. Ferber Corp. of Cal.,

522 U.S. 192 (1997) ........................................... 6

Cent. States, Se. and Sw. Areas Pension Fund

v. Laguna Dairy, S. De. R.L. De C.V.,

132 F.4th 672 (3d Cir. 2025) ............................. 7

Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr.

Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal.,

508 U.S. 602 (1993) ......................... 4, 10, 13, 24

Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,

475 U.S. 211 (1986) ......................................... 24

Connors v. B & H Trucking Co.,

871 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ........................... 6

Harris Tr. & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith

Barney, Inc.,

530 U.S. 238 (2000) ........................................... 7

Intel Corp. Inv. Pol’y Comm. v. Sulyma,

589 U.S. 178 (2020) ........................................... 9

M & K Emp. Sols., LLC v. Trs. of the IAM

Nat’l Pension Fund,

No. 23-1209 (Aug. 28, 2025) ........................... 12

Milwaukee Brewery Workers’ Pension Plan v.

Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.,

513 U.S. 414 (1995) ................................... 5, 6, 8

Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,

446 U.S. 359 (1980) ..................................... 3, 24

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,

467 U.S. 717 (1984) ................... 3, 4, 5, 6, 23, 24

Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Grp., Inc.,

590 U.S. 212 (2020) ..................................... 9, 10

Sofco Erectors, Inc. v. Trs. of Ohio Operating

Eng’rs Pension Fund,

15 F.4th 407 (6th Cir. 2021). .......................... 11

Trustees of the IAM Nat’l Pension Fund v.

M & K Emp. Sols., LLC,

656 F.Supp.3d 112 (D.D.C. 2023) ............... 9, 10

Trustees of the IAM Nat’l Pension Fund v.

M & K Emp. Sols., LLC,

92 F.4th 316 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ........................... 9

United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension

Plan v. Energy W. Mining Co.,

39 F.4th 730 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ................. 4, 5, 11

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.

29 U.S.C. § 1001 ................................................ 1

29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) ........................................... 3

29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) ......................................... 4

29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A) .................................... 4

29 U.S.C. § 1381 ...................................... 1, 6, 23

29 U.S.C. § 1391 ...................... 6, 7, 9, 10, 17, 21

29 U.S.C. § 1391(b) ....................................... 7, 8

29 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)(A)(ii) ............................. 8

29 U.S.C. § 1391(c) ............................................ 7

29 U.S.C. § 1393 .................... 7, 9, 10, 17, 21, 23

29 U.S.C. § 1393(a) ....................................... 7, 9

29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1) ....................................... 9

29 U.S.C. § 1393(b) ........................................... 9

29 C.F.R. § 2530.210(c)(1) (1991) ................................ 4

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

H.R. Rep. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 5455, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong.

& Ad. News 2918, 2922–23 ............................... 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Actuarial Standards Board, Actuarial

Standards of Practice, No. 27 (Dec. 2023) ..... 11

CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43305, MULTIEMPLOYER

DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS: A

PRIMER (2020) .................................................. 22

CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45187, DATA ON

MULTIEMPLOYER DEFINED BENEFIT (DB)

PENSION PLANS (May 22, 2020) ...................... 14

Daniel Thompson and Michael D. King, U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, P70BR-177, INCOME SOURCES OF

OLDER HOUSEHOLDS: 2017 1 (Feb. 2022),

https://www.census.gov/content/dam/

Census/ library/publications/2022/

demo/p70br-177.pdf. .......................... 13, 14, 20

Diane Oakley, Jennifer E. Brown, Joelle SaadLessler, and Nari Rhee, Shortchanged

in Retirement: Continuing Challenges

to Women’s Financial Future, NAT’L

INST. ON RET. SEC., (Mar. 2016),

https://www.nirsonline.org/reports/

shortchanged-in-retirement-continuingchallenges-to-womens-financial-future/ ......... 18

Edem Hado, Rodney Harrell, Dorothy Siemon,

& Debra Whitman, Aging Well in

America: AARP’s Vision for a National

Plan on Aging, AARP POLICY INSTITUTE

(July 16, 2024), https://www.aarp.org/

pri/topics/aging-experience/aarp-visionnational-aging-well-plan/. .............................. 19

vii

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN.,

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION

BULLETIN 16 (Oct. 2022), https://www.

dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/researchers/

statistics/retirement-bulletins/privatepension-plan-bulletins-abstract-2020 ............ 13

George Mannes, Cuts in Multiemployer Pension

Plans Hurt Older Americans, AARP

BULLETIN (July 12, 2019), https://www.

aarp.org/money/retirement/pensioncuts/ ........................................................... 16, 21

Jane Tavares, Marc Cohen, Maryssa Pallis,

Kerry Glova, & Reena Sethi, THE 80%:

LOW-INCOME ADULTS DIE 9 YEARS

EARLIER THAN THOSE WITH GREATEST

WEALTH 2, NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING

(Sept. 2025), https://assets.ncoa.org/

ffacfe7d-10b6-0083-2632-604077fd4eca/

df44501b-7c8e-43ac-8e12-2373288f71d4/

2025_80_ Percent_Report.pdf. ........................ 19

Jennifer Molinsky, One in Three Older

Households is Cost Burdened, JOINT

CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF

HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Aug. 11, 2025),

https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/

one-three-older-households-costburdened ................................................... 16, 20

viii

Mark Miller, Retirees’ Pensions Were Restored.

Debate About It Hasn’t Died, N.Y. TIMES

(Mar. 22, 2024), https://www.nytimes.

com/2024/03/22/business/multiemployerpensions-retirement-benefits.html................. 17

NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING, Addressing the

Nation’s Retirement Crisis: The 80%

(Oct. 7, 2025), https://www.ncoa.org/

article/addressing-the-nationsretirement-crisis-the-80-percentfinancially-struggling/ .................................... 15

Olivia Dean and Carlos Alberto Figueiredo,

One in Ten Adults Ages 50-plus Were

Food Insecure in 2023, AARP PUBLIC

POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 9, 2025),

https://www.aarp.org/pri/topics/health/

food-insecurity/food-insecurity-adults50-and-older/ (last accessed Oct. 7, 2025). ..... 20

PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2022 PENSION

INSURANCE DATA TABLES INSTALLMENT,

https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/2022-pension-data-tables.pdf ...... 15

PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., FY 2023 |

PROJECTIONS REPORT, https://

www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/fy-2023-projectionsreport.pdf. (last accessed Sept. 29,

2025) ................................................................ 23

PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., Multiemployer

Benefit Guarantees (Mar. 2, 2021),

https://www.pbgc.gov/workersretirees/learn/guaranteed-benefits/

multiemployer-plans ....................................... 23

PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. (PBGC), Orphan

and Inactive Participants in

Multiemployer Plans, 2015 Plan Year

Reporting, (Aug. 2019), https://www.

pbgc.gov/sites/ default/files/orphan-andinactive-participant-report-final.pdf. ............... 5

PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC Provides

Financial Assistance to Road Carriers

Local 707 Pension Fund— Participants’

Benefits Payments Cut to PBGC

Guaranteed Levels (Mar. 1, 2017),

https://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/pr17-02

(last accessed Oct. 15, 2025) ........................... 23

PENSION RIGHTS CTR., Income from Pensions

(Oct. 23, 2023) https://pensionrights.

org/resource/income-from-pensions/ ............... 14

Richard Fry and Dana Braga, Older Workers

Are Growing in Number and Earning

Higher Wages, PEW RSCH. CTR.

(Dec. 14, 2023), https://www.

pewresearch.org/social-trends/

2023/12/14/older-workers-are-growingin-number-and-earning-higher-wages/

(last accessed Oct. 15, 2025) ........................... 20

S. Kathi Brown, Increase in Overall Sense of

Financial Security and Spike in

Optimism, Though Common Financial

Worries Persist, AARP POLICY RESEARCH

INSTITUTE (Sept. 24, 2025), https://www.

aarp.org/pri/topics/work-financesretirement/financial-securityretirement/financial-security-trendssurvey/ ............................................................. 18

The Lived Experience of Adults 50-Plus:

Independence and Autonomy, AARP (JUNE

2022), https://datastories.aarp.org/the-livedexperience-of-adults-50-plus/factors/

independence-and-autonomy/index.

html (last visited Oct. 7, 2025) ................. 14, 19

The Multiemployer Pension Plan System:

Recent Re-forms and Current Challenges:

Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,

114th Cong. 16, 5 (2016) (statement of

Rita Lewis), https://www.finance.senate.

gov/imo/media/doc/03012016%20Rita%20

Lewis%20SFC%20Statement%20

Multiemployer%20Pensions.pdf (last

accessed Oct. 15, 2025) ................................... 23

U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., Employment

Projections: Civilian labor force

participation rate by age, sex, race, and

ethnicity (Aug. 28, 2025), https://www.

bls.gov/emp/tables/civilian-labor-forceparticipation-rate.htm (last accessed

Oct. 15, 2025) .................................................. 20

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Poverty in the United States:

2024 5, 22, 36 (Sept. 2025),

https://www2.census.gov/library/

publications/2025/demo/p60-287.pdf. ............ 19

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON

EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT

PLANS, Gaps in Retirement Savings

Based on Race, Ethnicity and Gender

(Dec. 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/

dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/aboutus/erisa-advisory-council/2021-advisorycouncil-issue-statement-gaps-inretirement-savings.pdf ................................... 18

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, News Release: US

Department of Labor reports distressed

pension assistance program has protected

benefits for more than 1.2M workers,

retirees families (Nov. 1, 2024), https://

www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/

ebsa20241101 .................................................. 22

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN

BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES AND

GRAPHS 1975-2022 (Sept. 2024), https://

www. dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/

researchers/statistics/retirementbulletins/private-pension-plan-bulletinhistorical-tables-and-graphs.pdf .................... 15

xii

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-435,

OLDER WOMEN REPORT FACING A

FINANCIALLY UNCERTAIN FUTURE (2020),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-435.

pdf .................................................................... 18

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

AARP is the nation’s largest nonprofit,

nonpartisan organization dedicated to empowering

Americans 50 and older to choose how they live as they

age. With a nationwide presence, AARP strengthens

communities and advocates for what matters most to

the more than 100 million Americans 50-plus and

their families: health and financial security, and

personal fulfillment. AARP’s charitable affiliate,

AARP Foundation, works for and with vulnerable

people over 50 to end senior poverty and reduce

financial hardship by building economic opportunity.

AARP and AARP Foundation are deeply

committed to increasing the financial security of older

adults and have long advocated on behalf of the

millions of workers, retirees, and beneficiaries who

depend on their retirement and pension savings to live

and age with dignity. Amici participate as amicus

curiae in federal and state courts to ensure that

pension plan participants receive all benefits to which

they are entitled. To achieve this goal, Amici endeavor

to secure accurate interpretations of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29

U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., as amended by the

Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980

(MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 37.2 and 27.6, no counsel

for either party authored the brief in whole or in part. In addition,

no person or entity, other than amici, their members, and their

counsel, has made any monetary contribution to the preparation

and submission of this brief. Counsel for all parties received

timely notice of our intent to file this brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Fifty years ago, Congress enacted ERISA to

ensure that employees and beneficiaries who are

promised pension benefits actually receive them.

Within six years, Congress enacted the MPPAA to

strengthen multiemployer plans and prevent plan

insolvency by imposing withdrawal liability on

employers that depart such plans. Critical to the

MPPAA’s statutory framework is the requirement

that withdrawal liability be calculated using

assumptions that reflect the actuary’s “best estimate”

of the plan’s anticipated experience based on complete

and accurate year-end data. The statute’s plain text

and remedial purpose foreclose any interpretation

that restricts an actuary’s statutory obligation to use

their best professional judgment in adjusting

assumptions based on accurate information that

accounts for the plan’s full experience.

Multiemployer plans remain a critical source of

retirement income for millions of American workers

and their families, making it essential that statutory

protections designed to safeguard these plans are

interpreted in a manner consistent with congressional

intent. Many workers lack sufficient retirement

savings, and economic conditions have made it more

difficult for retirees to maintain financial stability.

Requiring actuaries to use outdated and potentially

inaccurate prior-year assumptions risks undervaluing

employer withdrawal liability, thereby undermining

the solvency of multiemployer plans. Such an outcome

exposes employers and retirees to the very funding

shortfalls and systemic risks that Congress enacted

the MPPAA to prevent.

ARGUMENT

ERISA, AS AMENDED BY THE MPPAA, IS

INTENDED TO ENSURE PENSION PLAN

SOLVENCY THAT SAFEGUARDS THE

RETIREMENT SECURITY OF WORKERS

AND RETIREES

Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 in response to

mounting public concern that private pension and

retirement plans covering millions of American

workers were being mismanaged and abused. See 29

U.S.C. § 1001(a); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.

Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984). The collapse of

underfunded pension plans inflicted a “great personal

tragedy” on workers who lost the benefits they had

spent their careers earning. Nachman Corp. v.

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361, 374–

75 (1980). With ERISA, Congress sought to ensure

that “employees and their beneficiaries would not be

deprived of anticipated retirement benefits by the

termination of pension plans before sufficient funds

have been accumulated in [them].” R.A. Gray, 467 U.S.

at 720; 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Specifically, Congress

wanted “to guarantee that if a worker has been

promised a defined pension plan benefit upon

retirement—and if he has fulfilled whatever

conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit—he

will actually receive it.” R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. at 720

(citation modified). In essence, ERISA stands as the

cornerstone of retirement security, protecting both the

financial well-being of workers and retirees as well as

the integrity of the retirement system itself. See, e.g.,

29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (defining earned pension benefits

as “nonforfeitable” and “legally enforceable”).

The MPPAA Strengthens ERISA’s

Commitment

Protect

the

Integrity of the Retirement System

Unlike single-employer plans, which serve

employees of a single employer, multiemployer plans

cover unionized workers employed by different

contributing employers. The employers’ pension

obligations are pooled into a single shared trust fund

from which benefits are paid to retirees and their

families. See R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. at 721–22; see

generally 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A). Because the assets

are comingled, contributions made by one employer

may fund benefits owed to the employees of another.

These plans are particularly common in industries

characterized

project-based

transient

employment—such as construction, manufacturing,

retail, mining, transportation, entertainment, and

healthcare—allowing workers to move among

employers without forfeiting accrued credit towards

their pension benefits. See 29 C.F.R. § 2530.210(c)(1)

(1991); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Constr.

Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 606–07

(1993). In such industries, there are “hundreds or

thousands of small employers going in and out of

business,” where the union, rather than any employer,

anchors the employment relationship. United Mine

Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Plan v. Energy W.

Mining Co., 39 F.4th 730, 734, n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

The inherent mobility of workers in these industries

renders multiemployer plans particularly susceptible

to financial instability.2

Under ERISA as it was originally enacted,

multiemployer plans faced acute funding challenges.

The statute lacked clear provisions assessing liability

for withdrawing employers, generally absolving them

of any responsibility for their ongoing share of the

plan’s unfunded liabilities—provided the plan

remained solvent for five years after their departure.

Energy W., 39 F.4th at 734–35 & n.2.; see also R.A.

Gray, 467 U.S. at 722–23; Milwaukee Brewery

Workers’ Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513

U.S. 414, 416–17 (1995). Where a plan remained

adequately funded, ERISA’s protections functioned as

intended. See Milwaukee Brewery, 513 U.S. at 416–17.

But when a plan became underfunded, the funding

shortfall shifted to the remaining employers, whose

owed contributions were increased to ensure sufficient

assets to cover vested pension benefits. Id. Faced with

mounting liabilities, remaining employers then had

strong incentives to withdraw from underfunded

plans—hoping the plan would survive the statutory

five-year period, thereby insulating them from

liability. H.R. Rep. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 5455, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News

2918, 2922–23. This cascading effect produced what

Congress described as a “death spiral,” leaving “a

PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. (PBGC), Orphan and Inactive

Participants in Multiemployer Plans, 2015 Plan Year reporting,

3 (Aug. 2019), https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/orphanand-inactive-participant-report-final.pdf.

significant number of [multiemployer] plans to

experience “extreme financial hardship.” R.A. Gray,

467 U.S. at 721; see also Milwaukee Brewery, 513 U.S.

at 417 (“[A multiemployer] plan’s financial troubles

could trigger a stampede for the exit doors, thereby

ensuring the plan’s demise”). By the late 1970s,

widespread employer withdrawals threatened the

solvency of multiemployer plans and, by extension, the

retirement security of millions of workers and retirees.

See R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. at 721–22.

In response, Congress enacted the MPPAA in

1980 to stabilize multiemployer plans and ensure

their solvency when employers withdrew from them.

See generally Milwaukee Brewery, 513 U.S. at 416-17;

see also R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. at 722–24; Bay Area

Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferber

Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 196 (1997). To eliminate

adverse incentives and prevent the unfair shifting of

contribution burdens, the MPPAA requires any

employer who withdraws from a multiemployer plan

to pay its pro rata share of the plan’s unfunded vested

benefits—defined as the “the difference between the

present value of the plan’s vested benefits and the

present value of its assets.” Connors v. B & H Trucking

Co., 871 F.2d 132, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 29

U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1391. The MPPAA thus closed a

critical loophole in ERISA’s framework that had

allowed withdrawing employers to evade ongoing

liabilities, leaving multiemployer plans vulnerable to

insolvency. In doing so, the MPPAA represents a

deepening of ERISA’s central commitment: to ensure

retirement security and the payment of promised

pension benefits by stabilizing multiemployer plans.

The MPPAA’s Plain Language and

Purpose Require Complete and

Accurate Actuarial Assumptions to

Determine Withdrawal Liability

“In ERISA cases, as in any case of statutory

construction, our analysis begins with the language of

the statute.” Harris Tr. & Savings Bank v. Salomon

Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 254 (2000). And as

courts have long recognized, remedial statues like the

MPPAA should be construed liberally to achieve their

protective purposes. See, e.g., Cent. States, Se. and Sw.

Areas Pension Fund v. Laguna Dairy, S. De. R.L. De

C.V., 132 F.4th 672, 678, 681 (3d Cir. 2025) (collecting

cases and explaining that “case law has interpreted

[the MPPAA] liberally to protect plans’ solvency”).

Section 1391 of the MPPAA states that an

employer’s withdrawal liability—representing a

withdrawing employer’s share of the unfunded vested

benefits in a multiemployer plan—must be calculated

“as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year

in which the employer withdraws.” 29 U.S.C. § 1391(b)

& (c). Section 1393, in turn, states that withdrawal

liability under the MPPAA is determined based on

“actuarial assumptions and methods, which in the

aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the

experience of the plan and reasonable expectations)

and which, in combination, offer the actuary’s best

estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.” 29

U.S.C. § 1393(a). These two provisions are at the crux

of this case.

Petitioners contend that this statutory

language prescribes a brightline timing rule that

freezes the calculated value of a plan’s unfunded

vested

benefits—and

all

actuarial

assumptions—on the measurement or valuation date,

even if such calculation occurs before the last day of

the prior plan year. Petitioners also largely ignore the

MPPAA’s express mandate that actuaries use their

“best estimate” to make withdrawal liability

determinations. Petitioners are wrong on both counts.

Petitioners’ timing rule is not

rooted in the statute

In 29 U.S.C. § 1391(b), Congress declared that

withdrawal liability from a multiemployer plan is to

be determined “as of the end of the plan year preceding

the plan year in which the employer withdraws.” This

date—sometimes called a “measurement date” or a

“valuation date” — sets the point in time at which plan

assets must be calculated by an actuary.3 The MPPAA

by its own terms imposes no timing requirement as to

when the plan actuary must select or finalize the

assumptions used in withdrawal liability calculations.

Indeed, actuaries are not even referenced in Section

For example, an employer that withdraws from a

multiemployer plan in the 2023 plan year—which is consistent

with the calendar year—would owe withdrawal liability based on

its share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits as of the

December 31, 2022 measurement date. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b)(2)(A)(ii). The reason for this calculation appears to be

one of “administrative convenience” as plans already must

annually calculate their unfunded liabilities. Milwaukee

Brewery, 513 U.S. at 418.

1391. As this Court has made clear, it will not “read

into statutes” limitations that do not appear in their

text. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Grp., Inc., 590

U.S. 212, 215 (2020). And where Congress imposes no

timing rule, none should be implied. See Intel Corp.

Inv. Pol’y Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U.S. 178, 184 (2020)

(“We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory

language in ERISA, as in any statute, according to its

terms.”).

The D.C. Circuit correctly rejected Petitioners’

restrictive brightline timing arguments, holding that

ERISA permits actuaries to select assumptions after

the measurement date to satisfy Section 1393’s “best

estimate” requirement. Trustees of the IAM Nat’l

Pension Fund v. M & K Emp. Sols., LLC, 92 F.4th 316,

322–23 (D.C. Cir. 2024). The court observed that

essential plan data necessary to formulate accurate

assumptions often becomes available only after yearend. Id. (“It would be contrary to 29 U.S.C.

§ 1393(a)(1)’s requirement that an actuary use its

“best estimate” of the plan’s anticipated experience as

of the measurement date to require an actuary to

determine what assumptions to use before the close of

business on the measurement date”). Section 1393

further states that actuaries should rely on the “most

recent” and “complete” data “representative of the

status of the entire plan,” recognizing the need to

consider both the most timely and comprehensive

information available for the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(b).

Forcing actuaries to ignore such information would

lead to knowing inaccurate valuations and place

actuaries in “an untenable position” bound by “an

untenable reading of the statute.” Trustees of the IAM

Nat’l Pension Fund v. M & K Emp. Sols., LLC, 656

F.Supp.3d 112, 128 (D.D.C. 2023). As the D.C. Circuit

and district courts below recognized, Petitioners’

misguided rule would conflict with both the plain text

and purpose of the MPPAA.

Taken together, the plain text of Sections 1391

and 1393 confirm Congress’s clear intent to prioritize

accuracy and actuary professional judgment in

calculating an employer’s withdrawal liability.

Accordingly, this Court should not “read into” the

MPPAA “words that aren’t there.” Romag Fasteners,

590 U.S. at 215.

Petitioners’ argument thwarts

the statute’s requirement for

best estimate and reasonable

actuarial assumptions

The MPPAA requires that actuaries offer their

“reasonable” and “best estimate” of withdrawal

liability for multiemployer plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a).

By entrusting actuaries—“trained professionals” who

are “subject to regulatory standards” and not

“vulnerable to suggestions of bias”—with the

responsibility to determine accurate withdrawal

liability, Congress ensured that valuations are

anchored in expert judgment and complete

information. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 632.

For decades, consistent with their statutory

obligations and professional standards, actuaries have

selected and finalized their assumptions after the

close of the plan year to incorporate full-year data. See

Actuarial Standards Board, Actuarial Standards of

Practice (ASOP), No. 27 (Dec. 2023). These

professional standards require actuaries to rely on all

information known or reasonably available as of the

measurement date to produce “best estimate”

assumptions mandated by Congress. Id. (explaining

that “an assumption is reasonable” if, inter alia, “it

takes into account current and historical data that is

relevant to selecting the assumption for the

measurement date, to the extent such relevant data is

reasonably available”).

To make their “best estimate” calculations for

withdrawal liability, actuaries must employ

assumptions reflecting demographic realities such as

an aging workforce, increasing life expectancy, and

economic fluctuations. See Energy W., 39 F.4th at 735.

Of these assumptions, the discount rate assumption—

the rate at which the plan’s assets will earn interest—

is particularly consequential: a lower discount rate

increases the present value of unfunded vested

benefits and, in turn, a withdrawing employer’s

liability, while a higher rate decreases both the

unfunded vested benefits and resulting liability. Sofco

Erectors, Inc. v. Trs. Of Ohio Operating Eng’rs Pension

Fund, 15 F.4th 407, 419 (6th Cir. 2021). An actuary’s

failure to select a discount rate that reflects their best

estimate of anticipated experience under the plan

“will usually render the calculation contrary to the

MPPAA.” Energy W., 39 F.4th at 739.

This case demonstrates how minor changes in

discount rates could directly affect plan participants.

The IAM National Pension Plan’s actuary

incorporated updated information as of December 31,

2017, and reduced the discount rate from 7.5 percent

to 6.5 percent. J.A. at 4, M & K Emp. Sols., LLC v. Trs.

of the IAM Nat’l Pension Fund, No. 23-1209 (Aug. 28,

2025). That adjustment, made accord with actuarial

professional standards and grounded in the Plan

actuary’s professional judgment, revealed that the

Plan’s unfunded vested benefits had increased from

approximately $448 million in 2016 to more than $3

billion in 2017. Id. at 3–4. These liabilities are not

theoretical—they reflect the real financial resources

necessary to pay benefits earned by retirees and

beneficiaries, many of whom depend on modest

monthly pensions as their primary source of income.

But under Petitioners’ reading of the statute,

the Plan’s actuary would be forced to rely on outdated

assumptions made before the measurement date—

even if those assumptions did not reflect the actuary’s

“best estimate” of the withdrawal liability needed to

pay vested pension benefits. Such a reading that

forbids an actuary from using all relevant and

reasonably available information to formulate their

best estimate would directly contradict Section 1393.

Petitioners’ interpretation would also invert the

MPPAA’s remedial purpose. Congress enacted the

statute to ensure that withdrawing employers bear

their fair share of unfunded vested benefits,

preventing unfair cost-shifting to remaining

employers and plan participants. Petitioners’

proposed reading—freezing actuarial assumptions

before all relevant plan-year data is available—would

produce knowingly inaccurate valuations that

underestimate liabilities and undermine plan

solvency. Courts have long rejected statutory readings

that would contravene the plain language and defeat

Congress’s remedial design. See Concrete Pipe, 508

U.S. at 632. This Court should do so too.

II.

UNDERCOUNTING WITHDRAWAL

LIABILITY IN MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS

RISKS

UPENDING

MILLIONS

AMERICANS’ RETIREMENT SECURITY

AMID AN ONGOING RETIREMENT

CRISIS

While

this

case

about

statutory

interpretation, it is, ultimately, about what happens

to millions of hardworking Americans who have

planned their future around the promise of earned and

bargained for pension benefits. It is about long-haul

truck drivers; construction and manufacturing

workers; and retail, transportation, and service

industry employees.4 It is about mothers and fathers

and grandparents; people who have earned modest

but vital pension benefits that they are counting on

being paid out when they retire. For these retirees and

beneficiaries, financial security in retirement means

being able to afford necessities like food, utilities,

transportation, and medicine, to remain in their

See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF

LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION BULLETIN 16 (Oct. 2022),

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/researchers/statistics/retirem

ent-bulletins/private-pension-plan-bulletins-abstract-2020

(illustrating multiemployer plan participation by industry).

homes, and to live in retirement with dignity and

autonomy.5

Many Older Adults and Their

Families Depend on Their HardEarned Pensions to Afford Basic

Necessities, Like Housing, Food, and

Healthcare

Multiemployer plan benefits are earned as “a

form of deferred compensation,”6 and they serve as a

critical lifeline for workers and older adults who count

upon those earned benefits in retirement.7 As of 2022,

“one out of three older adults received income from

private company or union pension plans, federal,

state, or local government pension plans, or railroad

retirement, military or veterans pension.”8 And as of

See, e.g., The Lived Experience of Adults 50-Plus:

Independence

and

Autonomy,

AARP,

https://datastories.aarp.org/the-lived-experience-of-adults-50plus/factors/independence-and-autonomy/index.html

(last visited Oct. 7, 2025) (“54% of adults ages 50-64 are

extremely or very concerned about maintaining independence

when thinking about getting older”).

CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45187, DATA ON MULTIEMPLOYER

DEFINED BENEFIT (DB) PENSION PLANS 1 (May 22, 2020).

See, e.g., Daniel Thompson and Michael D. King, U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, P70BR-177, INCOME SOURCES OF OLDER HOUSEHOLDS:

2017 1 (Feb. 2022), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/ Census/

library/publications/2022/demo/p70br-177.pdf.

PENSION RIGHTS CTR., Income from Pensions (Oct. 23, 2023),

https://pensionrights.org/resource/income-from-pensions/.

that year, there were more than 1,300 multiemployer

plans covering more than 10.7 million participants.9

Pension benefits are a crucial component of

household income for older adults and their families.

According to U.S. Census Bureau data where the

householder is aged 65 and older, “Social Security

accounts for just half of total income,” while “pension

and retirement account income [amount to] 17.2

percent of total income.”10 As such, it is essential to

ensure that retirees and beneficiaries continue to

receive the vested benefits that they have earned and

are owed, particularly when “[o]ver 19 million (45

percent) of older adult households do not have the

income needed to cover basic living costs.”11 Older

adults’ risk of being cost-burdened—meaning they pay

more than 30 percent of their income on housing—is

particularly acute as housing costs rise. “Older renters

are more likely to live on fixed incomes that may not

keep up with rising rents,” such that “those with lower

incomes may have little left over in the household

budget to pay for out-of-pocket medical costs, food, and

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN

HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS 1975-2022 3, 5 (Sept. 2024),

https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/researchers/statistic

s/retirement-bulletins/private-pension-plan-bulletin-historicaltables-and-graphs.pdf; see also PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP.,

2022 PENSION INSURANCE DATA TABLES INSTALLMENT 4,

https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022pension-data-tables.pdf.

Thompson and King, supra note 7, at 6.

NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING, Addressing the Nation’s

Retirement

Crisis:

The

80%

(Oct.

2025),

https://www.ncoa.org/article/addressing-the-nations-retirementcrisis-the-80-percent-financially-struggling/.

other necessities.”12 In 2023, 34 percent of households

led by someone 65 or older were cost burdened.13 This

equates to a record high of 12.4 million households.14

Moreover, “people age 50 and over represent the

fastest growing population of unhoused people in the

U.S.”15

Given these dire circumstances, it is not

difficult to understand how the deleterious effects of

undercounting

withdrawal

liability

multiemployer plan can directly harm older

Americans and their families. Consider Mary Fry,

whose husband, Virgil, worked for 30 years in

construction, earning a monthly pension of $3,568 to

support his retirement.16 The promise of Virgil’s

earned and vested pension benefits included an

obligation for the payments to continue to Mary after

he succumbed to cancer.17 But in April 2019, due to

instability in their multiemployer plan, the payments

were slashed to $1,514, “shock[ing]” Mary, who was

then 72-years-old and herself a cancer survivor.18 Or

consider Cathy Green, who “worked 20 years … as an

office manager for an insurance company,” earning

Jennifer Molinsky, One in Three Older Households is Cost

Burdened, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD

UNIVERSITY (Aug. 11, 2025), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/

one-three-older-households-cost-burdened.

Id.

George Mannes, Cuts in Multiemployer Pension Plans Hurt

Older Americans, AARP BULLETIN (July 12, 2019),

https://www.aarp.org/money/retirement/pension-cuts/.

Id.

vested benefits in a multiemployer pension plan.19

When the fund she participated in faced insolvency

risks in 2018, Ms. Green’s monthly benefit was

reduced by “about 30 percent”—which, as she put it,

“was a lot for me.”20

Such are the very real, human stakes in this

case; these are the types of people who stand to lose

most if actuaries are not empowered to fully comply

with their statutory mandate to calculate the

shortfalls that may exist “as of the end of the plan

year” using “reasonable” and “best estimate”

assumptions. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1393. Requiring

actuaries to use outdated and potentially inaccurate

assumptions can have the effect of unfairly shifting

costs between employers or onto the Pension Benefit

Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federally chartered

organization

established

encourage

the

continuation and maintenance of pension plans. It

would also compound risk for the retirees and

beneficiaries least able to absorb it—women, older

adults with low-income, and people of color. For

example, women generally enter retirement with

disproportionately fewer resources, and women aged

65 and older earn 25 percent less income than men,

and “are 80 percent more likely to be impoverished at

Mark Miller, Retirees’ Pensions Were Restored. Debate About

Hasn’t

Died,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Mar.

22,

2024),

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/business/multiemployerpensions-retirement-benefits.html.

Id.

age 65 or older.”21 These gender disparities reflect

systemic factors such as lower lifetime earnings, more

part-time work, and caregiving responsibilities—

factors that combine to make monthly pension income

more valuable to women.22

The ongoing retirement crisis also heightens

the import of financial security for millions of

Americans, like Mary Fry and Cathy Green. As AARP

has frequently highlighted, an alarming number of

workers are aging with insufficient savings, and many

older adults struggle to meet basic expenses.23 The

“poverty rate for [adults aged] 65 and older was [at

least] 9.9 percent” in 2024, and potentially as high as

Diane Oakley, Jennifer E. Brown, Joelle Saad-Lessler, and

Nari Rhee, Shortchanged in Retirement: Continuing Challenges

to Women’s Financial Future, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC. (Mar.

2016), https://www.nirsonline.org/reports/shortchanged-inretirement-continuing-challenges-to-womens-financial-future/.

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE

AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Gaps in Retirement Savings Based

Race,

Ethnicity

and

Gender

(Dec.

2021),

https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/aboutus/erisa-advisory-council/2021-advisory-council-issuestatement-gaps-in-retirement-savings.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T

ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-435, OLDER WOMEN REPORT

FACING A FINANCIALLY UNCERTAIN FUTURE 8–9 (2020),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-435.pdf.

See, e.g., S. Kathi Brown, Increase in Overall Sense of

Financial Security and Spike in Optimism, Though Common

Financial Worries Persist, AARP POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

(Sept. 24, 2025), https://www.aarp.org/pri/topics/work-financesretirement/financial-security-retirement/financial-securitytrends-survey/ (last accessed Oct. 6, 2025) (“Prices, retirement

security, and unexpected expenses continue to be top financial

worries while worry about health care costs increased”).

15 percent, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.24

Thus, between 6.1 million and 9.2 million older adults

are living below the poverty threshold, which is

assessed to be $15,045 annually for a single individual

aged 65-and-older and $18,961 for a household of two

such individuals.25

But, if anything, that metric dramatically

understates the scope of the retirement crisis. Indeed,

“[o]ver 19 million (45 percent) of older adult

households do not have the income needed to cover

basic living costs.”26 Economic insecurity diminishes

older adults’ quality of life, including their ability to

live with dignity and autonomy and “age well,” which

is a core AARP policy objective.27 Disturbingly,

economic insecurity also correlates with higher

mortality rates.28 And being “cost burdened” often

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Poverty in the United States: 2024 5,

22, 36 (Sept. 2025), https://www2.census.gov/library/publication

s/2025/demo/p60-287.pdf.

Id. at 36.

NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING, supra note 11.

See The Lived Experience of Adults 50-Plus: Independence

and Autonomy, supra note 5 (“54% of adults ages 50-64 are

extremely or very concerned about maintaining independence

when thinking about getting older”); (“54% of adults ages 50-64

are extremely or very concerned about maintaining independence

when thinking about getting older”); see also Edem Hado,

Rodney Harrell, Dorothy Siemon, & Debra Whitman, Aging Well

in America: AARP’s Vision for a National Plan on Aging, AARP

POLICY INSTITUTE (July 16, 2024), https://www.aarp.org/pri/

topics/aging-experience/aarp-vision-national-aging-well-plan/.

Jane Tavares, Marc Cohen, Maryssa Pallis, Kerry Glova, &

Reena Sethi, THE 80%: LOW-INCOME ADULTS DIE 9 YEARS

EARLIER THAN THOSE WITH GREATEST WEALTH 2, NAT’L COUNCIL

leads older adults to make “difficult tradeoffs” when

prioritizing household expenses, such as between

shelter, healthcare, and food.29 Indeed, 10.4 percent of

adults aged 50 and older reported facing food

insecurity in 2023—“the highest share in nearly a

decade,” according to the AARP Public Policy

Institute.30 One consequence flowing from these

difficult circumstances is that older adults are

increasingly forced to work longer and later in life, as

they face the risk of outliving what meager retirement

savings they do have.31 This dynamic further

underscores pension benefits’ role as a key component

of older adults’ household income.32

AGING (Sept. 2025), https://assets.ncoa.org/ffacfe7d-10b60083-2632-604077fd4eca/df44501b-7c8e-43ac-8e122373288f71d4/2025_80_Percent_Report.pdf.

Molinsky, supra note 12.

Olivia Dean and Carlos Alberto Figueiredo, One in Ten

Adults Ages 50-plus Were Food Insecure in 2023, AARP PUBLIC

POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 9, 2025), https://www.aarp.org/pri/topics/

health/food-insecurity/food-insecurity-adults-50-and-older/ (last

accessed Oct. 7, 2025).

Richard Fry and Dana Braga, Older Workers Are Growing in

Number and Earning Higher Wages 5, PEW RSCH. CTR.

(Dec. 14, 2023), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/

2023/12/14/older-workers-are-growing-in-number-and-earninghigher-wages/ (last accessed Oct. 15, 2025) (“Numbering roughly

11 million today, the older workforce has nearly quadrupled in

size since the mid-1980s”); see also U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,

Employment Projections: Civilian labor force participation rate by

age,

sex,

race,

and

ethnicity

(Aug.

28,

2025),

https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/civilian-labor-forceparticipation-rate.htm (last accessed Oct. 15, 2025).

See, e.g., Thompson and King, supra note 7, at 6 (finding

that among householders aged 65 and older, “pension and

retirement account income [amount to] 17.2 percent of total

income”).

To be sure, the complex question of how to

resolve the growing retirement crisis is not before this

Court. But this Court can forestall a worsened crisis—

by construing the MPPAA in a manner that is

consistent with its plain text and remedial purpose,

and which ensures that retirees and beneficiaries are

placed in the best possible position to receive their

vested, hard-earned pension benefits. This Court can

do that by affirming the D.C. Circuit’s holding that

empowers multiemployer plan actuaries to continue to

comply with their statutory mandate to calculate

shortfalls that exist “as of the end of the plan year”

using “reasonable” and “best estimate” assumptions,

including data based upon the full plan year. 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1391, 1393.

Adopting

Petitioners’

Flawed

Interpretation of the Statute Risks

Systemic Destabilization of the

Nation’s Retirement System

In addition to risking direct harm to retirees

and beneficiaries, Petitioners’ interpretation of the

MPPAA also threatens to exacerbate systemic

destabilization of the retirement system more broadly.

This reality was made clear by the recent

multiemployer plan insolvency crisis we faced during

the last decade33—a recent history which underscores

that Petitioners’ reading of the statute would

undermine its plain text and remedial purpose.

See generally Mannes, supra note 16.

As of 2017, “over 800,000 participants [were] in

[multiemployer defined benefit] plans that [were]

expected to become insolvent from 2020 to 2030.”34

Prior to 2021, the PBGC’s “Multiemployer Program

was [itself] expected to become insolvent by 2026.”35 In

2021, Congress acted to shore up the PBGC’s ability to

provide a safety net for multiemployer plan funds,36

such that the “Multiemployer Program will likely

remain solvent for at least 40 years.”37 But serious

systemic risks remain, and are acutely implicated by

this case, given the interconnected nature of the

multiemployer pension system.

While the PBGC’s Multiemployer Program has

been temporarily stabilized, its continuing solvency

depends upon the solvency of each multiemployer plan

it covers.38 In turn, the solvency of each of those plans

depends upon member-employers contributing their

accurate, proportionate share of the plan’s unfunded

liabilities upon withdrawal, in accordance with their

statutory obligations; and those members may not be

charged with accurate assessments of their share of

unfunded vested benefits, if actuaries are prevented

CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43305, MULTIEMPLOYER DEFINED

BENEFIT PENSION PLANS: A PRIMER 6 (2020).

PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., FY 2023 | PROJECTIONS

REPORT 2, 3, https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/

fy-2023-projections-report.pdf (last accessed Sept. 29, 2025).

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, News Release: US Department

of Labor reports distressed pension assistance program has

protected benefits for more than 1.2M workers, retirees families

(Nov. 1, 2024), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/

ebsa20241101 (last accessed Oct. 2, 2025).

PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 35, at 2.

Id. at 3 (explaining the systemic interrelatedness).

from offering their “best estimate of anticipated

experience under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1393.

In the absence of accuracy in employer withdrawal

liability assessments, broad systemic risk will once

again rear its ugly head and push vulnerable retirees

towards the PBGC’s straining safety net that is

inadequate to replace employers’ pro rata share of

unfunded vested benefits.39

This systemic-stabilization concern is precisely

why Congress acted to strengthen ERISA by passing

the MPPAA in the first instance—having “identified”

that ERISA’s original framework operated to

“encourage[]

employer

withdrawals

from

multiemployer plans.” R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. at 730–31.

Thus, the intentional design of the MPPAA reflects

Congress’s “‘concern[] that a significant number of

Critically, even when the PBGC is fully funded, it cannot be

counted on as a perfect substitute for making best actuarial

efforts to keep multiemployer plans adequately capitalized as an

initial matter. That is because the PBGC may be unable to offer

a 1:1 replacement of benefits when a multiemployer plan requires

a bailout—which, in practice, means cuts for beneficiaries who

are entitled to more than the PBGC’s maximum guarantee

amount. See, e.g.,, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC

Provides Financial Assistance to Road Carriers Local 707

Pension Fund—Participants’ Benefits Payments Cut to PBGC

Guaranteed Levels (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.pbgc.gov/news/

press/pr17-02 (last accessed Oct. 15, 2025); see also The

Multiemployer Pension Plan System: Recent Reforms and

Current Challenges: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 114th

Cong.

16,

(2016)

(statement

Rita

Lewis),

https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/03012016%20Rit

a%20Lewis%20SFC%20Statement%20Multiemployer%20Pensio

ns.pdf

(Mar.

2021),

https://www.pbgc.gov/workersretirees/learn/guaranteed-benefits/multiemployer-plans.

plans were experiencing financial hardship,’” and a

desire to head off the systemic risk created by the

statute’s “incentive for employers to withdraw from

weak multiemployer plans.” Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at

608 (quoting first R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. at 721, and then

citing to Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475

U.S. 211, 215 (1986)).

From the foregoing, it should be apparent that

Petitioners’ misguided reading of the statute invites

this Court to gamble with millions of older Americans’

retirement security and risk systemic destabilization.

Requiring actuaries to use outdated, prior-year

assumptions risks shifting a withdrawing employer’s

financial burden onto the plan’s remaining

contributing employers, onto the already-strained

PBGC, and—most catastrophically—onto the workers

who count on these bargained-for and earned pension

benefits to be there when they retire. Such a reading

clearly contravenes Congress’s objectives and the

MPPAA’s plain language. Ensuring that pension

obligations are measured as accurately as possible, in

accordance with the MPPAA’s mandate, will bolster

multiemployer plan stability, guard against pension

insolvency, and serve to protect older Americans’

vested retirement security interests, just as Congress

intended. See, e.g., Nachman Corp., 446 U.S. at 375

(“Congress wanted to … mak[e] sure that if a worker

has been promised a defined benefit upon

retirement—and if he has fulfilled whatever

conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit—he

actually will receive it”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae

respectfully request this Court affirm the decision of

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit.

October 21, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

RACHEL N. LOKKEN

Counsel of Record

LOUIS LOPEZ

WILLIAM ALVARADO RIVERA

AARP FOUNDATION

601 E STREET, NW

Washington, DC 20049

(202) 434-3392

rlokken@aarp.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.